Georgia-Pacific Corp.

130 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Georgia-Pacific Corporation and Southern Council of Lumber and Plywood Workers, United Brother- hood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO. Cases 15-CA-4051 and 15-RC-4552 May 25, 1972 DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION OF SECOND ELECTION BY MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO On February 25, 1972, Trial Examiner John M. Dyer issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the Trial Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm' the Trial Examiner's rulings, findings,2 and conclusions and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the Georgia-Pacific Corporation, Taylorsville, Mississippi, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's recommended Order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the election conducted in Case 15-RC-4552 on March 11, 1971, be, and it hereby is, set aside, and that said case be, and it hereby is, remanded to the Regional Director for Region 15 to conduct a new election when he deems the circumstances permit a free choice of a bargain- ing representative. [Direction of Second Election3 omitted from publication.] I We hereby grant the request of International Woodworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, Intervenor, to withdraw from this proceeding 2 The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Trial Examiner It is the Board's established policy not to overrule a Trial Examiner's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions were incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C A 3) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings 3 In order to assure that all eligible voters may have the opportunity to be informed of the issues in the exercise of their statutory right to vote, all parties to the election should have access to a list of voters and their addresses which may be used to communicate with them Excelsior Underwear Inc, 156 NLRB 1236, N L R B v Wyman -Gordon Co, 394 U S 759 Accordingly, it is hereby directed that an election eligibility list, containing the names and addresses of all the eligible voters, must be filed by the Employer with the Regional Director for Region 15 within 7 days after the date of issuance of the Notice of Second Election by the Regional Director The Regional Director shall make the list available to all parties to the election No extension of time to file this list shall be granted by the Regional Director except in extraordinary circumstances. Failure to comply with this requirement shall be grounds for setting aside the election whenever proper objections are filed TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JOHN M. DYER, Trial Examiner: Southern Council of Lumber and Plywood Workers, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union or Carpenters, filed the charge in this case against Georgia-Pacific Corporation, herein called the Company or Respondent, on March 4, 1971,1 alleging that the Company violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. On June 2, the Regional Director for Region 15 issued the complaint in this matter which was later amended on July 14 and September 28. In addition to the requisite jurisdictional and commerce facts, the complaint alleged that Respon- dent had discharged Shelton Sellers in violation of Section 8(a)(3)2 and that Respondent had committed many violations of Section 8(a)(1), including' interrogation of employees concerning their union sympathies and mem- bership or the sympathies, desires, or membership of other employees; threatening discipline or discharge or the placing of relatives' jobs in jeopardy for engaging in union activities; creating an impression of surveillance of employees' union activities; soliciting an employee to distribute antiumon materials; and an improper grant of a wage increase. Respondent admitted the requisite jurisdictional and commerce allegations and that it discharged Shelton Sellers but denied that it had violated the Act in any manner. The supervisory status of two individuals, James Brown and William Beasley, were contested while Respondent admit- ted that the other supervisors named in the complaint were supervisors within the meaning of the Act. The petition in Case 15-RC-4552 was filed by the Union on January 22 seeking a P and M unit. The parties entered into a stipulation for certification upon consent election on February 16 and the election was held March 11. Of approximately 320 eligible voters, 306 ballots were cast, 137 for the Union, 11 for International Woodworkers of America, AFL-CIO, CLC (an Intervenor in that proceed- ing), 147 against the Unions, and the 11 challenged ballots were sufficient to affect the results of the election. On March 18, the Union filed timely objections but neglected to serve such objections on the Intervenor until May 24. The Regional Director for Region 15 issued a report on challenges and objections and order directing hearing on June 7, wherein he found that the challenges to four individuals should be overruled and that their ballots could be opened and counted at a subsequent time. As to three other challenged ballots which were cast by alleged I Unless otherwise stated all dates herein occurred during 1971 2 The Regional Director dismissed 8(a)(3) allegations regarding four other individuals alleged in the charge. 197 NLRB No. 27 GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION 131 8(a)(3)'s, the Regional Director noted that the appeal period had not expired on his dismissal of allegations concerning them in the instant charge. The appeal period has since expired which would mean that the challenges to these three ballots would be upheld. At the hearing in this matter, Respondent acknowledged that Robert H. Valen- tine was a supervisor prior to the election. Therefore the challenge to his ballot should be upheld. These resolutions left in contention the challenged ballots of Shelton Sellers, the alleged 8(a)(3) violations in this case, and Jimmy W. Brown and William Beasley who were challenged as supervisors. The Regional Director also recommended that certain of the Union's objections be overruled and that, since the conduct involved in the remaining four objections present- ed substantially the same issues as are present in the instant complaint, a consolidated hearing would resolve these issues as well as those involved in the challenged ballots. The Regional Director on June 7 issued his order consolidating these two cases and a notice of hearing. Respondent filed timely exceptions to the Regional Director's report with the National Labor Relations Board, contending that the Union's objections should not be considered since it failed to timely serve the Intervenor with a copy of its objections and urging that the Regional Director was in error in stating that no prejudice would result or could be shown from his consideration of the objections. Respondent stated that it had been prejudiced by relying on the fact that under the Board's rules and regulations an untimely filing meant that the objections were invalid and that in the interim period, on April 9, it granted a wage increase to its employees. Respondent did not except to the recommended disposition of the objections and the recommendations concerning the challenged ballots. On August 27, the Board issued its Decision and Order finding no merit in the Employer's exceptions and adopting the Regional Director's report in its entirety. In resolving this case I have concluded that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act; Brown and Beasley had the indicia of Respondent's supervisors prior to the election; and the objections to the election should be sustained. I will grant Respondent's motion to dismiss paragraph 20 of the complaint, which alleged that the wage raise was violative of the Act, and will recommend that the election be set aside and a new election run at an appropriate time. All parties were afforded full opportunity to appear, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to argue orally at the hearing which was held September 28 and 29 and October 26, 27, and 28 in Laurel, Mississippi. General Counsel and Respondent have filed helpful briefs which have been considered. In assessing the testimony and determining credibility a pattern appeared in Respondent's defense and in Respon- dent's testimony. General Counsel's witnesses would testify to certain facts and that certain questions were asked by Respondent's supervisors and on cross-examination an asserted attack on the credibility of a large number of these witnesses would be made by Respondent, attempting to show that, after some treatment the witness felt to be unfair, the witness gave an affidavit to the government investigators. Respondent would then urge that, since the witness was mad at the Company, his testimony should not be credited. But in quite a large number of these instances the main facts to which the witness testified would be corroborated either on direct or cross-examination of Respondent's witnesses with a slight shift in emphasis. Respondent's attack on credibility assumes that if a person gets mad at Respondent then he is revenging himself by lying. This is an untenable syllogism. A more insistent inference is that the witness is "blowing the whistle" and telling the truth about a subject he had refrained from mentioning. I have not found any basis for discrediting General Counsel's witness on such a sugges- tion. Respondent's witnesses in the main corroborated ac- counts of events by General Counsel's witnesses but would insist that they never asked questions of the employees, although they did at times admit they encouraged discussions about the Union and union activities. Appar- ently Respondent's witnesses believe if they denied asking questions they cannot be found to have interrogated employees. To provoke discussions about the Union and solicit information about activities while stating "I am not asking you, you are volunteering" is not a magical formula which sidesteps a finding of unlawful interrogation. A number of General Counsel's witnesses were so reluctant to testify3 that subpena enforcement proceedings were needed and even after such proceedings one witness did not comply with the court's order. Employee Clyde Eugene Corley was a most reluctant witness for General Counsel and was called separately as a witness for Respondent. In the main I have credited the General Counsel's witnesses' versions of the facts where they have differed from the versions of Respondent' s witnesses, finding them more reliable and consistent. I have also concluded that the interrogations which occurred were unlawful and violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, since there was no express protection afforded the employees nor was it stated or shown that the questions asked had a lawful purpose. These interrogations were designed to establish the identity of union adherents and in most instances false answers were given, demonstrating fear of identification as a union sympathizer. With the example of Sellers' discharge, such precautions would appear prudent. On the entire record in this case, including my evaluation of the reliability of the witnesses, based on the evidence received, my observation of their demeanor, and the nature of and manner in which responses were made, I make the following: 3 General Counsel's witnesses, Joseph Jerald Adkins, Clyde E Corley, Bernice D Dale, Alvie Hodge, Charles L McLaunn, James A . Mason, and Larry Moffett, did not appear at the initial part of the hearing and enforcement of their subpenas was granted by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi 132 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT AND THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Respondent is a Georgia corporation engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of wood and related forestry products at many locations. The only facility involved in this proceeding is Respondent's Taylorsville, Mississippi, plant at which Respondent annually receives goods and materials, valued in excess of $50,000, which are shipped directly to it from points outside the State of Mississippi. During the same period, Respondent sells and ships goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside the State of Mississippi. Respondent admits and I find that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Respondent admits and I find that the Union herein is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background and Undisputed Facts The Taylorsville plant was built by Respondent and completed during the late summer of 1970. The plant was then under the direction of Plant Manager Lyle L. Tidwell. According to Tidwell the Taylorsville plant was due to start operations on August 10, 1970, and, in preparation therefor, people were hired from the surrounding territory including some of the construction crew who built the plant. Tidwell testified that, of the approximately 15 supervisory positions which were open in the plant to begin with, around I 1 were filled by people from the Company's operations elsewhere and the other 4 were hired from other timber operations. .The Company operated a school for 1 week before beginning operations. Approximately half of the school time was spent in the classroom and half in the plant so that those employees who were new to these operations could learn what was expected of them. The plant did not commence in full operation but started on a 5-day schedule. It was later in October 1970 when a full operation was begun in the drying department, which meant that the dryers operated three shifts 7 days a week, which necessitated the institution of a fourth or relief shift. The relief shift worked 6 days a week relieving each of the other shifts for 2 days. Other parts of the plant operated on a two- or three-shift basis, 5 or 6 days a week. The testimony is somewhat confused as to the superviso- ry hierarchy, but it would appear that under the plant manager was a plywood superintendent and a stud mill superintendent. Underneath them were shift foremen for each of the three shifts and beneath them were some foremen for various departments, such as the "green end." Tidwell testified that even before the plant began operations it was known that the Union was seeking to organize the plant and would be conducting a campaign there. The Company held regular monthly meetings with its employees in small groups. Tidwell admitted that the Union was one of the topics of discussion in a number of these monthly meetings . Additionally the Company posted on its bulletin board various statements or news items illustrating its viewpoint that it did not want a union in the plant and felt that it could demonstrate to its employees that it could operate successfully without a union. In regard to the wage structure it was the Company's policy, which it followed, to start with the wage structure on the low side of the scale and, as production built up and reached its peak, it was its plan, which it announced to its employees, to raise the wage scale to meet the competitors in its area and possibly to exceed them. B. Supervisory Status of Brown and Beasley Respondent testified that it had a training program to bring people up through the ranks and train them in various areas of the Company and if a supervisory opening became available to place them in such opening if they were qualified and capable. It attempted in the first instance to discover individuals with potential by means of an exam following the week of school in August 1970. Two individuals who were taken into the training program were Jimmy Brown and William Beasley. The Company contends that neither one became a supervisor prior to the election and that Beasley did thereafter but Brown has never been made a supervisor. General Counsel and the Union contend that both Brown and Beasley were held out by Respondent as supervisors prior to the election. The parties agreed that in the plant various colored hard hats were worn in various areas. Men in one section would wear a blue hard hat while those in another section wore a green hard hat. The parties agreed that supervisors wore white hard hats, but Respondent attempted to show that on occasions someone from the office or a visitor in the plant might wear a white hat. There was no such clear evidence and indeed Respondent's witness, Foreman Walter Webb, stated that only supervisors wore the white helmets. Thus, it was generally acknowledged that a white helmet was the badge of a supervisor in the plant. Respondent admitted that trainees had at the very least a leadman status in that they could give routine orders to other employees, but stated that they could not effectively recommend hiring or firing or granting of raises. Jerald Adkins testified that he was a dryer tender working on the graveyard (11 p.m. -7 a.m.) shift until around Thanksgiving 1970. Foreman Jerry Stanford asked him to take the relief-shift job as the dryer tender since there wouldn't be a shift foreman on that shift since Stanford was moving from the graveyard shift to the swing shift and Foreman Tully was moving from the relief shift to the graveyard shift. (About that time Superintendent Bob Adkins left the Company and supervisors were moving up.) Stanford told Jerald Adkins that someone was needed on the dryers who knew what it was all about. He agreed to go on the relief shift telling Stanford that he wanted to return to the graveyard shift if a foreman was put on the relief shift. In mid-January after a few days off, Adkins found Jimmy Brown on the relief shift wearing a white hat. Brown said he was the dryer foreman and had been appointed because there had been a high percentage of absenteeism on the relief shift particularly on weekends GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION - 133 and he was there to correct it. Adkins had a conversation with Plant Superintendent Denny Justus, who told Adkins that Brown was the relief-shift foreman and had been appointed because absenteeism had been bad on that shift and the Company needed someone on that shift with a white hat for the people to look up to and who was to correct the absenteeism. Justus added that those on the shift who were absenting themselves would either shape up or ship out. Adkins asked to be transferred back to the graveyard shift saying he had taken the job with the understanding that if a foreman was appointed he could return to his former shift. Justus apparently acceded to the request and Adkins was transferred back to the graveyard shift within a week. In the interim Adkins stayed on the dryers helping Brown to familiarize himself once again with the dryer operation and assisting him in keeping the necessary records on that shift. Respondent did not produce Denny Justus or Jimmy Brown and there is no denial of Adkins' testimony. Joseph Gillum testified that when he was hired he was told by the personnel department to report to Jimmy Brown who would be his foreman on the relief shift. He reported to Brown who put him to work and told him what to do. According to Gillum, Brown did no manual labor and wore a white hat and Brown chewed him out regarding his breaking a broom handle. Charles McCullom testified that Brown wore a white hat on the relief shift up until shortly before the election and on one occasion chewed him out for being late and for giving Brown a false reason why he did not come to work. Bernice D. Dale testified that he worked on another shift and on one occasion Brown asked him to work over on the relief shift and that Brown wore a white hat. Concerning William Beasley's status as a supervisor, employee Dan Harris testified that he worked for Beasley about 1 month before the election, at which time Beasley was wearing a white hat. He testified that Beasley wrote up the men's time, had people work overtime, gave- them orders, and moved the men around and that all supervisors wore white hats. Benjamin Moubry testified that he worked for Beasley in February and that at that time Beasley was giving orders to the men, was the head of the gluing and pressing department, and was wearing a white hat. J. D. Hutchinson testified that he worked on another shift and in January and February worked over for Beasley at his request and that at that time Beasley, was the supervisor in the gluing and pressing department in the same way that C. H. Miles was on his shift., Herman L. Atwood testified that prior to the election he worked on a different shift and worked over for Beasley at his request and Beasley kept the time and acted as the supervisor of that shift. Bernice Dale testified that he worked over on another shift for Beasley prior to the election and at that time Beasley was wearing a white hat. Charles Ray Keys' testimony was a bit ambiguous as to whether it was before or after the election that he worked for Beasley, but he indicated that Beasley wore a white hat. As stated above, Brown did not testify, nor did Beasley, so there is no denial of their conduct in giving orders, keeping the men's time, chewing out people for infractions of rules, and wearing the white hard hat which to all the witnesses was the symbol of a supervisor in the plant. Respondent takes the position and offered testimony to the effect that there was no such position as relief-shift supervisor over the dryer department insofar as Brown was concerned. However, Respondent did not attempt to contradict the testimony that there had been a problem with absenteeism on that shift and that a man was put in there with "white hat authority." Respondent also con- tended that Brown and Beasley punched a timeclock as did the other employees and were paid hourly whereas supervisors were on a salaried basis. It may be true that Respondent had a table of organization and that Brown's position did not fit into that table, but it is also apparent from the testimony offered that an exception was made in this particular instance in order to correct the absentee situation Respondent found facing it. It is possible that Brown was never made a permanent supervisor as such, but it is apparent that Brown was given the indicia of supervisory authority by his use of the white hat and that he used that authority and wore that hat for some 6 to 7 weeks until shortly before the election. The white hard hat was the badge of supervisory authority and was so recognized by the employees and the supervisors. A person wearing a white hard hat had the authority to give binding orders to employees. The fact that Beasley and Brown both wore white hats for 1 to 2 months prior to the election means that Respondent held them out as supervisors to the employees who worked under them. Having given or allowed them the indicia of supervisory authority Respondent cannot now be heard to say that they really were not supervisors. I find that during the relevant preelection period Brown and Beasley were given supervisory status by Respondent and that Respon- dent management is bound by their actions. I would also recommend to the Board that the challenges to the ballots of Brown and Beasley be sustained on the basis that during the relevant period they were supervisors possessing Respondent's indicia of supervisory authority. C. The April 9 Wage Raise Paragraph 20 of the complaint alleges that the April 9 raise granted by Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act because it was granted at a time when the election, which was held March 11, was subject to being invalidated based on timely objections which had been filed by the Union. In the Regional Director's investigation of the objec- tions, he considered Union's Objections 2 and 6 together. These objections alleged in substance that the Company had coerced and inhibited its employees' freedom of choice in the election by promising them a raise and benefits if the Union was defeated. In his report which was adopted by the Board in its entirety, the Regional Director found as a fact that Respondent had a policy which it had announced to its employees well in advance of the representation petition that the Company would review it's initial wage scale after the plant had reached full production, which would occur 134 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD sometime after the first of the year, and that a wage increase of an undetermined amount would be granted at that time. After the first of the year, following the filing of the representation petition, the Company announced that the raise would be granted after the election in order to avoid any unfair labor practice charges being filed on the basis of granting a raise. The election was held March 11 and the objections filed by the Union were not served on the intervening party until May. Respondent granted the raise to its employees on April 9 feeling that the objections were not properly filed since the Intervenor had not received a copy in accordance with the Board's rules and regulations. In its August 27 Decision and Order in Case 15-RC-4552, the Board found that the Regional Director did not err in considering the objections properly filed, despite the Company's claim that it was being prejudiced because of the unfair labor practice allegation concerning the raise in the complaint which had issued by that time. The Company had urged dismissal of the objections because of such alleged prejudice. The Board found there to be no prejudice to the employer possibly on the basis that the allegation was only an allegation and Respondent was not being found guilty of an unfair labor practice by processing the objections. Respondent's claim is somewhat akin to a plea of entrapment, except that here Respondent acted in granting the wage increase on its own view of the law that the objections had not been properly filed. Beyond this is the question of whether the Company in granting this postelection raise was doing so in accordance with established company policy. The Regional Director's factfinding, as adopted by the Board, is that in accordance with the Company's policy a wage review would occur after the plant reached full production and as it was anticipated this would occur about the first of the year a raise would be granted about that time. It would seem therefore that the April 9 raise, which was postponed to that date by Respondent merely to avoid the filing of unfair labor practice charges, is a raise granted in accordance with established company policy. The General Counsel claims a violation due to the timing of the raise and argues that Respondent violated its own previously stated reason for not granting the wage raise earlier, in granting it on April 9. He argues that at that time the election could be rerun or set aside due to both the challenges and the objections and that it was possible to file unfair labor practice charges for granting the raise before a further election. In essence the General Counsel's complaint is based on timing of the raise and nothing more, in that no statements are alleged to have been made regarding the granting of a raise for a particular unlawful purpose or withholding of it for a particular unlawful purpose. Certainly not every raise granted at some time between the filing of a petition and the close of the representation case is by those facts illegal, for if so no raises could be granted in some cases for years. 4 One allegation (par 9(a) of the complaint) concerns statements by Plant Manager Tidwell to Jerald Adkins in regard to the union status of Such a situation might occur in the instant case if General Counsel's argument were permitted to stand. However, the Regional Director has found that it was a matter of company policy predating the petition to grant a raise sometime after the first of the year following a wage review by Respondent. All the evidence seems to indicate that this is that raise and as such, since it came within the orbit of company policy and appears to follow company policy as found by the Board in upholding the Regional Director's factfinding, I must conclude that the raise in these circumstances did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and I so find and grant Respondent's motion to dismiss paragraph 20 of the complaint. D. 8(a)(1) Allegations Prior to January 224 1. Clyde Corley was one of the General Counsel witnesses whose subpena was enforced. He was called as a witness both by the General Counsel and Respondent and exhibited great reluctance to testify for the General Counsel, appearing more friendly to Respondent. Corley testified that he discussed the Union with Foreman Jerry Stanford many times and that Stanford on several occasions said he was not asking Corley questions but Corley was volunteering to give him information. However, Stanford did ask him questions such as how many were in the Union and he told Stanford he could probably find out. These conversations took place between September and Christmas 1970, while Corley was on the graveyard (11 p.m.-7 a.m.) shift and generally were about what the Union would do and what it wouldn't do. In testifying about conversations with Corley, Stanford said: Corley said, him and me would start talking about the unions, and I'd-he'd start asking me questions about it, and want my opinion on things. And then he would tell me about the activities of the union, what they were doing. And things like that. Q. What do you mean activities? A. Well, he would tell me about union meetings and about people that was there. But every time he start telling me these things, I would tell him this was on a voluntary basis and I was not asking him no questions whatsoever about the union. And he told me, that's all right, and he still talked about it. But I did make that clear to him on every occasion when he started talking about it. Stanford admitted this happened on a number of occasions on almost every shift, but denied that he had asked Corley to find out how many employees were for the Union or how many were at union meetings, but stated Corley did give him that information. Stanford said that on several occasions he may have brought up something about the literature (antiunion) posted on the bulletin board and got a conversation started about the Union, but insisted that he never asked questions. I have stated earlier that Corley was a rather reluctant and grudging witness for the General Counsel. This reluctance was evident in his hesitant manner of testifying Shelton Sellers This will be considered in sec F, below, dealing with the discharge of Sellers GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION for the General Counsel and the necessity of prodding his memory which seemed to measurably improve when he was Respondent's witness. I credit Corley's testimony that Stanford did question him as to how many were in the Union and who attended union meetings and do not credit Stanford's statement that he did not ask any questions, although admitting he provoked conversations and secured information concerning the numbers and identity of union adherents. Accordingly, I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by Supervisor Stanford's interrogations of employee Corley as to how many people were in the Union and whether Corley could find out who attended the union meetings. 2. Charles L. McLaurin testified that somewhere between October and November 1970, Supervisor C. H. Miles asked him what he thought about the Union, and he replied he didn't know, that he had never worked on a union job and didn't know anything about it. Miles denied that he had any such conversation with McLaurin. McLaurin was one of the witnesses who had his subpena enforced. I considered him to be a credible witness, noting that he stuck to his testimony and stated it was the only conversation he had about the Union the whole time he was there. I credit his version over Miles' denial and find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by Miles' unlawful interrogation of McLaurin concerning his union sentiments. 3. Dan S. Harris testified that during the latter part of 1970 he had a conversation with Doyle Tully while working the graveyard shift in the spreader department. Supervisor C. H. Miles was present at the time. Tully asked Harris whether all those whose cars were down at the service station were at the union hall and Harris replied that he didn't know. Tully said there were very many down there and Harris replied that he didn't know how many, he couldn't count them all. Harris had been at the union meeting that night. Tully walked away and Miles told Harris that Tully was wrong for talking about the Union that way. Harris said yes, he felt that Tully had just violated the law by doing it. Miles told Harris that he was messing up and asked him if he wasn't building a new home and stated that he could lose it very easily. Miles admitted talking to Harris about work, personal matters, and the Union and that something was said about losing his home, but said they were discussing a rumored walkout and, after hearing that Harris was prepared to walk out, he was trying to get Harris to think of the consequences and asked if Harris didn't care what happened. Harris said he believed in what he was doing and Miles said you mean you would walk out knowing you would lose your job and Harris said he would. Miles asked Harris if he hadn't just built a new house, and Harris said he had. Miles asked if that meant that he would walk out even if he lost his job and wouldn't have a check coming and would lose everything and Harris replied he would. Miles was not asked to confirm or deny the conversation of Harris and Tully, even though Harris had specifically testified that Miles was present at the time Tully spoke and indeed commented on Tully's questions. From testimony of Adkins, it appears that the only talk 135 concerning a walkout occurred in 1971 and not during the fall of 1970, when the plant was just getting into full operation . I believe Miles is mistaken in trying to set his conversation with Harris in the aspect of a walkout unless such a vision was created by Miles himself. I believe that Harris' version of the conversation is correct and that Miles was placing the specter of Harris losing his house and job on the idea of the Union organizing the plant and asserting that Harris was messing up by putting his trust in a union. Respondent attacks Harris' credibility on the ground that he was mad at the Company. Such an attack as noted above is lacking in merit. Respondent suggests that no findings regarding Tully be made against it because it was unable to find Tully. Respondent's brief states that if it had been able to find Tully he could have refuted the 8(a)(1) allegations concerning him. This would appear to be a gratuitous assumption on Respondent 's part and Tully's absence does not demean the credibility of those who testified to his various statements and threats. I find and conclude that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by the interrogations and threats of Supervisors Tully and Miles as set forth above. E. Postpetition (1/22/71) 8(a)(1) Allegations 4. Joseph S . Gambrell worked on the construction of the plant between October 1969 and August 1970 as a millwright foreman . Around June 1970 he had a conversa- tion with Lyle Tidwell in which Tidwell said he was checking with the construction crew and was trying to line up a crew to start up the plant. He told Gambrell that a number of the men had worked at a union plant and he didn't intend to have a union in his plant, but was going to pay above union scale and the benefits would be better and in that way he felt unions would be kept out. He asked Gambrell's viewpoint and Gambrell replied that he had worked for a union for a number of years and helped organize a plant. Tidwell asked if he were to work at Respondent would he try to organize it and Gambrell said that, if Tidwell did what he said , there wouldn't be any need for a union and he wouldn 't try to organize the plant. Tidwell said he appreciated Gambrell being truthful about it and that he had checked around and found out about Gambrell's past union activity and knew that local people had him marked as a union organizer. About 3 weeks before the election Tidwell asked Gambrell how he felt about the election . Gambrell said it looked like the Union was going to win . Tidwell said he was afraid so and wanted to know if Gambrell would help him try to keep the Union out, that he would like to prove he could have a good plant without the Union . Gambrell said he would help him but that everything was mighty quiet. Tidwell said he wanted to know how the men felt. Gambrell said it was hard to tell, that they couldn't get anything out of the men and apparently the Union felt that it had it sewed up and had just quit discussing it. Tidwell asked what they should do and Gambrell said they needed a handbill or something to get talk started . Tidwell said what about handing out some "Vote No" buttons and trying to get the men to wear them and get some talk going. Gambrell said that would be good . Tidwell said he would 136 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD get the buttons for him. About a week before the election Tidwell told Gambrell where to go to pick them up. Gambrell went and got them and Tidwell told him to get some of the men to help hand them out, but be sure it was off the Company's premises. Gambrell got several others and they handed out the "vote no" buttons for I or 2 days in the morning just prior to the election. Tidwell essentially confirmed this much of Gambrell's testimony but tried to place their June 1970 conversation in a different light. His version was there was some talk about Gambrell's prior association with the Union and he had learned from Gambrell's employment application that he had worked in a union plant where there had been a lot of turmoil and further that some of the local people weren't very high on Gambrell. He asked Gambrell why and Gambrell told him that it was probably because of his union activities. He did tell Gambrell that he would like to operate the plant without a union and Gambrell said he would like to be a part of it. Tidwell denied asking Gambrell if he was going to try to organize the plant. Tidwell said that Gambrell was real antiunion but that he never asked him or anybody else how they felt about it. He testified, on one occasion before the election, Gambrell asked him about the seniority list and then went through the list and told him what his opinion was as to whether each of the persons on the list was for or against the Union. As to an antiunion campaign, Tidwell said that Gambrell mentioned there was some material on the bulletin board concerning what unions could or couldn't do which Gambrell wanted to get mimeographed, saying that they needed a meeting of the employees in opposition to the Union. As to the "Vote No" buttons, Tidwell stated that he had been apprised of the "situation" and that Gambrell said that Tidwell had some "Vote No" buttons available and he replied that was their thing and that he would have nothing to do with it but did tell Gambrell that Gambrel] could check that avenue out. According to Gambrell several days before the election, Tidwell asked if he would talk with the men and see if they were for the Union and if he could get them to vote against it. Gambrell said he would do so but felt that if they had a little whiskey it might help. Tidwell asked how much he thought he needed and Gambrell told him that two cases of half-pints would be enough. Tidwell asked how much that would cost and Gambrell said he didn't know, he had never bought that much but that it might be $45 or $50 a case . Tidwell said he would have to get the money and left the plant premises. When he came back later he gave Gambrell $95 in cash. Gambrell went to a liquor store in Laurel and got two cases of half-pints. He then visited with employees when they got off work or were at home, asking them to vote against the Union. He would either give them a drink of whiskey or sometimes a half-pint. During the week before the election while in the office, Tidwell asked him to look at a pad which contained employees' names with a notation of either OK or a question mark. Tidwell asked Gambrell to look it over and see how the men stood, whether they were for or against the Union. Gambrell looked over the names, noted a question mark beside his own name, and told Tidwell those who he was sure were on one side or the other and those about whom there was some doubt. Gambrell made trips to people's homes and gave out whiskey right up to the day before the election, visiting with some 40 to 50 employees altogether in trying to get them to vote against the Union. Tidwell denied that he had given Gambrell any money for the purchase of whiskey and denied that he had asked Gambrell to find out how the men felt. He said that Gambrell was free to tell him how the men felt. I credit Gambrell's versions of his conversations with Tidwell. Gambrell is presently working for Respondent as a machinist and leadman. Tidwell corroborated the testimony of Gambrell just short of admitting violations of the Act, by again maintaining that he did not ask questions. This is another example of brinksmanship by Respondent's witnesses walking up to the precipice of Act violations but asserting that though they walked the length of the precipice they did not transgress by asking questions or by advancing money or suggesting that Gambrell could get the "Vote No buttons. These ideas apparently originated from and were suggested by Gambrell accord- ing to Tidwell. However, I am inclined to doubt that Gambrell would have put up $95 of his own money to buy whiskey for this antiunion' campaign. I credit Gambrell's versions of what happened in this antiunion campaign and therefore conclude and find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by Tidwell's request to Gambrell to conduct an antiunion campaign and try to get the employees to vote against the Union and to distribute the "Vote No" buttons to its employees. Respondent sought to attack Gambrell's credibility in an oblique manner. On cross-examination Respondent first brought out that Gambrell, in making trips to employees' homes, was accompanied on some of those trips by certain employees of Respondent. Gambrell refused to disclose the name of one of the three employees and Respondent moved to strike all of his testimony. I allowed the striking of such testimony as referred to his making those trips with those employees. Respondent in its brief renews its motion to strike all of Gambrell's testimony. This motion is again denied. Respondent also sought to attack Gambrell's credibility on the basis that he became angry at Respon- dent and gave an affidavit to the Board. As stated above, I find such an attack utterly lacking any solid foundation, particularly where as here the essential facts are corrobo- rated by Respondent's witnesses. 5. Etha Thomas Jones testified that a few weeks prior to the election Plant Manager Tidwell, while going through his department, asked how he felt about the Union and he replied that he was not for it. During cross-examination Jones testified that he had several conversations with Tidwell in which the Union was mentioned. Jones admitted that he only told the General Counsel about his most recent conversation. Tidwell admitted that he had many conversations with Jones concerning procedures since Jones was a new employee and that Jones asked him questions concerning the Union and he attempted to answer them. Tidwell stated he did not approach Jones about the Union and does not think he asked Jones what he thought about the Union. He denied asking whom Jones knew to be for the Union, but stated that on one occasion he did have a GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION 137 conversation in which Jones told him who was for the Union but insisted that he did not ask for the information. In its brief Respondent attacks Jones' credibility on the basis that he exaggerated and instead of the one conversa- tion which was mentioned in his affidavit testified about several others. The fact however is that these other conversations were brought out under cross-examination of Jones and were corroborated by Respondent's plant manager, Tidwell. Although Jones was not the most impressive witness in this proceeding, I credit him and find that the conversa- tions took place as Jones testified. The conversations with Jones are part of a pattern of interrogation engaged in by Tidwell in seeking out the umon sentiments of employees and their knowledge of the union sentiments of their fellow employees. This pattern is demonstrated by the testimony and findings below. I conclude and find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by Plant Manager Tidwell's asking employee Jones about his union senti- ments. 6. Employee Bob Henry Ellis testified that some 3 days before the election while he was at the clipper in the "green end," Plant Manager Tidwell asked what he thought about the Union and he replied that he didn't know. Tidwell then asked if he was going to vote for it and again Ellis responded that he didn't know. Tidwell then told Ellis that if he knew of anyone going to vote for the Union to let Tidwell know. Tidwell did not recall a conversation with an employee at the number two clipper in the "green end" and did not remember Ellis. Tidwell stated that he didn't think he would ask an employee a question about what the employee thought of the Umon. He maintained that his conversations with employees were more question-and- answer type things with the employees questioning and him answering. Tidwell did not recall telling Ellis that if he knew anybody else in the plant who was going to vote for the Union to let him know. Tidwell's answers are not denials that the conversation took place just as Ellis described, but rather merely state that he does not have a memory as to whether the event took place or not. I find that the conversation did take place as Ellis described and that Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by Tidwell's unlawful interrogation of an employee concerning his union senti ments and plans and asking him to inform on other employees' union sentiments and feelings. 7. The direct testimony of Charles McCullom was clarified during cross-examination. McCullom testified that on the day of the election Tidwell asked how he felt about the Union and what he thought the rest of the fellows felt about the Union. He told Tidwell he did not know. As Tidwell walked away he patted McCullom on the shoulder and told him to talk to the other men. Tidwell testified that he did not remember Charles McCullom and stated that on the day of the election he did not ask an employee how he thought the election was going to go or what the employees felt about the Union or how the employee thought others felt about it. McCullom was a good witness and impressed me with his effort to recall and recite the facts. I credit him and find that Tidwell did question him as to his union sentiments and his estimate of the union sentiments of his fellow employees and that he sought to have McCullom speak against the Union to his fellow employees. The testimony fits the pattern of the undenied testimony above. I conclude and find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by Tidwell's unlawful interrogation as to an employee's union sentiments and plans and as to the employee's estimates of the union sentiments of his fellow employees. 8. Jerald Adkins had a number of conversations about the Union with Plant Manager Tidwell, several of which will be considered in section F, below, referring to the discharge of Shelton Sellers. About a week before the election Tidwell approached Jerald Adkins at work and asked whether each of the employees on the dryer crew was for or against the Union. Adkins told him that he thought one or two might have been for the Union, but thought they were 100 percent for the Company at that time. Adkins admitted at the hearing that he was lying when he gave this response to Tidwell. Tidwell told him he wanted to know everyone' s name on the dryer crew, so that the night before the election he could walk up to each of them and call them by name and shake hands, and he thought thereby to gain goodwill with them by letting them know the Company knew each of them. A week later, shortly before the election and at the same spot behind the dryers, Tidwell and Adkins began a conversation which continued as they walked towards the shipping department. Tidwell asked Adkins whether he was for the Union, that he had heard Adkins was not on the same side of the fence. Adkins said he wasn't. Tidwell asked how Adkins was going to vote and he responded the right way. Tidwell asked who was going to be the union observers. Adkins answered that he didn't know who the others were going to be, but that he was one. Tidwell said he would be there the next morning and would come and get him and if Adkins acted as a umon observer at the election it would cost Adkins his job. Adkins said he told them (the Umon) he would be the observer and he would. Tidwell then said Adkins could get sick and go home and that he would excuse him if he did so. The conversation ended and about 5:30 on the morning of the election, Tidwell came back and spoke to Adkins and asked if he was going to be sick and go home, saying that he would excuse him so he would not have to serve as a union observer. Adkins refused. Tidwell in general testified that he had several question- and-answer sessions regarding the Union with Adkins, in which Adkins would ask him questions and he would give the answers. He stated that he did not recall talking to Adkins a week before the election regarding the Union and that he had no conversation regarding how the individuals on the shift stood regarding their union sentiments or activities. Tidwell said that Adkins and some others volunteered information on individuals; on one occasion Adkins did volunteer to give him information as to the union sentiments and feelings of each of the employees on the shift; he listened to the volunteered information; and the last such occasion happened a few days before the election. 138 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Tidwell acknowledged that he had a conversation with Adkins on the night before the election in which Adkins volunteered more information about the employees. Tidwell said that Denny Justus, who was then the plant superintendent, had told him that Adkins was going to be an observer and he did not ask Adkins how he was going to vote but that Adkins volunteered this information. Tidwell stated that he did not threaten Adkins' fob for being the observer or try to get him to be sick. Sometime after the election Adkins needed surgery on a "football knee" and was released by the doctor to return to work in May, at which time he contacted the Company and a meeting was set up with Plant Manager Tidwell at Tidwell's office. Plant Superintendent Justus and Tidwell were in the office and Tidwell told Adkins that he was not going to fire him but wished Adkins wouldn't return to work. Adkins asked why. Tidwell responded that the plant was running much smoother with him gone from it. Adkins said that was a lie, that the men had been planning to walk out 3 to 4 weeks before and it didn't sound to him like it was running smooth. Adkins told Tidwell he had gone to a meeting and talked to the men against walking out. Tidwell said he knew that Adkins had been active in union work and had been seen coming to the plant and picking up "colored" and taking them to union meetings. Adkins denied being on company property except to go to the insurance office and asked why Tidwell wanted him to quit and whether it was his work. Tidwell said no, although Adkins' work wasn't spectacular Adkins said that at one time Tidwell told him he was the best dryer tender he had. Tidwell said something about Adkins being engaged in union activities but said that wasn't why he wanted him to quit. Adkins said that Tidwell was the one who first mentioned the union activities, not him. Tidwell said that Adkins had put the jobs of his nephew (a timekeeper at the Company) and of his sister (a statistician and secretary) on the line by the activity he had been in and asked how Adkins' sister felt with her being a company official and him engaged in union activities. He said that Adkins came from a good family but was the "rotten apple' in the family. Adkins said he knew Tidwell was trying to get him mad enough to quit or to hit Tidwell but that he wasn't going to do it, that he would merely laugh at Tidwell and take whatever came. Tidwell asked if he had a doctor's certificate. Adkins answered that he had turned in the release. Tidwell said he would have to go to the doctor and get a certificate saying he could squat, jump, crawl, climb, and run. Adkins said he hadn't been able to squat for a long time. Tidwell said he would have to get it and that there would be certain rules for him that he would see that they were carried out and if Adkins missed I day of work or was late for one shift he would be terminated. Tidwell testified that he did have a meeting with Adkins after Adkins' surgery but said it was a normal meeting, stating that the personnel manager had told him Adkins had brought in his doctor's certificate and there was some question as to whether he was going to be back full time on the same job. Tidwell stated that during the conversation he said that Adkins had been out for some time and knew he had some financial problems-"And I wanted to convey to him that bygones were bygones and we wanted to start all over again." He testified he told Adkins that he wanted a full day's work for a full day's pay and mentioned that he had some relatives working at the plant-"And that put them in a very embrassing situa- tion." Tidwell said he did not tell Adkins that his relatives' jobs were on the line and testified that Adkins was having a hard time walking that his leg appeared swollen. As to what he meant by letting bygones be bygones Tidwell responded, "Union activities. But that was behind us. And we were going to abide by the outcome of the election. And that he had a family to support and a job to do." As to Adkins being active and attending union meetings Tidwell said, "I said I heard, employees, including Negroes-I think I've got to qualify that-it had been reported to me he had been carrying employees, Negroes, to union meetings." Tidwell did not say he gave more stringent rules to Adkins, but implied that there had been some problem between Adkins and Denny Justus and he wanted to get it settled and get on with the work. As stated above, I find Adkins to be a credible witness and it appears from Tidwell's testimony that he confirms most of Adkins' testimony with the insistent modification that he didn't ask questions but was answering questions. But the essence of what Tidwell corroborated served to confirm that the conversations occurred as Adkins testi- fied. Tidwell's statements that he did not recall were in many instances later changed by testimony that he did recall certain things, admitting for instance that the statement about bygones being bygones related specifically to Adkins' union activities. Adkins had a protected right to engage in union activities so Tidwell's forgiving him has the appearance of Respondent holding a grievance against Adkins for engaging in such union activities. The conversa- tion which took place after the surgery certainly indicates that Tidwell was angry with Adkins for having had the temerity to engage in union activities while giving Respondent information, possibly wrong information, about the union sentiments of various employees. I do not find that Tidwell adequately denied or explained the conversations and statements attributed to him by Adkins and find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by Tidwell's interrogating Adkins about his union sentiments and feelings and the union activities and sentiments of others, threatening the loss of his job and the possible loss of his relatives' jobs because of his union activities, and placing or threatening to place tighter restrictions on him for having engaged in union activity. 9. Joseph Gillum testified that, when he and Joe McCurdy were hired on January 27, they were told to report to James Brown who interviewed them and asked whether they were for the Union or not. They replied that they didn't know. Brown told them that the plant didn't need a union and he wanted no talk of the Union in the plant. The Company contended that Brown was not a supervisor but did not produce Brown or state why he was not produced to deny this testimony. I found Gillum to be a credible witness and, in the absence of any denial and having found that Brown is a supervisor and that the interrogation and statements took GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION place as Gillum testified, I conclude and find that Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 10. Sylvester Owens testified that some 2 to 3 weeks prior to the election Supervisor Tully asked him if the union man had been around to see him. Owens gave Tully an evasive answer. I found Owens to be a straightforward and credible witness and further, in the absence of any denial of his testimony, conclude and find that by this question Respondent unlawfully interrogated an employee and violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. II. Charles R. Keys testified that some 2 to 3 weeks prior to the election Tully asked how he felt about the Union and if the Union did come into the plant why the men would vote for it. According to Keys, Jerald Adkins was present during this conversation and the question was directed to both of them. Keys responded that he hadn't given it much thought and left the break room while Adkins remained behind with Tully. I have found no reason to discredit the testimony of Keys and believe him to be a credible witness and, further in the absence of any denial of this testimony, find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by Foreman Tully's unlawful interrogation of an employee as to his union sentiments and why employees would vote for a union. 12. James B. Paige testified that some 2 weeks prior to the election Tully asked how he felt about the Union and he responded that he was against it. Tully said he wanted Paige to back him up and that ended the conversation. Paige appeared to be a straightforward witness and in the absence of any substantial reason to discredit his testimony, and in the absence of any denial of his testimony, I credit it and find and conclude that Respon- dent, by Tully's unlawful questioning regarding Paige's feelings for the Union, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 13. James Mason testified that some 2 to 3 weeks prior to the election Tully asked what he thought about the Union and whether he was for it and he answered he didn't know. Tully then asked how Billy Ray Hall felt about the Union and he again responded he didn't know. Tully asked if they didn't ride together and he answered yes but they didn't talk much about the Union. Tully also asked how he was going to vote and he responded he didn't know. Mason appeared to be a credible witness and Respon- dent offered nothing concrete which reflected on his credibility and further, in the absence of any denial of his testimony, I credit it and find that Respondent, by Tully's unlawful interrogation of Mason as to his own union sentiments and the union sentiments of another employee, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 14. Jerald Adkins had several conversations about the Union with Tully starting in latter January. Tully on one occasion asked if Adkins thought the Union was going to go in and he responded no. On another occasion Tully asked if the Strong brothers were union or whether they had been going to union meetings , continuing that he felt most of his graveyard shift was against the Union but thought that maybe the two Strong brothers were for it and asked Adkins if they were or not Adkins replied he didn't think they were but didn't know. Tully then asked if James Mason and Billy Hall had been attending union meetings 139 or were for the Union and received the same answer from Adkins. Tully asked about Mason's and Hall's union sentiments on other occasions, up until he left the Company shortly before the election. Jerald Adkins testified in this proceeding following subpena enforcement proceedings against him and at the time of the hearing was a trainee in the Company's training program. As is set forth in other sections, Plant Manager Tidwell and other supervisors believed that Adkins was opposed to the Union and they sought information concerning the union sympathies of various employees from him. Respondent attacked Adkins' credibility on the basis of his failure to remember certain dates and the length of time he stated Sellers worked in the dryer department before his discharge. Adkins was not precise on dates and he is probably mistaken as to how long Sellers worked in the dryer room before his discharge, but his testimony was essentially corroborated by various Respondent witnesses with their modifications designed to avoid violations of the Act. Adkins appeared to make a sincere effort to recall and describe what happened and I found him a most credible witness in describing what he heard , saw, and said. The fact that Respondent's then plant manager , Tidwell, sought to keep Adkins from returning to work, following his appearance as a union observer, would tend to confirm the antiunion disposition of Respondent 's managerial person- nel present at the plant during the early part of 1971. It may either be taken as a sign of Adkins' competence and ability or as a change in the management personnel and their positions that Adkins has advanced to the trainee capacity he enjoyed at I the time 'of;the' hearing. I credit Adkins that the statements he reported by Tully were made and find that Respondent, through Tully's unlawful interrogations of an employee as to the union sentiments and activities of other employees and requests for information in that regard, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 15. Employee Larry Moffett testified that in late January Foreman Robert Hampton asked what he thought about the Union and he responded that he was just out of school and didn't know anything about it . Foreman Hampton admitted that he talked with Moffett concerning the Union but stated that he didn't ask any questions. He did admit that he asked Moffett if he had read the bulletin boards where antiunion articles were posted and that he was referring to them , but said he let the employee bring up the subject. This appears to be another occasion when Respondent's supervisors feel that they have insulated themselves from a charge of unlawful interrogation by assertedly not asking an employee the first question about a union , although bringing up the topic in a manner which would call for a response which might indicate the employee's sentiment. However, Larry Moffett's testimony is exact, and I credit that he was specifically asked what he thought about the Union. I find that this is unlawful interrogation with no legitimate purpose, and I conclude and find that Respon- dent by Foreman Hampton's unlawful interrogation violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 16. Larry Moffett testified that about a week and a half 140 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD before the election he was working on the platform when Foreman Walter Webb said to tell him what Moffett thought about the Union. Moffett responded that it had brought Webb that far. Webb made a derogatory exclama- tion. On a second occasion prior to the election Webb asked Moffett how many of the men were going to vote for the Union and he responded that the men didn't talk about it. Webb denied asking Moffett what he thought about the Union or that he asked if Moffett knew how the men were going to vote. He testified that Moffett had volunteered to him that he was for the Union and would vote for it. In the circumstances where practically every employee was trying to conceal his union sentiments I do not credit this testimony. The Company tried to attack Moffett's credibility by stating that he did not at first recall dates and then later conveniently did so. Actually Moffett's testimony shows that he did not recall dates very well and so stated. He appeared to make a sincere effort to try to remember what was said and I credit Moffett's version of the conversations he had with Webb. I conclude and find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by Webb's interrogating an employee concerning his union sentiments and his knowledge of the union sentiments of other employees. 17. Employee Bernice Dale testified that on the day that the "Vote No" buttons were passed out at the gate (I or 2 days before the election), Foreman Webb asked Dale where his button was and he responded that it was in his pocket and showed it to Webb. Webb then told him to go on and wear it, that no one was going to bother him. Dale said that he wouldn't chance it. Webb denied having such a conversation with Dale saying he merely walked by a group of employees and asked where all the buttons came from. Webb later said he did not know whether Dale had one of the "Vote No" buttons on at the time, but said that Dale spoke up and said he had a button in his pocket but didn't want to wear it because he was afraid somebody would tear his car up in the parking lot. Webb said he asked Dale who told him that and Dale didn't reply and that ended the conversation. In essence, after originally denying the conversation, Webb corroborates all of the conversation except asking Dale where his button was. For this question Webb substitutes that he asked a group of employees where the buttons came from, but no one, as far as his testimony indicates, bothered to answer that question. It must have been obvious to one and all who entered the plant that morning where the buttons came from, since Gambrell and several others were outside the plant passing them out. I do not credit Webb's testimony as to what he asked Dale. The response, which Webb says came from Dale that he wasn't wearing it because he was afraid of what would happen out in the parking lot, is not a response that would be elicited from a question as to where the buttons came from. This response would only come from a question as to where was Dale's button. I therefore credit Dale that the testimony took place as he described. A question of this nature, as to where the employee's "Vote No" button was, is an indication to the employee that he is suspected of being prounion by not wearing it and asking the employee for an explanation is unlawful interrogation . I therefore find and conclude that by this questioning Respondent through Supervisor Webb violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 18. Jerald Adkins testified that, after he returned to the graveyard shift around mid-January, he had several conversations concerning the Union with Foreman C. H. Miles. On one occasion about a week before the election Miles stated that he heard Adkins was going to union meetings and asked if he had done so and if Dean "Junebug" Jones was attending union meetings. On another occasion Adkins told Miles a bunch of his boys were going to union meetings. Miles said he heard that Adkins was going to see Union Representative Smith. On the night of the election, according to Adkins, Miles asked if he had a "Vote No" button. Miles denied asking Adkins anything concerning Jones or other employees' union sentiments or whether they had been going to union meetings. Miles did admit that he talked with Adkins about the Union, including a conversa- tion concerning Umon Representative Smith. -Miles re- called that shortly before the election Adkins walked up to him and told him a bunch of his boys were going to union meetings. He said he laughed and said he heard that Adkins had been going to see J. W. (meaning Smith) and that ended the conversation . He denied that anything was said about Jones or two other employees going to union meetings. In regard to a "Vote No" button he first denied that he had such a conversation, then said he didn't recall any such conversation. As stated above, I consider Adkins a credible witness who appeared to make a sincere and substantial effort to describe the events as they occurred. Miles said he would discuss the Umon with an employee if the employee brought the subject up and asked him a question . He said that Adkins volunteered information to him which he received. I believe that Miles was more than just a willing subject waiting for information to be offered by employees and that rather Miles pumped for this information by asking specific questions when he wished information about specific individuals . I find that the conversations took place as Adkins testified and find and conclude that Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) by interrogat- ing an employee concerning the union sentiments and activities of himself and other employees. 19. Reluctant General Counsel witness Clyde Corley testified that after the election Foreman John Alexander asked him how many employees were going to union meetings and he answered that most everybody was. Alexander asked who was going from his shift . He gave Alexander the names and said it looked like his whole shift was for the Union. Alexander told him to be sure and go to the meetings and let him know what was said. On another occasion Alexander said he wanted to write up (issue a warning slip to) Corley to see what Union Representative Smith would say about it. Corley estimated he had between 5 and 10 conversations with Alexander wherein Alexander asked him who was at the union meetings. Alexander testified that Corley wanted it clear that he was on the Company's side and would approach him and tell him what occurred at union meetings. Alexander GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION admitted that on occasions he would ask Corley who was at the meetings and Corley would tell him. He said that Corley at times told him without being asked. Alexander did not recall asking Corley to go to union meetings and report on what happened and who was there but said that was possible but not probable. As stated previously, I credit Corley's reluctant testimo- ny for the General Counsel and particularly here where Respondent's supervisor corroborates it and admits he questioned Corley as to the events at union meetings and to the identity of the employees present. Accordingly, I find that Respondent, by Foreman Alexander's unlawful interrogation of Corley as to what occurred and who was present at union meetings, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 20. Charles Ray Keys who worked on the graveyard shift testified that on the day of the election he got to the plant 1 or 2 hours early in order to find out the results of the election since he had voted that morning. Foreman Bill Chadsey stopped him and asked what he was there for, how he wanted the election to go, and was he for or against the Union. Keys said he was against the Union and gave the negative answer because he was fearful. Chadsey denied asking such a question but admitted talking to Keys that day, saying that Keys did come into the plant early and he asked him why. Keys said he wanted to find out how the election went and he allowed Keys to go to the breakroom since he had allowed another early arrival to go there. I have previously stated that I found Keys to be a credible witness and I find that this conversation occurred as he described. It would seem normal that a person reporting for his shift 1 to 2 hours early was displaying a great interest in the outcome of the election and might conceivably elicit an inquiry such as I find Chadsey made. Since this conversation occurred while the ballots were being counted and Keys had already voted in the election, the questions could not have had any affect on that election at that point. However, it is unlawful interrogation since it has no purpose other than to discover the union sentiments of the employee without a legitimate purpose. I conclude and find therefore that Respondent by this unlawful interrogation by Foreman Chadsey violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 21. Employee Dan Harris testified that, on the day the "Vote No" buttons were given out, proumon stickers were torn off his lunchbox and he accused Foreman Chadsey of doing it. He testified that Chadsey admitted doing it. Later that day Chadsey asked Hams if he was really going to go through with the Union and Harris responded that he was. Foreman Chadsey, although questioned by Respondent as to the allegations made by Keys, was not asked about the allegations concerning him made by Dan Hams. I find, therefore, that Chadsey did make the statements testified to by Harris and that thereby Respondent unlawfully interrogated him concerning his union sentiments , violat- ing Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 22. Willie Bob Dixon testified that on the day before the election Foreman -Eddie Jennings asked how he was going to vote and he answered he was going to vote right. Jennings showed Dixon a sample ballot which had an x 141 marked in the Company 's box, telling Dixon that is the right one to vote for. Dixon again responded he was going to vote right. Jennings admitted that on the day before the election he carried a sample ballot and showed it to every employee on the "green end" and read it to those who could not read. He said he showed the men the three boxes but denied that there was any marking on the ballot or in the block for the Company. He also denied that he asked any employee how he was going to vote . Jennings did admit that he told the employees how he wanted them to vote and said he destroyed the sample ballot later. Again we have the picture of Respondent's agent admitting most of the facts testified to by General Counsel's witness but stopping short of admitting commis- sion of an unfair labor practice by stating that the ballot was not marked and he did not ask how the men were going to vote. This blueprint of corroborating basic facts but denying asking questions while in some cases admitting provoking the conversations was not I have found followed complete- ly or of itself a complete defense against an unfair labor practices finding. I have found that Plant Manager Tidwell did not follow this blueprint but deviated and with such an example other supervisors asked questions when they felt they could with impumty. I found Willie Bob Dixon to be a credible witness and credit his version of the conversation and therefore find and conclude that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by Supervisor Jennings' questioning of Dixon regarding his voting intentions and showing the employees a sample ballot with an x marked in the Company's box. 23. Employee James B. Paige testified that about a week before the election he was in the breakroom when Foreman Robert H. Valentine asked how he felt about the Union. Valentine denied that he asked Paige such a question, stating that his breaktime differed from Paige. Employee James E. Clayton testified that about 3 days before the election Foreman Valentine asked how he felt about the Union and he responded that he didn't know. Valentine then asked if he knew of anyone who was for the Union. Valentine denied any such conversation with Clayton. Clayton further testified that the day before the election Valentine asked where his button was. Clayton responded that they weren't out there and he didn't see them issuing the "Vote No" buttons. Valentine testified that he was not asking Clayton about the "Vote No" button but was asking about his safety campaign button. Valentine said the Company has a safety campaign and that he has asked quite a few employees about the campaign or about the buttons . He claimed he didn't remember talking to Clayton, but is sure that if he did it was because he was asking about the safety buttons. Valentine impressed me as not being a credible witness. It was made clear that the safety campaign had been going on since Respondent's plant started in August 1970. It seems indeed extraordinary and oddly fortuitous that Valentine would have picked the day on which the "Vote No" buttons were being given out , and a number of them were being worn in the plant, to ask an employee where his 142 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD button was, meaning according to Valentine a safety button, when apparently only the "Vote No" buttons were in evidence. Valentine's explanation is a poor attempt at evasion in that he walks up to the line of a violation and tries to explain it away by saying he meant a different button. Clayton's answer that they weren't out there and he didn't see them issuing buttons would have demonstrated to Valentine that Clayton was not talking about safety buttons and if Valentine had been talking about a safety button he would have tried to ascertain what Clayton's response meant. I credit the testimony of Clayton and Paige concerning their conversations with Valentine and find that Respon- dent violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act by Valentine's interrogating employees concerning their union sentiments and the sentiments of others. By questioning Clayton as to where his "Vote No" button was, Valentine was accusing Clayton of being against Respondent and prounion and was unlawfully interrogating him as to his union senti- ments in violation of Section 8(a)(1). F. The Discharge of Shelton Sellers Shelton Sellers testified that he started working for the Company in August 1970 and attended the Company's school for about a week. Although he was assigned to the dryer operation, he was there only an hour or two the first day until Plant Superintendent Bob Adkins moved him to the glue room and made him the glue mixer. Near the end of October while mixing glue he heard a loud noise and as far as he could tell a screw had sheared off from the paddle of the glue mixing machine and he stopped it and sought help. The glue became thick and had to be chipped out, which apparently indicated to company personnel that the glue had been mixed improperly. On his next shift he was sent to the drying room where he was used as a dryer feeder, on the graveyard (II p.m.-7 a.m.) shift.; During the fall he had been visited at home by a union organizer, had signed a union authorization card, and agreed to help the union campaign by passing out the four or five authorization cards given him. He gave out two cards at the plant and two at other locations. On the morning of his discharge (around November 4) shortly before the end of the shift, Jerald Adkins the dryer tender told him Foreman Stanford wanted him in the office. Denny Justus, who was then a shift foreman, was present in the office with Stanford. Stanford told Sellers he was going to have to terminate him that morning and Sellers asked what was the matter. Stanford said that Sellers had stayed in the breakroom too long. Sellers responded that if he did he didn't know it and that he didn't believe he stayed in the breakroom too long. Justus spoke up and said that he had been caught smoking in the plant. Sellers denied it. Stanford said he had been timed on his breaks in the restroom. Sellers denied ever being warned about staying in the breakroom too long and testified that the employees were allowed to smoke in the breakroom. He stated that he had never been warned about smoking in the plant and that there was a sign on the building which prohibited smoking within 50 feet of the building. Nothing was said to him at the time of his discharge concerning the glue mixer. During cross-examination Sellers admitted that on one occasion Foreman Webb saw him with a cigarette in his hand and told him he could not smoke in the building. He explained to Webb that he had been sent out on an errand on his breaktime to move a truck and was on his way back in the building to take his break and was headed for the breakroom and though he had the cigarette in his hand he was not smoking. When Foreman Webb testified he related the incident and stated it happened long (2-3 months) before Sellers' discharge. Respondent sought to show that Sellers was not a good employee and had been demoted and, though not told so, was in effect on probation when moved in latter October or early November to the dryers. Personnel forms were offered in an attempt to show that Sellers was originally" employed at the dryers at a rate which was lowered when he went to the glue mixer. But the forms did not establish such over the precise testimony that he was at the dryers only an hour or two before being moved to the glue mixer. Respondent did not show any notice to Sellers that this last move placed him on probation and indeed acknowledged that the incident in the glue room and the transfer were not a part of Sellers' discharge. Dryer tender Jerald Adkins testified that Plant Manager Tidwell told him a man was coming on his shift who he thought was a union man and was pushing cards and he wanted to know if Adkins would find out if the man, Sellers, was union or not. Adkins said he would. Adkins talked with Sellers in the breakroom but Sellers gave him no union card, although letting him know he was prounion by stating that they needed a union in the plant and everyone had a right to be for it or against it. Adkins then asked employee Clyde Corley to find out if Sellers was passing out union cards. Corley corroborates this request and testified that he told Adkins he thought Sellers was passing out union cards and would try to find out for him. While they were in the breakroom together Corley asked Sellers for a card and Sellers said he would get him one. They arranged to meet after the conclusion of the shift and Sellers brought a folded union card to the breakroom and gave it to Corley. Corley testified that Sellers was on the shiftjust a short while, from I to 3 days. Adkins testified that Corley got a union card from Sellers although Corley didn't give it to him. According to Adkins, it was the following morning between 5:30 and 6 a.m. when Tidwell came in and asked Adkins-if he had found out about Sellers. Adkins replied yes that Sellers was 100 percent union. According to Adkins, either Tidwell or Stanford said it was awful to let a man go because he took too long on his breaks. Adkins testified that, following the break when Corley and Sellers went together, Corley had come back to him and told him that Sellers offered to get a card for him. Corley as noted above was a reluctant witness for the General Counsel and testified that he didn't tell Adkins he had gotten a card from Sellers (not the same thing Adkins said) and testified further that he had told no one he had gotten a card from Sellers until he told that to Respon- dent's counsel who apparently conducted some interviews at the plant prior to the trial in this matter. Corley testified that Adkins told him to tell the company attorney about GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION 143 getting the card from Sellers, with Corley explaining he thought Adkins had seen the company attorney before he did. Thereafter Corley apparently recognized the inconsis- tency of Adkins knowing about Sellers giving him the union card and he admitted that he could have told Adkins about getting the card from Sellers. While testifying for Respondent, Corley stated he timed Sellers' last break before his discharge and he was gone some 19 minutes, a point of information Corley said he supplied only to Respondent's counsel. Both Corley and Adkins agree that Sellers was dis- charged very shortly after Corley's conversation with him. Plant Manager Tidwell admitted that he had a conversa- tion with Adkins about the time that Sellers was moved from the glue loft to the dryers. He states he told Adkins a new employee was coming on the shift as a utility man and he was to make sure he didn't mess up on the dryer or cause any more problems. Tidwell denied that the Union was discussed at that time or that he asked Adkins to find out about Sellers' union activities. He testified, however, that he recalled a meeting a few nights later when Adkins told him that Sellers was bitter at the Company and was passing out union cards. Tidwell said he did not ask for that information but that Adkins gave it to him. Tidwell testified, however, that he did not have any conversation concerning what Adkins told him with Foreman Stanford prior to the time Sellers was discharged. Foreman Stanford testified that Superintendent Bob Adkins told him Sellers was being transferred to the dryers since he couldn't handle the job in the glue department and they couldn't afford any more mistakes like that one. According to Stanford, in the drying department the men have three breaks, a I0-minute break about 2 hours after the shift starts, a 20-minute break for lunch, and a 10- minute break about 2 hours before the shift ends. Those on the dryer are relieved in turn by a utility man and Stanford tries to hold the breaks to the alloted time, allowing 1 or 2 minutes extra for the time it takes to get to the breakroom. He testified that Sellers immediately started overstaying his breaks and although he didn't time him in the beginning, Sellers was taking 15 to 18 minutes on a 10-minute break and 30 to 35 minutes on a lunchbreak. He testified that he warned Sellers three or four times about overstaying breaks and Sellers would reply that he was sorry, but that he didn't correct his error. Stanford sought to give the impression that he was very sincere concerning the enforcement of the breaks, and of all the men in his department (some 65 or so) Sellers was the only one who gave him a problem. He said that, about the second or third day Sellers was there, he told Sellers if he overstayed his break anymore he would fire him. During cross-examination Stanford's testimony was not as consistent and he was not precise as to exactly when Sellers overstayed his breaks. He admitted that he had about 65 employees working for him and was aware of the union campaign and that the Company was strongly opposed to the Union as he himself was. On the day Sellers was discharged he stated that Sellers went into the lunchroom to take a 10-minute break and that he immediately started timing Sellers, since he had warned Sellers three or four times about taking too long on his breaks, and that he timed him as staying in the breakroom for some 20 minutes. Prior to the time Sellers came out, after he had been in there some 18 minutes, Stanford told Adkins to have Sellers come to the office. He did not tell Adkins what was going on but seeing Justus upstairs in the lunchroom asked him to sit in on the discharge, since he wanted a witness. Stanford admitted that at the time of Sellers' discharge he had been receiving information concerning the Union from Corley for several weeks. Stanford's version is that he told Sellers he was going to have to terminate him and Sellers said OK, and did not ask why. Stanford told Sellers he was terminating him because, "I warned you once about over staying your breaks, more than once, and you're not going to stop it, and I'm going to terminate you. And he said o.k." At that point Justus spoke up and told Sellers he had been given another chance by being put in that department but he just didn't seem to want to work. Stanford states nothing was said about the Union and Sellers was told he could leave. Following the issuance of the complaint in this matter Sellers was rehired in July 1971 by Respondent and has worked at the plant continuously. Respondent's version of the reason for discharge of Sellers does not ring true, once consideration is given to the other facts surrounding the discharge. Sellers' version of what was stated during the discharge appears to be the more likely version of the conversation. The fact that Justus was present because Stanford asked him to be there feeling he needed a witness came very slowly from Stanford. A question apses as to why Stanford would feel the need of a witness if he was discharging an individual merely for overstaying breaks and he had as he claimed no knowledge of the individual's union sentiments. Another odd fact is that, during this interview for which Justus would seemingly be unprepared, he reached back several months to accuse Sellers of an alleged cigarette smoking violation. Respondent sought additionally to fabricate a quasi-probationary period for Sellers by detailing his asserted mistake in the glue room, although admitting that whatever the problem there it had no part in his discharge and that Sellers was never informed he was on any sort of a probationary status. Essentially undenied however is that information was sought by Respondent's plant manager as to whether Sellers was passing out union cards. Jerald Adkins and Corley got together and determined that Sellers was prounion and would give out union cards and this was reported back to Tidwell, who admits that he had that information prior to Sellers' discharge. Added thereto is the animus Tidwell displayed toward Respondent being organized, his engaging in other unlawful acts of interroga- tion, and the fact that Stanford was either present when Tidwell received the information or at least was available to learn from Tidwell what was to be done. The disposal of Sellers was planned with the remark from either Tidwell or Stanford, as testified to by Jerald Adkins, that it seemed a shame to lay off a man for overstaying his breaks. This was the reason given Sellers for his discharge and clearly is not the reason why he was fired but rather is the nearest pretext which seemed possible. Sellers was fired for his union sentiments and actions and I so find. I do not credit 144 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Stanford's denial of knowledge of Sellers' union sentiments and activities, nor do I credit the denial of Tidwell that Stanford was not informed of or knew of Sellers' union proclivities at the time of the discharge. Certainly if Stanford had been receiving information about the Union from Corley for sometime prior to this discharge, it would seem odd that this bit of information concerning a new employee in that particular area would have failed to have been passed to him, particularly when the plant manager already knew it. I conclude and find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) by the discharge of Shelton Sellers and I shall order his reinstatement to the extent that such reinstatement may not have been granted in full at the time he was reemployed in July 1971. I also conclude and find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by Tidwell's request to Adkins and Adkins' subsequent request to Corley to determine whether Sellers was for the Union and was passing out union cards. III. OBJECTIONS TO CONDUCT AFFECTING RESULTS OF THE ELECTION In accordance with the various 8(a)(l) findings above of violations which occurred on and after January 22, it appears that Union's Objections 5, 8, 9, and 10 have been sustained and that the facts found warrant setting aside the election held on March 11. I therefore recommend that the results of the election held on March 11 be set aside and that a second election be held at an appropriate time.5 It is further ordered that Case 15-RC-4552 be hereafter transferred to and contin- ued before the Board. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section II, above, and therein found to constitute unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, occurring in connection with Respondent's business operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent discriminatorily termi- nated Shelton Sellers on or about November 4, 1970, because of his union sympathies and activities, I recom- mend that Respondent offer him immediate and full reinstatement to his former position insofar as it has not done so after rehiring him in July 1971, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges. Respondent shall make him whole for any loss of pay he may have 5 It should be noted that, although I have found that James Brown was held out by the Employer as a supervisor during a 6 - to 7-week period prior to the election, it is Respondent's timony and there would appear to be some evidence to show that Brown has not been made a permanent supervisor of Respondent and does not occupy a supervisory position at the suffered by reason of this discrimination against him by payment to him of a sum equal to that which he would have received 'as wages froiXi the date of his discharge, until he is fully reinstated, less any net interim earnings. Backpay is to be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner established by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, with interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum to be computed in the manner set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. I further recommend that Respondent make available to the Board, upon request, payroll and other records to facilitate checking the amounts of backpay due and any other rights of Shelton Sellers. Respondent also engaged in interrogation of its employ- ees concerning their union membership, activities, or sympathies and the union membership, activities, or sympathies of other of its employees, threatened employees with severe discipline or discharge or placing jobs of their relatives in jeopardy for engaging in union activities; gave its employees the impression that their union activities were under surveillance; and solicited an employee to distribute antiunion material. I will recommend that Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from violating the Act in the same or a manner similar to the violations found herein. From the basis of the foregoing findings and the entire record, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Georgia-Pacific Corporation is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By discriminatorily terminating Shelton Sellers on or about November 4, 1970, and not thereafter reinstating him to his position because of his union sympathies and activities, Respondent engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 4. Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act by interrogating employees concerning their union member- ship, sympathies, and activities and the union membership, sympathies, and activities of its other employees; threaten- ing employees with the imposition of discipline, or discharge, or placing the jobs of their relatives in danger for engaging in union activities; giving employees the impression that their union activities were under surveil- lance; and soliciting an employee to distribute antiunion material. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: 6' present time, whereas William E. Beasley and Robert H Valentine were supervisors at the relevant period and have continued to be supervisors since that time 6 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION 145 ORDER Respondent, Georgia-Pacific Corporation, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discharging employees and refusing to reinstate them in order to discourage these employees and other employ- ees from being or becoming union members. (b) Interrogating employees concerning their union sympathies, activities, desires, or membership or the union sympathies, activities, desires, and membership of other employees. (c) Threatening employees that they would be disciplined or discharged or that the jobs of their relatives would be placed in jeopardy because of their union sympathies or activities. (d) Giving employees the impression that their union activities were under surveillance. (e) Soliciting employees to distribute antiunion material. (f) In the same or similar manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form labor organiza- tions, to join or assist Southern Council of Lumber and Plywood Workers, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, to bargain collectively with representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer to Shelton Sellers reinstatement in accordance with the recommendations set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." (b) Make Shelton Sellers whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of Respondent's discrimina- tion against him according to the recommendations set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." (c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due and the rights and privileges accorded to Shelton Sellers as set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." (d) Notify immediately the above-named individual, if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of the right to full reinstatement, upon application after discharge from the Armed Forces, in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act. (e) Post at its Taylorsville, Mississippi, plant copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 7 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 15, after' being duly signed by Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein' shall, as provided in Section 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions , and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 15, in writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.8 Case 15-RC-4552 Case 15-RC-4552 is hereby transferred and continued before the Board for further processing. Respondent's motion to dismiss one section of the complaint has been granted herein and I further recom- mend that the other sections of the complaint not found to be violative of the Act be dismissed. In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 8 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read. "Notify the Regional Director for Region 15, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a trial in which the Company , the Union , and the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board participated and offered evidence , the National Labor Relations Board found that we violated the law and ordered us to post this notice and we intend to carry out the order of the Board and abide by the following: WE WILL NOT ask our employees about their union sympathies, activities, desires, or membership or the union sympathies, activities, desires, or membership of our other employees. WE WILL NOT give our employees the idea that we are keeping their union activities under surveillance. WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with discipline or discharge or that the jobs of their relatives are in jeopardy because of their union activities. WE WILL NOT ask any employee to distribute antiunion materials. WE WILL offer Shelton Sellers full reinstatement together with all of his rights and any backpay due him. WE WILL NOT discharge, layoff, or refuse to hire or rehire any employee in order to try to discourage our employees from being or becoming members of Southern Council of Lumber and Plywood Workers, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO. WE WILL NOT in the same or similar manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist Southern Council of 146 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Lumber and Plywood Workers, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America , AFL-CIO, to bargain collectively with representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. All our employees are free to become or remain union members. 'GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) We will notify immediately the above-named individual, if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of the right to full reinstatement, upon application after discharge from the Armed Forces, in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act. This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, T6024 Federal Building (Loyola), 701 Loyola Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana 70113, Telephone' 504-527-6361.