Local 997, UAW

534 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Local 997, International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) and Saundra Whitton. Case 25-CA-4218 December 14, 1971 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND KENNEDY On September 22, 1971, Trial Examiner Max Rosenberg issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the Respon- dent filed a brief in support of the Trial Examiner's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the Trial Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner's rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the complaint be, and hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MAx ROSENBERG, Trial Examiner: With all parties represented, this proceeding was tried before me in Marion, Indiana, on June 30, 1971, on a complaint filed by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board and an answer filed thereto by Local 977, International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), herein called the Respondent.' The issues raised by the pleadings relate to whether Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by certain conduct to be detailed hereinafter. Briefs have been received from the General Counsel and Respondent, which have been duly considered. Upon the entire record made in this proceeding, including my observation of the witnesses who testified on the stand, I hereby make the following: i The complaint, which issued on April 30, 1971, is based on charges filed on March 23, 1971, and served on March 24, 1971. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 1. JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS Respondent is a labor organization chartered by and affiliated with the International Union, United Automo- bile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW). Subject to the provisions set forth in the constitution and laws of the International, Respondent is authorized to exercise the powers and privileges of a local union involving matters of general interest and welfare for its members. An integral part of a multistate labor organization comprising the International and affiliated local union, Respondent maintains an office and place of business in Marion, Indiana, where it engages in represent- ing approximately 3,000 employees for purposes of collective bargaining under a contract with an employer who is engaged in business operations both within and without the State of Indiana. During the annual period material to this proceeding, and in the course and conduct of its business operations, Respondent remitted per capita dues and taxes in excess of $75,000 directly to the International at its headquarters in Detroit, Michigan. During said period, the International received at its Detroit, Michigan, headquarters, per capita taxes in excess of $1 million which had ' been remitted to it across state lines directly from its various local member unions which are situated in and among the various States of the United States. The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Local Union # 1, Office and Professional Employees International Union,. AFL-CIO, herein called OPEIU, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by the following conduct: 5.(a) On or about October 29, 1970, the Respondent suspended the employment of Saundra Whitton, an employee at the Marion facility, and on or about November 2, 1970 converted the aforesaid suspension to a three day disciplinary suspension, because said ,employee threatened to file a grievance and to resort to the contractual grievance procedure, and because said employee engaged in other Union and protected concerted activities. (b) On or about November 16, 1970 the Respondent discharged JoEtta Miller, an employee at the Marion facility, and thereafter failed and refused to reinstate said employee except that on or about November 23, 1970 the Respondent rehired, but did not reinstate said employee. (c) The Respondent engaged in the discriminatory conduct alleged above in subparagraph (b) because of 194 NLRB No. 93 LOCAL 997, UAW Saundra Whitton's union and concerted activities described above in subparagraph 5(a), and for the purpose and as a result of implementing the discrimina- tory transfer of Saundra Whitton described below in subparagraph 5(d). (d) On or about November 16, 1970, the Respondent purported to eliminate the job heretofore performed by Saundra Whitton and transferred Saundra Whitton to a different job assignment, specifically to the job theretofore performed by JoEtta Miller, because Saundra Whitton engaged in the union and concerted activities described above in subparagraph 5(a). * * (e) Commencing on or about October 29, 1970 Respondent, by the acts and conduct alleged above in subparagraphs 5(b), (c) and (d), by other acts of harassment, including, but without limitation the acts described below, sought to induce the resignation of Saundra Whitton because of her union and concerted activity: (i) On or about November 21, 1970, refused to grant meritorious grievances of Saundra Whitton and JoEtta Miller unless Saundra Whitton agreed to resign her employment. (ii) On or about November 21, 1970 announced that JoEtta Miller's discharge was in retaliation for the Union and concerted activities of Saundra Whitton. (f) On or about November 21, 1970, Respondent constructively discharged Saundra Whitton and at all times since has failed and refused to reinstate or rehire said employee, because said employee engaged in union and concerted activities. For its part, Respondent denies the commission of any labor practices proscribed by the statute. It is undisputed and I find that, at all material times, Respondent represented a unit of employees at the General Motors Fisher Body plant in Marion, Indiana. To service its members, Respondent maintained an office in the city which it staffed with two secretaries, Saundra Whitton and Jo Etta Miller. Whitton, who was hired by Respondent in November 1964, served as the secretary to Ralph Brooks, the Fisher Body plant shop committee chairman. In the course of her normal duties, Whitton handled grievances and appeal cases. Miller, who was first employed in September 1966, acted as secretary to President James Dutton and Financial Secretary Chester Ward. She served as a receptionist' in the office and performed bookkeeping chores. Both Whitton and Miller were represented for purposes of collective bargaining with Respondent by the OPEIU and were covered by a labor agreement governing their terms and conditions of employment. Pursuant to this contract, Whitton, in 1966, and Whitton and Miller jointly, in 1968, grieved over Respondent's practice of assigning officials to perform unit work. Both employees received an adjustment in pay in settlement of the grievances. 'In September 1970,2 negotiations between representatives 2 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates hereinafter fall in 1970. 3 This section provides that "In the event of a decrease in volume of work to such an extent that a layoff of an employee is made necessary, the principle of seniority shall be applied providing that the employees who 535 of General Motors and officials of the Respondent and its International over a new contract broke down and a strike ensued at the Marion plant. In consequence of the strike, which terminated in early December, the secretarial workload doubled. This was occasioned by the fact that the girls were required to stencil and run off thousands' of copies of the tentative agreements which the parties had reached regarding the prospective contract. Around the middle of October, Shop Committee Chairman Brooks informed Whitton that Respondent intended to enlist the support of the members of his committee to assemble and distribute the tentative contract items to the membership of his union. Upon learning this, Whitton protested that it was unfair to the secretaries. This protest was apparently bottomed upon article IX, section 10, of the contract between the OPEIU and Respondent which recited that: Local 977, UAW, agrees that it shall not be the policy of the Local to allow supervisory officers or representa- tives of Local 977 to do work which will deprive OPEIU # 1 AFL-CIO employees of work or earnings. However, the section also related that "This provision can also be disregarded in the event of a prolonged strike." On October 29, Shop Committee Member Jim Basey approached Whitton and reported that he had been requested by President Dutton to appear on November 2 at Respondent's offices with the other committee members and assist in collating the approved contract clauses. Upset by this intelligence, Whitton proceeded to Dutton's office to verify Basey's statement. Whitton asked Dutton if it was true that the committee members would be utilized to assemble the contract and the latter responded in the affirmative. At this juncture, Dutton handed Whitton a letter, dated October 29, prepared by Miller and signed by Dutton, which read: Dear Mrs. Whitton: Due to a strike situation at the Fisher Body Plant in Marion it may be necessary to have a reduction in force of the employees at Local 977, U.A.W. This is in accordance with Article VI, Section 1, of the contract between Local 977, U.A.W. and OPEIU # 1 AFL-CIO .3 A similar letter was given to Miller on that day. Dutton assured both Whitton and Miller that the proffered written notice of possible layoff was contractually required and was "normal procedure" and advised them "not to worry about it " Dutton added that if Whitton "had any gripe to make" she should take it up"with Committee Chairman Brooks, her superior. Later that afternoon, Whitton visited the office of Brooks. She testified that, in the presence of Dutton, she asked Brooks what he thought about the letter which she handed to him. Brooks inquired as to who had given her the document and, when she replied that it was Dutton, Brooks asked "Well, then what's wrong?" Whitton protested that it was inequitable-for Respondent to lay off Whitton and Miller while at the same time it had enlisted the aid of its shop committee to perform the task of assembling the proposed contract. Brooks retorted that "it would thus be retained possess the qualifications and ability to perform the work available, and wherever practicable, said application shall be on an office-wide basis. Rehiring shall be on the basis of seniority, providing the employee can perform the available work." 536 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD was his office, he could do as he saw fit to do it." As the discussion became more heated, Brooks reminded Whitton that she had improperly typed a seniority agreement earlier that month. Whitton thereupon warned Brooks that, if Respondent actually utilized the shop committee members to fasten the contract pages, she would contact Frances Bick, chairman of the OPEIU bargaining committee, and file a grievance over the matter. According to Whitton, Brooks then inquired whether she was threatening to file a grievance against his contemplated action and she an- swered in the affirmative. Upon receiving her reply, Brooks shot back that Whitton was indefinitely suspended from her job. Initially, when asked whether Brooks had assigned any reason for her suspension, Whitton testified that he bottomed this personnel action on the ground that "I threatened a grievance." Pressed on this issue, Whitton then stated that Brooks "just said, after I had said that [the threat to file a grievance], that I was suspended until further notice, until I realized he ran this office." At this point, Fred Troxell, a member of Respondent's executive board, intervened and attempted to calm the disputants. Whitton was then instructed to leave the office. On November 1, Whitton filed a grievance with Bick in which the former charged Brooks "with unjust suspension on date October 29, 1970, also threatening me with replacement on my job. Demand therefore I be paid all monies and benefits lost." The following day, Whitton filed another grievance charging Brooks with "doing my work dunng my regular working hours and also on my lunch hour. Demand therefore I be paid all monies and benefits due me for this violation." On November 2, without apparently having seen Whitton's grievances, Brooks dispatched a letter to Whitton which read as follows: On Thursday, October 29, 1970 you were suspended at 4:00 p.m. You failed to perform the job assignments as you had been instructed to by your supervisor. You are hereby advised that a Balance of Shift plus three (3) days Disciplinary Layoff is being issued to you for your improper action. The Disciplinary Layoff will be for the Balance of Shift, Thursday, October 29, 1970 through Wednesday, November 4, 1970. You are to return to work on your regular shift Thursday, November 5, 1970. It should be noted that Friday, October 30 is not included in the disciplinary layoff because the employee was excused to attend a funeral service prior to the suspension. Because Whitton was ill, she did not return to work until November 9. When she reported for duty, she sought out Brooks and asked why he had indicated in his letter of November 2 that she had been suspended for failing to perform certain job assignments. Brooks replied that he had ordered her to prepare a seniority agreement as requested by an International representative and mail it to that official, a task which she had not executed. Brooks resumed her duties and, according to her testimony, working conditions had so deteriorated as to cause her "a tremendous strain and pressure." 4 Previously, Whitton and Miller took their 1-hour lunchbreak whenever they decided to do so. However, upon her return to work, Brooks instructed Whitton to take her break at noon although the duration remained the same. Whitton attributed another "change" in working conditions to the fact that Brooks told her to lock a "dutch" door which separated their office from the rest of the quarters. This entailed securing a slip lock which was located at the bottom of the door . Whitton explained that shop committee members and other individuals frequently sought admission to the office and this required that she open and close the lock on these occasions. However, she allowed as how "the shop committee members, or committeemen would come in for use of things. And he [Brooks ] would hear about this and get upset. Or maybe a few members would come in with the men. They weren't allowed in the office. And he would hear about it later and wouldn't like it very well." (Emphasis supplied) On November 16, Miller was laid off and she immediate- ly filed a grievance against the Respondent claiming that she had received inadequate notification of this employ- ment severance. On the same day, Whitton was transferred to Miller's position in President Dutton's office where she acted as a receptionist and did general office work . Whitton admitted that the transfer did not alter any of her existing wages or terms and conditions of employment . A few days after her assumption of the new position, Whitton stated that she had a conversation with Brooks in which "he told me at that time that the reason he had closed his office down was because he didn't feel we could work together and that things had to be straightened out before we could continue working in the office ." However, in the same conversation, Brooks related that "they would have to lay Jo Etta off to close down the chairman's office .because there wouldn't [be] enough work up front for two. And since the chairman's work wouldn't be done, well, it would just be general office work up front until the grievance meeting arrived." A meeting to discuss the grievances was held on November 21. In attendance were the two grievants, Frances Bick, their OPEIU representative, and Brooks and Dutton. The parties opened the parley by discussing the layoff of Miller. Miller took the position that her layoff on November 16 violated a provision in the existing contract which provided for a 2-week notice . Respondent claimed that the provision had been satisfied by its letter to Miller under date of October 29, and no settlement at this first stage was immediately reached. The parties then turned to the case of Whitton, with the Respondent contending that she had been suspended on October 29 for "personal" reasons and it refused to reimburse her for the period of her suspension. During the colloquy, and according to Whitton's testimony, President Dutton "made the state- ment that because of me another girl [Miller] was laid off for no reason at all except because they had to close the chairman's office and that the wrong girl had been laid off because after I was suspended they brought her back and she finished the work in one day, she did the work in one day that it took me two months to do." Dutton added that "they couldn't pay either Jo Etta or myself anything for the grievances, but if we would prefer to take it onto the second 4 Whitton also acknowledged that she experienced stress in her job had a history of "acute anxiety" as medically diagnosed during her because of the continuation of the strike. Indeed, Whitton unfortunately employment with Respondent. LOCAL 997, UAW step. They would not settle." At this juncture, the grievants requested a recess and met separately. In their solitude, Whitton of her own volition informed Bick and Miller,that the former would resign her job on the condition that Respondent reinstate Miller and pay both of the secretaries for any loss of wages suffered during the period of the suspension and layoff. In Whitton's words, she decided to resign because "It was the whole thing for the last two months. It was just everything. I just couldn't take it. The nerves and it was just making me nervous to have to work under that constant tension. And then laying Jo Etta off simply because of what was going on between Ralph Brooks and myself. It's just the constant little things that was being thrown at me." Whitton then added that "I would have quit no matter what after that day. With what was going on during the grievance I would have walked out no matter what." When the meeting reconvened, Whitton proffered her settlement proposal to Respondent's officials which, after further discussion, was accepted. Whitton handed in a written resignation and Brooks, in turn, gave her a letter of recommendation which recited that "Saundra Whitton is a good secretary. She is capable, qualified, and punctual. I would highly recommend her for any position you might have open." The parties stipulated and I find that, on November 27, Respondent hired another secretary to replace Whitton. In January 1971, Respondent conduct- ed a membership meeting at which the subject of Whitton's problems and resignation was reviewed, and she was invited to appear before the membership and present her side of the story. In March 1971, she filed unfair labor practice charges which triggered this litigation. Fred Troxell, a member of the Respondent's executive board, joined the heated discussion between Brooks and Whitton after it had commenced on October 29. He testified on behalf of the General Counsel that he appeared in the area of the dispute at a point when Whitton and Miller had been given their layoff notices. Whitton was in the process of protesting the layoffs, claiming that this action was unfair in light of the fact that Respondent intended to utilize members of its shop committee to perform the unit work of assembling the proposed contract between General Motors and Respondent. After unsuccess- fully attempting to still the troubled waters, Troxell overheard Whitton angrily inform Brooks that "You [Brooks ] give me no choice but to call my representative and write a grievance." Brooks retorted, "You're suspended as of now." When Whitton demanded an explanation for the discipline visited upon her, Brooks replied that "she wasn't carrying out her work assignment." The following day, the executive board met and the matter of Whitton's suspension became a topic of deliberation. Troxell argued against Brooks' personnel action and the latter repeated that the suspension was prompted by Whitton's unsatisfac- tory work performance and no mention was made of her threat to file a grievance against Respondent. Jo Etta Miller testimonially recounted that she had prepared the layoff notices on October 29 and that, on November 16, she was laid off and Whitton was retained. The predicate for her grievance was that she believed the October 29 notification became invalidated because the requisite 2-week notice provision in the unit contract had 537 expired. She recalled that she was present at the grievance meeting on November 21 in company with OPEIU Representative Bick, Whitton, Brooks, and Dutton. Miller's and Whitton's grievances were discussed seriatim. Miller sought backpay for the 5-day period of her layoff and Whitton requested compensation for her 3-day suspension. When Respondent's officials rejected this settlement proposal, Miller and her cohorts decided to caucus. Before they did so, Miller overheard President Dutton remark that "actually the wrong girl was being punished; that I was laid off, you know, because of she's [Whitton's] got higher seniority than I have." Dutton added that Miller "went back when she [Whitton] was suspended and I did the work in one day that it would take her to do in two weeks." During the settlement recess, Whitton voluntarily announced that she would resign her job because "she couldn't stand it any more" and that she would offer her resignation if Respondent would afford backpay to the girls. Although both Bick and Miller implored Whitton not to quit work, Whitton could not be dissuaded. Thereupon, the parties reconvened and Whitton made her announce- ment. After a short recess, Dutton and Brooks decided to accept Whitton's proposed settlement. Rounding out Miller's testimony, she acknowledged that, under her labor agreement, she, as the most junior secretary, would have been the first employee to be reached in a reduction in force. Miller also averred that, contrary to the allegations of the complaint, she was not "discharged" by Respondent on November 16 but was in layoff status; that she was recalled from layoff status on November 21 rather than refused reinstatement; and, that Respondent did not inform her that she was or had been severed from Respondent's employment rolls in order to punish Whitton because of the latter's concerted, protected activities. Frances Bick, the chairman of the bargaining committee for OPEIU, recalled the grievance meeting of November 21. Bick maintained, on behalf of her constituents, that the girls deserved backpay because the suspension of Whitton and the timing of Miller's layoff notice offended the existing contractual agreement. Dutton and Brooks ex- pressed the view that both personnel actions were privileged under the contract. Attention was then shifted to Whitton's complaint that her duties had become more onerous because she was required to lock the door to Brooks' office. According to Bick's undisputed testimony, Dutton and Brooks explained that they were in studied negotiations with General Motors during the strike and that "they were preparing proposal demands and that they wanted to pass these out at a membership meeting and that they were having trouble with all the members just walking in the office and helping themselves and that they wanted to have the door locked during this particular period so that ... the work could be done and so that these could be passed out at the membership meeting, which was to be held at a future date." It is also undisputed and I find that, during the session, Respondent's officials pointed out that the purpose for the layoff notices of October 29 was bottomed on Respondent's desire "to cut down on expenses because of the strike. . . . They said the strike was so long and it was costing the union money and the International 538 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD was running out of money. They were trying to cut corners." The meeting thereupon temporarily adjourned. During the respite, Whitton announced to Bick that "I don't want to work here any more. I'm going to resign." Bick essayed to impress upon Whitton the folly of such a venture, explaining that good positions such as Whitton occupied were difficult to obtain in the Marion area and pointing out that Whitton was the sole support of an infant. Despite this advice, Whitton replied, "No, Frances, I've been thinking about this for a long time. I want to quit. I'm going to quit anyway. And I dust don't want to work here." Whitton mentioned that her boyfriend was employed by a local insurance carrier and that he was in a position to secure employment for her. Bick once again sought to dissuade Whitton from tendering her resignation, pointing out that "as her rep' . . . I saw no reason for her to resign just because we hadn't won it [the grievance] at the first step or because we hadn't won it then. We hadn't even finished with the first step of the grievance procedure. Certainly we could have gone on." Whitton eschewed this counsel and the grievance committee reconvened. Whitton announced her decision to Dutton and Brooks. After consultation among Respondent's officials, they agreed to accept Whitton's resignation, recall Miller from layoff, and pay each girl the requisite amount of backpay. This agreement was reduced to writing, and the meeting terminated. If I understand the General Counsel correctly, his position appears to be that, on October 29, Respondent suspended Whitton because of her threat to file a grievance against it occasioned by her dissatisfaction over the potential layoff and the employment of nonunit personnel to perform her work; that, when she was recalled to her job on November 9, she was assigned more arduous duties to chasten her due to her threat; that, on November 16, Respondent "discharged" Miller and "refused to reinstate" her in order to punish Whitton for grieving; that, on November 16, Respondent eliminated the job which Whitton had held with Brooks and transferred her to the position previously occupied by the departed Miller; and, that, on November 21, Respondent "constructively dis- charged" Whitton in retaliation for the grievances she filed in early November. On my view of the evidence adduced in this proceeding, the General Counsel's position presents a portrait of sheer legal nonsense. It is undisputed and I have found that, in September, Respondent embarked upon a strike against General Motors which persisted until December. The work stoppage undeniably caused a financial drain upon the coffers not only of Respondent but its International as well and this, I find, was the sole reason for the issuance of the notices of possible layoff to Whitton and Miller on October 29. When Whitton learned that Respondent intended to utilize the services of its shop committee to assemble the agreed-upon aspects of its contract with General Motors, she became incensed and berated Brooks on this score. Brooks thereupon took Whitton to task for concededly having failed to fulfill her duties efficiently earlier that month 5 At the hearing, the General Counsel abandoned any contention that Whitton had been suspended because she was a persistent grievant. 6 1 would note that the General Counsel does not contend that when she neglected to collate and type a seniority agreement which an International representative had requested from Respondent's officials. After Brooks informed the excitable Whitton that "it was his office, he could do as he saw fit to do it," Whitton warned that she would file a grievance if Brooks implemented his plan to enlist the labors of his committee in performing the clerical tasks. Angered, Brooks stated that Whitton was immediate- ly suspended. At the outset of her testimony, Whitton averred that Brooks assigned her suspension to the fact that "I threatened a grievance." She later recounted that Brooks told her that, "I was suspended until further notice, until I realized he ran this office." Fred Troxell, who was present during this encounter, remembered that Whitton asked for the cause for her suspension and Brooks responded that "she wasn't carrying out her work assignment," a basis which Brooks reiterated at an executive board meeting the following day. In sum, I do not accept the General Counsel's assertion that Whitton was suspended by Brooks because she had chosen to grieve. I am fortified in this conclusion by the circumstance that Whitton had filed grievances on two previous occasions regarding the same subject and on each occasion the grievances were satisfactorily resolved in her favor without recrimination or punishment.5 However, assuming, arguendo, that I were to find that Whitton's temporary suspension was triggered by her threat to grieve and that the threat was statutorily privileged, I am not convinced that any remedial order would be warranted in this case. Following her return to work on November 9, Whitton claimed that she was subjected to more taxing terms and conditions of employment. The first of these related to Respondent's insistence that she and Miller take their lunches on repast at the noon hour. The second bore on Brooks' requirement that his office door be locked at all times. Both of these "changes" can be plausibly explained on the uncontroverted testimony adduced herein. Respon- dent's strike against General Motors had reached a crescendo. Agreement on tentative contract proposals between the economic combatants were flowing into Whitton's office. Committeemen and rank-and-file mem- bers were invading Brooks' office in numbers on conceded- ly unauthorized junkets. Viewing the totality of these circumstances, I conclude that it was reasonable for Respondent to ask the secretaries to conform their lunch hour to that prescribed by Brooks and to request that the door to his office be closed against unauthorized forays. Nor am I convinced that Miller's layoff on November 16 and Whitton's transfer to Miller's duties on that date was fraught with discriminatory overtones. The contract between Respondent and the OPEIU clearly provided that, in a reduction in force, the most junior employee should be laid off.6 Miller admittedly was the more jumor member of the staff. When Whitton was assigned to Miller's position in President Dutton's office, her wages and duties remained the same. Furthermore, I am not persuaded that Respondent "refused to grant meritorious grievances of Saundra Respondent's layoff notice of October 29 was prompted by statutorily proscribed considerations LOCAL 997, UAW 539 Whitton and Jo Etta Miller unless Saundra Whitton agreed to resign her employment" on November 21; that Respondent announced on that date that Miller's "discharge" was in retaliation for the concerted activities of Whitton; or, that Respondent "constructively discharged" Whitton on November 21. The recorded facts simply are to the contrary. Whitton, Miller, and Bick made it testimonial- ly clear that, during the grievance meeting on November 21, Whitton and Whitton alone volunteered to resign on that day if she could persuade Respondent to award backpay to her and Miller and to recall the later . Moreover, Miller's testimony belies any assertion that she , or anyone else, was informed by Respondent's officials that she had been laid off in order to punish Whitton for grieving. Furthermore, I perceive nothing Statutorily sinister in Dutton's statement that "the wrong girl was being punished ; that I [Miller ] was laid off . . . because of she's [Whitton's] got higher seniority than I have," in view of both Whitton's and Miller's testimony that Dutton added that Miller's production far exceeded that of Whitton. In sum, even were I to have found that Whitton was suspended because she threatened to grieve on October 29, the record establishes to my satisfaction that she was reimbursed for the 3-day period of her suspension; that none of Respondent's actions thereafter were designed to harass or punish her for making or fulfilling the threat, and that Whitton voluntarily quit her job and was not constructively discharged. I therefore find and conclude that the General Counsel has failed to sustain his burden of proof of any allegations listed in the complaint , and I shall recommend that it be dismissed in its entirety. RECOMMENDED ORDER It is hereby recommended that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety.