Kellwood Co.

756 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Greenfield Manufacturing Company, a Division of Kellwood Company and International Ladies' Gar- ment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO Kellwood Company (Dresden Plant) and International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO. Cases 26-CA-3952 and 26-CA-4075 October 16, 1972 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS On April 24, 1972, Administrative Law Judge ' Lloyd Buchanan issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, both the General Counsel and the Charging Union filed exceptions and support- ing briefs and the Respondent filed an answering brief and brief in support of cross-exceptions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record 2 and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions, of the Administrative Law Judge with the following modifications. The Administrative Law Judge found that Re- gional Manager D. Cannon's on premise, working- time speech to a group of Greenfield plant employees who were key union adherents was not violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. We disagree. On March 4, 1971, Respondent received a tel- egram from the Union designating some 34 employ- ees as additional members of the Union's organizing committee. On that same afternoon, Regional Man- ager Cannon arranged for a meeting in the plant lunchroom of these employees. In order to summon these newly designated committee members to the meeting, Respondent instructed its supervisors to or- der the 34 named employees, individually, to leave their work stations and immediately proceed to the lunchroom.' At approximately 4:20 p.m. when the i The title of "Trial Examiner" was changed to "Administrative Law Judge" effective August 19, 1972. 2 On July 13, 1972, General Counsel filed a motion to strike certain doc- uments attached to the Respondent's answering brief purporting to validate Respondent's compliance efforts coincidental to the disposition of an earlier case involving these parties We have duly considered General Counsel's motion and Respondent's opposition thereto and we find merit in the Gener- al Counsel's motion. Accordingly, and because under the circumstances we believe that the matter of Respondent's compliance with our order in the previous case is not germane to our decision herein, we hereby grant General Counsel's motion to strike. 3 In this connection, we note the uncontradicted testimony of employee P. Reynolds, who was named in the Union's telegram, that her supervisor, L committee members had been assembled, Cannon, in the company of Plant Manager T. Hamilton and Su- pervisor J. Clark, addressed the group using a written text from which he did not digress. Cannon adjured these union adherents, inter alia, "that you and other employees in this plant must not let your efforts either for, or against,4 the union interfere with your work, the work of others, or with plant rules." He further stated that, "you will not receive favored or privileged treatment and that, you will be subject to disciplinary action, including discharge ... if you violate plant rules or regulations." In our opinion, the modus operandi used by Re- spondent in arranging this separate, exclusive assem- bly of announced union sympathizers appears to be more antithetical to these employees' Section 7 rights than the actual content of Cannon's message. We find that this singling out of union supporters by calling them out from the midst of their coworkers to attend such a special meeting is invidious, and that it amounts to discriminatory treatment of them and is thus coercive. As for the regional manager's state- ment, he made no allusion whatsoever to the employ- ees' protected organizational rights and Respondent's correlative obligations under the Act, but restricted himself to emphasizing the dire consequences of what Respondent presumed to be a tendency on their part to ignore plant rules.' Accordingly, we find that Respondent's method of arranging this meeting of avowedly prounion employees, and the conduct thereof, is violative of Section 8(a)(1).6 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela- tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified below, and hereby orders that Greenfield Manufac- turing Company, a Division of Kellwood Company and Kellwood Company (Dresden Plant), Greenfield and Dresden, Tennessee, their officers, agents, succes- sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Bullington, "came back to me, just a row or two of machines in front of me and hollered out, 'Pearl, go to the lunchroon ' " Reynolds also testified that other employees, "were working all around me " 4 We note the absence of any evidence that Respondent lectured antiunion employees in similar fashion, or that any such meeting was ever conducted for them or the entire work force Further, although about December 10, 1970, Respondent had received a similar union telegram designating an initial organizing committee of 18 employees, it merely posted this telegram on the bulletin board alongside a statement analogous to the one Cannon personally delivered on March 4. 5 Although Cannon maintained he had received complaints or impressions that the Union's campaign had induced a deterioration of discipline and work habits, our reading of the record does not support this thesis. 6 Cf Standard Container Company, 171 NLRB 433, 434; also see General Shoe Corporation, 97 NLRB 499. Chairman Miller dissents with respect to this finding, and would affirm the Administrative Law Judge' s findings and conclusions on this issue. 199 NLRB No. 122 GREENFIELD MANUFACTURING COMPANY 757 said recommended Order, as so modified? 1. Insert as new subparagraph A,1(e), reletter the present subparagraph A,1(e) as A,1(f), and amend A,1(f) so that they read as follows: "(e) Summoning prounion employees or organiz- ing committee members from their work stations to attend special, exclusive meetings and lecturing them solely about plant rules and penalties for violations. "(f) In any other manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act." 2. Delete from subparagraph B,l(f) the phrase "In any like or related manner" and substitute "In any other manner." 3. Substitute the attached notices for the Admin- istrative Law Judge's notices. 7 General Counsel urges the Board to overrule the Administrative Law Judge by granting his request for a more stringent remedy, to wit, that an order be issued directing Kellwoo4 per se, to cease and desist from violations of Sec. 8(a)(1) at all of its plants and installations and that a coextensive posting of 8(a)(1) notices be mandated for all 51 plants in the Kellwood complex. While we ordered a similar remedy in Heck's Inc., 191 NLRB No 146, we do not feel that the circumstances herein warrant the application of the relief sought by the General Counsel, although we are not oblivious to the propensity of this Respondent to commit unfair labor practices, as dem- onstrated by the previous cases involving these parties. Hence, we affirm the Administrative Law Judge's denial of General Counsel 's primary remedial request. However, we find meet in the General Counsel's subsidiary request that broad-order provisions be substituted for the said recommended narrow order for the two plants involved herein Further, we, like the Administrative Law Judge, also deny the Union's request for remedial provisions designed to permit union access to employees in Respondent's parking lots, lunchrooms, and other off-duty places where employees gather, along with the right of the Union to address employees during working time and reasonable use of plant bulletin boards In our view, the record does not justify the application of this species of extraordinary relief because viable alternative means for the Union's organizational access to employees appear to be at hand . See N L KB. v. The Babcock & Wilcox Company, 351 U.S. 105. sible discriminatory action. WE WILL NOT assault employee distributors of handbills. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations , to join or assist Inter- national Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities. GREENFIELD MANUFACTURING COMPANY, A DIVISION OF KELLWOOD COMPANY (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu- tive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any question concerning this notice or compli- ance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Room 746, Clifford Davis Federal Building, 167 North Main Street, Memphis, Tennes- see 38103, Telephone 901-534-3161. APPENDIX A NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT summon prounion employees or organizing committee members from their work stations to attend special, exclusive meet- ings to lecture to them solely about plant rules and penalties for violations. WE WILL NOT unlawfully interrogate employ- ees, threaten reprisals, promise benefits, or warn of layoffs or plant closure, in connection with employee union activities or sympathies. WE WILL NOT solicit to or create an impres- sion of surveillance. WE WILL NOT connect card signing with pos- APPENDIX B NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT unlawfully interrogate employ- ees, threaten reprisals or discharge, or warn of lack of work, in connection with employee union activities or sympathies. WE WILL NOT create an impression of surveil- lance. WE WILL NOT advise or solicit abandonment of the Union or refusal to testify. WE WILL NOT coerce employees in connec- tion with distribution of handbills. WE WILL NOT minimize the possible remedy in a Board proceeding or declare the futility of designating the Union. 758 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist Inter- national Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities. KELLWOOD COMPANY (DRESDEN PLANT) (Employer) Dated By (Repre1sentative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu- tive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compli- ance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Room 746, Clifford Davis Federal Building, 167 North Main Street, Memphis, Tennes- see 38103, Telephone 901-534-3161. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION LLOYD BUCHANAN, Trial Examiner: The complaints herein (issued July 20 and September 17, 1971; charges filed March 19, April 1, July 27, and September 7, 1971), as consolidated and amended, allege that the Respondent Companies have violated Section 8(a)(1) I of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 73 Stat. 519, by threaten- ing lack of work and layoff, warning of discipline, unlawful- ly interrogating employees, promising benefits, soliciting to surveillance and creating an impression of surveillance, warning of plant closure, connecting card signing with dis- criminatory action, threatening discharge and harsh treat- ment, advising and soliciting abandonment of the Union and refusal to testify, molesting an employee-distributor of union handbills, threatening refusals to promote, coercing employees in connection with distribution of union and antiunion handbills, and by reference to employment of Black Panthers, minimizing the possible remedy herein, and declaring the futility of designating the Union. The answers deny the allegations of unfair labor practice. The separate allegation of advice and solicitation to abandon the Union was dismissed at the close of the General Counsel's case for failure of proof. The cases were tried before me at Union City, Tennes- see, on November 9 through 12, 1971, inclusive. Briefs filed by the General Counsel, the Respondents, and the Union, the time to do so having been extended, excellently pinpoint the testimony concerning the alleged violations . I would also commend counsel for the Union on his thorough argu- ment for an extended remedy. Such amaranthine persist- ence is worthy of a more appropriate cause. The General Counsel's motion to correct transcript, dated December 27, 1971, now marked Trial Examiner's Exhibit 1 and to which no opposition has been indicated, is granted except for what appears to be an inadvertent ref- erence to page 197, line 22. We need not concern ourselves with other errors, obvious or unimportant. Not to charge the General Counsel with a willful distor- tion or misstatement, but in what may be a fatuous hope to avoid rewriting of history, I should point out that the state- ment in his brief that "the General Counsel hereby renews its [sic] request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testifican- dum" (emphasis supplied) is at least misleading. The tran- script shows a request to keep the record open and a request for a subpena. The former request was denied. As for a subpena, the transcript includes the following, at page 651: TRIAL EXAMINER ... I will issue a subpoena if you want it, but we are going to close the record .... I fear that even though I don't say any more or didn't say anything about the subpoena, I might be charged with having refused to give you one. MR HARRINGTON. I assure you that I would do no such thing. The fear which I expressed is born of an unwarranted claim of refusal to issue long ago perpetuated in the annals of the Board and the circuit court of appeals. Upon the entire record in the case and from my obser- vation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT (WITH REASONS THEREFOR) AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I THE COMPANIES' BUSINESS AND THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The corporate status of each of the Respondent Com- panies, the nature and extent of their business in the manu- facture of wearing apparel , and their engagement in commerce within the meaning of the Act are admitted; I find and conclude accordingly. I also find and conclude that, as admitted, the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. Il THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF SECTION 8(aXI) 1 Important, not only to the parties in this case, but also on the question of Board rule and policy, is the question whether a so-called broad order should issue where interference but no discrimination is found. In several recent cases, even where little interference has been found , broad orders have issued contrary to established earlier practice ; and also contrary to other recent decisions where the Board has expressly issued only narrow orders so-called The question is here raised for guidance and consistency in future Trial Examiners' Decisions. While there are no serious questions of law in this case aside from the longstanding problem of threat or prediction, it offers difficult problems of credibility. It will be seen that some credibility findings are clearly indicated; others can reliably be made on the basis of both demeanor and testi- mony. Having heard the witnesses and looked on their out- GREENFIELD MANUFACTURING COMPANY ward appearance? I cannot announce apodictic findings. But I do claim the advantage of observation and, aided by reasonable inferences, need not nail down findings and con- clusions with an objectively factual hammer. In a few in- stances witnesses have been credited where their recital, if suggesting embellishment or exaggeration in claim or dem- al, was nevertheless generally persuasive in both content and manner. Other accounts, details of which would serve only to embarrass, were clearly apocryphal. Nor has this been a matter of "finding some, dismissing others" on the theory that where there is smoke, there is fire; for where there appears to be smoke, there may be only pipedreams. In sum, the witnesses have indicated some violations at each plant. If in some instances different credibility findings might be suggested, many of the violations alleged have been clearly supported, as we shall see. But for a single allegation in the second complaint, which relates to the Dresden plant, the events herein are not intertwined in time; not at all with respect to location, nor to the alleged individual violators. As for an overall plan or pattern of violation, which might cover these two plants, there is no suggestion of that in the testimony of Cannon, the regional manager who supervised both plants (he is the only supervisor above the plant level cited in any of the allegations before us and, as we shall see, there is no finding that he violated the Act), or in the questions put to him; and no such indicated connection between the violations at Greenfield and those at Dresden as could shed additional light on the allegations or the findings made.3 If reason ever existed for consolidating these cases, it disappears with denial of a companywide order requested to embrace all 52 Kellwood Company plants. Reasons for such denial were stated on the record after detailed argu- ment by counsel. Cases, including those where top company officials were involved (unlike the instant case) but no over- all remedy was provided, cited to support such an order are distinguishable on their facts. The legal basis for an extraor- dinary remedy may be perspicuous; not so its application in a given situation. This case scarcely approaches the need- edjustification. Indeed we shall see that, when a plant man- ager who was guilty of the greatest number of violations was discharged, all plant employees were immediately assem- bled and informed, although there was no disavowal of his activities generally. Nevertheless, both cases prepared, and the witnesses who were sought apparently being available, no severance has been effected, however convenient and less confusing it might have been to hear the cases separately and to issue two decisions. Greenfield and Dresden, where these two plants are 21 Samuel 16.7. 3 I have not overlooked counsel's reference to prior cases involving other plants and top Kellwood officials. In making findings and conclusions, I do not rely on and need not refer to the earlier findings of animus and violation on the part of such officials. The violations here alleged are limited to local officials (the sole exception , as noted, is Cannon, who committed no viola- tion) with evidence that, the Respondents remaining liable therefor, the violative acts were committed contrary to his instructions and without con- nection with the top officials involved in the cases cited . We must distinguish between overall supervision and legal advice not alleged to be unlawful, on one hand, and violation by or directly attributable to top officials on the other. 759 respectively located, are, we are told, 6 or 7 miles apart in northwest Tennessee. One witness, Wright, testified that she supervises approximately 248 employees at Dresden. Can- non told us that between December and March there were approximately 350 employees at the Greenfield plant. With a very occasional exception (I recall one, Damron), employ- ees apparently are not transferred from one plant to the other. A. The Alleged Violations at Greenfield On December 10, 1970,4 the Union sent to Greenfield a telegram which listed 18 employees as members of the Union's organizing committee. A second telegram, listing 34 additional employees, was sent on March 4. Thereafter on October 11 the Union sent a telegram to the Dresden plant, naming 12 employees as members of an organizing committee there. Cannon testified that he first learned of organizing activity with the posting of a union card on the plant bulletin board at Greenfield early in November 1970. There is no allegation of discrimination against em- ployees at either plant. But, as indicated, the allegations of interference with protected concerted activities are nu- merous. Cannon took no action vis-a-vis employees on the first information which he received concerning union activity. But a month later, on December 10, he did post a copy of the telegram received that day and a notice addressed to all employees in which he advised or warned that committee members would not receive favored treatment and that they were subject to plant rules and to discipline for violation "just as everyone else." No violation is alleged in that con- nection. On December 14 Cannon read a prepared speech to all Greenfield employees. It is alleged that in that speech he threatened that their union activities would lead to loss of business and ultimately to layoffs. The General Counsel's witnesses on this point, all of them named in the first tel- egram, emphasized remarks 5 which were neither violative nor alleged to be so. None testified that Cannon had warned of a loss of business which, as we shall see, he could lawfully do. At most it appeared from their testimony that Cannon, relaying what Sears buyers had told him, indicated their stated uncertainty about signing a contract for merchan- dise. In his prepared statement, which he read to the em- ployees without deviation, Cannon in this connection expressed no more than his embarrassment and concern over the question put to him whether labor problems might affect the plants' ability to deliver a quality product on time. (He' was undoubtedly concerned over possible loss of busi- ness.) Not only did Cannon not threaten, but he told the employees only what the Sears representatives had actually said to him.6 I find and conclude that the allegation of unlawful threats on December 14 has not been sustained. On March 4, immediately upon receipt of the second 4 Events in December 1970 will be cited as in December; all other dates, unless otherwise indicated, are in 1971. 5 Here and elsewhere I shall attempt a summary instead of reciting cumula- tive testimony I have reviewed the testimony of all of the witnesses, certainly not overlooking any cited by counsel. 6 Cf. Neco Electrical Products Corp, 124 NLRB 481, 487, set aside 289 F.2d 757 (C.A. 5), and modified by Board Order, April 13, 1961. 760 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD telegram, Cannon called a meeting of those named as addi- tional members of the committee . It is alleged that, sum- moning them to a meeting, he warned that they would be subject to discipline, including discharge, if they violated any company rules. A copy of Cannon's speech, as prepared in advance, is before us. It was testified for the General Counsel that Cannon read his remarks; for the Company, that he did not depart from the prepared text. There is no claim that the speech as written is wholly or in part violative. Nor is it claimed that the Company's rules are violative. Numerous employees named in this telegram testified that Cannon declared that those now named were not to let membership on the committee interfere with company rules; that they were not to expect special privileges; and that they would be disciplined if they did not do good work. Cannon made it clear that the rules would be applied to them as to all other employees. The findings in this connection are indicated with rela- tive ease. Curiously, this allegation could be drawn on the basis of the statements made in the posted notice of Decem- ber 10, which is not claimed to have been violative. The Regional Director was well advised not to base an allegation of violation on that earlier notice. A similar evaluation of the March 4 speech would have been equally wise. With knowledge that employees in such situations are often impelled to assume unwarranted attitudes and privi- leges (he referred in general terms on both direct and cross- examination to numerous complaints concerning deteriora- tion in discipline) which are not properly theirs, Cannon sought to avoid that problem. Were explanation for his remarks necessary, one could, without reliance on expertise and knowledge that such situations have been known to develop, accept Cannon's explanation as reasonable and valid: he had been told that some on the committee were congregating and stopping to talk with employees who were not on break, and he thought that they felt that they were guaranteed immunity from the rules of conduct; and a talk might lessen the problem and obviate disciplinary measures. Unlike a most recent case in which I found that there had been oral additions to a prepared text, I find that Can- non adhered faithfully to his prepared text and that his remarks were not violative; further that there was occasion to forestall the possibility of employee activity contrary to lawful plant rules. I find and conclude that without promise, threat, or other unlawful act or attempt to limit protected activities, Cannon lawfully informed the Greenfield em- ployees that they were expected to fulfill their duties without modification because of their organizational activities and desires. Here he was substantially reiterating what had been posted on December 10. These remarks were no more viola- tive in March than they had been 3 months before. However worded, such remarks and any others can be attacked. Un- less it be held that there is no way in which an employer may lawfully do what Cannon undertook, his remarks must be found to be privileged and lawful. We come now to instances where, despite instructions to the contrary issued at both plants, supervisors, imbued with a desire to "help" the Employer according to their understanding, in fact entered upon forbidden territory and violated the Act; and other instances where employees, oth- erwise motivated, exaggerated or fabricated statements al- legedly made to them. Were we ultimately concerned with a companywide pattern and remedy , we could consider and evaluate instructions to supervisors . (The General Counsel in his -brief appears to recognize that Cannon confronted Hamilton, plant manager at Greenfield from October 12, 1970, until March 8, 1971, with the report concerning his physical restraint on Lee, noted below, "concluded that it was best for" Cannon, Greenfield, and Hamilton to termi- nate the latter's employment, and then discharged him; and that Cannon assembled all of the plant employees later that day and informed them that Hamilton was no longer with the Company.) No more relevant is a claim of exculpation based on any such instructions, in which connection we might consider the testimony by the chairman of the organ- izmg committee that Cannon announced that he had dis- charged Hamilton because the two had not seen eye to eye. Numerous instances of interference are alleged to have been committed by Hamilton. Although he is no longer employed by the Company, his whereabouts are apparently unknown, and he was not called to contradict testimony concerning his alleged violations, the testimony concerning the latter did not in every case support the allegations. Thus employee Finney testified that on January 5, after 3 or 4 months of employment, she was sent to Hamilton's office, where he told her that he always called new employ- ees in and that she was doing good work, and asked whether she had heard anything about the Union. When Finney did not reply, he advised her not to go to an outsider if she had any trouble but to come to him. To Finney's statement that she had worked in a union plant for 6 years , Hamilton replied, "Well, I don't have to tell you anything about it then." Finney's later version was that, instead of asking her, Hamilton told her that he knew that she had heard of this business of a union; and that she did not reply. (With post- ing of the telegram and notice , this hardly suggests surveil- lance.) It is not clear whether Hamilton told or asked Finney about her hearing of the Union. He might have told her more and yet not have violated the Act. I find and conclude that the allegation of unlawful interrogation was not here supported. No more support was accorded the allegation of interrogation by Hamilton on December 21, concerning which employee Weaver was called to testify. On December 11, the day after receipt of the Union's first telegram, Hamilton sent for Carter, whose name head- ed that list of 18 and who was chairman of the organizing committee. Hamilton remarked that Carter must have something against the Company. When Carter replied that he was dissatisfied and had not received a promised promo- tion, Hamilton declared that he was not concerned with the past and asked what Carter wanted now. Although declara- tory in form, Hamilton's opening remark,- connected as it was with the telegram, together with the direct question separating past grievances from now current ones since the telegram had been received, constitutes unlawful interroga- tion; I so find and conclude. On March 5 after Hamilton told employee Jeter, in- cluded in the Union's telegram of March 4, that she had hurt him, Jeter sought him out, told him she was sorry if she had hurt him, and asked him why he had said that. Hamil- ton then proceeded to ask Jeter why she wanted the Union, explained that he was trying to help the employees, and GREENFIELD MANUFACTURING COMPANY 761 suggested that she could get out of the Union if she wanted to although he "wasn't telling" her to do that; yet he'd be hurt if she didn't.7 The question, although friendly in man- ner, followed by the reference to persuade Jeter's withdraw- al from the Union, constituted unlawful probmg; I so find and conclude. While the second conversation was initiated by Jeter, it was prompted by Hamilton's earlier remark. The latter's question and suggestion with reference to the Union were made on his own initiative. In the middle of December, Hamilton asked employee Carolyn Lamb to cooperate with him, referred to cards being passed out, and advised her not to sign lest she get into trouble: if she didn't cooperate, "there's ways"; if she did, "It could pay." Lamb later testified that Hamilton wanted her to cooperate with respect to loss of work time. The promise or indication of benefit might be deemed to refer to higher earnings if Lamb cooperated by improving her production. But in the immediate context of Hamilton's reference to union activity as he advised her not to sign a card (the reference clearly was to union cards, these were being distributed and discussed, and there is no suggestion of other cards), it appears and I find and conclude that Hamilton here made an unlawful threat and promise. Ham- ilton further unlawfully and in the same context told Lamb to tell him if she saw anything that management needed to know; that this would be a service, not a form of tattling. On December 11 Hamilton cited to Carter, during their conversation noted above, the closing of an RCA plant in Memphis, remarked that things were beginning to look bad and he did not want it to happen here, and suggested that Carter, when he was ready, talk to him. With the reference to Carter's membership on the organizing committee, the warning of loss of business and plant closure were violative. I so find and conclude. On the day after receipt of the December 10 telegram Hamilton called employee Geneva Armstrong into his of- fice (she had been 2 minutes late that morning), told her that employees, like supervisors, should be on time and that her production was low, and asked her not to sign a union card. Armstrong had been late many times before but had not been called into Hamilton's office about it. Hamilton pre- sumably knew that she had signed a union card (she had been listed as a member of the organizing committee), and the unusual warning to avoid tardiness, combined with the reference to signing, constituted disparate treatment and tended to interfere with further organizational activities. I so find and conclude. In support of an allegation that between December 10 and 24 Hamilton threatened discharge because of union activity, employee Lee, a member of the original organizing committee, testified that Hamilton called her into his office, told her that her production had fallen down, refused to hear her excuse, said that it had been reported that she had caused a disturbance (its nature not described) in her de- partment, and warned against repetition of that. There is no indication here of threat because of union activity. This is connected with the allegation and Lee's testimo- 7 Whether or not the latter remark constituted solicitation to abandon the Union, it is not alleged and was not litigated To support the allegation which was dismissed at the trial, the General Counsel hoped for testimony by a witness who did not appear. ny that Johnson, her supervisor, then asked Lee what Ham- ilton had said and threatened that she had to expect that when she signed a union card. In the light of Lee's uncer- tainty as she testified that she believed that these conversa- tions took place after receipt of the first telegram, one can understand her testimony that she did not know how John- son knew that she had signed a union card. Johnson denied that she knew that Lee had signed a card and that there was any reference to a union or union cards. Lee here appeared to be straining. While we shall see below that Johnson had been given the names of some who had attended a union meeting early in November, it does not appear that Lee was among those who attended or were so pointed out; and the instant reference is to signing of union cards. I find and conclude that these allegations of threat by Hamilton and Johnson have not been sustained. Employee Davis testified that on January 5 she was called into Hamilton's office, where he advised her not to sign a union card, warning of lack of business and of work. Here was no explanation such as Cannon had offered to justify his reference to loss of business, the employee being given merely a connection between union activity and lack of work. As a statement of possible economic effect, a warning of loss of business and lack of work is meaningless. Such a possibility always exists whatever the circumstances. Whether the employer's motive is sensible is not our con- cern. But the tendency to interfere is our concern; and an unsupported connection between union activity and lack of work does tend to interfere. Cannon lawfully cited the re- action of the Sears representatives: these were facts. Con- trariwise, Hamilton offered no "free speech" factual support for what was now a threat, not a mere prediction. The contrast between the Cannon and the Hamilton situ- ations should be recognized as valid and important. With cases to support any point of view or predilection, and indeed with contrary decisions in the same case, we can avoid, on this issue at least, so-called Democratic or Repub- lican,' conservative or liberal, pro- or antilabor bases for decision. On the statute as written, an employer may not make threats in connection with union activity. But not every statement which tends to limit such activity is viola- tive. A fair report of possible action not controlled by the employer meets the second branch of the threat or pre- diction dichotomy. Applying the statute and guided by principle, we are led to a finding of prediction in one situation, threat in the other. If, as he undoubtedly did, Hamilton already knew that Davis was a member of the organizing committee, such knowledge would not bar a finding, which the testimony otherwise warrants, that he advised her not to sign a union card. Such a reference, not seeking information which Ham- ilton already had, confirms its own purpose and is not at all incredible. I find and conclude that Hamilton's warning, as alleged, was violative. On March 5, as Lee was distributing union handbills on company property outside the plant door, Hamilton pulled her by the arm and reminded her that she had been warned not to solicit on company property. Lee stepped back but Hamilton again grabbed her arm. Lee withdrew, went to the 762 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD edge of the property, where she spoke to the union repre- sentative, and returned. To Hamilton's question whether she was refusing to get off the property, she replied that she was not refusing but had a legal right and he could not stop her. Hamilton thereupon put his arm in her back and pushed her to the street. This is hardly to be denied since it was allegedly one of the reasons for discharging Hamil- ton. Our concern here is with the question whether Hamil- ton unlawfully interfered with protected activities. Where as indicated the community limits distribution on public prop- erty, the legality of such limitation can be, as it is being, tested in the courts. Whatever the rules with respect to working areas, outside organizers, hazards, or limited ac- cess, I find and conclude Hamilton's restriction on Lee's distribution in front of the plant was violative. Employee Howard Reynolds testified that in August 1970 he asked for a transfer to another job and that Plant Engineer Auvenshine told him that he would be considered if anything opened; that he became a member of the organ- izing committee in March and was named in the March 4 telegram; and that, when he spoke to Auvenshme again about a transfer to another shift, the latter replied that Reynolds did stand for big money before the other day when the telegram came in, that Hamilton was the holdup (if this was said, it must have been before the latter's dis- charge on March 8), and that he would help Reynolds if he could. With an issue of credibility here, Reynolds' testimony is more significant for what he omitted. Auvenshine told us that Reynolds asked for a transfer so that he could earn more and that he arranged for a pay increase for Reynolds at the time of the first conversation; that when Reynolds in March again asked about the possibility of a transfer, this time to another shift, he replied in the negative, explaining to Reynolds that the Company had spent a great deal to train him and that his supervisor wanted to keep him on that job; and that he did not transmit this request to Reynolds' supervisor. Auvenshine's explanation about his wanting to keep Reynolds on his job is consistent with the increase given the latter in 1970 instead of the transfer which he had requested and which Auvenshine had not, at that time ei- ther, discussed with the supervisor. Auvenshine told us that he made no issue with respect to Reynolds' union activity or his own knowledge thereof. He testified that, in speaking of March, he was relying on Reynolds' testimony concerning the date, and that if their conversation took place at that time, he would have known of the union activity as indicated in the telegram.8 The allegation here centers not on the refusal or failure to transfer Reynolds, but on the allegation that Auvenshine had threatened that, because of his union activities, Rey- nolds would not receive a promotion to a better job. There is no sufficient basis for finding that Auvenshme made the alleged threat. I find and conclude that the allegation has not been sustained. We recall that a union card was posted on the plant bulletin board early in November 1970. Pearl Reynolds, s The conversation would have to have been on March 4, 5, or 8 to have occurred after receipt of the telegram and during Hamilton 's tenure. who was not listed as an organizing committee member until the telegram of March 4, testified that on November 12 Bullington, her supervisor, asked whether she knew anyone in the department who was working for the Union, and warned that, supervisors being picked from among the employees, anyone thus involved would not be selected. Bullington denied all of this. But after testifying that she first learned of union activity in the latter part of December or in January, Bullmgton admitted that the Union had been discussed in supervisors' meetings in November. It would be reasonable to infer that she was aware of the card posting in November. But in any event the telegram of December 10 was early discussed although Bullingto'n now admitted only that she received this information "sometime before Christmas." With little to go on in this "Yes - No" situation, I am impelled to credit Reynolds' testimony. I find and conclude that Bullington interrogated and warned as alleg- ed. It is further alleged that about January 30 Supervisor Clark interrogated an employee concerning his union sym- pathies. Employee Earls testified that to Clark' s question of what he thought of the Union, he put the same question, to which Clark replied that the Union is worthless and just wanted his money, and added a warning that Earls watch himself. Whether or not it was Earls' afterthought, this latter was not alleged. Clark denied that either of them had asked the other's opinion of the Union. If Clark did ask the ques- tion, there is no violative context involving either Clark or Earls to warrant a finding of unlawful interrogation here. The point was hardly clarified by the answer elicited from Clark that he did not know whether Earls' name was on the union telegram of December 10. His name, although the General Counsel would not so admit, was not on the tel- egram; it appears on that of March 4. I find and conclude that this allegation has not been sustained. Detailing a host of other statements by Blackburn, her supervisor, in opposition to unionization, none of them al- leged to be violative, employee Pope, whose name appeared on the December 10 telegram, testified that Blackburn told her on that day not to sign a union card and then distributed a newspaper article concerning the closing of an RCA plant in Memphis, telling Pope to read it. Pope later told us that she had seen the article being passed around, not by Black- bum, but that the latter did tell her to read it. Pope testified also that about a week later Blackburn asked whether she had done or said anything to cause Pope to support the Union, and then, when Pope replied in the negative, asked why the latter was for the Union. To this Pope replied that she wanted to protect her job, and then complained to Blackburn about Hamilton. Blackburn did not testify. The statement or advice that Pope not sign a union card is not a warning or unlawful. Nor is the request that an employee read a newspaper article (we do not know whether that article indicated a connection between organi- zation and closing of the other plant) a threat that selection of the Union here would result in plant closure. Finally, bearing in mind that Pope's name appeared in the Decem- ber 10 telegram, I find no other facts or context here and no tendency to interfere such as to support a finding of unlawful interrogation by Blackburn. I find and conclude that the allegations of violation by Blackburn must be dis- missed. GREENFIELD MANUFACTURING COMPANY 763 Employee Damron, who was listed in the December 10 telegram, testified that Johnson, her supervisor, asked her that morning why she wanted a union; that, having heard that Johnson had worked for a union in an earlier cam- paign, she in turn asked why Johnson had wanted one be- fore; and that when Johnson replied that she did it for the money, she herself declared that it meant more than money to her. Placing this conversation at about December 8, John- son told us that, although she had never before asked Dam- ron whether she had any grievances, she did now ask her that; and because Hubble, another employee, had told her that Damron was a member of the Union, she then asked Damron why she wanted the Union. Johnson explained that she thought it was part of her business to know why Dam- ron was a union member: Hamilton had told the supervisors to find out why the employees wanted a union. This expla- nation by Johnson does not apply to Damron alone. It persuades me that she similarly and for the same reason asked employees High, Cupples, and Edward Lamb why they wanted a union although she denied putting the ques- tion to the latter two. On the question of Johnson's knowledge, she testified that Hubble was one of her coriders and had mentioned the names of some employees who had attended a union meet- ing. But the issue here is not the extent of Johnson's knowl- edge or how she obtained it; rather whether she asked these employees why they wanted a union. This systematic inter- rogation at the very inception of a union campaign, when the tendency to interfere would be magnified, was violative; I so find and conclude. Lamb testified also that a month before the first tel- egram, about November 10 (the complaint places this at about December 10), Johnson first asked him and then told him that she knew where he had been the night before. The reference here was to the union meeting mentioned to John- son by Hubble. I do not credit Johnson's version that Lamb first asked whether she would like to know who had been at the meeting and that, as she walked off, she replied that she already knew . Her testimonial explanation that she had received the information from Hubble was not offered to Lamb. She here created an impression of surveillance in violation of the Act, and I so find and conclude. B. The Alleged Violations at Dresden Employee Finley, later named as a member of the organizing committee at Dresden , but her union sympathy indicated as early as February and her organizational ef- forts beginning about June, testified that on February 17 Plant Manager Wilson said to her that he had been told that she had attended a union meeting . When Finley, denying that, remarked that this is a free country, Wilson concluded with the observation that if one employee attends, others follow. Wilson denied that he had had any such conversa- tion with Finley. The latter impressed me generally as a credible witness in the face of exhaustive cross-examination. On the other hand, we shall note below several instances when Wilson appeared to be less than wholly credible. I find and conclude that Wilson here created an impression of surveillance of union activities. While it may be urged that he impliedly sought information from Finley and was thus guilty of interrogation also, there is insufficient warrant for magnifying the offense by basing a second finding of viola- tion on an implication from the unlawful impression of surveillance found. Employee Williams, included in the October telegram as a member of the organizing committee, testified that some time in March, Wilson asked her whether she had any business in Greenfield and when she replied in the negative, said that he was angry with her because she had not gone there to pick up antiunion literature. Wilson denied, and again when asked on cross-examination, that the conversa- tion had been held and that he had ever discussed Williams' union activities. I credit Williams' account. If this attempt to coerce did not succeed, it was nevertheless violative, and I so find and conclude. Also in March, Wilson told employee Haynes that she tickled him by her statement a few minutes before to the effect that, if the Union did not leave the employees alone, she would get the Black Panthers. Although Haynes now declared that she had been joking, Wilson allegedly asked whether she thought that the Company could get the Black Panthers to work for it and, when she said that she thought not, the conversation continued as Wilson asked whether she had any contact with the Black Panthers, Haynes replying that her husband had formerly but not now. When Wilson then asked how much the Black Panthers would charge, she replied that she thought it was about $1,500; and to his remark, "That's a little high," her answer was that "they get the job done." The conversation allegedly con- cluded with Wilson suggesting that Haynes "keep in touch with him because he might need them." Haynes added that Wilson "would come by [her] machine at intervals and he would say, `Do you think we ought to call them now? We might need them,' and walk on." According to Wilson, who denied various elements in Haynes' account, when he was told that she wanted to speak with him, he went to her department, where she told him amid general laughter in which both of them joined that she and another girl had been talking about asking the Black Panthers to come in, that they could be gotten for a sum which Wilson did not now recall, that it could be at half puce, and that the amount could be raised in one night. Wilson later thought that he should follow up on this, sent for Haynes, and told her that while he appreciated her humor, he wanted it clear that he did not want to get into such "issues." Recalled, Haynes denied certain portions of Wilson's testimony. Certainly not to show that Haynes no longer supported the Union (she clearly overflowed with bias as she testified) but to introduce an alleged admission on her part, Wilson told us further that in September Haynes came to his office, said that she had become disillusioned with the Union; that everyone knew that she, not Wilson, had spoken of the Black Panthers but that the Board had twisted her statement concerning that. (When this twisting had occurred is not clear.) Haynes did not deny Wilson's testimony concerning these latter items. (I am not relying on Supervisor Cashion's confirmatory testimony concerning these events.) Thereaf- ter Haynes gave Wilson her union pin, the testimony in 764 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD conflict whether she volunteered it or whether Cashion sug- gested that Haynes give it to Wilson. I find incredible Haynes' testimony that she did not mention to counsel or to the union organizers either the September talk or the alleged request for her union pin because she did not think it important; she was and is too concerned to leave anything unsaid. Other unreliable as- pects of Haynes' testimony need not be detailed here. The credibility findings bearing on this allegation are not based on demeanor, and the testimony may be differ- ently evaluated. It is therefore in order to note that, if Wil- son uttered any silly remarks with respect to the Black Panthers, they were induced by Haynes' self-important ref- erence to such contacts. Aside from inequity in holding one party responsible for an alleged response so prompted, I can discern little tendency to interfere with the rights of the employee so involved. If the claim be that Wilson advocated the use of improper means (the suggestion from either side is clearly such and hardly a credit to anyone's decency), violation is not to be founded on testimony that in effect Haynes suggested, "We can get the Black Panthers," and Wilson replied, "Yes, let's." With both sides evidently re- garding that group as a strong-arm unit, any offense was no greater in the response than in the original proposal. Cer- tainly there was neither coercion nor a tendency to coerce Haynes, and I so find and conclude. Employee Hugueley, named in the telegram of October 11 as a member of the organizing committee , testified that about the middle of June, Wilson asked her what she knew about the Union and said that he had a list; that, like the devil, he would take the good ones and leave the bad, sep- arating the good from the bad; and that, if the Union did not come in, employee Rodgers "has had it." I do not credit Wilson's denial that he made the threats. I find and con- clude that the threats here were clearly connected with un- ion activity, and that the question and the threats were violative. Finley, mentioned and credited above, testified that on June 17 Wilson remarked to her that he had heard that she was working the night before; that she thought he was kid- ding, and replied that she worked every night; that later, after she asked her supervisor to inquire for her, Wilson sent for her and she asked what he had meant; and that he answered that three girls had told him that she had been out with a union representative the night before. Finley told us further that she had been with the union representative the night before but did not admit that to Wilson: she had told the truth, but not all of it; she "just skirted around the rest." Nor did Finley at this point tell us all of the truth. She did not tell us that the day before she had volunteered to Wilson that she was not for the Union and wanted him to know; that she had led to Wilson's later remarks by asking to see him (she did admit this on cross-examination) so that he could explain what he meant when he indicated that she had not kept her word; or that Wilson added that his objec- tion was not to her working for the Union but to her doing one thing and telling him another. Considering the question whether the remark that three girls had told him is tantamount to giving an impression of surveillance, and the fact that all of this was prompted by Finley's volunteered statement to Wilson the day before, I find and conclude that there was no violation here. (We recall the finding of violation in February.) Continuing with the attempt to consider in chronologi- cal order the allegations of violation by Wilson, we note Hugueley's testimony that about a week after the mid-June interrogation and threats by Wilson, he remarked that she looked worried, and asked whether she had been pressured into the Union and whether she had signed a union card; that, saying that he had one, he then asked whether she wanted to sign one for him, and replied in the affirmative when she remarked that he was kidding. I do not credit Wilson's testimony that Hugueley at this point asked whether he thought that she had gone union and that he told her that he was serious when he told her that he had a union card and could let her have it if she wanted to sign one-all of this beginning with his sending for her and allegedly stemming from a report by her supervisor, Brundige, that Hugueley looked as if she weren't feeling well. Whether or not Wilson was joking when he offered Hugueley a union card, I find and conclude that his interrogation was viola- tive, even if he did say at one time that it was for her to decide whether she would work for the Union. A few days later according to Hugueley, Wilson told her that he had heard that her neighbor was at a meeting the night before. Hugueley replied that she was, figuring that he was referring to Rodgers, because the latter had told Hugueley that she had been at the meeting. We recall Wilson's threat concerning Rodgers a short time before. I do not credit Wilson's denial, and I find and conclude that he here conveyed the impression of surveillance of union acitivities. On November 5, 4 days before this trial opened, Hu- gueley informed Wilson that she had a subpena and had been told, as had other employees, by the union representa- tives to show it to him if he wanted to see it. (Finley had testified earlier in this connection that this was to be done so that arrangements could be made for the subpenaed employees to be away.) As Wilson directed, Hugueley went to his office a short time later. There during an hourlong conference, according to Hugueley, Wilson declared first that he saw that she had not yet changed her allegiance. I find and conclude that such an observation under the cir- cumstances does not support the allegation of unlawful in- terrogation. With as little reason as the claim of impression of sur- veillance involving Finley noted above, Wilson' s statement, "I see that ...." might be claimed to convey an impression of surveillance. (Such a claim appears to be based on an- other portion of this conversation, as we shall soon note. This welter of claims was brought in by amendment at the opening of the trial.) The allegation, clearly different from Hugueley's statement that Wilson declared his observation in the present tense, is that he said that he had observed, suggesting without testimonial support the possibility of surveillance. On the other hand, despite his denial, I find and con- clude that Wilson's suggestion to Hugueley that there are ways of getting out of the Union, and his statements that the only result of the hearing herein could be a requirement to post a notice on the bulletin board and that there was no way in which the Company and the Union could work GREENFIELD MANUFACTURING COMPANY 765 together, thus emphasizing the futility of organizational ef- forts, are violative. This is no less so even if Wilson did not say other things or commit other violations not alleged. In the course of comments whether or not union people would he, Wilson adverted to the claim of surveillance in- volving Finley several months before. One might use the statement of what was "reported" several months before as a peg for a finding of surveillance or impression thereof. But in the absence of a finding of violation in the original cir- cumstances, and with all that had been bruited about in the intervening months during this organizational venery, I find and conclude that Wilson did not again here create an impression of surveillance of union activities. As Hugueley did that day, Finley on November 5 went to Wilson's office to show him the subpena which she had received to appear at this trial on November 9. According to her testimony, he told her that she would be hurting 225 people, asked whether she wanted to testify, and told her that she could get out of that by seeing an impartial lawyer. Later that morning Wilson sent for Finley and told her, inter alia, that he did not have to let her off to testify if he didn't want to. Wilson also asked Finley to call him on Saturday if she saw a lawyer. Early Monday morning, November 8, Wilson again 9 sent for Finley and asked whether she had called him on Saturday. She replied that her daughter had tried to reach him but couldn't. Wilson continued with questions whether she had seen a lawyer and what he had said. To Finley's answer that she had been advised to leave things as they were, Wilson responded that a lawyer had told him that she could get out of it if she wanted to. His continued proffer of unsolicited advice belied his allegedly coy statement that he could help her but only if she asked him to, and that she should let him know at the end of the day. A few minutes later Wilson sent for Finley yet again; pointed out that another employee had gotten into trouble with the law over the weekend and that that could happen to others there; and told her that she had to be for one side or the other. Although the other employee's "trouble" had nothing to do with the union-company situation, Wilson's remarks in that context with his explicit connection of trou- ble and a stand for one side or the other were coercive. I do not credit Wilson's testimony that Finley sought his help to avoid responding to the subpena, especially in the face of his later importunacy, even to the limited extent which he admitted, when Finley clearly had not followed the advice which she had allegedly sought, that she see an impartial lawyer; or the request that she notify him at home so that he would know about her presence at work on Tues- day although he could have gotten the information from Finley on Monday or, as was "normal," from her supervi- sor. Although these allegations were separately stated and detailed by oral amendment, overall findings can be de- clared covering this congeries of violations, which directly involve the same employer and the same supervisor imme- diately preceding the opening of the trial herein. It should be noted that, with respect to the discussion 9 If Wilson was attempting to help Finley out of a "mess," he was now serving above and beyond the call of duty-and, he would have us believe, out of unselfish helpfulness. whether Finley was going to respond to the subpena, wheth- er she had to, her seeing a lawyer and calling Wilson and telling him what the lawyer had said, she had told Wilson of the subpena, as noted above, so that he could arrange for a substitute, Wilson suggested that Finley see a lawyer. He thus made it necessary as his own followup, to ask her to let him know whether she would appear for work 4 days later. Although Wilson does not appear to have asked directly, as alleged, whether Finley was going to appear in court, his actions in sending for her several times, asking her to call him over the weekend, and charging her with neglect in not so calling constituted unnecessary and unlawful pressure on Finley after she notified him of receipt of a subpena. Whether or not an employee be derelict in failing to notify the employer, one who does so notify should not be exposed to repeated suggestions not to honor a subpena or called upon to notify the employer again of her intention. The pressure on Finley was emphasized by the request to call Wilson over the weekend and his followup. It does not appear that inquiry Monday morning, if itself in order, would not have sufficed. I find and conclude that Wilson repeatedly violated the Act by these incidents vis-a-vis Fin- ley on November 5 and 8. Returning to Hugueley, she testified further that late in June, Wright, who was Wilson's assistant at the time, in- quired whether she had any influence with Crawford, her niece; that she replied, "Not very much"; and that Wright then requested that she ask her niece not to take union handbills, explaining that the Union would be discouraged and would go away if no one accepted them. Wright denied all that Hugueley testified to in this connection except that another employee had asked her whether Crawford is related to Hugueley. This was an un- likely, if possible, explanation since the other employee re- ferred to works with and just behind Crawford. Beyond this, Wright was clearly unreliable and slanting her account as she testified first that she did not remember whether there was discussion of the Union at supervisors' meetings except that the Union's telegrams were read although there was reference to union matters at the other plant in Greenfield; then that Wilson said at a supervisors' meeting that they were not to ask questions about the Union. She placed this latter at a meeting after telling us that it wasn't "in a meeting exactly." Later she testified that the Union was mentioned at other meetings of supervisors, and finally that a company attorney had spoken to the supervisors some time after De- cember 10, that she had received a card listing do's and don'ts, and that Wilson told the supervisors various things which were not to be said to employees. The uncertainty as to dates indicated in Hugueley's and Wright's testimony is reflected in the allegation that this violation occurred in "March, April or May." But whether it was in one of those months or late in June, the variance is not serious (that there was reference to Crawford both agree) and does not impede the finding and conclusion of coercion by Wright. Again, there is no basis for finding unlawful interrogation also. The question whether Craw- ford is Hugueley's niece is innocuous; it has "background" for and merged in the later remark. Employee Rodgers, named in the October 11 telegram as a member of the organizing committee and mentioned 766 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD above in connection with Wilson's threat as voiced to Hu- gueley, testified that early in March her supervisor, Brun- dige, declared to her and another employee in response to their question how long work would be slack that it was because the Union was trying to come in . We need not labor the distinction between this unsupported connection of un- ion activity and slack work, on one hand, and Cannon's fully explained statement to the employees at the other plant. Later that month at a ham supper in Rodgers' home to which Brundige was invited, the latter asked Rodgers how she felt about the Union . Rodgers replied that she was for it. Their relationship was friendly ; no other supervisors had been invited. But it does not appear that the Union was being discussed, and a friendly relationship does not war- rant an intrusive question concerning an employee's union sympathies. The relationship apparently was not so close but that Brundige found it necessary to inquire of Rodgers, who had not confided in her supervisor . What is otherwise a friendly relationship is not to be turned into a license for interference with concerted activities ; and what might oth- erwise be a friendly if long delayed visit is not to be made the occasion for departure into conduct which tends to interfere. Brundige flatly denied Rodgers' testimony concerning the violative statements attributed to her on each occasion. A basis for decision on the issue of credibility thus raised can be found in Brundige's testimony offered to support Wilson's, noted above, concerning her report to him that Hugueley did not appear to be feeling well. Brundige told us that she had asked Hugueley whether she was feeling well, and that the latter replied that she was concerned about her father. Brundige "supposed" that she had told Wilson that Hugueley was concerned about her father; but Wilson was ostensibly concerned with Hugueley's health when he called her in . Our own concern at this point is with Brundige who, having been told what was troubling Hugue- ley, testified that she led Wilson to summon Hugueley and ask her about Hugueley's own health. I do not rely on Brundige's testimony. I find and conclude that she unlaw- fully intimidated and interrogated Rodgers. Of three allegations involving Supervisor Cashion, the events surrounding one shed distinct light on her credibility. Employee Winstead, named in the October 11 telegram as a member of the organizing committee , testified that on June 24, during the course of a visit at her home by Cashion, the latter asked whether she had attended a union meeting and whether she had been talked to about the Union; and that she had replied that she had attended 2 nights before and that she took the Union on her own . Cashion and Winstead had exchanged invitations and home visits before, but this was Cashion's first visit to the new home which Winstead had occupied since the previous October. Winstead's husband, clearly biased, testified that he heard Cashion ask whether she had been to a union meeting and that his wife replied that she had, she liked what she saw, and would or might go to another meeting; and that Cashion then advised that she not get involved since it was just a bunch of junk. According to Cashion, she had several times been asked to visit the new home. After denying that there was any reference to the Union, she declared that Winstead volunteered that she had been to a meeting. She also ex- plained how production averages are computed when em- ployees are assigned to differentjobs . She denied the inter- rogation alleged and other statements attributed to her. As brought out on cross-examination, Cashion's statements that the Company would rather deal with its employees directly than through a third party and that they could talk problems over with their supervisor were made in response to Mr. Winstead's remark that the Company needs a union. Cashion was not barred from such a reply under the circum- stances. But concerned with credibility, we have already noted a contradiction or modification in her testimony as to whether there was any reference to the Union. A reasonable inference concerning the purpose of the visit and the nature of the discussion can also be drawn from the fact that this was a weeknight visit during the organizational campaign and only after several earlier invitations. I do not credit Cashion's denial that she questioned Winstead as alleged, or her claim that Winstead volunteered that she had attended a union meeting. While Cashion at Winstead's request ex- plained production averages, that was not the reason for the visit or Cashion's topic. I find and conclude that, concerned over the Union's organizational campaign, Cashion did un- lawfully interrogate Winstead. As important as this interro- gation 2 days after Winstead attended a union meeting, is the issue of credibility as it impinges on other allegations. I am impelled to find that Cashion , in this instance certain- ly, was not a reliable witness. Employee Lofton testified that early one morning on an unspecified date (the issue is one of credibility as to the conversation ; none is raised concerning a date) while the Union was distributing handbills, Cashion asked whether she had seen "those sneaks outside"; she replied that she had and, when Cashion continued that she thought it under- handed for them to come so early in the morning, Lofton declared that she had taken a handbill; Cashion now looked angry and asked, "Why?" When Lofton allegedly remarked that she had taken handbills from both sides, Cashion now declared her disgust and added that such action encouraged the organizers : they would be discouraged and would go away if the handbills were not taken . Cashion testified that she had watched the handbilling many times, but denied that she had had any conversation with Lofton concerning it. While I would credit Lofton's testimony, the first ques- tion, whether she had seen the handbillers, was quite rhetor- ical and would not tend to interfere: having entered the plant, Lofton must have seen them . That question would not unlawfully tend to interfere , restrain, or coerce. If the question why Lofton had accepted a handbill could in any circumstances be held to interfere by placing a burden of explanation on the employee , we must bear in mind that Lofton had volunteered the information . Here again we must not impose on an employer an unnatural burden of silence and refusal to respond to what may be regarded as a teasing remark . Nor was Cashion's expression of disgust and opinion an unlawful warning. I find and conclude that she did not here violate the Act. Haynes testified that in April, Cashion asked her why GREENFIELD MANUFACTURING COMPANY 767 she had accepted union literature; didn't she know that it would only encourage the Union? Haynes allegedly replied that she thought she should accept literature from both sides. There is no testimony to support the allegation of unlawful warning in addition to the alleged question. I ac- cept Cashion's denial of any conversation with Haynes con- cerning handbills or the Union, and I find and conclude that this allegation has not been sustained. Whatever unreli- ability attaches to Cashion's testimony, it certainly does not outweigh that noted in Haynes'. THE REMEDY Mindful of the many allegations of interference, and now of those sustained, the Order to be recommended is directed to the Respondent Companies only. Argument pro and con on the General Counsel's request that the Order be made applicable to all 52 plants of Kellwood Company or in the alternative that notices be posted at all 52 and the reasons for my decision in that connection were detailed on the record at the opening of the trial.10 A further request, by the Union, on which the General Counsel took no position, as at several points on matters grave and trivial, is for remedy at the Dresden plant beyond a cease-and-desist order and the usual posting of a notice: the Union urges that, because of local ordinance restrictions which are now before the courts, "the Respondent be or- dered to permit nonemployee Union organizers to have access [to] the employees in the parking lots, store lounge or lunchroom or other places where Respondent's employees spend their time when not at work." After the close of the trial, counsel submitted a letter from the Mayor of Dresden advising "that no arrest will be made under authority of [the local] ordinance until the constitutional question has been heard ...... The letter is received as Joint Exhibit 1. The purpose of the remedy extended in limited access cases has not been declared to be to provide for a union every facility inside the plant, which an employer has and pays for, and to make both sides "equal." It is to provide the union with such opportunity as it would otherwise have to communicate with employees but for the unavailability of access outside the plant. Where such access is unavaila- ble, the cases provide for as nearly equivalent opportunity as the union would otherwise have. But where as here it has not been shown that physical conditions or the employer itself has prevented access, there is no warrant for directing that employer to remedy a condition for which it is neither responsible nor liable. Our concern is not with the legality of an antibilling ordinance relating to public streets; nor is its effect within our purview. We are concerned with accessibility to em- ployees and their access to information. Even if handbills were not to be distributed on public streets (an issue which has not yet been definitively determined) the possibility would remain of distribution on plant parking lots. But before that situation is shown to exist, and in the absence of evidence of request thereafter by the Union and refusal by the Company (we recall the single incident involving Lee, 10 The very request made in this case for a companywide remedy may serve, if that be necessary, to forestall more widespread violation the uniqueness of Hamilton's action and apparent attitude throughout, and his discharge on the very next workday), it would be premature to direct that the access requested be permitted. To assume the permanence of the conditions described and the Respondent Dresden's refusal under such conditions is unnecessary and unwarranted. While that Re- spondent has not been absolved from responsibility for Hamilton's acts, this lone incident does not warrant the broad remedy requested. There is no evidence of any other incident of unlawful denial of access and distribution to any other of the several hundred employees. Were there basis for the colligated remedy which the General Counsel has requested, the Company's instructions to supervisors, its reaction to Hamilton's violations, and his discharge would have to be weighed prior to decision to impose such a reme- dy. The latter must await an appropriate tenter for viola- tions. There is no suggestion that the Respondent Dresden is directly or indirectly responsible for the ordinance under review or for such general limitation of access as would call for the remedy requested. As for nonemployee organizers (concerning whom no issue exists), we must at least await evidence of necessity and a refusal before directing that permission be granted. It has not been shown that alterna- tive means of access are not and will not be available or have found to be wanting; or that the Employer has "cre- ated" a glaring imbalance." This will await presentation to the Board of an issue between Dresden and outside organiz- ers. That issue is not to be raised in argument and de- termined merely on briefs. Parking lot restrictions and posted rules, referred to by the Union, are not claimed to be violative, and were not litigated. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER 12 A. Respondent, Greenfield Manufacturing Company, a Division of Kellwood Company and located at Green- field, Tennessee, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Unlawfully interrogating employees, threatening re- prisals, promising benefits, and warning of layoffs and plant closure, all in connection with employee union activities or sympathies. (b) Soliciting to and creating an impression of surveil- lance. (c) Connecting card signing with possible discriminato- ry action. (d) Assaulting an employee distributor of handbills. (e) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- 11 N.L.R B v. The Babcock & Wilcox Company, 351 U S. 105, The May Department Stores Company, d/b/a The May Company, 136 NLRB 797, 801 12 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall , as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 768 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its plant in Greenfield, Tennessee, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix A."13 Copies of said notice, on forms to be provided by the Regional Director for Region 26, shall be posted by this Respondent, after being duly signed by its representative, immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to its employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Company to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 26, in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.14 B. Respondent, Kellwood Company (Dresden Plant), Dresden, Tennessee, its officers, agents, successors, and as- signs, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Unlawfully interrogating employees, threatening re- prisals and discharge, and warning of lack of work, all in connection with employee union activities or sympathies. (b) Creating an impression of surveillance. (c) Advising and soliciting abandonment of the Union and refusal to testify. (d) Coercing employees in connection with distribution of handbills. (e) Incorrectly minimizing the possible remedy in a Board proceeding and declaring the futility of designating the Union. (f) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its plant in Dresden, Tennessee, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix B."15 Copies of said notice, on forms to be provided by the Regional Director for Region 26, shall be posted by this Respondent, after being duly signed by its representative, immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to its employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Company to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 26, in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.16 13 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 14 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify the Regional Director for Region 26, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith." 15 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States,Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " 16 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify the Regional Director for Region 26, in writing, within 20 days from the date Hof this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."