Unarco Industries, Inc.

FEDERAL STAINLESS SINK DIV. OF UNARCO Federal Stainless Sink Div. of Unarco Industries, Inc. and Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO Federal Stainless Sink Div. of Unarco Industries, Inc. and Textile Workers Union of America, Chicago Joint Board, AFL-CIO . Cases 14-CA-6210 and 14-RC-6697 June 14, 1972 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND KENNEDY On January 18, 1972, Trial Examiner Alvin Lieberman issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, General Counsel and Re- spondent filed exceptions and supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the Trial Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs, and has decided to affirm the Trial Examin- er's rulings, findings,' and conclusions and to adopt his recommended Order.2 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that Respondent, Federal Stainless Sink Div. of Unarco Industries, Inc., its officers, agents, succes- sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's recommended Order. ' Unlike the Trial Examiner, we will count the card of Alta Brown, which is dated March 2, 1971 It is well settled that the date for determining the union's majority status is the date on which the union's demand for bargaining is received by the employer Rea Construction Company, 137 NLRB 1769, 1770, fn I In this case the Union's letter containing its demand for recognition and bargaining was mailed on March 1, 1971 We believe that it is readily inferrable that this was not received by the Respondent until at least March 2 or possibly March 3. In either event Brown's card should be counted Chairman Miller, who agrees that the Union achieved majority status, nevertheless would not count the cards signed by employees Lorrance, Lance, and Sledge, as in each case the solicitation was accompanied by a representation which implied that the cards would be used only to obtain an election See Medley Distilling Company, Inc, 187 NLRB No 12, In 8. 2 Chairman Miller agrees that a bargaining order is appropriate herein as a part of the remedy but in accordance with his separate views as expressed in United Packing Company of Iowa, Inc, 187 NLRB No 132, and General Stencils, Inc, 195 NLRB No 173, he would predicate such order solely on the serious and extensive 8(a)(l) violations of the Respondent, particularly the promised wage increase TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE 489 ALVIN LIEBERMAN, Trial Examiner: Pursuant to a petition filed by Textile Workers Union of America, Chicago Joint Board, AFL-CIO, (herein, TWU) on March 1, 1971, and a consent-election agreement executed on March 16, 1971, a representation election was conducted in Case 14-RC-6697 among Respondent's employees. As shown by the tally of ballots, 37 votes were cast for, and 57 against, TWU. TWU filed objections to conduct affecting the results of the election. While these were under investigation by the Regional Director for Region 14 (herein, the Regional Director) of the National Labor Relations Board (herein, the Board) a complaint in Case 14-CA-6210, dated May 21, 1971, was issued by the General Counsel i alleging that Respondent had engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (herein, the Act). On May 25, 1971, the Regional Director reported on his investigation of TWU's objections to the election. Con- cluding that some raised questions of fact "which ... can best be resolved by a hearing," and noting that there was a substantial similarity between those objections and the allegations of the complaint, the Regional Director ordered that Cases 14-CA-6210 and 14-RC-6697 "be . . . consoli- dated for purposes of hearing, ruling, and decision by a Trial Examiner and that thereafter Case 14-RC-6697 shall be severed and transferred to [him] for further processing." The trial in this consolidated proceeding, with all parties represented, was held before me in Paris, Illinois, on 7 days between July 12 and 28, 1971.2 In general, the issues litigated were whether Respondent had violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act and whether the election should be set aside on the basis of the objections filed by TWU. Particularly, the principal questions for decision are as follows: 1. Did Respondent violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by, as the complaint alleges, threatening employees; i The complaint was issued pursuant to a charge filed on April 22, 1971, by the Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, with which TWU appears to be affiliated. 2 During the trial, the pleadings were amended in several respects and some allegations of the complaint were dismissed Respecting the former, pars. 4 and 5AA were amended by substituting the name "Winfield Best" for the name "Wendy," and par 4 of the answer was amended to admit the allegations of par. 4 of the complaint , as amended Par 51 of the complaint was amended by inserting the phrase "and March" after the word "February" Subpar. 0 of par 5 of the complaint was amended by substituting the words "On or about February 25, 1971" for the words "During the month of March 1971 " Finally, the clause "and offered the employee benefits in order to discourage employee union activities" was added to par 5Z At the conclusion of the General Counsel's case in chief the words "Manufacturing Superintendent Dean Tomlinson and" were stricken from par 5H of the complaint, and pars 5Q, 5S, 5T, 5X, and 511 were dismissed The General Counsel has suggested that the dismissal of par 5T was improvident The main thrust of par IT is that by the conduct (Continued) 197 NLRB-'No. 76 490 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD creating the impression that their union activities were under surveillance ; soliciting employees to engage in such surveillance ; promising, and granting, benefits to employ- ees to dissuade them from supporting the Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO (hereinafter, the Union); interrogating employees concerning their union activities and their conversations with an agent of the Board; and by other means? 2. Did the Umon represent a majority of Respondent's employees when its irequest for bargaining was made? 3. Assuming an affirmative answer to question 2, was Respondent's failure to bargain with the Union violative of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act? 4. Should the objections to the election be sustained and the election set aside?3 5. Assuming an affirmative answer to question 4, should a bargaining order issue or should a second election be directed? Upon the entire record,4 upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying , and upon careful consideration of the arguments made and the briefs submitted, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT6 1. JURISDICTION Respondent, an Illinois corporation, is engaged in Pans, Illinois, in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of sinks. During the year ending on April 30, 1971, Respondent shipped to customers located outside the State of Illinois goods valued at more than $50,000. Accordingly, I find that Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act and that the assertion of jurisdiction over this matter by the Board is warranted. Siemons Mailing Service, 122 NLRB 81, 85. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED The Union and TWU are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. there set forth Dean Tomlinson, Respondent's superintendent, created "the impression of surveillance of employee Union activities," and solicited an employee "to engage on behalf of Respondent in surveillance of other employees and their union activities " Not only are the allegations of par. 5T repetitious of other paragraphs of the complaint, for example 5P and 5U, but also Tomlinson, upon being called as a witness for Respondent, was examined with respect to his conduct as alleged in those paragraphs Accordingly, even if par 5T of the complaint was improvidently dismissed, the dismissal did not prejudice any party to this proceeding 3 In view of the substantial similarity between the objections and the allegations of the complaint, as noted by the Regional Director, separate findings of fact with respect to the objections will not be made Instead, the findings of fact referring to the complaint will relate to the objections where applicable 4 Issued simultaneously is a separate order correcting obvious inadvert- ent errors in the stenographic transcript of this proceeding [Omitted from publication ] 5 Although all the arguments of the parties and the authorities cited by them, whether appearing in their briefs or made orally at the trial, may not be discussed in this Decision, each has been carefully weighed and considered 6 Respondent's motions made at the conclusion of the trial, upon which decision was reserved , and those appearing in its brief are disposed of in accordance with the findings and conclusions set forth in this Decision. I As the contentions of the General Counsel and the Union are similar, III. INTRODUCTION Briefly, this case concerns itself with events following the Union's institution of a drive to establish itself as the collective-bargaining representative of Respondent's em- ployees. Among these were the Union's request, to which Respondent did not accede, for bargaining and the defeat of TWU in a representation election. The General Counsel and the Union contend 7 that TWU's8 election loss was occasioned by, what the General Counsel terms on brief, Respondent's "massive unlawful anti-Union campaign," in the course of which, continues the General Counsel, it "committed repeated and substan- tial 8(a)(1) violations." Respondent's conduct, thus charac- terized by the General Counsel, is pleaded with particulari- ty in the complaint, which also asserts that Respondent continued to trench upon Section 8(a)(1) of the Act after the election.9 Finally, the complaint alleges that Respon- dent's failure to comply with the Union's request for bargaining contravened Section 8(a)(5).'° For its part, Respondent denies the complaint's allega- tions that it violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Concerning its failure to bargain with the Union, Respondent main- tains that it was not obliged to do so because, as stated in its brief, "the Union at no time ever represented a majority of [its] employees," and that, in any event, it had "at all times . . . a good faith doubt as to the Union's .. . majority." IV. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS" A. Credibility The complaint alleges some 50 separate violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by Respondent. The testimony of the witnesses called by the General Counsel to support these allegations, except with respect to interrogation carried on by Respondent's officials and supervisors during the Union's organizing campaign, was in the main denied or contradicted by Respondent' s witnesses. It is apparent, therefore, that the resolution of these credibility they will be referred to hereinafter as the General Counsel's contentions 8 Hereinafter, TWU, like the Union, with which it is affiliated, will be referred to as the Union 9 The nature of these claimed violations, both before and after the election, appear above in my statement of the principal questions for decision io Quoted below are the provisions of the Act mentioned in the text* Sec. 8 (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7, (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a) Sec 7, insofar as relevant, is as follows. Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to self -organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing , and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. ii The purpose of these findings is to furnish a frame of reference within which to consider the facts relating to Respondent's alleged unfair labor practices and the conclusions to which they may give rise To the extent that the contentions of the parties relate specifically to the findings made here, they will be treated here, although they, as well as the findings, may again be considered in other contexts FEDERAL STAINLESS SINK DIV. OF UNARCO 491 conflicts will weigh the balance in favor of the General Counsel or Respondent. Putting aside for the moment the testimony given by Robert Maxwell, all the other telling testimonial evidence in support of the phase of the complaint here under consideration was furnished by witnesses who, at the time of the trial, were employed by Respondent. Among these employee witnesses were Carol Maxwell and Larry Winkler. Carol Maxwell believes, as she stated, that she had "the best paying job a woman could have" in Respondent's plant. Winkler was recently promoted to the position of plant technician, a nonsupervisory job, and at the time of the trial was being groomed for a foremanship. "The average employee [providing information in a proceeding to which his employer is a party] is keenly aware of his dependence upon his employer's good will, not only to hold his job but also for the necessary job references essential to employment elsewhere." 12 Bearing this truism in mind, it is plain to see that the employee witnesses who testified against Respondent, especially Carol Maxwell and Winkler, did so knowing that they were in considerable peril of economic reprisal. Having thus much to lose, their testimony, adverse to Respondent, was in a sense contrary to their own interests and for this reason not likely to be false.13 Accordingly, taking into account the foregoing as well as the comparative demeanor of the employee witnesses on the one hand and the officials and supervisors called as witnesses by Respondent who gave conflicting or contrary testimony on the other, I credit the former over the latter. Of the complaint's many allegations related to Respon- dent's violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, about 30 are attributed to the conduct of Dean Tomlinson, Respon- dent's superintendent. Robert Maxwell, Carol Maxwell's husband, was called by the General Counsel to give evidence in support of many of these claims. In recognition of this, Respondent's lawyer suggested, albeit facetiously, that the caption of this proceeding was "incorrect [and] should be Maxwell against Tomlinson." _ Maxwell was employed by Respondent from February 1965 until February 1968 and again from August 1969 until June 30, 1971. On the last mentioned date, he was discharged for refusing to perform certain work to which he was assigned.14 Before his first tour of duty with Respondent, Maxwell was twice convicted and sentenced to prison for burglary and robbery. While working for Respondent in 1968, he was found guilty of grand theft and again sentenced to prison. Maxwell did not set forth his first two convictions in the space provided for such information on the formal application for employment he filed with Respondent in February 1965. Respondent became aware, in August 1965, that Maxwell had falsified his application. Although Merle Leffelman, Respondent's personnel director, cau- tioned Maxwell against again submitting an incomplete employment application, he was not discharged for having done so because, as Leffelman testified, in his "judgment [Maxwell's] attendance ... attitude and efforts with and for the company were such that [he] overlook[ed] this falsification." Leffelman and Tomlinson, Respondent's superintendent, appeared as character witnesses for Maxwell when he was tried in 1968 for grand theft. Maxwell was, however, found guilty and sentenced to prison. Maxwell twice applied for parole. On each occasion, Leffelman and Tomlinson interceded on his behalf, again testifying to Maxwell's good character. In addition, they assured the parole board that if Maxwell were released from confinement, Respondent would offer him a job. Maxwell was paroled in August 1969 and promptly taken back into Respondent's employ. Respondent argues that Maxwell's testimony should not be believed because of his three convictions, his having submitted a false application for employment, and his discharge some 2 weeks before he testified. Considering the foregoing in inverse order, Maxwell did not appear to harbor any ill will toward Respondent because of his discharge. In this connection, in the course of his testimony Maxwell, with apparent sincerity, referred to Leffelman and Tomlinson, both of whom were instrumental in bunging about his discharge, as being "good" men, and to Tomlinson "as [being] a friend." Maxwell's failure to note his convictions on his applica- tion for employment with Respondent does not necessarily indicate a proclivity on his part to tell lies. Knowing that a disclosure of his criminal record on the application would probably have resulted in the denial of the job sought, as was acknowledged by Leffelman, Respondent's personnel director, to have volunteered such information in the application would have required strength of character not ordinarily possessed by the average person. And Maxwell did not appear to be above average. Maxwell's criminal record, however, gives me great pause. A trier of the facts normally views with a large degree of skepticism testimony given by a witness thrice convicted of felonies involving dishonest acts. Especially is this so where, as here, witnesses not similarly disadvan- taged have given contrary testimony. However, even in such a situation much depends on impressions. N.L.R.B. v. Dinion Coil Company, Inc., 201 F.2d 484, 487-490 (C.A. 2). My impression of Maxwell is that he was rehabilitated by the chastening experience of his last incarceration. That Leffelman and Tomlinson, high officials of Respondent, must have thought so, too, is evidenced by their having vouched for his good character while Maxwell was serving his term and by their having readily accepted him as an employee upon his enlargement on parole. Seemingly, they would not have done these things were Maxwell "totally unreliable" and "a dedicated liar," as Respondent characterized him on brief In my judgment, based on his demeanor on the witness stand, Maxwell is neither. Although he was unable, at times, to remember clearly some of the events as to which he was called on to give evidence or the dates on which 12 Wirtz v BA C Steel Products, Inc, et a!, 312 F 2d 14, 16 (C A 4) 13 See, in this connection , Georgia Rug Mill, 131 NLRB 1304, 1305, modified on other grounds 308 F 2d 89 (C A 5) 14 The General Counsel does not contend, nor does the complaint allege, that Maxwell's discharge was violative of the Act 492 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD they occurred, it did not seem to me that Maxwell was testifying falsely, as Respondent would have me conclude. Accordingly, I credit the testimony given by Maxwell rather than the contrary or conflicting testimony offered by Respondent's witnesses.15 B. The Removal of Respondent's Plant to Paris, Illinois Unarco Industries, Inc., (herein, Unarco), is composed of eight divisions. Unarco's Federal Stainless Sink Division (herein, Federal Division), with which this proceeding is concerned, was originally located in Bloomington, Illinois. It was moved to Paris, Illinois, in December 1970. While situated in Bloomington, the Union represented the employees of the Federal Division, and Respondent and the Union were parties to a collective agreement. Toward the end of October or early in November 1970, several employees conferred with Merle Leffelman, Re- spondent's personnel director, concerning the impending relocation of the Federal Division. Specifically, they were interested in knowing whether their employment would be continued in Paris. Leffelman assured them that if they applied for employment in Pans, they would be hired, but at a lower rate of pay than was then in effect in Bloomington. In response to the employees' questions about their accumulated seniority, Leffelman informed them, as he stated, that because Respondent "cancelled the [union] contract in Bloomington . . seniority would roll back to zero." Leffelman also told the employees present at this conference, as he further testified, that there would "not [be] a union in the Paris plant." 16 C. The Union's Organizational Campaign and its Bargaining Request Shortly after the establishment of Respondent's plant in Pans, the Union started to organize Respondent's employ- ees. It began by openly distributing literature and authori- zation cards at the plant gate on about January 25, 1971.17 On February 18, the Union held the first of several meetings with employees. Two meetings were conducted on that day, one at 1 p.m. and the other at 4 p.m. Both were chaired by Bill Sharpe, a business agent of the Union. After giving the employees who came to the earlier meeting some general information about the. Union and the manner in which it operated, Sharpe told them that before the Union could "demand . . . recognition from the company" a "majority of the people have to sign 15 Having thus concluded that Respondent's employees and Robert Maxwell, who at the time of the trial no longer worked for Respondent, should be believed rather than Respondent 's officials and supervisors where their testimony conflicts with, or is contradictory of, that given by its employees and Robert Maxwell , I will make no further reference to credibility From time to time, however, these testimonial differences may be mentioned in appropriate footnotes 16 The complaint does not allege, nor does the General Counsel contend, that Leffelman 's remarks, set forth in the text, were violative of the Act 17 All dates hereinafter mentioned without stating a year fall within 1971 is My findings as to what transpired at the February 18 meetings are based on, and the quotations appearing in the text are taken from , Sharpe's testimony , 19 G C. Exh 22 authorization cards." Sharpe then gave authorization cards to those present for their own use and for distribution to other employees. At the second meeting held on February 18, Sharpe again talked about the Union's method of operation and again passed out authorization cards. Concerning the latter, Sharpe remarked that, if 30 percent of Respondent's employees signed cards, a representation election could be had. Without further pursuing that line of discussion, Sharpe talked about the use to which the cards would be put. In this regard, Sharpe stated that the Union "will always sign [up] a majority of the people . . . and then make a demand for recognition upon the company." Continuing on this subject, Sharpe "told [the employees that] once they signed the cards . . . they were authorizing the [Union] to be their collective bargaining representa- tive." 18 Authorization cards were signed by employees before, during, and after the February 18 meetings. On March 1, 1971, the Union embarked upon two courses of action. It filed a petition for certification as the bargaining agent of Respondent's production and mainte- nance employees and it wrote a letter 19 to Respondent requesting that Respondent bargain with it. In this letter, the Union claimed to have been "designated [by a majority of Respondent's production and maintenance employees] as the exclusive representative of all such employees, for the purpose of collective bargaining." The Union further stated that it stood "ready to prove [its] majority status by submitting signed authorization cards to a mutually selected impartial person." The foregoing letter was addressed to Respondent in Paris. Although received there on or before March 3,20 it was never answered by Respondent, nor did Respondent bargain with the Union. To round out the bargaining picture, and by way of brief recapitulation of what has already been noted, on March 16, 1971, Respondent and the Union executed a consent- election agreement. The subsequent representation elec- tion, held on April 2, resulted in the Union's defeat. D. The Union's Majority On March 1, 1971, when the Union's bargaining request was made, there were in Respondent's Pans plant 105 production and maintenance employees.21 To establish the Union's majority in the appropriate unit on that date22 the General Counsel placed in evidence 60 authorization cards. Each card clearly and unambiguously authorized 20 Harris Moyer, who in March 1971 was president of the Federal Division, testified that "probably [on] the 2nd or 3rd of March" during a telephone conversation with the then manager of the Paris plant he "heard about the contents of the [Union's] letter " 21 The appropriate unit for bargaining, as to which there is no dispute, is described in the complaint as "all production and maintenance employees of the Employer's Paris, Illinois, facility, excluding office clerical employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act " 22 "[T ]he crucial question in a refusal to bargain case is whether the union had the support of a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit at the time the request to bargain was made International Union, U A W v. N L R B, 392 F 2d 801, 808 (C A.D.C.), cert denied 392 U S 906 FEDERAL STAINLESS SINK DIV. OF UNARCO 493 the Union to represent the signer as his collective-bargain- ing agent.23 It is Respondent's position that two groups of cards received in evidence should not be considered in determin- ing the Union's majority. Respondent argues that those in the first group, consisting of 5 cards, were not properly authenticated, and that those in the second group, consisting of 27 cards, were invalid because, as it states on brief, they "were . . . signed . .. for the sole purpose of obtaining an election." Three cards whose authenticity Respondent has placed in issue, those purporting to have been signed by Kenneth Jernigan, William Nicholas, and Louie Bailey,24 were received in evidence on testimony of Robert Maxwell, who is not a handwriting expert and who did not see the cards signed, to the effect that he was familiar with the signatures of the employees concerned and that the signatures on the cards in question appeared to be theirs. The fourth card in this category, purporting to have been signed by Jim Baroni,25 was received in evidence on similar testimony given by Carol Maxwell, who also is not a handwriting expert and did not witness the signing of the card. "There is .. . no reason to believe that signatures must be authenticated in a more restrictive manner in Board proceedings than in other administrative or in judicial proceedings. Wigmore's treatise on Evidence [Sec. 2131 (3d ed., 1940) ] supplies overwhelming precedent that the genuineness of signatures may be proved by the testimony of those who did not witness the actual signing. Handwrit- ing experts may state their opinion as to whether A signed a particular document, by comparing A's purported signature thereon with his known genuine signatures; and nonexperts may state their opinions based on their familiarity with A's handwriting. The competency of a nonexpert witness to state an opinion as to the genuineness of A's signature may be tested by examining him on his claim that he is familiar with A's handwriting . . . . and the genuineness is then left for the trier of fact." Thrift Drug Company, etc., 167 NLRB 426, 430, enfd. 404 F.2d 1097 (C.A. 2), remanded 395 U.S. 828, affd. 179 NLRB 827. Robert Maxwell was examined on his claim of familiari- ty with the signatures of Jernigan, Nicholas, and Bailey. On this score he testified that shortly after he started to work for Respondent in Pans he became "a floater through the polishing department helping all new employees learn their jobs and learn to set their machines up"; that in this capacity he trained Jernigan, Nicholas, and Bailey in the operation of their machines and each day he helped them prepare, and saw them sign, their workcards; 26 and that in this way he became familiar with their signatures. In addition, respecting Bailey, Robert Maxwell stated that after Bailey was transferred to the shipping department Bailey issued stock to him every day and in connection with each such transaction Bailey signed a document, which he saw, listing the material delivered to him. 23 The full text of each card, appearing above the signature line is as follows- I hereby accept membership in the [Union] and of my own free will hereby authorize the [Union], its agents or representatives to act for me as a collective bargaining agency in all matters pertaining to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment Carol Maxwell was likewise examined on the manner in which she became familiar with Baroni's signature. In this regard she testified that Baroni's work station is adjacent to hers; that "every day" Baroni "borrows [her] pen to fill out his [work] card,"; and that on these occasions she has seen Baroni's signature "at the top of the card." The foregoing testimony given by Robert Maxwell and Carol Maxwell persuades me that the former was, indeed, familiar with the signature of Jernigan, Nicholas, and Bailey and the latter with the signature of Barone, and that the signatures on the cards in question are genuine. This being so, I conclude that the cards were properly authenticated and they will be counted in determining the Union's majority. The fifth card claimed by Respondent to have been improperly authenticated is that purporting to have been signed by Floyd Tresner.27 Concerning this card, Robert Maxwell testified that he "saw [Tresner] sign it." It is well settled that authorization cards may be authenticated by persons who witnessed their signing. See, for example, Lifetime Door Company, 158 NLRB 13, 21, enfd. 390 F.2d 272 (C.A. 4), and Economy Food Center, Inc., 142 NLRB 901, 912, enfd. 333 F.2d 468 (C.A. 7). In view of this, I conclude that the card in question was actually signed by Tresner. Accordingly, it will be counted in determining the Union's majority. As noted above, Respondent has challenged a second group of cards, 27 in number, as having been signed "for the sole purpose of obtaining an election." The law applicable to such a claim was summarized by the Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co. Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 606-607. There the Court stated: [E]mployees should be bound by the clear language of what they sign unless that language is deliberately and clearly canceled by a union adherent with words calculated to direct the signer to disregard and forget the language above his signature. There is nothing inconsistent in handing an employee a card that says the signer authorizes the union to represent him and then telling him that the card will probably be used first to get an election. . . . We cannot agree with the employers here that employees as a rule are too unsophisticated to be bound by what they sign unless expressly told that their act of signing represents something else. In the concluding phase of its discussion of this point, the Court expressly "reject[ed] any rule that requires a probe of an employee's motivations" in signing an authorization card. Accordingly, a card unequivocally designating a union as an employee's bargaining agent and which does not mention that it will be used in any other fashion, as is the situation respecting the cards in this case, must be accepted as such, regardless of the signer's subjective intent, unless he was told by the person who solicited his signature that the card would not be used for its stated purpose, but to 24 These cards are in evidence as, respectively , G.C. Exhs 11, 14, and 35 25 This card is in evidence as G C. Exh. 60 26 Employees in Respondent's plant are required each day to prepare and sign a card on which they set forth various matters relating to their work 27 This card is in evidence as G C Exh. 18 494 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD attain an entirely different result. To invalidate unambigu- ous cards on the ground urged by Respondent it must be shown, as the Board held in Levi Strauss & Co., 172 NLRB No. 57,28 that their solicitors "explicit[ly] or indirectly [represented] that they will use such cards only for an election." In explanation of this rule the Board appended the following footnote to its decision: The foregoing does not of course imply that a finding of misrepresentation is confined to situations where employees are expressly told in haec verba that the "sole" or "only" purpose of the cards is to obtain an election. The Board has never suggested such a mechanistic application of the foregoing principles, as some have contended. The Board looks to substance rather than to form. It is not the use or nonuse of certain key or "magic" words that is controlling, but whether or not the totality of circumstances surround- ing the card solicitation is such, as to add up to an assurance to the card signer that his card will be used for no purpose other than to help get an election. With the foregoing precepts in mind the cards here challenged by respondent will be examined. Among these are cards signed by Pauline Fleming, Maude Hill, Patrick Bowman, Dave Dery, Elizabeth Hendricks, Richard Ellingsworth, Ronald McConkey, Gary Mefford, Louie Bailey, Ray Luth, Steven Overaker, Aaron Fowler, Jim Beauchamp, Herman Richey, Mike Lindsey, and Robert Maxwell.29 I have carefully examined the record relating to the signing of these cards and can find no evidence that an election was even mentioned by their solicitors. According- ly, they will be counted in determining the Union's majority. The second set of cards falling within this group consists of those signed by employees who were present at the second union meeting held on February 18, 1971.30 Upon receiving their cards from Bill Sharpe, the Union's business agent who presided at that meeting, they were informed by him, as I have found, that the Union would demand recognition from Respondent if a majority of its employees signed cards. To emphasize this point Sharpe told the employees, as I have further found, that when they signed the cards "they were authorizing the [Union] to be their collective bargaining representative." Although Sharpe mentioned at this meeting that an election could be had if only 30 percent of the employees signed cards, this remark was obviously informative. It is not, when taken in context, an "explicit or indirectly expressed representation" 31 that the Union would use the cards only to obtain an election. Accordingly, these cards will also be counted in determining the Union's majority. The remaining cards in the group to which Respondent objects on the ground here under consideration were 28 Levi Strauss was cited with approval in Gissel 29 These cards are in evidence, respectively, as G C Exhs 8, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 38, 39, 44, 45, 54, 57, and 59 30 The cards in question were signed by Kenneth Jernigan, Max Lindsey, William Nicholas, Floyd Tresner, and Jim Barom. They are in evidence, respectively, as G C Exhs 11, 12, 14, 18, and 60 31 Levi Strauss & Co, 172 NLRB No 57 32 These cards are in evidence, respectively, as G C Exhs. 42, 43, 47, 50, 52, and 56 signed by Shirley Lorance, Marianne Lance, Richard Page, Daniel Morrison, Robert Holland, and Louise Sledge.32 The circumstances under which these cards were signed are set forth below. Lorance and Lance: These employees received their cards from Donald Orris, who also worked for Respondent. They signed after Orris told them, as Alice Gail who was present at the time testified, that "they needed so many more cards before they could go ahead and get an election." I , Page, Morrison, and Holland: The cards which these employees signed were solicited by another employee, Dennis Thomas. As Thomas testified, "when [he] handed them the cards [he] explained to them . . . that we had a few people signed up but we needed to get as many as we could so we could have almost a full support of the plant before we took it to the ... Board to have it proposed to get an election and to have the union bargain for the employees." Sledge: Sledge was asked to sign a card by Maude Hill, also employed by Respondent. Hill told Sledge, as Sledge related, that "we need six or eight more signatures in order for the union to hold an election." A situation closely paralleling those just described was present in Crawford Manufacturing Co., Inc., 161 NLRB 989, 990, 1024. There, in seeking a signature to an authorization card which, like those here, made no mention of an election, the solicitor stated that "he had to have so many cards signed before we could have a vote on the Union." In considering the effect of this statement in the light of the nature of the card it was held that it was "not the kind of a representation which invalidates an otherwise valid authorization card." 33 Furthermore, as Gissel teaches,34 "[t]here is nothing inconsistent in handing an employee a card that says the signer authorizes the union to represent him [as do those in this case ] and then telling him that the card will probably be used first to get an election." This, in my opinion, speaks much for upholding the validity of the cards signed by Lorance, Lance, Page, Morrison, Holland, and Sledge, notwithstanding the "election" statements made by their solicitors. Accordingly, these, too, will be counted in determining the Union's majority. There is in the record, however, a card, signed by Alta Brown,35 which I will not count. This card is dated March 2, 1971, and there is no evidence to show that it was signed earlier. Having been signed after March 1, the date of the Union's bargaining request, this card may not be consid- ered in determining the Union's majority. International Union, U.A. W. v. N.L.R.B., 392 F.2d 801, 808 (C.A.D.C.), cert. denied 392 U.S. 906. Summarizing all of the foregoing, I find that by March 1, 1971, the day on which Respondent was requested to bargain with the Union, 59 production and maintenance 33 In Crawford the Board entered a bargaining order, founded , in part, on the majority of the union there involved, as demonstrated by cards, which the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit refused to enforce (386 F.2d 267) The denial of enforcement, however, was based on representa- tions other than the one quoted in the text which, in the court's opinion, tainted the cards. 34 395 U.S. 575, 606-607 3s G.C Exh 70. FEDERAL STAINLESS SINK DIV. OF UNARCO 495 employees working for Respondent had signed cards validly authorizing the Union to serve as their bargaining agent.36 There having been 105 employees in that unit on March 1, the Union's majority status on that day has been established. V. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The complaint alleges that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. The violations of Section 8(a)(1) set forth in the complaint are stated to have been committed before and after the representation election held on April 2, 1971. Those claimed to have taken place before the election fall within the following categories, assertedly proscribed by Section 8(a)(1): 1. Interrogating employees concerning their union activity and attitudes.37 2. Threats 3. Creating the impression of surveillance of employ- ees' union activities. 4. Requesting employees to report on the union activities of other employees. 5. Promising, and granting, benefits to individual employees to dissuade them from supporting the Union. 6. Requesting employees to campaign, and vote, against the Union. 7. Interrogating employees as to the probable outcome of the election. 8. Instituting a premium pay plan to dissuade employ- ees from supporting the Union. Summarizing the allegations of the complaint, Respon- dent's claimed postelection violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act may be said to fall within the following assertedly proscribed classifications: 1. Threats. 2. Interrogating employees as to whether, and how, they voted in the election. 3. Creating the impression of surveillance concerning visits to employees by an agent of the Board. 4. Interrogating employees concerning their interviews with an agent of the Board. A. Facts, Contentions, and Conclusions Concerning Respondent 's Alleged Preelection Violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act 1. General interrogation In its brief, Respondent admits that "during the period of the organizational campaign [it] engaged in .. . interrogation of [its] employees " However, relying on Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109 NLRB 591, Respondent argues that such interrogation was "lawful," its purpose being to ascertain whether the Union actually represented a majority of its employees and "its interrogations occurred in an atmosphere free of threats and were communicated to its employee with assurance against reprisals." Whether, in view of Struksnes Construction Co., Inc., 165 NLRB 1062, 1063, the doctrine enunciated in Blue Flash is still the law is problematical. In any event, the record is devoid of evidence to show that, as Respondent asserts in its brief, its "interrogations . . . were communicated to its employees with assurance against reprisals." Furthermore, its interrogation of employees did not occur "in an atmosphere free of threats." As will be shown below, threats were uttered by Respondent's agents. These, being intrinsically coercive, imparted a coercive aspect to the interrogation. Cohen Bros. Fruit Company, 166 NLRB 88, 89, 96. I conclude, therefore, that Respondent's general interro- gation of employees was violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 2. Threats and creating the impression of surveillance As will be shown, Merle Leffelman, Dean Tomlinson, and Dale Rhoads, respectively Respondent's personnel manager, superintendent, and production foreman,38 created the impression that the union activities of Respon- dent's employees were under surveillance. They also made substantial threats of reprisal against employees for supporting the Union. Respondent's conduct of the character here under consideration was directed, in the main, against Robert Maxwell and his wife, Carol Maxwell. In December 1970, shortly before Christmas and some 2 or 3 weeks after Robert Maxwell started to work in the Respondent's Pans plant, Leffelman told Maxwell that he had "been hearing . . . reports" that Maxwell was "a union organizer" and was "talking about the union down here." Brushing off Maxwell's denial, Leffelman pointedly stated, "you know we didn't have to give you a job down here." 39 Leffelman's remark about his "reports" concerning Robert Maxwell clearly conveyed to him the impression that his activities in support of the Union were under surveillance. Plasticoid Company, 168 NLRB 135. In my opinion, Leffelman's subsequent statement was an equally clear threat that Maxwell would be discharged should he continue to organize, and talk about, the Union. On February 17, 1971,40 Tomlinson, Respondent's superintendent, informed Carol Maxwell that there would be a union meeting that evening and that "it would be best for [her] if [she] didn't go." The next day Tomlinson again spoke to Carol Maxwell about the union meeting, telling her that he had been mistaken about its date and that it would actually be held that night. Broadening his previous admonition about her attendance, Tomlinson "told [her] it 36 1 have, thus, counted all but one of the cards adduced in evidence by the General Counsel 37 For convenience this type of interrogation will be subsequently referred to as general interrogation 38 Respondent has admitted Rhoad's supervisory status 39 My findings concerning this conversation between Leffelman and Robert Maxwell are based on, and the quotations appearing in the text have been taken from, testimony given by the latter 40 It will be remembered that on the following day the Union held its first two meetings for Respondent's employees 496 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD would be better for [her and her husband] if [they] just didn't have anything to do with the union." 41 On February 19, the day after the union meeting, Robert Maxwell was called to Tomlinson's office. There, upon Maxwell's admission, in response to a question from Tomlinson, that he had attended the meeting, Tomlinson stated that he had received "reports that [Maxwell was] the main instigator" at the meeting and had done "all the talking." Tomlinson went on to say that Leffelman and Joe Yuza, respectively Respondent's personnel manager and its then plant manager, "were ready to fire [Maxwell] right now and there [wasn't] a thing [Tomlinson could] do to stop them." Notwithstanding that Robert Maxwell denied being the Union's "main instigator" and that he had done "all the talking" at the meeting, Tomlinson gave him the same warning he had earlier given to Carol Maxwell; namely, to "stay away from this union" for his "own sake." Immediately after leaving Tomlinson's office Robert Maxwell sought out Dale Rhoads, his foreman; related to Rhoads his conversation with Tomlinson; and told Rhoads that Respondent's informant was lying. Rhoads responded that two employees had reported to him that Maxwell had, indeed, done "all the talking at the union meeting." A few days later Rhoads and Robert Maxwell again spoke about the Union. Rhoads asked Maxwell whether he knew which employees were "behind the union." Maxwell answered in the affirmative and added that Rhoads also knew who they were. Rhoads admitted this and, after naming three employees, including Gary Mefford, stated that he had "had some great hopes for some of these guys, but as long as [he worked for Respondent he] will see to it that they never get any place." Twice in March, Tomlinson, Respondent's superintend- ent, again warned Robert Maxwell to steer clear of the Union. The first occurred early in the month and was the capstone to a conversation during which Tomlinson informed Maxwell that as a "good worker" he had "good chances of bettering [himself ] here." The second such warning was given some 2 weeks later and was occasioned by a facetious remark about the Umon made by Maxwell to Tomlinson's secretary. Also in March, about a week before April 2, the date on which the representation election was conducted, the Union was again the subject of a discussion between Tomlinson and Robert Maxwell. This time Tomlinson stated that "if this union gets in, and if they strike, the company can close the doors and move out." 42 Finally, in connection with this phase of the case, early in March Tomlinson told Robert Maxwell, as Tomlinson admitted at the trial, that "we more or less knew who was attending the [union] meetings." Tomlinson's conversations with Robert and Carol Maxwell bristled with threats violative of the Act. Some were overt, such as Tomlinson's statement concerning the 41 My findings respecting Tomlinson's conversation with Carol Maxwell are based on, and the quotations appearing in the text have been taken from, Carol Maxwell's testimony 42 My findings as to the conversations between Robert Maxwell and Tomlinson and between Robert Maxwell and Rhoads , Respondent's production foreman, are based on, and the quotations appearing in the text are taken from testimony given by Maxwell Tomlinson and Rhoads denied, or gave different versions, of these talks closing of Respondent's plant and his remark to Robert Maxwell that Respondent's personnel manager and plant manager were ready to discharge him for being the Union's "main instigator." Others, while not so overt, were nevertheless threats. Examples of these are Tomlinson's repeated admonishments to the Maxwells that it would be best for them if they had nothing to do with the Union. These remarks did not constitute mere friendly advice. Considering their contexts, it needs no great imagination to discern that they were threats that Robert Maxwell and Carol Maxwell would suffer reprisals at Respondent's hand if they continued their involvement with the Union. Tomlinson also conveyed to Robert and Carol Maxwell the impression that their union activities and those of other employees were under surveillance by Respondent. Illus- trative of this are Tomlinson's statements to Carol Maxwell that union meetings would be held on particular dates,43 his reference, in his February 19 conversation with Robert Maxwell, to "reports" concerning Maxwell's conduct at the union meeting held the previous day,44 and his statement to Robert Maxwell regarding Respondent's knowledge as to the identity of the employees who attended union meetings.45 As Tomlinson and Leffelman, Respondent's personnel manager, had done, Rhoads, Respondent's production foreman, also made threats and conveyed the impression that the union activities of Respondent's employees were under surveillance. Concerning the latter, not only did he, like Tomlinson, refer, while talking to Robert Maxwell, to a report dealing with Maxwell's conduct at the February 18 union meeting, but, at a later time, also acknowledged to Maxwell that he knew the employees who were "behind the union." 46 In the conversation between Rhoads and Robert Maxwell respecting the employees who were "behind the union" Rhoads stated that they would "never get any place" while in Respondent's employ. This is an outright threat to disfavor employees because of their union activity and, hence, in contravention of the Act. Climate Control Division, etc., 160 NLRB 765, 766, 781-782. Louise Sledge, Carol Maxwell's mother, was also an object of a threat by Tomlinson, Respondent's superin- tendent. Like the Maxwells, Sledge had worked for Respondent in Bloomington, where she was an officer of the Union, and continued her employment with Respon- dent in Pans. She was still in its employ at the time of the trial. In March, some 2 or 3 weeks before the representation election, Tomlinson informed Sledge that Yuza, who was then Respondent's plant manager, and Leffelman, its personnel manager, were of the opinion that she and the Maxwells were "trying to start a union here." By way of, denial, Sledge stated that she had "told several people that [she could not] talk about the union because [she] would 43 Sea Life, Incorporated, 175 NLRB 982, 983 44 Plasticoid Company, 168 NLRB 135 45 Uranga, etc, 173 NLRB 635, 638, 639. 46 With respect to the violative nature of Rhoads' "behind the union" statement, see Uranga, etc, 173 NLRB 635, 638, 639, and Sanitary Bag & Burlap Company, Inc, 162 NLRB 1648, 1650, enfd in this respect 406 F 2d 750 (C.A. 6). FEDERAL STAINLESS SINK DIV. OF UNARCO 497 be fired." To this Tomlinson laconically replied, "That is correct." 47 Much need not be said about the nature of Tomlinson's reply. It was, on its face, a threat to discharge an employee for engaging in protected conduct. Such a threat, as is well settled, violates the Act. On all the foregoing, therefore, I conclude that by threatening to discharge and disfavor adherents of the Union; by threatening to close its plant should the Union succeed in becoming its employees' bargaining agent; and by creating the impression that its employees' union activities were under surveillance, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 3. Requesting employees to report on the union activities of other employees Not only did Dean Tomlinson, Respondent's superin- tendent, convey to Robert and Carol Maxwell the impression that the union activities of Respondent's employees were under surveillance, but he also sought their help in obtaining information concerning those activities. Thus, in March Tomlinson asked the Maxwells to talk to employees and report to him those who were in favor of, and those who were against, the Union. Requesting employees to act as informers concerning the union activities of other employees interferes with rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. Memcor, Inc., etc, 162 NLRB 930, 931, 934, 936. Accordingly, I conclude that by doing so Respondent further violated Section 8(a)(l). 4. Promising and granting benefits to individual employees to dissuade them from supporting the Union Larry Winkler began to work for Respondent in January 1971 as a press operator. In the latter part of February, he was promoted to the position of plant technician,48 received a pay raise, and was promised a foremanship. Winkler was an early supporter of the Union. He attended one of the union meetings held on February 18, was among the first to sign an authorization card,49 and collected cards signed by other employees for transmission to the Union's office. A few days before Winkler's promotion Dale Rhoads, Respondent's production foreman, asked him "how in- volved [he] was in this union thing." Winkler stated, in response, that he had signed a card "and ... had sent cards in that people had given to [him] " During their conversation about the Union, Winkler said that he wanted "union representation for bargaining for higher wages." At this point Rhoads inquired "if [Winkler] would be interested in a foreman's job." Receiving an affirmative reply, Rhoads told Winkler that he would discuss the matter with Dean Tomlinson, Respondent's superintendent. Later in the day, Rhoads informed Winkler that Tomlinson would see him after work. At the same time, Rhoads directed Winkler to "stay the hell out of this union thing," to which Winkler replied, "O.K."50 During Winkler's later conference with Tomlinson, he was offered, and soon thereafter accepted , an immediate promotion to the position of plant technician. In addition, Winkler was promised, as Tomlinson testified, "that if he could prove himself in six months or so . . . he could step up into a foremanship." Winkler heeded the direction given him by Rhoads, Respondent's foreman, "to stay the hell out of this union thing." As Winkler put it, after his talk with Rhoads, he "didn't have any more union activities." Like Winkler, Donald Orris, another employee, was also an active union adherent. Not only had he signed an authorization card early in the Union's organization campaign,51 but he was also instrumental in obtaining signed cards from other employees.52 In March James Thomas, a foreman,53 asked Orris what he thought about the Union and why he felt the employees needed a union. Upon Orris' response that a union would be helpful in raising wages, Thomas told him, as Thomas testified, "that the company was working on labor grades, the classifications, to get these in line with . . . what would be fair with the employees." As is well settled, to promise, or to confer, benefits to induce employees to forego unionization is violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. N. L.R. B. v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409-410. Such a promise, and its effectua- tion, is apparent in Winkler's case. Without any attempt at subtlety, so frequently present in such a situation, Winkler was told by his foreman on the day he was offered a promotion to "stay the hell out of this union thing." Winkler correctly read the message and promptly ceased all activity on behalf of the Union. A similar promise was given to Orris. To counter Orris' desire for a union to assist employees in obtaining wage increases his foreman informed him that Respondent was already "working on labor grades [and] classifications [which] would be fair with the employees." Statements like these, made in a similar context, were held to constitute promises of benefit within the purview of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Memcor, Inc., etc., 162 NLRB 930, 931, 935, 936-937; Bernel Foam Products Co., Inc., 146 NLRB 1277, 1278, 1299-1300. Accordingly, I conclude that by promising, and giving, benefits to individual employees to induce them to forsake the Union Respondent again violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 47 My findings concerning Sledge 's conversation with Tomlinson are based on, and the quotations appearing in the text have been taken from, Sledge's testimony, which Tomlinson denied 48 Winkler still held this position at the time of the trial 49 Winkler signed his card (G C Exh 71) on January 26, 1971 Only three employees, Robert Maxwell, Carol Maxwell, and Elizabeth Hendricks signed cards (respectively, G C Exhs 59, 58, and 30) before Winkler did 50 My findings concerning the conversation between Rhoads and Winkler are based on , and the quotations appearing the text are taken from, the latter's testimony Rhoads admitted talking to Winkler about a foreman's job, but he denied telling Winkler to "stay the hell out of this union thing" 5i Orris' card (G C Exh 6) was executed on February 4, 1971 52 The part played by Orris in obtaining authorization cards from Shirley Lorance and Marianne Lance (respectively, G C Exhs 42 and 43). appears in an earlier section of this Decision 53 Thomas' supervisory status has been admitted. 498 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 5. The premium pay plan During the years in which Respondent's plant was located in Bloomington, it had no premium pay, or incentive, plan to supplement employees' basic wage rates. Under circumstances to be set forth below, Respondent placed such a plan into effect after its plant was moved to Paris. On about February 25, 1971, a month after the Union began its organizing campaign by overtly distributing literature at the plant gates, and a week after the Union held its first meeting, which, as has been shown, Respon- dent was well aware of, Harris Moyer, then the president of Respondent's Federal Division,54 came to Paris and made a speech to Respondent's employees. He informed them that Respondent had decided to establish an incentive pay plan; that the details of the plan were still under consideration; that the plan would go into effect on March 1; and that it would provide for bonuses to be paid once a month based on total plant production. On March 2, one of the days on which Moyer testified he "probably ... heard about" the Union's bargaining request,55 and a day after the Union filed its petition for certification, a notice56 was posted on Respondent's bulletin board announcing that "the Federal Premium Pay Plan starts on March 1, 1971."_The notice also contained the details of the plan. On March 11, Moyer sent a five-page letter57 to all employees in the Paris plant. Set forth at the beginning of the letter, among other things, was Respondent's asserted justification for instituting the premium pay plan. In the last part of the letter, consisting of three pages, Respondent's employees were urged to evaluate the Union's advent in the light of the newly instituted premium pay plan. To assist them in making this evaluation Moyer wrote: Since the Plant has just started and people are still learning their jobs, we have set interim targets as to Production Units per attendance hour. The details of the Plan have been made clear to you, and we welcome your inquiry as to the mechanics of the Plan. Please note that the Federal Plan embraces all employees -both so-called "bargaining unit employees" and "management employees", traditionally "opponents" in today's labor-management philosophy. Federal's philosophy is that both groups are "team members" rather than "opponents", and that excellence in both groups is necessary for success. Since talking to you, the Textile Workers Union has represented to us that the majority of you desire to be represented by the T W.U.A. This attempt was not surprising, as the T.W.U.A. requested that when Unarco moved to Paris,-we should bring the T.W.U.A. along as an established representative of the work force. But, we did not feel that we had a right, legally or morally, to impose such restraint on Paris personnel without it being their free choice. While most of Unarco's Plants are organized, it was and is our belief that the question of a union or no union should be determined by neither the Company nor a Union Organizer-but by you. We point out, however, that you do not have to be represented by a union to receive fair treatment from Federal, nor do you have to pay a "brokerage fee" to any middleman. After all, our customers and our competitors determine what kind of pay we all receive. If we beat competition, we all share the benefits-if competition beats us, we go out of business, regardless of bickering and "bargaining". From past experience, we know that an Incentive Plan, such as we propose, can be more creative, flexible and rewarding outside of the restrictions and rigidity of a Company-Union relationship. A partnership of all employees can add the dimension of pay for "perform- ance" to the standard item of "seniority" and "job security". Neither Union Organizers nor Company Manage- ment can guarantee your future security and income. Security results from being competitive and profitable in the market-and this comes from the skill, efficiency and energy of all employees, both shop and office. No Union ever created a product or a market or built a business. Too often Union philosophy is to portray Management as an impersonal machine bent upon squeezing the last ounce of sweat from the Worker, without reward. This pits Worker against Company, and damages the teamwork so necessary for success. Federal rejects such philosophy-and we have demon- strated the fact by creating an incentive that includes all employees, both worker and management as a team. Federal is prepared to accept your decision as to whether the Plant should or should not have a Union. We make no threats nor suggest reprisals against our work force. We do suggest that all of us stand a better chance to succeed if we build a team-rather than creating a division of management and work force. You don't have to pay a fee to get fair and rewarding treatment from Federal Management. Obviously any significant change in overall economics would require that we re-evaluate the premium pay concept. We suggest that you consider the subject carefully and thoughtfully. It's a lot easier to get into a Union than to get out of one. Since this is true, and it takes only a vote to make it happen, you would appear to gain more by first trying the team approach. On April 1, the day before the election, the first bonus payments under Respondent's premium pay plan were distributed. No deductions for income or social security taxes were made by Respondent from the amount due to employees.58 By not making these deductions the spenda- ble amount of the bonus was made to appear larger than it should have been, On brief Respondent asserts "that incentive bonus was the rule, not the exception in plants of the Unarco Industries, Inc." I do not find evidence in the record to 54 It will be remembered that Respondent's Paris plant is included within 57 G C Exh 4 its Federal Division 58 The tax payments which should have been deducted from the bonus 55 See In 20, above checks received by employees on April I, were subtracted from each 56 G C Exh 3 employee's next regular paycheck FEDERAL STAINLESS SINK DIV. OF UNARCO support this statement. I find rather that the contrary is true. Not including the Federal Division, with which we are here concerned, only two of the eight divisions of which Unarco is composed operate under incentive plans. One such plan provides benefits only for supervisory and office personnel. Although the evidence concerning the other is sketchy, it appears to be similar to the one presently under consideration. To counter the allegations of the complaint that the premium pay plan was instituted for the purpose of dissuading employees from supporting the Union Respon- dent argues that the first notice of the plan was given to employees before the bargaining request was made by the Union and before it had knowledge, or reason to believe, that there would be a representation election. I am not persuaded by this argument that the purpose of the plan was not to wean employees away from the Union by granting them a benefit they never before enjoyed.59 Although the plan was announced 4 days before the Union made its bargaining request, Moyer, then president of Respondent's Federal Division, admitted in his letter of March I 1 that, in essence, Respondent had been expecting such a request ever since its removal to Paris because, as the letter states, before it left Bloomington the Union had made a similar request, which Respondent had denied. Furthermore, the plan's announcement came while the Union's organization campaign was in full swing, as Respondent was aware, and while the Union was contend- ing for support among Respondent's employees.60 To forestall the latter, Respondent, at the time of the plan's disclosure, had already embarked upon a program of unfair labor practices, including threats to discharge union adherents.61 The announcement of the plan was, in my opinion, another step in the same direction. "The broad purpose of 8(a)(1) is to establish `the right of employees to organize for mutual aid without employer interference.' . . We have no doubt that it prohibits not only intrusive threats and promises but also conduct immediately favorable to employees which is undertaken with the express purpose of impinging upon their freedom of choice for or against unionization and is reasonably calculated to have that effect. . . . The danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove. Employees are not likely to miss the inference that the source of benefits now conferred is also the source from which future benefits must flow and which may dry up if it is not obliged." N L.R.B. v. Exchange Parts Co, 375 U.S. 405, 409. The "inference" referred to by the Court in Exchange Parts was made virtually explicit in Respondent's letter of March 11, set forth above. There, without mincing words, Respondent informed its employees "that an Incentive Plan, such as we propose, can be more creative, flexible and rewarding outside of the restrictions and rigidity of a Company-Union relationship." To make doubly certain s9 My conviction in this regard is supported, albeit in a small way, by the fact that incentive plans, like the one with which we are dealing, are not generally in effect in all the divisions of which Unarco is composed so Of the 63 authorization cards offered in evidence by the General Counsel, 17 appear to have been signed on or after February 25, 1971, the date on which Moyer announced that the plan would be adopted 499 that employees understood this, the letter closed with the following warhing: We do suggest that all of us stand a better chance to succeed if we build a team-rather than creating a division of management and work force. You don't have to pay a fee to get fair and rewarding treatment from Federal Management. Obviously any significant change in overall economics would require that we re- evaluate the premium pay concept. We suggest that you consider the subject carefully and thoughtfully. It's a lot easier to get into a Union than to get out of one. Since this is true, and it takes only a vote to make it happen, you would appear to gain more by first trying the team approach. Considering the purpose of the premium pay plan in the light of all the evidence, I find that it was announced and adopted to influence employees to forsake the Union. Included in the factors upon which this finding is based are the timing of the plan's announcement and of the various steps taken by Respondent in its implementation; the contents of Respondent's letter of March 11; Respondent's failure to deduct tax payments from the first bonus checks distributed to employees; and Respondent's other unfair labor practices designed to undermine the Union, especial- ly its threats. Concerning the last factor, the Board stated in Texas Transport & Terminal Co., Inc., 187 NLRB No. 78, where it also considered other unfair labor practices as being indicative of an employer's unlawful purpose in granting benefits during a union's organization campaign, "The threats were the stick, the grant of [benefits] the carrot. Together they were intended to destroy the Union's majority status." Accordingly, I conclude that by announcing, placing into effect, and making payments pursuant to, its premium pay plan during the Union's organizing campaign and while a representation election was pending, Respondent further violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 6. Discussions with employees concerning the election During the pendency of the election Dean Tomlinson, Respondent's superintendent, requested several employees to vote against the Union and urged Carol Maxwell, as she testified, to circulate among the employees with whom she worked and "talk the company up and the union down." 62 In addition, about 2 weeks before the election and several weeks after Larry Winkler had been promoted, as already set forth, Tomlinson asked Winkler "how [he] thought the election might go." It does not appear that at that time Winkler was interrogated about any other matter concern- ing the Union. The General Counsel contends that by the foregoing Respondent engaged in further violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. In only one respect do I agree. Si As will be seen, I have also taken into account in determining the purpose of the plan's announcement and adoption Respondent's subsequent threats 61 Tomlinson denied asking Carol Maxwell, or any other employee, to campaign for Respondent and against the Union 500 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD It is not an unfair labor practice for an employer to ask an employee for "his opinion as to the probable outcome of [an] election" so long as the employee is not at the same time questioned "about his personal feelings toward the Union." Cussins & Fearn Co., Inc., etc., 170 NLRB 1, 5. Nor is it an unfair labor practice for an employer to request employees to vote against a union in a representa- tion election. Howard Manufacturing Company, Inc., 180 NLRB No. 47. Accordingly, I conclude that Tomlinson's mere request for Winkler's opinion as to how the election would turn out and his appeal to employees to vote against the Union were not violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. A different conclusion is required, however, concerning Tomlinson's request that Carol Maxwell "talk ... the union down." While an employer may with impunity ask employees to vote against a union in a representation election, he intrudes upon Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when he asks an employee to make the same request of other employees. Cf. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc., 167 NLRB 776, 782, enfd. 408 F.2d 374 (C.A. 5), and Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse Co., Inc., 151 NLRB 248, 249, 267, enfd. in this respect 369 F.2d 859 (C.A. 5). I find, therefore, that, by urging Carol Maxwell to campaign against the Union, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. B. Facts, Contentions, and Conclusions Concerning Respondent's Alleged Postelection Violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 1. Threats It will be recalled that on several occasions before April 2, 1971, the date of the representation election, Dean Tomlinson, Respondent's superintendent, admonished Robert Maxwell and Carol Maxwell, under pain of reprisal, as I found, to have nothing to do with the Union. It will also be recalled that Dale Rhoads, a foreman, threatened to disfavor certain employees, including Gary Mefford, because of their union activity. During conversations with Robert Maxwell after the election concerning his having been visited by an agent of the Board, which will be discussed in some detail below, Tomlinson again warned Maxwell to have nothing to do with the Union "for [his] own good." Gary Mefford left Respondent's employ after the election. Some days later Robert Maxwell inquired of Rhoads, Respondent's production foreman, as to Mef- ford's whereabouts. Rhoads replied that he had quit and added, "There are only three more to get rid of now [naming three employees, two of whom he had previously told Maxwell he would disfavor because they were "behind the union"] and this place will be all nght."63 As I have earlier done, I find that Tomlinson's remark 63 The findings made here are based on, and the quotations appearing in the text are taken from, Robert Maxwell 's testimony, which was denied by Tomlinson and Rhoads 64 Tomlinson denied asking Maxwell this question 65 Stratford Furniture Corporation, 96 NLRB 1031 , enfd 202 F 2d 884 (C.A 5) 66 Clark Printing involved a situation in which an employer asked employees how they intended to vote in a forthcoming election Analytical- ly, however, there appears to be no difference , insofar as the Board's that Robert Maxwell refrain from union activity "for his own good" was a threat of reprisal if he continued to be involved with the Union. Rhoads' statement to Maxwell ..can only be construed as a threat to eliminate [the employees he named] because of their Union activities and a message that a similar fate may befall other Union adherents." Arland Printing Co., Inc., 181 NLRB No. 68. 2. Interrogation concerning the election On April 2, 1971, the day on which the representation election among Respondent's employees was conducted, James Hendricks, a foreman, asked Carol Maxwell whether she had voted. Hendricks then walked away from Maxwell, apparently without saying anything else to her. Later on the same day Maxwell was asked by Dean Tomlinson, Respondent's superintendent, as she testified, "if [she] had voted for him."64 The General Counsel argues that each question fell within the ambit of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I do not completely agree that this is so. Inquiring how an employee voted in a representation election, as Tomlinson did, is violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.65 This is so because "[s]uch conduct tends to undermine the very purpose of a Board-conducted elec- tion, i.e., the opportunity for an employee to cast a secret ballot without the necessity of publicly declaring his position toward a proposed bargaining representative." Clark Printing Company, Inc., 146 NLRB 121, 122.66 The question put by Hendricks, Respondent's foreman, to Maxwell, however, stands on a different footing. It has long been the law that it is not an unfair labor practice for an employer to "encourage his employees to vote, so long as he limits his encouragement to that and says nothing which is calculated to influence his employees in the way in which they vote." Martin Food Products, Inc., 52 NLRB 1131, 1133-34.67 Hendricks' inquiry of Maxwell seems to fall within this category. Although framed as a question, it appears to have been nothing more than innocuous encouragement that she cast a ballot. Accordingly, respecting this phase of the case, I conclude that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act only by Tomlinson's interrogation of Carol Maxwell as to how she had voted. 3. Interrogation, and creating the impression of surveillance, concerning visits to employees by agents of the Board In connection with the investigation of the charge filed in the instant case an agent of the Board visited Robert and Carol Maxwell at their home during the latter part of April 1971 and again during the following month.68 These visits occurred during the evening and the Maxwells did not rationale is concerned, between an employers asking an employee how he intends to vote and his asking an employee how he had actually voted. Both destroy the secrecy of the ballot. 87 It is obvious from the context that the "influence" to which the Board referred in Martin Food was such as would, itself, constitute an unfair labor practice 68 During the course of his investigation , the Board's agent interviewed the Maxwells at their home on a third occasion This third visit, however, is not material to any allegation of the complaint FEDERAL STAINLESS SINK DIV. OF UNARCO inform any of Respondent's officials or supervisors that they were about to be, nor did they voluntarily disclose to any such person that they had been , interviewed by an agent of the Board. Notwithstanding this, on the day following the two interviews several persons occupying positions in Respon- dent's management hierarchy, including Dean Tomlinson and Dale Rhoads, respectively Respondent's superintend- ent and production foreman, made known to the Maxwells their awareness that they had been visited by the Board's agent. In addition, Robert Maxwell and Carol Maxwell were individually interrogated as to the subjects of their discussion with the Board's agent, the questions they were asked, and the answers they gave 69 Respondent's interrogation of the Maxwells concerning their conversations with an agent of the Board was inherently coercive.70 If Respondent had actually spied on the Board agent's interview with the Maxwells , its conduct would have been equally coercive .71 That the evidence does not establish such actual spying is of no moment. What is important is that Respondent gave the Maxwells the impression that it had done so. "[T]he law reasons that when the employer either engages in surveillance or takes steps leading his employees to think it is going on , they are under the threat of economic coercion . ..." Hendrix Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. N.L R.B., 321 F .2d 100, 104, footnote 7 (C.A. 5). Accordingly, I conclude that, by interrogating employees concerning interviews with an agent of the Board and by creating the impression that their interviews were under surveillance, Respondent further violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act C. Facts, Contentions, and Conclusions Concerning Respondent's Alleged Violations of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by not bargaining with the Union and by engaging in substantial violations of - Section 8(a)(1). Respondent asserts that its refusal to recognize the Union was justified because as stated in its brief the "alleged illegal activity attributed to [it] did not in fact occur."72 Respondent further argues on brief that " at all times [it] had a good faith doubt as to the Union's claimed majority." In determining violations of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act "under the Board's current practice, an employer's good faith doubt [as to a union's majority] is largely irrele- vant." 73 Most relevant in ascertaining whether an employ- er unlawfully refused to bargain by an outright failure to recognize a union representing a majority of his employees in an appropriate unit, as in the case here, is an assessment 69 Carol Maxwell was interrogated on these points by Tomlinson Robert Maxwell's interrogation was carved on not only by Tomlinson, but also by Harris Moyer, then the president of Respondent's Federal Division, William Webber, Respondent's plant manager, and Rhoads 70 General Stencils, Inc, 178 NLRB 108, enfd in this respect 438 F 2d 894 (CA 2), Uranga, etc, 173 NLRB 635, 639 7' Queen City Coach Company, 159 NLRB 204, 217, enfd in this respect 398 F 2d 231 (CA 4), Grand-Central Chrysler, Inc, 155 NLRB 185, 188 72 This contention warrants no further mention in view of the many 501 of the employer's conduct when faced with the union's organizing campaign and bargaining request. The Board has traditionally held that in such a situation if the employer engages in serious independent unfair labor practices for the purpose of avoiding bargaimng,74 he also violates Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. That there has been no erosion in this view of the law was recently made plain by the Board. In United Packing Company of Iowa, Inc., 187 NLRB No. 132, the Board stated that its "historic practice of finding a violation of Section 8(a)(5) . . . where an employer has . . . refused to bargain and has committed serious violations of Section 8(a)(1) remains very much alive, having been specifically affirmed in [N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co. Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 620] where the contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was reversed." Accordingly, taking into account Respondent's many and serious independent violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act starting soon after Respondent learned of the Union's organizing campaign and which continued after its receipt of the Union's bargaining request and even after the election was held, I conclude that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. VI. THE CONDUCT AFFECTING THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTION The Board has held that the "critical period" within which objectionable conduct will be deemed to affect the results of a representation election starts on the date on which the petition for certification is filed. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, 138 NLRB 453, 454-455. The Board has also held that "conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) is, a fortiori, conduct which interferes with the exercise of a free and untrammeled choice in an election." Dal-Tex Optical Company, Inc., 137 NLRB 1782, 1786. Many of Respondent's violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act occurred before April 2, 1971, the date on which the representation election among Respondent's employees was held, and after March 1, 1971, the date on which the Union's petition for certification was filed. I conclude, therefore, that the election must be set aside. Implicit in this conclusion is a ruling that the Union's objections to conduct affecting the results of the election are sustained insofar as the objections relate to the violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act committed by Respondent during the "critical period." VII. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE Respondent's unfair labor practices, as found above, occurring in connection with its operations set forth in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial senous violations of Sec 8(a)(I) of the Act committed by Respondent, as I have found 73 N L R B v. Gissel Packing Co, Inc, 395 U S 575, 594 74 That Respondent intended to follow a course of this nature was presaged even before it left Bloomington In this regard, it will be remembered that, while Respondent's plant was still located in that city, Merle Leffelman, Respondent's personnel manager, emphatically stated to several employees who had inquired about working for Respondent in Paris that there would "not (be ] a union in the Paris plant." 502 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. VIII. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, my recommended Order will require Respondent to cease and desist therefrom and to take such affirmative action as will effectuate the purposes of the Act. Concern- ing the latter, the General Counsel urges the entry of a bargaining order. "A bargaining order . .. is strong medicine." 75 It should be prescribed, however, as the Supreme Court held in N.L.R.B v. Gissel Packing Co, Inc, 395 U.S. 575, 610, 614-615, to cure "a [Section] 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain where an employer has committed independent unfair labor practices which have made the holding of a fair election unlikely or which have in fact undermined a union's majority and caused an election to be set aside." The Court went on to say, quoting in part from Franks Bros. Co. v N L R.B., 321 U.S. 702, 704, that in such cases if the Board were to "enter only a cease-and-desist order and direct an election or a rerun, it would in effect be rewarding the employer and allowing him `to profit from [his] own wrongful refusal to bargain.' " Finally, and by way of summarizing its extensive discussion on this point, the Court stated that where "the possibility of erasing the effects of past [unfair labor] practices and of ensuring a fair election (or a fair rerun) . . . is slight and that employee sentiment once expressed through cards would, on balance, be better protected by a bargaining order, then such an order should issue." In the light of the foregoing principles it is my opinion that a bargaining order should issue in this case to remedy Respondent's numerous grave unfair labor practices committed both before and after the election. Many were so pervasive as to make slight and unlikely the "possibility of erasing [their] effects . . . and of ensunng a fair . . . (rerun)" of the election already held. In view of the great number of unfair labor practices committed by Respondent, to recatalogue and comment again on each would be mainfestly impractical. One, however, deserves special mention. I refer to Respondent's institution during the critical period before the election of the premium pay plan and its continuation of the plan since the election. Had Respondent been guilty of no other unfair labor practices this, alone, by reason of its lingering effect, makes impossible a fair or free rerun election and makes imperative the entry of a bargaining order. Cf. C & G Electric, Inc., 180 NLRB No. 52. In Tower Enterprises, Inc, 182 NLRB No. 56, the only unfair labor practice involved was the grant of a benefit, in that case a wage increase, during a union's organizing campaign. In deciding that this single violation of the Act made a bargaining order appropriate and necessary the Trial Examiner aptly reasoned as follows. It is a fair assumption that in most instances where employees designate a union as their representative, a major consideration centers on the hope that such representative may be successful in negotiation wage increases.... A unilateral award of a wage increase by an employer following a union's demand for recogni- tion results in giving the employees a significant element of what they were seeking through union representation. It is difficult to conceive of conduct more likely to convince employees that with an important part of what they were seeking in hand union representation might no longer be needed. An employ- er may have the nght to persuade the employees that representation is not in their best interests, but it does not have the nght to . . . confer benefits on them which are designed to influence the employees against choosing a representative. When, as here, an employer does so, free choice in a subsequent election becomes a matter of speculation, so long as the effects of the interference remain unremedied. The Board, in adopting the Trial Examiner's rationale, specifically noted its agreement "with the Trial Examiner's conclusion that the [employer's] granting of a wage increase . . . in violation of Sec. 8(a)(1) requires a bargaining order." Accordingly, having sustained the Union's objections to conduct affecting the results of the election insofar as they relate to Respondent's violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act during the critical period before the election, I will recommend that the election be set aside. However, for the reasons set forth above, a new election will not be directed. Instead, my recommended Order will provide that Respon- dent bargain with the Union upon request. It will also provide for the dismissal of the Union's petition for certification and for the vacation of all related proceedings. Because of the large number and flagrancy of the unfair labor practices engaged in by Respondent, broad cease- and-desist provisions will be recommended. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By the following conduct Respondent has engaged, and is engaging, in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act: (a) Interrogating employees concerning their attitudes toward, and activities on behalf of, the Union. (b) Threatening to discharge and disfavor employees who supported the Union. (c) Threatening to close its plant should the Union succeed in becoming the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its employees. (d) Creating the impression that its employees' activities in support of the Union were under surveillance. (e) Requesting employees to act as informers concerning employees' activities in support of the Union. 75 N L R B v Flomatic Corporation, 347 F 2d 74, 78 (C A 2) FEDERAL STAINLESS SINK DIV. OF UNARCO (f) Promising, and granting, benefits to employees to dissuade them from supporting the Union. (g) Announcing, instituting, and distributing benefits to employees pursuant to an incentive wage program, sometimes referred to as the Federal Premium Pay Plan, to dissuade employees from supporting the Union. (h) Requesting employees to persuade employees to vote against the Union in a representation election. (i) Interrogating employees as to the manner in which they voted in a representation election. (1) Interrogating employees concerning their conversa- tions with an agent of the Board. (k) Creating the impression that meetings between employees and an agent of the Board were under surveillance. 4. All production and maintenance employees at Respondent's Pans, Illinois, plant, excluding office clerical employees, professional employees, guards, and supervi- sors as defined in the Act constitute a unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining. 5. At all times material herein the Union has represent- ed a majority of the employees in the unit set forth in Conclusion of Law 4, above. 6. By failing to recognize and bargain with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the unit set forth in Conclusion of Law 4, above, Respondent has engaged, and is engaging, in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 7. The unfair labor practices engaged in by Respon- dent, as set forth in Conclusions of Law 3 and 6, above, affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: 76 ORDER Respondent, Federal Stainless Sink Div. of Unarco Industries, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Coercively interrogating employees concerning their attitudes toward, or activities on behalf of, Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organiza- tion. (b) Threatening employees with discharge, unfavorable treatment, or any other form of reprisal, including the closing of its plant, or effectuating any such threats, for joining, assisting, or in any other manner supporting Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. (c) Threatening to close its plant should Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organiza- tion, succeed in becoming the exclusive collective-bargain- ing representative of any of its employees. (d) Engaging, attempting to engage, or giving employees the impression that it is engaging in surveillance of rs In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 503 employees' activities in support of Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. (e) Ordering, directing, instructing, urging, soliciting, requesting, or suggesting that employees act as informers concerning employees' activities in support of Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. (f) Promising or granting benefits to employees to dissuade them from joining, assisting, or in any other manner supporting, Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, or to induce employees to forsake or renounce the foregoing named labor organization, or any other labor organization. (g) Ordering, directing, instructing, urging, soliciting, requesting, or suggesting that employees induce, persuade, or encourage employees to vote against Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organiza- tion, in a representation election. (h) Interrogating employees as to the manner in which they voted in a representation election or seeking to obtain such information by any other means. (i) Interrogating employees concerning conversations with agents or employees of the National Labor Relations Board. (1) Engaging, attempting to engage, or giving employees the impression that it is engaging, in surveillance of meetings between employees and agents or employees of the National Labor Relations Board. (k) Failing or refusing to recognize Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive collective- bargaining representative of its employees in the following appropriate unit: All production and maintenance employees at its Paris, Illinois, plant, excluding office clerical employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, or failing or refusing to bargain with Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, respecting rates of pay, wages, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment of its employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit. (1) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self- organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, or to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in conformity with Section 8(a)(3) of said Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which, it is found, will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, recognize and bargain with Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit respecting rates of pay, wages, 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 504 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD hours, or other terms and conditions of employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (b) Post at its premises in Paris, Illinois, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 77 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 14, after being duly signed by its authorized representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 14, in writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.78 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges unfair labor practices not specifically found herein. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the objections filed by Textile Workers Union of America, Chicago Joint Board, AFL-CIO, to conduct affecting the results of the election conducted on April 2, 1971, as summarized in the report on objections issued on May 25, 1971, by the Regional Director for Region 14 of the National Labor Relations Board be, and they hereby are, sustained insofar as said objections relate to unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section.8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, engaged in by Respondent between March 1, 1971, and April 2, 1971. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for certification filed by Textile Workers Union of America, Chicago Joint Board, AFL-CIO, in Case 14-RC-6697 be, and the same hereby is, dismissed and that all proceedings held thereun- der be, and the same hereby are, vacated. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Case 14-RC-6697 be, and the same hereby is, severed from Case 14-CA-6210 and remanded to the Regional Director for Region 14 of the National Labor Relations Board for further processing in accordance with the provisions of this Order. 77 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " 78 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board after exceptions have been filed , this provision shall be modified to read- "Notify the Regional Director for Region 14, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a trial in which all sides had the opportunity to present their evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the law and has ordered us to post this notice and we intend to carry out the order of the Board and abide by the following: WE WILL NOT question you about what you think of the Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other union. WE WILL NOT question you about what you have done or intend to do to help the Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other union. WE WILL NOT question you about whether you have gone to meetings of the Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other union, or whether you intend to go to union meetings. WE WILL NOT question you about whether you signed a card for Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or for any other union, or whether you intend to sign a union card. WE WILL NOT question you about whether you joined the Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other union, or whether you intend to join any union. If you do or have done any of these things, WE WILL NOT discharge or threaten to discharge you; or lay you off or threaten to lay you off; or treat you unfavorably in any other way or threaten to treat you unfavorably in any other way; or close our plant or threaten to close our plant. WE WILL NOT close our plant or threaten to close our plant if the Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other union, becomes your bargain- ing representative. WE WILL NOT spy on what you do in connection with the Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other union, and we will not say or do anything to make you believe that we have spied or that we are spying on what you do in connection with the Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other union. WE WILL NOT order or ask any employee to spy on what you do in connection with the Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other union. WE WILL NOT in the future give you or promise to give you promotions, wage increases, bonuses, or any other valuable thing to make you give up the Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or to make you stay away from the Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other union or to make you refuse to do anything to help the Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other union. WE WILL NOT order or ask any employee to ask you to vote against the Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other union in a union election held by the National Labor Relations Board. WE WILL NOT question you about how you voted in a union election held by the National Labor Relations Board. WE WILL NOT question you about talks or meetings you had or may have with National Labor Relations Board agents. WE WILL NOT spy on any meetings you have with National Labor Relations Board agents and we will not say or do anything to make you believe that we have FEDERAL STAINLESS SINK DIV. OF UNARCO spied or are spying on your meetings with National Labor Relations Board agents. WE WILL, if we are asked to do so, recognize and bargain with the Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, about your rates of pay, wages, working hours, and other matters relating to your work or employment. If we come to an agreement about any of these things with the Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, we will put that agreement in writing and sign it. WE WILL respect your right to form any union, to join any union, to help any union, and to bargain with us through any union. We will also respect your right not to do any of these things, except as required by law. All our employees are free, without any objection from us, to become or remain members of the Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or of any other union or not to become or remain members of the Textile Workers 505 Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other union, except as required by law. FEDERAL STAINLESS SINK Div. OF UNARCO INDUSTRIES, INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office. Room 448, 210 North 12th Boulevard, St. Louis, Missouri 63101, Telephone 314-622-4142.