Cayuga Crushed Stone, Inc.

CAYUGA CRUSHED STONE, INC. 543 Cayuga Crushed Stone, Inc. and International Union of Operating Engineers Local No. 545; Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers Local No. 65 affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. Case 3-CA-4494 to bargain with the Unions in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.' Upon the entire record and from my observation of the witnesses I make the following' FINDINGS OF FACTS I THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT February 23, 1972 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS On November 12, 1971, Trial Examiner Thomas A. Ricci issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions and a sup- porting- brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the Trial Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner's rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt his recom- mended Order.' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re- lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the Re- spondent, Cayuga Crushed Stone, Inc., South Lansing, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's recommended Order. ' In affirming the Trial Examiner's finding of an 8(a)(5) violation, we rely solely upon Respondent's withdrawal of voluntary recognition before a reasonable period of bargaining had taken place (see Kimbrough Trucking Co., 160 NLRB 954, 957-958), .and upon the Trial Examiner's alternative finding that, in any event, Respondent had insufficient objective evidence upon which it could question the Union's representative status TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE THOMAS A. Ricci, Trial Examiner; A hearing in the above-entitled proceeding was held before the duly desig- nated Trial Examiner on October 5, 1971, at Ithaca, New York, on complaint of the General Counsel against Cayuga Crushed Stone, Inc., herein called the Respondent or the Company. The complaint issued on August 10, 1971, on a charge filed on June 11, 1971, jointly by International Union of Operating Engineers, Local Union No. 545, herein called the Operating Engineers, and Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Ware- housemen and Helpers Local Union No. 65, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, herein called the Teamsters. The sole issue is whether the Respondent refused 195 NLRB No. 108 The Respondent is a New York corporation engaged in the quarrying, crushing, and nonretail selling of crushed stone, with its principal place of business in South Lansing, New York. It wasnot shown to make direct out-of-state sales, but jurisdiction is predicated upon its sales, within the State, to purchasers who are themselves' engaged in direct interstate commerce to an extent sufficient to satisfy the Board's juris- dictional standards. The Respondent's customers, said to do an interstate business, are Lane Construction Corporation, of Meriden, Connecticut, and the State of New York. Two let- ters, dated August 6 and September 7, 1971, from Lane to the Board's Regional Office in Buffalo, state that that company is engaged in constructing a road in the State of New York, and for that purpose purchased materials "in excess of $50,- 000 per year." Moreover, the Board has asserted jurisdiction over the Lane Company in 138 NLRB 1118. As to the State bf New York, a document received in evidence, issued by the office of General Services, Standards and Purchases of the State, shows that under a single contract for the period Au- gust 1970 to May 1971 it purchased mineral crushed rock for use in the State from a Pennsylvania concern, valued far in excess of $50,000. The General Counsel, the Respondent, and the Charging Parties stipulated that the Respondent made the following sales of crushed stone to Lane and the State of New York: For the period August 1, 1970, to July 31, 1971, $326.20 to Lane and $15,848.90 to New York State. For the calendar year 1970, $31,918.40 to Lane and $20,121.01 to New York State. As originally drawn the complaint based jurisdiction upon the indirect sales made "during the past 12 months," meaning August 1970 to August 1971, for the complaint is dated August 10, 1971. At the hearing the General Counsel moved to amend the complaint to make the jurisdiction allegation read "during the calendar year 1970" instead. The motion was granted over the Respondent's opposition. The Respond- ent contends that the complaint must be dismissed because its indirect outflow sales during the most recent 12-month period preceding issuance of the complaint fails to satisfy the Board's jurisdictional standards. In Aroostook Federation of Farmers, 114 NLRB 538, the Board said it would assert jurisdiction relying "on the experience of an employer during the most recent calendar or fiscal year, or the 12-month period immediately preceding the hearing before the Board, where such experience was available." What is presented is a question of policy. The quoted lan- guage from Aroostook is ambiguous. It can be read to mean that if commerce data for any one, or for all of three different 12-month periods is available-last calendar year, last fiscal year or 12-months preceding the hearing-and any one of them satisfies the established standards, the Board will exer- cise its jurisdiction. Or, it can be taken to mean that if the data is availablefor more than one of the three 12-month periods, the data reflected for the most recent 12-month period availa- ble will be determinative, without regard to what any earlier 12-month period may show. The matter seems to have been put at rest, in Jos. McSweeney, 119 NLRB 1399. I therefore A typographical error in the transcript on p. 79, 1 25, is hereby cor- rected to change the word "Steamfitters" to "Teamsters " 544 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD find that the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to exercise jurisdiction herein. II THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED I find that International Union of Operating Engineers, Local Union No. 5451 and Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Ware- housemen and Helpers Local Union No. 65, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware- housemen and Helpers of America, are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Issue This is a refusal-to-bargain case. The two unions, Operat- ing Engineers Local 545 and Teamsters Local 65, jointly organized the Company's employees at the end of March 1971, and demanded recognition on the basis of signed au- thorization cards. The Respondent conceded the majority status and signed a written recognition agreement early in April. Three bargaining sessions followed-on April 12 and 29 and May 18. Before the next planned meeting the Re- spondent withdrew recognition and refused to meet further. The complaint alleges this was a refusal to bargain within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. The Company defends on the ground that towards the end of May it learned there had been a change of heart by the employees and that there- fore it had a right to change its position and put the Unions to the test of an election. The General Counsel asks that the Company be ordered to bargain with the Unions now. B. Appropriate Bargaining Unit and Majority Status The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that all employees of the Respondent at its Portland Point, South Lansing, plant excluding all office clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act constitute a unit appro- priate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. At the hearing the parties stipulated that during the payroll period ending March 31, 1971, there were 13 employees in- cluded within this bargaining unit; an exhibit listing their names was received in evidence. On March 29, 1971, seven of these employees signed au- thorization cards in favor of the Operating Engineers; the cards were received in evidence without objection. In perti- nent part they read as follows: I hereby designate the INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS Local Union No. 545 to represent me for the purpose of collective bargaining and in any and all other situations that may arise under the operation of the National Labor Relations Act and- /or with any individual employer where the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act are not invoked. On March 30 two other employees signed union cards, Donald Rogers also in favor of the Operating Engineers, and Orrin Warner in favor of Teamsters, Local 65. The last card reads as follows: I hereby designate the Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware- housemen, Helpers and Inside Plant Workers Local Union No. 65, Ithaca, Cortland, Hornell, N.Y. & Vicinity through its authorized agents, as my representa- tive for collective bargaining. C. Demand, Recognition, and Bargaining On behalf of the Unions a lawyer wrote a letter to the Company on March 30, asserting majority representative status, requesting recognition for bargaining purposes, and offering to "submit to a card check of union authorization cards." As suggested in the lawyer's letter, General Manager Herman Besemer, of the Respondent, then telephoned Busi- ness Representative Fay Chapman of the Operating Engi- neers, and arranged for a meeting. Accompanied by Law- rence Small, Teamsters business representative, Chapman met with Besemer in his office on April 6 or 7. When the union agents spoke of recognition, Besemer asked to see their authorization cards. Small answered he would only show them to a judge or a clergyman "to check in [sic] the validity of the cards." This according to Small as a witness. As Besemer recalled it, Small did not offer to have the cards examined by anyone. Besemer continued to testify that when the union agents told him the employees wanted a union, "I thought, if they want it, no use of fighting it," and agreed to recognize the Unions as a bargaining agent . It was also agreed a recognition document would be prepared; Small did this, and Chapman, on April 9, brought it to Besemer for signa- ture. In Besemer's office Chapman and Besemer also signed the agreement. It reads as follows: LETTER OF RECOGNITION It is hereby agreed between Herman D. Besemer for and on the behalf of Cayuga Crushed Stone, Inc. located on Portland Point Road, Lansing, New York and Fay Chapman for and on the behalf of the International Union of Operating Engineers Local # 545, and Law- rence Small for and on the behalf of Chauffeurs, Team- sters, Warehousemen and Helpers Union Local # 65, that the said Company will recognize the said Unions as the collective bargaining agents of all the employees of said Company, exclusive of office clerical employees, guards, supervisory personnel as defined under the Act. It is further agreed that the Company and the Unions will immediately within reason commence to meet for the purpose of negotiating a collective bargaining agree- ment. Between the lawyer's demand letter and the April 9 signing of the recognition agreement, the Unions had filed a joint petition with the Board requesting an election ; it is dated April 5. Besemer had already, received notification of this petition from the Board, together with the usual copies of a Notice to Employees for posting in the work areas. After agreeing to recognize the Unions he`told Chapman "to cancel it out ... because he had already signed the letter of recogni- tion." The Unions withdrew the petition and on the 15th the Board's Regional Office informed, the Respondent of the fact. Chapman met with Besemer in his office on April 12 and the two spent "a couple" of hours talking. Two subjects occupied most of the time, the Union's welfare and pension plan and job classification. A union contract demand would have been contributions, based upon hours worked, by the employer into the plan. On the question of job classification it seems the Respondent has differing wage rates for em- ployees working on the same machine, or doing the same work, and also, in some instances, pays the same scale to employees operating different kinds of machines. Chapman explained the Operating Engineers concept of job classifica- tion, distinguishing one piece of equipment from another, with applicable diverse rates of pay. No decisions were reached and it was decided to meet again. CAYUGA CRUSHED STONE, INC. 545 They did so on April 29, again in Besemer's office; now they were together about 4 hours, and again the major issue was the matter of job classification and relative or pertinent wage rates. According to Chapman: We discussed what he was paying the men then that would fall into those classifications. Like, he had three men that were shovel operators and he was paying them all three, a different rate. And we were trying to figure out a rate that would be satisfactory to him and the men to balance it out. The one, rate for that classification instead of three rates for the same classification. Matters remained open and another meeting was set for May 18. This time Small, of the Teamsters, was also present. The Unions presented a proposed comprehensive written con- tract, 16 pages of print, and containing the usual terms and conditions of collective-bargaining agreements. Three to 3Y, hours were devoted to discussing the various items. After all the talk, all that was settled was a minor question of how overtime work should be assigned. Again it was agreed to meet later, possibly in the office of a Mr. Cartwright, of the Local Builders Association. All the foregoing concerning these meetings was related by Chapman and Small as witnesses. Besemer testified in defense but spoke little about the meetings. He contradicted none of the other men's stories. All he said was of the May 18 meet- ing: "Q. Did you discuss the written proposals? A. Very much ... Q. You spent a lot of time discussing each proposal? ... The Witness: Well, I haven't seen it [the written proposal] for a time. I'd have to go over it. But I know there was many items there I Xed out and put question marks behind and we was talking quite heatedly about the various items. We didn't get through all of them. Twelve, I think, and I-it got to be 8:30. We all decided it was getting pretty late." No useful purpose would be served by detailing what hap- pened thereafter between the parties, because there is no issue about it. A tentative meeting for May 27 was canceled; the Union agents tried several times to communicate with Besemer but without success; a further union demand letter of June 15 went unanswered. The Respondent concedes that by about June 1 it had decided no longer to recognize the Unions as representatives of the employees. D. Affirmative Defense,- Analysis and Conclusions At the time of Besemer's first meeting with Chapman, as well as on April 9 when he signed the recognition agreement, the Unions had clearly been authorized by a majority of the employees to bargain for them. Nine out of 13 had signed unequivocal designation cards. There is no contention that the card signers then intended anything other than immediate authorization for collective bargaining, or entertained any mental reservations. Certainly there is no evidence even in- directly casting doubt upon this one critical fact. Besemer admitted at the hearing that at the first meeting he said nothing to indicate doubt as to the validity of the cards, and that there were no facts that could raise any question then in his mind. And the only employee who appeared at the hear- ing to speak about the matter made clear his desire not to be represented by a union came into being long after he had signed his card, that he had changed his mind as an after- thought. Although the question presented here is not precisely analogous to more common situations of which Board law speaks, there is a certain similarity to other cases. The Re- spondent first asserts that at the end of May or early in June it learned that the Unions had lost majority. support, that the employees no longer wished to be represented, and then argues it was privileged to discontinue collective bargaining for this reason. Had the employees voted in a Board election on March 30 instead of signing cards, and a majority chosen the union as a bargaining agent, this defense would not have been available to the employer, regardless of any change of heart by some few of the employees. N.L.R.B. v. Brooks, 348 U.S. 96. There is, of course, a difference between voting in secret ballot and signing authorization cards. Compare N.L.R.B. v. Gissel, 395 U.S. 575. But if the determinative element in the Brooks line of cases is the uncontrovertible fact of majority authorization, as evidenced finally by issuance of a Board certification, the signed cards in this case, coupled with the Respondent's execution of the recognition agree- ment, could also be said to fix the bargaining relationship and protect it from this kind of attack for a certain period. In that event this employer, too, would be precluded from question- ing the majority only 2 months after it was affirmatively established and in the teeth of the bargaining. The case can also be analogized to the situation where a question concerning the duty to bargain arises after expira- tion of an earlier contract. United Gypsum Company, 157 NLRB 652. There consideration, starts with the fact of majority authorization established in the old contract, recog- nition of necessity conceded and extended to the union in the very language of the agreement itself; the majority status there fixed is presumed to continue. Unlike the case of the decertification year, however, an employer faced with a de- mand to negotiate a new contract may raise a question of continuing majority, provided his asserted doubt is based on reasonable and objective criteria. A persuasive argument could be made that the recognition agreement signed by Besemer on April 9 is comparable to any collective-bargain- ing relationship established by contract, and that therefore the fixed majority status must be presumed to continue in the absence of objective proof to the contrary. A third possible analogy is to the case of Snow and Sons, 134 NLRB 709; there, as here, the Board was faced with an initial organizational campaign situation. The employer in Snow first agreed to abide by the results of a card check, and to extend recognition if it should appear that a majority of employees had signed appropriate authorization cards. He reneged and refused to bargain after the fact of majority was so proved, and the Board found a violation of Section 8(a)(5) as a result. The employer in Snow looked at the cards; Besemer did not. But if a mere promise to extend recognition on the basis of the cards binds an employer to his word, so that he may not soon thereafter question majority, does it not follow, a fortiori, that actual concession of proper representa- tive status, in writing, also precludes the employer from too early a refusal to bargain? However the case be viewed, I find that the Respondent unlawfully refused to bargain with the Unions on June 15, 1971, if not earlier, and thereby violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. It admitted the decision to withdraw recognition had been made before that date, and that is the date the Unions' final written invitation to continue negotiations was con- sciously ignored. The best possible view of the defense is that the recognition agreement ought be likened to an earlier con- tract establishing majority status. The Respondent contends that the Unions thereafter lost standing as exclusive bargain- ing agent; this is essentially an affirmative defense. I find the evidence insufficient to justify its refusal to bargain. The evidence offered to support the defense consists primarily of Besemer's testimony as to what an employee named Donald Rogers told him at the end of May and early in June. Besemer started by saying he once overheard Orin Lovelace, also an employee say "I hope they kill this Union. We're getting sick of hearing about it." Besemer added that employee Hagg was then present and said, "well, I agree with 546 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD that." Shown his earlier affidavit on cross-examination, Besemer altered this testimony, and said all Lovelace had spoken was "I hope they kill this Union," and that as to Hagg all that he knew was that the man "was somewhere there because he was getting ready to do the shooting," but that he, Besemer, did not recall whether Hagg said anything at all. As to employee Rogers, Besemer related how towards the end of May the mane"came in and said, in the conversation back and forth around the workers, that they didn't think the majority of them wanted it [the Union] ... He says `I can't speak for actually the particular names, but the talks back and forth.' And he, says, `I' think that we'd like to have a vote."' Besemer then gave Rogers the name and address of the Labor Board Regional Office, and Rogers wrote the fol- lowing letter to the Board about June 1: I am employed by Cayuga Crushed Stone, Inc. at Port- land Point, South Lansing, N.Y. I and my fellow em- ployees, who work in the quarry, do not have a union. We found out that our boss has agreed to have the Teamsters and Engineers represent us. Most of us do not want this. Will you please send me forms so that we can send them in, and have an election. After a telephone conversation with him to inquire further, the Regional Office wrote to Rogers on'June 15, indicating it did not have enough information to advise whether a decer- tification petition might be appropriate at the moment. Rog- ers then showed both his and the Board's letters to Besemer. Asked had he heard from any other employee concerning union representation, Besemer at one point answered: "No, I didn't, just hearsay I heard." Later, asked once again by his own lawyer to give what employees' names he could recall, he said: "Well, I'm not going to quote the men's names, I don't think I have to quote men's names because I didn't write them all down. I have talked to various ones. I do have one man down from there, Croffert." There is no employee named Croffert on the stipulated employee list. And finally, Besemer threw in the name "Ward," as a person also express- ing dissatisfaction about the Union, but with no comment as to anything Ward might have said. There is an employee named Ward on the agreed-upon list of employees, but he was 1 of,the 4, out of the 13, who did not sign a union card. Rogers, called by the General Counsel to authenticate his authorization card, did so directly. He then said that some- time in May he decided he did not wish to be represented and told this to Besemer. He also testified, however, that in talk- ing to the manager he made clear the fact he was speaking only for himself. "Mr. Burke: And at that time did you say anything about other' employees? The Witness: That I couldn't speak for them ... Mr. Burke: In substance, in substance what did you say to him? The Witness: That we'd lieen thinking it over and we had some second thoughts about the Union. And we decided that'we didn't want it. But I could not speak for everybody because I didn't know 'exactly what everyone thought. Now that's the nearest I can get at it." "Q. Did you ever go back ' to Mr. Besemer and tell him, I'm speaking for all the other guys, we'all changed our minds? A. No, I-Q. No?'A.'I told him several times I couldn't possible speak for the others." At best Besemer had objective grounds early in June for believing that one man had changed his mind after authoriz- ing the Union, and one or two others, of whose earlier atti- tude he knew nothing, were lukewarm on the subject. This was not sufficient basis for a reasonable belief that the joint unions no longer commanded the majority adherence which . had been established to Besemer's satisfaction 2 months ear- her, and which he was willing to accept during the several bargaining sessions in which he participated. No single case need be decisive of a future one in this field of law, and no specific precedent is required for finding ille- gality on a set of facts presented in a later proceeding before the Board. I do not hold, as a rule of law, that an employer who signs a proper recognition agreement with a first organ- izing union may not thereafter justify its refusal to bargain on the grounds of reasonable basis for doubting majority, nor do I hold that he does have the right to prove such a defense against, a refusal-to-bargain complaint. I find only that, even assuming the defense to be available as a matter of law, on the evidence here shown this Respondent has failed to satisfy the affirmative burden. Regardless of which of them may be necessary, or indeed pertinent, all of the following facts are revealing. The Unions in fact represented a majority of the employees on March 30. The Company conceded as much and signed a regular recog- nition agreement. It requested the Unions to withdraw, their election petition then in the hands of the ,Board Regional Office, thereby avoiding the necessity of posting any notice advising its employees of their statutory organizational rights. The employer in fact negotiated with the thus recog- nized exclusive bargaining agent over- a period of almost 2 months. Besemer discussed matters of substance with Chap- man and Small; payment to a union welfare and pension plan involved money contributions for ' work, as did proposed modifications of work classifications. It does not appear that the Respondent yielded on significant clauses in the Unions' proposed contract, but on Besemer's own testimony it is clear he rejected a number of, them. Bargaining consists not only of making concessions, but also of denying demands of one party or another after "heated" discussions, to use Besemer's own words. And finally, the assertion that the Unions had lost majority support is advanced without sufficient sub- stance. The refusal to bargain in this case was a violation of the statute, and the Respondent must be,ordered to bargain now on request. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent is an employer within the meaning of the Act. 2. The Unions are labor organizations within the meaning of the Act. 3. The Unions are and have at all material times herein been the exclusive majority representative of all employees in the following bargaining unit of employees at the Respond- ent's South Lansing, New York, plant: All employees, ex- cluding all office clerical employees , guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. 4. By refusing, on June 15, 1971, and thereafter, to bargain with the Unions upon request, the Respondent has refused to bargain collectively with the Unions as the exclusive collec- tive-bargaining representative of its employees in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 5. By the foregoing conduct the Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Section '7 of the Act, in violation of'Section 8(a)(1). 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law and the entire record and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:' In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and Recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions , and order, and all objections CAYUGA CRUSHED STONE, INC. 547 ORDER The Respondent, Cayuga Crushed Stone, Inc., South Lans- ing, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from refusing to bargain, upon request, with the Unions as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre- sentative of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit described above. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request bargain collectively with the Unions as the exclusive representative of the employees in the appropri- ate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment. (b) Post at its plant in South Lansing, New York, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."' Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re- gion 3, after being duly signed by an authorized representa- tive of the Respondent, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasona- ble steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 3, in writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.' thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. ' In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." ° In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a full trial in which both sides had the opportunity to present their evidence the National Labor Relations Board has found that we, Cayuga Crushed Stone, Inc., violated the National Labor Relations Act, and ordered us to post this notice. We therefore notify you that: WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with these Unions as the exclusive representative of all em- ployees in the above-described bargaining unit with re- spect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. WE WILL NOT refuse to meet and bargain with Inter- national Union of Operating Engineers, Local Union No. 545, and Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union No. 65, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, as the exclusive representative of the following employees: All employees employed in our Portland Point, South Lansing, New York, location, excluding all office clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to re- frain from any and all such activities. Dated By CAYUGA CRUSHED STONE, INC. (Employer) (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by any- one. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Federal Building, Ninth Floor, 111 West Huron Street, Buffalo, New York 14202, Telephone 716- 842-3100.