Ted Mansour's Market

218 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Theodore P. Mansour d/b/a Ted Mansour's Market and Retail Store Employees Union, Local 40, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO. Case 7-CA-8967 September 22, 1972 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND PENELLO On March 31, 1972, Trial Examiner David S. Davidson issued the attached Decision in this pro- ceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the Trial Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner's rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela- tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that Theodore P. Mansour d/b/a Ted Mansour's Market, Flushing, Michigan, his agents, successors, and as- signs, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's recommended Order. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE DAVID S. DAVIDSON,Trial Examiner: Pursuant to a charge filed on September 17, 1971, by Retail Store Employees Union, Local 40, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the Union, a complaint issued on November 12, 1971. The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to bargain with the Union since on or about Octo- ber 6, 1971. In its answer Respondent denies the commis- sion of any unfair labor practices. The issue is whether Respondent on October 6, 1971, was required to bargain with the Union over terms of a new agreement, without regard to fluctuations in the Union's majority, as a consequence of having 4 months earlier en- tered into a settlement agreement in which, among other things, it recognized the Union and agreed that it was bound by a predecessor's contract for the remainder of its term in return for dismissal of a pending suit to enforce an arbitrator's award and withdrawal of an earlier unfair labor practice charge. A hearing was held before me in Flint, Michigan, on January 13, 1972. At the conclusion of the hearing, oral argument was waived and the parties were given leave to file briefs which have been received from the General Counsel and Respondent. Upon the entire record in this case and from my observa- tion of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the follow- ing: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS I THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Respondent is an individual proprietorship engaged at a single location in Flushing, Michigan, in the operation of,a retail g; ocery store. During the calendar year 1970, a repre- sentative period, Respondent had gross revenue in excess of $500,000 and purchased goods and materials valued in ex- cess of $20,000 which were transported directly or indirectly to its store from points outside the State of Michigan. I find that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce with- in the meaning of the Act and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein. II THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. III THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Facts 1. The predecessor corporation and its' contract with the Union Before August 1969 Mansour's Super Markets, Inc., re- ferred to hereinafter as Super Markets Inc., operated several supermarkets in and around Flint, Michigan. Super Mar- kets, Inc., was owned by brothers Theodore and Alfred Mansour. The Union was certified as the representative of Super Markets Inc., and entered into three or more succes- sive collective-bargaining agreements with Super Markets Inc., covering all grocery, produce, and dairy department employees, cashiers, bagger-carryout, night porters, and truckdriver-maintenance men employed in its stores. The most recent of the contracts was executed on December 1, 1968, and was effective from October 31, 1968, until Octo- ber 30, 1971. 2. The transfer of ownership of the stores By July 1969 Super Markets, Inc., had only three stores still in operation and was in financial difficulty. As a conse- quence of arrangements with its creditors, in August 1969, Super Markets, Inc., turned over one of its stores, known as the Davison Road store, to its major creditor. Of the re- maining two stores, one, known as the Corunna Road Store, was turned over to Alfred Mansour, and the other, known as the Flushing Store, was transferred to Theodore Mansour to be run by them as individual proprietorships. Super Mar- 199 NLRB No. 29 TED MANSOURS MARKET 219 kets, Inc., remained thereafter as a corporate shell and no longer operated any stores. Following the transfer of the Davison Road Store it was closed for 1 week and its employees were laid off. When it reopened the new owner did not rehire any of the former employees. The other two stores continued in operation without a break and all of their former employees were retained, but after certain joint advertising commitments were fulfilled, the two stores operated independently of one another. The issues in this case relate only to the conduct and obligations of Theodore Mansour after the transfer of own- ership. 3. The first alleged refusal to recognize the Union by Respondent Following the transfer, Theodore and Alfred Mansour continued to pay the rates called for by the contract be- tween the Union and Super Markets, Inc., and for the next 2 months they apparently raised no questions as to their willingness to adhere to the contract. However, at the time of the closing of the Davison Road Store, the Union took the position 'that the former employees of that store were entitled under the contract to transfer to the other two stores in accord with their seniority, and the Union filed a griev- ance over the failure of the individual owners to place these employees in their stores. During September or October 1969,UmonBusinessRep- resentative Terrence Brady visited Respondent at his store and asserted that Respondent was obligated to apply the contract and employ the employees who had been displaced from the Davison Road Store. According to Respondent, he took the position in response that he was willing to adhere to the contract insofar as it applied to his store but not to honor any obligations arising from the other stores. Accord- ing to Brady, Respondent took the position that he was not bound by the contract at all. In any event, after Brady's visit although Respondent continued to pay the wages called for by the contract, he did not otherwise adhere to it. He did not remit insurance premium payments to the union insur- ance fund for his employees, and although he had deducted union dues from employees' pay for the first 2 months of his operation, he returned the amounts withheld to the employ- ees and thereafter stopped deducting union dues. As Re- spondent testified, in his conversation with Brady neither moved from their respective positions, and when the Union adhered to its position, "I didn't do anything." I find that whatever Respondent might have been prepared to do in the absence of the Union's grievance, after his conversation with Brady Respondent stopped honoring the contract as to his present employees. The issue of the Union's representa- tion rights apart from the contract does not appear to have been raised. In due course, the Union requested arbitration of its grievance, which related to the failure of both brothers to accept the displaced employees from the Davison Road Store, and on January 20, 1970, a hearing was held before Arbitrator Leon Herman in which both Mansour brothers participated. At the hearing Respondent contended that he was not a successor to Super Markets, Inc., and therefore had no obligation under its contract with the Union. In his decision the arbitrator found, however, that both brothers were bound by the contract and issued an award on March 24, 1970, sustaining the grievance. During the pendency of the grievance, on December 29, 1969, the Union filed ,a charge in Case 7-CA-7687 alleging that Respondent had violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to recognize the Union and disavowing the contract. On February 2, 1970, the Regional Director wrote the parties that action was deferred pending the arbitration pursuant to the Board's Decision in Dubo Manufacturing Corporation, 142 NLRB 431, because the issues raised by the charge were parallel to those in the arbitration proceeding. On April 13, 1970, after the award issued, the Regional Director dismissed the charge pursuant to Spielberg Manu- facturing Company, 112 NLRB 1081, because the parties had fully participated in the arbitration proceeding, the pro- ceeding appeared to be fairly and regularly conducted, and the award was not repugnant to the policies of the Act. However, following the issuance of the award, Respon- dent refused to comply with its terms and in September 1970, the Union filed a complaint in the United States Dis- trict Court for the Eastern District of Michigan seeking enforcement of the award.' Respondent filed an answer joining issue with the allegations in the complaint. At or about the same time that the District Court action was filed, on September 18, 1970, the Union filed a second charge in Case 7-CA-8209 (1) alleging that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by disavowing its contractual bargaining obligations as confirmed by the arbitrator's award. On November 23, 1970, the Regional Director notified the parties-that he was again deferring action because the issues were the subject of the District Court proceeding which grew out of an arbitration proceed- ing and the Board had indicated hospitable acceptance of the channelization of disputes which also come within its purview through grievance and arbitration procedures. 4. The settlement of the pending proceedings and Respondent's acknowledgment of the Union's representative status On June 3, 1971, Respondent and the Union entered into a settlement agreement. In its preample the agreement referred to the pending District Court action and the unfair labor practice charge and expressed the desire of the parties to avoid further litigation and expense and to compromise certain disputed claims. Among other substantive terms the settlement provided: Theodore Mansour acknowledges and agrees with the Union that he is the successor employer of the Corpo- ration relative to the Mansour's store at 7324 Flushing Road, Flushing, Michigan, previously known as Store No. 3 of the Mansour chain, and of employees em- ployed at said store; that the Union is the exclusive collective bargaining agent of his employees at said store; that he is obligated, relative to said store and its 1 Thereafter the Union amended its complaint to add an allegation that the defendants had refused to process an additional grievance to arbitration and sought an order compelling arbitration of that grievance. 220 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD employees, as successor employer thereunder, on the collective bargaining agreement dated December 1, 1968, between the Union and the Corporation, which agreement is incorporated herein by reference, and that he agrees, effective April 19, 1971, to fully abide by and apply its terms, in all respects as if he had executed the same. In addition, the agreement provided for payments to laid-off employees and settlement of their claims and for reso- lution of two other grievances against Respondent which had arisen, but were not processed by Respondent, between the time of the arbitration and the time of the settlement. The agreement further provided that upon payment of the sum agreed upon to settle the grievance which was arbitrat- ed, the Union would dismiss the District Court action and the unfair labor practice charge. Following execution of the settlement agreement the Un- ion requested permission to withdraw the charge, and the Regional Director permitted its withdrawal on August 25, 1971. 5. Respondent's conduct following execution of the settlement After the settlement was reached, the Union requested Respondent to deduct and remit union dues. Respondent took the position that he should have signed withholding authorizations, and the Union gave him blank authorization cards which he distributed to the employees. At the same time he read a statement to the employees in which he informed them that he had entered into a settlement with the Union, that he had agreed that he was a successor to the union contract negotiated with Super Markets, Inc., and that the terms of the contract required that all employees become members of the Union. Respondent told the em- ployees that it was their decision whether or not to execute membership and dues-deduction forms, that under the terms of the contract they were required to become mem- bers within 60 days of their employment, and that they would be subject to discharge at the Union's request if they failed to join. Thereafter, on July 20, the Union filed a grievance requesting the discharge of 19 of Respondent's 21 employees for failure to join the Union. Respondent posted the grievance on the store bulletin board, accompanied by a notice which stated that the employees were required to join the Union or be separated. The employees on the list thereafter complied, and no further request was made for their discharge. After the settlement was reached Respondent also nego- tiated with the Union over the two outstanding grievances which had arisen between the time of the arbitration hearing and the settlement agreement, and the two grievances were resolved. Between the date of the settlement agreement and the expiration date of the contract, Respondent also dealt with the Union with respect to other grievances as request- ed. After the settlement was reached Respondent made in- surance premium payments to the Union fund for the month of July but did not transmit them for August, Sep- tember, and October, 1971. Respondent explained that his reason for not making these payments was that he lacked the funds. 6. Respondent's alleged refusal to bargain over a new contract On August 6,2 Respondent sent a letter to Union Secre- tary-Treasurer Theodore E. Kasprzak, stating his intention to terminate the Super Markets, Inc., agreement as succes- sor pursuant to its termination clause and effective on its expiration date, October 30. On August 16, Kasprzak sent Respondent a form notice of intent to modify the agreement requesting Respondent to contact Kasprzak so that negotia- tions could commence as quickly as possible. By letter of August 28 Respondent acknowledged receipt of Kasprzak's notice, requested Kasprzak to forward his written proposal so that Respondent could review it before meeting, and stated that after receipt of the proposal he would contact Kasprzak to arrange a meeting time. On September 13 Kasprzak forwarded the union proposal to Respondent and stated that he would be available to meet on September 20. He again requested that negotiations start as early as possi- ble and that Respondent call him to arrange a date. In the meantime on August 30, Respondent received a petition signed by 19 of his employees stating that they no longer wished to be represented by the Union. Copies were mailed to the State and Federal Mediation Services and to the Regional Office of the Board. On August 31, a decertifi- cation petition signed by two of Respondent's employees, one of whom was also Respondent's stepson, was filed in Case 7-RD-979, and on the following day the Regional Director wrote to Respondent requesting certain informa- tion in connection with the investigation of the petition. On September 17, the original charge in this case was filed, alleging that Respondent had instigated the filing of the decertification petition. On September 30, Kasprzak sent a further letter to Re- spondent stating that it was the Union's position that Re- spondent was legally obligated to bargain with the Union for a new contract and requesting negotiations as soon as possible. On October 6, Kasprzak again wrote requesting a written reply as to Respondent's intentions with respect to negotiating modifications in the contract. On the same date, Respondent wrote in reply to Kasprzak's September 30 let- ter that Respondent would continue to honor the Super Markets, Inc., contract for the remainder of its term, would continue to recognize the Union as the bargaining agent until it was determined otherwise, but would not negotiate for a new agreement until the question of representation was settled. Thereafter, by letter postmarked October 12, Respon- dent received a second petition signed by 20 employees stating their wish to have reinstated the proceedings in Case 7- RD-979 which had been indefinitely postponed as a result of the Union's charges. On October 19, the Union filed its amended charge in this case adding the allegation that Respondent had refused to bargain with the Union since October 6. On November 11, the Regional Director administratively dismissed the decer- tification petition on the ground that as a result of the investigation of the Union's charges the Regional Director had concluded that there was substantial evidence that Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, that a com- 2 All dates referred hereafter occurred in 1971. TED MANSOURS MARKET 221 plaint would issue absent settlement, and that as a result no question concerning representation existed. On December 28, the Board denied an administrative appeal from the dismissal of the decertification petition. B. Concluding Findings The General Counsel contends that the June 3, 1971, settlement agreement between the Union and Respondent was tantamount to a settlement of an unfair labor practice charge, that the Union was entitled to a reasonable period of time thereafter to bargain and negotiate a new agree- ment, and that a reasonable period had not elapsed when Respondent refused to bargain for a new agreement on and after October 6, 1971. There is no contention herein that the basis on which Respondent challenged the Union's majority would have been inadequate even if the challenge were made at an appropriate time. Likewise, despite Respondent's assertions to the Union that it would continue to recognize the Union until the representation question was settled, there is no question that Respondent refused to negotiate with the Un- ion over the terms of a new agreement on and after October 6, 1971. The issues therefore concern only the effect, if any, of the June 3 settlement agreement of Respondent's obliga- tion to bargain over the terms of a new agreement. The General Counsel seeks to apply to this case the hold- ing of Poole Foundry and Machine Company.3 There the Board held that following the execution of an unfair labor practice settlement agreement containing a bargaining pro- vision, an employer is under an obligation to bargain for a reasonable time without questioning the representative sta- tus of the union. In so holding the Board gave a settlement agreement containing a bargaining provision the same ef- fect as a Board bargaining order. As to either, the Board held, such a rule is necessary to give the order to bargain or the settlement its fullest effect; "i.e., to give the parties to the controversy a reasonable time in which to conclude a contract." Assuming arguendo that the Poole rule should apply to the settlement in this case, Respondent contends that be- cause the settlement imposed the Super Markets, Inc., con- tract on Respondent, it was obligated to recognize the Un- ion only for the purposes of administering the Super Mar- kets, Inc., contract for the remainder of its term. While there is some dictum to support Respondent's view,4 the bargain- ing obligation which flows from a settlement during a con- tract term has not been so limited .5 The ultimate question to be answered in each case is not the extent of the bargain- ing obligation but whether a reasonable period of time has elapsed since the settlement for it to have served its purpose at the time a challenge to the Union's majority is raised. The answer to that question depends not only upon the length of time which has elapsed since the settlement, but also upon the conduct which is to be remedied and the likelihood 3 95 NLRB 34, enfd 192 F 2d 740 (C.A. 4), cert. denied 342 U.S 954. 4 Ohio Car & Truck Leasing, Inc, 169 NLRB 198, 201 'Interstate Brick Company, 167 NLRB 831, Frank Becker Towing Compa- ny, 151 NLRB 466. Although the issue arose in both cases in representation proceedings, the applicable principles are the same . Dick Brothers, Inc, 110 NLRB 451. 6 Frank Becker Towing Company, supra that it had been remedied at the time the Union's majority was challenged. Here approximately 4 months elapsed between the date of the settlement and Respondent's refusal to bargain over the terms of a new agreement. In accord with the arbitrator's prior decision, the settlement acknowledged Respondent's successorship to Super Markets, Inc., and Respondent's obligation to honor the Super Markets, Inc., agreement. In the settlement, Respondent recognized the Union as representative of its employees. By these terms, Respondent conceded the validity of the claims which the Union had pressed since September 1969. Viewed from the present vantage point in the light of the concessions in the settlement, it must appear that the settlement was intended to remedy a denial of the Union's contract rights which had continued for over a year and a half until the settlement was reached. Such a repudiation of a contract would be viewed by the Board as a repudiation of the Union's representative status and a violation of Respondent's duty to bargain call- ing for a remedial bargaining order.' If the repudiation of the contract had been of a shorter duration and if the settlement had occurred at the time of the arbitrator's award, the violation in all probability would have been viewed as remedied during the contract term, and a reasonable period for effectuation of the settlement would have expired before the time for negotiation of a new agree- ment. Conversely had the settlement been reached only at the time appropriate for negotiation of a new agreement, no time would have remained for its effectuation, and a chal- lenge to the Union's majority at that time would clearly have frustrated its effectuation. Of course, neither of those things happened here. But over a year and a half had passed during which the contract was not honored. Grievances which arose during that period were not considered, and contract rights were withheld from employees. During that period the Union's representative status was effectively de- nied and undermined. For much of that period the repudia- tion of the contract continued in the face of an outstanding arbitrator's award, further diminishing the Union in the eyes of the employees. It is not likely that recognition of the Union and adherence to the contract terms for the relatively brief period between June 3 and the date of Respondent's refusal to negotiate was sufficient for the repudiation of the Union's representative status to be dissipated. I find that a reasonable period of time to effectuAte the settlement had not passed when Respondent refused to bargain with the Union over a new agreement.8 All of the above assumes that the Poole rule applied to the settlement in this case. The General Counsel's conten- tion that it should apply to an out-of-Board resolution of disputes may be expected to be encountered more frequent- ly in the future in view of the Board's expansion of its policy with respect to deferring to private methods for settlement of disputes in its recent Collyer Insulated Wire decision .9 While different facts may call for different results, I find that the Poole rule should apply to the settlement in this case. ' NL.R B v. M & M Oldsmobile, Inc, 377 F.2d 712, 715-717 (C.A. 2); George E Light Boat Storage Inc., 153 NLRB 1209, enfd. in part 373 F.2d 762 (C.A 5). B See cases cited in In . 5, supra. 9 192 NLRB No 150. 222 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Here there were two prior charges filed, both of which were deferred, the first because of the pendency of the arbi- tration, and the second because of the pendency of the District Court action. The settlement agreement entered into while the second charge was pending was intended to dispose not only of the District Court action but also of the charge, and pursuant to its terms the second charge was withdrawn. That charge clearly was not frivolous. Rather, given the arbitrator's findings and the concessions in the settlement, there was basis for a Board determination of a refusal-to-bargain and a bargaining order.10As the charge was withdrawn, there was no Board order or settlement, but the June 3 settlement agreement produced essentially the same result as a Board proceeding. While there was no affirmative bargaining order, the settlement did include af- firmative recognition of the Union from which the obliga- tion to bargain follows. As the settlement reached the same result as a Board order, the same opportunity to effectuate that result should be afforded,I I Accordingly, I find that the Union was entitled to a reasonable period within which to effectuate the settlement before its majority could be chal- lenged. In reaching this conclusion, I have considered Respondent's contention that court and Board decisions rendered after the settlement was reached indicate that the settlement was based on a mistaken assumption that the District Court would have imposed the Super Markets, Inc., contract on Respondent. However, the decisions relied on12 by no means make that clear, for at issue before the District Court was enforcement of an arbitrator's award, which was not at issue in the cases cited by Respondent. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that those cases would have reached the same results if there had been prior arbitrators' decisions in them finding that the successors were bound by their predecessors' contracts. In any event, second thoughts as to the wisdom of the assumptions on which a settlement is based are not a sufficient reason to ignore it. I also find that the Board's decision in Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 176 NLRB No. 102, which Respondent also cites as applicable to this case, is materially distinguishable. There, unlike this case, there was no refusal to honor an entire collective-bargaining agreement for most of its term. Accordingly, I find that Respondent, since October 6, 1971, has refused to bargain with the Union without allow- ing a reasonable period of time to elapse to effectuate the June 3 settlement agreement and thereby has violated Sec- tion 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. IV THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES ON COMMERCE The acts of Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with its operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial 10 See cases cited in fn. 8, supra. 11 See the Daily Press, Incorporate4 1 12 NLRB 1434; Keller Plastics East- ern, Inc., 157 NLRB 583; Kimbrough Trucking Co, 160 NLRB 954; San Clemente Publishing Corporation, 167 NLRB 6 12 William J Burns International Detective Agency, Inc v N L R B, 441 F.2d 911 (C A. 2), cert granted 404 U.S. 822; N L.R.B v. Interstate 65 Corp, 453 F.2d 269 (C.A 6); G T. & E Data Services Corp., 194 NLRB No. 102 States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and, upon request, bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of all employ- ees in the appropriate unit, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agree- ment. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All full-time and regular part-time grocery, produce, and dairy department employees, including cashiers, bag- ger-carryout, night porters, and truckdriver-maintenance men employed by Respondent at its Flushing , Michigan, location, excluding all store managers, assistant store man- agers, meat department employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. The Union is, and at all times since October 6 , 197 1, has been, the exclusive representative of the employees in the appropriate unit within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. By refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union on and after October 6 , 1971, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact , conclusions of law, and the entire record , and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended.13 ORDER Respondent, Theodore P. Mansour, d/b/a Ted Mansour's Market, its officers, agents, successors, and as- signs, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to recognize and bargain with Retail Store Employees Union Local 40, Retail Clerks International As- sociation, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of its employees in the appropriate unit described in paragraph 3 of the Conclusions of Law above. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. 13 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. t02 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. TED MANSOURS MARKET 223 2. Take the following affirmative action which is neces- sary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request bargain collectively with the above- named Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of work, or other terms and conditions of employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (b) Post at its Flushing, Michigan, place of business copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."14 Copies of said notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 7, after being duly signed by Respondent's au- thorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are custom- arily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or cov- ered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in writ- ing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.15 14 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 15 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read- "Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX representative of the employees in the bargaining unit described below. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL, upon request, bargain with the above- named Union as the exclusive representative of all em- ployees in the bargaining unit described below with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody such under- standing in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is: All full-time and regular part-time grocery, produce and dairy department employees, including cashiers, bagger-carryout, night porters, and truckdriver-main- tenance men employed at our Flushing Michigan, loca- tion, excluding all store managers, assistant store managers, meat department employees, guards and su- pervisors as defined in the Act. All of our employees are free to become or remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining , members of any labor organization, except as that right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Report- ing and Discharge Act of 1959. Dated By NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Re- tail Store Employees Union, Local 40, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive THEODORE P. MANSOUR, d/b/a TED MANSOUR'S MARKET (Employer) (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning 'this notice or compliance with its provisions may be direct- ed to the Board's Office, 500 Book Building, 1249 Washing- ton Boulevard, Detroit, Michigan 48226, Telephone 313-226-3200.