The Hamlet Steak House, Inc.

632 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The Hamlet Steak House, Inc. and Hotel, Motel, Club, Cafeteria, Restaurant Employees and Bar- tenders Union, AFL-CIO, Local 450 and Jean Pierce. Cases 13-CA-10717 and 13-CA-10866 June 16, 1972 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO On February 8, 1972, Trial Examiner Bernard J. Seff issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the Trial Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner's rulings, findings,' and conclusions and to adopt his recommended Order. ' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that Respondent, The Hamlet Steak House, Inc., Carol Stream, Illinois, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's recommended Order. i It is noted that Pierce's testimony, which is credited by the Trial Examiner, reflects that the other two waitresses, Minans and Veslovitch, were present at the time Pierce confronted Chipain concerning the discrepancy between the amount of the tip that the girls received and the amount they thought they were entitled to, and that Chipain was thus fully aware of the concerted nature of Pierce's activity. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE BERNARD J. SEFF, Trial Examiner : This matter was heard at Chicago, Illinois, on August 18, September 2, and November 5, 1971.1 The original complaint in Case 13-CA-10717 was issued on July 29 based on a charge filed on June 29 ; the complaint in Case 13-CA-10866 was based on a charge filed on September 8. The cases were i All dates are in 1971 unless otherwise indicated 2 The General Counsel 's request was granted after Respondent failed to file an opposition thereto with the Trial Examiner in response to an Order To Show Cause why the request should not be granted It appears that an opposition had been timely filed, but with the Regional Office of the Board, by inadvertence, and it was not brought to the attention of the Trial Examiner until considerably later. Upon consideration of this opposition, and in the light of all the circumstances, the Trial Examiner affirms the ruling consolidating these matters. consolidated by the Trial Examiner, upon the request of the General Counsel, dated October 6, to reopen the record and consolidate cases.2 The complaints allege Respondent (also referred to as the Company) discharged Dorothy Stancil on May 25 in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act; that employee Jean Pierce was discharged on May 24 because of her concerted activities in violation of Section 8(a)(1); it is also alleged that the Company engaged in illegal interrogation of one employee. The Company's answers deny the commission of any unfair labor practices. The Company contends that both Pierce and Stancil were discharged for cause. , Upon the entire record in the case, and upon my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses , I make the following: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENTS Respondent is an Illinois corporation with offices and a place of business located in Carol Stream , Illinois, a suburb of Chicago, where it operates a restaurant known as The Hamlet Steak House, Inc. During the past 12 months, it derived a gross income in excess of $500,000. During the last calendar year, it purchased in Illinois goods and materials with a gross value in excess of $5,000 which originated outside the State of Illinois. I find that the Company is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. If. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED It is admitted and I find that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Facts Concerning the Discharge of Jean Pierce Mrs. Jean Pierce was employed by Respondent as a waitress from May 20, 1970, until she was discharged on May 24, 1971. So far as the record shows there was no complaint as to her work during this period. The circumstances of her discharge were as follows: Hostess Maralyn Wright called Pierce at home on May 17 and asked if she would work a wedding party on Saturday, May 22. Pierce asked how much she would earn. According to Pierce's credited testimony, Wright, after checking her books, said that she would assign two other girls to the party and each girl would get about $40 based on the approximate amount of the bill ? On the Thursday before the party, Pierce discussed the gratuity which Wright said each would receive with waitresses Marilyn 3 The commerce facts set forth herein are contained in a stipulation signed by the parties which was received in evidence and is contained in the exhibit file It is noted that this exhibit is not numbered I have personally marked it as "TX Exhibit I " 4 Wright's testimony was to the effect that she advised Pierce she would receive $40 contingent upon the number of guests who attended and the number of waitresses who worked . Based on my analysis of the witnesses and the record, I am convinced this is an afterthought and do not credit it 197 NLRB No. 86 THE HAMLET STEAK HOUSE 633 Minaris and Angie Veslovitch, both of whom later worked the party with Pierce. Hostess Tina Pazolt, Chef Pedro, and Respondent's president, Spyros Chipain, also assisted at the party. After the party, Pierce, Minaris, and Veslovitch were each paid $27. On the next regular working day, Monday, May 24, the three waitresses discussed the amount of the gratuity received. Minans estimated that each of the three waitresses should have received $37. Pierce was told that Veslovitch had spoken to Wright and Office Manager Bouzeos, who refused to let Veslovitch see the bill for the party, but said Pedro, the cook, and Pazolt, the hostess, had each been given $15. The girls decided to speak to Chipain about the gratuity. Pierce spoke to Chipain about 11 a.m. that day. According to Pierce, whom I credit, the following occurred (in pertinent part): "I told Mr. Chipain that regarding the wedding party we had worked for him on Saturday that I felt he had cheated us. And he said, `Cheated? You don't know the meaning of the word....' And I tried to explain what I meant by cheating. And I said, `I have talked to the other waitresses here and they all tell me they have always received 15 per cent of the bill on any party that they have worked.' And he said, `Well, we have never had a party this big....' He said, `You know, Pedro worked very hard and I worked very hard and so did Tina on that party.' I said, `Yes, I agree, but they were on salary.' He said, `Well, aren't you on salary?' And I said, `Yes, but it is incomparable.' " Pierce explained that she received a nominal amount of "a dollar an hour as far as salary goes." She states that was the extent of the conversation. Chipain stated that in this conversation Pierce said to him, "You cheated us," to which he responded that she was calling him "a thief." According to Chipam, Pierce agreed, stating that she didn't receive enough money from the party. Pierce denied that she referred to Chipain as a "thief," asserting that she said only that Chipain had "cheated us," but agreeing that that could be taken "in that sense in that to cheat means to default or to swindle." To the extent the two accounts are in conflict, I credit Pierce. I do not believe that Pierce called Chipain "a thief," but that this was his reaction to her accusation that he had cheated the girls. After lunch that day, Chipain came to Pierce while she was at work. Chipain told her that at one time he had respect for her, but not any longer. It was apparently at that time that Chipain told Pierce that he wanted to see her later that afternoon in his office. Pierce met with Chipain and Office Manager Bouzeos in the former's office about 3 p.m. At that time, Chipain told Pierce that he felt they could work together no longer, that Pierce should punch out, and Bouzeos could give her a check. Chipain testified that he fired Pierce because she called him a thief and not because she complained about wages. It appears that Chipain made no effort to check the bill for the party to ascertain whether the waitresses had been properly compensated. B. The Facts Concerning the Discharge of Dorothy Stancil 1. Stancil's work record Stancil was employed from November 1968 until she was discharged on May 25, 1971. During this time, there were apparently few or no complaints as to Stancil's perform- ance on the job. Chipain testified that she was "a good employee. She was doing a good job." Various employee witnesses, Bouzeos, and Chipain stated, however, that Stancil had a propensity for engaging in arguments with the other waitresses and the help. It appears that these arguments stemmed from statements of Stancil critical of the work and performance of the cooks, busboys, and waitresses, while at work. Such activities apparently were not uncommon among the help at Respondent's restaurant generally, but Respondent's witnesses assert that Stancil was particularly difficult to get along with. Waitresses had made complaints to Chipain about the difficulties they were having with Stancil for a period of about 2 years. In each case, Chipain sought to play down the complaint and persuade the employee that she should get along with Stancil. However, there is no indication that Chipain or other management officials ever reprimanded Stancil or advised her of these complaints. On a number of occasions in the past, Chipain decided to discharge Stancil, but in each case he changed his mind and did not do so. 2. Stancil's union activities Edward Altman, the Union's business agent and organiz- er, testified credibly that about the middle of April Stancil spoke to him about working conditions at the restaurant. Stancil complained about the fact that the girls had to come to work one-half hour before their shifts but received no pay for this extra time required of them. She said all waitresses had had $4 taken out of their pay to compensate Chipain for a silver coffee pot that had been stolen. She described other working conditions that needed correction. Altman gave her a batch of union application cards and asked her to sign up the employees. She said she would try. In fact, Stancil did not obtain any signed cards and did not return any cards to Altman. 3. Altman's meeting with Chipain on May 25 Altman and another union representative, Gus Vack, spoke to Chipam in his office on May 25 for about an hour between 8 and 9 p.m. According to Altman, on previous occasions when he approached Chipain about signing a contract with the Union, Chipain had begged off with excuses that business was not good or that he had had changes in his work force. Altman told Chipain that he could no longer take delaying answers because the Union had received a letter complaining about working condi- tions, stating that Chipain was unfair to the employees and making accusations that the Union was too slow in organizing the employees. It also accused the Union of having been bought off. At Chipain's request, Altman gave him a copy of the letter, which was unsigned. Chipain said he did not agree with the matters set forth in the letter. When Altman demanded immediate recognition, Chipain 634 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD said he had to contact his partners. He would be out of town until the following Wednesday and suggested that Altman call him for an appointment at which time he would give his answer. The following Wednesday, Altman called Chipain. When Chipain's secretary said he had not returned, Altman left word that it was important for Chipain to return the call and left his number. When Chipain did not return the call, Altman called him on Thursday. The secretary again said Chipain was not in. Altman again said a return call was important and left his number. Not having heard from Chipain, Altman called again on Friday and this time he was told that "as soon as they could contact Chipain he would call Altman." Chipain never got in touch with Altman. Altman testified that on three occasions in the past he had offered Chipain pledge cards of employees working for Respondent as proof of his majority status. Altman agreed that Stancil's name was not mentioned in his conversation with Chipain in connection with the anonymous letter, or in any other way. At the hearing, she denied having written the letter. 4. Stancil's exit interview with Chipain At or about 3 p.m. on May 25, Chipain told Bouzeos, Respondent's office manager, that he was going to fire Stancil and Bouzeos should be available to prepare Stancil's last paycheck. Bouzeos testified that she laughed because on at least four occasions in the past, Chipain had told her he was going to fire Stancil and he had not done so. She did not take him any more seriously this time than on the previous instances. About 11 p.m. Chipain called Stancil to his office. He told her they would have to sever their business relation- ship. He said it was easier to replace her than six other waitresses. Stancil asked why she was being discharged. Chipain answered that there was a lot of animosity in the restaurant and he felt she was the troublemaker. He went on that he was sorry this had to happen, and that he would give her `good references. Chipain said she was the best waitress he ever had and only Chipain could do this; that he hoped he was doing the right thing. Stancil said he was making a mistake. Chipain replied, "Well it's one of those things." Stancil left and Bouzeos did not see her nor had she (Bouzeos) made out her separation check. Stancil came back the next day to pick up her money. Chipain testified that 2 or 3 days before Stancil was fired, three waitresses, Donna Power, Ida Weiss, and Shirley Ozman, complained to him about Stancil. Power, however, testified that the last time she had complained to Chipain was about 2 months before Stancil was dis- charged. Ida Weiss, whose testimony was vague and uncertain about time, said the last time she had com- plained to Chipain was "a couple of months ago." Ozman did not testify. Chipain admitted he was angry and upset by the visit of the two men from the Union. Finally Chipain said that coupled with the complaints of the three waitresses, his decision to fire Stancil came to a head with the visit of the union men, and he discharged her on May 25. Chipain explained his vacillation in handling the problem of Stancil by saying that he was weak and she was a good employee. 5. Stancil's interrogation by Chipain on June 15 On June 15 Stancil received a phone call from Altman telling her to report to the restaurant because Chipain had agreed to put her back to work. Stancil arrived at the restaurant; Chipain, Wright, and Bouzeos were all present during the ensuing confrontation. Chipain charged Stancil with indiscretions with a young Greek salad boy, and said she had criticized Wright's morals. Stancil responded that, when questioned on other occasions about Wright's absences from work, she had referred to Wright's reputa- tion, at a previous place of employment, for running around with men friends. Chipain accused Stancil of writing the unsigned letter to the Union and of complaining to the department of health. She denied these charges. He called her "liar-liar." Chipain testified that he had learned from a source he could not disclose that Stancil had written the letter to the Union. Stancil asked Chipain if he would crucify her if she returned to work. Chipain said, "If you were a man do you know what I'd do to you?" Stancil replied he would break her nose, knock out her teeth, or beat her up. Chipain replied "you better believe it." Chipain asked if she still wanted her job back after all this. Stancil said she did. Chipain said he would call her when he had an opening. The record shows that Respondent hired a waitress the latter part of May, and three waitresses in June. The General Counsel took a pretrial affidavit from Chipain on July 7 at which time he had signed a statement that "No openings have occurred since my last conversation with Stancil." He explained the inconsistency by stating, "No, at the time I gave this affidavit, I wasn't aware I had another girl working for me. I don't do the hiring and firing." Concluding Findings and Analysis Discharge of Pierce, Case 13-CA-10866 The questions concerning Pierce are (1) was she engaged in concerted activities and, if so, (2) did her use of the word "cheat," in characterizing Chipain's payment to the three waitresses of less than the amount they understood they would receive, remove her from the protection of the Act? Section 7 of the Act declares that employees "shall have the right . . . to engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." Interference, restraint, or coercion in the exercise of this right is an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a)(1). When Pierce complained to Chipain about earnings, she was clearly speaking on behalf of herself, Minaris, and Veslovitch, all of whom were similarly situated . The three girls had discussed the matter of the gratuity among themselves prior to and after the wedding party. Being dissatisfied with the amount received , the three agreed that their complaint should be taken to Chipain. Though there is no evidence that Pierce was formally designated spokesman for the three, in fact, she did specifically make her complaint on behalf of all three waitresses. In the circumstances, it is found that her action in complaining THE HAMLET STEAK HOUSE about the amount of the gratuity received by the waitresses was concerted activity, on behalf of all three girls who were similarly situated, and was not confined to her personal grievance. See N.L.R.B. v. Guernsey-Muskingum Electric Cooperative, Inc., 285 F.2d 8 (C.A. 6), where the court said: The mere fact that the men did not formally choose a spokesman or that they did not go together to see Mr. Scott does not negative concert of action. It is sufficient to constitute concert of action if from all the facts and circumstances in the case a reasonable inference can be drawn that the men involved considered that they had a grievance and decided, among themselves, that they would take it up with management. Nor do I consider that Pierce's use of the word "cheat," in the context of this case was so "defamatory or opprobrious," see N.L.R.B. v. Ben Pekin Corp., 452 F.2d 205, (C.A. 7), as to remove Pierce from the protection of the Act. The statement was made in a private conference and was clearly relevant to Pierce's claim that the three girls had been shortchanged and Chipain obviously was aware of the circumstances which had the girls upset, as evidenced by his attempted explanation as to why the girls had received less than promised. Nor can Pierce's complaint be considered ill-founded or malicious. Though the language used was not drawing room nicety, it was in keeping with the language used among the restaurant personnel, and not as abusive as that used by Chipain himself. As the court stated in N.L.R.B. v. Thor Power Tool Co., 351 F.2d 584, 587 (C.A. 7): The employee's right to engage in concerted activity may permit some leeway for impulsive behavior, which must be balanced against the employer's right to maintain order and respect. In an analagous situation, in Crown Central Petroleum Corporation, 177 NLRB 322, in finding that employees were not removed from the protection of the Act because they accused their employer of lying during a grievance meeting, the Board stated: The issue is not whether the statements by Harris and Gilliam were justified by either the Trial Examiner's standards or ours, but rather whether these statements were so opprobrious as to remove them from the otherwise protected nature of the grievance meeting. We find that they were not. On the facts in the instant case it seems clear that Pierce's remark furnished the excuse and not the reason for her termination. Under all the circumstances of the case, I find that Pierce was engaged in protected concerted activities, that her conduct did not remove her from the protection of the Act, and therefore that her discharge, because of such protected activity, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Discharge of Stancil, Case 13-CA-10717 Though the record does not establish that Stancil was especially active in behalf of the Union , or that she in fact wrote the unsigned letter which caused the Union to seek immediate recognition, the record is convincing that Chipain believed that she had written the letter , and was thus the moving force behind the Union, and he dis- charged Stancil for that reason. Despite the fact that 635 Stancil had been the subject of complaints for 2 years, Chipain had always previously sought to minimize them and to soothe the feelings of the complainants. Chipain's defense that he fired Stancil on May 25 because some of his best waitresses came to him 2 or 3 days before this date and said they would quit unless Stancil was discharged, is not supported by the record. Respondent's witnesses Power, Weiss, and Melnick testified that the last time they had complained to Chipain about Stancil was a couple of months before she was discharged. Even if Chipain is to be believed that the waitresses had complained to him further about Stancil 2 or 3 days before her discharge, which I am inclined to doubt, it is clear that these complaints were not the reason for Chipain's decision to terminate Stancil. He took no action when the complaints were made, did not even advise or discuss them with Stancil, and was admittedly only triggered into action by the appearance of the union representatives and the letter which brought the Union into the picture. The conclusion is inescapable that but for Stancil's suspected union activity he would not have fired her. His asserted reason-i.e., the alleged complaints 2 or 3 days before-for that action is a pretext. It is well settled that while an employer can discharge an employee for any reason, or no reason, if any part of the reason for the discharge is grounded on the employer's concern of the employee's union activity (actual or suspected), such discharge is violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. I therefore find that Respondent, by discharging Stancil under the circumstances described, and upon the whole record, discouraged membership in and activities on behalf of the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. The General Counsel alleged in the complaint that the interrogation of Stancil on June 15 constituted evidence of an independent violation of Section 8(a)(1). It is difficult to see how this incident, which occurred almost 3 weeks after she was discharged, could have had an inhibitory effect on Respondent's employees. I therefore recommend that this allegation in the complaint be dismissed. The evidence litigated at the hearing shows that at the June 15 meeting between Stancil and Chipain at which her request to be reinstated was discussed, in rather harsh and uncomplimentary terms, Chipain finally agreed to reinstate Stancil when he had an opening. The record shows that Respondent thereafter hired some additional waitresses without recalling Stancil. Chipain does not deny that he agreed to recall Stancil when he had need for waitresses, nor did he give any explanation for his failure to recall Stancil as promised. In the circumstances of this record as a whole, I find that the failure to reinstate Stancil had the same motivation as her original discharge, and thus additionally violated 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes 636 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent, by discharging Jean Pierce for her concerted activities, engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Respondent, by discharging Dorothy Stancil, who was suspected of engaging in union activities, engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 3. Respondent, by refusing to reinstate Dorothy Stancil on June 15, 1971, was additionally engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 4. Respondent has not independently violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by interrogating Dorothy Stancil on June 15, 1971. 5. Respondent has not violated 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act in. any respect other than those specifically found. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action in order to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Respondent discriminatorily dis- charged Jean Pierce and Dorothy Stancil, I shall recom- mend that Respondent offer them immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if their jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without preju- dice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make them whole for any loss of earnings they may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against them. Any backpay found to be due shall be computed in accordance with the formulas set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: 5 ORDER Respondent, The Hamlet Steak House, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discouraging membership in Hotel, Motel, Club, Cafeteria, Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Union, AFL-CIO, Local 450, or any other labor organization, by discriminatorily discharging any of its ' employees or otherwise discriminating against them in any manner with regard to their hire and tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment. (b) Discharging employees for engaging in concerted activities. (c) Discharging employees because they are suspected of engaging in union activities. (d) Refusing to reinstate employees because they are suspected of engaging in union activities. (e) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist the above-named labor organization, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representa- tives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, or to refrain from any or all activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer Jean Pierce and Dorothy Stancil immediate and full reinstatement to their former positions or, if these positions no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights or privileges. (b) Make Jean Pierce and Dorothy Stancil whole for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of the discrimination against them in the manner set forth in the section above entitled "The Remedy." (c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (d) Post at its Carol Stream, Illinois, restaurant, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix.' 16 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 13, after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by it immediate- ly upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ- ing all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 13, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith.? 5 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 6 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 7 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read- "Notify the Regional Director for Region 13, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith." THE HAMLET STEAK HOUSE 637 APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a trial in which all parties had the opportunity to present their evidence, it has been decided that we violated the law and we have been ordered to post this notice. We intend to carry out the order of the Board and abide by the following: WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Hotel, Motel, Club, Cafeteria, Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Union, AFL-CIO, Local 450, or any other labor organization, by discrimmatorily discharging any of its employees or otherwise discriminate against them in any manner with regard to their hire and tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment. WE WILL NOT discharge employees for engaging in concerted activities. WE WILL NOT discharge employees because they are suspected of engaging in union activities. WE WILL NOT refuse to reinstate employees because they are suspected of engaging in union activities. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with you or attempt to restrain or coerce you in the exercise of the above rights. WE WILL offer Jean Pierce and Dorothy Stancil full reinstatement to their former positions or, if those positions no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges , and pay them for the earnings they lost as the result of our discrimination with interest at 6 percent. THE HAMLET STEAK HOUSE, INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Everett McKinley Dirksen Building, Rm. 881, 219 S. Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois 60604, Telephone 312-353-7572.