General Teamsters Local No. 126

GENERAL TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 126 253 General Teamster, Warehouse and Dairy Employees Union Local No. 126, affiliated with the Interna- tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America; Local #139, International Union of Operating Engi- neers, AFL-CIO; Local # 782, United Brother- hood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO; Building and Construction Trades Council of Fond Du Lac County ; Local #1086, International Hod Carriers, Building and Common Laborers Union of America, AFL-CIO; Local #206, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO and Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc. Case 30-CC-144 November 13, 1972 DECISION AND ORDER On June 22, 1971, Trial Examiner Alvin Lieberman issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Charging Party filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the Respondents filed a joint brief in opposition to the Charging Party's excep- tions. On January 3, 1972, oral argument, in which the Respondents and the Charging Party participat- ed, was held before the Board in Washington, D.C. The Board has considered the record and the Trial Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and finds merit in the Charging Party's exceptions. Accordingly, the Board affirms the Trial Examiner's rulings, findings, conclusions, and rec- ommendations only to the extent consistent with the following: The complaint alleged that Respondents violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act. The Trial Examiner found several incidents of violation of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) by Respondents Teamsters, Carpenters Union, Council, and Laborers, to which no exceptions have been filed, but otherwise recom- mended dismissal of the complaint. The Charging Party, Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc. (RMC), has filed exceptions to the dismissal. As set forth in detail in the Trial Examiner's Decision, Respondent Teamsters embarked on a campaign to put RMC out of business because of what the Teamsters believed was a breach of confidence by Leo Geis, owner of RMC, which is 1 Sailors' Union of the Pacific, AFL (Moore Dry Dock Company), 92 NLRB 547 2 The Trial Examiner also found that Teamsters Business Representative Rickmeier's threat to Tiede's superintendent to put up a picket line unless Tiede discontinued its purchases of concrete from RMC did not violate Section 8(b)(4)(iiXB) of the Act because there was no evidence "that a picket line was ever established or that the inducement offered by Rickmeier was effective ...." A threat to an employer to picket is itself said to have resulted in a heart attack suffered by the Teamsters secretary-treasurer, William Wetzel, Sr. As a first step in the campaign to achieve this objective, the Teamsters published and distributed leaflets to various business firms and others, includ- ing construction contractors, construction employ- ees, employees of industrial and commercial estab- lishments, officials and members of various labor organizations, and people in general, setting forth what the Teamsters alleged was Geis' perfidious conduct and urging recipients not to patronize RMC. As the next step, the Teamsters began picketing construction sites at which RMC was supplying concrete. The pickets carried signs referring to Geis' conduct toward Wetzel, Sr. At the Oakfield School project, where Wm. Tiede & Sons was engaged as the general contractor, a business representative of the Teamsters, Eugene Rickmeier, approached Tiede's superintendent and another individual employed there, informed them that "scab concrete" was being used, suggested that concrete be obtained from a source other than RMC, and threatened to put up a picket line unless this was done. At RMC's own premises no picketing was conducted. The Trial Examiner concluded that, inasmuch as the picketing of the construction sites where RMC was delivering concrete conformed with the Moore Dry Dock' criteria, the picketing was lawful, even though its conceded object was to put RMC out of business.2 In this regard, we are persuaded that the Trial Examiner had a faulty view of the controlling principles and thus reached the wrong result. Section 8(b)(4) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for a union (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual ... to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufac- ture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or com- modities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person ... where in either case an object thereof is: (B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the ,products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other coercive, whether or not the picketing is subsequently instituted, and if the threat is intended to achieve an object prohibited by Section 8(b)(4)(B), as in this case, it is violative of Section 8(b)(4)(n)(B). We therefore find, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that Rickmeier's threat to Tiede violated Section 8(b)(4)(n)(B) of the Act. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local Union No I2, AFL-CIO (Associated Independent Owner-Operators, Inc.), 180 NLRB 293, 296. 200 NLRB No. 41 254 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD person . . . : Provided That nothing con- tained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlaw- ful, any ... primary picketing. These provisions reflect "the dual congressional objective of preserving the right of labor organiza- tions to bring pressure to bear on offending employ- ers in primary labor disputes and of shielding unoffending employers and others from pressures in controversies not their own." N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692. Thus, a union is permitted to picket a primary employer with whom it has a labor dispute but runs afoul of Section 8(b)(4) if it pickets or threatens to picket a neutral employer with a proscribed object3 of enmeshing the neutral employ- er in a controversy not its own. Ascertaining a union's motivation becomes diffi- cult in cases involving an "ambulatory" or "com- mon" situs where the primary and secondary employer are engaged in operations at the same location.4 In assessing union picketing activities at such locations the Board is confronted by the difficult problem that unrestricted union activity, which is designed to turn away all who approach the situs, would be inconsistent with the neutral employ- ers' intended immunity. Conversely, depriving a union of all opportunity to picket the primary employer at the ambulatory or common situs might render its ability to bring any pressure on the primary illusory when the primary employer's only place of business in the geographic area is the common or ambulatory situs. In order to accommo- date these conflicting interests, the Board has evolved criteria in the Moore Dry Dock case designed to help resolve the question of whether a union has the proscribed motive of enmeshing neutral employ- 3 It is unnecessary to find that the sole object of picketing is unlawful, an unlawful object is enough. N.L.R.B v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, 341 U S. 675, 688-689, N LRB. v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local Union No. 584, IBT [Old Dutch Farms, Inc.], 341 F.2d 29, 32 (C.A. 2), cert. denied 382 U.S. 816; N LR B. v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, Local 753 [Pure Milk Association], 335 F.2d 326, 329 (C.A. 7), New York Mailers' Union No 6 [New York Herald Tribune, Inc ] v N.LR B., 316 F.2d 371, 372 (C.A.D C.). 4 The line between legitimate primary, and unlawful secondary, activity is relatively easy to draw where primary and secondary employers have separate work sites ; union activity occurring at the primary employer's own premises, and seeking no more than the disruption of his own normal operations, is considered primary, whereas activity extending beyond the premises of the primary employer to those of another employer, which is designed to disrupt the operations of the latter employer, is generally considered secondary. Compare, International Rice Milling Co. v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 665, 672, with N L R.B. v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, District Council of Kansas City [Wadsworth Budding Company], 184 F 2d 60 (C.A. 10), cert denied 341 U.S. 947. And see, generally, Retail Fruit & Vegetable Clerks Union, Local 1017 [Crystal Palace Market] v. N.LR B, 249 F.2d 591, 597-600 (C.A 9). 5 Although Moore Dry Dock involved picketing at the common situs of a secondary employer, its rule has been extended by the Board to picketing at ers when it pickets locations where both the primary and secondary employer are present .5 The criteria set forth in Moore Dry Dock are to assure that common situs picketing, to be lawful, is conducted in a manner that clearly indicates that the appeal of the picketing is directed only to the employees of the primary employer. The Board and the courts uniformly have held that picketing at a common situs violates Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act if any of the requirements of Moore Dry Dock are disregarded, or if the picketing is in any respect conducted in a manner which demonstrates that the intent and purpose of the picketing is to appeal to the employees of secondary employers.s N.L.R.B. v. Northern California District Council of Hod Carriers, 389 F.2d 721 (C.A. 9); Retail Fruit Clerks v. N. L. R. B., supra; N. L. R. B. v. Truck Drivers & Helpers Local Union No. 728 [National Trucking Company], 228 F.2d 791 (C.A. 5); N.L.R.B. v. Service Trade Chauffeurs, Salesmen & Helpers Local 145 [Howland Dry Goods], 191 F.2d 65 (C.A. 2); N.L.R.B. v. Local Union No. 55 and Carpenters' District Council of Denver, supra; N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, 219 F.2d 870 (C.A. 10); Piezonki d/b/a Stone Steel Service v. N.L.R.B., 219 F.2d 879 (C.A. 4); Richfield Oil Corp., 95 NLRB 1191; Crystal Palace Market, supra. The Moore Dry Dock tests are not the single guide for determining the legality of "common situs" picketing. They are, rather, "evidentiary in nature, and they are to be employed in the absence of more direct evidence of the intent and purposes of the labor organization." N.L.R.B. v. International Hod Carriers, Building and Common Laborers' Union of America, Local No. 1140, AFL-CIO, 285 F.2d 397, 401 (C.A. 8), cert. denied 366 U.S. 903. Thus, mere compliance with the four requirements of the Moore Dry Dock case does not immunize a union's picketing the situs of a primary employer where a secondary or neutral employer is engaged. American Newspaper Guild ( Youngstown Arc Engraving Co.), 153 NLRB 744, Retail Fruit if Vegetable Clerks Union, Local 1017 (Crystal Palace Market), 116 NLRB 856, enfd. 249 F.2d 591 (C.A. 9), Local Union No. 55, and Carpenters' District Council ofDenver and Vicinity (Professional and Business Men's Life Insurance Company), 108 NLRB 363, enfd. 218 F.2d 226 (C.A 10). 6 Picketing constitutes "inducement or encouragement" of individuals within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) and "coercion or restraint" of persons within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4XiiXB). N.L.R.B. v. Internation- al Hod Carriers, Local 1140 [Economy Farms], 285 F.2d 397 (C.A 8), cert. denied 366 U.S. 903, N.L.R B v. Plumbers Union of Nassau County, Local 457 [Bomat Plumbing & Heating], 299 F.2d 497 (C.A. 2). It is likewise well settled that a threat of picketing or a work stoppage violates Section 8(b)(4)(u)(B). NL R B v Highway Truck Drivers and Helpers, Local No 107 [Riss & Co.], 300 F.2d 317 (CA 3); Local 810, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Fein Can Corp.), 131 NLRB 59, enfd. 229 F.2d 636 (C.A. 2) The Board and the courts have also uniformly held that successful inducement or encouragement of workmen to cease performing services necessarily restrains or coerces their employer. N.L.R.B. v. Local 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers [New York Telephone Co.], 325 F.2d 561 (C.A. 2). GENERAL TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 126 255 and other conduct, for a union may, by its other conduct, reveal that its objective is secondary.? Thus, if the picketing is directed at the primary employer it will be regarded as primary and lawful, but if a purposeful effort is made to direct it at the neutrals that work at a common site the activity will be viewed as secondary and unlawful .8 The Board and the courts have uniformly held that direct appeals to secondary employees or other regular common situs tenants have in effect negated the conditions re- quired in Moore Dry Dock to justify picketing, and have exceeded the limits of permissible primary activity and constituted violations of the secondary boycott provisions of the Act. Crystal Palace Market, supra' Gonzales Chemical Industries, Inc., 128 NLRB 1352; Highway Truckdrivers and Helpers, Local No. 107 (Riss & Company, Inc.), 130 NLRB 943, enfd. 300 F.2d 317 (C.A. 3). As was stated in this regard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in N.L.R.B. v. Northern California District Council of Hod Carriers, 389 F.2d 721, 725: Respondent next argues that the picketing was primary and not secondary in nature in that it complied with the requirements for primary picketing established by the Board in Moore Dry Dock Co., 92 NLRB 547 (1950). It would appear that its reliance on this doctrine is misplaced. Moore Dry Dock does not establish a formula whereby picketing with a secondary object can be done lawfully.' Rather it simply establishes [an] evidentiary aid for the Board to determine the object of picketing where the other evidence is equivocal. The Board is not bound by the inference of lawfulness from compliance with the Moore Dry Dock standards. Superior Derrick Corp. v. N.L.RB., 273 F.2d 891, 895-897 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, Seafarers International Union of North America, Atlantic and Gulf Desto, etc. v. N L.R.B., 364 U.S. 816 . . . (1960); Retail Fruit and Vegetable Clerks Union v. N.LRB., 249 F.2d 5911, 596-599 (9th Cir. 1957); N.L.R.B. v. General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 968, 225 F.2d 205, 209-210 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 914... (1955). 7 "The umon's object may be inferred from its act." New York Mailers' Union v. N.L.R B, 316, F.2d 371, 372 (C.A D.C.). "In the absence of admission by the Union of an illegal intent, the nature of acts performed shows the intent."" Seafarers International Union [Salt Dome Production Co.] v. N L R B., 265 F.2d 585, 591 (C.A D.C.), quoted with approval in Local 761, Electrical Workers [General Electric Company] v. N L.R B., 366 U.S. 667, 674. 8 It'is well settled that picketing is a "signal" to the initiated regardless of the message it conveys. As the courts have recognized, the "normal purpose of a picket line is to persuade employees not to cross it." N.LR B. v. Dallas General Drivers, Local No. 745 [Associated Wholesale Grocery of Dallas], 264 F 2d 642, 648 (C.A. 5), cert denied 361 U.S. 814 Picketing is essentially a signal to organized economic action backed by group discipline. See N.LRB. v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council [Gould & Preisner], 341 U.S. 675, 690. "The objectives of any picketing include a In Local 761, Electrical Workers v. N.L.R.B., supra, the Supreme Court recognized the propriety of applying the Moore Dry Dock criteria and of looking to other evidence "the means to which a union resorts in promoting its cause" in order to determine in common situs cases whether the impact of the picketing on the neutral employees who work there was merely an incident of activity directed at the primary employer or whether a deliberate attempt was made to induce "those employees to engage in concerted conduct against their employer in order to force him to refuse to deal with the struck employer." 366 U.S. at 673-674. With the above principles in mind, we proceed to a consideration of all the evidence bearing on the Teamsters object in carrying on its picketing activi- ties. Upon such consideration, we are persuaded that the picketing at the construction projects here involved was not conducted in a manner uninhibited by "restraint consistent with the right of neutral employers to remain uninvolved in the dispute." Retail Fruit Clerks Union v. N.L.R.B., supra at 599. We note, first, that the Teamsters admits that the object of its picketing and other conduct was to put RMC out of business. Realistically appraised, such object could only be accomplished by causing RMC's customers to cease doing business with it. In view of Respondent's admitted object, it could hardly be said that the "cease-doing business" purpose was merely incidental to what in other circumstances might have been a legitimate primary picket line; the prohibited object was, rather, the sole, all consuming aim of the picketing. Further, it appears to us that when the Teamsters found out that its handbilling did not accomplish the result of curtailing RMC's operations, it turned to picketing as the means for attaining its objective. It chose picketing because it was "more dramatic"; it got people to stop; and it was more effective than mere handbilling. It changed its methods even though that meant a substantially greater expense to it. However, instead of picketing at the premises of RMC,9 where the appeal of its picket,line would have been directed solely at RMC's employees several desire to influence others from withholding from their employer their services or trade." Local 761, International Union of Electrical; Radio & Machine Workers [General Electric] v. N.L.R.B., 366 U.S. 667y 673 "The loyalties and responses exacted by picket lines are unlike those flowing from appeals by written word." Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 U.S. 460, 465. Picketing is commonly employed "to conscript neutrals having no relation to the dispute." Carpenters & Joiners Union of America, Local No 213 v Ritters Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 728. "The reluctance of workers to cross a picket hne is notorious." Printing Specialties and Paper Converters Union Local 388 v Le Baron, 171 F.2d 331, 334 (C.A 9). "A picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated " Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S 769,776-777. 9 Chairman Miller would doubt the legitimacy even of such picketing, where the sole object thereof is a "cease-doing business" object. Normally, (Continued) 256 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD times during the course of the day, the Teamsters set up picket lines at construction sites where RMC was delivering concrete and where construction contrac- tors' employees were also engaged at work.'° It thus appears quite obvious that Teamsters directed the appeal of its picket lines toward the employees of the contractors rather than toward the RMC employees, who could have been reached at the plant of RMC, where no picketing took place. Moreover, we note that some of such picketing took place on streets adjacent to areas some distance removed from entrances to the construction sites through which RMC's concrete was delivered and on abutting streets.11 If the picketing were directed solely at RMC's employees, we fail to understand the need to picket along the full frontage of the construction sites and on abutting public streets instead of restricting such picketing to the points of ingress and egress of RMC's truckdrivers. On the contrary, it appears to us that Teamsters deliberately attempted to enmesh neutrals in its dispute with RMC by appealing to such neutrals' employees. This we find particularly true in the case of picketing at the Gross Terminal. As previously noted, in addition to picketing, Teamsters engaged in oral inducement of an employ- ee of a neutral contractor on at least one construc- tion project and in threats of picketing. We are convinced that the Teamsters' picketing was not engaged in so as to have as little impact on neutral employers and employees as possible, but, instead, was directed at them. The Teamsters made no effort to insulate employers with whom it had no dispute and to insure that its activities did not result in work stoppage or disruption of business. The facts devel- oped in the case, viewed in the light of settled principles, show that the Teamsters picketing and other conduct violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act. Common situs picketing is never privileged when it is directed, as it was here, at neutral employees and their employers. N.L.R.B. v. Carpenters District Council of Kansas City [Kaaz Woodwork Company], 383 F.2d 89 (C.A. 8); N.L.R.B. v. Hod Carriers, supra; Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Union, Local 279 (Wilson Teaming Company), 140 NLRB 164; International Brotherhood of Electri- cal Workers, Local Union No. 11 (L. G. Electric Contractors, Inc.), 154 NLRB 766; Carpenters District Council of Kansas City (J. E. Dunn Construction Company), 158 NLRB 269; Local 25, International the incidental secondary effects of primary picketing are regarded as inevitable incidental effects of protected primary activity. But, in the Chairman's view, this reasoning loses its force when the sole announced purpose of the activity is an object proscribed by the statute 10 In International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 861 (Plauche Electric, Inc.), 135 NLRB 250, 254, the Board stated that it would consider the place of picketing " as one circumstance, among others, in determining an object of the picketing." Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (Building Trades Employers Association), 169 NLRB 856; United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry (A & B Plumbing, Inc.), 171 NLRB 498; Local 134, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (Polly Electric Co.), 175 NLRB 507; Drivers, Warehouse & Dairy Employ- ees, Local No. 75 (Seymour Transfer, Inc.), 176 NLRB 530; Iron Workers Local Union 167 (Tayloe Glass Co.), 180 NLRB 201. Picketing by other Respondent Unions John Sharkey was a business representative of Respondent Plumbers. He was also a member of the board of directors of Workshops, Inc., a charitable corporation. When Workshops proposed erecting a new building, Sharkey became a member of its building committee. RMC received a contract to deliver part of the concrete for the new building. Sharkey resented the award of this contract to RMC, a nonunion firm, and threatened to picket the project. On June 29, 1970, he went to the project, found Teamsters Business Representative Rickmeier picketing, took a picket sign from Rickmeier's car, and began to picket on one of the streets abutting the project while RMC's trucks were making deliveries. After about 30 minutes, he stopped picketing. The Plumbers had not authorized the picketing; in fact, its executive board reprimanded him for having done so. However, the Plumbers took no steps openly to disavow Sharkey's picketing conduct. The Trial Examiner found that the Plumbers was not responsi- ble for Sharkey's conduct because Sharkey was picketing the Workshops project not in his capacity as a Plumbers agent, but as an individual "giving vent to his outrage at having been, he thought, lied to and made a fool of by Workshops." We do not agree with this exculpation of Respondent Plumbers. Sharkey was a known business representative of the Plumbers. Anyone seeing him picket would naturally assume that he was acting in his capacity as such agent. Although the Plumbers privately reprimanded him for his picketing activity, it took no steps publicly to repudiate his conduct and thus to undo the effect of his otherwise unlawful picketing. Under these circumstances, we find that the Respondent Plumbers is responsible for his conduct and that it 11 United Brick and Clay Workers of America v. Deena Art ware, Inc, 198 F.2d 637 (C.A 6), cert. denied 344 U.S. 897; Amarillo General Drivers, Local Union No 577 (Crowe-Gulde Cement Company), 122 NLRB 1275, enfd. 273 F.2d 519 (C.A.D.C.); Dallas General Drivers, Local 745 (Dallas County Construction Employer's Association, Inc.), 124 NLRB 696, enfd. as modified 281 F.2d 593, and as further modified on denial of rehearing 281 F.2d at 596 (C A. 5, 1960), cert. denied 365 U.S. 826; Union de Trabajadores (Gonzalez Chemical Industries, Inc), 128 NLRB 1352. GENERAL TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 126 thereby violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act.12 Warren Tupper was a business representative of Respondent Operating Engineers. On November 18, 1970, he and Teamsters Business Representative Rickmeier were inspecting projects at which mem- bers of their respective unions were working. Upon their arrival at the Fond Du Lac Mental Health Center construction project they found RMC trucks delivering concrete. Soon thereafter, Rickmeier began picketing the project. Rickmeier asked Tupper to join him in the picketing. Tupper did so, and both picketed as long as RMC's trucks remained at the site. When Geis asked Tupper the reason for his picketing, Tupper replied "birds of a feather stick together." The Trial Examiner found that Tupper's picketing was accidental and was not the result of a joint venture of the Operating Engineers and the Teamsters to further the campaign of the Teamsters. However, whether or not the Operating Engineers was engaged in a joint venture with the Teamsters, Tupper's picketing was engaged in as a representa- tive of the Operating Engineers and was as unlawful as that of Rickmeier since it had the same object. Respondent Operating Engineers, as Tupper's princi- pal, was therefore responsible for his conduct. Accordingly, we find that by Business Representative Tupper's picketing of the Fond Du Lac Mental Health Center project Respondent Operating Engi- neers violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act.13 THE REMEDY Having found that Respondents Teamsters, Car- penters, Council, Laborers, Plumbers, and Operating Engineers have engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act, we shall order them to cease and desist therefrom and to take such affirmative action as will effectuate the purposes of the Act. AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Delete Conclusions of Law 2-13 and substitute therefor the following: 2. RMC, Workshops, Rosenthal, Gross, Smith, Tiede, Hennes, and Baumhardt are persons engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4) of the Act. 3. Respondents are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 12 Milk Wagon Drivers, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 552, 556; United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local Union No 2067 (Batterman Construction, Inc), 166 NLRB 532; International Brother- hood of Teamsters, Local Union No. 377 (All-American Stamp and Premium Corporation), 159 NLRB 1313; International Longshoremen's and Warehouse- men's Union, Local 8 (General Ore, Inc.), 124 NLRB 626. 257 4. By inducing and encouraging an individual employed by Tiede to engage in a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to perform any services, an object thereof being to force or require Tiede to cease using, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in products supplied by RMC and to cease doing business with RMC, Respondent Teamsters Union has engaged, and is engaging, in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act. 5. By inducing and encouraging an individual employed by Smith to engage in a strike or refusal in the course of his employment to perform any services, an object thereof being to force or require Smith to cease using, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in products supplied by RMC and to cease doing business with RMC, Respondents Carpenters Union and Council have engaged, and are engaging, in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act. 6. By inducing and encouraging an individual employed by Smith to engage in a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to perform any services, an object thereof being to force or require Smith to cease using, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in products supplied by RMC and to cease doing business with RMC, Respondent Laborers Union has engaged, and is engaging, in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act. 7. Respondent Teamsters Union did not threaten, coerce, or restrain Hutter within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4) of the Act. 8. Respondent Teamsters violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act by its picketing of the various construction sites at which RMC was making deliveries of concrete and by its threat to picket the Oakfield School project unless Tiede obtained its concrete from a source other than RMC. 9. Respondent Plumbers violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act by Business Repre- sentative Sharkey's threats of picketing and his picketing of the Workshops construction site. 10. Respondent Operating Engineers violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act by Business Representative Tupper's picketing of the Fond Du Lac Mental Health Center site. 11. Respondents Carpenters, Council, and Labor- ers did not threaten, coerce, or restrain Smith within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4) of the Act. 12. Respondent Laborers did not engage in unfair 13 See fn. 12, supra. The Trial Examiner concluded that Respondents have not engaged in a joint venture in furtherance of a campaign by Teamsters to drive RMC out of business. Since we have found that each Respondent has independently engaged in conduct proscribed by Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act, we need not, and do not, pass upon the joint venture theory of the General Counsel's complaint. 258 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD labor practices by reason of the activities of Harold LaShay in connection with the erection of the Workshops' new building. 13. The unfair labor practices engaged in by the Respondents Teamsters, Carpenters, Council, Labor- ers, Plumbers, and Operating Engineers set forth in the above Conclusions of Law affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, we hereby issue the following: ORDER 1. Respondent General Teamster, Warehouse and Dairy Employees Union Local No. 126, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Inducing or encouraging any individual em- ployed by Workshops, Inc.; John Hennes Trucking Company; Baumhardt Sand and Gravel; Rosenthal Construction Co., Inc.; Gross Construction Co., Inc.; Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc.; and Wm. Tiede & Sons or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, by means of picketing, orders, directions, instructions, requests, or appeals, or by permitting any such to remain in existence or effect, to engage in a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is to force or require the said persons, or any other person, to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of, or to cease doing business with, Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc. (b) In any manner threatening, coercing, or restraining Workshops, Inc.; John Hennes Trucking Company; Baumhardt Sand and Gravel; Rosenthal Construction Company, Inc.; Gross Construction Co., Inc.; Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc.; and Wm. Tiede & Sons, or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where an object thereof is to force or require the said persons, or any other person, to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of, or to cease doing business with, Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc. 2. Take the following affirmative action which, it is found, will effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended: (a) -Post at its offices and meeting halls copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix A." 14 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 30, after being duly signed by its authorized representative, shall be posted by Re- spondent Teamsters immediately upon receipt there- of, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by it to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered, by any other material. (b) Deliver to the Regional Director for Region 30 signed copies of said notice in sufficient number for posting by Workshops, Inc.; John Hennes Trucking Company; Baumhardt Sand and Gravel; Rosenthal Construction Company, Inc.; Gross Construction Co., Inc.; Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc.; and Wm. Tiede & Sons, they being willing, at all locations where notices to their employees are customarily posted. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 30, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent Teamsters has taken to comply herewith. II. Respondent Local #782, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall: 1. Cease and desist, by means of orders, direc- tions, instructions, requests, or appeals, or by permitting any such to remain in existence or effect, from inducing or encouraging any individual em- ployed by Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc., or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, to engage in a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is to force or require Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc., or any other person, to cease using, handling, transport- ing, or otherwise dealing in the products of, or to cease doing business with, Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc. 2. Take the following affirmative action which, it is found, will effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended: (a) Post at its offices and meeting halls copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix B." 15 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 30, after being duly signed by its authorized representative, shall be posted by Re- spondent Carpenters immediately upon receipt there- 14 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order Order of the National Labor Relations Board " of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted 15 See fn. 14, supra GENERAL TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 126 of, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by it to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Deliver to the Regional Director for Region 30 signed copies of said notice in sufficient number for posting by Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc., it being willing, at all locations where notices to its employees are customarily posted. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 30, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent Carpenters has taken to comply herewith. III. Respondent Building and Construction Trades Council of Fond Du Lac County, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall: 1. Cease and desist, by means of orders, direc- tions, instructions, requests, or appeals, or by permitting any such to remain in existence or effect, from induci. g or encouraging any individual em- ployed by Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc., or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, to engage in a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is to force or require Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc., or any other person, to cease using, handling, transport- ing, or otherwise dealing in the products of, or to cease doing business with, Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc. 2. Take the following affirmative action which, it is found, will effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended: (a) Post at its offices and meeting halls copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix C." 16 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 30, after being duly signed by its authorized representative, shall be posted by Re- spondent Council immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by it to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Deliver to the Regional Director for Region 30 signed copies of said notice in sufficient number for posting by Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc., it being willing, at all locations where notices to its employees are customarily posted. 259 (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 30, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent Council has taken to comply herewith. IV. Respondent Local # 1086, International Hod Carriers, Building and Common Laborers Union of America, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, and repre- sentatives, shall: 1. Cease and desist, by means of orders, direc- tions, instructions, requests, or appeals, or by permitting any such to remain in existence or effect, from inducing or encouraging any individual em- ployed by Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc., or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, to engage in a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is to force or require Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc., or any other person, to cease using, handling, transport- ing, or otherwise dealing in the products of or to cease doing business with, Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc. 2. Take the following affirmative action which, it is found, will effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended: (a) Post at its offices and meeting halls copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix D." 17 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 30, after being duly signed by its authorized representative, shall be posted by Re- spondent Laborers immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by it to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Deliver to the Regional Director for Region 30 signed copies of said notice in sufficient numbers for posting by Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc., it being willing, at all locations where notices to its employees are customarily posted. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 30, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent Laborers has taken to comply herewith. V. Respondent Local #206, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, and repre- sentatives, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: 16 See fn. 14, supra. 17 See fn. 14, supra. 260 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (a) Engaging in, or inducing or encouraging any individual employed by Workshops, Inc., Rosenthal Construction Company, Inc., or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, to engage in a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport , or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is to force or require Workshops, Inc., Rosenthal Con- struction Company, Inc., or any other person, to cease using, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of, or to cease doing business with, Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc. (b) Threatening, coercing, or restraining Work- shops, Inc., Rosenthal Construction Company, Inc., or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where an object thereof is to force or require Workshops, Inc., Rosenthal Construction Company, Inc., or any other person, to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or other- wise dealing in the products of, or to cease doing business with, Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc. 2. Take the following affirmative action which, it is found, will effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended: (a) Post at its business offices and meeting halls copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix E." 18 Copies of said notice , on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 30, after being duly signed by its authorized representative , shall be posted by Respondent Plumbers immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by it to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Deliver to the Regional Director for Region 30 signed copies of said notice in sufficient number for posting by Workshops, Inc., and Rosenthal Con- struction Company, Inc., it being willing, at all locations where notices to its employees are custom- arily posted. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 30, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent Plumbers has taken to comply herewith. VI. Respondent Local # 139, International Un- ion of Operating Engineers , AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Engaging in or inducing or encouraging any individual employed by Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc., or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, to engage in a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is to force or require Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc., or any other person, to cease using, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of, or to cease doing business with, Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc. (b) Threatening, coercing, or restraining Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc., or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where an object thereof is to force or require Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc., or any other person, to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of, or to cease doing business with, Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc. 2. Take the following affirmative action which, it is found, will effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended: (a) Post at its offices and meeting halls copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix F." 19 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 30, after being duly signed by its authorized representative, shall be posted by Re- spondent Operating Engineers immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by it to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Deliver to the Regional Director for Region 30 signed copies of said notice in sufficient numbers for posting by Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc., it being willing, at all locations where notices to its employees are customarily posted. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 30, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent Operating Engineers has taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in all other respects the complaint be, and it hereby is, dismissed. MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS, dissenting in part: With one modification, we would affirm the Trial Examiner's Decision and issue an appropriate order to remedy the violation found by the Trial Examiner. We wish to make it clear at the outset that we do not condone, in the circumstances of this case, the decision and attempt of Respondent Teamsters to picket Charging Party Ready Mixed Concrete with an objective of driving it out of business. Our 18 See In. 14, supra. 19 See In . 14, supra. GENERAL TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 126 261 disapproval of such conduct, however, does not persuade us that we should join our colleagues in their decision. We are convinced their decision is a serious distortion of the law as to what constitutes unlawful secondary activity within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(ii)(B) of the Act. We therefore dissent in part from our colleagues' decision. Our colleagues state that the law regarding com- mon sites picketing permits only such picketing as "is directed only to the employees of the primary employer" and that such picketing is unlawful if it is "in any respect conducted in a manner which demonstrates that the intent and purpose of the picketing is to appeal to the employees of secondary employers." Although our colleagues cite what is numerically an impressive list of case citations for these propositions, they neglect to apply relevant principles of law set forth in two of the recent Supreme Court decisions in this area. This omission has, we believe, caused them to make only half the required analysis in this case. In the General Electric20 and Carrier21 cases, the Supreme Court plainly indicated that it is no longer sufficient, if it ever was, to determine with respect to ambulatory or common situs picketing whether the picketing was addressed to employees other than the primary employees. It is necessary to determine the nature of the appeals, if any, to such other employ- ees, as well as the relationship of the work tasks performed by such employees, to those performed by the primary employees. Thus, in General Electric, the Court, taking care to distinguish between legitimate "primary activity" and banned "secondary activity" instructed: Almost all picketing, even at the situs of the primary employer and surely at that of the secondary, hopes to achieve the forbidden objec- tive, whatever other motives there may be and however small the chances of success." But picketing which induces secondary employees to respect a picket line is not the equivalent of picketing which has an object of inducing those employees to engage in concerted conduct against their employer in order to force him to refuse to deal with the struck employer. [Emphasis supplied.]22 The italicized sentence states the issue which the Board must decide in this case, namely did Respon- dent Teamsters picket Ready Mixed trucks for the object of inducing employees of Ready Mixed's customers to take action against their employers to force them to cease dealing with Ready Mixed, or did Respondent Teamsters seek merely to induce such employees to respect the picket line thrown up around Ready Mixed's cement trucks as deliveries were being made to Ready Mixed's customers. The answer to such question cannot be found in an analysis which simply determines that the picketing union was not interested in appealing to Ready Mixed's employees. For the Supreme Court in the Carrier case expressly rejected the view of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit "that picketing at the site of a strike could be directed at secondary employees only where incidental to appeals to primary employees." The Court stated: It seems clear that the rejection of the Board's position in General Electric [that picketing with an object of enmeshing employees of neutral em- ployers in a dispute with a primary employer is per se unlawful] leaves no room for the even narrower approach of the Court of Appeals in this case, which is that the picketing at the site of a strike could be directed at secondary employees only where incidental to appeals to primary employees. Under this test, no picketing at gates used only by employees of delivery men would be permitted, a result expressly disapproved by the Court in General Electric: "On the other hand, if a separate gate were devised for regular plant deliveries, the barring of picketing at that location would make a clear invasion on traditional primary activity of appealing to neutral employ- ees whose tasks aid the employer's everyday operations." 366 U.S., at 680-681. ... We think General Electric's construction of the proviso to § 8(b)(4) (B) is sound and we will not disturb it. The primary strike, which is protected by the proviso, is aimed at applying economic pressure by halting the day-to-day operations of the struck employer. But Congress not only preserved the right to strike; it also saved "primary picketing" from the secondary ban. Picketing has traditionally been a major weapon to implement the goals of a strike and has characteristically been aimed at all those ap- proaching the situs whose mission is selling, delivering or otherwise contributing to the opera- tions which the strike is endeavoring to halt. In light of this traditional goal of primary pressures we think Congress intended to preserve the right to picket during a strike a gate reserved for employees of neutral delivery men furnishing day-to-day service essential to the plant's regular operations.23 [Citations of legislative history omitted.] It is clear that Ready Mixed was in the business of preparing, selling, and delivering to customers at 20 Local 761, International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machme Workers, 376 U.S. 492. AFL-CIO [General Electric Company] v. N.L.R.B, 366 U.S. 668. 22 366 U.S. at 673-674. 21 United Steelworkers of America AFL-CIO [Carrier Corp.] v. N I.R.B., 23 376 U.S. 498-499 262 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD construction sites ready mixed concrete. It can not be disputed that the receipt and unloading of this concrete by employees of Ready Mixed' s customers at the site of delivery is a "task aid[ing Ready Mixed's] every day operations." Consequently, there can be no doubt that the employees of Ready Mixed's customers fall within the class of employees to whom the Respondent Union could legitimately make primary appeals in support of its primary labor dispute with Ready Mixed. Of course, it is necessary to determine whether such appeals as were made were limited to inducements to respect the picket line or whether they went beyond such limited induce- ments and sought to induce such employees to strike their own employer because it was doing business with Ready Mixed. The Board has long utilized the so-called Moore Dry Dock tests to aid it in determining whether picketing and attendant picket line appeals are primary in nature. These standards are applied as the Supreme Court noted approvingly in General Electri- cal24 irrespective of whether the common situs is owned by the primary employer or by a neutral employer, though the Court warned against a too mechanistic application of those standards "so that a violation of one of the standards [is] taken to be presumptive of illegal activity." 25 The Trial Examiner carefully evaluated the picket- ing at issue in this case against the Moore Dry Dock standards,26 and found with respect to Respondent Teamsters picketing that it conformed to those standards. Our colleagues do not seriously dispute the correctness of his findings in this respect, though they do question why Respondent Teamsters did not limit its picketing solely to the entrances of the projects where Ready Mixed was delivering concrete, but instead picketed along borders of the sites. But their questioning goes not to a concern with whether the picketing was limited to places reasonably close to the sites of the dispute, as it clearly was.27 Rather they are concerned with the conclusion that a failure to so limit the picketing demonstrates that Respon- dent was appealing to employees of the neutral employers, not to Ready Mixed's employees. One can agree, with their factual conclusion but not with their legal conclusion, for as indicated above the Supreme Court has rejected an approach which focuses on that narrow question as being insufficient to establish a violation of Section 8(b)(4)(B). As we are satisfied that Respondent Teamsters clearly attempted to conform its picketing of Ready Mixed's trucks to the Moore Dry Dock tests, and was successful in so doing, and as we are convinced, moreover, that those tests aptly serve to distinguish picketing which merely serves to induce employees to respect the picket line from picketing which is aimed at inducing employees of neutral employers them- selves to engage in a strike against their own employer, we find that Respondent Teamsters did not, by engaging in picketing in conformity with those standards, violate Section 8(b)(4)(B). Notwithstanding the foregoing, we are in agree- ment with the Trial Examiner that Respondent Teamsters' appeal to employees of a neutral employ- er (Wm. Tiede & Sons) at the Oakland School project to refrain from working if the site were picketed was an unlawful inducement in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B). The inducement was not clearly limited to a request to honor the promised picket line only so long as it was lawfully maintained. We would further find that this inducement, also made as it was to Tiede's superintendent, was a threat to maintain a picket line for the purpose indicated in the unlawful inducement to the employees present. Accordingly, we would also find that Respondent Teamsters violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) by such threat. In all other respects, we agree with the Trial Examiner's findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Ac- cordingly, we concur in the remedial orders directed by our colleagues in this proceeding to the extent that they conform to the recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and to the extent that they require Respondent Teamsters to cease and desist from violating Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and to post notices which include the appropriate reference to this violation. 24 366 U.S. at 678-679. 25 366 U.S. at 677 26 Namely that (a) the picketing be strictly limited to times when the situs of the dispute is located on the secondary employer's premises, (b) at the time of the picketing, the primary employer is engaged in its normal business at the sites, (c) the picketing is limited to places reasonably close to the location of the situs of the dispute, and (d) that the picketing clearly discloses that the dispute is with the primary employer. See Moore Dry Dock Company, 92 NLRB 547. 27 The Respondent was refused permission to enter the construction sites so as to be able to picket Ready Mixed's trucks at the point of delivery They thus were forced to picket along the borders of the sites at places where their picketing would be visible to employees accepting delivery. APPENDIX A NOTICE POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government To all members of General Teamsters, Warehouse and Dairy Employees Union Local No. 126, affiliat- ed with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America To employees of Workshops, Inc.; John Hennes Trucking Company; Baumhardt Sand and Gravel; Wm. Tiede & Sons; Rosenthal Construction Co., Inc.; Gross Construction Co., Inc.; and Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc. GENERAL TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 126 After a trial in which all sides had the opportunity to present their evidence, the National Labor Rela- tions Board has found that we violated the law and has ordered us to post this notice and we intend to carry out the Order of the Board and abide by the following: WE WILL NOT, nor will our officers, business representatives, business agents, or anyone acting for us, whatever his title may be, engage in, or induce or encourage any individual employed by Workshops, Inc.; John Hennes Trucking Compa- ny; Baumhardt Sand and Gravel; Wm. Tiede & Sons; Rosenthal Construction Co., Inc.; Gross Construction Co., Inc.; or Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc., or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of employment to use, manufacture, process, trans- port, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is to force or require Workshops, Inc.; John Hennes Trucking Company; Baumhardt Sand and Gravel; Wm. Tiede & Sons; Rosenthal Construction Co., Inc.; Gross Construction Co., Inc.; or Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc.; or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting com- merce, to cease using, selling, handling, transport- ing, or otherwise dealing in the products of, or cease doing business with, Ready Mixed Con- crete, Inc. WE WILL NOT threaten, coerce, or restrain Workshops, Inc.; John Hennes Trucking Compa- ny; Baumhardt Sand and Gravel; Wm. Tiede & Sons; Rosenthal Construction Co., Inc.; Gross Construction Co., Inc.; or Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc., or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where an object thereof is to force or require Workshops, Inc.; John Hennes Trucking Compa- ny; Baumhardt Sand and Gravel; Wm. Tiede & Sons; Rosenthal Construction Co., Inc.; Gross Construction Co., Inc.; or Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc.; or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of, or to cease doing business with, Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc. 263 GENERAL TEAMSTER, WAREHOUSE AND DAIRY EMPLOYEES UNION LOCAL No. 126, AFFILIATED WITH THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA (Labor Organization) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compli- ance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Second Floor, Commerce Building, 744 North Fourth Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53203, Telephone 414-224-3861. APPENDIX B NOTICE POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government To all members of Local #782, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO To employees of Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc. After a trial in which all sides had the opportunity to present their evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the law and has ordered us to post this notice and we intend to carry out the Order of the Board and abide by the following: WE WILL NOT, nor will our officers, business representatives, business agents, or anyone acting for us, whatever his title may be, engage in, or induce or encourage any individual employed by Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc., or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of employment to use, manufacture, process, transport,' or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is to force or require Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc., or any other person, to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise 264 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD dealing in the products of, or to cease doing business with, Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc. LOCAL # 782, UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO (Labor Organization) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not oe defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compli- ance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Second Floor, Commerce Building, 744 North Fourth Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53203, Telephone 414-224-3861. APPENDIX C NOTICE POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government To all members of Building and Construction Trades Council of Fond Du Lac County To employees of Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc. After a trial in which all sides had the opportunity to present their evidence, the National LaborRelations Board has found that we violated the law and has or- dered us to post this notice and abide by the following: WE WILL NOT, nor will our officers, business representatives, business agents, or anyone acting for us, whatever his title may be, engage in, or induce or encourage any individual employed by Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc., or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is to force or require Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc., or any other person, to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of, or to cease doing business with, Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc. BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION TRADES COUNCIL OF FOND Du LAC COUNTY (Labor Organization) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compli- ance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Second Floor, Commerce Building, 744 North Fourth Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53203, Telephone 414-224-3861. APPENDIX D NOTICE POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government To all members of Local # 1086, International Hod Carriers, Building and Common Laborers Union of America, AFL-CIO To employees of Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc. After a trial in which all sides had the opportunity to present their evidence, the National Labor Rela- tions Board has found that we violated the law and has ordered us to post this notice and we intend to carry out the Order of the Board and abide by the following: WE WILL NOT, nor will our officers, business representatives, business agents, or anyone acting for us, whatever his title may be, engage in, or induce or encourage any individual employed by Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc., or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is to force or require Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc., or any other person, to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of, or to cease doing business with, Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc. GENERAL TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 126 LOCAL # 1086, INTERNATIONAL HOD CARRIERS, BUILDING AND COMMON LABORERS UNION OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO (Labor Organization) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compli- ance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Second Floor, Commerce Building, 744 North Fourth Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53203, Telephone 414-224-3861. APPENDIX E NOTICE POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government To all members of Local #206, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada To employees of Workshops, Inc., and Rosenthal Construction Co., Inc. After a trial in which all sides had the opportunity to present their evidence, the National Labor Rela- tions Board has found that we violated the law and has ordered us to post this notice and we intend to carry out the Order of the Board and abide by the fol- lowing: WE WILL NOT, nor will our officers, business representatives, business agents, or anyone acting for us, whatever his title may be, engage in, or induce or encourage any individual employed by Workshops, Inc., Rosenthal Construction Co., Inc., or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is to force or require Work- shops, Inc., Rosenthal Construction Co., Inc., or any other person, to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of, or to cease doing business with, Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc. 265 WE WILL NOT threaten, coerce, or restrain Workshops, Inc., Rosenthal Construction Co., Inc., or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where an object thereof is to force or require Workshops, Inc., Rosenthal Construction Co., Inc., or any other person, to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of, or cease doing business with, Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc. LOCAL # 206, UNITED ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN'AND APPRENTICES OF THE PLUMBING AND PIPE FITTING INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (Labor Organization) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compli- ance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Second Floor, Commerce Building, 744 North Fourth Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53203, Telephone 414-224-3861. APPENDIX F NOTICE POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government To all members of Local # 139, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO To employees of Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc. After a trial in which all sides had the opportunity to present their evidence, the National Labor Rela- tions Board has found that we violated the law and has ordered us to post this notice and we intend to carry out the Order of the Board and abide by the following: WE WILL NOT, nor will our officers, business representatives, business agents, or anyone acting for us, whatever his title may be, engage in, or induce or encourage any individual employed by Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc., or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of employment to use, 266 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is to force or require Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc., or any other person, to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of, or to cease doing business with, Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc. WE WILL NOT threaten, coerce, or restrain Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc., or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where an object thereof is to force or require Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc., or any other person, to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of, or cease doing business with, Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc. LOCAL # 139, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, AFL-CIO (Labor Organization) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compli- ance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Second Floor, Commerce Building, 744 North Fourth Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53203, Telephone 414-224-3861. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ALVIN LIEBERMAN, Trial Examiner: The trial in this proceeding, with all parties represented, was held before me in Fond du Lac, Wisconsin, on February 17, 18, and 19, 1971, upon the General Counsel's complaint' dated January 15, 1971,2 and respondents' answer .3 In general, the issue raised by the pleadings was whether respondents violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (herein called the Act). Particularly, the questions for decision are as follows: 1. Have respondents been engaged as joint venturers in 1 During the trial par. 13 of the complaint was amended to substitute the name Martin Koenig for the third name appearing therein. 2 The complaint was issued pursuant to a charge filed on November 18, 1970, by Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc. 3 During the trial the pleadings were amended by changing the designation of respondent United Association of Journeymen and Appren- tices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and a campaign to put Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc. (herein called RMC), out of business? 2. Did any respondent engage in secondary picketing? 3. Was any individual employed by any person with whom RMC does business, or by any other person, induced or encouraged by means other than picketing to refrain from performing services for his employer? 4. Was any person with whom RMC does business, or was any other person, threatened, restrained, or coerced? 5. Assuming an affirmative answer to questions 2, 3, or 4, above, did an object of the conduct involved fall within the proscription of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act? Upon the entire record,4 upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, and upon careful consideration of the arguments made and the able briefs submitted by the parties,5 I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION RMC, a Wisconsin corporation, is engaged at Fond du Lac, Wisconsin, in the preparation, sale, and delivery of concrete. RMC annually sells and delivers concrete valued at more than $50,000 to customers located within the State of Wisconsin who are themselves engaged in commerce or in industries affecting commerce. Gross Construction Co. Inc., Rosenthal Construction Company, Inc., Wm. Tiede & Sons, Charles D. Smith and Son Inc., The Hutter Construction Co., and Baumhardt Sand & Gravel (herein respectively called Gross Construc- tion, Rosenthal, Tiede, Smith, Hutter, and Baumhardt) are contractors in the building and construction industry. Workshops, Inc. (herein called Workshops) is a nonprofit corporation organized for the purpose of rehabilitating and training handicapped people. At all material times Rosen- thal, as general contractor, has been erecting a building for Workshops in Fond du Lac pursuant to a contract with Workshops valued at more than $95,000. On the foregoing facts I find that RMC and Workshops are engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. I further find that Gross, Rosenthal, Tiede, Smith, Hutter and Baumhardt are engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4) of the Act. Accordingly, I conclude that the assertion of jurisdiction in this matter by the National Labor Relations Board (herein called the Board) is warranted. Children's Village, Inc., 186 NLRB No. 137; S.M. Kisner, et al., etc. 131 NLRB 1196, 1199; Siemons Mailing Service, 122 NLRB 81, 85: McAllister Transfer, Inc., 110 NLRB 1769, 1771-72. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED Respondents are labor organizations within the meaning of the Act. Canada, AFL-CIO, from Local #501 to Local #206. 4 Issued simultaneously herewith is a separate order correcting obvious inadvertent errors in the stenographic transcript of this proceeding. 5 Although all the arguments of the parties and the authorities cited by them, whether appearing in their briefs or made orally at the trial, may not be discussed in this Decision, each has been carefully weighed and considered. GENERAL TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 126 267 III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Introduction Briefly this case concerns itself, in the main, with the measurers taken by respondent General Teamster, Ware- house and Dairy Employees Union Local No. 126, etc. (herein called Teamsters Union) to effectuate its admitted purpose of putting RMC out of business and thus bring to a close a dispute between them of long standing. The complaint alleges, and the General Counsel and RMC contend,6 that to accomplish this end respondent Team- sters Union and the other respondents combined together in a joint venture and engaged in conduct, including picketing of construction sites at which RMC delivered concrete, violative of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act.7 Seeking exculpation, respondents deny that they were, or are, joint venturers, assert that the picketing was carried on in compliance with the criteria for lawful common situs picketing laid down by the Board in Moore Dry Dock Company, 92 NLRB 547, 549, and that their other conduct did not fall within the purview of Section 8(b)(4)(B). B. General Principles The purpose of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act, like its predecessor former Section 8(b)(4)(A),8 is to combat secondary boycotts .9 Its provisions are patently complex, difficult to apply,1° and require construction and reconcili- ation with other provisions of the Act rather than literal reading. Especially is this true where, as here, the conduct complained of occurred, in the main, at locations occupied jointly by RMC, the employer involved in the dispute, and neutral employers. See, generally, Local 761, etc. v. N.LR.B., 366 U.S. 667, 671-679. In view of this, it would be well, I feel, to set forth here, at the outset of this Decision and before considering respondents' conduct in detail, some general principles having applicability to the broad situation presented by the evidence adduced at the trial and to some of the contentions of the parties. 6 As the contentions of the General Counsel and RMC are, for the most part, similar, unless otherwise mentioned they will be referred to hereinafter as the General Counsel's contentions 7 Section 8(b)(4)(B) reads as follows: Sec. 8... (b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents- (4)(1) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is: (B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person . . Provided That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing, 8 Section 8(b)(4)(B) was enacted in 1959. It was "designed to close certain loopholes in the application of Section 8(b)(4)(A)." N.L.RB v. Section 8(b)(4)(B) is ... the product of legislative compromise and also reflects a concern with protecting labor organizations' right to exert legitimate pressure aimed at the employer with whom there is a primary dispute. This primary activity is protected even though it may seriously affect neutral third parties. Thus there are two threads to Section 8(b)(4)(B) that require disputed conduct to be classified as either "primary" or "secondary." And the tapestry that has been woven in classifying such conduct is among the labor law's most intricate. N.LR.B. v. Local 825, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, 400 U.S. 297, 303. Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act condemns certain conduct an object of which is to force or require "any person . . . to cease doing business with any other person." However, as was made clear in International Rice Milling Co. Inc., et al. v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 665, 669-673, primary conduct, including picketing even for an interdicted object is not unlawful. "Plainly, the object of all picketing at all times is to influence third persons to withhold their business or services from the struck employer. In this respect there is no distinction between lawful primary picketing and unlawful secondary picketing." Schultz Refrigerated Serv- ice, Inc., 87 NLRB 502, 505. The interference with business relationships adverted to in Schultz "is the necessary consequence of the purest form of primary activity [and is] clearly protected. Likewise secondary activity could have such a limited goal and the foreseeable result of the conduct could be, while disruptive, so slight that the `cease doing business' requirement is not met." Operating Engineers, supra, at 304. Accordingly, there is no violation of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act unless there is a concurrence of unlawful conduct and proscribed object.11 In recognition of this principle RMC states in its brief "even if the union's objective is within the literal meaning of section 8(b)(4)(B), if the [conduct] is legitimate primary activity, it is not unlawful." Respondent Teamsters Union has admitted that the Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 51. 9 "The gravamen of a second boycott is that its sanctions bear, not upon the employer who alone is a party to the dispute, but upon some third party who has no concern in it. Its aim is to compel him to stop business with the employer in the hope that this will induce the employer to give in to his employees' demands." International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501, v. N.LR.B, 181 F.2d 34,37 (C.A. 2); affd 341 U.S. 694. 10 "[0Ine of the most important, but one of the most elusive distinctions embedded in our labor law [is] the distinction between `primary' and `secondary' union activity under Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the . . . Act." Local 742, United Brotherhood of Carpenters etc., et a!. v. N.LR. B., et at 444 F.2d 895 (C.A.D.C.) 11 A & B Plumbing, Inc., 171 NLRB No. 66; L G Electric Contractors, Inc., 154 NLRB 766; and Tayloe Glass Company, 180 NLRB No 42, decided in reliance upon L G Electric, appear to be to the contrary. They seem to hold that notwithstanding lawful picketing, a union violates Section 8(b)(4)(B) if it expressly states to a neutral person that an object of the picketing is to cause that person to cease doing business with the struck employer. These cases, however, are not in accord with the weight of authority. Moreover, in Estes Express Lines, Inc., 181 NLRB No. 121; and Quality Roofing Company, 169 NLRB 1014, both of which presented facts similar to L G Electric, the doctrine seenungly enunciated in L. G. Electric was not followed. Furthermore, in every decision in which the Board cited L G. Electric or A & B Plumbing for the proposition set forth above in this footnote, except Tayloe Glass, there was conduct which tainted the picketing. 268 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD object of its picketing and other conduct is to put RMC out of business. Because, realistically, this object can be effectuated only by causing customers of RMC to "cease doing business" with RMC, the General Counsel, on brief, urges me to find "all picketing [unlawful] wherever it occurr[ed]," except that which might have taken place at RMC's office or plant. However, were I to do so without considering whether the picketing was primary or second- ary I would have to give the statute an unwarranted broad reading and ignore the teaching of Operating Engineers, Rice Milling, and Schultz. Unlike the situation presented in Operating Engineers, where the Court noted that "the normally difficult task of classifying union conduct [within the framework of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act was there] easy," here the situation is normal. The "task of classifying [respondents'] conduct," especially the picketing, is "difficult." As will appear, all the picketing complained of occurred at common sites, "i.e., . . . where a neutral employer is engaged along with the primary employer [RMC 1 in different activities on the same premises." N.L.R.B. v. International Hod Carriers, Building and Common Laborers' Union etc., 285 F.2d 397, 400 (C.A. 8), cert. denied 366 U.S. 903. Foreshadowing the "legislative compromise" which later produced Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act and "balanc- ing the right of a union to picket at the site of its dispute as against the right of a secondary employer to be free from picketing in a controversy in which it is not directly involved," the Board in Moore Dry Dock Company, 92 NLRB 547, 549, established standards to assist in deter- mining when picketing at common sites is pnmary. These are: (a) The picketing is strictly limited to times when the situs of the dispute is located on the secondary employer's premises; (b) [A]t the time of the picketing the primary employer is engaged in its normal business at the situs; (c) [T]he picketing is limited to places reasonably close to the location of the situs; (d) [T]he picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is with the primary employer. Where all the foregoing conditions are met the picketing is clothed with a "presumption of legality [rebuttable] by other relevant evidence disclosing that the true objective of the picketing was the enmeshment of neutrals." Jones and Jones, Inc., 158 NLRB 549, 553. Care must be exercised to avoid a mechanical applica- tion of the Moore Dry Dock criteria for lawful common situs picketing. "These standards," as the Board made plain in Plauche Electric, Inc., 135 NLRB 250, 255, "are not to be applied on an indiscriminate `per se' basis, but are to be regarded merely as [commonsense] aids in determining the underlying question of statutory violation." Following this rationale, the Board has refused to find violations of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act notwithstanding a failure of 12 The cases cited in the text are not intended to be inclusive. They are set forth merely as examples 13 The purpose of these findings is to furnish a frame of reference within which to consider the facts relating to respondents' alleged unfair labor practices and the conclusions to which they may give rise. To the extent that the contentions of the parties relate specifically to the findings made here they will be treated here, although they, as well as the findings, may again compliance with Moore Dry Dock standards where the evidence disclosed that, overall, the picketing was not designed to extend beyond the primary employer. Con- versely, the Board has found violations despite literal compliance with those standards where the union's other conduct at the picketed site indicated that its main purpose was to enmesh neutrals in its dispute. Thus, in Timber Buildings, Inc., 176, NLRB No. 17; New Power Wire and Electric Corp., 144 NLRB 1089, 1093, affd. 340 F.2d 71 (C.A. 2); and Plauche the Board concluded that picketing at common sites during the absence of pnmary employees was not unlawful. A similar conclusion as to the lawfulness of picketing was reached in Reilly Cartage, Inc., 183 NLRB No. 39, despite the fact that the picketing did not take place in the immediate vicinity of the area in which the primary employees were working. On the other hand, although there was ostensible conformity with Moore Dry Dock criteria in Roger W. Peters Construction Co. Inc., 168 NLRB 606, '610-611; Eastern New York Construction Employers, Inc., 153 NLRB 993, 994-995; Northwestern Construction of Washington, 152 NLRB 975, 980-981; and Riss & Company, Inc., 130 NLRB 943, 948-950, enfd. 300 F.2d 317 (C.A. 3), the Board found the picketing to be violative of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act.12 C. Preliminary Findings and Conclusions 13 1. The dispute between respondent Teamsters Union and RMC RMC has been furnishing concrete to contractors in the construction industry since at least 1956. It is one of the two suppliers of concrete in Fond du Lac, the other being Lakeview Sand and Gravel Company (herein called Lakeview), whose employees have been represented, at all material times by respondent Teamsters Union. Before August 1970 Leo Geis, the present president of RMC, owned 20 percent of the stock of RMC, was one of its officers, and sat on its board of directors . Since its organization, Geis, alone, has been RMC's manager. In this capacity Geis has had complete control over the day- to-day operations of RMC. In August 1970 Geis and his wife became the sole stockholders of RMC. Upon their acquisition of all the stock of RMC, Geis became its president, secretary, and treasurer; and his wife assumed the office of vice president. Geis has continued in his role as manager of RMC and continues to control its day-to-day affairs. Fond du Lac is a relatively small community.14 In view of this, and Geis' long held position as manager of RMC, one of the city's two dealers in concrete, it is reasonable to believe that his relationship to, and identification with, RMC is well known to employers and employees engaged in the construction industry in Fond du Lac.15 I find, therefore, that all references to Geis in connection with the be considered in other contexts. 14 As reported by the Bureau of the Census, U.S Department of Commerce, the 1970 Census of Population & Housing showed that there were 35,330 people living in Fond du Lac when that census was taken 15 Cf. Fairbank Knitting Mill, Inc, 134 NLRB 951, 956, Holland Manufacturing Company, 129 NLRB 776, 777, 783-784, enfd. 292 F.2d 840 (CA 3), and Atlas Engine Works, Inc, 129 NLRB 101, 102, 107, among GENERAL TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 126 269 dispute between RMC and respondent Teamsters Union are tantamount to references to RMC. The employees of RMC were represented by respondent Teamsters Union until 1968. During this period a friend- ship developed between Geis and William Wetzel, then secretary-treasurer of respondent Teamsters Union. In 1968 respondent Teamsters Union struck RMC in furtherance of a contract dispute. While the strike was in progress respondent Teamsters Union was decertified as the collective-bargaining representative of RMC's employ- ees. Within the year following the election which resulted in the decertification of respondent Teamsters Union it picketed RMC, ostensibly to protest RMC's substandard wages and working conditions. While this picketing was being carried on Geis called William Wetzel, who, at the time, was still secretary-treasurer of respondent Teamsters Union, on the telephone. In the ensuing conversation, which William Wetzel apparently thought was "confiden- tial" and was being had "as a friend to a friend," 16 Geis asked, as he testified, for "a straight answer on what we could do to stop the picketing." In reply William Wetzel stated that if RMC's employees came "down to the union hall, [paid] up their dues, and [got] back into the union," the picketing would be discontinued. Without telling William Wetzel that he was doing so, Geis recorded this conversation. Armed with this recording RMC filed a charge (Case 30-CP-33) alleging that respondent Teamsters Union was engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(7)(B) of the Act.17 Geis' recording of his telephone conversation with William Wetzel then came to light. Upon being confronted with a transcription of this conversation, respondent Teamsters Union, on September 23, 1969, executed a stipulation providing for the entry by the Board of a consent order remedying the violations of Section 8(b)(7)(B) of the Act set forth in RMC's charge.18 An order pursuant to this agreement was entered on February 17, 1070. Among other things, it required respondent Teamsters Umon to refrain from picketing RMC for an object proscribed by Section 8(b)(7) until September 10, 1970, and'to refrain from "all picketing of [RMC] . . . at any place, for any object" until April 20, 1970.19 The knowledge that his conversation with Geis had been recorded and the recording transcribed and, in essence, made public had an adverse effect upon William Wetzel's health. Heeding the advice of his physician William Wetzel retired from his post as secretary-treasurer of respondent Teamsters Union ad his son Donald Wetzel20 succeeded to that position. Under Wetzel's leadership respondent Teamsters Union initiated a campaign to drive RMC out of business. This others, in which the Board drew an inference of knowledge by an employer of an employee's union activity based, in part, upon the fact that the employer's place of business was located in a small community. 16 G'. C. Exh. S. 17 In sum, Section 8(b)(7)(B) prohibits organizational or recognitional picketing within a year of the holding of a representation election is Although, the terms of the stipulation do not appear in the record, an assumption may be made that its provisions were similar to those appearing in the Board's subsequent order. 19 G.C. Exh. 3. was done, as Wetzel related, "because the actions taken by Mr. Geis in betraying a friend was very detrimental to his health, and after physical examination . . . the doctors immediately decided that my father had to retire or take the chances of dying, so . . . he took the early retirement and retired." In planning the campaign Wetzel did not seek the advice of any other labor organization. Nor did he or any other representative of respondent Teamsters Union discuss it with agents of any other labor organization or inform them of the course of action which respondent Teamsters Union intended to follow.21 The reason for this, as Wetzel stated, was that the matter was the "problem" of respondent Teamsters Union and that in the past "where [respondent Teamsters Union] thought [it was ] running a good, clean, legitimate cam- paign" it had experienced "some very bad situations and [a] lawsuit" because agents of other unions "without .. . authority [of respondent Teamsters Union] went out and said things which . . . tainted [its] campaign . . . there- fore, we did not inform them of anything . . . if they knew nothing, they could say nothing." Furthermore, respondent Teamsters Union did not, except in two instances to be described in detail in a later section of this Decision, ask for assistance from any other labor organization and when other labor organizations offered to help, the offers were refused. Having agreed in the stipulation settling the charge filed by RMC under Section 8(b)(7)(B) of the Act to refrain from picketing RMC "for any object" until April 20, 1970, respondent Teamsters Union began its campaign to put RMC out of business in another manner. In about November 1969 respondent Teamsters Union published two different leaflets describing its past relationship with RMC and Geis' recording of his telephone conversation with William Wetzel, its former secretary-treasurer. At the end of each leaflet two questions were posed. In one the questions were: "The next time you receive a phone call from [Geis], will you wonder why he called you and who else is listening? For that matter, do you want to support this man by patronizing his firm?" 22 In the other leaflet the following questions appeared: "Do you want to support [Geis ] by patronizing his firm-Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc.? Do you trust Leo Geis?" 23 More than 3,000 copies of each leaflet were distributed by mail and handed out on the streets of Fond du Lac. Their recipients included business firms of all types, construction contractors, construction employees, employ- ees of industrial and commercial establishments, officials and members of labor organizations, and 'people in general.24 As its campaign against RMC wore on, respondent Teamsters Umon began, after April 20, 1970, to picket 20 All subsequent references to Wetzel without stating a first name relate to Donald Wetzel. 21 The findings concerning the manner in which respondent Teamsters Union prosecuted its campaign against RMC being made here will be again considered in connection with the complaint's allegations that "Respon- dents have been engaged in a joint venture in furtherance of [Respondent Teamsters I labor dispute with [RMC l." 22 G C. Exh. 4. 23 G.C Exh. 5. 24 The complaint does not allege, nor does the General Counsel contend, (Continued) 270 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD RMC at construction sites at which it supplied concrete. Except in one instance, the pickets were either business representatives of respondent Teamsters Union or persons hired by it to picket. The picket signs, like the leaflets distributed by respon- dent Teamsters Union, referred to Geis' recording of his telephone conversation with its former secretary-treasurer, William Wetzel.25 Thus, some signs stated: Leo Geis, president of Ready-Mixed, bugs private telephones. Leo Geis, president of FDL Redi-Mixed, Inc., bugs private telephones. Other signs were framed in the form of questions, and, like the leaflets, asked: Do you trust Leo Geis? Would you help a man who betrayed a friend? Donald Wetzel, the present secretary-treasurer of re- spondent Teamsters Union, formulated rules for the guidance of the pickets. They were instructed to picket only when RMC's trucks and employees were present at the construction site and to walk along the full frontage of the site on abutting public streets. The pickets were further instructed not to block entrances or exits to the site; not to do anything which might cause people to refuse to enter, or to remain on, the site; not to talk to anyone; and not to reply to any questions. Instead of answering questions the pickets were directed to give the questioner a slip of paper containing the telephone number of respondent Teamsters Union and a request that the recipient call that number for information concerning the picketing. On one occasion Wetzel received a report that a hired picket, in violation of his instructions, had spoken to someone while picketing. Notwithstanding the picket's denial that he had done so, and without attempting to verify the accuracy of the report, Wetzel, apparently out of an abundance of caution, immediately discharged the picket. 2. Workshops, Inc.26 As already noted, Workshops is a nonprofit corporation. Its mission, charitable in nature, is to rehabilitate and train handicapped people. For instructional purposes Workshops obtains materials and some subcontracts from industrial concerns in Fond du Lac. This work is secured for Workshops by its staff, members of its board of directors, and other persons, including some representatives of labor organizations.27 Although Workshops tries to place its trainees in suitable jobs, it does not seek employment for them in the building industry because of their mental or physical inability, as the case may be, to perform construction work. Workshops has been located in Fond du Lac since about 1962. On two occasions shortly after it began its operations that the publication and distribution of these leaflets constituted unfair labor practices. 25 Not all signs were carried at all sites at which picketing occurred, but one or more were displayed at each site. 26 The complaint alleges the commission of unfair labor practices in connection with the construction of a new building for Workshops. 27 There is no evidence showing that labor organization representatives who procurred work for Workshops did so in their official capacities. 28 The full name of each of these respondents , as set forth in the caption there Workshops' facilities required extensive repair. In each instance John Sharkey and Harold LaShay, respec- tively business representatives of respondents Plumbers Union and Laborers Union,28 were instrumental in persuading members of their unions and of other construc- tion unions to work on these projects without wages. When Workshops began to make plans for the erection of a new building, Sharkey, who was then serving on its board of directors, became a member of its building committee. In view of the help given to Workshops by members of construction unions in connection with the repair of its old building "several of the people on the committee felt," as Sharkey testified, "that it should go union a hundred percent." This position was adopted by the building committee. However, the contract for the erection of the building, as ultimately let, although providing for the engagement of union contractors exclu- sively, contained no similar provision regarding material- men. To help finance its new building Workshops established a building fund. Sharkey solicited and obtained contrib- utions to this fund from respondent Plumbers Union, of which he was a business representative, and its members and from many other labor organizations and their members. In doing so Sharkey represented, in accordance with the resolution of Workshops' building committee, that only union people would be involved in the construction of Workshops' new building. In this regard, as Sharkey related, he gave the people from whom he sought donations to the building fund "the understanding that it would be one hundred percent union." RMC and Lakeview,29 the only suppliers of concrete in Fond du Lac, also contributed, in almost like amounts, to Workshops' building fund. Because of this, Workshops' board of directors, apparently without Sharkey's knowl- edge, asked its general contractor to divide the concrete orders equally between RMC and Lakeview and the contractor acquiesced. RMC began to deliver concrete to Workshops' building site on June 29, 1970. Receiving a report to this effect early on the morning of that day and having been reprimanded by a member of respondent Plumbers Union for, as Sharkey, its business representative, testified, "lying [when he said] that everything [in connection with the building] was going to be union," Sharkey decided to picket at the site. To this end Sharkey put a blank picket banner in his car, intending to write an appropriate legend on the sign when he arrived at the project. Before leaving his office, however, Sharkey called Michael Ahern, the president of Workshops' board of directors. He told Ahern that RMC's trucks were on the building site, and as Ahern testified, "that he [Sharkey] felt he had been double crossed by somebody on the board of of the complaint, as amended, is Local #206, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, and Local 1086 International Hod Carriers, Building and Common Laborers Union of America, AFL-CIO. For convenience they will be referred to in the manner set forth in the text. 29 It will be remembered that Lakeview's employees, unlike RMC's, are represented by respondent Teamsters Union. GENERAL TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 126 directors," in view of the decision by the building committee "that it would be an all-union job." As Ahern further testified, Sharkey "was very upset and said that he was going to go over and start picketing the job." After trying unsuccessfully, over the telephone, to dissuade Sharkey from doing this, Ahern asked Sharkey to wait for him so that they could drive to the site together. Sharkey agreed. While traveling from Sharkey's office to the project Ahern again tried to dissuade Sharkey from picketing, but was equally unsuccessful. Sharkey continued to insist that he had been "doubled crossed" by Workshops' use of concrete supplied by RMC. In this connection, Sharkey suggested that the unions which had contributed to Workshops' building fund upon his representations con- cerning the union nature of the construction would withdraw their support. Upon their arrival at the site Sharkey and Ahern found that Eugene Rickmeier, a business representative of respondent Teamsters Union, was already picketing. Sharkey asked Rickmeier for a picket sign. Rickmeier refused to give him one, told Sharkey that his help was not needed, and asked him to leave. Nevertheless, Sharkey took a sign making reference to Geis, RMC's president, from Rickmeier's car and began to picket on one of the streets abutting the project. Sharkey picketed for about 30 minutes. When he started an RMC truck was on the site and it was shortly followed by two others. Sharkey stopped picketing and left the project either upon the departure of the second truck or while the third was still on the site. Sharkey's picketing was not authorized in advance by respondent Plumbers Union, nor did it subsequently approve his picketing. On the contrary, the executive board of respondent Plumbers Union reprimanded Sharkey because he picketed. As Sharkey stated in this connection, that body gave him "a good chewing out." Sharkey left the site with Howard Searl, another member of Workshops' board of directors, who had arrived while he was picketing. In a discussion related to his reason for picketing Sharkey told Scarf, as the latter testified, that he "had been, promised . . . that it would be an all union job"; that he had made this representation to the members of respondent Plumbers Union and to members of other unions when soliciting contributions to Workshops' build- ing fund from them; and that "this whole thing [had] made a fool of [him and made him] look like a fool among [his] fellow members." Later in the day30 Sharkey attended an emergency meeting of Workshops' building committee. Sharkey repeated to them much of what he had earlier told Searl concerning his picketing. He also informed the committee that he was "disturbed" because he had been "lied to" when it "promised" him that the construction of Work- shops' new building "was to be a totally union job."31 For these reasons Sharkey announced that he was resigning from the building committee and from Work- 30 All the events set forth in the instant section of this Decision took place on June 29, 1970. 31 The findings in this paragraph are based on a synthesis of, and the quotations are taken from, testimony given by Sharkey and Searl. 271 shops' board of directors and that he would no longer assist Workshops in any of its functions.32 A similar remark concerning the withdrawal of assistance from Workshops was made on the same day by LaShay, a business representative of respondent Laborers Union, in a conversation with an official of Workshops' general contractor. The General Counsel contends that Sharkey's picketing violated Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act because it did not comport with the standards for lawful common situs picketing appearing in Moore Dry Dock Company, 92 NLRB 547, 549. The General Counsel further contends that respondent Plumbers Union is liable for Sharkey's conduct because he is one of its business representatives. "The only unfair labor practices to which [Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act] applies are such practices of a `labor organization or its agents.' " Di Giorgio Fruit Corporation, et al. v. N.L.R.B., 191 F.2d 642, 644 (C.A.D.C.), cert. denied 342 U.S. 869. Accordingly, had Sharkey picketed Workshops' construction site as an agent of respondent Plumbers Union or some other respondent, an inquiry into the manner in which his picketing was carried on would be relevant. But this is not the case. It is crystal clear from the evidence that Sharkey, although a representative of respondent Plumbers Union, was not picketing as an agent of that labor organization or any other labor organization, but as an individual giving vent to his outrage at having been, he thought, lied to and made a fool of by Workshops. It is equally clear that although Sharkey picketed with a sign mentioning Geis, RMC's president, he was not picketing RMC but was, in fact, picketing Workshops to support his protest against it for his supposed shabby treatment. This being so, it cannot be said that respondent Plumbers Union or any other respondent violated Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act by Sharkey's picketing, regardless of the manner in which it was carried on. The same considerations apply to the remarks by Sharkey and LaShay, business representative of respondent Laborers Union, characterized as threats in the complaint, relating to the withdrawal of their support from Workshops. Accordingly, I conclude that the General Counsel has not established that respondent Plumbers Union violated Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act by reason of the picketing of the building under construction for Workshops engaged in by Sharkey, a business representative of respondent Plumbers Union. I further conclude that the General Counsel has not established that respondents Plumbers Union and Laborers Union, or either of them, violated Section 8(b)(4)(B) by reason of statements made by Sharkey and LaShay, a business representative of respon- dent Laborers Union, concerning the discontinuance of their support of Workshops. I shall, therefore, recommend that paragraph 17, insofar as it refers to the picketing by respondent Plumbers Union, paragraph '19, and the relating portions of paragraph 27, 28, 29, and 30 of the complaint be dismissed. 32 An interesting sidelight to this is that notwithstanding his avowed refusal at this meeting to be of assistance to Workshops, in January 1971, Sharkey materially assisted Workshops in obtaining a substantial grant from the United Fund. 272 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 3. The alleged joint venture The complaint alleges that "Respondents have been engaged in a joint venture in furtherance of [Respondent Teamsters'] dispute with [RMC]." Some findings have already been made concerning the manner in which respondent Teamsters Union carried on its campaign to drive RMC out of business. These findings show that labor organizations operating in Fond du Lac were aware of the campaign and the reasons for its institution. They also show that in its efforts to bring about the demise of RMC respondent Teamsters Union did not seek the advice of any other respondent, did not discuss or plan its campaign with them, did not inform them of the course of action it intended to follow, and spurned their offers of assistance. Although, as will be seen, some respondents engaged in conduct which might be said to have been of help to respondent Teamsters Union in effectuating its avowed purpose of putting RMC out of business ,33 this was not done with the knowledge or connivance of respondent Teamsters Union ; nor, except in two instances, did it seek such aid. The two situations in which assistance from other respondents was sought by respondent Teamsters Union occurred through happenstance and inadvertence, rather than through joint planning, and one was aborted. Both involved picketing. On November 18, 1970, Eugene Rickmeier and Warren Tupper, respectively business representatives of respon- dents Teamsters Union and Local # 139 , International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO (herein called Engineers Union) were, together, inspecting building jobs at which members of their unions were working. Upon their arrival at the Fond du Lac County Mental Health Center (herein called Health Center) construction project RMC's trucks were there delivering concrete . Tupper entered the site to transact his business and Rickmeier went to his office to obtain picket signs and to look for one of respondent Teamsters Union 's hired pickets to picket RMC's trucks with him at the project. Being unable to find a hired picket or any other representative of respondent Teamsters Union , Rickmeier returned to the Health Center construction site and asked Tupper to join him in picketing. Tupper agreed and both picketed as long as RMC's trucks remained at the site. While Tupper was so engaged he was asked by Geis, RMC's president, what the reason was for his picketing. Tupper's answer was, as Geis testified, "birds of a feather stick together." Getting back to his office, Rickmeier made arrangements for representatives of two other respondents , Laborers Union and Local #782, United Brotherhood of Carpen- ters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO (herein called Carpenters Union), to picket at the Health Center project the next day. Rickmeier then informed Donald Wetzel, secretary-treasurer of respondent Teamsters Union, that Tupper had picketed that day and that he planned to picket the next day with representatives of respondents 33 These incidents will be discussed in a later section of this Decision. 34 This being the case, no respondent will be held responsible for unfair Laborers Union and Carpenters Union. At this, as Rickmeier testified, Wetzel "really blew his cool" and told Rickmeier that he did not "want anybody involved in this damn thing but us." Wetzel ended his tirade against Rickmeier , characterized by the latter, as a "pretty good [eating] out," by giving him "[emphatic ] instructions . . . to just use only our people [as pickets]." Having been thus emphatically instructed, Rickmeier canceled the arrangements he had made for the next days's picketing. To establish a joint venture it must be demonstrated that the venturers participated in a planned course of action, jointly conceived, coordinated, and adopted to attain a mutually agreed upon object . Cf. Fox Valley Material Suppliers Association, Inc., 176 NLRB No. 51; Frank A. Calhoun, 174 NLRB No. 185. Significant indicia of a joint venture appear in Overnite Transportation Company, 130 NLRB 1007, 1017. There, several unions were found to have been parties to a joint venture to organize Overnite's employees on evidence showing that they engaged "in synchronized action" to attain their common goal, "held joint meetings to discuss . . . progress . . . and to plan courses of action," "agreed to conduct and join in a strike against Overnite, and upon the time to begin it," and "carried [picket signs bearing ] the name of each of the involved" labor organizations . None of these factors is present here. As proof that the other respondents made common cause with respondent Teamsters Union in its campaign to drive RMC out of business, the General Counsel points to the picketing of the Health Center project by Tupper, a representative of respondent Engineers Union; to his statement, while picketing, that "birds of a feather stick together"; and to assistance given to respondent Teamsters Union by other respondents. Tupper's picketing was, however, completely accidental and not the result of a plan conceived and adopted jointly by respondents Teamsters Union and Engineers Union ; his "birds of a feather" remark is too equivocal to serve as a foundation for a joint venture finding; and the assistance furnished by other respondents to respondent Teamsters Union was not sought, or knowingly accepted, by the latter. Although the General Counsel has not done so, RMC argues, on brief, that the attempt by Rickmeier, a business representative of respondent Teamsters Union, to enlist representatives of respondents Carpenters Union and Laborers Union to serve as pickets at the Health Center construction site shows that those respondents "had joined in the labor dispute," and that respondent Teamsters Union "made [itself ] responsible for the conduct of the trades business representatives in furtherance of the Teamsters picketing." However, Rickmeier's efforts in this direction, were completely inadvertent and, moreover, were effectively aborted by respondent Teamsters Union before they could be brought to fruition. Accordingly, I conclude that the General Counsel has not established that respondents engaged in a joint venture to further the campaign of respondent Teamsters Union.34 labor practices committed by any other respondent . However, any respondent shown by the evidence to have violated Sec. 8(bX4)(B) of the GENERAL TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 126 I shall, therefore recommend the dismissal of paragraph 14 of the complaint to the extent that it alleges a joint venture. D. Facts Concerning Respondents' Alleged Unfair Labor Practices Related to Picketing The complaint alleges that Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act was violated by the manner in which picketing in support of the campaign by respondent Teamsters Union against RMC was conducted at four construction locations in Fond du Lac; namely, the Lee Beverage warehouse, where Gross Construction Co. Inc., was the general contractor; the new building being erected for Workshops by Rosen- thal Construction Company, Inc., as general contractor; the terminal of Gross Common Carrier, Inc. (herein called the Gross Terminal), where Gross Construction was installing a new floor; and the Health Center, where Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc., was general contractor. The facts respecting the picketing at each of these locations will be separately considered. However, four factors were common to all picketing. The first is that at no place where picketing was carried on were the pickets invited to enter the premises and picket in the immediate vicinity of RMC's trucks and thus minimize the impact of the picketing on neutral employers and their employees. The second common factor, related in part to the first, is that at all picketed sites the pickets, at times, were closer to neutral employees than to employees of RMC. The third common factor is that the pickets could be seen by RMC's employees from the places where they performed their work at the sites at which picketing occurred. Finally, the fourth factor common to all the picketing is that at no site where picketing was carried on was there a driveway set aside for the exclusive use of RMC. 1. Lee Beverage warehouse The Lee Beverage warehouse is bounded on the north by Horseshoe Lane and on the west by Moms Street, both public ways. Two driveways on Morris Street gave access to the warehouse during its construction. Both of these were used by RMC's trucks. RMC's trucks also entered upon, and departed from, the project by crossing the curbing on Morris Street (herein called the curb crossway) south of the southern driveway on that street. On May 20, 1970,35 Donald Wetzel, secretary-treasurer of respondent Teamsters Union, picketed on Morris Street respondent shown by the evidence to have violated Sec 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act will be held liable, individually, for its unfair labor practices. 35 All dates subsequently mentioned without stating a year fall within 1970. 36 My findings as to the hunts of Wetzel's picketing are based on a synthesis of the testimony given by him and by two truckdnvers employed by RMC, Norbert Giebel and Sylvester Huck. To the extent that Leo Geis, RMC's president, gave evidence to the contrary it is not believed. 3' My findings as to the time during which Wetzel picketed are based on his testimony Huck, who drove the second RMC truck gave testimony differing from Wetzel's in one detail. Huck testified that he drove off the project through the curb crossway and turned north on Morris Street. Huck testified further that as he crossed Horseshoe Lane, which he judged to be about 100 to 300 yards from the construction site and which he reached within a period of time estimated by him as being "less than a minute," or perhaps "two or three minutes," he looked in his rear view mirror and saw 273 from the southern edge of the north driveway to the point at which RMC's trucks crossed the curbing 36 Wetzel picketed at this location during the presence on the site of two RMC trucks. When none was there Wetzel sat in his car which was parked on Moms Street, a few yards south of the north driveway. Upon the departure from the site of RMC's second truck Wetzel stopped picketing.37 Respondent Teamsters Union did not again picket at the Lee Beverage warehouse construction site. 2. Workshops' new building Workshops' new building is bounded on the east by Brooke Street, and on the north by Forest Avenue. Brooke Street and Forest Avenue are public streets on each of which there was, at material times, one driveway through which access to the project was gained. RMC's trucks entered and left the site through the driveway on Forest Avenue and also by crossing the curbing on Brooke Street (herein called the curb crossway) at a point between the driveway on that street and Forest Avenue. Pursuant to an arrangement between Rosenthal, Work- shops' general contractor, and RMC concrete was to be continuously poured at the project during the morning of June 29, 1970. As it happened, however, there was a hiatus of about 20 minutes between the departure of each RMC truck and the arrival of the next one. On June 29, while the first RMC truck was on the premises, Eugene Rickmeier, a business representative of respondent Teamsters Union, began to picket on Brooke Street, patrolling from its intersection with Forest Avenue to the southern edge of the building under construction. In following this path Rickmeier passed in front of the Brooke Street curb crossway. While picketing Rickmeier carried his sign high. Upon the departure of the first RMC truck from the site, Rickmeier reversed his sign and carried it so that the placard was close to the ground. With his sign held in this position Rickmeier walked to his car, which was parked on Brooke Street, south of Workshops' property line. With the coming of the second RMC truck Rickmeier resumed his picketing on Brooke Street in the manner described. When that truck left Rickmeier again discontinued his picketing, reversed his sign, and walked to his car. Ric'kmeier once more picketed on Brooke Street upon the arrival of the third RMC truck.38 Rickmeier stopped picketing at the Workshops' site Wetzel picketing "directly in front of his" car. The upshot of this testimony, assuming its truth, is that Wetzel continued to picket for not more than 3 minutes after Huck left the site. Assuming further that Wetzel was not actually walking to his car to await the arrival of the next RMC truck, Wetzel's picketing for this very short period of time can, be disregarded under the familiar doctrine of de minimis, there being no evidence that Wetzel continued to picket after Huck crossed Horseshoe Lane. 38 My findings concerning the time and manner of Rickmeier's picketing is based on his testimony as well as that given by John Sharkey, a business representative of Plumbers Union, who, it will be remembered, also picketed at Workshops' building project, and Norbert Gieblel, a truckdnver employed by RMC Giebel, who made the first delivery of concrete to the site, testified that "as [he ] was leaving the job ... after delivering the first load [Rtckmeier and Sharkey ] walked over to a car" James Rosenthal, Howard Searl, and Sylvester Huck, respectively, an official of Workshops' general contractor, a member of Workshops' board of directors, and an (Continued) 274 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD when the third RMC truck left. Since then there has been no picketing at that project by any respondent. 3. Gross Terminal The Gross Terminal is bounded on the west by Satterlee Street and on the south by Johnson Street, both public streets. On Johnson Street, somewhat east of the terminal building is a driveway through which RMC's trucks entered, and departed from, the premises. This driveway is also used by the employees and customers of an automo- bile body shop. Attached to the west side of the building is a loading platform at which trucks receive and discharge freight, which is taken into, and out of, the terminal through large doors in the west wall. At material times there was a wide opening at approxi- mately the midpoint of the east wall of the building. Satterlee Street could be seen through this opening, if the freight doors were not closed, notwithstanding that trucks might be parked at the loading dock. In making deliveries to the Gross Terminal, RMC's trucks were driven through the driveway on Johnson Street to the opening in the east wall. By means of a chute, concrete was poured from the trucks through the opening and received inside the building in wheelbarrows. On November 17, 1970, while RMC's trucks were at the terminal, respondent Teamsters Union stationed a picket on the abutting streets. The picket on Johnson Street patrolled from the western edge of the driveway to a point about even with the center of the south wall of the building. The picket on Satterlee Street walked a path roughly equal- to the building frontage on that street 39 The truckdrivers employed by RMC who came to the site saw the picket on Satterlee Street through the opening in the terminal's east wall while they were pouring concrete. As earlier noted, the driveway on Johnson Street used by RMC's drivers was also used by the employees and customers of an automobile body shop. Because it did not want to interfere with the business of this enterprise, respondent Teamsters Union instructed the Johnson Street picket not to walk in front of the driveway. 4. Health Center The western boundary of the Health Center project is Vincent Street and First Street is its southern boundary. RMC truckdriver, testified that Rickmeler picketed at times when there were no RMC trucks on the project Rosenthal stated that Rickmeier continued to picket in the interval between the departure of the first truck and the arrival of the second. The weight of Rosenthal's testimony, however, is greatly diminished by his having been, during much of the time in question, in the construction office, remotely situated from Brooke Street, making and receiving telephone calls. Furthermore, Rosenthal testified that once when he came out of the construction office he saw Rickmeier and Sharkey, who had been picketing on Forest Avenue, walking together on Brooke Street in the direction of Rickmeiei's car. Taking Rosenthal's testimony as a whole and synthesizing it with that given by Rickmerer, Sharkey and Giebel, I believe Rosenthal misinterpreted what he observed Rickmeier was not picketing when Rosenthal saw him on Brooke Street after the departure of the first RMC truck. Rickmeier and Sharkey were, in fact, walking toward Rickmerer's car to await the arrival of the next RMC truck. Searl testified that there was picketing for a "very short time [not] more than a few minutes" when there was no RMC truck on the site Huck testified that upon completing his delivery he drove off the project through the curb crossway, turned north on Brooke Street, and as he was crossing Both are public streets. At material times there were two driveways on Vincent Street and four on First Street, all giving access to the site. The two easternmost driveways on First Street (herein called the parking lot driveways) also led to an area being prepared to serve as a parking lot. All driveways were used by RMC's trucks in entering, and leaving, the project. In addition to entering, and leaving, the site through the driveways, RMC's trucks also did so by crossing the curbing at various points on First Street. On several days in November and December 1970 picketing was carried on at the project while RMC's trucks were present. Except for November 18, the first day on which picketing took place, the pickets were business representatives of, or people hired by, respondent Team- sters Union. On November 18, as has already been found, Warren Tupper, a business representative of respondent Engineers Union, was one of two pickets. The other was Eugene Rickmeier, a business representative of respondent Teamsters Union. Picketing took place on November 18, 20, and 30, and on December 2. On each of those days First Street was patrolled from its intersection with Vincent Street west- ward to the western edge of the east parking lot driveway. On November 20 the south driveway on Vincent Street was picketed.40 On November 30 there was picketing on Vincent Street from its intersection with First Street northward to the north driveway. E. Contentions and Concluding Findings Concerning Respondents' Alleged Unfair Labor Practices Related to Picketing In an earlier portion of this Decision I rejected what appears to be the General Counsel's main contention that all the picketing disclosed by the evidence, regardless of the manner in which it was conducted, was unlawful because it was carried on in furtherance of an object, freely admitted by respondent Teamsters Union, proscribed by Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act. Perhaps in anticipation of this the General Counsel urges two additional theories to support his claim as to the violative nature of the picketing. Both are based on its asserted nonconformity with the Forest Avenue, a distance he estimated as being "maybe 25, 30 feet" from the curb crossway he "noticed [that Rickmeier was ] still picketing." Accepting the testimony of Searl and Huck at face value, it shows only that Rickmeier picketed in the absence of an RMC truck in one case for "a few minutes," and in the other for what must have been only a few seconds. Like the picketing at the Lee Beverage site in the absence of an RMC truck, also described by Huck (see footnote 37), the picketing here under consideration similarly falls within the de minimrs principle. Accordingly, it, too, will be disregarded. as My finding concerning the extent of the picketing on Satterlee Street is based on testimony given by Norbert Giebel, a truckdriver employed by RMC. Leo Geis, RMC's president, testified that the picket covered a longer path. However, I was more impressed with Giebel's truthfulness and powers of observation than I was with Geis'. 40 My findings concerning the picketing on Vincent Street on November 20 is based on testimony given by Norbert Giebel, a truckdnver employed by RMC. Leo Geis, RMC's president testified to more extensive picketing. I have already commented on the relative merits of Giebel's and Geis' testimony. (See fn. 39). GENERAL TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 126 275 standards for lawful common situs picketing set forth in Moore Dry Dock Company, 92 NLRB 547, 549.41 The General Counsel's first additional argument, in this regard, is that the picketing at Lee Beverage and Work- shops Construction sites was carried on during periods when no RMC trucks were there. If, contrary to my findings that this was not the case, there was, indeed, such picketing at these locations, its duration was so short as to be of no moment. Accordingly, I also reject this argument. The General Counsel's second additional point dealing with the failure of the picketing to comport with Moore Dry Dock criteria is that at times the pickets were closer to neutral employees than they were to RMC's truckdrivers. As will be seen, this contention is likewise not well taken. As I have found, at none of the sites where picketing was conducted was there a driveway set aside for the exclusive use of RMC. No driveway having been reserved for them, RMC's trucks entered, and departed from, those premises through any convenient driveway and, in the case of the Lee Beverage, Workshops and Health Center projects by driving over the curbing of abutting streets at irregular points removed from the driveways. In these circumstances Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act does not reach the picketing carried on along the public streets on which the construc- tion sites fronted. Jones and Jones, Inc., 158 NLRB 549, 550-552. The fact that the paths followed by the pickets, who were seen at all projects by RMC's employees, took them closer, at times, to areas where neutral employees were at work than to places where RMC's employees worked is not relevant here to a determination concerning the legality of the picketing.42 This was merely a nonviolative concomi- tant of the picketing, which otherwise appears to have been lawful primary picketing and did not convert it into illegal secondary picketing. To minimize the incidental effect picketing on the streets abutting the projects might have had on neutral employees who were nearer, on occasions, to the pickets than were RMC's employees, their employers, as the Board suggested in a recent case "could easily have invited the pickets to the immediate vicinity of "C's ] trucks." This not having been done, I, like the Board in that case, "cannot find that ... the picketing [on the streets] either violated the Moore Dry Dock standard requiring that picketing be limited to locations reasonably proximate to the primary situs, or otherwise evidenced a secondary objective." Reilly Car- tage, Inc., 183 NLRB No. 39. Cf. Retail Fruit Dealers' Association, 116 NLRB 856, 857, 860-861, enfd. 249 F.2d 591 (C.A. 9). Accordingly, I conclude that the General Counsel has 41 As I have already pointed out "these standards . . are not to be applied on an indiscriminate per se' basis, but are to be regarded merely as [commonsense} aids in determining the underlying question of statutory violation." Plauche Electric, Inc., 135 NLRB 250, 255. 42 The inability of primary employees working at a common site to see the pickets was deemed, in Brawn Transport Corp., 144 NLRB 590, 591, 592-593, 600-601, to be insignificant The Fifth Circuit did not agree with the Board on this point. Brown Transport Corporation v. N L KB, 334 F.2d 30, 35, 38-39. However, I am bound by the Board's view Prudential Insurance Company of America, 119 NLRB 768, 773, reversed on other grounds, 361 U.S. 477. Accordingly, even if I had found that the pickets could not be seen by RMC's employees, I would not have considered that to be a material element insofar as the General Counsel's argument here under not established that the picketing complained of violated Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act. I shall, therefore, recommend that paragraphs 16, 17, insofar as it refers to picketing by respondent Teamsters Union,43 21, 22, and the relating portions of paragraphs 27, 28, 29, and 30 of the complaint be dismissed. F. Facts Concerning Respondents' Alleged Unfair Labor Practices Unrelated to Picketing In addition to alleging violations of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act by the manner in which picketing was carried on, the complaint asserts that Section 8(b)(4)(B ) was violated in other respects. The incidents involved in these allega- tions occurred at the place where the Oakfield Elementary Learning Center (herein called the Oakfield School) was under construction, at the Health Center project, and at a prejob conference held in connection with the erection of a warehouse to be occupied upon completion by the Badger Liquor Company (herein called Badger). As was done with respect to the alleged picketing violations, each of the events will be separately considered. However, it is patent that an object of all the conduct to be considered below, whether or not found to be within the ambit of Section 8(b)(4)(i) or (ii) of the Act, fell within the proscription of Section 8(b)(4)(B).44 1. Oakfield School At all material times Wm. Tiede & Sons was engaged, as general contractor, in building the Oakfield School. The concrete used by Tiede on this job was furnished by RMC. Roy Schroeder was Tiede's superintendent at the Oakfield School project. He was Tiede's highest ranking official at the site and had day-to-day control over the work. Also employed there by Tiede was Donald Lecker, an apprentice carpenter. On June 30, 1970, while Schroeder and Lecker were working together at the site they were approached by Eugene Rickmeier, a business representative of respondent Teamsters Union. Rickmeier informed them that "scab concrete" was being used; suggested that concrete be obtained from a source other than RMC; and stated that unless that were done "he would possibly put up a picket," which he hoped they "would honor."45 2. Health Center Leander Olig, a member of respondent Carpenters Union, was employed by Charles D. Smith and Son, Inc., the general contractor at the Health Center project. On consideration , is concerned. 43 1 have already indicated my intention to recommend the dismissal of par 17 of the complaint insofar as it refers to picketing by respondent Plumbers Union. My recommendation here concerns the remainder of this paragraph. 44 Although this conduct, insofar as it was engaged in by respondents other than Teamsters Union, may have been designed to be of assistance to respondent Teamsters Union in its campaign to drive RMC out of business, there is no evidence to show that such help was sought or instigated by respondent Teamsters Union. 45 The quotations appearing in the text are taken from testimony given by Schroeder and Lecker. 276 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD November 18, 1970, Olig spoke to John Murray, a business representative of his union about the picketing against RMC which was then in progress at the site. Murray told Ohg, as the latter testified, that if pickets were not present when he reported for work he "should stay there and fill out the day, but if [pickets] happened to be on the job .. . any time before [he got] there [he] should honor the picket line." On December 4, Olig and Murray again discussed the picketing at the site. Also present on this occasion was Harold Van Gorder, a business representative of respon- dent Building and Construction Trades Council of Fond du Lac County (herein called the Council). During the course of this conversation Olig stated that he would continue to work, notwithstanding the picketing, unless it began before he arrived at the project. Van Gorder, however, had a different opinion. He told Olig that "as far as he was concerned [upon the appearance of a picket] we should all quit for the day and walk off the job."46 Leroy Schneider, a member of respondent Laborers Union, was also employed at the Health Center project by Smith, the general contractor. On about November 24, Eugene McEvoy, a business representative of Schneider's union, visited the site. While McEvoy was on the premises Schneider asked him what he should do if picketing started while he was already working. McEvoy replied, Schneider testified, that he could not tell Schneider what to do in such a situation "but he knew what he would do." McEvoy's version of the answer he gave to Schneider's question is a little different. McEvoy stated that he said to Schneider "don't bring [the pickets ] up to me now. You know what to do." 3. The prejob conference The Hutter Construction Co., was retained to build a warehouse in Fond du Lac for Badger Liquor Company. On November 18, 1970, before Hutter started its work for Badger, F. W. Harvath, Hutter's project manager, and Merle Failen, another Hutter official, attended a prejob conference called by Harold Van Gorder, a business representative of respondent Council.47 Also in attendance at this conference were representatives of several construc- tion unions located in Fond du Lac. When the meeting began there was no representative of respondent Teamsters Union present. The principal concern of the labor organizations whose representatives were in attendance at the conference, was to make certain that the employees of all contractors and materialmen who would be engaged at the Badger project were members of an appropriate craft union. When the subject of the concrete supplier arose, Hutter's officials stated that Hutter intended to obtain some of its concrete from RMC. Anticipating that this might cause a problem, Van Gorder asked Donald Wetzel, secretary-treasurer of 46 The findings made in this paragraph are based on, and the quotation is taken from, testimony given by Ohg, whose demeanor as a witness was above reproach Although Van Gorder admitted his participation in the conversation in question and also admitted asking Olig whether he knew what he was "supposed to do when there is a picket sign out on a project," he denied telling Olig "to honor that sign." In view of Van Gorder's respondent Teamsters Union, to join the meeting and Wetzel did so. Failen, a Hutter official, asked Wetzel, as the latter testified,48 "to give him a pass on the use of [RMC)" on the Badger work. Wetzel refused to do this, telling Failen that "if Mr. Geis and his equipment went on the job site, we will be there . . . to picket on the days that he was there."49 At this point Failen suggested that respondent Teamsters Union would be picketing Hutter at the construction site, not RMC. To this Wetzel replied, as he further testified, "You said that and not me." Wetzel then left the meeting. In addition to Wetzel, Harvath, Hutter's project manag- er, also gave evidence as to the events at the prejob conference. Except in one respect Harvath's testimony was in general agreement with Wetzel's. The point of difference consists of Harvath's statement that after saying"You said that and not me" Wetzel added "But you know what I mean." Harvath also testified that he was aware that respondent Teamsters Union had picketed at construction sites, but that he knew of no occasion when such picketing was carried on in the absence of RMC's trucks from the sites. Finally, Harvath testified that except for Failen, no one at the conference said that Hutter, rather than RMC, would be picketed. G. Contentions and Concluding Findings Concerning Respondents' Alleged Unfair Labor Practices Unrelated to Picketing 1. Oakfield School The plea made by Eugene Rickmeier, a business representative of respondent Teamsters Union, that Roy Schroeder and Donald Lecker, who were employed at the Oakfield School project "honor" a picket line directed to RMC at the site was violative of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act. This, because the thrust of Rickmeier's appeal was to induce the individuals to whom it was made, one a supervisor and the other a rank-and-file employee, to withhold their services from their employer. N.L R.B. v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 49-54. However, there being no evidence that a picket line was ever established or that the inducement offered by Rickmeier was effective, it cannot be said that Rickmeier's appeal also violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). Cf. Baughan Plumbing and Heating Company, Incorporated, 157 NLRB 20, 21. Nor, as the General Counsel urges, can Rickmeier's warning to Schroeder, the general contractor's superin- tendent, concerning the establishment of the picket line be said to be a threat within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. It can be likened to "the mere giving of notice of prospective strike action against a subcontractor to the prime contractor" This, the Board admissions, his dental lacks the ring of truth. Accordingly, I do not credit it 47 In general, the purpose of a prejob conference is to anticipate, and solve in advance, problems that may arise dunng the course of a construction job. 48 Wetzel impressed me as being an extremely credible witness. 49 Leo Geis, it will be remembered, is the president of RMC. GENERAL TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 126 277 held in Marshall & Haas, 133 NLRB 1144, 1146 "is [not] a violation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)." 2. Health Center The instructions given by John Murray and Harold Van Gorder, respectively business representatives of respon- dents Carpenters Union and Council, to Leander Olig, an employee of Smith, the general contractor at the Health Center project, to "honor" the picketing against RMC and to "walk off the job" upon the start of such picketing were so obviously violative of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) that further discussion is unnecessary. The incident involving Eugene McEvoy, a business representative of respondent Laborers Union, and Leroy Schneider, another employee of Smith, does require some discussion. McEvoy's advice to Schneider as to how to conduct himself in the event that picketing against RMC began after he started to work was in two parts. The first part consisted of McEvoy's statement that he could not tell Schneider what to do. Had McEvoy stopped at this point there would have been no violation of Section 8(b)(4)(B). Tampa Sand and Material Co., 132 NLRB 1564, 1566. However, McEvoy went further and told Schneider either that he, McEvoy, "knew what he would do," or that Schneider, himself, knew "what to do." Regardless of which statement McEvoy made, the effect is the same. Both carried the implication that upon the appearance of the pickets in support of the dispute between respondent Teamsters Union and RMC Schneider was to stop working for Smith. Howard H. Whitney, 167 NLRB 511. According- ly, each constituted inducement and encouragement within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act. As was the case with respect to the situation at the Oakfield School, there is here also an absence of evidence showing that the inducement offered to neutral employees by representatives of respondents, Carpenters Union, Council, and Laborers Union was effective. This being the case, a finding that Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act was also violated is not warranted. 3. The prejob conference Relying on testimony given by F. W. Harvath, Hutter's superintendent, that Donald Wetzel, secretary-treasurer of respondent Teamsters Umon, added to his "you said that and not me" statement the fillip "But you know what I mean," the General Counsel argues that respondent Teamsters Umon was threatening to picket Hutter, not RMC, at Hutter's Badger project. I do not agree. Wetzel's account of his remarks at the prejob conference did not include the final utterance ascribed to him by Harvath. In view of the candor which characterized Wetzel's lengthy testimony at the trial, it is my opinion that had he made the comment in question he would have mentioned it while he was on the witness stand. His not having done so leads me to find that Wetzel did not say "But you know what I mean," to Hutter's representatives. But even had Wetzel done so, there would have been no basis for concluding that a threat was being made by respondent Teamsters Union to picket Hutter, rather than RMC. On November 18, the date on which the prejob conference was held, respondent Teamsters Union had already picketed at the Lee Beverage, Workshops, and Gross Terminal construction sites. As I have found, however, and as Harvath admitted knowing, picketing was carried on only when RMC's trucks were on the premises. I have also found that the picketing in all other respects conformed to the criteria for lawful common sites picketing enunciated in Moore Dry Dock Company, 92 NLRB 547, 549. In view of this, it would not have been reasonable for anyone to assume, even had Wetzel uttered the words attributed to him by Harvath, that he was thereby threatening that respondent Teamsters Union would not picket RMC, but would picket Hutter. If any threat at all was involved in Wetzel's statement at the prejob conference, it was a threat that respondent Teamsters Union would picket at Hutter's construction site when RMC's trucks were on the project, as was its right. Wetzel's announcement that respondent Teamsters Union would do this was "nothing more than a legitimate expression [by respondent Teamsters Union] of [its] intention to exercise its unquestioned right to picket [RMC] at the neutral [employer's site ] in the lawful manner prescribed by the Board. Such statements do not constitute threats within the meaning of Section 8 (b)(4) of the Act." Estes Express Lines, Inc., 181 NLRB No. 12. In sum, I conclude as follows respecting this branch of the case: 1. Respondent Teamsters Union violated Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act, but not Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), by appealing to Donald Lecker and Roy Schroeder, both employed by Tiede, to refrain from working in the event that respondent Teamsters Union picketed at the Oakfield School construction project in support of its campaign to drive RMC out of business. 2. Respondents Carpenters Union and Council each violated Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act, but not 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), by appealing to Leander Olig, an employee of Smith, to refrain from working in the event that respondent Teamsters Union picketed at the Health Center construction project in support of its campaign to drive RMC out of business. 3. Respondent Laborers Umon violated Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act , but not Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), by appealing to Leroy Schneider, an employee of Smith, to refrain from working in the event that respondent Teamsters Umon picketed at the Health Center construc- tion project in support of its campaign to drive RMC out of business. 4. Respondent Teamsters Union did not violate Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act by informing Roy Schroeder, Tiede's superintendent, that it would picket RMC at the Oakfield School construction project. 5. Respondent Teamsters Union did not violate Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act by informing Merle Failen, a Flutter official, that it would picket RMC at the Badger construc- tion project. In view of my foregoing conclusions, I shall recommend that paragraph 20, insofar as it refers to a threat by respondent Teamsters Union, paragraph 26, and the 278 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD relating portions of paragraphs 27, 28, 29, and 30, of the complaint be dismissed. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The violations of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act by respondents Teamsters Union, Carpenters Umon, Council, and Laborers Union, as set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of RMC, Tiede, and Smith described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com- merce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that respondent Teamsters Union, Car- penters Union, Council, and Laborers Union have engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act, my recommended Order will require those respondents to cease and desist therefrom and to take such affirmative action as will effectuate the purposes of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. RMC is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) of the Act. 2. Tiede, Smith, and Hutter are persons engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4) of the Act. 3. Respondents are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 4. Respondents have not engaged, and are not engag- ing, in a joint venture in furtherance of a campaign by respondent Teamsters Union to drive RMC out of business. 5. By inducing and encouraging individuals employed by Tiede to engage in a strike or a refusal in the course of their employment to perform any services, an object thereof being to force or require Tiede to cease using, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in products supplied by RMC, and to cease doing business with RMC, respondent Teamsters Union has engaged, and is engaging, in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act. 6. By inducing and encouraging an individual em- ployed by Smith to engage in a strike or refusal in the course of his employment to perform any services, an object thereof being to force or require Smith to cease using, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in products supplied by RMC, and to cease doing business with RMC, respondents Carpenters Union and Council have engaged, and are engaging, in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act. 7. By inducing and encouraging an individual em- ployed by Smith to engage in a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to perform any services, an object thereof being to force or require Smith to cease using handling, transporting or otherwise dealing in products supplied by RMC, and to cease doing business with RMC, respondent Laborers Union has engaged, and is engaging, in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act. 8. Respondent Teamsters Union did not threaten, coerce, or restrain Tiede or Hutter within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4) of the Act. 9. Respondents Carpenters Union, Council, and La- borers Union did not threaten, coerce, or restrain Smith within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4) of the Act. 10. Respondent Teamsters Union did not engage in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act by the manner in which it picketed at the Lee Beverage, Workshops, Gross Terminal, and Health Center construction sites. 11. Respondent Engineers Union did not engage in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act by the manner in which it picketed at the Health Center construction site. 12. Respondent Plumbers Umon and Laborers Union did not engage in unfair labor practices by reason of the activities of John Sharkey and Harold LaShay in connec- tion with the erection of Workshops new building. 13. The unfair labor practices engaged in by respon- dents Teamsters Union, Carpenters Union, Council, and Laborers Union as set forth in Conclusions of Law 5, 6 and 7, above, affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommended Order omitted from publication.]