Lincoln Supply Co., Inc.

932 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Lincoln Supply Co., Inc. and Truck Drivers & Helpers Local Union 317, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware- housemen and Helpers of America. Cases 3-CA-4515 and 3-RC-5181 August 16, 1972 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND KENNEDY On March 30, 1972, Trial Examiner Marion C. Ladwig issued the attached Decision in this consoli- dated proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the Trial Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner's rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that Respondent, Lincoln Supply Co., Inc., Syracuse, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's recommended Order. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MARION C. LADWIG, Trial Examiner: These consolidat- ed cases were tried at Syracuse, New York, on November 30 and December 1-3, 1971.1 The charge was filed on July 6 (amended August 25), and the complaint was issued on August 30, with an order consolidating the cases and referring the representation case to the Board. The primary issues in the complaint case are whether the Company, the Respondent, in response to the Union's organizational drive (a) engaged in numerous acts of interrogation, promises of benefits, and threats of plant close, discharge, and other reprisals, (b) urged employees to bypass the Union and form a committee or company union for immediate bargaining and benefits, (c) granted preelection wage increases and other benefits and encouraged bargain- ing with an employee committee to dissuade employees from supporting the Union, (d) unlawfully discharged four ' All dates are in 1971 198 NLRB No. 137 employees, and (e) illegally refused to recognize and bargain with the Union, in violation of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act. In the representation case, the petition was filed on May 19 (amended June 1), a stipulated consent election agreement was approved on June 4, and the election was conducted on June 14. The vote was 12 for and 21 against union representation, with I challenged ballot. The Union filed timely objections, which are in issue. Upon the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Company, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION The Company, a New York corporation, is engaged in the manufacture of sheet metal products and the wholesale of hardware and sheet metal products at its shop and warehouse in Syracuse, New York, where it annually purchases and receives sheet metal, hardware, and other goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from outside the State. The Company admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Early Terminations, Interrogation, and Threats of Discharge Employee Lloyd Gilbert contacted the Union on May 6, and he and employee David Vollmer began organizing at the warehouse on May 7. Early in the week of May 10, Foreman Nick Adernatto (an admitted supervisor) told Gilbert and Vollmer "that we should think twice about the union business, that it had been tried before, and people had been discharged for it. . . . you better watch your step or [President] Irving [Carmen] will fire you." (Emphasis supplied. Although called as a company witness, Adernatto did not deny this conversation.) I find that this warning and threat of discharge, as credibly testified by Vollmer, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as alleged. About 1:45 p.m. on Tuesday, May 11, President Carmen called Gilbert into the office and began interrogating him. After Gilbert answered that he liked his job and was not dissatisfied with working there, Carmen (in Gilbert's words) "asked me who else was involved in this union activity" and "I told him I did not feel it was any of his concern or I was not going to reveal the other persons' names." Carmen thereupon asked the bookkeeper to figure out Gilbert's pay and gave him his final check, discharging him. (Carmen testified that he asked Gilbert if he was happy, and Gilbert said no; he then asked why Gilbert was staying, and Gilbert answered, "I haven't got anything better right now." According to Carmen, he told Gilbert that he was being trained for a better fob, that this costs LINCOLN SUPPLY CO., INC. 933 money, and that if he was not happy, "you better go.") The Company admits that it was aware of Gilbert's union activity. Whereas Gilbert impressed me as an honest witness, Carmen appeared, while testifying on the stand, to be less than candid. I credit Gilbert's account of what happened, and find that Carmen coercively interrogated him, and discharged him (as earlier warned by Foreman Adernatto) because of his union activity, violating Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. Two days later, Thursday morning, May 13, General Manager Seymour Seidenberg terminated employee Vollmer. As Vollmer credibly testified, Seidenberg told him "that I was junior man in the Company and that he had orders that I was to be laid off because of lack of business. He had my check ready, and he wrote me a letter of recommendation." (Seidenberg did not testify.) Following this termination, several of the employees decided to strike if any more of the union organizers were discharged. The same day, May 13, President Carmen interrogated employee Thomas Ray and learned that employees John Feeney and Willie Johnson were also involved in the union activity. As Ray credibly testified, "Mr. Carmen and I had quite a close relationship as far,as friends were concerned. And so he called me up there" to his office and "asked me who was instigating the Union, and I told him, to the best of my knowledge, Lloyd [Gilbert] was.. . . He asked me if there was any other parties involved in it and I says I thought Feeney and Willie Johnson." Carmen asked if Ray thought something was going to become of this, and Ray answered, "Possibly." Then Carmen "told Seymour [Seid- enburg] that he thought that he should dismiss Johnson and Feeney. . . . I told him I didn't state the people's names so that they'd get fired. Irving [Carmen] said, well, if . . they was going to start trouble there, he'd just as soon get rid of them." (Carmen testified that he had "plenty of conversations" with Ray. Carmen did not specifically deny this particular conversation, but denied generally that he made any threats of discharge and testified that he never interrogated any employee about "whether or not they were members of the Union." I discredit the denials. As already indicated, Seidenburg did not testify.) I find that this interrogation of Ray, along with the threat of discharges, were coercive and violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The next morning, Friday, May 14, General Manager Seidenburg terminated both Feeney and Johnson. About 8 o'clock, Seidenburg told Feeney he was laid off for lack of work and paid him for the full day. A few minutes later, Seidenburg called Johnson to the office and told him also that he was laid off for lack of work. Johnson asked why, and Seidenburg said, "It comes from the top." Johnson (a truckdriver) protested, "How could I be laid off for lack of work when they had a truck loaded downstairs to leave the city that morning." There was no response. Soon thereafter, several of the warehouse employees engaged in a work stoppage, claiming that the four employees had been discharged because of their union activity. President Carmen arrived, and later his counsel, and they agreed to reinstate Gilbert, Vollmer, Feeney, and Johnson without loss of pay. Later that day, the Company gave each of the warehouse employees a written statement of "the substance of decisions arrived at a meeting of company employees and management on May 14, 1971." The first two points read: 1. All employees laid-off during the past week will be reinstated without loss of pay. 2. No employees will be adversely affected hereaf- ter in their, employment by' reason of their legitimate ,union activity. The four employees returned to work on Thursday, May 18 ((after the strike ended), with backpay. No other employees were terminated until near the election, when most-but 'not all-of the employees had abandoned the Union to laccept the Company's promise of direct bargaining without union and its offer of an immediate wage increase and kther benefits before the election. In his brief, the General Counsel contends that the termination of Vollmer, Feeney, and Johnson (as well as Gilbert) were "clearly unlawful discharges." However, Gilbert's discharge was the only one of these early terminations which was alleged in the complaint to be unlawful, and the General Counsel stated at the trial (without explanation) that the facts concerning the other three terminations were offered only as "background." I therefore do not rule on whether these early terminations of Vollmer, Feeney, and Johnson were separate violations of the Act. B. Employees Urged to Form Committee or Company Union for Immediate Bargaining and Benefits Soon after the May 14 work stoppage began, Union Business Agent John Parise arrived at the warehouse and spoke to President Carmen. Parise claimed majority status (discussed later) and complained about the discharges. Later in the conversation, as credibly testified by Parise (who impressed me as being an honest, forthright witness), Carmen stated that if "an outside union was brought into his company, that he was along in his years . . . and he was financially set . . . where he could afford to close the doors and not have these headaches. And then they would all be out of a job." (This statement, to the union representative, was not alleged to be a separate violation.) Carmen also told Parise, "I'm talking to some of the employees because I feel that it would be to my advantage to have a shop union. I have several employees that see this my way. And I think that if you butt out of this situation, we can resolve it pretty much ourselves." (Emphasis supplied. I discredit Carmen's testimony that he did not at any time seek to promote an inside union.) Later that morning, in a meeting with most of the warehouse employees, President Carmen proposed the formation of an employee committee and stated his approval of the idea when a company union was proposed by one of the employees, Richard Keeler. As credibly testified by Keeler, a company witness, Carmen, was talking when Keeler entered the office, and was telling the employees "he would like to have some kind of a committee or something" and that he was "going to look into better benefits" and "would be able to possible come up with a hospital plan, a reviewing of people's pay status 1 934 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD at different times during the year." Then when Keeler proposed a company union, Carmen told the employees (in Keeler's words) "that-he would rather work with his own employees than he would with an outside union"-thereby indicating "that he was in favor of a company union." (Carmen, who testified that he had been in business for 38 years, appeared to be obviously fabricating a defense when he claimed that "the very first time that I knew the difference between an inside union and an outside union was when Mr. Keeler mentioned it.") Keeler acknowledged that still later in the meeting, in the presence of the company counsel, Business Agent Parise told Carmen that Carmen's trying to convince the employees to have a shop union was an unfair labor practice. Business Agent Parise credibly testified that after he joined the meeting, he told the Company, "They had no right to try to shove a company union down" the employees' throat, whereupon the company counsel invited Parise to wait downstairs, telling him, "We're working out an agreement now . . . and we feel we'd like to work this out on our own." Thereafter the Company drafted-and presented to the employees-the aforementioned written statement, the fourth point of which read: 4-We promise to meet immediately with a commit- tee of employees to discuss employee grievances such as wages, health insurance, holidays, job security and other issues that the committee chooses to submit. [Emphasis supplied.] In its brief, the Company contends that the "idea for a company union, or committee, originated with the employ- ees, particularly with Keeler"; that there were no promises made to the employees; and that President Carmen's May 14 written statement, or letter, "prepared by his counsel and delivered that day to his employees . . . was not designed to influence them in their choice of a union representative." I do not agree. The credited testimony shows that Carmen had already proposed a "shop union" to several of the employees before he talked with Business Agent Parise that Friday morning. Furthermore, the Company's own witness, Keeler, revealed that Carmen was suggesting in the employee meeting that morning that they have a "committee or something" before Keeler proposed a company union; that Carmen stated he was "going to look into" and "possibly come up with" some better benefits; and that Carmen told the employees he would prefer working with the employees rather than with an outside union . Moreover there is the documentary eviden- ce-the Company's attorney-prepared written statement to the employees-promising to meet "immediately" with an employee committee to discuss wages and benefits. I therefore find, as alleged in the complaint, that the Company suggested, urged, and encouraged the employees to bypass the Union and form a company union or committee to deal with the Company regarding wages and conditions of employment. I further find that the Company promised them wage increases and other benefits to induce them to abandon their support of the Union. The Company thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. As the strike continued (some of the employees insisting on an informal election in order that they could vote immediately for the Union), President Carmen made further efforts to persuade the employees to deal directly with him, without an outside union . Carmen went to the picket line and talked to employees Ray, Gilbert, and Feeney. As credibly testified by Ray, Carmen "asked us if we would put down the pickets and come in and settle our differences within our own company. . . . He stated that he could form a gnevance board of our own choosing. He also stated that if we would go along with him, that he would make changes right away, such as pay increases and things of this nature." (Emphasis supplied. I discredit Carmen's general denials that he ever made promises of any kind to the employees and his denial that he had a conversation with Ray about the problem of work stoppages.) I find that by this conversation with the pickets, the Company further urged the employees to form an employee board or committee and bypass the Union, offering them benefits "right away," in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The demand for an immediate, informal election was finally refused on Monday, May 17, and the Union advised the strikers to return to work and wait for a Board election. When they returned the next day, May 18, employee Keeler began an effort to organize a company union. (Although Keeler was the only employee who proposed a company union in the May 14 meeting, the Company had agreed in its attorney -prepared statement, point 5, to a Board election between an "inside" and "outside" union.) President Carmen granted approval for an office employee to type and duplicate the authorization cards for the "Independent Employees Union of Lincoln Supply" and authorized Keeler to solicit signatures on company time. The effort failed and the company union was not included on the June 14 ballot. The Company admits in its brief that it "ill advisedly" allowed the use of its duplicating equipment to print the cards, but fails to mention Carmen's authorization of company time solicita- tion (which was revealed by Keeler and later admitted by Carmen). I find that the Company's participation in the efforts to establish the company union was a further encouragement of the employees to bypass the Union and interfered with the exercise of the employees ' Section 7 rights, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Thereafter, while the Regional Office was processing the Union's petition for an election , the Company continued its efforts to induce the employees to abandon their support of the Union . President Carmen talked to some of the employees about what they wanted and agreed to a meeting of warehouse employees to present his package proposal of what he could offer . Finally, after one or two postponements, Carmen promised to meet on Monday morning, June 7-4 days after the Company and the Union signed the stipulated consent election agreement for an election on June 14. Meanwhile, General Manager Seidenburg advised the employees in the sheet metal shop that they should not worry about whatever took place at the warehouse, that they would get the same wage increase. I find that this preelection promise of a wage increase to the sheet metal employees (who were not involved in the May 14-17 work stoppage) was made to induce them not to support the Union and violated Section 9(a)(1) of the Act. LINCOLN SUPPLY CO., INC. 935 In apparent preparation for his June 7 proposal, President Carmen privately announced a larger wage increase to two of the union leaders , employees Gilbert and Feeney (both of whom had been discharged and reinstat- ed). Carmen called Feeney to the office, mentioned the forthcoming meeting, and told him that because of his position and responsibilities, he was getting a 50-cent hourly raise, which was more than the others would be getting. Carmen then told Feeney to send in Gilbert. Carmen, in the presence of General Manager Seidenburg, told Gilbert that he was giving him a 50-cent increase "because he felt that certain employees worked harder than others and deserved more." Then, "at the very end of our conversation he said something to the effect , I'm sure you now know how to vote." (This credited testimony by Gilbert is undemed.) Particularly in view of the fact that both Feeney and Gilbert had been union leaders, and in view of the comment to Gilbert that "you now know how to vote," I find that the promises of the two special increases were timed to induce the employees to drop their support of the Union and violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Also before the scheduled June 7 meeting, President Carmen repeated the threat he had made on May 14 to Business Agent Parise. Carmen called Feeney to the office and (in Feeney's words), "said that if the Union did get in, that he was well situated in life and he could afford to close his doors and live comfortably without the business." (Although Carmen denied threatening to close the plant if the Union came in, he admitted telling Parise, "John, at my age, I need all these problems?" When asked if he ever said that to the employees, he answered, "If I did, I don't remember, Your Honor.") I credit Feeney's testimony and find that the threat, or implied threat, was clearly coercive and violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I also find that it was an additional inducement for the employees to abandon the Union and to deal directly with Carmen. About the same time (early June or late May), one of the former union supporters did abandon the Union. As employee Norman Porter credibly testified, he went to President Carmen's office and "asked him what I could get, for more pay, for more benefits andjob security. I was looking out for myself. . . . He said that there would be substantial increases. He would take care of his people if they took care of him. . . . he mentioned that as far as any union activity, he was going to forestall [that in] any way, form, shape or manner that he could." (Carmen testified that he tried to persuade employees to agree with him in opposing a union, but denied that he ever made "any threats or promises or anything of that kind," Finding Carmen not to be a trustworthy witness, I discredit the denial.) I find that Carmen's promises and threats to Porter were coercive and further violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. C. Preelection Wage Increase, Other Benefits, and Formation of Employee Committee On the morning of June 7, President Carmen neither appeared for the scheduled meeting of warehouse employ- ees nor gave them any notice that he would be absent. (His motivation for failing to notify them is not explained.) When the employees made inquiry, they were informed that he had an eye infection. Having abandoned the Union in response to the Company's promises of immediate bargaining and bene- fits, a majority of the warehouse employees decided that they would not return to work until Carmen met with them. Someone notified the Union about the work stoppage, but when Business Agent Parise and the union president arrived at the warehouse , "we were ordered out of the property." President Carmen did appear the next morning, June 8 (6 days before the election), and met first with the sheet metal employees. He told them that even though they had not caused him any trouble , they would get the same wage increase and other benefits he was giving the warehouse employees. He also told them he had rather deal with company men than outsiders, and that if he had to pay the outside union scale , he could not compete . He revealed his package proposal to them, and according to him, "They seemed to be satisfied." Then across the street , where most of the warehouse employees were idle for about an hour before he arrived around 9 o'clock, President Carmen read off his package proposal. It included a 25-cent wage increase, 4-hour (instead of 5-hour) workday on Saturday, a 3-day July 4 weekend, optional contributory hospitalization, and a clarification of vacation pay. The employees met among themselves and then advised Carmen that his proposal was accepted on condition 'he would allow them to have the employee committee (which he had promised in wasting on May 14) to negotiate on these and other matters . Carmen agreed, and the employees elected a committee . When the committee went to his office to let him know who had been selected, Carmen told them (as employee Gilbert credibly testified) that "with this committee the Company could make better progress," that there would be "more for the Company to offer the employees," and "the management, along with this committee , could do more than they could with an outside union." (The Company paid the employees for the time not worked that Monday and Tuesday.) A day or so later, Carmen met with the committee-before the election-and discussed various matters. He agreed that the employees could use their sick leave for other purposes, like going hunting. On June 11, the Friday before the Monday election, the Company began paying the 25-cent wage increase (and the 50-cent increase to the two former union leaders, Gilbert and Feeney). President Carmen personally distributed the paychecks and repeatedly connected the wage increases to employee votes in the forthcoming election , saying: (to Feeney) "Now I've kept my promise, and I expect you will keep your end of the bargain with me"; (to Gilbert) "I have kept my end of the bargain, now I expect you to keep yours"; (to Porter) "that he had kept his end of the bargain, he was hoping that I was going to keep mine. And he had hoped that I knew how to vote"; and (to Vollmer) "I just wanted to show you that you do have the 25-cent an hour increase, and that I do carry through with my promises . And when the election comes up, I'm sure of how you will vote." (Carmen testified that the only thing he remembered telling the employees was "you demanded 936 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD this; you've got it now. . . . Here's your promise and here's your pay.") When Carmen gave the paycheck to employee Johnson (one of the former union organizers whom the Company had terminated and reinstated), Johnson complained that some of the employees were getting a 50-cent increase whereas he was getting only 25 cents. It is undisputed that Carmen called the bookkeeper and told her to put Johnson in for another 10-cent raise, which was paid the following week. (I find that this special increase, like those to former union leaders Gilbert and Feeney, was to influence his vote and violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.) As Ray credibly testified, Carmen asked him "how I was going to vote," and upon getting an evasive answer, asked "If I was for the Teamsters or against the Teamsters," only to get another evasive answer. Carmen asked for Ray's support, gave him a pat on the back, and gave him his paycheck. (In view of the Company's unlawful antiunion campaign, and Carmen's earlier coercive interrogation of and threats to Ray, I find that this additional interrogation was coercive and violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.) In his brief, the General Counsel describes this preelec- tion conduct as "blatant" in nature, and contends that despite the Union's majority status, the Company bar- gained with "an employee committee it had encouraged and assisted" and "threatened, interrogated, promised, cajoled, and otherwise did everything in its power," to undercut the Union. The Company argues that, "unques- tioned," the granting of the wage increase and other benefits and the establishment of the grievance committee shortly before an election are "normally unlawful." However, it contends that its conduct was not unlawful in this case "since the benefits were coerced by the very employees who now seek to sustain the charge. . . . There is absolutely no evidence that the Respondent had any intention or expectation of granting a wage increase or other benefits in advance of the election. the was compelled by his employees to do so as the price for continuing his business. . . . The creation of the Griev- ance Committee was, in fact, a condition of the employees accepting the Respondent's offer on June 8 and one of the conditions on which they agreed to return to work." Thus the Company ignores its written promise on May 14 "to meet immediately with a committee of employees" to discuss wages and other benefits, the evidence of other unlawful conduct designed to induce the employees to abandon the Union, and President Carmen's promise to meet with the warehouse employees on June 7 to present his package proposal of what he could offer them. After continually flouting the law to undercut the Union, and succeeding in inducing a majority of the employees to abandon the Union and deal directly with him, President Carmen then precipitated a strike on June 7 by reneging, without notice, on his promise to meet and present his wage-and-benefits package that morning. Then, after granting the preelection benefits, again agreeing to the formation of an employee committee as promised in writing on May 14, and bargaining with the committee, Carmen personally distributed the paychecks containing the wage increases and urged an antiunion vote in return for the benefits. Even apart from the General Counsel's contention that a strike could not justify these preelection benefits and bargaining in any event, the strike clearly could not excuse the Company's preelection conduct in the foregoing circumstances-particularly where the Company repeated- ly promised the employees preelection bargaining and benefits, and then provoked the strike during the course of dealing directly with its employees who had been induced to abandon the Union. I find that by promising and granting the preelection wage increases and other benefits, and by encouraging the formation of an employee committee and bargaining with it before the election, in order to dissuade the employees' union support, the Company violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. D. Alleged Unlawful Discharges and Other Coercion 1. Joseph Dixie Dixie was one of the union organizers in the sheet metal shop. He signed a card on May 14, and succeeded in getting three other sheet metal employees to sign. Some- time in the latter part of May or early June, Superintendent Al Heber (an admitted supervisor in the warehouse) went to the sheet metal shop and asked Dixie how he felt about the Union. Dixie gave Heber an evasive answer. (Heber did not testify.) Also sometime during that period, President Carmen talked to Dixie about the Union. As Dixie credibly testified, Carmen called Dixie out in the hall and commented that "one hand washed the other hand" (referring to the times when Dixie had asked for a job back after leaving the employ of the Company, and Carmen had rehired him). Then Dixie began to tell Carmen what Dixie thought the employees were entitled to: a substantial raise and insurance. "I said that I thought the fair thing would be 50, 75 cents an hour." Carmen responded, "Let's not be ridiculous.... You know, Joe . . . if the outside [union] comes in . . . I'll still be in charge of hiring and firing, and I can always get a grievance against anybody I want." (Carmen did not specifically deny this conversation.) Particularly in view of the Company' s earlier discharges and threats, I find that Heber's undenied interrogation of Dixie, and also Carmen's implied threat of discharge if the Union came in, were coercive and violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I also find that Dixie's evasive response to Heber (when asked how he felt about the Union), and Dixie's so-called "ridiculous" proposal for a wage increase of 50 to 75 cents an hour (when Carmen called him out into the hall and talked to him), caused the Company at least to suspect Dixie's support of the Union-whether or not through employee interrogation or otherwise the Company was aware that Dixie was a union organizer. On Wednesday morning, June 9 (5 days before the election), President Carmen went to the sheet metal shop and questioned Dixie about not being willing to operate the shear. Dixie testified that he explained that the guard on the machine had not been adjusted properly and had been unsafe to operate. (It had been fixed about a week earlier.) Carmen asked about other machines and then Dixie returned to work. That afternoon Dixie left work to make an appointment with his lawyer concerning a LINCOLN SUPPLY CO., INC. 937 personal matter. (Foreman Harry Coughenour credibly testified that it was about 10 or 10:30 when Carmen came to the shop that morning, and about 1 p.m., when Dixie left. Coughenour admitted that Dixie said he had some personal business to transact, and that Coughenour responded, "I'll see you tomorrow, Joe.") Dixie further credibly testified that the next morning, Thursday, June 10, he had his wife call in and report that he was sick and would be out for a couple of days. (On cross-examination, Dixie revealed that he feigned sickness because of a belief that "if I was to stay at the plant, I felt that I would be laid off before the election. And I wanted to be eligible to vote." The Company did not deny that it had received the report that Dixie was sick.) Then the next afternoon, June 11, when Dixie went to the plant to get his paycheck, Carmen asked Dixie how he was going to vote, saying: "I would like to have a 100 percent vote for the Company . . . how are you going to vote?" Dixie was again evasive, answering, "I know which side my bread is buttered on. And that's the way I'm going to vote." In this or another conversation, Carmen told Dixie, "You're nervous . . . maybe the election is too much for you .. . why don't you take a week off?" Dixie replied, "No . . . I'll be here for the election." However on Monday, when Dixie returned to work and to vote, his timecard was missing, and Foreman Coughenour told him, "You'll have to see Mr. Carmen." Later, Dixie went to where the election was to be held and Carmen told him, "You no longer work for us." (Dixie's vote was challenged.) The complaint alleges that Dixie was discharged on June 11. The Company contends in its brief that the evidence "about the shear machine is pointless. . . . The fact is that [President Carmen] did not fire Dixie, because of the machine or otherwise. Dixie simply walked off the job and did not return for almost a week . . . probably for one of the same reasons that he quit on many prior occasions. By definition this is a quit." However, the Company's own testimony does not support this defense. Foreman Coughenour, a company witness, implicitly admitted that he gave Dixie permission to leave on June 9 (by testifying that Dixie said he had some personal business to transact and that Coughenour simply respond- ed, "I'll see you tomorrow, Joe"). Coughenour did not deny receiving the word from Dixie's wife that Dixie was sick and would not be in for a couple of days. Coughenour testified that he talked to Dixie on Friday, June 11, when Dixie came for his paycheck, and did not ask him if he had quit. Nevertheless, as Coughenour further testified, Car- men "said to me" sometime that Friday "that as long as Joe hadn't showed up, to pull his clock card," that Carmen "wanted to talk to him before he went back to work." (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, according to the Company's own witness, the Company did not believe that Dixie had quit. (Carmen, who testified that Dixie quit, did not confirm or deny this conversation with Coughenour on Friday. He testified that as far as he knew, Dixie did not show up for work on Thrusday, Friday, or Saturday, and did not come to the plant on Friday. As previously indicated, he did not impress me as being a candid witness.) I find that President Carmen's claim that Dixie quit was merely an attempt to conceal the fact that the Company discriminatorily discharged him because of its knowledge or suspicion that he favored the Union. I therefore find that the Company discharged Dixie in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, and that under these circum- stances, President Carmen's interrogation of Dixie on June II (asking him how he was going to vote) was coercive and further violated Section 8(a)(1). 2. John Feeney As discussed above, Feeney was one of the union leaders who was terminated and offered reinstatement on the same day, May 14. About 2 weeks later, he and another union leader were promised a special 50-cent hourly increase, as found, to induce them to drop their union support. Then on June 11, when the 50-cent increase was paid to Feeney aiid one other and a 25-cent increase was paid to all other employees, some of the employees accused Feeney of "selling out." Upon giving Feeney his paycheck, President Carmen told him (as he did others), "Now I've kept my promise, and I expect you will keep your end of the bargaining with me." But, as Feeney credibly testified, Carmen went further, saying "Now I want you to know that you are working for me. I want you to keep me informed of what the other employees are doing in regard to union activity." Carmen then added that "if I was dissatisfied with the way things were, he was sure there was employment elsewhere." Thus, upon giving Feeney the 50-cent raise, Carmen conditioned Feeney's continued employment on his will- ingness to report on other employees' union activities. (Carmen repeatedly denied that he had any private conversation with Feeney before June 14. He finally testified, though, that he talked to Feeney privately on June 8, but denied asking him to report on union activities. He impressed me as being more interested in making a plausible defense than reporting accurately what hap- pened. I discredit his denials.) I find that Carmen's statements to Feeney, requiring that Feeney report on union activities or be discharged, were coercive and violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Feeney went to lunch, and "I got to thinking about the position I was in. I was sort of caught in the middle. I didn't want to be a stoolie on my friends and my fellow workers." He returned from lunch and decided to quit. He decided not to vote in the election, as he credibly testified, because he and Gilbert "got more money than the rest. So immediately everybody figured we'd sold out. So my vote having been slandered, I chose not to vote in that election." About 2 p.m., Feeney went to the timeclock and clocked out. As credibly testified by Foreman Adernatto, "I see him go punch his timecard, and he came back and handed me the timecard and said he's quitting. And I told him I was sorry to see him quit. . . . I overheard him say that they're accusing him of selling out. . . . There was several people around there." The next day, Feeney saw President Carmen in a bar near the warehouse. Carmen "said to me that he under- stood why I quit and that in the future I could come back." A month later, on July 12, Feeney telephoned Carmen and 938 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD asked if he (Feeney) could come back to work. Carmen first asked if Feeney had been in touch with Business Agent Parise or David Vollmer (who was discharged immediately after the June 14 election, as discussed below), "or had anything to do with the Union." I find that this interrogation about Feeney's being in touch with the Union and the union leader, Vollmer, was coercive and violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. (Vollmer was not rehired or reinstated.) The General Counsel contends that Feeney was con- structively discharged, contending that "Carmen had euchred Feeney into a position where no self-respecting worker could stay in the plant. Added to this was Carmen's threat to fire him if he didn't spy on his co-workers. Faced with this prospect, Feeney did what he thought was the honorable thing to do." The Company argues that even if Feeney's disputed testimony is true, "it does not constitute a request to inform on his fellow employees." (As quoted above, though, Feeney testified that Carmen said, "I want you to keep me informed of what the other employees are doing in regard to union activity.") The Company also contends that the Company did not make "working conditions so unbearable" that Feeney was forced to quit. I disagree. Particularly in the circumstances of this case, where President Carmen gave Feeney a special wage increase to induce him to drop his support of the Union, resulting in Feeney's being called a "sell out," I find that Carmen's requirement that Feeney report on the employ- ees' union activities or be discharged placed Feeney in an untenable position and coerced him into quitting. I therefore find that the Company constructively discharged Feeney in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. The credited testimony of employee John Christian shows that President Carmen, on and after June 11, continued to engage in interrogation about the Union. Christian, a senior employee who formerly had been a foreman, worked behind the picket line until noon, Saturday, May 15, and then failed to return until June 11. (Upon his return to work, the Company did not mention his absence.) Beginning on June 11, Carmen asked Christian about the Union "practically every time he came in the building where I was." Carmen asked him if he knew who was the head of the Union, who had joined the Union, who started it, and if he had signed a card. After the election, Carmen also "asked me and different ones in the place" how they voted. Christian retired on June 26. (Carmen did not specifically deny any of this testimony, although he denied interrogating any employees "about whether or not they were members of the Union.") I find that this continued interrogation, about union support and activity, and about how employees voted, was coercive and violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 3. David Vollmer Employee Vollmer was one of the four union leaders who were terminated early in the organizational drive and reinstated. Of the four, he was the only one who received a wage increase of only 25 cents (Gilbert and Feeney each being given an extra 25 cents, and Johnson being promised an extra 10 cents, to induce them to drop their union support, as found above). Then on Friday, June 11, when President Carmen was personally distributing the pay- checks contained the wage increases, Vollmer was evasive about how he would vote . Carmen told Vollmer, after mentioning the 25-cent increase , "I do carry through with my promises. And when the election comes up, I'm quite sure of how you will vote." Vollmer responded, "I already have my mind made up as to how I would vote ." Carmen stated he hoped that Vollmer's mind was made up in the right direction. On the following Monday, June 14, before the 8-9 a.m. voting began, President Carmen went over to where Vollmer and employee Porter were talking. As Vollmer credibly testified, Carmen "warned me about taking time off" and said "if it happens again , I'm going to fire you. . . . this is a warning, take it as such." Porter credibly testified that he overheard Carmen say something about Vollmer taking time off and point out, "This is a warning. I'm giving you another chance. " (Emphasis supplied. This testimony is undenied.) Vollmer credibly testified that he always called in whenever he missed work and that no one had ever spoken to him before about being absent. (Although elsewhere citing transcript page references in its brief, the Company erroneously asserts that Carmen and Foreman Adernatto both "testified that they had warned [Vollmer] about his absenteeism "-without any page references. Neither Carmen nor Adernatto so testified.) About 10 minutes after the election was over , Vollmer was called to the office and discharged . As Vollmer credibly testified, Carmen said, "You're being laid off." When asked why, Carmen stated, "We'll put it this way, time off, missing time. . . . We'll say that this is the reason. . . . another thing you must take into considera- tion, that you, as much or more than anyone else , has cost me quite a bit of money as far as disruptions of this business goes as to forming a union." Carmen stated "that he still had to control the employees," that he needed "what he called a scapegoat," and "I guess you're it." After that, "I was ushered out of the office, down the elevator, picked up my jacket, and he escorted me out of the building. He wouldn't let me say anything to anyone." (Vollmer impressed me as a most alert and an honest witness with a good memory.) Although the Company contends in its brief that Vollmer was discharged for "excessive absenteeism," President Carmen claimed at the trial that there were several reasons (absenteeism, ramming a forklift truck into merchandise, and threatening to kill a foreman-or, as amplified on cross-examination , threatening to kill two foremen and he "also threatened a fellow employee"). I find all of these purported reasons to be mere pretexts or fabrications-particularly in view of the timing of the discharge, the reasons given at the time , and, as argued by the General Counsel, "the haste with which Vollmer was thrown out of the plant" once the election count was in. The evidence is clear that the Company was aware of Vollmer's union activity . That afternoon, several hours after the election , President Carmen showed Vollmer's absentee record to four members of the newly formed committee (which had been bargaining with the Company before the election), and got their signatures on a statement reading: LINCOLN SUPPLY CO., INC. 939 We, the members of the Grievance Committee .. . feel because of his poor record of attendance at work and his attitude toward his work, the services of David M. Vollmer should be terminated. This has nothing to do with his Union activities. [Emphasis supplied.] This statement, prepared by the Company, did not mention threats dr damage to merchandise , but added still another purported reason for the discharge. I also note that a month later, when unlawfully interrogating discharged employee Feeney (as found above), Carmen connected Vollmer with the Union by asking Feeney if he had been in touch with Business Agent Parise or Vollmer, "or had anything to do with the Union." The Company contends in its brief that "Here, sensitive to the possibility of inviting a charge of discrimination, the Respondent refrained from terminating Vollmer's employ- ment until after the election ." Instead, the credited evidence shows that after warning Vollmer about absentee- ism for the first time immediately before the election, and telling him, "I'm giving you another chance," President Carmen discharged him immediately after the election, blaming him for the union-related disruptions of the business, and ejected him from the warehouse. Thereafter, I find, Carmen sought to conceal his discriminatory motivation by inducing part of the employee committee (with which he had been dealing unlawfully before the election) to sign a statement that "This has nothing to do with [Vollmer's] Union activities." I find that Vollmer's discharge was clearly discriminato- ry and violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Moreover, another consideration for discounting the Company's defense, although not essential for a finding of unlawful motivation, is the Company's failure to produce requested evidence. Vollmer had'testified that from his observation, the attendance record of warehouse employ- ees was "Very poor," and employee Christian, as indicated above, had testified that he was absent without permission from May 15 to June ,11, yet no one mentioned his absence when he returned. Vollmer also gave undisputed testimony that although he worked only one full 47 1/2-hour week in the I I weeks he was there, no one had ever spoken to him about being absent. The General Counsel sought the production of other employees' attendance records for comparison. Finally the company counsel promised to produce the records for the warehouse employees in the second calendar quarter and stated, "I am aware of what the General Counsel is trying to prove . . . that our people did not show up for work on time or a full week and that sort of thing." Yet the Company later reneged on the promise and produced only selected records. It produced payroll records of 13 of the 21 other warehouse employees (omitting Baldwin, Barry, Christian, Coleman, Demereaux, Mazzuca, Smith, and Walter), and 3 of the 4 truckdrivers (omitting Flora)-claiming erroneously that "This repre- sents about 90 percent or so of the people of the warehouse." (One of the records produced, that of regular employee Schadle, shows that he did not work a single full 47 1/2 hour week in the 20-week period from January 7 through May 20, but worked most of the weeks from 32 to 47 hours, averaging 39.7 hours.) Even assuming, as argued by the Company without support of evidence, that one or two employees worked a 40-hour week, or certain employees were part-time or worked less than a full day, the records (and at most, a minimum amount of explana- tion) would have readily identified any such exceptions. I infer that the records were withheld because they would have been unfavorable to the Company's defense. Having found the numerous foregoing 8(a)(1) violations, I find it unnecessary to rule on other alleged coercion of the employees. E. Alleged Refusal To Bargain 1. Majority status The following combined unit of employees in the warehouse and sheet metal shop is admittedly an appropri- ate bargaining unit: All regular part-time and full-time truckdrivers, ware- housemen, counter help, and sheet metal workers employed by the Employer at its place of business on 109 Otisco and 215 Wyoming Streets, Syracuse, New York, excluding all office clerical employees, profes- sional employees , foremen, printers, guards and super- visors as defined in the Act. On May 18, the Union had valid authorization cards signed by 21 of the 36 employees in this unit. This clear majority of 21 consisted of 13 cards signed on May 13 (Boster, Feeney, Flora, Gilbert, Hawley, Johnson, Mazzu- ca, Porter, Ray, Schadle, Vollmer, Walter, and Zeppetello); 3 cards signed on May 14 (Dixie, MacMaster, and Perry); 1 card signed on May 17 (Ferns); and 4 cards signed on May 18 (Blake, Mickelson, Neivvine, and Thomas). There were 14 nonsigners (Baldwin, Daniels, Barry, Beck, Brock, Christian, Compton, Dailey, Demeraux, Horner, Phohl, Pine, Smith, and Utas), plus Keeler, who signed a card on May 13 and did not withdraw it, but who on May 14 began campaigning for a company union. 2. Bargaining requests On May 13, the day the second union organizer was terminated, the Union sent the Company a letter, claiming majority status and requesting bargaining in a warehouse unit of "drivers , countermen, warehousemen, and working foremen ." On May 14, Business Agent Parise met with the Company. He claimed, and then demonstrated, the Union's majority in a unit of the warehouse employees (13 valid cards in a unit of 24). The Company told Parise that an appropriate unit must include the sheet metal employ- ees (working in a separate building across the street), and that the Company would want a formal Board election. Upon leaving the meeting, Parise and some of the warehouse employees began organizing in the sheet metal shop. President Carmen was aware of this organizing, because he ordered , Parise to leave the shop on two occasions. On May 19, 1 day after achieving majority status in a combined unit, the Union filed a petition for an election in the warehouse unit. Then on June 1 , it filed an amended petition for an election in the combined unit. (The Union lost the June 14 election by a vote of 12 to 21, with one challenged ballot. The Union 's objections are discussed later.) 940 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 3. Contentions and concluding findings The General Counsel contends that the originally sought warehouse unit would also be appropriate for bargaining, that the Union's May 13 bargaining demand was continu- ing in nature, that the Company's unlawful conduct "utterly destroyed the possibility of conducting an election in which the employees might have any kind of free choice of bargaining representative," and that a bargaining order should issue, with the election being set aside and the petition dismissed. The Company contends that there was no illegal refusal to bargain because the Union did not renew its bargaining demand and that there is no proof that the Company had knowledge of the union majority in the combined unit. The Company further contends that it "is convinced that the charges alleged in the complaint are unproven," but even if proved, "in the absence of a refusal to bargain, the existence of unfair labor practices is irrelevant on the subject of the issuance of a bargaining order." I do not agree. Because of the extensive and flagrant nature of the Company's unfair labor practices, dissipating the Union's majority and removing any hope of a fair election, I find it unnecessary to rule on whether or not there was a technical 8(a)(5) violation. This is such a case in which the Supreme Court has approved the issuance of a bargaining order even in the absence of an 8(a)(5) violation, where the unfair labor practices are "outrageous" and "pervasive," and of "such a nature that their coercive effects cannot be eliminated by the application of traditional remedies, with the result that a fair and reliable election cannot be had." N. L. R. B. v. Gissel Packing Co, 395 U.S. 575, 613-614. As found above, the Company engaged in numerous acts of interrogation, threats of discharge, plant closure, and reprisal. It urged employees to bypass the Union and form a company union or committee and promised in writing to meet immediately with a committee to discuss wages and other benefits. It promised pay increases and other changes if the employees would abandon the Union. It participated in an effort to form a company union. After the election petition was filed, the Company continued to promise benefits and then, 6 days before the election, actually granted a 25-cent wage increase to all unit employees and again agreed to the formation of an employee committee. Thereafter, also before the election, it bargained with the employee committee and conferred another benefit. It also granted a special wage increase to three of the former union leaders to induce them to drop their support of the Union. Three days before the election, the company president personally distributed the paycheck containing the wage increases and urged an antiunion vote in return for the benefits. It threatened an employee with discharge unless he informed against other employees for engaging in union activity. It discriminatonly discharged four employ- ees, including one immediately after the election, and continued its coercion of employees by interrogating them about how employees voted in the election. Inasmuch as the Company has, by outrageous and pervasive unfair labor practices, dissipated the Union's majority and made a fair election impossible, I find that a bargaining order is necessary and appropriate to remedy the 8(a)(1) and (3) violations. III. REPRESENTATION PROCEEDING In the June 14 stipulated consent election, the employees voted 12 for, and 21 against, union representation, with I challenged ballot. On June 15, the Union filed timely objections to conduct affecting the results of the election. As found above, the Company, between May 19 (when the original petition was filed) and June 14, violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discriminatonly discharging Joseph Dixie and constructively discharging John Feeney, and coerced the employees in violation of Section 8(a)(I) by such conduct as engaging in unlawful interrogation, threatening to close down if the Union were successful, and promising benefits to dissuade the employ- ees' union support. I find, as alleged in the union objections, that this and other unlawful company conduct during that period of time interfered with the employees' free choice in the election. I therefore find that the election must be set aside, and that in view of the Company's above-found outrageous and pervasive unfair labor practices-dissipating the Union's majority and making a fair election impossible-the election petition must be dismissed. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. By discriminatorily discharging Lloyd Gilbert on May 11, Joseph Dixie and John Feeney on June 11, and David Vollmer on June 14, the Company engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (I) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. By coercively interrogating employees, and by making threats of discharge, plant closure, and reprisal for engaging in union activity, the Company violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 3. By urging employees to bypass the Union and form a committee or company union, and by participating in an effort to form a company union, the Company violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. By promising immediate bargaining with an employ- ee committee and, before the election, again agreeing to the formation of the committee and bargaining with the committee, the Company violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 5. By promising wage increases and other benefits if employees would abandon an outside union, the Company violated Section 8(a)(I). 6. By granting preelection wage increases and other benefits, the Company violated Section 8(a)(1). 7. By threatening to discharge an employee unless he informed against fellow employees for engaging in union activity, the Company also violated Section 8(a)(1). 8. As a result of the foregoing outrageous and pervasive unlawful company conduct, dissipating the Union's May 18 majority in a stipulated appropriate bargaining unit and making a fair election impossible, a bargaining order is appropriate and necessary. 9. The June 14 election must be set aside and the election petition dismissed. l LINCOLN SUPPLY CO., INC. 941 REMEDY In order to effectuate the policies of the Act, I find it necessary that the Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from the unfair labor practices found and from like or related invasions of the employees' Section 7 rights, and to take certain affirmative action. The Respondent having discriminatorily discharged three employees (and not having reinstated them with backpay, as it has the fourth discharged employee, Lloyd Gilbert), I find it necessary that it be ordered to offer them full reinstatement, with backpay computed on a quarterly basis, plus interest at 6 percent per annum, as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716, from date of discharge to date reinstatement is offered. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: 2 ORDER Respondent, Lincoln Supply Co., Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against any employee for supporting Truck Drivers & Helpers Local Union 317, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, or any other union. (b) Urging employees to bypass an outside union and form an employee committee or company union. (c) Assisting any employee in an effort to organize a company union. (d) Promising to bargain, or bargaining, with an employee committee or grievance board to undercut employee support of an outside union. (e) Promising or granting wage increases or other benefits in the future to undermine employee support of an outside union. (f) Threatening discharge, plant closure, or any reprisal for engaging in union activity. (g) Threatening to discharge any employee unless he informed against other employees for engaging in union activity. (h) Coercively interrogating any employee about union support or union activity. (i) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain in good faith with Truck Drivers & Helpers Local Union 317, nternational Brother- hood of Teamsters, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the following appropriate unit and embody in a signed agreement any understanding reached: All regular part-time and full-time truckdrivers, ware- housemen, counter help, and sheet metal workers employed by the Employer at its place of business on 109 Otisco and 215 Wyoming Streets Syracuse, New York, excluding all office clerical employees, profes- sional employees, foremen, punters, guards and super- visors as defined in the Act. (b) Offer Joseph Dixie, John Feeney, and David Vollmer immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if their jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make them whole for their lost earnings in the manner set forth in the section of the Trial Examiner's Decision entitled "Remedy." (c) Notify immediately the above-named individuals, if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of the right to full reinstatement, upon application after discharge from the Armed Forces, in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act. (d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (e) Post at its warehouse and sheet metal shop in Syracuse, New York, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."3 Copies of notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 3, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of the Respondent, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (f) Notify the Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the June 14, 1971 election held in Case 3-RC-5181 be set aside and that the petition therein be dismissed. 2 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations . be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes { In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board having found, after trial, that we engaged in numerous violations of Federal 942 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD law to turn you against the Teamsters Union after most of WE WILL NOT unlawfully interfere with your union you chose it to represent you: WE WILL bargain , upon request, with Teamsters Local 317 as the exclusive representative of our warehouse and sheet metal shop employees , and put in writing and sign any bargaining agreement reached. WE WILL offer full reinstatement to Joseph Dixie, John Feeney, and David Vollmer , with backpay plus 6 percent interest. WE WILL NOT discharge or discriminate against any of you for supporting the Union. WE WILL NOT threaten to close down , to discharge you, or to take away any benefits if you support the Union. WE WILL NOT threaten to discharge any of you for refusing to inform us about employees ' union activity. WE WILL NOT urge you to form an employee committee or company union , or promise to bargain with any committee, to encourage you to drop your support of the Union. WE WILL NOT promise or give you any wage increase or benefits in the future for the purpose of discouraging your support of the Union. WE WILL NOT coercively question you about the Union. activity. Dated By LINCOLN SUPPLY CO., INC. (Employer) (Representative) (Title) We will notify immediately the above-named individuals, if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of the right to full reinstatement, upon application after discharge from the Armed Forces , in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act. This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board 's Office, 9th Floor, Federal Building, 111 W. Huron St., Buffalo, New York 14202, Telephone 716-842-3100.