Bulk Haulers, Inc.

BULK HAULERS Bulk Haulers, Inc. and Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local 633 of New Hampshire, affiliated with international Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Ameri- ca. Case 1-CA-7998 November 22, 1972 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND PENELLO On June 9, 1972, Administrative Law Judge' Sydney S. Asher issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and Respondent filed a brief in support of the Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,2 and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed. ' The title of "Trial Examiner" was changed to "Administrative Law Judge" effective August 19, 1972. 2 We agree with the finding below that Steve Monas is not a supervisor within the meaning of the Act We note that Monas was the senior employee and the most "experienced" worker in the warehouse, and that he had been given the title of leadman . However, the uncontradicted testimony of Law and Thernaulta indicates that Monas performs routine warehouse work, is paid hourly as are the other warehouse employees; does not have the authority to hire, fire, or discipline or effectively to recommend such action, does not evaluate the employees' work; is not responsible for the daily operation of the warehouse , and makes no managerial decisions With regard to this question we attach no significance to Themaulta's ambiguous testimony that Monas could "possibly" grant time off to sick employees, since the record is clear that this is the normal duty of Warehouse Supervisor Charles McKay TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION SYDNEY S. ASHER, Trial Examiner: On December 14, 1971, Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local 633 of i In its brief, the Respondent states that the admissibility of Resp. Exit 12 for identification "was left open." This is erroneous. On page 354 of the transcript the exhibit was rejected . This ruling is reflected in the official reporter's stamp which the exhibit bears 2 The Respondent is, and at all material times has been, a New Hampshire corporation with its principal office and place of business in 389 New Hampshire, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, herein called the Union , filed charges against Bulk Haulers, Inc., Nashua, New Hampshire, herein called the Respondent. Based on these charges, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the General Counsel, on January 31 , 1972, issued a complaint alleging that since on or about December 3, 1971, the Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in certain specified respects; and that the Respondent discharged Ronald V. Hall, an employee, on or about December 9, 1971, and since then has refused to reinstate him, because he joined or assisted the Union or engaged in other concerted activities. It is alleged that this conduct violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. Sec. 151 , et seq.), herein called the Act. The Respondent filed an answer admitting that it discharged Ronald V. Hall, an employee, on or about December 9, 1971, and since then has refused to reinstate him, but denying that it did so for the reasons stated in the complaint, and denying the commission of any unfair labor practices. Upon due notice, a hearing was held before me on various dates between March 21 and April 5, 1972, both dates inclusive, at Nashua, New Hampshire . All parties were represented and participated fully in the hearing. At the close of the hearing the Respondent moved that the complaint be dismissed for lack of a prima facie case. Ruling on this motion was reserved. The motion is now granted for the reasons set forth herein . After the close of the hearing, the General Counsel and the Respondent filed briefs, which have been carefully considered. Upon the entire record,' and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT A. Preliminary Matters The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and it is found that the Respondent is, and at all material times has been, an employer engaged in commerce as defined in the Act, and its operations meet the Board's jurisdictional stand- ards.2 The parties stipulated, and it is found, that the Union is, and at all material times has been, a labor organization as defined in the Act. B. The Background Law Motor Freight has been in existence for some time. It maintains a place of business in Nashua, and is licensed by the Interstate Commerce Commission, herein called the ICC, as a common carrier. In December 1971, Law Motor Nashua, New Hampshire It is an ICC licensed contract carrier perfornung interstate freight transportation services . During the year prior to January 31, 1972, the Respondent's gross revenue from interstate operations involving firms which themselves engaged in interstate commerce exceeded $50,000. 200 NLRB No. 61 390 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Freight employed approximately 80 nonsupervisory work- ers. Law Warehouses, Incorporated, has since 1955 maintained a commercial public warehouse in Nashua. In December 1971 its working complement consisted of approximately five nonsupervisory employees. The Res- pondent, which is also based in Nashua, was incorporated in 1964 and was certified by the ICC in 1970 as a contract carrier. In December 1971 it employed approximately six nonsupervisory employees, all of whom were drivers. The Respondent and Law Motor Freight share the same terminal facilities. All three separate corporations have some common management. George B. Law, who owns half the stock of the Respondent, half the stock of Law Warehouses, and 77 percent of the stock of Law Motor Freight, is treasurer of all three. He determines the labor relations policies of each of these three concerns. In 1970 and 1971 Law Motor Freight had a collective- bargaining contract with the Union covering the working conditions of its drivers. This contained a clause requiring the employees, as a condition of employment, to join the Union within 30 days after hiring. So far as the record shows, neither the Respondent nor Law Warehouses, Incorporated, has ever recognized any union as the representative of its employees. From its inception the Respondent has had only two customers, the United States Steel Corporation and the New Hampshire State Liquor Commission, herein called the Commission. We are concerned here only with the Commission's contract, to which approximately four full- time drivers have been assigned. The Respondent's principal function under that contract is to ship liquor by motor to the Commission's warehouse in Concord, New Hampshire, from four distilleries: Heublein, Inc., in Hartford, Connecticut, 106 miles from Nashua; Fleish- mann's in Peekskill, New York, 210 miles from Nashua; Standard Brands (Seagram's) in Lasalle (Montreal), P. Q., Canada, 270 miles from Nashua; and Taylor Wines in Hammondsport, New York, 370 miles from Nashua. Under the contract the liquor must be picked up at the distilleries at an appointed hour; 3 failure to pick up on time is considered a "service failure." It is important to the Respondent that the drivers arrive at the pickup point at or before the designated times; frequent service failures can endanger the Respondent's contractual relationship with the Commission. The procedure followed by a driver on an assignment is usually as follows: The afternoon before the scheduled run, he picks up his papers. Taking into account the appoint- ment hour and predicted weather conditions, he leaves the Respondent's Nashua terminal in the early morning with a tractor hauling an empty trailer. Although the Respondent suggests a departure hour, this decision is left to the driver's discretion. Upon arrival at the pickup point (the distillery) the driver waits while the cargo is loaded into the trailer. (If it is an overnight trip, namely, Hammondsport, he will sleep for 8 hours, as required by ICC regulations.) 3 The normal appointment times are Peekskill, 8 a m.; Hartford and Montreal, 7 30 a m.; and Hammondsport, 3 or 3 30 p.m. 4 These findings are based on McKay's credited testimony. Thernault admitted asking McKay whether he had been approached by the Union, and admitted that McKay answered affirmatively. However, Thernault denied that he was the one who brought up the subject of seniority. Next, he signs papers regarding the cargo and drives the loaded trailer to the Commission's warehouse in Concord, New Hampshire. At the Commission's warehouse he drops the loaded trailer from the tractor and, should one of the Respondent's empty trailers be available, substitutes the empty trailer. Then he drives back to the Respondent's terminal, drops the empty trailer, and turns in his papers. C. Therriault's Conversation with Stephen McKay Sometime between November 23 and December 5, 1971, Henry Therriault, the Respondent's vice president of operations, called Stephen McKay, one of the Respon- dent's drivers, into the conference room. They discussed what Stephen McKay thought about truckdriving and what he liked about working for the Respondent. Ther- nault asked McKay whether he "had been approached by the Union," adding that McKay did not have to answer if he did not want to. McKay responded that he would answer, and that he had been approached by the Union. Therriault remarked that, in this type of business, he "expected sooner or later" that the Respondent would become "a union job." He advised McKay that "if [the employees] decided to go union ... to make sure that what the union provided for [the employees] was enough to compensate for the dues and membership fee." Therriault also pointed out that if the employees became unionized the Respondent "would be run differently, that, rather than the work being split down the middle, that the senior man would get better work, if he chose to take better work." To McKay, who was not the senior driver, he pointed out: "you could come up short ... if a senior man took the better work." 4 The complaint alleges, and the answer denies, that in this conversation Therriault interrogated McKay "about his union membership, activities and desires." " In my opinion, this overstates the case. The only question Therriault asked was whether McKay had been approached by the Union. He did not question McKay about the time when this took place, or whether he had joined the Union, or how he felt about the Union, or in what union activities he had engaged or the identity of the person who had approached him. Furthermore, by assuring McKay that he need not answer unless he wanted to, Therriault blunted what otherwise might have been the coercive nature of the inquiry. I conclude that the General Counsel has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Therriault's questioning of McKay violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The complaint further alleges, and the answer denies, that in this discussion Therriault "threatened [McKay] with loss of income if the Union became the employees' bargaining representative." It is true that Therriault pointed out that, because of McKay's low seniority, McKay's earnings could be adversely affected. However, this is not a threat of action by the Respondent, but on the contrary constitutes merely a prediction of what a According to Therriault, McKay volunteered "that he wasn't particularly interested" and stated that in view of his relatively low seniority "it was possible that the seniority provisions [of a union contract] might hurt him as far as work assignments go." Were Themault's version to be credited, I would not reach a different result. BULK HAULERS 391 negotiated collective bargaining contract might provide. And it had a reasonable basis in fact, for Therriault, in his capacity as a member of Law Motor Freight's manage- ment, was presumably familiar with the existing contract between that firm and the Union, and was in a position to envision the type of seniority system the Union might succeed in installing at the Respondent's operations. Accordingly, I conclude that Therriault's prediction falls within the protection of the free speech provision of Section 8(c) of the Act, and that the General Counsel has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that Therriault's remarks on this occasion-threatened loss of benefits or otherwise violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.5 D. The Discharge of Ronald V. Hall 1. Facts Ronald V. Hall was first employed as a driver by Law Motor Freight in May 1970. In compliance with the requirements of the collective-bargaimng agreement then in effect between the Union and Law Motor Freight, Hall joined the Union. When the Respondent entered into its contract with the Commission and began hauling liquor from distilleries to the Commission's warehouse in Novem- ber 1970, Hall was the first driver hired to make such runs. His immediate superior in both employments was Charles McKay, customer service manager for Law Motor Freight, who also acted as dispatcher for the Respondent, and general foreman of Law Warehouses, Incorporated. The parties agree that Charles McKay is, and was at all material times, a supervisor of the Respondent as defined in Section 2(11) of the Act. Therriault is, and at all material times was, Charles McKay's immediate superior in all of his capacities. On March 9, 1971, Heublein, Inc., complained to the Commission, in writing, that the Respondent "failed to make their 7:30 a.m. appointment" on four specific occasions during February 1971. A spokesman for the Commission referred this complaint to the Respondent, remarking: "unless [the Respondent] could meet that schedule, that we don't have a contract " Investigation revealed that two of these service failures were attributable to Hall's fault .6 After that, Therriault verbally warned Hall "that [the Respondent] would not tolerate service failures without a valid excuse." On' May 7 7 Hall was three-fourths of an hour late at the pickup point in a run to Hartford (Heublein, Inc.) because he overslept. On July 22 Hall was assigned a run to Hartford (HeubleinInc.) with an appointment time of 7:30 a.m. He was sickle night before, as a result of which he overslept and did not arrive at the pickup point until noon--4 1/2 hours late. The distillery complained to the Commission. Perley Savoy, superintendent of the Commission's ware- house, telephoned to the Respondent and inquired what 5 An employer "may even make a prediction as to the precise effects he believes unionization will have on his company." N.LR.B v. Gissell Packing Company, Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 618. 6 On February 3, he was 2 1/2 hours late at the pickup point. On February 17 he was again 2 1/2 hours late at the pickup point 4 Hereaftei the year intended is 1971 unless otherwise noted. 8 The findings regarding the Themault-McKay conversations are based had happened. When it was explained to Savoy that the driver had overslept, Savoy notified the Respondent's spokesman "that if this driver couldn't improve and be there on time for these pickups, that they should replace him." The Respondent accepted Hall's explanation "as a valid excuse." On November 4 Hall was assigned a run to Peekskill, with an appointment time of 8 a.m. He overslept and arrived at the pickup point at 11:45 a.m.-3-3/4 hours late. Sometimes after Hall returned to the Respondent's terminal Charles McKay asked Hall what had happened. Hall replied that he had overslept. Therriault, who was present, commented that Hall "should get another alarm clock." Therriault further told Hall that "whether or not [the Respondent] was going to be successful depended on maintaining schedules and appointment times."" Early in November Hall, after discussing the matter with two other truckdrivers in the Respondent's employ, contacted the Union. During the first week in November a meeting was held in Hall's home attended by a representa- tive of the Union, Hall, and Stephen McKay. The matter of organizing the Respondent's drivers was discussed. After this Hall continued to confer with Stephen McKay about the Union at the Respondent's terminal, on the road, and at the Commission's warehouse. Hall also talked about the Union to a third driver by telephone and a fourth in person at the Respondent's terminal. Hall continued these activities until "probably a couple of weeks" before his discharge. Leo Tully, then a driver for Law Motor Freight who occasionally worked part time for the Respondent, and Stephen Monas, then a warehouseman employed by Law Warehouses, Incorporated, also knew that Hall was active in attempting to bring the Respondent's drivers into the Union. It is in this context that Therriault questioned Stephen McKay about the Union, as described above. On November 30 Hall was assigned a run to Montreal (Seagram's) with an appointment time of 7:30 a.m. He arrived at 2 p.m.-64/2 hours late, because of inclement weather. On another run to the same distillery on December 3, with an appointment time of 8 a.m., Hall arrived at noon-4 hours late-because of a breakdown. On December 6 Hall was assigned to' a run to Hammondsport (Taylor Wines), with an appointment time of 3 p.m. He departed from the Respondent's terminal between 7:30 and 7:50 a.m. Charles McKay, who saw him leaving, shook his head negatively at Hall, indicating that Hall was leaving rather late and would have to drive fast to make the appointment on time. In the late morning or early afternoon of that day Charles McKay told Therriault that Hall had left rather late that morning, and predicted that the Respondent would receive a complaint about his being late. Sometime later, probably around 3:30 p.m., Therriault asked McKay: "Have you heard from Taylor Wine yet?" McKay replied: "No.."8 Hall actually arrived at Hammondsport at about 3:30 p.m.-l/2 hour late-but on Charles McKay's credited testimony. Themault testified that at about 4 p in. that day McKay stated that he (McKay) had just received a telephone call informing him that the Respondent's truck had not yet arrived at the pickup point, Taylor Wines. McKay denied that he received any such telephone call, or that he had told Therriault that he had received such a call. I do not credit Themault's version. 392 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the papers he handed in indicate that he arrived at 3 p.m., on time. Hall returned to the Respondent's terminal on the morning of December 7. Charles McKay remarked that Hall had "left kind of late . . . really cut it kind of short" and asked how he "made out." Hall replied: "I didn't have no trouble." McKay mquired: "Did you get any com- plaints?" and Hall answered: "No." On December 9 Hall came back from a run at about 4:30 p.m. and turned in his papers. He was called into the conference room by Therriault who stated: "Well, we tried it out and it didn't work out. You've gotten too expensive and you're going to be discharged." Hall asked: "Why, for today? You don't even know what happened today." When Therriault asked what had happened that day, Hall explained that his personal car would not start. Therriault remarked: "Well, you use that excuse all the time anyway." Angry, Hall denied that he had previously claimed that his car was not working properly. Therriault asked: "What about the 6th?" and Hall answered: "I wasn't late the 6th." Therriault responded: "Charlie seen you leave late." Hall denied that he had left the terminal late. Themault said: "All the other habitual lateness." Hall asked Therriault "to show me where I had been late all these times." Therriault declined to do so on the ground that he "didn't have time" to "drag out all the papers." Hall then left the Respon- dent's terminal and, so far as the record shows, has never returned. That evening Hall saw Charles McKay at a bowling alley. McKay asked Hall how he "made out." Hall replied that McKay must know. McKay responded that Therriault asked McKay if he could "get along without number 40 [Hall's tractor] for the next day." Hall asked what time anyone knew he was late and McKay answered that he didn't know Hall had been late and had received no complaint. Hall asked what time it was when Therriault asked McKay if he could get along without number 40 and McKay replied around noon. Hall then pointed out: "I was fired before anyone knew I was late." McKay remarked that Hall "was being fired for the 6th." Hall protested: "I wasn't late the 6th." McKay responded: "You left late." Hall denied this, declaring: "I've always left at that time and no one never said nothing about it." This ended the conversation.9 So far as the record shows, there has been no further communication between Hall and the Respondent. Hall applied for unemployment benefits, but was turned down. He appealed. The Appeal Tribunal of the Depart- ment of Employment Security of the State of New Hampshire, after a hearing, affirmed by a 2 to 1 vote. The majority decision reads, in pertinent part: The claimant . . . was discharged on December 9, 1971 because he was about one and one-half hour late reporting for work on that day. The claimant testified that he had been late about six times from about fifteen minutes to three hours during . . . his employment. Hall appealed to the Commissioner, who declined to change the decision of the Appeal Tribunal, and advised Hall of his right to appeal to Superior Court. However, no further appeal was taken. 2. Contentions of the parties The General Counsel maintains that the Respondent harbored animus toward the Union . He also contends that Hall "was the spearhead for the Union organizing campaign" at the Respondent's terminal and that the Respondent knew of Hall's role . Finally, the General Counsel urges that the reasons assigned for Hall's discharge were "merely pretextual," and that the real reason was "Hall's union activity." In this connection, the General Counsel points to the testimony of Therriault that he decided on December 7 to discharge Hall and argues that this "makes entirely irrelevant the issue of whether Hall was involved in an unjustified service failure on December 9th." The Respondent, conversely, contends that the record "is absolutely devoid of any objective evidence that Respon- dent had knowledge of Ronald Hall's union organizational activities" and that such proof "is essential to the establishment of his discharge as discriminatory." In any event, argues the Respondent, Hall was let go "for justifiable cause," namely, as Therriault described it in his testimony, "because of his continuous lateness resulting in service failures after many warnings." 3. Conclusions In support of his contention that the Respondent harbored union animus, the General Counsel points to Law's admission on cross-examination: Q. (By Mr. Kowal) Were you opposed to unioniza- tion of your drivers at Bulk Haulers? A. Yes. Based on that testimony, in agreement with the General Counsel, it is concluded that the Respondent was, at all material times, opposed to unionization of its truckdrivers. It is also quite clear from the record , as the General Counsel contends, that Hall was the most active union supporter in the Respondent's employ . I so find. We come then to the crucial question of the Respon- dent's knowledge of Hall's union activities. The General Counsel supports his contention that such knowledge has been proven with the following arguments : (1) Stephen Monas knew of Hall's union activities. He was a supervisor employed by Law Warehouses, Incorporated, and his knowledge is imputable to the Respondent because the Respondent, Law Motor Freight, and Law Warehouses, Incorporated, together constitute a single employer; (2) the Respondent knew that Hall was a union member at the time he was hired by the Respondent; (3) Hall was a chronic complainer and dissatisfied with working condi- tions; (4) Therriault learned from Stephen McKay before Hall's discharge that McKay had been approached by the Union; and (5) from the small size of the operation it may reasonably be inferred that Hall's union activities, a matter of "common knowledge throughout Respondent's opera- tions," came to the attention of management. Let us examine these arguments. 1. In view of Law's control of the labor policies of all three corporations, I agree with the General Counsel that 9 The findings concerning the Hall-McKay conversation at the bowling was not questioned about this incident. alley are based on Hall's undemed testimony Although McKay testified, he BULK HAULERS together they constitute a single employer. However, Law's testimony regarding Monas' lack of authority is convinc- ing. ][ conclude, contrary to the General Counsel, that the General Counsel has not demonstrated that Monas was clothed with any of the attributes of supervisory status spelled out in Section 2(11) of the Act. His knowledge is accordingly not imputable to the Respondent. 2. It is true, as the General Counsel points out, that the Respondent knew that Hall had been a union member when he had worked for Law Motor Freight and at the time the Respondent hired him. But it is quite a different matter to infer from this fact that Hall supported the Union enthusiastically. For the Respondent well knew that, had Hall not joined the Union as required by the then existing contract between the Union and his then employ- er, he would have jeopardized his job. Accordingly, in my opinion, the Respondent's knowledge of Hall's union membership, viewed in this light, is of no real significance. 3. Hall's complaints about working conditions, as reflected in the record, were registered as an individual, and not as spokesman for others. The General Counsel does not contend that such activities were protected by Section 7 of the Act. But he takes the position that from the fact of Hall's chronic complaining, the Respondent might have inferred his enthusiasm for the Union. To me, this does not follow logically. 4. The General Counsel states in his brief: "Therriault only found out about the union campaign on .. . December 3." This lacks record support. The evidence indicates that Themault had questioned other employees previously (although details are lacking). He testified: "I had known . . . for some time that there had been talk [of a union] on and off." All that Therriault learned from Stephen McKay was that at an unspecified time some unidentified: person or persons had approached McKay about the Union. Neither Hall nor any other individual was mentioned by either Therriault or McKay. There was not even any indication that the approach had been made by one of the Respondent's employees. To expand this into knowledge that Hall was the responsible individual is to build an inference on an unsound base, and is unjustified on this record. 5. Finally the "common knowledge" of Hall's active role in the Union's campaign was confined, so far as the record shows, to nonsupervisory employees. It is true that the small size of the Respondent's work complement (less than 100 if all three corporations are considered as a single employer) would bring it within the ambit of the Board's 10 See Hadley Manufacturing Corporation, 108 NLRB 1641, 1650. 11 Laboratory Equipment Corporation, et al, 146 NLRB 1247. See also cases cited in fns 10 and 11, on page 1252 thereof Long Island Airport Limousine Service Corp, 191 NLRB No. 16, cited by the General Counsel is distinguishable on its facts 11 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the 393 so-called "small plant doctrine." This permits-but does not compel-presumption in small plants that manage- ment soon learns of union activities and the identity of union supporters. However, it is not a per se doctrine.io Here, in my opinion, any such presumption is overcome by the denials of Law and Therriault that they had any knowledge of Hall's prounion activities until after his discharge. These denials were not unreasonable, and withstood vigorous cross-examination. Moreover, here some of the union activities took place by telephone or in places away from the Respondent's terminal. While the matter is not entirely free from doubt, it is concluded that the General Counsel has failed to demon- strate by a preponderance of evidence that the Respondent was aware or suspected, at the time of Hall's discharge, that Hall was an active proponent of the Union. Thus an essential element of a discriminatory discharge is mis- sing.11 In this posture of the case, no prima facie violation having been proven, it is unnecessary to evaluate the Respondent's defense that Hall was discharged for good cause. Upon the above findings of fact, and upon the entire record, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Bulk Haulers, Inc., is, and at all material times has been, an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 633, of New Hampshire, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, is, and at all material times has been, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The General Counsel has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent has engaged in or is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) or (3) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: 12 ORDER The complaint is dismissed in its entirety. rules and regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the rules and regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes.