Local 1426, Longshoremen

1076 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Local No. 1426, International Longshoremen's Associ- ation, AFL-CIOand Local No. 1766, International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO and Al- mont Shipping Company ; Heide Company; Inter- national Shipping Company; International Termi- nal Operating Company ; Stevedores, Inc.; Waters Shipping Company; Wilmington Shipping Compa- ny Local No. 1807, and Local 1847, International Longshoremen's Association and Checkers and Morehead City Shipping Company; Heide Compa- ny. Cases 11-CC-82, 11-CC-84, and 11-CC-86 August 28, 1972 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND KENNEDY On March 7, 1972, Trial Examiner Samuel M. Singer issued the attached Decision in this proceed- ing. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the Trial Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner's rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt his recommended Order. As set forth in the Trial Examiner's Decision, the sole issue presented by this complaint is whether Respondent Unions, all of which are locals of the ILA respectively representing separate units of longshore employees of shipping companies operat- ing in the South Atlantic ports, violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act by inducing a strike among the employees they represented in the latter part of 1971. The alleged violation was litigated on the theory that Respondents struck the Charging Employers in order to aid the bargaining objectives sought to be furthered by sister unions who struck the shipping companies operating in the North Atlantic ports when their negotiations failed to produce agreement. The North Atlantic unions struck at midnight of September 30, 1971, and the Respondent Unions, as well as others representing employees of other South Atlantic port shipping companies, struck soon thereafter in the early hours of the morning of October 1, 1971. The Trial Examiner dismissed the complaint. Although we have no criticism of his decision, we believe some additional comments are in order in light of the unusual theory of the alleged violation and the willingness of our dissenting colleague to sustain that theory. The unusual aspect of the complaint, as litigated, is that it seeks to extend to the Charging Employers the protection afforded by Section 8(b)(4) to neutrals in a labor dispute not of their own making, even though: (1) the Charging Employers and the Respon- dent Unions were primary parties to a contract bargaining dispute which had not been resolved at the time that Respondent Unions called the employ- ees for whom they bargained out on strike; and (2) Respondents neither established any picket lines nor engaged in any other action beyond striking the Charging Employers upon the expiration of their bargaining contracts. In claiming the extension of 8(b)(4)'s protections to be appropriate, General Counsel undertook to prove that, in inducing the strike, Respondents were moved, not by their legitimate interests in obtaining from the Charging Employers a settlement of their own contract terms, but, rather, by their interests in 'strengthening the bargaining position of the New York sister unions in the resolution of the contract 'dispute concurrently existing at the New York ports. Like the Trial Examiner, we believe his theory was critically affected by affirmative evidence, largely undisputed, which established the existence of: (a) a bona fide primary labor dispute between Respondent Unions and the Charging Employers at the time Respondents struck; and (b) interdependent interests of both the Charging Employers and the Respondent Unions in the settlement by the parties to the New York negotiations of the contract dispute. The existence of a bona fide primary labor dispute between Respondent Unions and the Charging Employers was amply documented by the Trial Examiner. The Respondent Unions and the Charg- ing Employers had engaged in a few meetings before their then current contracts were terminated for purposes of establishing agreements looking to the settlement of wage and economic items laid open for discussion at the bargaining table. But although neither side had fully explored nor determined how 'far the other was willing to go to compromise differences with respect to the contents of new bargaining agreements, the fact remains that there had been no settlement on the important issue of new wage rates and similar economic matters by the date the precedent contracts expired. In terms of its legal effect on the issues here 198 NLRB No. 150 LOCAL 1426, LONGSHOREMEN involved, the absence of any settlement on the critical date afforded the Respondents a lawful warrant to call the employees they represented out on strike even if, as General Counsel claimed, no impasse had yet been reached in their negotiations' and no hourly wage and benefit package proposals had yet been placed upon the table by any of the parties. There was nothing to forbid the Charging Employers from presenting proposals on those items at any time here relevant. But the reasons they did not do so during the bargaining meetings held prestrike are to be found in the bargaining proce- dures they had developed with Respondents during the conduct of their long bargaining relations, and in evidence of their acquiescence to the continued use of the historical procedures for purposes of the current negotiations. The parties' stipulations depict the historical procedures under which the parties had, in a sense, permitted their interests in major wage and fringe benefit terms to be determined by the results of the bargaining conducted at the New York port loca- tions. Under these procedures, the parties had, in the past, confined their active negotiations to "local" issues; had deferred discussion of hourly wage and fringe benefit items until the New York port contracts had been settled; and, almost routinely had then agreed to the inclusion in their contracts of identical provisions on such items. The testimonial admissions by agents of the Charging Employers satisfy us of their acquiescence in the continued use of the traditional bargaining patterns for purposes of the contract negotiations we are concerned with here. We note particularly that, although the employer negotiators unsuccessfully sought a union commitment looking to the avoidance of strike action on the contracts' expiration dates, (1) the parties adjourned their September 21 meeting without scheduling another; (2) the Employers submitted counterproposals to the Unions on that date stating, inter alia, that wages and fringe benefits would be presented and discussed at a later (unspeci- fied) date; (3) the Unions had earlier proposed deferral of bargaining on such items pending the conclusion of the New York negotiations in accord with past bargaining practices; (4) the union propos- als on "local" issues regarded as open for immediate negotiation included a "guaranteed annual income" provision-one the Employers categorically rejected; and (5) the employer counterproposals were confined to the matters traditionally viewed by the parties as matters involving "local" issues. In the context of the mutually adopted bargaining practices, we, like the Trial Examiner, would not I There is nothing in the provisions of the Act which requires that unions must await an impasse in negotiations before conducting a stoke in aid of 1077 place a secondary taint upon Respondents' strike action by reason of the statements made by union negotiators which General Counsel and our dissent- ing colleague would construe as proof that the Respondents' strike action was dictated by the concurrent strike action of the sister unions in New York. As the Trial Examiner indicated, even assum- ing both the correctness of the General Counsel's reading of the ambiguous statements and of his contention that those who uttered them spoke for Respondents, the statements do not, in the context of the situation depicted by this record's total facts, provide any warrant for extending to the Charging Employers the protections afforded by Section 8(b)(4). We shall, accordingly, dismiss the complaint. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. MEMBER KENNEDY, dissenting: Unlike my colleagues, I would not adopt the Trial Examiner's Decision herein. In my opinion, the record amply demonstrates that Respondents violat- ed Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act by striking when their contracts expired with an object of causing the Charging Parties to bring pressure on North Atlantic shippers to settle their contemporane- ous dispute with North Atlantic ILA locals. In my view, under the circumstances here, it is unrealistic to conclude that the strike was called solely in support of whatever labor dispute existed between the parties. Thus, despite the South Atlantic employers' attempts to negotiate a complete agree- ment without regard to bargaining at other ports, and notwithstanding past practice, the Unions insisted on following past practice when negotiations began on August 9, 1971. This meant that Respondents' representatives would only discuss "local" issues with South Atlantic shippers while "national" issues were being resolved in the North. And, under this practice, the parties were in essence bound to incorporate into their agreements any accords reached in the North Atlantic region on such issues. After several bargaining sessions, and the submis- sion of proposals and counterproposals, on Septem- ber 21 the parties amicably broke off negotiations without reaching an impasse on any local issue. But, despite having received assurances from union contract demands 1078 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD committeemen that there would be no strike when the contracts expired on September 30, at 7:30 a.m. on October 1 Pidgeon, the head of the group negotiating for the shippers, was called by Union Negotiating Committee Chairman Harvey and told that because negotiations in New York between the New York Shipping Association and the North Atlantic ILA locals had failed at 3 a.m., the South Atlantic locals had gone on strike effective midnight September 30. During the strike a South Atlantic shipper's request that a vessel containing deteriorating cargo be unloaded was referred to ILA President Gleason who directed the company to the New York strike committee. After neither the committee nor Gleason had acted, the Charging Party was forced to unload the cargo elsewhere. Further proof that Respondents' strike had an object of influencing the North Atlantic negotiations can be found in Harvey's comment to fellow committeeman Williams that the Union's policy was "one port down, all ports down." Given Respondents' refusal to alter the pattern of bargaining, the absence of an impasse over local issues, Harvey's October 1 comment to Pidgeon concerning the reason for the strike, Gleason's apparent control over the South Atlantic local's strike activity, and Harvey's asserting that the union policy was one port down, all ports down, I cannot agree with my colleagues' adopting the Trial Examin- er's conclusion that the strike was called in conformi- ty with Respondent's "no contract, no work" policy solely in furtherance of a primary labor dispute with the Charging Parties.2 To me, it seems more realistic to conclude from the record that Respondents' strike was designed at least in part to force the South Atlantic shippers to pressure the North Atlantic negotiators into settling with the ILA as soon as possible. Hence, the strike had an unlawful secondary objective, and I would so find. 2 Cf International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots (Lykes Bros Steamship Co), 197 NLRB No 68 TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION SAMUEL M. SINGER, Trial Examiner: This proceeding, tried before me in Wilmington, North Carolina, on January 12, 1972, pursuant to charges filed on November 3 and 9 and consolidated complaint issued on November 24, 1971,1 concerns allegations that Respondents violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act by engaging in secondary boycott activities. General Counsel's basic theory is that an object of a work stoppage or strike engaged in by Respondents upon I Unless indicated, all dates are 1971 2 The transcript is corrected as follows at p 5, 1 17, insert "TRIAL EXAMINER" prior to "Of course", and at p 105, 1 22, substitute "no termination of their collective agreement with the Charging Parties (employers operating at the ports of Wilmington and Morehead City, North Carolina-i.e., "South Atlan- tic" ports) was to bring pressure upon the Charging Parties to in turn bring pressure upon other Employers (members of the New York Shipping Association, operating at "North Atlantic" ports) to settle such other employers' dispute with sister locals of International Longshoremen's Association. All parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity to be heard and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. Briefs were received from General Counsel and Respon- dents by February 7, 1972. Upon the entire record,2 and my observation of the testimonial demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 1. THE EMPLOYERS AND LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED Charging Parties, North Carolina corporations with principal offices and places of business in Wilmington and Morehead City, North Carolina, are engaged in shipping, stevedoring, and related services at the ports of Wilming- ton and Morehead City. During the past representative year, each of them received total revenues in excess of $50,000 for services performed in connection with trans- portation of goods in interstate and foreign commerce. I find that at all material times, each of the Charging Parties has been an employer engaged in commerce or industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Respondent Unions are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Facts3 1. Introduction; traditional bargaining pattern As already noted, Charging Parties are shipping compa- nies operating at South Atlantic ports-specifically Wil- mington and Morehead City, North Carolina. Other employers in the Southern region include those operating at the ports of Charleston, Savannah, Jacksonville, and Tampa. The North Atlantic region includes shipping companies (including employers comprising New York Shipping Association) which operate at Nothern ports. Respondent Locals are members of the South Atlantic and Gulf Coast District, affiliated with the International Longshoremen's Association-Local 1426 representing longshoremen, and Local 1766 clerks and checkers, of employers in the Wilmington area; and Locals 1807 and 1847 representing longshoremen, clerks, and checkers in the Morehead City area. Northern ILA locals represent employees in the North Atlantic region including those of employers comprising New York Shipping Association. It was stipulated that "traditionally" negotiations be- charges" for "the charges " 3 Based almost entirely on substantially uncontradicted testimony and stipulations entered into at the hearing LOCAL 1426, LONGSHOREMEN tween the Northern employers (including New York Shipping Association) and Northern ILA locals "set the pattern" of agreements between South Atlantic employers and locals on major issues or issues of "national scope" (e.g., hourly wages, fringe benefits such as pensions, and contract duration); that "concurrently and contemporane- ously" with the negotiations in the North, employers and locals in other areas (including South Atlantic ports) conduct negotiations concerning matters .more local in character" (seniority, pay days, gang size, etc.); that after agreement is reached on "major matters " between New York Shipping Association and Northern locals the parties in other areas "would invariably incorporate those agree- ments in the Regional [in this case , South Atlantic] port agreements"; that this would be done "routinely"; and "that thereafter the parties would confine themselves to only resolve local issues." 4 The record establishes that each employer in the South Atlantic area signs a separate collective agreement with the local in whose jurisdiction it operates-one for longshoremen and another for clerks and checkers. General Counsel witness Barker , a member of the South Atlantic employer bargaining committee, indicated that as far as he knew never before had the South Atlantic region consummated a collective agreement with Respondents before the major issues , such as wages, were settled in the North Atlantic region.5 2. The current (August-September 1971) negotiations The latest collective agreement between Respondents and Charging Parties (the 3-year South Atlantic contract), as well as the Northern Atlantic contract covering New York Shipping Association , expired on September 30, 1971. After serving notices on the Employers in regard to the expiration date, the parties met to negotiate a new agreement . On or about August 9 the Union submitted its initial proposals, indicating the changes desired as to "local" matters covered in the prior (1968) agreement. The parties met on August 9 and 10, each represented by a five- man committee, with Perry Harvey (the Tampa, Florida Local president) acting as chairman of the union commit- tee and C. W. Pidgeon (a Savannah employer) as chairman of the Employer committee . Union representative Leonard (Wilmington Local 1426 president ) spoke for the Wilming- ton and Morehead City longshoremen, and one of the Company representatives , Barker, for the employers at those two ports. Some bargaining sessions were attended by an ILA International representative, including Burke or Thomas Gleason, Jr. (the latter an attorney and son of ILA International President Gleason who participated in the Northern negotiations). According to Company Negotiator Barker, at the outset of the negotiations Respondents (through Harvey) took the position that the "national issues . .. were [to be ] put 4 The stipulation was preceded by company testimony to the effect that "Traditionally, we accept those [major ] points as part of our contract and then we continue [bargaining ] with our local issues" At the same time, it was stressed that management does not formally recognize the major issues as "national issues" (although the Unions do) It was also indicated that resolution of major issues by North Atlantic negotiators was not necessarily "binding" on South Atlantic negotiators 5 It was stipulated that the nature of the unit (i e , a multi-or 1079 aside" for later discussions since "they had to be settled as they had in the past in New York." The Employer committee did not submit counterproposals until Septem- ber 21 (the third bargaining session), some 6 weeks after the Unions had submitted theirs. Pidgeon, the employer committee chairman, testified that the parties nevertheless "discussed quite a lot" of the union proposals. One such proposal-resisted by the Employers-involved the Un- ions' demand for a guaranteed annual income which the North Atlantic (but not the South Atlantic) locals had succeeded in incorporating in the prior 1968-71 agree- ment.6 As a member of the South Atlantic negotiating committee, Barker testified that he was fully aware "through the media, telephone calls, contacts with our principals in New York" that this same (guaranteed annual income) issue was the major "hang-up" in concluding the contemporaneous 1971 negotiations in New York. Accord- ing to Barker, when he asked the New York employer committee chairman (Talbott) "what they were going to do about" this issue, Talbott said that "they were going to try to get rid" of this 1968 contract clause "because it was too expensive." Employer Committee Chairman Pidgeon testified that the parties adjourned their September 21 (third) bargaining session without scheduling another, although the then current contract was to expire only a week later. According to Pidgeon, two of the five union committeemen (Williams, president of the Jacksonville and White of the Savannah local) had told him that there "was not going to be any strike," because "there was a [Presidentally proclaimed] wage freeze on." Also, according to Pidgeon, International President Gleason was quoted in the newspapers that there would be no' strike. However, Pidgeon and Employer Committee Negotiator Barker also testified that the Union had made no response to Pidgeon's formal telegraphic request to Union Committee Chairman Harvey and to Pidgeon's request at the last bargaining session "to consider working right through [beyond the September 30 contract expiration date regardless of what happened in other ports such as New York and New Orleans. Both company spokesmen stressed that the parties had not reached an "impasse" in the negotiations at their final (September 21) bargaining session; according to Barker, even the Unions' request for a guaranteed annual income clause (which the Employers vigorously resisted) was still on the bargaining table. 3. The strike The uncontradicted evidence establishes that traditional- ly ILA locals have adhered to a "no contract, no work" rule; i.e., Respondents have never worked without a contract except under judicial restraint as in the case of a 10(1) Taft-Hartley injunction . While admitting that "there has been a strike" in the past in "every instance "where the nonmulti-employer unit) was irrelevant to determination of the issues in this case, although it was also indicated that the negotiations by groups (employers and locals) was largely a matter of convenience 6 Under the clause involved, longshoremen were granted payment for 2,080 hours of work a year , whether or not they worked that many hours Company Negotiators Barker testified that, although involving wages, this clause was not regarded as a "national issue " 1080 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD parties had failed to conclude a contract "up to the time of the deadline," Employer Representative Pidgeon neverthe- less testified that this time he expected none because two of the five union committeemen (Williams and White) had said there would be none on account of the wage-price freeze; he admitted that neither Leonard (representative of Wilmington and Morehead locals-respondents in this case) nor Harvey (chairman of the five-man union committee) said so; and that he (Pidgeon) did not "really know" if Williams and White spoke for the union committee. Pidgeon also quoted Harvey as telling him on the telephone at 7:30 a.m. on October 1 that "the South Atlantic ports have gone on strike effective midnight, September 30, because the negotiations in New York between the New York Shipping Association and the ILA had failed around 3 a.m."; there is no evidence, however, that Harvey (the Tampa, Flordia, representative and chairman of the union bargaining committee) was author- ized to speak or spoke for the other locals (more particularly Respondent locals) as to the object of the strike. On the contrary, Leonard, the president of the Wilmington longshoremen and representative on the union bargaining committee for the Wilmington and Morehead locals here involved, as well as Guthrie (president of the Morehead City locals and an alternate on the union negotiation committee), denied that Respondents' mem- bers struck in support of the New York port, insisting that the strike was called "for the benefit" of the South Atlantic ports in accordance with the Unions' traditional "no contract, no work" policy. Moreover, the record shows that on October 1, when Leonard informed Dyer, manager of Almont Shipping Company (one of the Charging Parties), of the strike, he made no reference whatever to the bargaining breakdown or work stoppage at New York or Northern ports. On October 11 (during the strike), Dyer asked Local 1426 President Leonard about "the possibility of obtaining longshoremen to complete the discharge" of a vessel (the "Grecian Temple") then in Wilmington. When Leonard refused to supply the men, Dyer "suggested that possibly, could we complete the discharge of this vessel using our own supervisory personnel" and pay into the union fund "the ordinary pension and welfare benefits." Leonard said "no," stating that if the Company "intended to discharge that vessel anyway, he would have to put up a picket line." 7 The ship remained unloaded for several weeks, until the Local issued a "back-to-work" order pursuant to a Federal court injunctions Actually, none of Respondent locals picketed any of the Charging Parties. On October 12 (also during the strike), Ruffin, president of Wilmington Shipping Company (one of the Charging Parties) telephoned Local 1426 President Leonard and asked him "if there was any way that [he] could obtain labor to discharge" a cargo of fertilizer which arrived on the vessel St. Helene "within a day or so after the strike was called [October I]," explaining at the hearing that although the cargo was "not perishable" it could deterio- rate "if allowed to remain in the ship for an indefinite period of time." Ruffin testified that he reminded Leonard that when faced with a similar situation, involving the same type of cargo during the 1968 strike, Leonard had asked him to take the matter up with International President Gleason in New York; that on asking Gleason for "special permission" to discharge the cargo in 1968, Gleason had informed him that permission would be granted and Leonard would be notified to supply the necessary labor; and he would now like to obtain Leonard's "permission" to "call Mr. Gleason and explain the circumstances to him and ask if an exception could be made" this time also. Leonard consented to Ruffin's approaching Gleason, agreeing that "this would have to be handled" by Gleason and stating that he (Leonard) "will not do anything" until he heard from him. Later the same day when Ruffin telephoned Gleason, the latter said, "we will help you if we can," but suggested that Ruffin contact Bowers, chairman of the New York "strike committee." The next morning (October 13), Ruffin telegraphed Bowers, explaining the problem and requesting his "cooperation" in unloading the cargo. Receiving no response, the following day (October 14), he telephoned Bowers, who told him the "strike committee was made up of rank-and-file members of our [New York] union who were not interested in [Ruffin's] problem," and all "would depend . . . on how strong a position Mr. Gleason took in regard to the matter." The next week (October 21) when in New York "on other business," Ruffin again telephoned Bowers, complaining that he had not yet heard from him. Bowers said that "Gleason had not made a representation" of any kind and "nothing had been done about the matter." Several days later, the vessel left the Wilmington harbor and the cargo was discharged elsewhere. 4. Continued bargaining The parties resumed negotiations on November 1, still during the strike. With the wage freeze still in effect, Union Bargaining Committee Chairman Harvey stated that he could now negotiate "on all of the points within our contract, including wages." The Employer committee again proposed that the longshoremen "continue working in the South Atlantic . . . regardless of what transpired" in other ports such as New York or New Orleans, and the Union again gave "no response" to this suggestion. At the November 4 bargaining session, one of the union commit- teemen (Williams, representing Jacksonville) happened to mention to one of the employer negotiators (Barker) that he had unloaded two ships carrying automobiles during the strike and was endeavoring to load a third. When Barker "complimented" him on this, Union Committee Chairman Harvey told Williams, "Even though it may be unfortu- nate, the policy is `one port down, all ports down.' " At the last (December 15) bargaining meeting held before the hearing herein, the Union submitted new proposals, including proposals on wages. However, no meetings have been held since then, Company Respresen- r Dyer admitted that he required no "union permission" to use his States District Court (E D N C ), was continued after the November 19 supervisors who were not union members, and that he made this request hearing thereon, pending decision by the Board of the issues raised in this "voluntarily " proceeding 8 The temporary restraining order, issued on November 14 by the United LOCAL 1426, LONGSHOREMEN 1081 tatives Pidgeon and Barker attributing this to the upcom- ing holidays (Thanksgiving and Christmas). In the mean- time the North Atlantic ports (including New York Shipping Association) reached a "Memorandum Agree- ment," subject to ratification by members of the affected locals .9 Although the parties in this case have not met since that agreement was executed, management on January 12 (the date of this hearing) began to "initiate[d ] contacts" with other employer committeemen in order to schedule further negotiation with the Union. B. Analysis and Conclusions As the Supreme Court recently stated in N.L.R.B. v. Local 825, International Union of Operating Engineers [Burns and Roe, Inc. ], 400 U.S. 297, 302-303, "Congres- sional concern over the involvement of third parties in labor disputes not their own prompted Section 8(b)(4)(B). This concern was focused on `secondary boycotts,' which was conceived of as pressure brought to bear not `upon the employer who is a party [to a dispute ], but upon some third party who has no concern in it' with the objective of forcing the third party to bring pressure on the employer to agree to the union's demands. [Footnotes omitted. ]" "Congress did not seek by Section 8(b)(4), to interfere with the ordinary strike ........ Labor Boardv. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 672." Local 761, International Union of Electrical Workers [General Electric Co. ] v. N.L.R.B. 366 U.S. 667, 672. Indeed, in its 1959 amend- ments to the Act, Congress included a proviso specifically stating that "nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing." The basic issue here is whether Respondents were only pursuing their primary objective in obtaining a collective agreement after their prior 1968-71 agreement with Charging Parties expired. As found, after serving notice of the September 30, 1971, termination of their collective agreements, Respondents and other Locals comprising the South Atlantic District of ILA met to negotiate a new agreement with the South Atlantic shipping companies, of which Charging Parties are members. After several bargaining sessions in August and September, the five-man union and five-man employer committees failed to reach agreement. In accordance with custom, the parties concentrated on "local" issues (seniori- ty, gang size, paydays, etc.), since major issues or issues of "national scope" (basic wages, fringe benefits, contract duration, etc.), were first negotiated and agreed upon in contemporaneous bargaining between the North Atlantic employers (including New York Shipping Association) and Northern locals. As stipulated at the hearing, agreement on the major issues "would invariably" be incorporated in the regional (South Atlantic) port agreements, although the Northern agreement was not necessarily "binding." Una- ble to reach agreement by the September 30 "deadline,", 9 As of the date of this hearing, it remained unratified iU Sec.' 2(9) of the Act defines broadly the term "labor dispute" to "include[s] any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment . " ii As stated in N LR B v Erie Resistor Corp, 373 U S 221, 233-234, 235, "This repeated [Congressional] solicitude for the right to strike is the South Atlantic locals (including Respondents) struck the South Atlantic employers (including Charging Parties) on October 1, in accordance with the Unions' traditional "no contract, no work" policy. The North Atlantic locals, likewise deadlocked in their negotiations, similarily struck the North Atlantic employers, including New York Shipping Association. It is clear, contrary to General Counsel's claim,that a bona fide labor dispute existed between Respondents and Charging Parties on October 1 and that it was that dispute that triggered the strike here involved. I so find.10 Moreover, contrary to General Counsel's contention (br.,p. 8), the fact that the South Atlantic unions and employers "had never reached an impasse on any subject" prior to the strike does not mean that they "had nothing to strike over." The unions had every right to use the strike as an economic weapon to strengthen their bargaining objec- tives.ii Furthermore, unlike General Counsel, I find nothing significant in the circumstance that the parties ,continued to bargain during the strike since it is well settled that existence of a strike does not relieve a party from its obligation to negotiate. "On the contrary, the need !for carrying out [the bargaining] obligation when a strike is in progress is all the greater in order that a peaceful settlement of the dispute may be reached." N.L.R.B. v. Pecheur Lozenge Co., 209 F.2d 393, 403 (C.A. 2). The record establishes that the focus of Respondents' interest and pressure was on Charging Parties, the primary or disputing employers. There is in this case a complete absence of evidence of appeals, let alone threats and coercive action, against secondary employers to bring pressure on the primary employers to settle the Unions' dispute with the primary employers-the secondary activi- ty barred by Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act. See Burns and Roe Inc., supra, 400 U.S. at 302-303; General Electric Co., supra, 366 U.S. at 672-673.12 A union is free to induce work stoppages among the employees of a primary employer, irrespective of the adverse impact of such inducement on the primary employer or even on secondary or neutral employers. As the Supreme Court has stated in National Woodwork Manufacturers Association v. N. L. R. B., 386 U.S. 612, 627: This Court [has] refused to read Section 8(b)(4)(A) to ban traditional primary strikes and picketing having an impact on neutral employers even though the activity fell within its sweeping terms . [Citations.] Thus, however severe the impact of primary activity on neutral employers, it was not thereby transformed into activity with a secondary objective. Accordingly, contrary to General Counsel, the fact that Respondents refused to extend the terms of the 1968 agreement beyond the September 30, 1971, expiration date and that they rejected the request of primary employers to unload cargoes during the strike (including Almont predicated upon the conclusion that a strike when legitimately employed is an economic weapon which in great measure implements and supports principles of the collective-bargaining system." 12 See also Local Union No 227, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO (Iowa Beef Packers, Inc), 185 NLRB No 12; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 134, etc (Illinois Bell Telephone Company), 179 NLRB 202, 204-205, enfd. 433 F 2d 302 (C.A 7) 1082 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Manager Dyer's October 11 request to unload "Grecian Temple") is of no consequence . And when Local 1426 President Leonard "threatened" to picket one such ship if it was unloaded, he did nothing more than threaten to advertise the primary dispute . "Ordinarily, what you may do without liability you may threaten to do without liability." Justice Holmes in Silsbee v. Webber, 171 Mass. 378, 380, 50 N.E. 555, 556. See also Illinois Bell Telephone Company, 179 NLRB 681 , 684, enfd. 446 F.2d 815 (C.A. 7). Although Respondents ' conduct does not present the typical secondary boycott situation-i.e., appeals and threats against secondary or neutral employers in order to bring pressure on primary employers to settle a primary dispute-General Counsel claims that the pressures exert- ed by Respondents against the primary employers here nevertheless were secondary and unlawful, since (accord- ing to General Counsel ) the objective of Respondents' work stoppage was to bring pressure on Charging Parties (the primary employers ) in order that they, in turn, would bring pressure on the North Atlantic employers (particular- ly New York Shipping Association) to yield in their dispute with the North Atlantic locals. In addition to the incidents already mentioned (which for reasons stated in no way support his position), General Counsel relies primarily on: (a) Union Committee Chairman Harvey's statement to Employer Committee Chairman Pidgeon just prior to the October 1 walkout that the South Atlantic ports were going to strike "because the negotiations in New York between the New York Shipping Association with ILA had failed"; (b) Local 1426 President Leonard 's October 12 statement to Wilmington Shipping President Ruffin that Ruffin must obtain permission from International President Gleason to unload the fertilizer on the St . Helene and that he (Leonard) "will not do anything" until he heard from Gleason ; (c) that when Company Bargaining Representa- tive Barker "complimented" one of the union negotiators (Williams, representing Jacksonville ) regarding his Union's unloading two ships during the strike , Union Committee Chairman Harvey remarked that union policy was "one port down, all ports down"; and (d) that an International representative from New York had sat in on some South Atlantic bargaining sessions. To be sure, the conduct relied on could tend to support the objective claimed by General Counsel (assuming such objective is secondary and unlawful) if that conduct were considered in isolation . However, as in all cases of this type, the question whether the conduct is proscribed secondary activity "cannot be made without an inquiry into . . . all the surrounding circumstances " (National Woodwork Manufacturers, supra, 386 U.S. at 645)-including the evidence already summarized, demon- strating the existence of a bona fide primary dispute concerning the consummation of a new agreement to replace the expired 1968 agreement. In any event, I find no significance whatever in the fact that an International Representative had participated in the negotiations-a not uncommon practice in bargaining at a local level; certainly the parent International had an understandable interest in the successful outcome of these negotiations . Nor do I view as controlling Leonard's' request that Ruffin obtain "special permission" from International President Gleason to unload a ship's cargo during the strike-a request which, incidentially, originated with Ruffin who approached Leonard with a request that Leonard sanction his (Ruf- fin's) securing necessary clearance from Gleason. More troublesome in evaluating the Unions' strike objective is Harvey's prestrike remark to Pidgeon that the strike would begin because the negotiations in New York faltered and Harvey's November 4 remark to one of f the_ union negotiators about a "one port down, all ports down" Union policy . However, balancing all the factors in this case, I do not find Harvey's statements determinative of the issue posed. To begin with, there is no evidence that Harvey, as chairman of the union bargaining committee (and representative of the Tampa local), was authorized to speak for Respondents (Wilmington and Morehead City locals) on matters other than collective bargaining-i.e., on the question of objective, nature, and effect of the strike. I credit the testimony of Leonard and Guthrie (Presidents of Respondent locals)--both of whom impressed me as forthright and candid witnesses-that the strike at the two ports involved was called only "for the benefit" of the South Atlantic ports in accordance with the Unions' traditional "no contract, no work" policy. (Cf. Riverton Coal Company etc. v. U. M. W., 79 LRRM 2372, 2375 (C.A. 6).) Furthermore, in evaluating General Counsel 's conten- tions, I cannot ignore the fact that a community of interest has existed between South Atlantic and North Atlantic ports-as regards both employers and unions. As we have seen (supra, sec. A, 1), five major contractual issues (including wages and fringe benefits) negotiated in the North Atlantic region have been traditionally and routine- ly incorporated into South Atlantic agreements. The South Atlantic negotiators had a natural interest, if not substan- tial stake, in the outcome of the North Atlantic negotia- tions. That both sides kept themselves informed of the positions of Northern employers and locals is a reasonable assumption. Indeed , Company negotiator Barker admitted that while the Northern negotiations were in progress he was "in contact with our principals in New York" by telephone and other means and that at least on one occasion sought to ascertain the New York employers' position on wages. And Pidgeon, the employer committee chairman, testified that in formulating his belief that South Atlantic locals would not strike on October 1, he relied, in part, on a report that International President Gleason did not contemplate a strike at that time. Additionally, the record indicates that it was not until the negotiations in New York culminated in a written memorandum (subject to ratification by the unions' members) that the South Atlantic employer committee attempted to revive the bargaining with South Atlantic locals (in January 1972). It may equally be assumed that the South Atlantic locals (including Respondents) had kept abreast of the New York negotiations, that they had sought their International's advice and counsel in dealings with South -Atlantic employers, and that, whenever feasible, they cooperated with the International in facilitating agreement between Northern locals and employers. But this is a far cry from demonstrating that an objective of the South Atlantic unions' strike was to bring pressure on the South Atlantic LOCAL 1426, LONGSHOREMEN 1083 (primary) employers in order that they, in turn, would bring pressure on Northern employers to yield to the Northern unions' bargaining demands. In any event, if, as General Counsel intimates, this case presents one of alliance between South Atlantic locals, it indicates an alliance (or at least common concern and interest) between South and North Atlantic employers as well. Cf. Detroit Newspaper Pubhshers Association v. N.L.R.B., 372 F.2d 569, 572 (C.A. 6). For all the reasons stated and on the basis of the entire record, I find and conclude that General Counsel has failed to meet his burden of establishing by a preponder- ance of the credible evidence that Respondent locals have engaged in a secondary boycott in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act. I find that Respondents' strike and conduct was lawful, designed to resolve their 13 In the event that no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Rules and Regualtions of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in own pnmary dispute with Charging Parties. As such, the Unions' conduct amounted to nothing more than the exercise by employees of their Section 7 right "to engage in .. . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection... . CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Respondent Locals have not violated Section 8 (b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act, as alleged in the complaint. RECOMMENDED ORDERi3 Upon the basis of the foregoing findings and conclusions and upon the entire record in the case, it is ordered that the complaint be and hereby is dismissed in its entirety. Sec 10248 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes