Franklin Equipment Co., Inc.

FRANKLIN EQUIPMENT CO., INC. 643 Franklin Equipment Company, Inc. and Laborers' District Council of Virginia, Production and Main- tenance Employees, Local Union 1138 affiliated with Laborers' International Union of North Ameri- ca, AFL-CIO. Case 5-CA-5138 Upon the entire record, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY December 20, 1972 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND KENNEDY On September 17, 1971, Trial Examiner Thomas A. Ricci issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a sup- porting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the Trial Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner's rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the Respondent, Franklin Equipment Company, Inc., Franklin, Virginia, its officers, agents, successors and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's recommended Order. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE THOMAS A. Ricci, Trial Examiner: A hearing in the above-entitled proceeding was held before the duly designated Trial Examiner on July 27, 1971, at Franklin, Virginia, on complaint of the General Counsel against Franklin Equipment Company, Inc., herein called the Respondent, or the Company. The charge was filed on April 15, 1971, and the complaint issued on June 17. The issue of the case is whether the evidence suffices to prove the complaint allegation that the Respondent refused to bargain with Laborers' District Council of Virginia, Production and Maintenance Employees' Local Union 1138, affiliated with Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO. Briefs were filed after the close of the hearing by the General Counsel and the Respondent. I As alleged in the complaint and admitted in the answer, I find that all production and maintenance employees employed by the Respondent at its Franklin, Virginia, plant, including service department employees, parts department employees, inventory, filing and warranty clerks, but excluding The Respondent, a State of Virginia corporation, has a plant in, Franklin, Virginia, where it is engaged in the manufacture of logging equipment. From this plant the Respondent receives goods valued in excess of $50,000 and ships merchandise valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside the State of Virginia. The complaint alleges, the Respondent admits, and I find that the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED I find that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of "the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Issue Presented This is a refusal-to-bargain case. The Union was certified by the Board as exclusive representative of the Respon- dent's production and maintenance employees on March 19, 1970, and the parties thereafter met a number of times in regular negotiating sessions.' At a last meeting on January 11, 1971, they reached complete agreement on all substantive terms of a collective-bargaining contract and decided the Union's attorney would prepare the appropri- ate draft and forward it to the Company for approval and signature. The contract was mailed out by the Union's attorney on February 2. It was followed by five letters to the Company's principal negotiator during the next 60 days, each inviting, and importuning the Respondent's representative to respond, to have the contract signed, to at least communicate with the Union. Throughout February and March there was only one communication from the Company to the Union. On March 2 its lawyer telephoned to say he was arranging to meet his clients, would call again, and intended to arrange a meeting for March 8. He did nothing about this and never called back. On April 5 he wrote, saying cryptically the document he had received.2 months earlier was "in no way final. "With the Union still pressing, on the 12th of April the Company wrote there could be no meeting until at least after April 21. On that same day, April 12, some of the employees filed a union decertification petition with the Board. Four days later the Respondent withdrew recognition from the Union on the ground it doubted its majority status. The complaint alleges that from February 2 and thereafter the Respondent literally refused to bargain with the employees' majority representative and thereby violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. In pertinent part, the Act reads: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of his professional employees, office clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Sec 9(b) of the Act 194 NLRB No. 110 644 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD employees," and defines bargaining as including the "mutual obligation ... to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith ...." It is also alleged that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5)' by its refusal to sign the collective-bargaming agreement fully negotiated and agreed upon. See Heinz v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 514. The Respondent justifies its delay in responding to the repeated requests from the Union on the general ground that certain officials of the Company were busy elsewhere, but primarily on the specific ground that its lawyer had too much to do for his other clients during the period of almost 2-1/2 months. The Respondent also denies there had been agreement on a contract and therefore contends there was nothing to sign at all. There is no significant evidentiary dispute as to the truly pertinent facts upon which the complaint rests. These go to the factual questions: (1) What is it that was agreed upon between the parties on January 11, 1971, and (2) what demands for meeting did the Union make thereafter and what did the Respondent do in response. B. Agreement on January 11, 1971 By January 11, 1971, there had, taken place upwards of 10 bargaining sessions. In November of 1970 Augustus Anninos, a lawyer, had taken over as principal spokesman for the Union in place of another lawyer in his firm who at the time left for other employment. He testified as to what took place on the 11th and also on January 5, the penultimate meeting. Robert Moss, the lawyer, who did the bargaining for the Company throughout together with company officers, and who also represented the Respon- dent at the hearing, spoke as sole witness for the defense, but offered no testimony at all about the January 5 and 1 I meetings. Anninos' testimony therefore stands completely uncontradicted on the record. He said that on January 5, in the presence of two union officers who accompanied him and two company officials who were also in attendance, he recapped what had gone on before to assure all parties understood one another. "I said, `Now, we agree on wages, we agree on the classifications, we agree on vacation pay, we agree on everything that we were in dispute.' He [Moss I said, `That is correct, but you don't have a contract because we never agreed to a checkoff.' I said, `Now, just to be sure,' and I repeated it. I said, `Now, the only thing that keeps us from signing an agreement with the Company is the fact that you will not agree to a checkoff, is that correct?' He says, 'That's right' I said, `Well, Mr. Moss, you have an agreement,' and I reached my hand out to shake his, `because the Union waives-the Union waives checkoff.' Anninos also testified that at an earlier meeting the Company had left it for the Union to decide what the duration of the contract would be, and that at this point on January 5-after it had been agreed all substantive matters were at rest-a question arose over the term. The Union asked a 1-year agreement, but the Company was uncertain. It was decided the parties would meet again on the 11th in Anninos' office. When the parties assembled there 1 week later the Company, pursuant to a request made in the interval, presented certain written data about the employee complement and plant rules. These were received in evidence without objection as General Counsel's Exhibit 5; they consist of: a listing of all employees together with hiring dates, classification and current wages, written company policies and practices concerning such matters as vacation rights, insurance benefits, retirement profit-shar- ing plan, work hours, timeclock procedures, rules of personal conduct and such things, and, posted notices pertaining to absenteeism, shift hours and National Guard duty privileges. Anninos said that after the Union agents had looked over these papers and found them in order, it was agreed they would become part of the agreement, incorporated in some fashion into the contract itself-"to be attached to the agreement." With this, still according to Anninos, it was also agreed he would draw up the contract, incorporate all that had been decided, and send it to Moss. To record the final understanding Anninos dictated the arrangement to his secretary, in everybody's presence. He then asked had he stated it all correctly, and both Moss and Mr. Owen, the company vice president, said it was. Anninos sent the draft to Moss on February 2, with a covering letter that mentioned three items he had added to the agreement. The typewritten contract Anninos sent Moss that day was received in evidence as General Counsel's Exhibit 4; it is 23 pages long and covers virtually all the substantive conditions ordinarily found in collective-bargaining agree- ments, including management right clauses, grievance procedure, steward privileges, seniority, hours of work, job classifications, a complete and very detailed schedule of wage rates, holidays, vacations, health and welfare, leave of absence, profit sharing, and other such matters. If four items, or phrases, added to this document although not agreed upon in advance-three mentioned by Anninos in his letter of February 2 and discussed by both lawyers at the hearing, and one brought up by Moss as a witness and not disputed by Anninos-be held in abeyance for later consideration here, it must be found that the comprehensive written agreement sent to the Respondent for its signature in fact represents a fully negotiated and agreed upon contract. As stated above, Moss, the only witness for the defense, denied none of Anninos' testimony about the January 5 and 11 meetings, showing clearly that all issues had been resolved by them. Moss had the contract for many months before the hearing, and despite the fact his principal defense rests upon assertion this was not the agreed-upon contract, he pointed to nothing but the four items mentioned. Indeed, it is clear every clause, however minute, did conform with the understanding of the parties, for Moss was able to say at precisely what word a certain paragraph was supposed to end, but did not because Anninos. had added a singlewsentence at that point. I find that the contract received by the Respondent on February 4, 1971, except for the four items, had been fully negotiated and agreed upon. This is what is received as General Counsel's Exhibit 4. The parties had also agreed that what is here received as General Counsel's Exhibit 5, consisting of a number of printed or typewritten sheets, would become part of their agreement, whether physically attached to the contract or incorporated by reference. FRANKLIN EQUIPMENT CO., INC. 645 C. Bargaining Requests,- Company Refusal What the Respondent, or its agent, did in response to union requests for meetings or signature on the contract is factually clear and not disputed. All that Moss did at the hearing was press his, or the Respondent's, explanations of why the Respondent acted as it did. A purpose will nevertheless be served by setting but the correspondence itself, for a more detailed picture will serve to shed light on the perhaps more important question whether the Respon- dent should be ordered to sign the contract as negotiated. With the contract draft-General Counsel's Exhibit 4-went the following letter from Lawyer Anninos to Lawyer Moss. February 2, 1971 Enclosed is a copy of the proposed agreement as we discussed. The changes that probably were not discussed between us are as follows: 1. In Article XII at the end of paragraph B, we have added the last sentence. 2. In Article XIX there has been inserted at the bottom of Page 21 the last sentence. 3. Article XXI Please let us hear from you as soon as you have had a change to review the agreement with your clients. cc: R. E. Owens [The Company Vice President] Next letter: February 16, 1971 I would like to hear from you at your earliest convenience concerning when we can meet to sign the contract. cc: R. E. Owens Again: February 26, 1971 Please let me hear from you concerning the execution of the agreement reached between Franklin Equipment Company and the Union. Anninos also testified he telephoned Moss' office, was referred to a out-of-town hotel where Moss was staying, left word for him to call back , but did not succeed in speaking with him. Finally, on March 2 Moss telephoned Anninos, said he was meeting with his clients on the 4th, and would arrange for a meeting with the Union the following week, March 8 sometime . Moss never did this, and his only explanation at the hearing was that "unfortunately" the company officials he wanted to consult were not "all" there when he visited the plant in Franklin, and thereafter his interest in other clients made it impossible for him to "coordinate" with this one client before April, 1. Left hanging by Moss' phone call on March 2, Anninos pressed with another letter to the lawyer. March 18, 1971 I have been put in a very embarrassing position since I have notified Mr. Radford that you were meeting with your clients two weeks ago. Please let me hear from you promptly as to when we can meet to sign the contract. Again, Anninos to Moss: March 31, 1971 Unless we meet to sign the agreement reached between the parties hereto within the next seven (7) days, we will have no other choice but to file an unfair labor practice charge with the appropriate governmen- tal agency. We sincerely hope that we will not have to do so after many, many months of conferring in an effort to reach the agreement. I would appreciate your calling me on Monday, April 5th, so that we may agree on a time. cc: Mr. Robert E. Owens On April 5 Moss for the first time claimed the contract draft was improper : Letter from Moss to Anninos: April 5, 1971 The document you sent me is in no way final. I suggest we schedule an early meeting for further negotiations. Although put out by this late suggestion that bargaining must begin all over again, Anninos nevertheless asked for a meeting: April 6, 1971 I don't know how to interpret your letter of April 5, 1971. However, we will give it one last try and, in this connection, please be advised that I am available to meet with you and your clients in my office on April 13, in the afternoon of April 14, April 15, in the afternoon of April 19. Moss continued to put off Moss to Anninos: April 12, 1971 any possible meeting; letter In reply to your letter of April 6, 1971 , 1 shall be in grievance sessions and negotiation `meetings through April 21st. Please suggest some date subsequent to that in which we may meet. It was on April 12 that employees of the Company filed an election request with the Board to unseat the Union as bargaining agent. Such petitions must be supported by the requisite signatures of employees, usually some form of petition. Moss said he knew of such a petition "in April." He must had known about it before the 12th; and he must had learned of its existence from the company officials, for Moss' office is in Richmond, perhaps 100 miles from Franklin. Apparently, there was enough "coordination" between lawyer and client for this purpose. Moss' next letter to the Union came on April 16, withdrawing recognition. Analysis and Conclusion I find that the Respondent refused to meet with the Union, and to bargain, on request, as the statute requires, and thereby violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. The main thrust of the defense is that the lawyerwas too busy with his other office work to do the bargaining for the Company. It is not a defense available to an employer that its chosen representative had no time available to discharge this-one statutory duty. Insulation Fabricators, Inc., 144 NLRB 1325, enfd. 388 F.2d 1002 (C.A. 4). The duty to bargain rests upon the employer and not upon its agent , and the Board has long held that an employer may not divest itself of the legal obligation by shifting the responsibility to its agent. See Village Rambler Sales, Inc., 174 NLRB No. 43. No charge of wrong doing has been leveled at the lawyer; he is 646 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD neither a respondent nor a party. "The right of employees to engage in collective bargaining cannot await the personal convenience of any particular representative, whether hired by employer or labor organization." Woody Pontiac Sales, Inc., 174 NLRB No. 81. Even assuming, contrary to the fact, that there was a serious departure between whatever had been agreed upon and the contract draft received from Ammnos, this fact would not excuse the Respondent's refusal even to respond to the repeated requests for some kind of meeting. Anninos' letters did ask the Company to sign, but they also, after a while, requested that the parties meet and talk about whatever might be in the Company's mind. Moss knew, when he received the contract, that there were some changes. The accompanying letter told him so, and he admitted reading the document and seeing for himself. It will not do for an employer, 2 months later, to interpose such a belated contention between itself and so long a deliberate failure to communicate with the bargaining agent at all. There is no reason for doubting Moss' word that he had nothing to do with the decertification petition among the employees, and there is no evidence proving the Company was responsible for its creation. But Moss said he did know of the Board's 1-year certification rule, Ray Brooks v. N.L.R. B., 348 U.S. 96, and therefore the suspicion that the long delay was in fact occasioned by at least the hope of such an eventuality is not entirely unwarranted. In view of its refusal to bargain with the Union as the statute dictates, the Respondent must be ordered to bargain now on request. In his contract draft-General Counsel's Exhibit 4-Anninos added 4 items which had not been specifically agreed upon. They are as follows: 1. Article XII contains three paragraphs respecting vacation privileges. At the end of one paragraph Anninos added: "The employer agrees to pay the vacation pay when the vacation begins." On reading the documents given him on January 11 by the Company concerning existing conditions at the plant, Annmos first learned that with respect to National Guard duty the Company pays for such absences in advance, and he therefore thought it reasonable to suggest like advance payments for vacations. The question precisely had not arisen during the bargaining sessions. 2. Article XIX of the contract sets out a detailed understanding about the Profit Sharing Plan the Company had been making available to the employees. At the end of the Article Anninos added the following clause: "The Company agrees to keep this profit sharing plan, as described in the attached `Exhibit A,' in full force and effect." 3. During the negotiations the parties had talked about certain employees who were in laid off status. They could not agree as to what recall rights, if any such employees would have. In his draft Anninos added an article XXI: "It is specifically understood between the parties to this Agreement that all laid off employees who were laid off by the Company for economic reasons between March 19, 1970 and the date of the signing of this Agreement shall have their rights interpreted as construed by the National Labor Relations Board insofar as recall back to the Company for employment is concerned." 4. A last change added by Anninos, never mentioned by anyone before the hearing, is a clause providing "the parties shall initiate negotiation no later than fifty (50) days prior to the anniversary date." These are the "changes" in the overall settlement that moved Moss to tell the Union, in his letter of April 5, that the contract was "in no way final," and to, contend, at the hearing, that Anninos' draft "put us [Company and Union I right back where we would've been in the bargaining sessions." In the total circumstances shown on this record, it must be held that all four of the language changes together did not amount to such deviations from the settlement reached as to warrant saying there was no contract ready to be signed. This conclusion rests in part upon what the insertions in fact provide and in part upon the Respondent's indicated indifference to them. Vacations had been agreed upon in detail, but nothing had been said as to when payment for vacation time would be made. The plant rules which the Company placed in Anninos' hands on January 11 stated that if a man chose to use his vacation time to do National Guard duty, he would be paid for the vacation in advance. For Anninos to add that 'advance payment would also be made for regular vacation was the minutest of details indeed. The profit- sharing plan had also been discussed and agreed upon, with express provision that the amount of contributions to be made would be in "such amount as the Board of Directors shall deem advisable." When Anninos added that the plan should not be changed during the contract year he added nothing significant to the agreement. Clearly, the Company would still be free to add no more than the directors saw fit, possibly even nothing, throughout the year. Moreover, any change the Company might make during the life of the contract would be a violation of the Statute in any event, for an employer is not free, without bargaining with the majority representative, to alter agreed-upon conditions of employment unilaterally. Fibreboard Paper Products v. N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 203. Again, therefore, while the inserted phrase spoke of a matter not mentioned during the bargaining, it can hardly be called a contract proposal such as could possibly justify the contention that all matters were thereby reopened for consideration anew. As to the idea that laid-off employees would be free to turn to the Labor Board for vindication of any real or fancied statutory rights, this too was no more than restatement of what they already were privileged to do, contract or no contract. Certainly the employer has a right to insist there be no such language in the collective- bargaining agreement it signs. It is quite another matter to say the Union was thereby proposing something of substance that bore such a relationship to the economic elements of the agreement as to require relative reappraisal of all subjects so as to weigh each and every one against all others. Of greater significance in this case is the fact Moss himself did not consider these insertions matters of real moment. Had they truly altered the substance of the settlement he admitted on January 11 to have been finalized, he would for the least quickly so have advised FRANKLIN EQUIPMENT CO., INC. Anninos. Moss admitted he noticed the changes when he received the draft. And when, a month later, he did telephone the Union's lawyer, it was only to hold him off with a promise to gather his clients the following week. No mention then of the necessity for discussing substantive matters with the Union. It was only on April 5, when, it is fair to infer, the decertification petition had become a reality, that he first questioned the finality of the draft. But even at that late date he still made no reference to the items Anninos himself had pinpointed in his letter 2 months earlier. And finally, that Moss strained at the hearing to elevate these miniscule matters to major importance, is strongly indicated by his testimony about a fifth alleged change he accused Anninos of making in his draft agreement. Moss testified the draft contained "a great deal of verbiage which was sent out in the personnel book which I had agreed to incorporate by a reference. I found that counsel had taken this and put it in the contract." He was speaking about a portion of the plant rules which he himself had given the Union for the purpose of making them in one way or another part of the agreement. In the end it was not clear how Moss wanted the personnel rules to be part of the contract, by physical stapling, by word reference, or what. This is hardly the sort of good faith approach to collective bargaining dictated by the statute. I am satisfied the Respondent well knew the Union's draft received in the mail correctly reflected the agreement reached. Anninos' suggestion, in his covering letter of February 2, that the Company "review the agreement," referred to the phraseology used, the usual courtesy owed to another lawyer, and Moss so understood it. I find the Respondent refused to sign the agreement, in complete reversal of its commitment, and thereby violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. On April 12, 1971, a decertification petition was filed by some of the employees in the bargaining unit, and on April 16 the Respondent wrote to the Union advising that because the decertification petition had been filed, the Respondent had "good reason to doubt" the Union's majority representative status. This was unequivocal announcement of intention no longer to recognize the Union as bargaining agent or to negotiate with it in any manner thereafter. I find that by such withdrawal of recognition the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. The literal refusal to meet on request had been going on for 2 months, and the refusal to sign the agreed-upon contract had already occurred. In the circumstances, the fact that employees thereafter filed a decertification petition cannot serve either as objective ground for a reasonable doubt, or as justification for a deliberate refusal to bargain. Brooks v. N.L.R.B, 348 U.S. 96; United States Gypsum Co., 157 NLRB 652; Franks Brothers v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 702. IV. THE REMEDY An adequate remedy for the unfair labor practices committed requires restoration of the status quo. The Z General Asbestos & Rubber, 183 NLRB No. 27 3 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and Recommended Order herein 647 Respondent must therefore be ordered to recognize the Union as exclusive representative of its production and maintenance employees and to bargain with it on request with respect to whatever matters normally arise in the collective-bargaining relationship. The Respondent must also be ordered to sign the contract agreed upon on January 11, 197 1, with effective date February 4, 1971, This means signing and being bound by the document received in evidence as General Counsel's Exhibit 4, after deletion of the following four phrases detailed and discussed above: (1) the last sentence in paragraph B of article XII; (2) the last sentence in article XIX; (3) article XXI; and (4) the phrase in article XXII: "Thereupon, the parties shall initiate negotiations no later than fifty (50) days prior to the anniversary date." As to the employee status data and plant rules, consisting precisely of what was received as General Counsel's Exhibit 5, they shall be made part of the contract by physical attachment and incorporation by word reference. A no less important element of the appropriate remedy shall be that the Respondent must retroactively make whole all of the employees included in the bargaining unit for any economic benefits they would have enjoyed under the terms of the contract from February 4, 1971, on.2 Exact effectuation of this aspect of the order is left to the compliance stage of this proceeding. The unfair labor practices found are of such a nature as to require an order that the Respondent be enjoined from hereafter violating the proscriptions of the Act in any other manner. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent and the Union are, respectively, employer and labor organization within the meaning of the Act. 2. The Union is, and has at all material times herein been the exclusive majority representative of all employees in the production and maintenance unit at the Respon- dent's Franklin, Virginia, plant. 3. By refusing, on February 2, 1971 and thereafter, to meet with the Union upon request, by refusing to execute the collective-bargaining agreement negotiated with the Union effective for the term of 1 year, and by withdrawing recognition from the Union on April 16, 1971, the Respondent has refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the collective-bargaining representative of its employees in the aforesaid unit, and has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act, and thereby engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law and the entire record and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: 3 shall, as provided in Sec. 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 648 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ORDER The Respondent, Franklin Equipment Corporation, Inc., Franklin, Virginia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Failing and refusing, upon request, to meet and bargain with Laborers' District Council of Virginia, Production and Maintenance Employees ' Local Union 1138, affiliated with Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO. (b) Failing and refusing, upon request, to sign and give effect retroactively to February 4, 1971, the agreement reached with the Union. (c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights to self- organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment. (b) Upon request, sign the collective-bargaining agree- ment fully negotiated and agreed upon on January 11, 1971, in the manner set forth in the section herein entitled "The Remedy." (c) Make whole all employees for any loss suffered by reason of its failure to sign and comply with the aforesaid agreement on February 4, 1971, retroactive to that date. (d) Post at its plant in Franklin, Virginia, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 4 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 5, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of the Respondent, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 5, in writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.5 4 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an'Order of the National Labor Relations Board " 5 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify the Regional Director for Region 5, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a full trial in which both sides had the opportunity to present their evidence the National Labor Relations Board has found that we, Franklin Equipment Company, Inc., violated the National Labor Relations Act, and ordered us to post this notice. We therefore notify you that: WE WILL NOT refuse to meet and to bargain with Laborers' District Council of Virginia, Production and Maintenance Employees' Local Union 1138, affiliated with Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative of the following employees: All production and maintenance employees in our Franklin, Virginia plant, including service depart- ment employees, parts department employees, inventory, filing and warranty clerks, but exclud- ing professional employees, office clerical em- ployees, guards and,supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT refuse to sign and execute any collective-bargaining agreement fully negotiated and agreed upon with this Union. WE WILL, upon request, sign and execute the collective bargaining agreement fully negotiated be- tween us and this Union on January 11, 1971. WE WILL make whole all employees in the unit described above for any loss suffered by reason of our failure to sign and comply with the aforesaid agreement on February 4, 1971, retroactive to that date. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist' any labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities. FRANKLIN EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Federal Building, Room 1019, Charles Center, Baltimore, Maryland 21201, Telephone 301-962-2822.