Gold Standard Enterprises, Inc.

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Gold Standard Enterprises, Inc.; Gold Standard Li- quor Store at Ridge Avenue; Chalet Wine and Cheese Shops, Ltd. at Fullerton Avenue; Chalet Wine and Cheese Shops, Ltd. at Highland Park and Helen Alcantar. Case 13-CA- 16062 February 1, 1978 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS PENELLO AND MURPHY On June 15, 1977, Administrative Law Judge Martin S. Bennett issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and Respon- dent filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge only to the extent consistent herewith. Respondent Gold Standard Enterprises, Inc., is a holding company which owns all the shares of stock of Gold Standard Liquor Stores and Chalet Wine and Cheese Shops,1 which are located in the metro- politan Chicago area. The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act by threatening employee Helen Alcantar that she or someone else would suffer physical harm because of her union activities; violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by discharging and failing and refusing to reinstate Helen Alcantar because of her union and other protected concerted activities; and violated Section 8(a)(3), (4), and (1) by refusing to transfer employee Billie Van Wieren from its Highland Park Chalet to its Fullerton Avenue Chalet, because of her union and other protected activities and because she filed unfair labor practice charges against Respondent The ownership and management of Gold Standard Enterprises is in the hands of four persons related by blood or marriage: Thomas Binstein, Harold Binstein (Respondent's president), Seymour Binstein (Respondent's executive vice president), and Benard Greenfield. Benard Greenfield's son, Fred Greenfield, an admitted supervisor, was identified by Seymour Binstein as "operations head of all the Chalet Wine and Cheese Shops." 2 The complaint also alleges that Respondent's vice president, Seymour Binstein, violated Sec. 8(aX I) on January 6, 1977, by interrogating employee Helen Alcantar regarding the nature and extent of her union activities. Inasmuch as the General Counsel did not except to the Administrative Law Judge's failure to find this violation, this allegation is not before us and will not be considered herein. 3 Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). 4 In this regard, we deem Electri-Flex Company, 228 NLRB 847 (1977), cited by our dissenting colleague, as inapposite here. In that case, the Board affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's findings 234 NLRB No. 64 with the Board-2 and gave a statement to a Board agent. The Administrative Law Judge's Decision The Administrative Law Judge, relying on, and apparently crediting, the testimony of Respondent's witnesses, found that Respondent had not violated the Act as alleged and recommended dismissal of the complaint in its entirety. The General Counsel has excepted to the findings of the Administrative Law Judge, the credibility resolutions on which he based his conclusions, his failure to consider or even to mention the testimony of two witnesses with regard to certain material incidents, and his other alleged errors on the record. In addition, the General Counsel has pointed to other findings and conclusions allegedly not support- ed by the record as a whole. We find merit in these exceptions. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule the Administrative Law Judge's credibility resolu- tions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect.3 Having carefully examined the record in this case, we have concluded that the credibility resolutions of the Administrative Law Judge are in many critical instances contrary to a clear prepon- derance of all the relevant evidence and, on the whole, cannot be relied upon in determining whether Respondent violated the Act as alleged in the complaint.4 The General Counsel correctly notes that the Administrative Law Judge's Decision fails to set forth, consider, and/or analyze all of the relevant evidence in the record as it relates to the complaint's allegations. Nor are any reasons advanced for ignor- ing such evidence. Additionally, as discussed below, the Administrative Law Judge's Decision contains statements and findings which are either unsupport- ed by record evidence or are otherwise clearly erroneous. and conclusions "to the extent consistent" with the Board's Decision. The Board upon examination of the record found 8(aX3), (5), and (1) violations of the Act in addition to those found by the Administrative Law Judge. The Board further found that, upon careful examination of the record, it fully supported those violations found by the Administrative Law Judge, even though he had not made specific credibility resolutions with respect to some of the testimony discussed in his decision. Just the opposite situation obtains in the present case. As noted above, the Administrative Law Judge has failed entirely to note significant testimony here, and careful examination of the record as a whole convinces us that a clear preponderance of the relevant evidence demonstrates that the Administrative Law Judge's critical findings are not in fact supported by that record. In these circumstances, the Board has held that "the importance of the demeanor factor is greatly diminished, and we are impelled to substitute our own credibility findings for those of the Administrative Law Judge." W T Grant Company, 214 NLRB 698 (1974); accord, Warren L Rose Casting, Inc. d/b/a V & W. Castings, 231 NLRB 912 (1977). 618 GOLD STANDARD ENTERPRISES, INC. Specifically, the Administrative Law Judge com- pletely omitted reference to the testimony of Respon- dent's employees Mary Loftus and Sharon Lekkas. Both of these employees testified on behalf of the General Counsel, in corroboration of the Charging Party, whom the Administrative Law Judge discre- dited, and in contradiction of Respondent's wit- nesses, whom he credited. No explanation is offered why Loftus' and Lekkas' testimony was ignored, and none is apparent from a reading of the record. To the contrary, every reason exists for finding the testimo- ny of these employees particularly credible since both were still in Respondent's employ at the time of the hearing and both testified in direct contradiction to certain statements of their present supervisors. The Board has long recognized that the testimony of a witness in such circumstances is apt to be particular- ly reliable, inasmuch as the witness is testifying adversely to his or her pecuniary interest, a risk not lightly undertaken. 5 Examples of findings and statements in the Admin- istrative Law Judge's Decision which are unsupport- ed by the record or otherwise erroneous include the following: (1) that Helen Alcantar, the Charging Party, in the past "had difficulties" with manage- ment; the record shows, and Respondent conceded, that Alcantar was considered an excellent employee and that her "difficulties" with management began only after she became involved in union activities; (2) that Helen Alcantar testified that she asked Respondent to pay for her psychiatric treatment; the record shows that Alcantar testified that she had no recollection of suggesting that Respondent pay for her treatments; (3) that Helen Alcantar "said rela- tively little about what Sonenblum knew about (her union) activities;" the record shows that Alcantar testified at length regarding conversations between herself and Sonenblum concerning her union activi- ties; (4) that public transportation from Billie Van Wieren's home to Respondent's Highland Park store was "ample;" the record shows that the Highland Park store was some 30 miles from Van Wieren's home and that it regularly took her a total of 4 hours per day to commute between home and store by public transportation; and (5) that Van Wieren's testimony could not be credited because of internal inconsistencies regarding the reasons that Supervisor Greenfield gave her for not granting her request for s Georgia Rug Mill, 131 NLRB 1304, 1305 (1961); Gateway Transporta- tion Co., Inc., 193 NLRB 47, 48 (1971); Federal Stainless Sink Div. of Unarco Industries, Inc., 197 NLRB 489, 491 (1972). e E.g., the Administrative Law Judge stated that Mr. Champagne, a representative of Local 162, represents Local 1550. We also agree with the General Counsel that the Administrative Law Judge's statements that the "Alcantar allegedly testified that this sounded like Respondent was run by the 'syndicate,' " and "the evidence as to any alliance by Respondent with the 'syndicate' is purely speculative" are nonsensical and irrelevant. Witnesses do not "allegedly" testify, and there was no allegation that transfer to the Fullerton Avenue store; the record shows that Van Wieren consistently testified that Greenfield raised the topic of the unfair labor practice charge which she had filed when they spoke on January 6, 1977, and that he also said that he could not take her back because she was trying to bring a union into the store. These statements are not internally inconsistent in light of the fact that the complaint alleges a violation of both Section 8(aX3) and (4) by Respondent's refusal to transfer Van Wieren. In light of these significant errors and omissions, as well as other, albeit less serious, mistaken and/or irrelevant statements6 and findings discussed herein, we are compelled to evaluate the evidence bearing on the complaint's allegations without regard to the decision of the Administrative Law Judge. Accordingly, we have reconstructed the events of the period covered by the complaint based on a composite of the testimony of Helen Alcantar, Billie Van Wieren, Mary Loftus, and Sharon Lekkas which we find, on the whole, to be mutually corroborative, consistent, and credible. We also rely upon the testimony of all other witnesses to the extent that their testimony is not inconsistent with the credited testimony of the above-named witnesses. To the extent that the testimony of such other witnesses contradicts that of Alcantar, Van Wieren, Lekkas, and Loftus, it is discredited. Helen Alcantar Helen Alcantar has worked for Respondent in a variety of positions since 1963. Although, for person- al reasons, she voluntarily quit Respondent's employ on two occasions,7 she was rehired without hesitation each time she reapplied for employment. Respondent has not faulted her job performance in any respect and does not assert that she was fired for cause; in fact, Seymour Binstein testified that he considered her an excellent employee. During the last week of October, Helen Alcantar first learned of employee union activity when Curtis Thomas, a delivery driver for Respondent, told her that Billie Van Wieren had been transferred to Skokie from Fullerton for "trying to get a union in there." Alcantar went to Van Wieren's home, where, after a discussion of union activities, Alcantar signed Respondent was run by or allied with the "syndicate." Alcantar's testimony as to her statements regarding the syndicate were simply background showing the circumstances of her discharge. No findings were necessary with regard to the substance of those statements. I In January 1967, she resigned because she was moving to California, and in April 1976, she resigned due to combined work and family pressures. After she returned from California, she applied for a job in 1972, and was rehired by Seymour Binstein, who considered her an excellent employee. Again, in May 1976, she was rehired on Mr. Binstein's recommendation. 619 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD an authorization card and volunteered to help organize and to hold a meeting in her house the following Sunday, October 31, 1976. Van Wieren and Alcantar continued to hold organizational meetings at their homes during No- vember and early December. At one such meeting, on Monday, November 22, they were informed by Retail Clerks Union representatives, Martin Nalley and Wayne Racine, that another union, Retail Liquor Salesmen Union Local 162 (herein Local 162), claimed that it already represented Respon- dent's employees. On November 26, at a meeting at Alcantar's home, employees present drafted a letter to Local 162's business agent, Carl Champagne, requesting a copy of that Union's purported contract with Respondent. On November 29, Van Wieren and Alcantar went to the Department of Labor office on the assumption that a copy of Local 162's purported contract might be on file there. They were told that it was not. While at the Department of Labor office, Alcantar called Champagne and requested a copy of the contract. Champagne asked her to call again the next day (November 30), which she did. During the latter conversation, Champagne agreed to send people to Respondent's Fullerton and Ridge Avenue stores to talk with employees. At work later that day, while Alcantar was count- ing out her change drawer in Mr. Sonenblum's office, she noticed on his desk a piece of paper on which was written, inter alia, "This store is under union contract. If there are any questions see or call H. B." (Harold Binstein is often referred to as "H.B.") When Alcantar subsequently asked Sonenblum about the note, he conceded that it was a note he had made at the Monday managers' meeting and said that the note meant that there is a union in the store. Alcantar expressed disbelief and Sonenblum asked her if she knew what a "sweetheart union" was. She said that she did not, and he explained that Harold Binstein "pays a man money ... and the man puts it in his pocket . . . and he does that to keep the other union out." Sonenblum further stated that the reason this subject came up at the managers' meeting was because somebody from a union came out to Abe Grossman's house and Abe had called to tell him about it. No one from Local 162 visited either the Ridge Avenue or Fullerton Avenue stores that week. On the morning of Friday, December 3, Alcantar called Champagne again, this time to ask him why no one had come. Subsequently, Alcantar went to Sonen- blum's office and told him she had called Champagne and asked him for a copy of the contract. Sonenblum replied in a loud voice "You what?" (Mary Loftus testified that she overheard this initial portion of their conversation.) Sonenblum then told Alcantar that she was looking for trouble and she should stop messing around with the Union. Later that morning, Mary Loftus, Sharon Lekkas, Herman Sonenblum, and Helen Alcantar were standing by the cash registers and talking while the store was not busy. Sharon Lekkas, who was both- ered by the air quality in the store, suggested that she or Sonenblum call Bernie Greenfield, manager of wine sales at several stores, to ask that a humidifier be installed. Sonenblum replied "why don't you call your union?" Alcantar called Champagne again on Monday, December 6, and he again assured her that someone would come to the store with a copy of the contract. When Alcantar, on the morning of December 7, told Sonenblum about this conversation, he told her there was no contract and that no one from the Union would come to the store. He also reiterated that she should "stop messing around with that union" and said that if she didn't, she or someone would get hurt. Later that morning, Champagne called Alcantar at the store. Mr. Sonenblum was standing by her register as she and Champagne conversed. Cham- pagne told her that he was checking to be sure that she was there as he was sending someone over. Alcantar replied that she would be in the store and that he should bring extra copies of the contract. During that conversation, Alcantar wrote a note to Sonenblum, who was waiting by the register, indicat- ing that the person on the phone was the "union man." Sonenblum then walked around the register telling her several times to "hang up." When she did hang up at the conclusion of her conversation, Sonenblum told her to "call that man and you tell him not to send anybody here. He is going to get killed if he does." After heated discussion, during which Alcantar refused to comply with Sonenblum's demand, Sonenblum left Alcantar's station and she returned to her duties. Sonenblum admitted telling Alcantar to hang up. Shortly thereafter, Sonenblum returned and again asked Alcantar to call the man and tell him not to come. Alcantar again refused and said that Sonenb- lum made it sound "like Gold Standard is run by the Syndicate or something." Sonenblum did not reply. Alcantar asked, "Is that what you are telling me?" Sonenblum responded "that's right, so what." Alcan- tar then said if that were true and Sonenblum could prove it to her, she did not want to work there anymore. Sonenblum later asked if she was serious, and she responded "If you can prove to me what you said about Gold Standard and the Syndicate, yes, I am serious." On Sunday, December 12, Alcantar asked Sonen- blum if Assistant Manager Ralph Fischer (Sonen- 620 GOLD STANDARD ENTERPRISES, INC. blum's assistant) had made up a work schedule for the Christmas holidays. Sonenblum then instructed Fischer to do so and to give the schedules to Sonenblum for his approval prior to distribution to employees. Later that day Fischer gave Alcantar and Mary Loftus their schedules which showed the days they were to work between December 13 and 24. On Tuesday, December 14, when Alcantar arrived for work, Sonenblum told her "I am replacing you Thursday, you gave your notice and your time is up." Alcantar replied, Herman, what are you talking about? First of all, I did not give you notice. I told you that if you can prove what you said to me about the Syndicate and Gold Standard that I don't want to work for them anymore. Second, even if you had taken that as notice, my time wouldn't be up until the 21st. Today is only the 14th. Are you firing me? Sonenblum replied, "I am tired of this aggravation. All right. I am firing you if that is what you want." Sonenblum then walked away and Alcantar left the store. On Wednesday, December 15, when Mary Loftus arrived at the store, she was given a new schedule for the period of December 15-24, which superseded the schedule issued on December 12. She testified with- out contradiction that on Thursday, December 16, Sonenblum told her, Mary, I want you to understand about Helen. I hired Helen, I trained Helen. And I like Helen. Helen had to be dismissed. It wasn't my choice to dismiss her. I was just following orders I had, and my orders came from Harold Binstein, and I was just doing my job. Mary Loftus asked why it had been necessary to fire Helen Alcantar; Sonenblum replied, "she was just trouble. She was just a lot of troublemaker." On several occasions subsequent to her discharge, Alcantar came into the store to pick up her paycheck or to make purchases. The employees who spoke to Alcantar on these occasions were reprimanded by Sonenblum for doing so. In late February or early March 1977, Alcantar went into the store and asked for an application for an open part-time cashier position advertised in the store window. Ralph Fischer gave her an application after much delay, but told her "I don't know what good it's going to do you." Alcantar was not rehired for this position. Discussion and Conclusion Regarding Alcantar Based on the foregoing, and the entire record in this case, we find, contrary to the Administrative Law Judge and in agreement with the General Counsel's contention, that Respondent discharged Helen Alcantar on December 14 because of her union and other protected concerted activities. In so finding, we rely on the following relevant facts which are fully sustained on the record. Respondent became generally aware of the union organizing activities among its employees as early as mid- or late-October when employee Abe Grossman called Sonenblum to report that a Retail Clerks representative, Ken Moore, had come to his house. Respondent learned of Alcantar's interest in union representation at least by November 29, when she noticed a piece of paper on Sonenblum's desk which stated that "[t]his store is under union contract." When Alcantar asked Sonenblum about this note, the latter explained to her what a "sweetheart contract" is and mentioned the fact that the matter was raised in a managers' meeting because employee Abe Grossman had been visited by a union represen- tative. A few days later, on December 3, Alcantar told Sonenblum that she had telephoned Local 162's business agent, Champagne, and asked for a copy of the contract purportedly in existence between that Union and Respondent. Sonenblum answered in a loud voice, "You what?" and warned her that she was looking for trouble and should stop messing around with the Union. Later that same morning, Sharon Lekkas suggested that she or Sonenblum should call Bernie Greenfield, manager of wine sales, to ask that a humidifier be installed at the store. Sonenblum replied, "why don't you call your union?" On the morning of December 7, Alcantar told Sonenblum that she had called Champagne again and that the latter had promised to come to the store with a copy of the contract. Sonenblum responded by telling her that there was no contract and that no one from the Union would come to the store. He again warned her to "stop messing around with that union" lest she or someone got hurt. Later that day, Champagne called Alcantar while Sonenb- lum was standing by her cash register. When she indicated to Sonenblum that she was talking to the "union man," Sonenblum became excited and told her repeatedly to hang up, which Alcantar refused to do. At the conclusion of her conversation, Sonen- blum told Alcantar to "call that man and you tell him not to send anybody here. He is going to get killed if he does." Later that day Sonenblum again asked Alcantar to call Champagne and tell him not to come to the store. Alcantar responded by saying that 621 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Sonenblum made it sound as though Respondent is run by "the Syndicate or something." Sonenblum did not reply, and Alcantar asked "is that what you are telling me?" Sonenblum responded, "that's right, so what." Alcantar then said that if he could prove to her that what he had said is true, she did not wish to work there anymore. Sonenblum later asked Alcan- tar if she was serious, to which she replied, "If you can prove to me what you said about Gold Standard and the Syndicate, yes, I am serious." Exactly 1 week later, on Tuesday, December 14, Sonenblum told Alcantar that she was being replaced on Thursday (December 16). He said "you gave your notice and your time is up." Alcantar protested, and asked Sonenblum if he was firing her. She denied that she had given Sonenblum notice, and reminded him that she had only said that, if he could prove that Respondent was allied with the underworld, she did not want to work there any longer. She also told him that even if she had given notice, her time would not be up until December 21. In response to these protestations, Sonenblum said, "I am tired of this aggravation. All right, I am firing you if that is what you want." On December 16, Sonenblum told Mary Loftus, according to the latter's uncontradicted testimony, "Helen [Alcantar] had to be dismissed. It wasn't my choice to dismiss her. I was just following orders ... and my orders came from Harold Binstein, and I was just doing my job." Loftus asked why it was necessary to fire Alcantar. Sonenblum explained, "she was just trouble. She was just a lot of trouble- maker." Based on these relevant facts, the conclusion is inescapable that Respondent was deeply concerned about Alcantar's dogged pursuit of the elusive "contract" which Respondent assertedly had with Local 162. Sonenblum repeatedly warned Alcantar not to "mess around" with that Union lest she or someone got hurt. When Alcantar failed to heed these warnings and persisted in her efforts to get a copy of this contract, Sonenblum fired her. Respondent's contention that Alcantar voluntarily quit her employment after giving notice is unsupport- ed by the weight of the record. At most, Alcantar told Sonenblum that she would quit if he could prove that Respondent had ties with the "syndicate." This can hardly be said to reflect an unequivocal intent by Alcantar to terminate her long employment relation- ship with Respondent. Moreover, Sonenblum did not provide Alcantar the proof which would have prompted her to quit. Accordingly, there is no basis on the record for Respondent's contention that Alcantar quit. Additionally, it is undenied on the record that Respondent always considered Alcantar a superior employee, at least until she began her union activities. Thus, in the past she had twice quit her employment with Respondent for personal rea- sons. Each time she was promptly rehired when she reapplied for work. This time, however, she was denied an available job when she applied for it in late February or early March 1977. Although he gave her a job application, Ralph Fischer told her, "I don't know what good it's going to do you." Contrary to Respondent's assertion, the record amply supports a finding, which we make, that Respondent decided to discharge Alcantar because it felt uncomfortable, if not actually threatened, by her persistent attempts to get a copy of Respondent's purported agreement with Local 162. Alcantar's discharge for these activities clearly violates Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, and we so find. We further find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by refusing or failing to rehire Alcantar for the same reasons. In addition, we find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act by Sonenblum's threat that Alcantar or someone would get hurt if she persisted in her pursuit of the phantom contract with Local 162. Billie Van Wieren Billie Van Wieren has been employed by Respon- dent in various positions, including store manager, since June 1973. (At all material times herein, she was not a supervisor as defined in the Act.) From September 1975 until October 26, 1976, Billie Van Wieren worked in Respondent's Fullerton Avenue Chalet Wine and Cheese Shop, three blocks from her home. In October 1976, Billie Van Wieren began orga- nizing the employees of Respondent's Chicago area stores on behalf of Retail Clerks Union Local 1550 (herein the Retail Clerks). She gathered authorization cards and, in mid-October, took employee Sharon Lekkas to the Retail Clerks office where Lekkas gave Union Representative Ken Moore information with regard to the best times to approach Respondent's employees at their homes. Several days later, Abe Grossman, one of the employees visited by Moore, called Herbert Sonenblum, manager of Respondent's Ridge Avenue store, while Lekkas was in his office. Lekkas testified without contradiction that in her presence, Sonenblum spoke with Grossman and wrote down the words "Retail Clerks Union" and "Ken Moore." Sonenblum then called Harold Bin- stein in Lekkas' presence and reported that Ken Moore had visited Grossman but that Grossman had refused to talk with him. The following week, while standing at her cash register, Lekkas heard Sonen- blum ask three other employees to call Harold 622 GOLD STANDARD ENTERPRISES, INC. Binstein if they were contacted by anybody from the Retail Clerks. On October 26, Respondent transferred Van Wier- en from its Fullerton Avenue store to its store in Skokie, Illinois, and within a week, transferred her again to its new store in Highland Park, some 30 miles from her home. Van Wieren does not have a functioning automobile and her travel time between her home and the Highland Park store totals 4 hours per day on public transportation. On November 1, Billie Van Wieren filed an unfair labor practice charge in Case 13-CA-15936, alleging that she had been transferred because of her protect- ed concerted activities including "assisting a labor organization to organize the Employer's employees." Supervisor Pat Collins notified Ms. Van Wieren of her transfers to Skokie and Highland Park. At the time of each transfer, and on several subsequent occasions before the one on February 23 described below, Van Wieren asked Collins if she could be transferred back to Fullerton. On those occasions he indicated he would send her back as soon as he could. In later December 1976, Ms. Van Wieren saw a newspaper advertisement in which Respondent was seeking salespeople in its Armitage and Fullerton Chalets. When she told Supervisor Pat Collins that she was available for both advertised positions, Collins said, "O.K." In early January 1977, Van Wieren learned of another ad by Respondent for sales positions at both these stores and, on January 4, she called Mike Santowski, manager of the Fullerton Chalet, who told her that the position at his store had not yet been filled. On January 6, Van Wieren met with Fred Greenfield at the Fullerton store to apply for an open wine sales position.8 Greenfield said that Santowski had mentioned that Van Wieren wanted to return to Fullerton Avenue to sell cheese. He then said, I can't have you coming back here talking to new people, telling what a bad store this is, because you are responsible for trying to get a union in the store.... the feeling in the Company is that if you are giving us a hard time and have charges against us, we are not going to do anything for you. In the ensuing discussion, he said that he would discuss with Harold Binstein the possibility of her return to the Fullerton Avenue cheese department, but that "the conditions would be that I drop the [pending unfair labor practice] charges." 9 Billie Van Wieren at that time was a cheese salesperson. 9 The charge in Case 13-CA-15936 was withdrawn on February 4, 1977. l0 As stated at fn. 8, supra, the foregoing charge was withdrawn on Subsequent to this discussion, Van Wieren again spoke with Pat Collins in the second week of February 1977. At that time she asked him to give her "a definite answer on whether or not I would be at the Highland Park store permanently or not." Collins replied that he would do so in 2 weeks. On February 23, according to Van Wieren's testimony, Collins said that he was "never sending me back, that I would just have to move out there or get a car or something." At the time of the hearing, Van Wieren had not been transferred from Highland Park. Discussion and Conclusion Regarding Van Wieren Respondent contends that its refusal or failure to transfer Billie Van Wieren was based solely on business necessity and had no relation to her protect- ed concerted activities. Respondent further contends that even if Fred Greenfield made a statement which conditioned her transfer back to the Fullerton store upon her withdrawal of the earlier unfair labor practice charge, Respondent cannot, on that basis, be held to have violated the Act inasmuch as Greenfield had no authority to effect Van Wieren's transfer. We find no merit in these contentions. As set forth above, Van Wieren was the instigator of the employees' activities on behalf of Retail Clerks Local 1550. She solicited authorization cards from approximately 31 percent of the work force and hosted several organizing meetings at her home. Respondent learned of these activities in early-to mid-October 1976. As discussed above, in connec- tion with Alcantar's discharge, Respondent did not look with favor upon the employees' involvement in union activities. On November 1, 1976, Van Wieren filed an unfair labor practice charge against Respon- dent alleging that her transfer on October 26, 1976, from the Fullerton Avenue store to the Highland Park store was in retaliation for her union activities. Thus, Respondent became aware of Van Wieren's union activities in early November when the charge was served.10 Thereafter, Van Wieren repeatedly asked her supervisor, Pat Collins, if she could be transferred back to the Fullerton Avenue store. He initially told her that he would transfer her back as soon as he could. In later December 1976, she told Collins that she was available for an advertised opening either at Respondent's Fullerton Avenue or Armitage locations. Collins merely said, "O.K." On January 4, Van Wieren again learned of available sales positions at both these stores and called Mike Santowski, manager of the Fullerton Avenue store, February 4, 1977, and the instant complaint does not allege a discriminatory transfer to Highland Park, but only a discriminatory refusal to transfer Van Wieren back to Fullerton Avenue. 623 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD who told her that the job at his store was still open. On January 6, Van Wieren met with Greenfield at the Fullerton store. Greenfield, who had been told by Santowski of Van Wieren's desire to transfer to Fullerton, responded that he could not take her back "because you are responsible for trying to get a union in the store. .... The feeling in the Company is that you are giving us a hard time and have charges against us, we are not going to do anything for you." He later said that he would talk to Harold Binstein about the possibility of her transfer, but "the condi- tion would be that I drop the charges." It is undisputed, and the Administrative Law Judge found, that Van Wieren was "admittedly a most competent and desirable worker." He discredited her testimony only because he found that it contained "several inconsistencies and contradictions." We have carefully perused the record and find no inconsistencies or contradictions in Van Wieren's testimony. The complaint alleges that Respondent's refusal to transfer Van Wieren was violative of both Section 8(a)(3) and (4) of the Act. Van Wieren testified that Greenfield told her that he could not transfer her back to the Fullerton Avenue store because she had tried to bring a union into the store and because she had filed unfair labor practices against Respondent. This testimony is neither incon- sistent nor contradictory. Rather, it establishes the complaint's dual allegations that Respondent retali- ated against Van Wieren not only because of her union activities, but also because she had enlisted the Board's processes. In light of Van Wieren's testimony, we find that Respondent's contention that it did not transfer Van Wieren back to its Fullerton Avenue store because it needed an experienced employee at the Highland Park store is unsupported by the record and pretex- tual. Neither Collins nor Greenfield told Van Wieren that she would have to stay at the Highland Park store because Respondent needed her experience at that location. Thus, Respondent's economic defense appears to be an afterthought. We also find without merit Respondent's contention that it cannot be held to have violated the Act by Greenfield's statements inasmuch as Greenfield lacked authority to effect Van Wieren's transfer. Greenfield is an admitted supervisor and his statements are, for that reason, attributable to Respondent. Accordingly, based on the foregoing and the entire record herein, we find that Respondent failed and refused to transfer Van Wieren back to its Fullerton Avenue store because of her union and other protected concerted activities and because she had filed an unfair labor practice charge against Respon- dent in Case 13-CA-15936 on November 1, 1976. Respondent by such conduct violated Section 8(a)(l), (3), and (4) of the Act. We also find that Greenfield's statement constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(1). CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Gold Standard Enterprises Inc.; Gold Stan- dard Liquor Store at Ridge Avenue; Chalet Wine and Cheese Shops, Ltd. at Fullerton Avenue; Chalet Wine and Cheese Chops, Ltd. at Highland Park, is an Employer whose operations affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Retail Clerks Union Local 1550, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, and Retail Liquor Salesmen Union Local 162, affiliated with the Distillery Wine, Rectifying and Allied Workers of America, AFL-CIO, are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By threatening Helen Alcantar that she or someone else would suffer physical harm because of her concerted protected activities and by asking her, with regard to those activities, if she were looking for trouble, and by telling Billie Van Wieren that it would do nothing for her because of her concerted protected activities, Respondent has interfered with, coerced, and restrained employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. By discharging and refusing to rehire Helen Alcantar because of her union and protected con- certed activities, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 5. By refusing to transfer Billie Van Wieren to its Fullerton store because of her union and protected concerted activities and because she filed unfair labor practice charges with the Board, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(3), (4), and (1) of the Act. 6. Respondent's violations of the Act described above, occurring in connection with its operations, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(l), (3), and (4) of the Act, we shall order Respondent to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action. Specifically, as we have found that Respondent has unlawfully dis- charged, and failed or refused to rehire, Helen Alcantar, we shall order that Respondent offer Helen Alcantar immediate reinstatement to her former position or, if such job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without loss of 624 GOLD STANDARD ENTERPRISES, INC. seniority and other rights and privileges, discharging, if necessary, any replacement hired. We shall further order that Respondent make Helen Alcantar whole for any loss of earnings or other benefits she suffered as a result of the discrimination against her from the date of her discharge to the date of Respondent's offer of reinstatement, in accordance with the Board's formula set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest thereon to be computed in the manner prescribed in Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977)."l Further- more, as we have found that Respondent discrimina- torily failed and refused to transfer Billie Van Wieren to its Fullerton Avenue Chalet, we shall order that Respondent offer to Billie Van Wieren immediate transfer to the position at Respondent's Fullerton Avenue Chalet to which she requested transfer in December 1976, displacing if necessary any employ- ee assigned to, or working in, that position since that date. Furthermore, although there is no indication that Van Wieren suffered any loss in pay as a result of Respondent's discriminatory refusal to transfer her, she did incur certain travel expenses which she otherwise would not have incurred absent such discrimination. We shall, therefore, order that Re- spondent reimburse her for such expenses with interest thereon to be computed at the adjusted prime rate set forth in Florida Steel Corporation, supra. Finally, inasmuch as Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices which go to the very heart of the Act, we shall order that Respondent cease and desist from in any other manner infringing upon the rights guaranteed to its employees by Section 7 of the Act.' 2 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Gold Standard Enterprises, Inc.; Gold Standard Liquor Store at Ridge Avenue; Chalet Wine and Cheese Shops, Ltd. at Fullerton Avenue; Chalet Wine and Cheese Shops, Ltd. at Highland Park, Chicago, Illinois, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Threatening employees with physical harm because of their union or other protected concerted activities. (b) Discharging, failing to reinstate, failing to transfer, or otherwise discriminating against employ- ees because of their activities on behalf of, or to II See, generally, Isis Plumbing d Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). i2 See N.L. R.B. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 532, 536 (C.A. 4, 1941). 13 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order discourage employees from supporting, Retail Clerks Union Local 1550, or any labor organization, or because they filed unfair labor practice charges with the Board. (c) In any other manner interfering with, restrain- ing, or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which it is found will effectuate the purposes of the Act: (a) Offer to Helen Alcantar immediate and full reinstatement to her former position or, if such job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent posi- tion, without prejudice to her seniority and other rights and privileges, discharging if necessary any replacement hired, and make Helen Alcantar whole for any loss of earnings or other benefits suffered by her as a result of the discrimination against her, in the manner set forth in "The Remedy" section of this Decision. (b) Offer to Billie Van Wieren immediate transfer to the position at Respondent's Fullerton Avenue Chalet to which Ms. Van Wieren requested transfer in December 1976 and January 1977, displacing if necessary any employee assigned to or working in that position since those dates, and reimburse her for any travel expenses she may have incurred as a result of Respondent's refusal to so transfer her, in the manner set forth in "The Remedy" section of this Decision. (c) Post at all of its Gold Standard Liquor Stores and Chalet Wine and Cheese Shops in the Chicago, Illinois, area copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 13 Copies of said notice, on forms to be provided by the Regional Director for Region 13, after being duly signed by Respondent's representa- tive, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 13, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply here- with. MEMBER MURPHY, dissenting: For the reasons stated by the Administrative Law Judge, I agree with him that Respondent did not violate the Act as alleged. The Administrative Law Judge made his finding upon the entire record and of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 625 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD from his observation of the witnesses, and, unless the preponderance of evidence on the record clearly undermines those findings, the Board should not disturb them. My colleagues note that the Administrative Law Judge apparently discredited the testimony of the General Counsel's witnesses whenever such testimo- ny conflicted with that of Respondent's witnesses, and that in so doing, the Administrative Law Judge omitted any reference to the testimony of employees Lekkas and Loftus. My colleagues have seized upon the "uncontradicted" testimony of these witnesses, as well as some minor mistakes in the Administrative Law Judge's recitation of the facts and his discussion of Alcantar's testimony, to reverse the Administra- tive Law Judge's credibility resolutions on the ground that they are not supported by the record as a whole. Thereafter they set forth their own version of the facts and find that Respondent violated the Act as alleged. The Board has always been reluctant to reverse an Administrative Law Judge's credibility resolutions, especially where such resolutions are based on the demeanor of the witnesses.' 4 Here, although the Administrative Law Judge based his findings upon his "observation of the witnesses," my colleagues overturn these findings. However, it is implicit in the Administrative Law Judge's general statement re- garding credibility that he has discredited the testi- mony of any witnesses to the extent such testimony conflicts with the facts as described by the witnesses whom he has credited.15 It is, therefore, clear that the Administrative Law Judge inferentially discredited the testimony of Lekkas and Loftus, even though some of their testimony is not specifically contradict- ed. As to the Administrative Law Judge's mistakes, I have looked at them carefully and consider that they are inadvertent and insufficiently substantial to undermine his credibility resolutions. The Board has often, in footnotes, disavowed or corrected such inadvertences without disturbing an Administrative Law Judge's principal findings. I see no reason why that approach would not have been appropriate in the instant case. In light of all of the above, I would affirm the Administrative Law Judge's decision and dismiss the complaint. 14 Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., supra, fn. 3. 15 See Electri-Fler Company, 228 NLRB 847 (1977), par. 4 of the Decision and Order. Contrary to my colleagues in the majonty, the Board's finding there, that the Administrative Law Judge implicitly resolved conflicting testimony without making explicit credibility resolutions there- on, is not undermined by (nor is my reliance here on the Board's rationale regarding that issue rendered inapposite by) the Board's subsequent findings of separate violations which the Administrative Law Judge had failed to make. While I do not doubt that the Board (as my colleagues suggest) examined the record, the language of the Decision indicates that the Board there looked pnmarily to the Administrative Law Judge's Decision itself. Thus, the Board stated: Viewing the Decision as a whole. it discloses that the Administrative Law Judge's findings on the excepted 8(a)( ) allegations were not based solely on the presence or absence of specific denials by Respondent's witnesses. The Decision initially credits the General Counsel's wit- nesses who testified to the 8(a)(I) allegations. There was, to be sure, certain testimony by Respondent's witnesses which conflicted with that of the General Counsel's witnesses. However, although the Administra- tive Law Judge did not make explicit credibility findings with respect to this conflicting testimony, it is clear from reading the Decision that the Administrative Law Judge implicitly resolved this conflict by accepting and relying on the testimony of the General Counsel's witnesses. It is clear then that with regard to those issues. the Board found in Electri- Flex-as I would here--that the testimony credited by the Administrative Law Judge fully supported his findings. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board having found, after a hearing, that we violated the National Labor Relations Act, we notify you that: WE WILL NOT threaten our employees that they or others will suffer bodily harm because of their union or other protected concerted activities. WE WILL NOT discriminate against our employ- ees by discharging and failing to reinstate them or failing to transfer them because of their union activities. WE WILL NOT discriminate against our employ- ees because they filed unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. WE WILL offer Helen Alcantar immediate and full reinstatement to her former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position without prejudice to her seniority or other rights or privileges. WE WILL make Helen Alcantar whole for any loss of earnings or other benefits she suffered as a result of the discrimination against her, together with interest. WE WILL offer Billie Van Wieren immediate transfer to the position to which she requested transfer at our Fullerton Avenue Chalet in Chica- go, Illinois, displacing, if necessary, any employee assigned to or working in that position since the date of her request, and we shall reimburse her for 626 GOLD STANDARD ENTERPRISES, INC. any travel expenses incurred by reason of our unlawful refusal to transfer her, plus interest. GOLD STANDARD ENTERPRISES, INC.; GOLD STANDARD LIQUOR STORE AT RIDGE AVENUE; CHALET WINE AND CHEESE SHOPS, LTD. AT FULLERTON AVENUE; CHALET WINE AND CHEESE SHOPS, LTD. AT HIGHLAND PARK DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MARTIN S. BENNETT, Administrative Law Judge: This matter was heard at Chicago, Illinois, on March 28 and 29, 1977. The complaint, issued February 28, 1977, and based upon charges filed December 15. 1976, and February 3, 1977, by Helen Alcantar, an individual, alleges that Respondent, as named above and below, has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(4), (3), and (I) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. Briefs have been submitted by the General Counsel and Respondent.' Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS Gold Standard Enterprises, Inc., is an Illinois corpora- tion and also a holding company which owns all of the shares of stock of various Gold Standard Liquor Stores as well as the stock of Chalet Wine and Cheese Shops, Ltd.; the latter is also an Illinois corporation. At all locations it is variously engaged in the retail sale of liquor, cheese, wines, and related items. Respondent annually enjoys gross revenues in excess of $500,000, sells and ships goods valued in excess of $10,000 from Illinois to points outside that State, and receives in Illinois goods valued in excess of $10,000 from points outside that State. I find that the operations of Respondent affect commerce with the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II1. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED Retail Clerks Union Local 1550, Retail Clerks Interna- tional Association, AFL-CIO, herein Local 1550, and Retail Liquor Salesmen Union Local 162, affiliated with the Distillery, Wine, Rectifying and Allied Workers of America, AFL-CIO, herein Local 162. are labor organiza- tions within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 1 A motion by the General Counsel to correct the transcript in a number of minor respects, unopposed. is hereby granted. In. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACrICES A. Introduction, The Issues The General Counsel alleges that Respondent discharged Helen Alcantar on December 14, 1976, because of her union and concerted activities and refused to transfer Billie Van Wieren from its Highland Park (Chalet) store to its Fullerton Avenue (Chalet) store because of her union and concerted activities, because she filed an unfair labor practice charge against Respondent, and because she gave a statement to a Board agent relating to same. Van Wieren is still in the employ of Respondent at the former location. The complaint further attacks an alleged threat by Manag- er Herman Sonenblum of the Ridge Avenue store (Gold Standard) that an employee might suffer physical harm for engaging in union activities and interrogation by Executive Vice President Seymour Binstein of an employee concern- ing union activities. B. The Termination of Helen Alcantar Alcantar, the Charging Party herein, has worked at a number of stores of Respondent since 1963, with various departures including a move to California in January 1967 and a subsequent return to the Chicago area less than a year later. As indicated, her termination in December 1976 is at issue herein. Alcantar, after her return from California, worked at the Skokie store and was then transferred in 1976 to the Chalet store in Armitage as comanager; she was then transferred to the Chalet store in Fullerton where she quit in 1976 after, as she testified, giving approximately I month's notice. Despite the foregoing, she applied for work and was rehired by Gold Standard at its Ridge Avenue store as a part-time cashier approximately I-month later. Respon- dent concedes her competency as an employee. The record demonstrates that she had difficulties with management and resigned at least twice from the employ of Respondent and had threatened to do so on other occasions, all this prior to the final incident treated below. On or about December 7, 1976, Alcantar gave Manager Herman Sonenblum of the Ridge Avenue store notice that she was leaving. She did not state the date. He assumed that this was a notice of 2 weeks. Sonenblum admittedly was unhappy with her abrupt decision because it was given in the midst of the busy holiday season. He reported this action to Assistant Manager Ralph Fischer and instructed him to find a replacement. A job applicant, Janice Steffans, had applied for work late in November and Fischer duly hired her between December 8 and 10, effective December 16,2 the day after Respondent scheduled the departure of Alcantar. Steffans, because of personal commitments not disclosed herein, did not become an active employee of Respondent for some days later. Assistant Manager Ralph Fischer of the Ridge Avenue store, as he testified, customarily prepares a master sched- ule at the beginning of each month which discloses the scheduled working hours of all employees. Alcantar was so 2 December 15 was the end of a scheduled pay period for the employees of Respondent. 627 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD included in the schedule he prepared early in December and this reflected proposed working hours from December 13 through 24. This schedule was not given to her, but he testified and I find, that this was available on his desk for her inspection, as well as for other employees. Also relied upon herein by the General Counsel is an incident after the departure of Alcantar from the employ of Respondent, this predicated upon her filing of the original charge herein on December 15, 1976. At the request of Seymour Binstein, executive vice president of Respondent, the two met on the morning of January 6, 1977. According to Binstein, who had long regarded her as a superior employee, he had been advised of her quitting the employ of the concern and he was desirous of inducing her to return, this consistent with her frequent rehires in the past and also consistent with his endeavors to persuade her not to resign on a number of occasions. The record amply demonstrates that Binstein had at- tempted to promote and assist Alcantar. For example, he had striven to rehire or promote her to the position of chief clerk at a higher rate of pay. And, on two occasions, he had arranged for small loans to her for personal reasons without interest; both of these were duly repaid. At this meeting on January 6, according to Binstein, they discussed her intention to work as a cashier at a restaurant, unrelated to Respondent, with hours and reimbursement less desirable than those at Respondent. He did assure her that he would in no way interfere with her aspirations in this direction. She in turn testified that she asked that Respondent pay for her psychiatric treatment and that he then raised the topic of the charges involved herein. But she admitted that Binstein said he was not asking her to drop the charge. She testified that he asked to read her affidavit, and this he denied. On balance, and particularly in view of his long term consideration of the lady, as well as my observation of the witnesses, I credit Binstein. Stated otherwise, he attempted to recall and retain an employee he regarded well. Alcantar testified in considerable detail on behalf of the General Counsel concerning her union activities, but said relatively little about what Sonenblum knew about such activities. She testified that she spoke with Sonenblum as to whether the employees of Respondent, including herself, were represented by a labor organization. This included telephone calls to one, Champagne, of Local 1550, who told her that she, as a part-time employee, was not covered by any labor contract between Respondent and the Union. She allegedly brought this up with Sonenblum who, she contended, told her that there was a union and that she should stop "messing with that Union." Again, she attrib- uted to Sonenblum the statement that when another employee asked for a humidifier, Sonenblum stated that she should call "your Union." She also attributed to Sonenblum a statement that someone would "get her" for "messing around with that labor organization." Sonenblum denied making these statements. He did recall that she received a telephone call during which she spoke of union activity, this while at the cash register, and stated that this was the first he learned of this activity. Respondent has contended that Alcantar testified, "in- terminably" about union activities and this is perhaps close to the fact. Stated briefly, she learned that Billie Van Wieren, whose case is treated below, was interested in getting a union into the store. She thereafter contacted Van Wieren, and visited her. Van Wieren had a list of the employees and the two ladies went over it. She asked if Van Wieren had any cards to be signed and Alcantar signed a card and indeed took a card for her daughter, also an employee, to sign. She offered to have others sign and Van Wieren replied that this was not necessary as almost everyone had previously signed a card for Local 1550. Alcantar offered to have a meeting at her own home and did so approximately October 31 with about 10 employees attending. She had two other meetings at her home, as also did Van Wieren, whose case is treated below. The last meeting was in the first week of December and this followed a meeting at her home on November 26, because at that prior meeting, or at one shortly before that, a representative of Local 1550, Nalley, had told them that his organization could not represent them because another union already did represent the employees of Respondent and he named Local 162. As for the key incident, on the testimony of Alcantar, Representative Champagne of Local 1550 called her at the store on the morning of December 7, and she was at the cash register. Sonenblum was in the area. This related to her request that copies of the purported union contract be brought to the shop. Sonenblum asked her to hang up and she refused. She wrote him a note that this was a call from the union representative. He again told her to hang up. As she testified, he told her about three times to hang up and she shook her head in a negative manner and he was visibly disturbed. According to Sonenblum, he was concerned about this interfering with her handling her job at the register. Alcantar, in a lengthy answer, testified that Sonenblum became angry, pointed his finger at her, told her to get back on the phone and tell the man not to send a representative to the shop because he might be "killed" if he did. She refused to do so twice. Alcantar allegedly testified that this sounded like Re- spondent was run by the "syndicate." She claimed that he admitted that it was run by the syndicate, and she said that if the Company was run by the syndicate, she did not want to work there any longer, and she walked away. Later that day, Sonenblum asked her if she was serious. She stated that if he could prove to her this connection with the syndicate, she was serious and did not intend to work there any more. There is much more of this which I deem unnecessary to set forth herein. On balance, and upon a preponderance of the evidence, I find that the contentions of the General Counsel are not supported herein. Perhaps one further matter should be treated. In late February or early March, she allegedly went to the store, and after some byplay, obtained and filled out an application for employment. She contended that Assistant Manager Ralph Fischer told her, "You know how much good it is going to do you." She has not heard further from Respondent. 628 GOLD STANDARD ENTERPRISES, INC. In view of the foregoing considerations, and upon the entire record, the evidence as to any alliance by Respon- dent with the "syndicate" is purely speculative. Again, in view of all the foregoing considerations, I recommend the dismissal of the allegations of the complaint with respect to Alcantar. C. The Refusal To Transfer Billie Van Wieren Van Wieren entered the employ of Respondent in June 1973 and is still employed by it. Her union activities have been set forth above. She was initially hired in the Chalet at Armitage to sell cheese, was transferred to the Hyde Park and other stores, and was at the Fullerton cheese shop until October 26, 1976, as assistant manager, although not a supervisor. Around that time, she was transferred to the newly opened Highland Park store and on November 1, she filed a charge that this transfer was discriminatory because of her union activities; this charge was eventually withdrawn on February 4, 1977. 3 According to Respon- dent, the new Highland Park store needed experienced employees, in view of the normally busy months of November and December. She was considered a good choice for the transfer because she fully knew the line of cheese products and was expected to do a better job than a new employee. In addition, the evidence demonstrates that Respondent had experienced difficulties in obtaining new help for the cheese departments. The record well documents her attempts to transfer from the Highland Park store back to the Fullerton store. This was predicated upon the fact that she lived but two or three blocks from that store, whereas the Highland Park store was at least 30 miles distant and she was forced to rely upon public transportation; it appears that this was ample. The record demonstrates that the Highland Park store is the largest of all the facilities operated by Respondent and is second in cheese sales, with almost a 50 percent greater volume than at Fullerton. Van Wieren approached both Fred Greenfield, the manager of wine sales at several stores, including the Fullerton store, and Pat Collins, manager of cheese sales at Highland Park and other stores, in her efforts to return to Fullerton. During the first week of January, approximately January 6, she called upon Greenfield at the Fullerton store and asked whether she could fill a position in wine sales which had been advertised. According to Respondent, this position was filled and Greenfield, as he testified, told her that she would have to contact Collins, since only Collins could authorize her transfer from the cheese department in Highland Park. She testified that he told her he could not have her back there telling new people what a bad store it was, because she was responsible for trying to get a union into the store. She had filed charges against them and he refused to let her come back in the wine department, but that if she dropped the charges, he could get her back to the cheese depart- ment. According to Greenfield, there had been some problems with Van Wieren in the past, in that she objected to the interior design at the store, the manner in which a It appears that she went very triefly to the Skokie store during the transition period for training; she testified that she did not receive any such training. cheeses were ordered and the dress code of Respondent. These were discussed during this interview and Van Wieren stated that Respondent was unfair. She brought up the charge she had filed, and asked whether straightening out her problems meant dropping the charge. Greenfield replied that he had nothing to do with the charge, and she should do whatever she wanted in reference to it. I note an inconsistency in the testimony of Van Wieren; she did testify that Greenfield raised the topic of the charge, but also that he could not take her back because she was trying to get a union into the store; the latter he perforce knew. In addition, as Greenfield testified, he had no authority over her and was aware that Highland Park needed her badly. Van Wieren did go to her supervisor, Pat Collins, in February and claimed that he said he would not send her back to Fullerton and she would just have to move or get a car. On the other hand, she also testified that Collins had told her previously that he would try to get her back to Fullerton as soon as he could. She also testified that she asked him in January if it would be all right for her to speak with Greenfield and that Collins replied he would not stand in her way. According to Collins, he actually stated that he could not prevent her from talking with Greenfield about a job at Fullerton. This conversation is described above. The problem is not without difficulty. Van Wieren was admittedly a most competent and desirable worker, but the record warrants a finding that she very definitely was needed and more valuable at Highland Park. The several inconsistencies or contradictions in her testimony warrant the conclusion that the respective versions of the represen- tatives of Respondent are the more reliable. The fact that a man was hired for wine sales effective in mid-January at Fullerton does not affect the foregoing in view of the need for Van Wieren at Highland Park. In view of all the foregoing considerations, I recommend the dismissal of the allegations of the complaint with respect to Billie Van Wieren. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Gold Standard Enterprises, Inc.; Gold Standard Liquor Store at Ridge Avenue; Chalet Wine and Cheese Shops, Ltd. at Fullerton Avenue; and Chalet Wine and Cheese Shops, Ltd. at Highland Park is an employer whose operations affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Retail Clerks Union Local 1550, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, and Retail Liquor Salesmen Union Local 16, affiliated with the Distillery, Wine, Rectifying and Allied Workers of America, AFL- CIO, are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor prac- tices within the meaning of Section 8(aX4), (3), and (1) of the Act. [Recommended Order for dismissal omitted from publi- cation.] 629