Alamo Express, Inc.

178 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Alamo Express, Inc., Alamo Cartage Company and General Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Local Nos. 657 and 988, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware- housemen & Helpers of America. Case 23-CA-4007 November 9, 1972 DECISION, ORDER, AND ORDER REMANDING PROCEEDING TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE BY MEMBERS FANNING, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO On June 22, 1972, Administrative Law Judge' Lowell Goerlich issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent and General Counsel filed exceptions and supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, with the following modifications. The Respondent excepts to the Administrative Law Judge's recommended backpay order on behalf of employee Floyd Coleman. That order was based on the Administrative Law Judge's construction of the Respondent's First Amended Answer which admit- ted that Respondent discharged Coleman and further stated that "Coleman has been offered full reinstatement, and Respondent has and does offer to make Coleman whole for any loss under Board procedures." The Administrative Law Judge read this as an admission of a discriminatory discharge. We disagree. Nowhere in Respondent's First Amended Answer does there appear any admission of the allegation; i.e., that Coleman was discharged because of his union activities or sympathies. On the contrary, Respondent's First Amended Answer further' goes on to deny specifically that any of its employees were discriminated against because of their union activities. Moreover, the record clearly indicates that, while Respondent admitted both the discharge and reinstatement of Coleman, the reason 1 The title of "Trial Examiner" was changed to "Administrative Law Judge" effective August 19, 1972. 2 TRIAL EXAMINER: Is there any issue that the employee started back at his old job or substantially equivalent? MR LEVY (General Counsel): No sir. TRIAL ExA[ruriER: And as far as he is concerned the only matter for the for the discharge was understood to be in issue and was in fact litigated.2 Accordingly, we shall remand this portion of the case to the Administrative Law Judge in order that he may make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning whether or not Coleman's discharge was violative of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. The General Counsel has excepted to the Adminis- trative Law Judge's failure to find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by refusing to reinstate employees Ben Walker, Elmo Thornton, and Veanes Jenkins on January 6, 5, and 5, 1971, respectively. Inasmuch as Respondent has not excepted to the Administrative Law Judge' s recom- mending backpay for these employees, we shall grant the General Counsel's exception and find, as we must to order backpay for employees whom Respondent discriminatorily refused to reinstate for union activi- ties, that Respondent in that regard violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge as modified below and hereby orders that the Respon- dent, Alamo Express, Inc. and Alamo Cartage Company, San Antonio, Laredo, and Houston, Texas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Administrative Law Judge's recommended Order, as so modified: 1. Delete "Floyd Coleman" from paragraph 2(a) of the recommended Order. 2. Substitute the attached notice for the Adminis- trative Law Judge's notice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this proceeding be, and it hereby is, remanded to Administrative Law Judge Lowell Goerlich for the purpose of making findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether or not Floyd Coleman was discharged by Respon- dent in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the said Administra- tive Law Judge shall prepare and serve on the parties a supplemental decision containing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations in accord- ance with this Order, and that, following service of such supplemental decision on the parties, the provisions of Section 102.46 of the Board's Rules and Trial Examiner is whether by reason of his discharge he is entitled to backpay for that period. MR. LEVY: That's correct. MR SCHOOLFIELD (Respondent): That's right, in other words, whether the discharge was discriminatory. TRIAL EXAMINER: Yes. 200 NLRB No. 32 ALAMO EXPRESS, INC. 179 Regulations, Series 8, as amended, shall be applica- ble here. APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a trial in which all parties were permitted to introduce testimony and other evidence it has been decided that we violated the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended, and among other things discharged employee Veanes Jenkins in order to discourage membership in the Union. We were ordered to assure our employees that: WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with General Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local Unions Nos. 657 and 988, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf- feurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, in the appropriate unit by unlawfully granting wage increases to our employees without bargaining with the Union in regard to such wage increases prior to the institution of the same; by unlawfully refusing to furnish to the Union names of employees receiving wage increases and the amount of the increases; by unlawfully refusing to furnish the Union with the Anthony B. Cassidy report; and by refusing to bargain with the Union with respect to the institution of 600 pounds of freight per man per hour production quota at our Laredo terminal or any other terminal as long as such Union remains our employees' lawful collective-bargaining agent. WE WILL NOT tell our employees that employ- ees will not get a wage increase or vacations because of the Union. WE WILL NOT tell our employees that we will never sign a union contract. WE WILL NOT discriminate against employees who participated in the strike of May 1968 by giving them less hours than nonstriking employ- ees and we will restore lost wages to the following strikers: Lester Boone, M. Dunn, Willie Fletcher, W. T. Henderson, S. McGregor, E. Milford, R. J. Richards, R. L. Tolder, A. Adams, J. Crowder, M. Crowder, R. Glenn, and L. Lofton, whom we were found to have discriminated against. WE WILL rescind the 600-pound per man per hour production quota established at our Laredo terminal. WE WILL give Veanes Jenkins back his job or, if his job no longer exists, a substantially equivalent job. WE WILL restore his seniority and pay him the backpay he lost because we discharged him. WE WILL reimburse Ben Walker, Elmo Thorn- ton, and Veanes Jenkins for loss of earnings due to our refusal to reinstate them upon their request after the strike. WE WILL NOT discharge employees for engaging in union activities or for the purpose of discourag- ing membership in a labor organization. The Act gives all employees these rights: To organize themselves To form, join, or help unions To bargain as a group through a representative they choose To act together for collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection To refuse to do any or all of these things. All of you are free to become or remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining, members of any labor organization. The appropriate unit is: All over-the-road drivers, city pickup and deliverymen, dockmen, helpers, checkers and mechanics, at all of the employer's Texas terminals, excluding office clerical employees, guards, watchmen, salesmen, solicitors and supervisors, as defined in the Act. ALAMO EXPRESS, INC. AND ALAMO CARTAGE COMPANY (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) We will notify immediately Veanes Jenkins, if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of the right to full reinstatement, upon application after discharge from the Armed Forces, in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act. This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compli- ance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Dallas-Brazos Building, 1125 Brazos Street, Houston, Texas 77002, Telephone 713-226-4296. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE LowEL.L GoERLICH, Trial Examiner: A charge was filed by General Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Local 180 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Unions Nos. 657 and 988, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, herein collectively called the Union, on June 21, 1971, and was served on Alamo Express, Inc. and Alamo Cartage Company, the Respondent herein, by registered mail on the same date. A complaint' and notice of hearing was issued on November 10, 1971, in which it was alleged that the Respondent had violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, herein referred to as the Act. The Respondent filed a timely answer admitting certain allegations of the complaint and denying others. The case came on for hearing on February 28 and 29 at San Antonio, Texas, March 1 at Laredo, Texas, and March 3 and April 7, 1972, at Houston, Texas. Each party was afforded a full opportunity to be heard, to call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally on the record, to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions, and to file briefs. All briefs have been carefully considered by the Trial Examiner. Upon the whole record, and upon his observation of the witnesses, the Trial Examiner makes the following: FINDINGS OF FACT Conclusions and Reasons Therefor 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Alamo Express, Inc., is, and has been at all times material herein, a Texas corporation with its principal office and place of business in San Antonio, Texas. It operates terminals in San Antonio, Laredo, Houston, Galveston, and other cities in the State of Texas, and is engaged in interstate transportation of freight by motor vehicle within the State of Texas under licenses issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Railroad Commission of Texas. Alamo Cartage Company is and has been at all times material herein a Texas corporation, having its principal office and place of business in San Antonio, Texas. It operates terminals located in San Antonio, Laredo, Houston, Galveston, and other cities in the State of Texas, where it is engaged in the pickup and delivery of local freight under authority granted to Alamo Express, Inc. Alamo Express, Inc., employs all of the over-the-road truckdrivers and dock employees used in Respondent's common carrier motor transportation operation. Alamo Cartage Company employs all local pickup and delivery drivers utilized in Respondent's common carrier transpor- tation operation. Alamo Express, Inc. and Alamo Cartage Company are, and have been at all times material herein, affiliated businesses with common offices, ownership, directors, and officers, and constitute a single integrated enterprise. Said directors and officers formulate and administer a common labor relations policy for the aforesaid enterprise, affecting the employees of said companies. During the past 12 months, a representative period, Respondent's gross revenue was in excess of $500,000 and 1 On April 7, 1972, an amendment was allowed, to wit: "On or about January 27, 1972, Respondent discharged its employee, Veanes Jenkins" of this amount in excess of $100,000 was received for interchanging and interlining freight that was destined or shipped from points outside the State of Texas.2 Respondent is, and has been at all times herein, an employer as defined in Section 2(2) of the Act engaged in commerce and in operations affecting commerce as defined in Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, respectively. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Union is now, and has been at all times material herein, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Pertinent Facts The parties stipulated as follows: All over-the-road drivers, city pickup and deliverymen, dockmen, helpers, checkers and mechanics at all of the Employer's Texas terminals, excluding office clerical employees, guards, watchmen, salesmen, solicitors and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. On or about July 29, 1965, a majority of the employees of Respondent, in the unit described in the paragraph above, by secret ballot election conducted under the supervision of the Regional Director for Region 23 of the National Labor Relations Board, designated and selected the Union as a representative for the purposes of collective bargaining with Respondent, and on or about May 20, 1966, said Regional Director certified the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the said unit. At all times since July 29, 1965, and continuing to date, the Union has been the representative for the purposes of collective bargaining for the employees in the unit described above, and by virtue of Section 9(a) of the Act has been, and is now, the exclusive representative of all the employees in said unit for the purposes of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employ- ment. On May 21, 1968, the employees in the unit described above ceased work concertedly and went out on strike. On or about December 17, 1970, the Union, on behalf of the employees described in the unit above, offered the return of all said employees to the employment of the Respondent. Since on or about December 17, 1970, and continuing to date, the Union has requested and is requesting Respon- dent to bargain collectively with respect to the rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment as the exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees of the Respondent in the unit described above. On May 28, 1971, the Union requested that Respondent furnish the names of employees in the bargaining unit 2 The foregoing findings are drawn from stipulations entered into by the parties ALAMO EXPRESS, INC. described above who had received raises, the amount of said raises, and when said raises were granted. Respondent informed the Union that 45 men had received raises in 1971, but did not state when the raises were granted, the names of the persons receiving the raises, or the amounts of said increases. Respondent, however, furnished the Union, pursuant to its request, weekly payroll records commencing January 1971, which, inter alia, would demonstrate changes in the wage structure for employees in the unit. Respondent did not, however, discuss or bargain with the Union concerning the drafting of these raises prior to the implementation of the same. Since August 1971, Respondent has notified the Union of its intent to grant pay increases for bargaining unit employees in advance of said raises being implemented. On February 12, 1971, and again on March 9,1971, the Union requested a production study known as the Anthony B. Cassidy report. This report was not furnished to the Union by Respondent. On January 20, 1972, by letter, Respondent offered to furnish and discuss said report with the Union. Benjamin J. Walker began working for Respondent at its San Antonio, Texas, operation in March 1967. Walker worked as a truck helper and dockman. On January 6, 1971, Walker, who had taken part in the strike of May 1968, reported to Terminal Manager Pat Meyers that he was ready to return to work. Meyers stated that Walker was supposed to have reported on January 4, 1971, and refused to allow Walker to return to work. Meyers further refused to consider Walker for employment as openings and vacancies occurred thereafter. Elmo Thorton began working for Respondent at its Houston, Texas, terminal sometime in the 1950's. As of the time of the strike in May 1968 called by the Union and in which Thorton participated, he was a bobtail driver on the west-end run and had been so for about 8 years prior to that date. During the first week of January 1971 Thorton reported back to Respondent's Houston, Texas, terminal and spoke with Mr. A] Crawford, general manager of Respondent. Thorton told Crawford that he was reporting back to work and was told by Crawford that he had come in too late and that Crawford would not accept Thorton for employment. Thorton left his name and telephone number pursuant to Crawford's request, and also pursuant to Crawford's instructions returned a few days thereafter to speak with the Respondent's vice president, H. D. Walker. When Thorton spoke with Walker, he was told by Walker that Respondent would not reinstate Thorton because he had reported too late to be accepted for employment. Veanes Jenkins was hired by Respondent in 1967 as a bobtail driver at its Houston, Texas, terminal. Jenkins honored and supported the picket line established in May 1968. 3 The foregoing facts are drawn from a stipulation entered into by the parties. 4 The Respondent makes no contention that the Cassidy report should not have been furnished to the Union upon its request. Counsel for the 181 In December 1970 Jenkins and fellow employees reported to Respondent's Houston, Texas, terminal and left their names and addresses. Thereafter, Jenkins received a letter from Alamo which had Jenkins' correct address but did not have Jenkins' apartment number on it. Jenkins physically received said letter on January 5, 1971, and immediately reported to Respondent and spoke with Mr. A] Crawford, general manager of Respondent, in order to secure his job back. Crawford told Jenkins that he was supposed to have been there on January 4, 1971, and would not accept Jenkins as an employee. Jenkins explained to Crawford as to the time he actually received the letter and the fact that the apartment number was not on the address, to which Crawford replied that Jenkins was not to be considered for employment as a returning striker due to the fact that he reported 1 day late. Respondent has offered reinstatement to all the employ- ees; to wit: Benjamin J. Walker, Elmo Thorton, and Veanes Jenkins and here and now stands ready to make said employees whole for any amount of money which may be owing to them as a result of the Respondent's refusal to reinstate them as hereinabove enumerated. Each of said employees were employees of Respondent prior to the May 1968 strike called by the Union and were unfair labor practice strikers. Each of these employees was the subject of the Union's December 17, 1970, letter offering the return of the striking employees to Respondent's employ.3 The Cassidy report, which deals with the methods of operation, was furnished to the Union by the Respondent in January 1972.4 On November 24, 1969, a 600-pound per man-hour production quota was set for employees at the Respon- dent's Laredo, Texas, terminals and has been in effect since such date. The 600-pound per man-hour production quota was not discussed during negotiations with the Union-6 Floyd Coleman, an employee of the San Antonio terminal, was a member of the Union and had picketed during the strike; he returned to work after the strike on December 27, 1970. He was discharged on May 27, 1971. He commenced work in January 1964. Coleman's dis- charge resulted from an accident in which he was involved on May 27, 1971. In the accident report signed by Coleman there appeared: "pulled into Graybar Electric to check on pickup when trailer hit shed over dock." Coleman explained, "I stopped the trailer, I pulled my brakes out, I pulled . . . the brakes on the trailer . . . and the trailer lunged forward and hit the building." Damage to the trailer amounted to $528. There was no damage to the Graybar Electric building. Coleman did not report the accident when it occurred but continued with the pickup. When he returned to the terminal about one-half hour later he reported the accident to L. W. Stephens, vice president and general manager of the Respondent. Stephens told Coleman to see Clyde Crawford, operations manager, who instructed Dock Respondent stated, "I agree there is no issue on the Anthony Cassidy plan itself." 5 Testimony of Donaciano Aldrete, Jr, Laredo terminal manager. 6 The parties so stipulated. 182 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Foreman Badgett to make out an accident report. Crawford also instructed Badgett to keep Coleman on the dock for 3 days. In the meantime Crawford checked the Graybar Electric building and found no damage. After the report was finished, according to Coleman, Crawford said, "that he couldn't use [him] any more because [he] didn't call in, call the accident in." According to Crawford, after Stephens had directed him "to let Mr. Coleman go because of the accident, the damage to the trailer," he toad Coleman that he was firing him "because he tore up a trailer." The Respondent's relevant published rules in respect to the reporting of accidents are as follows: Damage to any customer's property or the property of the Company shall be reported immediately to the Dispatcher or Terminal Manager. Any motor accident, no matter how small shall be reported by the employee in charge of the motor vehicle involved to his superior immediately. This rule applies to accidents of any kind with another vehicle or involving any damage to property of others. Coleman didn't dispute the rule except he maintained that if the accident occurred on private property the employee need not report the accident unless there was some injury to property. Pedro de Alva, an employee at the Laredo terminal, was discharged on September 2, 1971. Like Coleman he had been a striker. Prior to his discharge de Alva had been suspended on four occasions. De Alva persisted in reporting late and on Thursday, May 20, 1971, Dock Foreman Francisco Alvarado told him to take the rest of the week off; he was told to report on the following Monday. De Alva did not report on Monday. In the meantime Alvarado was informed that de Alva was working at Brown Express. Alvarado reached de Alva by phone at Brown Express on Tuesday. Alvarado asked de Alva why he had not reported to work on Monday. He responded that "he would work for Brown Express for the rest of the week." 7 Alvarado told de Alva that before he reported he "needed to talk to us" and if he were needed he would be given work. De Alva's earnings were higher at Brown Express. De Alva returned on Friday and was told by Aldrete that his job was terminated. According to the Respondent it discharged employee Veanes Jenkins on January 31, 1972, because he did not report his absence during the week commencing January 23, 1972.8 A published company rule on absences was as follows: 7 De Alva admitted the phone call. De Alva testified that he replied, "They had given me a week off . . I had to take the eight days to work." Whereupon Alvarado said, "I didn't give you the week. I gave you the rest of the week off " Alvarado then asked De Alva whether he would report that day. De Alva replied, No I am going to wait until Friday." Alvarado said, "If you are going to wait until Friday to come back to work don't come to work, just come to talk to us " 8 Dudley testified: "Due to not hearing from him, being absent for one week, this we felt was reason enough for termination." 9 The penalty for violating this rule, as well as 30 others, was: Violation of, or failure to comply with, any of the following rules and policies shall be grounds for disciplinary action or discharge of the employee, at the discretion of the Company 10 Dailey admitted a phone call from Jenkins but fixed it on Monday, January 31. According to Dailey, Jenkins' message was : "When [Colley] Frequent or habitual tardiness or absenteeism will not be permitted. Employees are required to call in to a supervisor if either is anticipated on scheduled work.9 Jenkins was ill on Monday, January 24, 1972, and visited a doctor. Jenkins "called in" and talked with the dock foreman and six-wheel dispatcher, Dewey Dailey. He told Dailey that he was sick and would be unable to attend work. He asked Dailey to inform bobtail dispatcher Walter C. Culley. Dailey said that he would speak to Culley.10 Employee Lester Boone "come by to pick up" Jenkins on Monday morning and was told that he had gone to the doctor. He was asked by his informant to give such information to Culley. When Boone arrived at work he told Dailey that Jenkins would be absent, that he was sick and he had gone to the doctor. Later he gave Culley the same message." Employee Willie Fletcher also stopped at Jenkins' residence on Monday, January 24, 1972. A lady there told him Jenkins had gone to the doctor and asked him to tell the dispatcher. About 9 o'clock Fletcher reported to Culley that he "came by [Jenkins'] house and he was gone to the doctor, that the lady told [him] he was gone to the doctor." 12 According to Culley, he informed Douglas Bruce Dudley, Houston terminal manager, that Fletcher had told him that Jenkins "might have went by the doctor's office and wanted to know if he had come to work."13 According to Culley, he and Dudley discussed Jenkins' absence several times during the week. Dudley was "wondering what happened to him, because he hadn't showed up for work. Didn't know whether he quit or what." 14 Jenkins remained under the doctor's care until January 27, 1972, when he returned to work. On January 25, 1972, Jenkins "called in" and asked to speak to Culley. Dailey, who answered the phone, said that Culley was not there. Jenkins informed Dailey that he was sick and "had to go back to the doctor." Dailey told Jenkins to "tell" Dudley and gave him a telephone number for such purpose. Jenkins called the number but was unable to reach Dudley. On Thursday, January 27, 1972, Jenkins reported to work. Culley sent him to Dudley. Dudley told him "to go back home and call him later." Jenkins phoned Dudley around 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Dudley informed him that he "couldn't use [him] any more." Jenkins, who had first been employed in 1967, except for the period of the strike, had not been absent from work prior to January 24, 1972.15 On January 2, 1971, Laredo Terminal Manager Aldrete contacted employee Baldomero Pena Garcia in order to comes in will you tell him that I will be at work this mormng." The Trial Examiner is convinced that Jenkins phoned Dailey but the message was as described by Jenkins. Dailey is discredited. 11 Boone's testunony is credited. 12 Culley testified that Fletcher asked him whether Jenkins had come to work and then said that "he thought he was going by the doctor's office" 13 Dudley testified that he had no inkling that Jenkins had been ill. Dudley is not credited. 14 Dudley testified that he inquired of Dailey and Culley as to Jenkins' "whereabouts"; that he was "concerned as to why he [hadn't] been working" and conducted an investigation. 1s The Respondent claims that Jenkins did not return to work until Monday, January 31 , 1972. The facts do not support this contention. Not only was Culley unable definitely to fix the date of Jenkins' return as Monday but the Trial Examiner credits Jenkins, whom he considers to be ALAMO EXPRESS, INC. ascertain whether he desired to return to work after the conclusion of the strike. He said to Pena that "as a friend he would recommend that [he] would stay where [he] was because the Union would not come into the Alamo Express." He further stated that "as a friend he was giving [him] this advice, that the lady wouldn't sign." The lady was also referred to as Mrs. Walker. (Mrs. J. L. Walker is president of the Respondent.) About a month and a half before employee de Alva was discharged, Aldrete, referring to "the fact that the work was very little," again "told [Pena] that as a friend he would advise [him] to go back to work for International Bonded Warehouse"; and that "there was no future there for [him], that there was nowhere to do, and that there was no future for anybody." He added "That there was no future there, that Mrs. Walker wouldn't sign for the Union." While Aldrete was discussing production with de Alva in August 1971, among other things, Aldrete said that "there was nothing here, that if we were waiting for something, that nothing would result of what we were waiting for .... because he told [him ] that the old lady had told him that there were not going to be any vacations, there would be no raise in salaries, and that a contract was not going to be signed with the Union." Attachments no. 1 through no. 6 are a breakdown of bobtail drivers, six-wheel drivers, and dock workers employed by the Respondent at its Houston and San Antonio terminals compiled by the General Counsel for the period of January 16 through July 17, 1971. The breakdown is by name, rate of pay, hours worked, average hours per week, and the hours difference. The attachments provide a comparison between the strikers as a group and the nonstrikers as a group. The Trial Examiner finds that the attachments are a fair representation of what they purport to be. B. Conclusions and Reasons Therefor First: The granting of wage increases without discussion or bargaining with the Union. According to the stipulation set out above, the Employer did grant wage increases to its employees commencing on or about December 17, 1970, without discussion or bargaining with the Union in regard to such wage increases prior to the institution of the same. Such unilateral action on the part of the Respondent was in violation of the Respondent's duty to bargain and constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. According to the stipulation, Respondent also refused to furnish to the Union when the aforesaid raises were granted the names of the persons receiving the raises and the amount of the increases and also refused to furnish to the Union a copy of the study known as the Anthony B. Cassidy report. Since the Employer's refusal, it has complied with the Union's request. Since the information sought was necessary to provide information that was needed by the Union for the proper performance of its duties as exclusive bargaining representative, the Employer violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by its refusal. N.L.R.B. v. Acme Industrial Company, 385 U.S. 432,435-436. 183 In respect to the General Counsel's contention that the production quota system at the Laredo terminal was established at 600 pounds of freight per man-hour without notice or consultation with the Union, it was stipulated that the Union was certified on May 20,1966, and that the Respondent did not negotiate with the Union in regard to the establishment of the 600-pound quota. Since the 600- pound quota became effective on November 24, 1969, at a time when the Union's bargaining rights were current, it follows, therefore, that the Employer did not fulfill its obligation to bargain with the Union about this condition of employment and thus violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. The General Counsel claims in the complaint that the Respondent, by Terminal Manager Don Aldrete, told employees that the Respondent was never going to sign a union contract; that employees were not going to get wage raises because of the Union; and that there would be no vacations because of the Union. These claims are support- ed by the credited testimony of employees Pena and de Alva. The Trial Examiner finds that by reason of the foregoing representations the Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act and thereby the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Second- The Respondent's refusal to reinstate employees Ben Walker, Elmo Thornton, and Veanes Jenkins after the cessation of the strike. The Respondent in its first amended answer admitted the allegations of paragraph 13(a) of the complaint, to wit: On or about the following dates set opposite their respective names, Respondent did refuse to reinstate the following employees: Ben Walker-January 6, 1971; Elmo Thorton-January 5, 1971; Veanes Jenk- ins-January 5, 1971. Further answering the Respondent states that ... Respondent has fully reinstated the named employees or 'offered reinstatement to same, and hereby offers to make said,employees whole from the dates set forth in paragraph 13(a) to the date of the offer of reinstatement. Since each of the above employees was reinstated to his former position, except for the computation of backpay, the matter is now moot. A backpay order is recommended pursuant to the Respondent's offer. Third: The discharge of Floyd Coleman. In its first amended answer the Respondent admits it discharged Floyd Coleman on May 27, 1971, but "would show that Floyd Coleman has been offered full reinstatement, and Respondent has and does offer to make Coleman whole for any loss under the Board procedures." Since employee Coleman has been reinstated to his former position, except for the computation of backpay, the matter is now moot. A backpay order is recommended pursuant to the Respon- dent's offer. Fourth: The discharge of Pedro de Alva. Pedro de Alva was a constant offender and on at least four occasions was suspended for his objectionable work habits. It appears from the credible record that de Alva brought about his an honest and forthright witness. Moreover, Respondent's counsel stated that Jenkins "was discharged on the 27th of January, according to our records." 184 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD own discharge when he preferred staying with Brown Express rather than returning to his job with the Respon- dent. The' action of the Respondent in terminating him under these circumstances was not unreasonable and was for cause. While the Respondent's antiunion disposition may raise a suspicion of reprisal against de Alva, the Trial Examiner deems it insufficient to support a discriminatory motive as to de Alva. Accordingly, the Trial Examiner grants the Respondent's motion to dismiss those allega- tions in the complaint which refer to de Alva's discharge. Fifth: The discharge of Veanes Jenkins on January 27, 1972. An employer may in the absence of a contract "discharge an employee for good cause, bad cause or no cause at all." Portable Electric Tools, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 309 F.2d 423 (C.A. 7). "An employer has the right to discharge an employee for any reason whether it is just or not, and whether it is reasonable or not, as long as the discharge is not in retaliation for union activities or support." N.L.R.B. v. Ogle Protection Services, Inc., 375 F.2d 497 (C.A. 6), cert. denied 389 U.S. 843. An arbitrary decision as well as one based on just cause is acceptable absent improper motive. Hagopian & Sons, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 395 F.2d 947,950-951 (C.A. 6). If, however, "the real motive for the firing is discrimination against [an employee] because of his union activities or affiliations there is a violation of the Act." N. L R. B. v. Challenge-Cook Brothers of Ohio, Inc., 374 F.2d 147, 152 (C.A. 6). The Supreme Court has said in the case of NLRB. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1,45-46: The Act does not interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the employer to select its employees or discharge them. The employer may not, under cover of that right, intimidate or coerce its employees with respect to their self-organization and representation, and, on the other hand, the Board is not entitled to make its authority a pretext for interference with the right of discharge when that right is exercised for other reasons than such intimidation and coercion. The burden, of course, of proving an unlawful discharge is on the General Counsel. Kellwood Company, Ottenheimer Bros. Mfg. Division v. N.L.RB., 411 F.2d 493, 498 (C.A. 8). The Respondent's union animus is well established in the credible record.16 Moreover, in January 1971 the Respon- dent seized on a technical pretext to bar Jenkins from reinstatement after he had engaged in an unfair labor practice strike. This time the Respondent asserts that it discharged Jenkins because he was absent a whole week without notifying the Respondent. The reason stated was false. Jenkins was neither absent for a whole week nor did he fail to notify the Respondent of his absence. There is no doubt in the Trial Examiner's mind that the Respondent knew at the time it discharged Jenkins that he had reported 16 In this regard see also the following prior unfair labor practice cases involving this Respondent and this Union: 119 NLRB 6, enfd. 45 LRRM 2052 (1959, CA. 5), 127 NLRB 1203, enfd. 395 F.2d 481 (1968, C.A. 5); 170 NLRB 315, enfd. 430 F.2d 1032 (1970, C.A. 5), cert dewed 76 LRRM 2272 (1971). 17 The court said in N.LR B. v. Bird Machine Co, 161 F 2d 589, 592 (C.A. 1), that support for a finding of unlawful motivation "is augmented [when I the explanation for the discharge offered by the Respondent [does ] not stand up under scrutiny." 1E The unreasonable and unnatural discharge of an employee by an employer justifies the inference that the assigned reason was a pretext out sick. Its fabrication of the facts in this proceeding is strong evidence of its unlawful motivation and the attempt to conceal its true reason for discharging Jenkins. "Proof ... that the reason given [for a termination] was false warrants the inference that some other reason was being concealed. . . . If the employer is independently shown to have an antiunion animus which the discharge would gratify, it may be a fair inference that this was the true reason." N.L.R.B. v. JosephAntell, 358 F.2d 880, 883 (C.A. 1). Indeed when Dudley informed Jenkins that the Respondent "couldn't use [him] any more" he did not reveal the reason for his discharge. An employer's failure to give the employee a reason for his discharge "alone would be enough to support an inference that the [termination] was discriminatory." NLRB. v. Griggs Equipment, Inc., 307 F.2d 275, 278 (C.A. 5). See also Virginia Metalcrafters, Incorporated, 158 NLRB 958, 962. Furthermore, the reason advanced by the Respondent was not only a false reason but it does not withstand scrutiny.17 Indeed, if the Respondent's reasons were credited, Jenkins' discharge was an unreasonable and unnatural act18 for the Respondent, having been admittedly put on notice that Jenkins had visited a doctor, incredulously discharged Jenkins (a good employee with a spotless record of job attendance from the day he commenced work in 1967 except for participation in an unfair labor practice strike) for his first absentee offense19 and without making a reasonable effort to verify the true reason for his absence. While Dudley claimed he was "concerned" with Jenkins' absence, he neither tried to contact Jenkins at his residence nor to query employee Fletcher who had produced information as to why Jenkins was absent. Dudley's investigation which was confined to shallow inquiries of Culley and Dailey suggests that his "concern" as well as the claim of an investigation were afterthoughts utilized in this proceeding to detract attention from the real motive of the Respondent and to enhance its defense in this action. "If one can show that every other alternative except the fact sought to be proven is not true, you indirectly prove the fact is true. By excluding every other reasonable hypothesis that fact is left standing above as proved." N.LR.B. v. Melrose Processing Co., 351 F.2d 693, 698 (C.A. 8). The Trial Examiner is convinced that the Respondent concealed the true reason for Jenkins' discharge which was inextricably related to his union affection 20 Accordingly, the Trial Examiner finds that the "real 'motive" 21 of the Respondent in discharging Jenkins on January 27, 1972, was to discourage membership in a labor organization and thereby the Respondent violated Section ^8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Sixth: The alleged discrimination against returned strikers. The General Counsel asserts that a finding of unlawful Magic Chef, Inc., 181 NLRB No. 1136. 19 It is significant that Jenkins had not been guilty of "frequent" or "habitual" absenteeism which was the kind barred by the rule. 20 "[W]hen every other plausible motive has been eliminated and the reasons advanced are not persuasive the [protected I activity may well disclose the real motive behind the employer's action." NLRB. v. Melrose Processing Co, supra, 699 21 "It is the `true purpose' or `real motive' in hiring or firing that constitutes the test." Local 357, International Brotherhood of Teamsters [Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express] v. N.L.R B, 365 U.S. 667, 675 See also N.LR B v. Brown Food Stores, 380 U.S. 278, 287. ALAMO EXPRESS, INC. discrimination in the treatment of returning strikers is supported by the disparity of hours which persisted between the strikers as a group and the nonstrikers as a group. The General Counsel urges that "[t]here is absolute- ly no explanation for Respondent's disparity of hours, save and except discriminatory intent to retaliate against strikers, simply because they had observed and honored the picket line of May 21, 1968." Discriminatory intent, of course, is bottomed on the Respondent's past demonstra- tion of union animus. However, the General Counsel has not explained, if the Respondent's motive was discrimina- tory, why, in the assignment of hours, many of the strikers appear to have been treated no differently than the nonstrikers. "Discrimination consists of treating like cases differently." Frosty Morn Meats, Inc. v. N.LRB.,296 F.2d 617, 621 (C.A. 5). For example: In the case of the Houston bobtail drivers (32 in number, see attachment no. 1) the Respondent is claimed to have allegedly discriminated against 8 strikers, 2 of whom worked more hours than the average nonstriker, yet 6 nonstrikers worked less hours than the average striker and 11 worked less hours than the average nonstriker, 1 of whom worked less hours than any striker; in the case of the Houston six-wheel drivers (20 in number, see attachment no. 2) the Respondent is claimed to have discriminated against 5 strikers, yet 1 nonstriker worked less hours than the average striker and 4 nonstrik- ers worked less hours than the average nonstriker; in the case of the Houston dock workers (31 in number, see attachment no. 3) the Respondent is claimed to have discriminated against 8 strikers, 5 of whom worked as many or more hours than the average nonstriker, yet 12 nonstrikers worked less hours than the average striker and 13 nonstrikers worked less hours than the average nonstriker; 22 in the case of the San Antonio bobtail drivers (17 in number, see attachment no. 4) the Respondent is claimed to have discriminated against 3 strikers, yet 6 nonstrikers worked less hours than the average striker and 8 nonstrikers worked less hours than the average nonstrik- er, 6 of whom worked less hours than any striker; in the case of the San Antonio six-wheel drivers (15 in number, see attachment no. 5) the Respondent is claimed to have discriminated against 2'strikers, yet 5 nonstrikers worked less hours than the average striker and 7 nonstrikers worked less hours than the average nonstriker, 5 of whom worked less hours than any striker; and in the case of the San Antonio dockworkers (19 in number, see attachment no. 6) the Respondent is claimed to have discriminated against 4 strikers, yet 6 nonstrikers worked less hours than the average striker and 8 nonstrikers worked less hours than the average nonstriker, 4 of whom worked less hours than any striker. Thus, based on these employment statistics' it is difficult to ascertain with any degree of certainty where the discrimination actually lies. Hence the 22 The average weekly hours of the strikers was 39, the average weekly hours of the nonstrikers was 39.1. Thus, as to Houston dockworkers, the General Counsel's theory lacks support. 23 There were 8 bobtail drivers and 5 six-wheel drivers who returned to work after the strike; 13 in all. Boone in his testimony referred to around 15 returned strikers Hence the Trial Examiner concludes that he was referring to both the bobtail drivers and the six-wheel drivers. 24 Additional proof of discrimination is found in the following testimony of Boone: I asked him [Dudley] when I first went back in there, I said, "How 185 Trial-Examiner considers the General Counsel's theory to be at most tenuous and lacking in sufficient probative value, without other substantiating evidence, to support a finding of unlawful discrimination by the preponderance of the evidence. However, in the case of the Houston bobtail and six-wheel drivers 23 other substantiating evi- dence does exist in the credited testimony of bobtail driver Lester Boone. Boone testified that the returned strikers were told that if they "got through breaking out before [they] got 8 hours" they should "hit the clock." On the other hand nonstrikers were permitted to "help somebody else or piddle around his own truck" to make the extra hours.24 Boone testified that this practice ceased after the filing of the unfair labor practice charge in this case. The charge was filed on June 21, 1971.25 Accordingly, the Trial Examiner finds that commencing on the date of their respective reinstatements after the cessation of the strike of May 1968 and continuing until June 21, 1971, the Respondent unlawfully discriminated against returned strikers Lester Boone, M. Dunn, Willie Fletcher, W. T. Henderson, S. McGregor, E. Milford, R. J. Richards, R. L. Tolder, A. Adams, J. Crowder, M. Crowder, R. Glenn, and L. Lofton by giving them less hours than those employees who did not go out on strike in May 1968, or who were hired between May 1968 and January 4, 1971, and thereby the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. 2. The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and it will effectuate the policies of the Act for jurisdiction to be exercised in this case. 3. By refusing to bargain in good faith with the Union, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 4. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act. 5. By unlawfully discharging Veanes Jenkins on Janu- ary 27, 1972, the Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 6. By discriminating against employees who returned from the strike of May 1968 on January 4, 1971, and thereafter by giving them less working hours than those employees who did not go out on strike in May 1968, or were hired between May 1968 and January 4, 1971, the about me, I've got years at Alamo." I said, "I might have went out on strike but I have got years more seniority than most of these fellows got" And he said, "Well, you have to take it like it come now " [Emphasis supplied.] 25 Among other things it was alleged in the charge that the Respondent had violated Sec. 8(a)(3) of the Act by discriminating against employees who had engaged in an unfair labor practice strike "[b ]y denying available work to such employees. 186 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 7. All over-the-road drivers, city pickup and delivery- men, dockmen, helpers, checkers and mechanics, at all of the Employer's Texas terminals, excluding office clerical employees, guards, watchmen, salesmen, solicitors and supervisors, as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDED REMEDY It having been found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, it is recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It having been found that the Respondent unlawfully discharged Veanes Jenkins, it is recommended in accord- ance with Board policy26 that the Respondent offer Veanes Jenkins immediate and full reinstatement to his former position or, if such position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against him by payment to him of a sum of money equal to the amount he would have earned from the date of his discriminatory discharge to the date of an offer of reinstatement, less net earnings during said period to be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner established by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and including interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum in the manner set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. It is further recommended that, in accordance with the above formulae and the Respondent's offer, loss of earnings be paid by the Respondent to Ben Walker from January 6, 1971, until he was reinstated to his former position; to Elmo Thorton from January 5, 1971, until he was reinstated to his former position; to Veanes Jenkins from January 5, 1971, until he was reinstated to his former position; and to Floyd Coleman from May 27, 1971, until he was reinstated to his former position. It is further recommended in accordance with the above formulae that loss of earnings caused by the Respondent's discrimination be paid by the Respondent to those strikers; viz: Lester Boone, M. Dunn, Willie Fletcher, W. T. Henderson, S. McGregor, E. Milford, R. J. Richards, R. L. Tolder, A. Adams, J. Crowder, M. Crowder, R. Glenn, and L. Lofton, who were discriminatorily given less working hours than nonstrikers commencing on the dates of their respective reinstatements after the May 1968 strike and continuing thereafter until June 21, 1971. It is further recommended that the Respondent be ordered to rescind the 600 pounds of freight per man per hour production quota established at its Laredo terminal. 26 See Rushton Company, 158 NLRB 1730, 1740. 27 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herem shall, as provided in Sec. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, the Trial Examiner hereby issues the following recommended: 27 ORDER The Respondent, Alamo Express, Inc. and Alamo Cartage Company, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with General Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Local Unions Nos. 657 and 988, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, in the appropriate unit by unlawfully granting wage increases to its employees without bargaining with the Union in regard to such wage increases prior to the institution of the same; by unlawfully refusing to furnish to the Union names of employees receiving wage increases and the amount of said increases ; by unlawfully refusing to furnish the Union with the Anthony B. Cassidy report; and by refusing to bargain with the Union with respect to the institution of a 600 pounds of freight per man per hour production quota at its Laredo terminal or any other terminal as long as the Union remains the Respondent's employees' lawful collective-bargaining agent. (b) Unlawfully representing to employees tat it would never sign a union contract; that employees were not going to get a wage increase because of the Union; and that there would be no vacations because of the Union. (c) Discouraging membership in the General Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Local Unions Nos. 657 and 988, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, or any other labor organization, by discriminatorily discharging any of its employees or discriminating in any other manner in respect to their hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment. (d) Unlawfully discriminating against employees who returned from the strike of May 1968 by giving them less hours than those employees who did not go out on strike in May 1968 or who were hired between May 1968 and January 4, 1971. These employees are Lester Boone, M. Dunn, Willie Fletcher, W. T. Henderson, S. McGregor, E. Milford, R. J. Richards, R. L. Tolder, A. Adams, J. Crowder, M. Crowder, R. Glenn, and L. Lofton. (e) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist the aforesaid Union, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act or to refrain from any or all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action which will effectuate the policies of the Act: 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. ALAMO EXPRESS, INC. 187 (a) Offer Veanes Jenkins immediate and full reinstate- ment to his former job or, if his former job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole for any loss of pay that he may have suffered by reason of the Respondent's discrimination against him in accordance with the recommendations set forth in the section of this Decision entitled the "Recommended Remedy," and also fully comply with the recommenda- tions for payment of lost earnings to Ben Walker, Elmo Thornton, Veanes Jenkins, Floyd Coleman, and those named employees who returned from the strike of May 1968 as set forth in the section of this Decision entitled the "Recommended Remedy." (b) Rescind the 600-pound per man per hour production quota established at its Laredo terminal. (c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this recommended Order. (d) Notify immediately Veanes Jenkins, if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of the right to full reinstatement, upon application after discharge from the Armed Forces, in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act. (e) Post at its Houston, San Antonio, and Laredo, Texas, terminals copies of the attached notice marked "Appen- dix."28 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 23, after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 23, in writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.29 IT Is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act other than those found in this decision. 28 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 29 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify the Regional Director for Region 17, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith." 188 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ATTACHBENT NO. 1 Houston Bobtail Strikers Rate of Pay Gross Wastes Hours 1/16 - 7/17 Avg./ Week Hour Diff. Boone ,L. 2.80/hr. $3301.95 1179.8 45.1 .9 Dunn, M. 2.80 2600.81 928.2 35.2 11.8 Fletcher, W. C. 2.80 2974.07 1062.5 40.2 -- Henderson , W. T. 2.80 2380.98 851.0 32.2 14.8 McGregor, S. 2.80 3914.92 1398.5 53.2 Milford, E. 2.80 3572.48 1275.3 49 Richards, R. J. 2.80 2489.13 888.3 34 13 Tolder, R. L. 2.80 2944.46 1051.2 40.1 6.9 8/329.0 Avg. 41.0 Non-Strikers Starting Or Quit Date [Gross Wa es [ Hours 1/16 - 7/171 [Avg./ Week Carter, D. C. 2.85 2023.74 710.2 50.1 4-12-71 (14 wk) Bernol , F. R. 2.80 1717.66 613.1 47 4-20-71 (13 wk) Chriesman , Be 2.80 4441 .32 1586.5 61 Concha, J. Jr. 2.80 1494.70 533.2 41 6-17-71 (13 wk) Daehler, W. H. 2.80 2745.18 980.1 44.1 2-17-71 (22 wk) Davis, R. K. 2.80 3429.26 1224.2 47 Dibello, S. 2.80 3947.01 1409.2 54 Elias , M. X. 2.80 4322.40 1543.2 59 Espinosa , R. S. 2.80 4340.65 1550.7 59.2 Flores, R. R. 2.80 989.61 335.2 41 5-26-71 (8 wk) Fergerson, R. E. 2.80 1670.07 596.1 39.1 (15 wk) Gutierrez , D. 2.80 1019 .13 363.3 40 5-17-71 (9 wk) 7-24-71 Lowe, L. D. 2.80 3085.48 1101.3 42 Linscombe, J. D. 2.80 1973.66 704.3 50 4-17-71 (14 wk) ALAMO EXPRESS, INC. 189 Starting Or Quit Date (Gross Wages] [ Hours 1/16 - 7/171 [Avg./ Week] Morales, M. 2.80 3555 . 63 1269.2 48.2 Muro , S. L. 2.85 5175 . 65 1816.1 69.2 Perez , M. M. 2.80 3320 . 90 1186.1 45.2 Rodriguez , F. 2.80 3696 . 97 1320.9 50.2 Stahl , W. 2.80 1284 . 10 458.2 38 4-21 71 (12 wk) Teague, D. 2.80 3193 . 41 1140.1 51.2 2-24-71 (22 wk) Villeareal , E. 2.80 3687 . 95 1317.4 50.2 Wilkins , M. Jr. 2 .80 5 wks off (23 wk) 2305 . 12 823.7 35.2 Williams , L. 2.80 544 . 04 194.8 32.0 6-12-71 (6 wk) Witt , J. N. 2.80 1506.33 537.3 38.1 4-17-71 (14 wk) 24 1132.0 Avg. 47.0 ATTACIISENT NO. 2 Houston 6-Wheel Strikers Rate of Pay Gross Hours Wanes 26 wks Avg./ Week Hour Diff. Adams, A. 2.85/hr $3530 . 07 1238 . 2 47.2 7.9 Crowder, J. 2.85 3941.89 1383 .3 53.1 2.0 Crowder , M. 2.85 3937 . 38 1381.2 53.0 2.1 Glenn, R. 2.85 (20 wks) 2856 .79 11002.1 50.0 5.1 Lofton, L. 2.85 3675.05 1289 . 1 49.2 5.9 5/252.5 Non-Strikers Avg. 50.0 Andrus, N. 2.85 (8 wks) 1222 . 23 428.2 53.0 Brooks , R. L. 2.85 4170 . 25 1463.7 56.0 Burton, H. L. 2.85 4540 . 02 1592.3 61.1 Davis , J. 2.85 (25 wks) 3570 . 67 1252.3 50.0 Gann, B. J. 2.85 1896 . 45 665.1 55.1 (12 wks) ii 190 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD [Rate of Pa Goetz , G. C. 2.85 Gray, J. E. 2.85 (17 wks) Henderson , T. R. 2.85 (4 wks) Johnson, J. C. 2.85 Pawkett, G. S. 2.85 (16 wks) Roberts, W. B. 2.85 Ross, S. 2.80/2.85 4 3 71 Snyder, A. W. 2.85 Thompson, J. 2.85 Williams, M. A. 2.85 (Gross [Hours Waxes] (26 wks 4061.08 1424.3 2332.30 818.1 644.00 226.3 4127.11 1448.3 2559.38 898.1 4235.81 1486.7 4352.55 1538,0* 4510.71 1582.2 4191.48 1470,2 4241.14 1488.3 * 935.8 hrs at 2.85/hr. 602.2 hrs at 2.80/hr. 1538 . 0 total hours Rate of pay Bartlett , R. 2.75/hr Davis, J. 2.75 (25 wks) Hampton , H. 2.75 Hard , G. 2.75 Jones, L. H. 2.75 Lewis , L. 2.75 Nugent , C. 2.75 Picken, D. 2.75 ATTACHMENT NO. 3 Houston Dock Strikers Gross Hours Wages (26 wks Avg. / Week 54.2 48.0 56.0 55.2 56.0 57.1 59.0 60,2 56.1 57.1 15 834.1 Avg. 55.1 Avg. Week $2947.34 1071.2 3333.75 1212.8 3126.33 1136.2 2531.72 920.2 3291.28 1196.2 2841.61 1033.9 2302.88 837.1 2201.09 800.1 41.0 48.1 43.2 35.1 46.0 39.2 32.1 30.2 8/ 314.9 Avg. 39.0 iii ALAMO EXPRESS, INC. 191 Non-Strikers Rate of pay. Gross Wages Hours (26 wks Avg./ Week Andrews, L. 2.75 2613.75 950.1 36.1 Carlisle, H. E. 2.85 4187.72 1469.1 56.1 Chavez, G. F. 2.75 (22 wks) 2273.63 826.2 37.1 Dailey, D. M. 2.75 (3 wks) 323.08 119.2 39.2 Dailey, R. W. 2.75 (13 wks) 1359.11 494.6 38.0 Estrada, R. 2.75 3171.50 1153.8 44.1 Fontenot , R. J. 2.75 (7 wks) 700.46 254.2 36.0 Guidry, C. 2.85 3499.90 1228.1 47.1 Lara , J. M. 2.75 2879.96 1047.7 40.1 Longoria, J. P. 2.75 (6 wks) 562.19 204.1 34.0 Luna, E. R. 2.85 3278.86 1150.1 44.1 Morales, J. C. 2.75 (14 wks) 1546.02 562.5 40.0 Ramirez , 0. V. 2.75 2627.39 955.1 36.2 Ramirez , B. J. 2.75 (20 wks) 2180.80 793.1 39.1 Ritter, S. J. 2.50/2.75 3027.96 1141.5* 43.2 4-4-71 Rodriguez, A. 2.75 (10 wks) 995.55 362.1 36.2 Rodriguez, E. G. 2.75 (17 vks) 1772.08 644.1 37.2 Rodriguez, M. 2.75 (8 wks) 753.83 274.3 34.0 Salinas, B. S. 2.75 (18 wks) 1897.16 689.2 38.1 Stover , J. A. 2.75 (7 wks) 699.05 254.5 36.0 Tyler, P. 2.85 (24 wks) 3024.34 1061.5 44.1 Valencia, J. A. 2.75 3039.21 1105.5 42.1 Valencia, R. L. 2.75 1067.41 388.4 35.0 23/913.1 Avg. 39.2 *441.3 hrs. at 2.50/hr. 700.2 hrs at 2.75/hr. 1141.5 total hours iv 192 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ATTAC} 4ENT NO. 4 SAN ANTONIO BOBTAIL STRIKERS Wage Gross Hours Avg./ Hours Rate Wastes (26 weeks) Week diff. Flores, R. M. 2.30/2 .40* 2939 . 79 1242.3 47.8 1.2 Torres, A. G. 2.30/2 .40 2923 . 31 1236.1 47.1 1.9 Williams, L. 1.95/2.05 2466 . 10 1227.3 47.2 1.8 2/142.1 NON-STRIKERS Avg. hr. 47.0 Beef-*. 1449 (5 wks) 489r8H H44.4 48TH Need 10 wks Cantu, R. G. 1.87/1.97 (20 wks) 1658.71 864.3 43.2 Dilworth, T. H. 2.30/2.40 (20 wks) 2818 . 94 1200.9 60.0 0area -My- . (3 wks) +98rH3 "6T4 38r?^ Need 10 wks Gil, M. N. 2.05/2.15 2744 . 13 1300.4 50.0 Hilliard, J. A. 1.97/2.05 2293.49 1135.5 43.2 Howard, M. 2.30/2.40 3238.10 1455.5 56.0 Jambers, W. B. 1.97/2.05 (16 wks) 2695 . 29 1469.0 56.1 Johnston, W. S. 1.87/1.97 (25 wks) 1485.68 777.2 48.1 Kosub, 0. M. 1.87/1.97 2332 . 25 1208.0 48.1 McLemore, R. A. 1.87/2.00 (25 wks) 2617.40 1338.3 51.1 Meneses, R. L. 2.05/2.10 2166.36 1040.8 41.2 Muth, E. D. 1.97/2.05 2288.54 1132.5 43.2 Sanchez, E. C. 1.87/2.00 2289 . 02 1173.3 45.0 Schneider, V. A. 2.10/2.20 2525.09 1165.4 44.2 White, A. L. 2.30/2.40 3458 . 03 1463.1 56.1 14685.5 *Actual hours computed for each wage rate. Avg./hr 49.0 v ALAMO EXPRESS, INC. ATTACHMENT NO. 5 SAN ANTONIO 6 -WHEEL STRIKERS 193 Wage Rate Gross Hours Avg./ Waves (26 weeks) Hour Hours Diff, Coleman, F. 2.05/2.15* (20 wks) 2183.70 1039.6 52.0 2.8 Trtado, J. C. 2.30/2.40 3141.82 1328.4 51.0 3.8 2/103.0 Avg./hr 51.0 NON-STRIKERS Anderson, T. 2.30/2.40 3200.64 1354.3 52.0 Coffall, E. B. 2.30/2.40 4090.48 1730.7 66.2 Gonzales , W. R. 1.70/1.87 (18 wks) 1277.07 725.7 40.1 "peterA-w 9. 4-^8 (3 wks) 84§vff 144,4 48x8 Need 10 wks Dior, F. 1.70/1.87 (21 wks) 2008.25 1121.7 53.1 Galindo , J. D. 2.07/2.15 3183.24 1502.0 57.2 Hernandez , J. R. 2.00/2.10 1578.56 (19 wks) 772.1 40.1 Davis, N. 1.70/1.87 (12 wks) 976.12 544.9 45.1 IE+^t^gr-1i. 3s'39 (5 wks) 33 4 03 "fiva 39 Q need 10 wks Jordan, J. L. 2.30/2.40 4911.18 2077.8 79.2 Kraus , R. E. 1.70/1.87 (12 wks) 1225.29 684.8 57.0 Puente, F. T. 1.70/1.87* (22 wks) 1895.08 1025.3 46.1 Rios, T. F. 2.07/2.15 2721.13 1282.9 49.1 Sanchez, J. M. 2.18/2.25 (22 wks) 2755.68 1241.3 56.1 Brown , D. L. 2.30/2.40 4451.50 1882.9 72.1 13 713.4 Avg./ hr 54.8 *Actual hours computed for each wage rate. vi 194 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ATTACHMENT NO. 6 SAN ANTONIO DOCK STRIKERS Wage Rate Gross Wages Hours (26 weeks) Avg./ Hour Hours Diff. Barbosa, W. H. 1.90/2.00 2247.73 1144.4 44.0 8.0 Guzman , F. M. 1.90/2.00 2255.91 1148.2 44.0 3.0 Sauceda , A. V. 1.90/2.00 2386.43 1214.3 46.2 1.8 Vivier, J. L. 1.90/2.00 2465.34 1253.9 47.2 .8 4/181.1 Avg. /hr 45.0 NON-STRIKERS Anderson, J. C. 1.90 2287.37 1203.2 47.1 Bosquez, E. 1.85/1.90* 2697.77 1423.6 54.2 Cabrellero, D. W. 2.06/2.16* 2875.40 1339.3 51.1 6ee1-eeeesr-9,-6r 4-160 (3 wks) 148:48 144T8 3749 need 10 wks Castaneda, R. A. 1.60/1.70 2110.67 1468.2 56.1 Dena, D. 1.60/1.70 (16 wks) 991.31 706.0 44.0 Espaza, E. 1.60 (4 wks) 263.12 164.7 41.0 need 10 wks eamwr-3s-b. 1968 (2 wks) 49v6S EFL 44rG need 10 wks Gil, A. 1.60 (15 wks) 1079.67 674.1 44.1 Gil, A. N. 2.00 2683.13 1341.1 51.2 ebrier-!t. 1•:'39 (5 wks) 435x1:6 99918 4318 need 10 wks Hermand, P. 1.60/1.65 (18 wks) 1651.67 1006.7 55.2 Johnson, E. 2.14 2580.19 1205.2 46.1 Lisera, V. M. 1.60 (18 wks) 1232.26 770.3 42,1 Lopez, P. R. 1.60 (5 wks) 251.44 157.2 31.0 need 10 wks Me63teeber;-3,-P. 1.168 (9 wks) 63LI,87. 395r9 44,9 need 10 wks Mann, J. L. 1.60/1.75 (18 wks) 1253.29 766.2 42.1 Martinez, R. 1.60 (17 wks) 1185.13 740.1 43.1 Abi^rereer-J,-b. 8,88 244466 1.3843 38,8 need 10 wks (4 wks) vii ALAMO EXPRESS, INC. 195 Wage Gross Hours Avg./ Hours Rate Wages (26 weeks ) Hour Diff. Hank, iis3. 4 ,68 (6 wks) 363x33 ,336s7< 3741- need 10 wks per-Rz-hv 4s74 (3 wks) 38$03 143:1• 49T9 need 10 wks Perez, J. E . 1.90/2.00 2734.12 139.30 53.2 Peres,RtrI4s : ^T60 (4 wks) LL41•:10 -i gs1- 37-sg need 10 wks Salas, M. 1.60/1.70 (25 wks) 1873.87 1121.3 44.2 Valdez, D. 1.60 966.08 603.1 50.0 -Yel errs-3s-6. : •VfiO3sgg* 3-03-A3 1.66V8 33:3 need 10 wks 15 723.8 Avg./hr 48.0 *Actual hours computed for each wage rate. viii