Western Massachusetts Electric Co.

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Western Massachusetts Electric Company and Local 455, International Brotherhood of Electrical Work- ers, AFL-CIO. Case I -CA- 12748 January 6, 1978 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND PENELLO On July 20, 1977, Administrative Law Judge Max Rosenberg issued the attached Decision in this pro- ceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed excep- tions and a supporting brief. Respondent filed a reply brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge only to the extent consistent herewith. The facts which gave rise to this litigation were stipulated to by the parties. In brief, in late summer of 1976 Respondent, a public utility, began to revise certain established meter-reading routes. This rerout- ing was part of Respondent's plan to eventually re- route its entire meter-reading system. In rerouting the system Respondent followed a so-called formula de- vised for it pursuant to a study of its operations con- ducted by the Northeast Utilities Company, Respon- dent's parent corporation. Before the development of the formula Respondent revised meter-reading routes based largely on the recommendations of supervisors who walked the routes themselves, or assigned expe- rienced meter readers to walk them, to determine whether they were too long or too short. Local 455 of the IBEW, which represents Respon- dent's meter readers, repeatedly asked Respondent for information about the formula. In support of its request, Local 455 pointed out that Respondent had indicated on several occasions that in all probability there would be layoffs of meter readers once system- wide rerouting was fully implemented. Local 455 also complained that the rerouting which had already tak- en place had resulted in longer meter-reading routes. In rebuffing Local 455's request for information concerning the rerouting of the system, Respondent maintained that rerouting fell within the scope of I Nothing contained in the relevant collective-bargaining agreement pur- ports to be a waiver of the Union's nght to information. The Board has long held, with court approval, that no waiver of statutory rights is to be found' absent proof of clear intent to relinquish such rights. See Clifton Precision Products Division, Litton Precision Products, Inc., 156 NLRB 555 (1966). The Administrative Law Judge found the formula in issue here similar 234 NLRB No. 19 assignment and direction of the work force, a matter which was, under the applicable collective-bargain- ing agreement, solely the province of the Company.' In recommending dismissal of the 8(a)(5) com- plaint alleging that Respondent's refusal to supply the requested information was an unlawful refusal to bargain, the Administrative Law Judge pointed out that prior to the events in issue, when Respondent revised routes based on the recommendations of a supervisor, the Union never pressed any claim that it should be consulted. In the Administrative Law Judge's view, Respondent's utilization of the formula as a basis for rerouting its meter-reading system was nothing more than the use of a management tool to expedite changing the routes.2 Although the Admin- istrative Law Judge acknowledged the established principle that an employer has a general obligation to provide a bargaining agent with information neces- sary to enable it to carry out its representational du- ties, he observed that the inquiry must be made in each case whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the statutory obligation to bargain in good faith has been met.3 On the facts of the instant case, the Administrative Law Judge found no merit in the Union's claim that information relating to re- routing was necessary for it properly to assess the validity of potential grievances over the length of routes which had already been revised, or to deal with the anticipated layoffs which the Company had warned would probably accompany implementation of rerouting throughout the entire system. In this connection, the Administrative Law Judge pointed out that as of the date of the hearing no grievances had actually been filed concerning the rerouting and Respondent had not as yet begun to reduce its work force by laying off meter readers. In these circum- stances the Administrative Law Judge concluded, cit- ing language from the circuit court's decision in The Kroger Co. v. N.L.R.B., 399 F.2d 455 (C.A. 6, 1968), that Local 455's demand for information about re- routing was unjustified because it was "based upon an alleged necessity which was more general and the- oretical than immediate and practical." We find, contrary to the Administrative Law Judge, that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing to comply with Local 455's re- quest for information about rerouting. Of course it is well settled, as the Administrative Law Judge recog- nized, that certain information, specifically wage and related information pertaining to employees in the bargaining unit, is presumptively relevant to a collec- to the report of a consulting firm in dispute in General Aniline and Film Corporation, 124 NLRB 1217 (1959). In that case the Board found no viola- tion in an employer's refusal to furnish the report which the Board charac- terized as merely recommending "a system for the more effective managerial scheduling of work." 124 NLRB at 1220. 3 N.LR.B. v. TruittMfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149(1956). 118 WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY tive-bargaining agent's statutory duty to represent employees and must be produced because it goes to the very core of the employer-employee relation- ship. 4 Furthermore, because a labor organization must represent unit employees with respect to the terms and conditions of their employment, it is enti- tled upon appropriate request to any information from the employer that may be relevant to its dis- charge of that obligation.5 And the Board has point- ed out that a union's obligation to represent employ- ees includes not only the duty to police the adminis- tration of an existing agreement but also the duty to formulate wage and other proposals in connection with future contract negotiations. 6 Applying these principles to this case, we find that there is a significant and substantial relationship be- tween Respondent's use of the formula to effect a restructuring of its entire meter-reading system and the working conditions of employees represented by Local 455. Without question, meter readers and their bargaining representative have a direct and immedi- ate interest in a management initiative which not only alters the length and composition of meter-read- ing routes, and hence may change the workload em- ployees will be expected to carry, but will also in all probability, as Respondent concedes, affect the tenure of some meter readers by occasioning layoffs. 7 In these circumstances, it is readily apparent that the Administrative Law Judge's characterization of the formula as merely "a management tool to reduce the amount of time required by the supervisors to arrive at scheduling" is at once simplistic and misleading. 8 Nor do we find the Administrative Law Judge's observation that as of the date of the hearing no grievances had been filed over rerouting and as yet no meter readers had been laid off determinative of the relevancy of the requested information. 9 Thus, it is well settled that a labor organization's entitlement to information is not to be limited merely to that which would be pertinent to a particular existing controversy but rather extends to all information that is necessary for the labor organization properly and intelligently to perform its duties in the general 4 Curis s-Wright Corporation, Wright Aeronautical Division v. N. LR B., 347 F.2d 61 (C.A. 3, 1965). Vertol Division, Boeing Company, 182 NLRB 421 (1970). 6 See TheA. S. Abell Company, 230 NLRB 1112(1977). T See The Kroger Co., 163 NLRB 441,444, 445-446 (1967). s The Administrative Law Judge's reliance on General Aniline and Film Corporation, supra, is misplaced. As the Board carefully pointed out in Gen- eral Aniline, the report in issue there was solely for the convenience of supervisors and concerned neither the rearrangement nor the elimination of jobs. See also The Kroger Company, supra at 446, and Texaco, Inc., 170 NLRB 142(1968). 9 It was with regard to this observation that the Administrative Law Judge, citing the opinion of the reviewing court in The Kroger Co. v. N.L.R.B., supra at 457, concluded that Local 455's request for information "was based upon an alleged necessity which was more general and theoreti- cal than immediate and necessary." It is worth noting that the court in Kroger, although declining to enforce the Board's order, did so not because course of bargaining.10 Indeed, a more restrictive view of a union's right to information would often require it to play blindman's bluff with respect to potential grievances, a result repeatedly rejected by this Board and the courts.a' Thus, in the words of the court in Curtiss-Wright, the absence of a specific grievance currently under consideration between the parties "does not detract from the potential value of [the information requested] as pertinent data with which the Union should be supplied in order to assist it in its task of deciding whether to institute grievance proceedings or use other policing tools under the ex- isting bargaining agreement and to guide the Union in contract negotiations themselves." 347 F.2d at 70. Furthermore, the approach urged by the Adminis- trative Law Judge ignores the undoubted right of a labor organization to information necessary to the formulation of its bargaining positions in future neg- otiations.' 2 In the instant case it seems basic that Local 455 has a legitimate and continuing interest both in the workload which employees are expected to shoulder and in alterations in the workload which will affect the tenure of employees whom it repre- sents. Consequently, Local 455 is entitled to informa- tion concerning the factors which go into determin- ing what that workload should be. Absent such infor- mation, it is difficult to see how the Union can be expected to fulfill its proper role in the full develop- ment of collective-bargaining negotiations which the Act is intended to achieve.13 THE REMEDY Having found that by the aforementioned conduct Respondent has violated Section 8(aX5) and (1) of the Act, we shall order it to cease and desist from engaging in such conduct in the future and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. As we have found that Respondent refused to give to the Union relevant information which it requested, we shall order that Respondent furnish the Union it disagreed with the Board's conclusion that the requested information bore a significant relationship to employee working conditions, but because on the particular facts of the case it found that the request for information was overly broad and also because it found merit in the company's contention that disclosure of much of the information sought could produce competi- tive damage. io N.LR.B. v. Whitin Machine Works, 217 F.2d 593 (C.A. 4, 1954); Gen- eral Electric Corporation, 199 NLRB 286 (1972). n" N.LR.B. v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 438 (1967), citing with approval The Fafnir Bearing Co. v. N.LR.B., 362 F2d 716, 721 (C.A. 2, 1966). 12 See A. S. Abell Company. supra. 13 See Northwest Publications, Inc.. 211 NLRB 464 (1974). There the Board noted, at 466, that all the possible ways in which information sought by a labor organization may become important often "cannot be foreseen in advance of negotiations." 119 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD with the information requested concerning the For- mula used to reroute its meter-reading routes. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela- tions Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Western Massachusetts Electric Company, Spring- field, Massachusetts, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: I. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Local 455, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, by refusing to furnish the said labor orga- nization with the information it requested concerning the rerouting of meter-reading routes. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec- tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, or to refrain from any or all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Local 455, International Brotherhood of Electrical Work- ers, AFL-CIO, by furnishing the said labor organiza- tion with the information requested pertaining to the revision of meter-reading routes. (b) Post at its Springfield, Massachusetts, place of business copies of the attached notice marked "Ap- pendix." 14 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 1, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respon- dent to insure that said notices are not altered, de- faced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply here- with. 14 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals. the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Local 455, International Brotherhood of Electri- cal Workers, AFL-CIO, by failing and refusing to furnish the said labor organization with informa- tion it has requested pertaining to the revision of meter-reading routes. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other con- certed activities for the purpose of collective bar- gaining or other mutual aid or protection as guar- anteed by Section 7 of the Act, or to refrain from any and all such activities. WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with Local 455, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, by furnishing the said labor organization the information requested pertaining to the revision of meter-reading routes. WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY DECISION MAX ROSENBERG, Administrative Law Judge: With all parties represented, this proceeding was heard before me in Springfield, Massachusetts, on June 15, 1977, upon a com- plaint filed by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board and an answer filed in opposition thereto by Western Massachusetts Electric Company, herein called the Respondent. t The sole issue raised by the pleadings relates to whether Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by certain conduct to be chronicled hereinafter. Briefs have been re- ceived from the General Counsel and Respondent which have been duly considered. Upon the entire record made in this proceeding, I hereby make the following: The complaint, which issued on March 31, 1977, is based on a charge filed on February 15, 1977, and served on February 16, 1977, and an amend- ed charge filed and served on March 23, 1977. In the original charge, the Union alleged that Respondent violated Sec. 8(aX5) of the Act by changing the route assignments and workloads of its meter readers, by refusing to supply the Union with necessary information to carry out its bargaining responsibilities, and by refusing to bargain collec- tively concerning route assignments and workloads of its meter readers. However, in the amended charge, the Union altered its stance and simply alleged that Respondent offended that section by refusing to supply the Union with information necessary to carry out its bargaining functions. 120 WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS I. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER Respondent, a Commonwealth of Massachusetts corpo- ration, maintains its principal office and place of business in West Springfield, Massachusetts, where it, as a public utility, is engaged in the production, sale, and distribution of electric power and related products. During the annual period material to this proceeding, it received at its West Springfield facility goods and materials valued in excess of $500,000 directly from points located outside the Common- wealth of Massachusetts and, during the same period, in the course of its business operations as a public utility, derived gross revenues in excess of $250,000. The com- plaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that Respon- dent is an employer engaged in commerce within the mean- ing of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Local 455, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing, on or about December 21, 1976, to satisfy the Union's requests for certain information referred to as the Formula which was utilized by Respon- dent to reevaluate and reestablish its meter-reading routes. According to the General Counsel, this data was both nec- essary and relevant for the Union to administer effectively the applicable collective-bargaining agreement between the parties, and to represent properly the members of the bar- gaining unit. For its part, Respondent contends that its refusal to proffer the requested information was privileged because the Union was not legally entitled to it. At the hearing, the parties stipulated to the facts govern- ing this proceeding and I find them to be as follows. Respondent is one of four wholly owned subsidiary oper- ating companies controlled by Northeast Utilities Compa- ny. For approximately 35 years, Respondent and the Union have bargained collectively for a unit of production and maintenance employees, including meter readers, who work at three locations known as the Springfield, Franklin- Hampshire, and Berkshire areas. The collective-bargaining agreement in effect at all times material to this proceeding runs from July i, 1976, to July 1, 1978. By its terms, this labor compact provides only for the payment of hourly wage rates. It contains no provision for piece rates, incen- tive wages, job performance standards, or even job descrip- tions. In section IV(4) thereof, the contract recites: The Union agrees, for itself and the Employees, not to hinder or interfere with the management of the Em- ployer in its several departments, including the assign- ment of work, the direction of working forces, the right to hire, suspend or discharge for proper cause, to trans- fer Employees to work for which they are better suited and to furlough Employees because of lack of work or for other good and sufficient cause, but in the exercise of these responsibilities in management the Employer agrees that it will not discriminate against any member of the Union. The controversy which gives rise to this litigation began in September 1974, when Respondent notified the Union of the former's intention to return to the monthly reading of residential meters and thereafter to reroute the meter- reading routes. Prior to October 1974, certain meters were read by Respondent's employees on a monthly basis and others were scanned bimonthly. In practice, the bimonthly readings were made for residential users who did not utilize electric heat, while monthly readings were taken for all commercial and industrial users and for residential custom- ers who used electric heat. This dual system resulted in the perpetuation of an inefficient method of reading meters inasmuch as two different meter readers might be dis- patched to service the area; i.e., one to read the residential meters and the other to monitor the commercial meters. Accordingly, Respondent's decision to alter its meter-read- ing operations was reached in order to improve its cash flow, to satisfy customer preferences, and to fulfill its obli- gation as a public utility to furnish energy to the public at the lowest possible cost. Because Respondent was in the process of implementing an entirely new billing accounting system, it opted to add more meter readers rather than to reroute the entire system immediately, and consequently increased the number of meter readers from approximately 35 to 50. This new pro- cedure produced the result whereby all accounts were read monthly, but the inefficient meter-reading methods were continued with the understanding by Respondent and the Union that the system would be rerouted as soon as the billing procedures were implemented. To staff the enlarged meter-reading complement, some employees were permit- ted to bid on the posted vacancies, some were transferred from within the Company, others were temporarily as- signed from within the Company, and still others were hired from outside sources on a temporary basis. In the latter instance, Respondent pointedly informed the Union that some of these jobs were temporary in nature and that, once the rerouting was accomplished, the temporary em- ployees would no longer be needed. Armed with the intelligence that Respondent intended to resume monthly readings of residential meters with the resultant rerouting of routes, Union Business Manager-Fi- nancial Secretary Edward W. Collins, Jr., wrote to Respon- dent's manager of personnel, Donald E. Riga, on Septem- ber 5, 1974, stating that: In regard to our conversation the other day, wherein you outlined the Company's intention to return to monthly reading of residential meters and the resulting rerouting of meter-reading routes, it is the Union's de- sire that the Business Manager or my designated repre- sentative be present at the rerouting of each such route. It is our position that such rerouting is in the form of a time-and-motion study and as such, effects wages, hours, and conditions of employment and is clearly a bargaining matter. 121 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD In January 1976, Northeast Utilities Company, Respon- dent's parent, conducted a study with a view toward devel- oping another prescheduling system for meter-reading su- pervisors. The underlying idea of the system was that, by properly scheduling and coordinating the routes, some of which were fragmented and/or improperly sequenced, the meter reading would be accomplished more efficiently. When the Union failed to receive a reply to its September 5 letter, Collins sent another letter to Riga on February 10, 1976, which recited: Attached is a copy of our letter to you dated Septem- ber 5, 1974, requesting Union representation at the re- routing of meter reading routes. It is my understanding that rerouting is now immi- nent and I would like to renew my request at this time. Riga responded to Collins' communication on February 19, 1976, as follows: This is in reply to your letter to me dated February 10, 1976. It is the position of the Company that the routing of meter-reading routes is a management func- tion which falls within the assignment of work and di- rection of working force provisions outlined in Section IV(4) of our agreement with the Union. It has never been the Company's practice to have a Union represen- tative present when routes are being determined, and the Company does not plan to change its procedures in connection with the anticipated rerouting of meter- reading routes. I will, of course, be pleased to discuss with you any specific questions you may have concerning any changed routes. In late summer of 1976, Respondent commenced to re- route the system. On November 17, 1976, Collins again dis- patched a letter to Riga which read: On Wednesday, Nov. 10, 1976, the Company imple- mented revised meter-reading routes in its Easthamp- ton Area. The Union had previously requested the op- portunity to negotiate with the Company on the pro- duction standard to be used in the rerouting. The Com- pany, however, has apparently chosen to unilaterally establish the production standard for Meter Readers. It appears that the rerouting has resulted in unusual- ly long meter-reading routes. In order for the Union to determine whether or not the production standard is reasonable and based on normal conditions and an approved method of reading by a regular meter reader, it will be necessary for us to have a copy of the standard. This should include the formula used to determine the number of meter read- ings assigned to a given route and the method used to arrive at the formula. This information will be necessary in order for us to properly represent our members in this matter, espe- cially in view of the fact that the Company has in- formed us on several occasions that once the rerouting is completed, some layoffs of Union members may re- sult. Please forward the herein requested information as soon as possible. Riga answered Collins' letter on December 21, 1976, by repeating that: This letter is in reply to your letter to me dated No- vember 17, 1976. It is the position of the Company that in accordance with Section IV(4) of its Agreement with the Union, it has established certain meter reading routes and the Company is not obligated to negotiate with the Union concerning assignment of work and direction of the working forces. As I indicated to you in my letter dated February [19], 1976, it has been long Company practice to reroute meter reading routes from time to time, and the Union has never been involved in determining methods used in arriving at proper assign- ments. By letter of December 27, 1976, Collins rejoined: In response to your letter of December 21, 1976, it is the position of the Union that Sec. IV(4) of the Agree- ment has no relevance to the issue at hand. The Union is not questioning the Company's right to assign work (i.e., to assign a particular meter reading route to a particular meter reader on any given day) or to direct the working forces (to exercise normal supervisory re- sponsibility associated with the day-to-day operation of the Company's business). However, Section IV(4) of the Agreement does not relieve the Company of its duty to bargain with the Union over changes in wages, hours, working conditions and other terms and condi- tions of employment. In September 1974 when the Company first in- formed the Union that it intended to reroute the meter reading routes at some time in the future, we believed it would be done by local supervisors actually walking the route. We stated at that time that we believed the Union had a right to be involved in the rerouting when it was done. On November 10, 1976, we were informed that re- routed routes were assigned to two meter readers in Easthampton. The Company subsequently informed us that the routes had not been physically rerouted by the local supervisor, but had been done in accordance with a 'formula devised by Northeast Utilities.' On Novem- ber 17, 1976, by letter to you, I requested a copy of the formula. The Company, on December 17, 1976, refused to supply it. We have been informed on several occasions since Sept. 1974 that once all of the rerouted routes were implemented, there would, in all probability, be layoffs of some of our members. In our opinion, the 'formula devised by Northeast Utilities' is a production standard arbitrarily devised and unilaterally implemented by the Company. The Company's refusal to supply us with a copy of the formula and to negotiate with us on the matter of increasing the length of the routes and the resultant effects (including possible layoffs) on the employees, constitutes, in our opinion, a blatant refusal to bargain. 122 WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY 1, hereby, renew my request for a copy of the formu- la. I further request that once we have been provided with the formula, the Company meet with the represen- tative of the Union to bargain over the implementation of this or a modified version of the formula and the resultant impact on our members. The final correspondence in this written dialogue was a letter from Riga to Collins dated February 1, 1977, in which the former wrote that: We have read your letter of December 27, 1976, with interest. Your request for the so-called 'formula' and your additional request for bargaining on this matter has been given careful consideration. Again, I would like to restate the Company position that it has for many years established and changed meter routes from time to time, and it feels that this falls within the assignment and direction of the work force as outlined in Section IV(4) of the Agreement. We decline the requests outlined in your letter of December 27, 1976. Rounding out the chronology, the parties stipulated and I find that, during the past 35 years, Respondent utilized several methods of arriving at the establishment of routes which it considered as representing a fair day's work.2 When conditions on a route changed sufficiently to war- rant rerouting, the supervisors would be totally responsible for the change. Thus, a supervisor would put together a series of accounts which represented a full day's work. This series would be based on a supervisor's familiarity with the route and, in part, on suggestions made by the meter reader who was assigned to the route. The supervisor would then either make a field survey to determine whether or not it was too long or too short, or would designate an experi- enced meter reader to perform that task. Finally, Respon- dent contemplated that meter readers would spend their entire working time reading meters. As yet, no meter reader has been disciplined by Respondent for failure to complete his assigned route due to the additional meters which were added to a route pursuant to the formula, nor has a meter reader been rewarded for completing his rounds earlier than expected. At present, the formula has been used only as a starting point in laying out the initial routes. More- over, Respondent has never sought to justify a position taken during any grievance by relying on the formula. To be sure, it is now established law that an employer has a general obligation under Section 8(aX5) of the statute to provide information needed by the employees' bargain- ing representative for the proper performance of its agency functions, including the provision of data in support its claims made at the bargaining table.3 It is also settled that an employer is required by the Act to afford a bargaining agent with information to enable it properly to perform its duties as such representative during the administration of any collective-bargaining agreement.4 However, in each case, "The inquiry must always be whether or not under 2 Indeed, as early as 1955, Respondent retained the Remington Rand Corporation to implement a system of prescheduling routes which Rand had developed. So far as this record stands, the Union neither requested nor obtained the data on which this system was based. the circumstances of the particular case the statutory obli- gation to bargain in good faith has been met." s In the instant proceeding, the parties had for a number of years consistently agreed by contract that the Union would not impede or interfere with the Respondent's operation of its several departments, which specifically included such matters as the assignment of work to employees, the direc- tion of the working forces, the right to hire, suspend, or discharge employees for proper cause, to transfer personnel to work for which they were better suited, and to furlough employees because of lack of work or for other good and sufficient cause. The current agreement between Respon- dent and the Union embodies this proscription in section IV(4), and, thus, explicitly leaves to management's sole judgment and prerogative the right to assign work and to direct its working force so long as it does not discriminate against union members. As a public utility, Respondent labors under an obligation to operate its business in an efficient manner. In the past, Respondent had relied exclu- sively on its supervisors to gauge whether a route was either too long or too short and, when the supervisors reached a determination that a particular route had changed suffi- ciently to warrant a rerouting, they would uniformly effec- tuate the change without prior consultation with or inter- ference from the Union. In January 1976, Respondent's corporate parent, Northeast Utilities Company, prepared a set of guidelines referred to as the formula which was de- signed to assist the supervisors in scheduling the reading of meters and to serve as a springboard to determine proper meter reading scheduling. In essence, the formula simply involved the use of a management tool to reduce the amount of time required by the supervisors to arrive at scheduling initial routes. Contrary to the claims of the Union and the General Counsel, Respondent's production of the information con- tained in the formula was not necessary for the Union to assess effectively the merits of potential grievances of meter readers protesting that their routes were too long, or to deal effectively with any anticipated reduction in force, nor was the formula analogous to a timestudy. With regard to the first claim, the test for determining whether a route was too long rests upon a consideration as to whether meter readers were able to finish their assigned routes within an alloted time. Under the formula, the methods utilized in determin- ing the routes would be relevant only when and if Respon- dent relied on that methodology as justification for its posi- tion that the routes were not indeed excessive. However, the parties stipulated that, as late as the date of the hearing in this proceeding, no employee had ever been disciplined for his failure to complete a route which he contended was too long, no employee had ever been rewarded for exceed- ing the formula standards, no grievances have ever been filed against Respondent by the meter readers claiming any detrimental change in their wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment, and no position had ever been taken by Respondent to justify a position assumed during any grievance in reliance on the formula. E.g., N. LR.B. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149(1956). 4 E.g., N.LR.B. v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967) 5 See N.L.R.B. v. Truitt Manufacturing Co., supra at 153 154. 123 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Regarding the second claim, it is undisputed that, in September 1974, when Respondent first informed the Union of its intention to conduct monthly readings of resi- dent meters and thereafter to reroute the meter-reading routes, Respondent amply notified the Union that the for- mer contemplated the hiring of between 35 and 50 more meter readers on a temporary basis and that, once rerout- ing was accomplished, the temporary employees would be terminated. On the state of this record, Respondent had not, at the time of the hearing, reduced its work force either by separating these newly hired meter readers, or by fur- loughing, or discharging the regular personnel. Moreover, even assuming that a reduction in staff had occurred pursu- ant to the utilization of the formula, the rerouting would have occasioned the same result which obtained under past practice where adverse reports by experienced meter read- ers dictated a reduction in nonproductive time. Finally, Respondent's production of information relating to the for- mula is not commanded by the decisions of the Courts or the Board dealing with the issue of timestudies, for those cases have relevance only to situations where timestudy reports bear on wage rates.6 From even a casual study of the parties' stipulation, it seems abundantly clear that wage rates were not affected by the rerouting guidelines. Fur- thermore, it is undisputed and I find that the current labor agreement between the parties contains no provision for piece rates, incentive wages, job performance standards, or even job descriptions. In General Aniline and Film Corporation, supra, a case strikingly similar to the instant one, the Board held that an employer was not required to give to the incumbent Union reports made by an outside agency which were intended exclusively for establishing a more efficient managerial scheduling system where the collective-bargaining agree- ment provided only for hourly wage rates, had no piece rates or incentive wage systems, and contained no job per- formance standards or job descriptions. In that case, the employer had retained an independent organization named Proudfoot which specialized in scheduling to survey opera- tions in certain areas of the employer's control department in order to devise a prescheduling system of performing work. When the company instituted Proudfoot's recom- mendations, it was able to eliminate a significant number of jobs by decreasing the nonproductive time of employees. The employer, upon request, refused to comply with the union's demand for the data contained in the Proudfoot report, whereupon the union claimed that it felt that the report had resulted in speedups and job elimination, that the reports might affect complaints and grievances received from employees, and that the withholding of the reported information evidenced bad-faith bargaining on the part of the employer in violation of Section 8(aX5) of the Act. In disposing of these claims, the Board stated: 6 E.g., N L.R.B. v. Otis Elevator Co.. 208 F.2d 176 (C.A. 2, 1953); J. 1. Case Company v. N.L.R.B., 243 F.2d 149 (C.A. 7, 1958). And see General Aniline and Film Corporation, 124 NLRB 1217, 1218 (1959), where the Board commented that "[the prescheduling system of performing work has] no An employer is not required to furnish a union with all information which the union conceives might be help- ful in collective bargaining or in the processing of griev- ances.... The [Proudfoot report has] no bearing on wage rates. In this respect [it differs] from the time- study reports which the Board has required employers to furnish a union. [Footnote omitted.] The weight of the testimony is that ... the Proudfoot report recom- mended a system for the more effective managerial scheduling of work. It is true that the Proudfoot report contains rough standard times for the performance of certain tasks, but the evidence is uncontradicted that these standards were solely for the convenience of su- pervisors in scheduling work. They were never commu- nicated to employees and no employee was ever told that he had to accomplish work in accordance with this or any other standard. No employee was ever rewarded for exceeding or punished for not meeting the stan- dards in the Proudfoot report. These standards cannot therefore properly be considered terms or conditions of employment. Moreover, the Proudfoot report contains neither manning tables nor proposals for the elimina- tion of jobs. Finally, there is absolutely no evidence that at any time during contract negotiations or during the processing of grievances, the Respondent sought to justify a position by appealing to the [Proudfoot re- port]. In view of the above, we are not convinced that the [Proudfoot report was] relevant and necessary to enable the Union intelligently and efficaciously to bar- gain collectively with 'respect to wages, hours, and oth- er terms and conditions of employment.' We find that the General Counsel has not established by a prepon- derance of evidence that under all the circumstances of this case the Respondent failed to fulfill its obligation to bargain in good faith with the Union by refusing to furnish to the latter copies of the [Proudfoot report]. Accordingly, we shall dismiss the complaint.7 In sum, I find that the Union in this proceeding has failed to demonstrate evidentially that the guidelines con- tained in the formula were either relevant or necessary for it to administer effectively the terms of the existing contract between the parties, or to represent properly its members in the bargaining unit. In my opinion, the Union's demand that Respondent provide it with the guidelines for resched- uling routes was based on an alleged necessity which was more general and theoretical than immediate and practi- cal. 8 Accordingly, I conclude that Respondent did not vio- late Section 8(aX5) of the Act by refusing to comply with the Union's request for the data contained in the formula. I shall therefore dismiss the complaint in its entirety. [Recommended Order for dismissal omitted from publi- cation.] bearing on wage rates. In this respect they differ from the time-study reports which the Board has required employers to furnish a union." Id. at 1219-20. s See The Kroger Co. v. N. LR.B., 399 F.2d 455, 457 (C.A. 6, 1968). 124