199 NLRB 705
G & S Metal Products Co., Inc.
G & S METAL PRODUCTS COMPANY
705
G & S Metal Products Company, Inc. and Internation-
al Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America,
AFL-CIO. Case 8-CA-6712
October 12, 1972
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO
Labor Relations Act, as amended, by conduct hereinafter
detailed. At the conclusion of the hearing all parties waived
oral argument, but briefs have been received from the Gen-
eral Counsel and the Respondent and have been duly con-
sidered.
Upon the entire record made in this proceeding, and
from my observation of the testimony and demeanor of the
witnesses, I hereby make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
On April 18, 1972, Administrative Law Judge'
Eugene George Goslee issued the attached Decision
in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed ex-
ceptions and a supporting brief, and the General
Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order .2
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that G & S Metal Products Company, Inc.,
Cleveland, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said rec-
ommended Order.
1 The title of "real Examiner" was changed to "Administrative Law
Judge" effective August 19, 1972
2 In view of an 8(a)(4) finding and order reinstating Small with backpay,
we find it unnecessary to decide whether Small 's termination also violated
Sec. 8(a)(3) of the Act.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
EUGENE GEORGE GOSLEE, Trial Examiner: This case
came on for hearing before me at Cleveland, Ohio, on Feb-
ruary 2, 1972, on a complaint issued by the General Counsel
of the National Labor Relations Board and an answer filed
by G & S Metal Products Company, Inc., hereinafter called
the Respondent.' In substance, the issues raised by the
pleadings in this case relate to whether or not the Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(3), (4), and (1) of the National
1 The complaint, which was issued on December 16, 1971, is predicated
upon a charge filed on November 10, 1971, and served on the Respondent
on November 11, 1971.
I THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent is an Ohio corporation, maintains its
principal office and place of business at Cleveland, Ohio,
and is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of
metal housewares. In the course and conduct of its business
operations the Respondent annually ships its products val-
ued in excess of $50,000 to points located outside the State
of Ohio. The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I
find that the Respondent is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
During the course of the hearing all parties stipulated
and I find that International Union, Allied Industrial Work-
ers of America, AFL-CIO, hereinafter called the Union, is
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
III THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The complaint alleges that the Respondent violated
Section 8(l)(3), (4), and (1) of the Act by discharging its
employee, Virginia Small, because she gave testimony under
the Act and because she joined, assisted, and favored the
Union. In response to the complaint the Respondent filed
an answer in which it generally denied the commission of
any unfair labor practices.
The discharge of Virginia Small occurred in the context
of a hearing concerning a prior unfair labor practice pro-
ceeding involving the Respondent. In the light of this cir-
cumstance the General Counsel requested at the outset of
the hearing in this case that the Trial Examiner take official
notice of that prior proceeding,2 in which a Decision was
issued by Trial Examiner John F. Funke on February 1,
1972, as well as official notice of a prior Decision and Order
of the Board which issued on April 24, 1970.3 It is the
General Counsel's contention that the Decision issued in
the proceeding before Trial Examiner Funke, hereinafter
sometimes referred to as Case 8-CA-6349, and the Board's
Decision as reported at 182 NLRB 111, constitute disposi-
tive and persuasive evidence of the Respondent's animus
and hostility to the rights of its employees protected by
Section 7 of the Act. In furtherance of this contention the
General Counsel offered, and I received in evidence over
the objection of the Respondent, the Trial Examiner' s Deci-
2 G & S Metal Products Company, Inc, Cases 8-CA-6349, 8-CA-6440-2,
8-CA-6504, 8-CA-6538, 8-CA-6572, 8-CA-6577, 8-CA-6593, and 8-
RC-8239.
3 G & S Metal Products Company, Inc., 182 NLRB I11.
199 NLRB No. 100
706
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
sion in Case 8-CA-6349, including certain pages of the
record made in that proceeding before Trial Examiner
Funke, and the Board's Decision and Order in the other
prior related case as reported at 182 NLRB 111. At the
conclusion of the hearing in this proceeding the Respondent
renewed its objection to the receipt in evidence of the doc-
uments relating to the prior cases, and moved to strike on
grounds of the absence of any showing of relevancy or
materiality. The Respondent's motion was taken under con-
sideration, but for reasons related below I adhere to my
ruling that the documents were properly received in evi-
dence, and the Respondent motion to strike is denied.4
As related above the Respondent is a corporate entity
and is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of
metal housewares. Harry Schwartz, who is the president of
the corporation and a director, is the sole owner of all shares
of stock issued and outstanding from the corporation. In
addition, Joseph L. Newman, who was counsel for the Re-
spondent in this and the prior related proceedings, is the
secretary and a director of the corporation, and Marvin
Roseman is its vice president.
Virginia Small was first employed by the Respondent
on September 12, 1970, and, apparently worked for the
whole term of her employment as a packer. Small's imme-
diate superior was Mary Hyde, whom I find to be a supervi-
sor and an agent of the Respondent within the meaning of
Section 2(11) and (13) of the Act.
The Union began an organizing drive among the
Respondent's employees in March 1971.5 According to the
testimony of Mrs. Small, as corroborated in part by the
testimony of Frank Evans, a member of the Union's inter-
national executive board, Small signed an authorization
card, solicited other employees to sign cards, attended un-
ion meetings, and was a member of the Union's organizing
committee. On June 3, as a member of that committee,
Small and other employees and union representatives met
with agents of the Respondent in an attempt to settle a strike
and arrive at a mutually agreeable date for a Board election.
The Respondent's president, Harry Schwarts; its secretary,
'Joseph L. Newman; and its vice president, Marvin Rose-
man, were present and participated in the meeting. It is
uncontroverted, and I find that Virginia Small was engaged
in protected activities on behalf of the Union, and that her
union activities, interests, and sympathies were known to
the Respondent.
According to the testimony of Small, she became ill on
the night of October 13, and attended a hospital where she
was informed that she was in danger of having a miscar-
riage. A clinical appointment was made for Small for the
following day, October 14, but before attending the clinic
she called and reported to Supervisor Hyde that she was ill
and unable to report to work. At the clinic Small was sub-
jected to pregnancy tests and the diagnosis of a danger of
miscarriage was confirmed. Small again called Hyde and
° With respect to that portion of the record offered by the General Counsel
from Case 8-CA-6349, the Respondent objected only to the receipt in evi-
dence of pages 277 to 280, but did not object to pages 272 through 276. As
the pages objected to pertain only to a colloquy between the General Counsel
and the Trial Examiner relative to a proposed amendment to the complaints,
the Respondent's motion to strike is granted to this limited extent
5 All dates recited hereinafter are in 1971 , unless specified to the contrary
informed her of the illness and her inability to report to
work. Hyde replied, "Virginia, you stay home and when you
are able to come back to work you get your doctor's release
and come back to work."
Small continued under a
physician's care until December 2, and obtained a doctor's
release to return to work.
In the interim Small had been subpenaed to appear as
a witness in Case 8-CA-6349. Small was present at the
hearing on November 9, and although she did not testify on
that date her presence was observed by agents of the Re-
spondent. On the second day of the hearing, November 10,
Small was called and testified to her employment history
and her activities on behalf of the Union. Small also gave
evidence concerning the union activities of other employees
alleged as discriminates in Case 8-CA-6349. At the conclu-
sion of her testimony on direct examination, Small was
cross-examined as follows:
Q. (By Mr. Newman) You testified that you are
presently in the employ of the Company?
A. Yes.
Q. When was the last time you worked?
A. That was October the 13th.
Q. And you have never been back to work since
that date?
A. No.
Q. Do you still consider yourself an employee of
the Company as of November 10, 1971?
A. Yes.
Mr. Newman: May I inform you that you are not
in the employ of the Company? That is all:
HEARING EXAMINER Did you understand that?
THE WITNESS May I explain the reason?
HEARING EXAMINER I don't know how you can ex-
plain it-no, you are not-your discharge, if that is
what it is, or termination.
MR FIENBERG Is that effective today?
HEARING EXAMINER. That is not an issue here.
MR NEWMAN No, it's effective as of 10-25.
As related above, on December 2, Small received a
release from her physician which advised that she was not
pregnant and could return to work. On December 3, Small
called Supervisor Hyde, informed her that she had a release
from the doctor, and was ready to return to work. Hyde
replied that Small would have to go to the Respondent's
front office and talk to Mr. Roseman. Small complied with
Hyde's direction, and was told by Roseman that she had
been on sick leave, had not called in, and, accordingly,
Roseman had to replace her.
It is the Respondent's contention that Mrs. Small was
discharged for cause because she violated the Respondent's
clear and published policy with respect to absences. More
particulary, by its brief, the Respondent argues that Small
did not have a leave of absence, did not conform with
established company rules to report her absence , and was
discharged before she ever appeared and gave testimony
before the Board in Case 8-CA-6349. In addition, the Re-
spondent argues that Small's testimony concerning her ill-
ness lacks corroboration and that it is inherently incredible
that Small was threatening a miscarriage and subject to a
physician's care for a period of 2 months.
The Respondent's case was adduced through the testi-
G & S METAL PRODUCTS COMPANY
707
mony of its Vice President, Marvin Roseman, who testified
that the Respondent's books and records are maintained
under his supervision and control. Through Roseman the
Respondent introduced four documents into evidence, con-
sisting of Mrs. Small's employment application, her at-
tendance record, a permanent record from her personnel
file, and the disciplinary report relating to her discharge.
The documents were offered and received as records kept
in the ordinary course of business, and Roseman was not
questioned concerning their contents on his direct examina-
tion.
In the absence of any questions to Roseman, or argu-
ment by brief, I am unable to determine any relevancy from
Small's employment application, which contains no more
than certain personal data applicable to Small on the date
of her hire. Small's attendance record contains some evi-
dence of prior absences, but there is no contention that the
prior absences were a consideration in her discharge. The
attendance record does reflect that Small last worked on
October 13, had an excused absence on October 14, and
unexcused absence on October 15, and "Quit 10/25/71."
The permanent record from Small's personnel file contains
the notation, "Released: Nov. 5, 1971-Unreported Ab-
sence." The last document, the disciplinary report relating
to Small's termination, is dated November 5, signed by
Mary Hyde, who did not testify in this proceeding, and
contains the following remarks:
VIRGINIA SMALL called in sick Monday, October 18th.
She said she went to the doctor's and he told her she
had a miscarriage. She said she didn't know that she
was even pregnant since she had been taking birth
control pills. She said she would return to work. It has
been 3 weeks and I have not heard from her. Therefore,
I am releasing her from G & S Metal Prod. as of this
date.
On cross-examination Roseman testified that he saw
Small at the hearing in Case 8-CA-6349, but said nothing
to her about her absence, or the discharge which had alleg-
edly already occurred. With respect to when Small was
discharged, Roseman related that "it was assumed she quit
on 10/25 because we had heard nothing from her," but that
Small's official release was on November 5. Roseman ad-
mitted that the Respondent had Small's address and tele-
phone number, but he did not know if anyone had called
Small to inquire about her absence, or when she intended
to report back to work, or whether Small was given notice
of her termination. As to the date of December 3, Roseman
testified that it was possible that Small called and asked to
talk to him. Roseman further testified that pursuant to the
Respondent's established policy 3 days unreported absence
constitutes grounds for an automatic dismissal, but that
termination notices are served on an employee only if the
employee is present in the plant to receive the notice.
I do not credit Roseman's testimony except where his
version of the events and circumstances relating to the dis-
charge of Mrs. Small finds corroboration in the testimony
of other witnesses. Throughout the course of his testimony
on direct and cross-examination, Roseman testified from
the documents introduced in evidence and described
above-indicating that he had no personal knowledge of the
events leading to and culminating in the discharge of Mrs.
Small. For reasons related below, I also find that Roseman's
testimony concerning absences and leaves of absence is
unreliable and a distortion of the Respondent's established
policies.
Nor do I accept the documents introduced through
Roseman from Small's personnel file as dispositive evidence
of the reasons for her termination. The documents may be
from those records maintained by the Respondent in the
ordinary course of business, but as I made clear in the
record, without verification from the individual responsible
for the entries, their contents constitute hearsay which may
not be considered as probative evidence of the Re-
spondent's contentions of discharge for cause. This rea-
soning is particularly applicable to the termination or disci-
plinary notice which is alleged to contain the Respondent's
reasons for terminating Mrs. Small. Some of the reasons
recited in this disciplinary notice contradict entries made on
other documents from the Respondent's records. Far more
crucial, nevertheless, is the Respondent's failure to call Su-
pervisor Mary Hyde as a witness, particularly when viewed
in the light of its admission that Hyde is still employed by
the Company, and insofar as the record reflects, was avail-
able to testify.
On further cross-examination Roseman testified that 3
days unreported absence constitutes grounds for automatic
discharge, but that this policy does not apply to sick leave.
According to Roseman, if an employee calls in requesting
permission to be absent for illness, the Respondent's policy
allows some additional time beyond 3 days, depending
upon the nature of the illness. Roseman related, however,
that sick leaves have to be approved by a supervisor and
must be in writing.
The Respondent's policies pertaining to absences, sick
leaves, and leaves of absence is contained in a booklet which
is distributed to its employees. The booklet contains the
following pertinent language:
LEAVE OF ABSENCE
AN EMPLOYEE MAY APPLY FOR A LEAVE OF ABSENCE FROM HIS
FOREMAN, BUT MUST SUBMIT A GOOD REASON SO THAT THE
LEAVE CAN BE ACCEPTED A LEAVE OF ABSENCE MAY BE ACCEPT-
ED FOR A PERIOD OF NO MORE THAN 60 DAYS FOR THE FOLLOWING
LIST OF REASONS-
A) INJURY-MUST FURNISH DOCTOR' S RELEASE IN WRITING
BEFORE RETURNING TO WORK
B) SICKNESS-MUST FURNISH DOCTOR'S RELEASE IN WRITING
BEFORE RETURNING TO WORK, EXCEEDING 3 DAY'S ABSENCE
C) PREGNANCY-MUST FURNISH A STATEMENT APPROXIMAT-
ING DATE OF BIRTH OF CHILD EMPLOYEE MUST THEN FURNISH
DOCTOR'S RELEASE IN WRITING BEFORE RETURNING TO WORK
D) DEATH OR ILLNESS IN EMPLOYEE'S IMMEDIATE FAMILY
E) OTHER THAN ABOVE LISTED, NOT TO EXCEED 14 DAYS, MAY
BE GRANTED BY THE COMPANY WITHOUT LOSS OF SENIORITY
RIGHTS UPON APPLICATION OF THE EMPLOYEE AND WRITTEN PER-
MISSION BY THE COMPANY, PROVIDED THE LOSS OF THE EMPLOY-,
EE DOES NOT HINDER THE PRODUCTION PLANS OF THE COMPANY
(THERE SHALL BE A MAXIMUM OF 2 LEAVES OF ABSENCE, OTHER
THAN FOR INJURY AND SICKNESS IN ANY I8-MONTH PERIOD FOR
ANY EMPLOYEE.)
Contrary to the Respondent's contention, and on the
basis of Small's uncontradicted testimony, I find that she
was taken ill on the night of October 13 and reported to a
708
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
hospital. Small was examined and a clinical appointment
was made for her for the following day . On the basis of
Small's further uncontradicted testimony , I find that she
called her supervisor before keeping the clinical appoint-
ment to inform the Respondent of her illness and inability
to report to work . After a clinical examination had con-
firmed the prior diagnosis that Small was in danger of a
miscarriage, she again called Supervisor Hyde , informed her
of the nature of the illness, and advised Hyde that she would
be unable to come to work. There is no contradiction of
Small's testimony that Hyde told her to stay home until she
was able to come back to work, and that Hyde reminded her
to obtain a doctor's release when she was able to return.
Small complied with Hyde's reminder and the Respondent's
policy with regard to leaves of absence for sickness, and had
a doctor's release when she attempted to return to work on
December 3.
On this evidence I find that Small fully complied with
the Respondent's policy with respect to a leave of absence
for sickness. Contrary to-the testimony of Roseman, Small
was not required under the Respondent's leave-of-absence
policy to put her request in writing . As to the Respondent's
contention that Small failed to conform to its policy pertain-
ing to leaves of absence for pregnancy by failing to furnish
a statement giving the approximate date of birth of the
child, I find the contention both ridiculous and absurd.
Small did not request a leave of absence because she was
pregnant and anticipated the birth of a child. She requested,
and was granted, a leave of absence because she was ill and
in danger of suffering a miscarriage . In this respect Small
fully complied with the Respondent's policy pertaining to a
leave of absence for sickness, as specified in subparagraph
B, quoted above.
On the whole of the record in this proceeding, I find
that the Respondent's profferred justifications for the dis-
charge of Small are hastily assembled pretexts , and that
Smallwas discharged for reasons proscribed by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. Until the date Small actually
testified in Case 8-CA-6349, she had no notice from the
Respondent that her right to be absent from work for illness
was in jeopardy, or that she had in fact been terminated for
an unreported absence . On two occasions during Mrs.
Small's absence from work, her husband, Joseph Small,
picked up her checks at the Respondent's office. Joseph
Small was not asked any questions about his wife, and no
mention was made of her alleged unreported absence from
work. The record also reflects that the last paycheck to Mrs.
Small on October 22 was not, like checks given to other
employees discharged by the Respondent, marked as a "Fi-
nal Check." In consideration of the Respondent's defense
that Small was discharged for an unreported absence, I have
also taken cognizance of the evidence that it is the
Respondent's published policy to separate an employee im-
mediately after 3 consecutive days of an unreported ab-
sence. Small was not, however, discharged at the end of 3
days,
but as the testimony of Rosemand and the
Respondent's records reflect, it was assumed that Small quit
on October 25, and her official termination did not occur
until November 5.
Upon the foregoing and all of the evidence in the rec-
ord, I find and conclude that the Respondent 's discharge of
Virginia Small was motivated by her appearance and testi-
mony in Case 8-CA-6349. As a witness for the General
Counsel, Small testified to her own union activities, and to
the union activities of other employees named as discrim-
inates in the proceeding before Trial Examiner John Funke.
Immediately upon conclusion of the General Counsel's
questions on direct examination , Small was notified of her
discharge. I have found above that the Respondent's assert-
ed reasons for Small's discharge are pretexts , but even in the
absence of such finding, the timing of Small's discharge,
when considered in relation to her appearance as a witness
against the Respondent, urgently supports the conclusion
that she was discharged in violation of Section 8(a)(4) of the
Act.
The General Counsel has also alleged that the
Respondent's discharge of Virginia Small violated Section
8(a)(3) of the Act. As found above, Small was engaged in
union activities and her activities, sympathies, and interests
were clearly known to the Respondent . Small's discharge on
November 10 was not isolated in point of time from her
activities on behalf of the Union, and it may be that her
appearance and testimony as a witness in Case 8-CA-6349
merely exacerbated the animus that the Respondent already
harbored toward Small because of her union activities.
There is, however, no evidence in the record before me upon
which to predicate a finding of the Respondent's animus or
hostility toward the rights of its employees to engage in
union activities.
As related above, the General Counsel contends that
the Respondent's union animus is established in two prior
Decisions, and he has requested that I take official notice
of the Decision of Trial Examiner Funke in Case 8-
CA-6349, as well as notice of the Board's Decision and
Order as reported at 182 NLRB 111. The Respondent here
was the Respondent in both prior cases , and "it is not error
for a Trial Examiner to take judicial notice of a prior pro-
ceeding before the Board involving the same parties .... "6
I view the Board's Decision and Order at 182 NLRB
111, nevertheless, as somewhat remote in point of time and
circumstances from the case presently before me . That case
involved a labor organization other then this Union, arose
out of a different organizing campaign , and the Board
found no violations of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. As to the
Decision of Trial Examiner Funke in Case 8-CA-6349, that
matter is presently pending before the Board on exceptions,
and I cannot justifiably consider the Trial Examiner's find-
ings and conclusions reflecting upon the Respondent's al-
leged union animus and hostilty until the Board has
disposed of the exceptions. I could, of course, delay the
issuance of my decision here, pending a final Board Deci-
sion and Order in Case 8-CA-6349,7 but in the light of the
circumstances of this case I find that such delay is not
warranted. At issue here is Mrs . Small's right to be reinstat-
ed to her job and to be made whole for the losses she
suffered because of the Respondent's discrimination against
her. In view of the violation found above, and the remedy
recommended below, I find that the policies of the Act
would not be well served by delaying the issuance of this
6 N L.R.B v American Art Industries, Inc, 415 F.2d, 1223, 1227 (C.A. 5),
enfg. 170 NLRB 571.
7 American Art Industries, supra, 170 NLRB 571.
G & S METAL PRODUCTS COMPANY
709
Decision so as to find an additional violation of Section
8(a)(3) of the Act. Accordingly, as such a finding would add
nothing to the remedy recommended herein , I will further
recommend that the 8 (a)(3) allegation be dismissed.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with its operations de-
scribed in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and sub-
stantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening
and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
Upon the foregoing findings and conclusions, I hereby
make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, G & S Metal Products Company,
Inc., is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union, International Union, Allied Industrial
Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. By discharging Virginia Small because she appeared
as a witness and gave testimony before the National Labor
Relations Board, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(4)
and (1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in and
is engaging in unfair labor practices, I will recommend that
it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
actions to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that the Respondent discharged Virginia
Small in violation of Section 8(a)(4) of the Act, I will recom-
mend that the Respondent offer Small immediate and full
reinstatement to her former job, with all seniority and rights
and privileges she enjoyed prior to the act of discrimination
against her, or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially
equivalent position. I will further recommend that the Re-
spondent make Virginia Small whole for any loss of earn-
ings she suffered by reason of the discrimination, by
payment to her of a sum equal to what she would have
earned in the absence of the discrimination , less net earn-
ings during such period, with backpay computed on a quar-
terly basis in the manner prescribed in F.
W. Woolworth
Company, 90 NLRB 289, and the backpay shall carry inter-
est at the rate of 6 percent per annum as established in Isis
Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. I will also recom-
mend that the Respondent preserve and upon request, make
available to the Board all payroll records, social security
payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports,
and all other records necessary and useful to determine the
amounts of backpay due and the rights of reinstatement
under the terms of these recommendations.
As the unfair labor practices committed by the Re-
spondent are of such nature and character as to strike at the
basic rights of employees safeguarded by the Act, I shall
recommend that it cease and desist from infringing in any
other manner upon the rights of its employees guaranteed
in Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings and conclusions, and the
entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I
hereby issue the following recommended:8
ORDER
The Respondent, G & S Metal Products Company,
Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging employees because they have appeared
and given testimony in a proceeding before the National
Labor Relations Board.
(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under
Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative actions necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer employee Virginia Small immediate and full
reinstatement to her former job, with all seniority and other
rights and privileges she previously enjoyed, or, if that job
no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, and
make Virginia Small whole for her loss of earnings in the
manner set forth in the section of the Trial Examiner's
Decision entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Notify the above-named individual immediately, if
she is presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United
States, of her right to full reinstatement upon application
after discharge from the Armed Forces, in accordance with
the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Train-
ing and Service Act.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll
records, social security payment records, timecards, person-
nel records and reports, and all other records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this
recommended Order.
(d) Post at its place of business at Cleveland, Ohio,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." Copies
of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 8, after being duly signed by the Respondent's
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent imme-
diately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent
8 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall as provided in Sec . 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
9 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
710
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 8, in vent-
ing, within 20 days of the receipt of this Decision, what steps
have been taken to comply herewith.1°
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the allegation that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act be dis-
missed.
10 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board after
exceptions have been filed , this provision shall be modified to read - "Notify
the Regional Director for Region 8 , in writing, within 20 days from the date
of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT discharge employees because they
have appeared and given testimony in a proceeding
before the National Labor Relations Board.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their
rights under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act.
WE WILL offer employee Virginia Small immediate
and full reinstatement to her former job, with all sen-
iority, rights, and privileges she previously enjoyed, or,
if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent
position, and WE WILL make Virginia Small whole for
her loss of earnings , with interest at 6 percent per an-
num.
Dated
By
G & S METAL PRODUCTS
COMPANY, INC
(Employer)
(Representative)
(Title)
WE WILL NOTIFY the above-named individual immediately if
she is presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United
States, of her right to_ full reinstatement upon application
after discharge from the Armed Forces, in accordance with
the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Train-
ing and Service Act.
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced,
or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning
this notice or compliance with its provisions may be direct-
ed to the Board's Office, 1695 Federal Office Building, 1240
East Ninth Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44199, Telephone 216-
522-3715.