McGraw-Edison Co.

462 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Speed Queen, a Division of McGraw-Edison Co. and United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO. Case 26-CA-3920 February 18, 1972 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS Upon a charge filed on February 12, 1971, by United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, and duly served on Speed Queen, a division of McGraw-Edison Co., herein called the Respondent, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, by the Regional Director for Region 26, issued a complaint on September 3, 1971, against Respondent, alleging that Respondent had engaged in and was en- gaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. Copies of the charge, complaint, and notice of hearing before a Trial Examiner were duly served on the parties to this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed its answer to the complaint admitting in part, and denying in part, the allegations in the complaint. On October 4, 1971, counsel for the General Counsel filed directly with the Board a Motion for Summary Judgment. On October 12, 1971, the Respondent filed Respondent's Opposition to General Counsel's Motion for Summary Judgment. Subsequently, on October 13, 1971, the Board issued an order transferring the pro- ceeding to the Board and a Notice To Show Cause why the General Counsel's Motion for Summary Judgment should not be granted. Respondent thereafter filed a response to Notice To Show Cause. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. On the basis of the entire record, the Board makes the following: FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Respondent is a corporation with an office and plant in Searcy, Arkansas, where it is engaged in the manu- facture of washers and dryers. During the past 12 months the Respondent received at its Searcy, Arkan- sas, location goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of Ar- kansas. During the same period Respondent sold and shipped from its Searcy, Arkansas, plant goods and 195 NLRB No. 84 materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points located outside the State of Arkansas. We find, on the basis of the foregoing, that Respond- ent is, and has been at all times material herein, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and that it will effectu- ate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, is a la- bor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES In a prior unfair labor practice proceeding involving the parties to this proceeding,' the Trial Examiner found that Respondent had engaged in certain unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act and recommended that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to remedy the violations. Soon after, Re- spondent received notification of the Trial Examiner's findings and recommendations, but before the Board issued its Decision and Order adopting the Trial Ex- aminer's Decision, Respondent posted the notice which is the subject of the instant proceeding. The complaint herein alleges, in material part, that on or about January 20, 1971, Respondent posted a notice on its bulletin board in the lunchroom of its Searcy, Arkansas, plant which read as follows: Notice to All Employees The Company has recently received notification from the N.L.R.B. Trial Examiner that he has recommended to the labor Board in Washington, D. C. that in his opinion the Company committed unfair labor practices when it discharged former employee Billy Nixon for his repeated failure to wear safety glasses while on the job and in showing the employees a movie about an actual union strike at another plant, among other things. The Trial Examiner's decision comes as no sur- prise to the Company. It is well known that the Labor Board and its Trial Examiners are pro- union and one-sided. This is why Unions always file a bunch of unfair labor charges with the Labor Board when they are trying to organize the em- ployees in a plant. They use this as a "smoke- screen" to get your attention off the real issue- which is-that only the Company can make changes in its employees' wages, benefits, and working conditions and, Unions cannot force ' Speed Queen, a Division ofMcGraw-Edison Co., 192 NLRB No. 142. SPEED QUEEN 463 companies to do things which are not in the best interest of the Company or its employees. Their only weapon is to try to drive a wedge between the Company and its employees , to set employee against employee through the filing of false charges and then try to take advantage of the bad feelings they have produced. We don't have to let this happen at Speed Queen. Don't let anyone do your thinking for you or mislead you into thinking that a Union can prevent any company from disciplinging an em- ployee who breaks plant rules. In the meantime, you may be assured that the Company intends to appeal the Trial Examiner's opinion eventually to a federal appeals court, if necessary, in order to get a fair ruling on the Billy Nixon case. We will continue to keep you in- formed as to the facts of the matter. ROLAND SPRINGSTROH, PLANT MANAGER It is the position of the General Counsel that the posting of this notice, without more, amounted to an unlawful threat of discipline or discharge in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Respondent contends that its notice to employees was protected free speech under the first amendment of the United States Constitution and Section 8(c) of the Act. We find merit in this con- tention. While the notice is derogatory of the Board, it contains no threat and is not, in and of itself violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.' The allegations of the complaint that the posting of this notice was unlawful then cannot be sustained. We therefore deny the Gen- eral Counsel's Motion for Summary Judgment inas- much as the complaint on its face does not allege con- duct unlawful under the Act, and we shall, dismiss the complaint in its entirety. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re- lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. The Brearley Company, 163 NLRB 637, 638, fn 1, relied on by the General Counsel, is not in point. There, the Board did not find that a letter which the respondent circulated to its employees informing them of a Trial Examiner's adverse decision was, per se, unlawful. There, the Board deter- mined only that, in a context of unfair labor practices found therein, the remedy should include provisions neutralizing the effects of the respond- ent's letter