Tyee Construction Co.

TYEE CONSTRUCTION CO. 307 Tyee Construction Co. and Harold J. Honeycutt and James Ingraham . Case 19-CA-5386 March 9, 1973 DECISION AND ORDER On June 1, 1972, Administrative Law Judge' Robert L. Piper issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed an answering brief and a brief in support ' of the Decision. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and finds merit in certain of Respondent's exceptions. Accordingly, the Board has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge only to the extent consist- ent herewith. The complaint alleged, the General Counsel contended, and the Administrative Law Judge found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by laying off certain named employees, in order to effectuate the Charging Parties' discharge, because of their previously condoned unprotected concerted activity, and by thereafter refusing to reemploy the Charging Parties for the same reason. We agree with Respondent's exceptions to the Administrative Law Judge's failure to defer the instant controversy to the dispute settlement mechanism agreed upon between the parties for the following reasons. In declining to dismiss the complaint and leave the parties to resolving the dispute through their contrac- tual grievance and appellate procedures, the Admin- istrative Law Judge reasoned that no issue of contract interpretation was involved in the proceed- ing, as was the case in Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB No. 150. However, in National Radio Compa- ny, Inc., 198 NLRB No. 1, the Board deferred to a grievance-arbitration procedure where the contract prohibited discipline for other than "just cause" and provided a mechanism for the quick and fair vindication of employee rights when that clause was violated. The same considerations which led to deferral in that case are present here. Thus, Respondent, through its -membership in the Northwest Line Constructors Chapter, National Electrical Contractors Association, is a party to a collective-bargaining agreement with the Union which expires on March 31, 1973. With the exception of two wildcat strikes, discussed infra, the record indicates that the relationship between the parties has been harmonious and productive for several years. The_ contract provides the following with respect to strikes, disputes, and the settlement thereof: 1.4 There shall be no stoppage of work either by strike or lockout or any subterfuge thereof because of any disputes relating to this Agree- ment. Any grievance which may apse between the Union and the Contractor [Respondent] with respect to the interpretation or application of any terms of this Agreement or with respect to such matters as the alleged discriminatory or arbitrary treatment of an individual employee arising out of his employment . . . shall be determined by the following procedure. 1.4.1 Any employee having a grievance may pre- sent it in person when the Steward has been given an opportunity to be present, or the Steward may present such grievance; in either case it shall be presented to the foreman or super- visor in charge in an endeavor to settle the griev- ance on the job. 1.4.3 If the grievance has not thus been settled as provided for in Sections 1.4.1 and 1.4.2, then it shall be, referred . . . to the Business Manager or his representative, who may immediately pre- sent such grievance to the contractor or his representative. 1.4.4 In the event the grievance is not settled by the above procedure, the problem shall be pre- sented to the Labor-Management Committee. . . 1.5 The Labor-Management Committee shall consist of three (3) representing the Union and three (3) representing the Contractor. It shall meet regularly at such stated times as it may de- cide. .. Meetings shall be conducted in accord- ance with "Structure and Procedural Rules" as adopted June 15, 1966. Any decision made by this Committee shall be final and binding. 1.7 Should this Committee fail to agree to adjust any matter, such shall then be referred to the "Council on Industrial Relations for the Electrical Construction Industry of the United States and Canada." Its decisions shall be final and binding. It is clear from the above that an employee may grieve his alleged discriminatory-or arbitrary treat- ment by Respondent; implicitly, Respondent cannot take arbitrary or discriminatory action against an employee. In 1968 Charging Parties Honeycutt and Ingraham and journeyman lineman Johnson participated in a wildcat strike and since then pursuant to the contract Respondent has refused to employ Johnson.2 How- ever, in July 1971, while Respondent was converting 1 The title of "Trial Examiner" was changed to "Administrative Law 2 Sec 2 4(b) of the agreement permits Respondent "to reject any applicant " Judge effective August 19, 1972 202 NLRB No. 34 for employment" but if the applicant has never worked for Respondent, it may reject him "for any reason allowed under law " 308 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and constructing a high voltage power transmission line for the Bonneville Power Administration, Project Manager Chivrell hired Johnson because he was not aware of the company policy regarding Johnson. When Chivrell learned about Johnson's status with Respondent, he checked with Sargent, Respondent's president, who told Chivrell to discharge him. Johnson was released that afternoon. The following morning, July 15, all of the 200 employees engaged on the project struck in protest, including the Charging Parties. It is clear, and the General Counsel does not argue otherwise, that the July 15 strike was unprotected concerted activity in violation of section 1.4 of the contract. After Chivrell initially agreed with Sar- gent's order to discharge Honeycutt and Ingraham for engaging in the wildcat strike, Chivrell decided to avoid the possibility of prolonging it by retaining them. And, on Monday, July 19, after discussing the situation with the Union, Respondent permitted all of the employees who had struck to return to work. Later that day, a notice was distributed by Sargent stating that "should reoccurrence of this action take place in the future" all employees who had partici- pated in the strike would be subject to immediate dismissal. Honeycutt, Ingraham, and the other members of their eight-man light assembly crew returned to work on July 19 and, when Crew Foreman Moody was discharged for drinking on the job on July 20, Ingraham was made acting foreman. As more fully described in the attached Decision, later that afternoon Chivrell, Foreman Hinerman, and Union Steward Jacobs met to discuss the status of the crew. Hinerman and Chivrell told Jacobs that the crew was being laid off for lack of work and the unavailability of a qualified journeyman to serve as foreman. The crewmembers were informed the next morning, July 21, that they were being laid off; their termination slips stated that they were eligible for rehire. Later that day, however, Sargent sent identical letters to the Union stating that as provided in the contract Honeycutt and Ingraham were not eligible for future employment with Respondent because they had induced employees to engage in a strike. Since then, all members of the crew save the Charging Parties have been rehired by Respondent. The Charging Parties did not file grievances over their layoff and Respondent's subsequent refusal to rehire them. As noted, the Administrative Law Judge, in 3 Contrary to our dissenting colleagues , we perceive no meaningful distinction between a contract clause prohibiting discharge except for "just cause," as was the case in National Radio, and the instant agreement's prohibition of discriminatory or arbitrary treatment of employees by Respondent Unlike our dissenting colleagues , it is our view that a grievance filed pursuant to this provision would enable an arbitration board fully to agreement with the General Counsel's contentions, found that Respondent had condoned the participa- tion of its employees, including the Charging Parties, in the prior unprotected concerted strike activity and then, in violation of Section 8(a)(1), had discriminat- ed against Honeycutt and Ingraham, and indirectly the entire crew, by laying off the crew and refusing to rehire Honeycutt and Ingraham because they had engaged in such conduct. The Administrative Law Judge found Respondent's assigned reasons for the layoff to be pretexts. Respondent, while denying the commission of any unfair labor practices, asserts that the matter should be resolved by the parties' contractual grievance settlement mechanism. We agree. It is clear that under the collective-bargaining agreement Honeycutt, Ingraham, and the crewmem- bers who were laid off with the Charging Parties may grieve their alleged arbitrary and discriminatory treatment by Respondent. Here, as in National Radio, where the contract prohibited discipline for other than "just cause," there exists a contractual means for the quick and fair vindication of employee rights.3 And, in Howard Electric Company, 166 NLRB 338, where the Board dismissed the complaint and deferred to an award of the Council of Industrial Relations for the Electrical Construction Industry of the United States and Canada, the same body which could issue a final and binding decision herein if the dispute is not otherwise resolved, the Board stated that the procedure and award of the Council met the arbitration criteria of Spielberg Manufacturing Com- pany, 112 NLRB 1080. In sum, therefore, for the policy and other reasons more fully explicated in National Radio, under the circumstances herein, including the parties' stable and productive bargaining relationship and the absence of a history of union animus, we decline at this time to exercise our remedial powers in this case and so decline as well to render any decision now upon the merits. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed; provided, however that: The Board shall retain jurisdiction of this proceed- ing for the purpose of entertaining an appropriate consider these employees' claims of injustice. This Board has no monopoly on wisdom in such matters, nor is the doctrine of condonation a new-found invention of this Board Claims by employees that they were unfairly treated by reason of some past conduct which may be shown to have long since been forgiven or "condoned" by their employers are surely as cognizable in an arbitration forum as they are before this Board TYEE CONSTRUCTION CO. and timely motion for further consideration upon a proper showing that either (a) the dispute has not, with reasonable promptness after the issuance of this Decision, either been resolved by amicable settle- ment in the grievance procedure or submitted promptly to arbitration, or (b) the grievance or arbitration procedures have not been fair and regular or have reached a result which is repugnant to the Act. MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS, dissenting: We predicted in our dissent in Joseph T. Ryerson & Sons, Inc., 199 NLRB No. 44, that the majority's deferral policy would lead to the dilution of the Act, and that employees would be left with only such protection as they were accorded under the collec- tive-bargaining agreement-a protection dependent upon the relative strengths of the employer and the union, and upon the union 's ability and willingness to process grievances . This case confirms our fears and again illustrates the extent to which the majority is willing, by its policy of deferring to private tribunals, to abrogate the rights of individual employees under the Act we administer. The majority justifies their deferral here by analogizing the legal and factual situation to that in National Radio Company, Inc., supra, where they relied on a "just cause" provision in the contract under which employees could be disciplined as the foundation for deferring the alleged discrimination of an employee under Section 8(a)(3) to the arbitral process. In our dissent in National Radio we set forth in explicit detail our objections to the course the majority was following in extending its Collyer policy to a situation in which the only issue was whether an employee was discharged for union activity in violation of Section 8(a)(3). Not only are the same considerations applicable here , but, even if we were inclined to accept the majority views in National Radio, we find that the instant case is an inappropri- ate vehicle for the application of those views . For the reasons discussed below, we are concerned that the majority had enlarged the National Radio doctrine, and has done so with insufficient evidentiary and legal rationale and further eroded the protective rights of employees under the statute we administer. The complaint alleged* that on July 21, 1971, Respondent laid off the eight members of a working crew, including the Charging Parties, Honeycutt and Ingraham, to retaliate discriminatorily against them because of their participation in concerted work stoppages which took place during the previous week, or because of the Charging Parties' participa- tion in a concerted work stoppage in 1968, or both and thereafter refused to rehire the Charging Parties for the same reasons. As pointed out in the majority decision, there is no dispute that the work stoppages in question were in violation of the contract and 309 constituted unprotected concerted activity. It is also clear that at that time Respondent could have discharged the employees involved for engaging in such unprotected concerted activities . However, it is undisputed that the Respondent condoned their activities by agreeing to the return to work of all of the employees without reservation despite knowledge of their participation in such unprotected activities and the prior participation of Ingraham and Honey- cutt in similar work stoppages in 1968 . The Respon- dent was willing to forgive and forget as long as it could get the work moving again . Respondent's notice of July 19 to all the employees involved in the work stoppage after their return to work which specifically stated that it would not in the future permit reoccurrence of such work stoppages and that in the future employees involved would be dis- charged further emphasized that the prior conduct had been condoned. From the above it is clear that the prior unprotect- ed conduct of the members of the work crew, including Ingraham and Honeycutt , had been unconditionally condoned, and the laying off of the crew to accomplish the discharge of Honeycutt and Ingraham on July 21 interfered with , restrained, and coerced the employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1). It is also equally clear that the refusal to rehire the Charging Parties thereafter because of their partici- pation in prior work stoppages was an independent violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act regardless of the reason for their layoff on July 21. The doctrine of condonation is neither a new nor novel one and has been uniformly accepted by the Board and courts for many years. Its purpose is to. insure stability in employment relations by prevent- ing an employer from misleadingly agreeing to return its employees to work and then taking disciplinary action for something apparently forgiven . We believe it is a doctrine which should not be lightly discarded. Unlike , National Radio, the central issue here is not alleged discrimination of an employee for union activities in violation of Section 8(a)(3), but, as described above, condonation of unprotected concerted activities and sub- sequent discrimination . This involves alleged vio- lations of statutory, not contractual, rights. The legal doctrine of condonation in our opinion is clearly not within the confines of the provisions of the contract. The majority opinion in fact admits as much since they point out they are not relying, as they did in National Radio, on deferring to a grievance-arbitration procedure where the contract prohibited discipline for other than "just cause," a provision absent here, but upon a broad catchall provision in section 1.4 of the contract which permits the Union to grieve for employees "with respect to 310 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD such matters as the alleged discriminatory or arbitrary treatment of an individual employee arising out of his employment." They interpret this provision to cover employees' statutory as well as contractual rights. In doing so the majority has finally admitted, as we predicted they would, that there need not be a contract clause covering the conduct involved in order to defer to arbitration, but merely a collective- bargaining contract with grievance procedures with language related to our Act. The result is that the union and employer can escape the Board's and courts' application of the Act to their violations of it by simply including in their contract a provision, as here, which contains lan- guage similar to that of the Act and attaching an arbitration clause. Statutory rights are then reduced to contract rights and will disappear unless the arbitration tribunal departing from statutory stand- ards inadvertently makes an explicit disclosure in its decision that it had done so. Failure of the arbitra- tion tribunal to determine the statutory rights is not sufficient to warrant this Board's vindication of them, for the majority will presume they have been determined, and properly, under a "just cause" or similar clause. Terminal Transport Company, Inc., 185 NLRB 672. Thus, the majority, as we have previously observed, undermines the Act's protection of the individual and makes the public interest in proper and uniform application of the Act a plaything of private treaty and interpretation.4 National Radio and Ryerson, supra, were predicated on the finding that the interests of the union and the employee therein were in "substantial harmony." Here no grievances were filed by the Union, nor is there any indication that any will be. The unfair labor practices were filed and pursued by the individuals in question. The Union took no part in the unfair labor practice proceeding and filed no brief. The two individuals involved must depend upon the Union's hiring hall for job referrals, and they are not in a position to take an independent or forthright stand to force the Union to pursue their interests. There is no reasonable grounds under the facts of this case for assuming that the interests of the two individuals involved would be adequately represented, or indeed presented, in the complicated 4 Since the contract must be construed as consistent with the Act if at all possible, it will be a short step for the majority to dispense with the clause which contains some or all of the statutory language It will then follow that the mere presence of an arbitration clause in a contract will bar individual employees from access to the Board for protection of their statutory rights. 5 Nor, in Member Jenkins' view, can the majority properly rely on the existence of a quick and fair vindication of employee rights under the contract or a stable and productive bargaining relationship as support for their position The private tribunals involved here are quite unlike the single arbitrator who was empowered to make a final decision in National Radio and other Collyer deferrals. They consist of a Labor- Management Committee consisting of three representatives each of the Union and the tribunals, which involve the union and the contrac- tor, the industry and the International. The Board has previously noted that it would be repugnant to the purposes of the Act to defer to arbitration under such circumstances. Kansas Meat Packers, a Division of Aristo Foods, Inc., 198 NLRB No. 2. We feel the Board should also refuse to do so here.5 Moreover, in view of the work stoppages which go back to 1968, and the strained relations between the Employer and the employees, as shown by facts fully described in the Administrative Law Judge's Deci- sion, reliance on bargaining history would appear to be a thin reed to support the majority's position. Similarly, to rely on the absence of a history of union animus would appear to be equally makeweight, since the very conduct alleged which the majority refuses to adjudicate upon its merits clearly involves animus. Finally, we note that the majority Decision does not deal with the Administrative Law Judge's finding that by laying off certain of the members of the crew on July 21, 1971, in order to effectuate the discharge of Ingraham and Honeycutt, because of their previously condoned unprotected concerted activity Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Their Decision deals only with Honeycutt and Ingraham. The Administrative Law, Judge recommended in his Order that Respondent make the six employees involved whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered as the result of such discrimination. The majority would apparently leave this issue unresolved and dangling. Here, in our opinion, the majority is acting contrary to their previously stated views that they will not defer part of a dispute to the arbitral process when they are required to determine a closely related and integrat- ed part. Sheet Metal Workers, International Associa- tion, Local Union 17, AFL-CIO (George Koch Sons, Inc.), 199 NLRB No. 26. The majority's view that these other dischargees can also seek arbitration seems beside the mark. The violation alleged is that they were fired in order to cloak the firing of Ingraham and Honeycutt. Such violation has no discernible connection with any contract interpreta- contractor, with a final appeal to the Council on Industrial Relations for the Electrical Construction Industry of the United States and Canada, consisting of six members of the National Electrical Contractors Associa- tion and six members of the international Union, whose decisions must be unanimous Significantly, neither body provides for neutrals In Member Jenkins' view such tribunals are conductive to compromise , horsetrading, and the possible subversion of individual employee interests, and of statutory rights as well, by the vote of only one of the six-member appeal council The Collyer principle contemplated that the labor contract must bind the parties to the dispute decision of a "forum of third parties or a neutral arbitrator" and thus this would not appear to be an acceptable form See Tulsa- Whisenhunt Funeral Homes, Inc, 195 NLRB No. 20. TYEE CONSTRUCTION CO. tion, and the majority points to none. We see nothing an arbitrator can determine under the contract as to this group of dischargees. For the above reasons we would decide the allegations in the complaint on their merits. The Administrative Law Judge in his Decision, in our opinion, has properly analyzed the evidence and applied applicable Board and court precedents, and we would adopt it. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ROBERT L. PIPER, Trial Examiner: This proceeding under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, was heard at Seattle, Washington, on March 7 and 8, 1972, pursuant to due notice. The complaint, which was issued on February 2, 1972, on a charge filed July 27, 1971,1 alleged in substance as amended that Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by (1) laying off or discharging on July 21 eight named employees because of their participation in a concerted refusal to work, and (2) failing and refusing thereafter to employ the Charging Parties because of their participation in said concerted work stoppage and a prior concerted work stoppage. Respondent's answer denied the alleged unfair labor practices and affirmatively alleged that the Board should defer to the grievance and arbitration procedures contained in the contract between Respondent and Local No. 77, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO (hereinafter called the Union). Res- pondent's unopposed motion to correct the official transcript of proceedings is hereby granted. Upon the entire record in the case and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS Respondent is a Washington corporation engaged in the construction of electric power lines in the States of Washington, Oregon, and Alaska, with principal offices in Bellevue, Washington; Portland, Oregon; and Anchorage, Alaska. During the past year, it performed services valued in excess of $50,000 for customers located outside the State of Washington and had a gross business volume in excess of $500,000. Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. I All dates hereinafter refer to 1971 unless otherwise indicated III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Introduction and Issues 311 At all times relevant herein, Respondent and the Union were parties to a collective-bargaining contract which contained a no-strike clause. During 1971, Respondent was engaged in the conversion and construction of a high voltage power transmission line known as the Chief Joseph-Monroe project. On July 14, Respondent dis- charged Charles J. Johnson, one of its employees at that project. On July 15 and 16, approximately 200 of Respondent's employees engaged in a strike or concerted refusal to work to protest said discharge. On July 19, pursuant to agreement with Respondent, all of said employees returned to work unconditionally. On July 21, Respondent laid off one of its assembly crews, consisting of eight of said employees, including the Charging Parties, allegedly because of their participation in the aforesaid work stoppage and the Charging Parties' participation in a prior concerted work stoppage. On the same day, Respon- dent notified the Union, pursuant to their contractual hiring hall arrangement, that the Charging Parties were no longer eligible for employment with Respondent because they had induced the employees to engage in the aforesaid work stoppage. The issues as framed by the pleadings are, after Respondent on July 19 had unconditionally permitted all of the employees to return to work: (1) laying off or discharging the eight members of Respondent's assembly crew, including the Charging Parties, because of their participation in the work stoppage on July 15 and 16 and/or the Charging Parties' participation in a concerted work stoppage in 1968, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act; and (2) on and after July 21, refusing to permit the Union to refer the Charging Parties for employment with Respondent through the Union's exclusive hiring hall because of their participation in the July 15 and 16 work stoppage and/or another concerted work stoppage in 1968 involving Respondent, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. B. Chronology of Events During 1971 Respondent was engaged in the conversion and construction of a high voltage power transmission line, known as the Chief Joseph-Monroe project, running from the Chief Joseph Dam on the Columbia River in Washington, west across Stevens Pass in the Cascade Mountains, to Monroe, Washington. The project consisted of the conversion of the existing power line to 500,000 volt capacity, involving the removal of the old transmission lines, the conversion of some and the replacement of other transmission towers, and the necessary rewiring, all pursuant to a contract with the Bonneville Power Adminis- tration which required completion before the winter of 1971-72. At all times relevant herein, Respondent, as a member of the Northwest Line Constructors Chapter, National Electrical Contractors Association, was party to a collective-bargaining agreement with the Union and other IBEW locals containing, inter alia, an exclusive hiring hall arrangement, a no-strike clause, ,a grievance and "arbitra- 312 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tion" procedure and a clause permitting the employer to reject any applicant for employment "for any reason allowed under law." Respondent's Chief Joseph-Monroe project included several "shops," including the Skykomish and Merritt shops, where construction offices and equipment were maintained and the employees reported to work. Most of Respondent's employees worked in crews, which did assembly, erection, wiring, and disassembly, respectively. Respondent obtained all of its employees for such crews from the Union's hiring hall Each of these crews had a working foreman, who was required under the contract to be a journeyman lineman referred by the Union. During the relevant period, Respondent's officials with whom we are here concerned were E. B. Sargent, president of the corporation; William J. Chivrell, project manager of the Chief Joseph-Monroe project; and Jack Hinerman, general foreman or superintendent of the Skykomish shop, under Chivrell. Chivrell did all of the hiring pursuant to requests for men received from the several general foremen underneath him. On July 13, Chivrell, apparently by mistake, hired Charles J. Johnson, a journeyman lineman, pursuant to referral from the Union. In 1968, Johnson, together with the Charging Parties, Honeycutt and Ingraham, and other employees, engaged in a wildcat strike involving Respon- dent and other members of the National Electrical Contractors Association. As a result, Respondent thereaft- er refused to employ Johnson. On July 14, Chivrell, having been informed by Hinerman of Respondent's policy concerning Johnson, contacted Sargent and was instructed by him to fire Johnson, although Chivrell advised Sargent that this might precipitate a strike . Chivrell, during the course of discussions with Hinerman and Stanley Jacobs, the Union's shop steward employed by Respondent as a journeyman lineman, concerning the requested discharge of Johnson, learned that Honeycutt and Ingraham had participated with Johnson in the wildcat strike in 1968. Chivrell fired Johnson that afternoon. The following morning all of the project's employees, approximately 200, including Honeycutt and Ingraham, engaged in a concert- ed work stoppage by refusing at starting time to work unless Respondent reinstated Johnson. Hinerman and Chivrell both talked with the striking employees at Skykomish, but they refused to return to work unless Johnson was reinstated. Chivrell appeared to be considering this request favorably, but then stated he was going to call Sargent to find out who was running the job. He did so. Sargent said that he had ascertained that Honeycutt and Ingraham were employed on the project, had participated in the 1968 work stoppage, and that he wanted them fired also because of their current activities and those in 1968. Chivrell agreed to fire Ingraham and Honeycutt and had their termination slips and checks prepared. However, after second thought, he realized this might prolong the work stoppage which he was anxious to avoid because of Respondent's contractual deadline. As a result, Chivrell warned Sargent that, if Chivrell fired Honeycutt and Ingraham as Sargent desired, it might prolong the strike indefinitely. Sargent finally agreed that Chivrell was running the job and Sargent would leave the decision to him, and Chivrell decided not to fire Honeycutt and Ingraham. Although Chivrell contended that Sargent gave him exactly the same choice with respect to Johnson's prior discharge, nevertheless Chivrell fired Johnson under substantially the same circumstances, i.e., lack of personal knowledge concerning Johnson's involvement in 1968 and a substantial certainty that the discharge would result in a work stoppage or strike. The strike continued through July 15 and 16, Thursday and Friday. On July 16, at a meeting at the union hall the employees decided to return to work on Monday, July 19, leaving the disposition of Johnson's discharge to other channels. Chivrell, who was anxious to have the men return to work, was informed by Jacobs that they had decided to return to work unconditionally on Monday. Despite Respondent's knowledge that the strike was in violation of the contract, Chivrell conceded that there were no restrictions whatsoever placed on anybody returning to work, that every employee was permitted to return to work without reservation and that, as far as he was concerned, it was all over and done with. Chivrell also admitted that, with full knowledge of Ingraham's and Honeycutt's participation in the work stoppage on July 15 and 16 and the work stoppage in 1968, he permitted them to return to work without any reservation. On the morning of July 19, all of the employees, including Honeycutt, Ingraham, and the other six members of their crew returned to work without any conditions or objections. Later that day, Respondent posted and gave all of the employees a notice signed by Sargent that all employees who had participated in the unauthorized work stoppage in violation of the contract would be subject to immediate discharge "should reoccurrence of this action take place in the future." Honeycutt and Ingraham were members of an eight-man assembly crew engaged in the assembly of light steel towers which did not require the assistance of a crane, as distinguished from the assembly of towers consisting of heavy steel parts which required lifting by a large crane. The foreman of their crew was Charles Moody. Moody, as required by the contract, was a journeyman lineman. The other six members of the crew were Frank J. Milos, Earl Appleton, Larry C. Wearin, William L. Harper, Leroy Chase, and Asa Pronovost. None of the crew members were classified as journeyman linemen, all being classified as assemblymen, ground men, or equipment operators, classifications receiving a uniform but lower pay scale than that of journeyman linemen. Under the Union's referral system, assemblymen, ground men, and equipment opera- tors could be referred alternatively but not as journeyman linemen. Journeyman linemen could, of course, accept referral to lower paid classifications. Certain requisite skills, which were possessed by both Ingraham and Honeycutt, were required for referral to operate certain types of equipment. About midday July 20, Respondent fired Moody for drinking on the job and Hinerman named Ingraham as acting foreman for the balance of the day. The crew was engaged in the assembly of a light tower in the Skykomish area. Jacobs informed Hinerman that under the contract the crew could not operate without a foreman, who had to be a journeyman lineman. Hinerman then informed Jacobs TYEE CONSTRUCTION CO. 313 that the crew would have to be laid off because there was no journeyman lineman available to act as foreman. Jacobs immediately pointed out that this was incorrect and that there were a number of eligible journeyman linemen, whom he named, on the project available to act as foremen . In addition, the record establishes that there were three eligible journeymen on the Union's out of work list whom Respondent could have requested. Chivrell conced- ed that he did not consider calling the hall. I credit Jacobs and find that, contrary to the testimony of Chivrell and Hinerman, there were journeyman linemen available. After Jacobs had pointed out that there were journeyman linemen available, Chivrell changed Respondent 's reason and contended that the crew should be laid off because there was not enough work for it. According to Chivrell and Hinerman, whom I do not credit unless otherwise corroborated, they had decided to terminate or lay off Moody's crew for lack of work sometime before Moody's discharge. As will be discussed more fully hereinafter, the record not only fails to establish such lack of work or need but establishes the contrary. Chivrell admitted that, as he did in the case of Johnson's discharge and all other matters involving personnel, he discussed the proposed layoff thoroughly with Jacobs. Jacobs then argued that there was plenty of work available, because he knew that it was Respondent's busy season and peak employment period, that there was a constant turnover of personnel, and that Respondent would need additional employees throughout the summer to complete its project on schedule. He pointed out that the members of the crew could be transferred temporarily to other positions until vacancies, which occurred repeatedly, arose in other crews on the project . During the ensuing discussion Chivrell conceded that he could use four named members of the crew, not including Ingraham and Honeycutt, on other jobs on the project. Jacobs replied that all of the members of that crew were good workers, there was ample work on the project to warrant keeping all of them, and that he saw no reason for selecting only the four named by Chivrell. Chivrell finally conceded that he could find places for all of the members of the crew except Honeycutt,and Ingraham. Jacobs countered by pointing out that both Hinerman and Chivrell had conceded that Honeycutt and Ingraham were good workers. Chivrell then told Jacobs that Respondent could not afford to keep Ingraham and Honeycutt because they were "troublemak- ers and loud mouths." Jacobs warned Chivrell and Hinerman that if they selected only Ingraham and Honeycutt to be laid off Respondent would probably have another work stoppage at the project and rather than do that it would be better to lay off the entire crew. After considerable further discussion, Chivrell decided to lay off the entire crew. Inasmuch as it was then the afternoon of July 20, Chivrell at Jacobs' request decided to lay off the crew the following morning, which would entitle them to 4 hours' showup time. The following morning when the crew reported, Hiner- man informed them that they were being laid off because their foreman had been fired and Respondent was unable to secure another journeyman lineman to act as foreman. At this point, Richard Rogers, a journeyman lineman, reported for work, having been referred by the Union. One of the members of the crew informed Rogers that they were being terminated because they had no journeyman lineman to act as foreman. Rogers thereupon volunteered to accept the position to prevent their layoff. Hinerman refused, stating that it was too late and that there was no work for the crew in any event. Under the contract, Respondent had the right to select its crew foremen. Hinerman testified that he did not want Rogers because he had previously worked on the project eight or nine times and could not be depended upon to remain for any period of time. However, Hinerman and Chivrell both also contended that one of the reasons the crew was laid off was because it had only 1- 1/2 days' work left. Respondent gave termination slips to the entire crew, including Ingraham and Honeycutt. The slips stated that each workman's ability was good and that each of them was eligible for rehire. However, the same day, Sargent sent two identical letters to the Union advising it that, pursuant to the contract, Ingraham and Honeycutt were not eligible for future employment with Respondent because they had "induced employees to engage in work stoppage." The letters referred to the provision of the contract authorizing the employer to reject any applicant for employment for any reason allowed under law. Chivrell claimed that his decision to lay off the crew, including Ingraham and Honeycutt, was in no respect dictated or requested by Sargent, and Sargent claimed that the letters he wrote to the Union the same day were written without the knowledge of Chivrell. Their testimony concerning their actions that day is inconsistent and contradictory. Sargent testified that he had not been in touch with Chivrell and was not aware of the layoff of the crew, which included Ingraham and Honeycutt, until his secretary presented him with the termination slips the same day, whereupon he immediately wrote the Union rejecting Ingraham and Honeycutt for future employment. It is not clear how the termination slips reached Sargent's office so quickly. According to him, Chivrell acted on his own and never advised Sargent of the layoff action. On the contrary, Chivrell testified that Sargent knew about the layoff because Chivrell was dealing directly with him on July 21 and that Sargent had told Chivrell that day that Sargent had sent the letters to the Union rejecting Honeycutt and Ingraham for future employment. Chivrell did not explain why their termination slips stated they were eligible for rehire. At various times after July 21, all of the members of the Moody crew except Ingraham and Honeycutt were referred back to the project by the Union and reemployed by Respondent. Respondent presented shifting and varied defenses for terminating the Moody crew on July 21, all of which I find to be without merit. The record establishes that Respon- dent's originally stated reason was the lack of a foreman after Moody was fired. When it became apparent that this reason was without merit, because of Jacobs' naming several journeyman linemen on the project who could be appointed as foreman, Rogers' volunteering on the morning of July 21 to accept the position of foreman, and the fact that there were three journeyman linemen available on the Union's out-of-work list, Respondent 314 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD changed its reason to lack of need for the crew because of lack of work. In support of this contention, Chivrell and Hinerman testified that there was no crane available for the Moody crew and none could be obtained, so it could not be transferred to heavy assembly work. The Moody crew was engaged in light assembly which did not require the use of a crane. Other assembly crews, which had and used a heavy crane, could perform both light and heavy assembly work. Respondent also contended that because of the poor condition of the access roads to the sites where the transmission towers were erected, it was unable to haul steel into such sites and there were only one and a half light steel towers left to be assembled by the Moody crew. Considerable evidence was offered to establish the lack of adequate access roads, but the record fails to indicate why this had any greater effect upon the Moody crew than upon the other crews using a heavy crane, which would be more difficult to get to the site of construction. The record establishes that there was a great deal of work available for the Moody crew, that it was the peak of Respondent's busy season, that there was a shortage of qualified applicants, and that Respondent's regular prac- tice was to not lay off unneeded crews but to transfer members to other crews for the time being until vacancies occurred, which happened regularly. Most significantly, during the conversation on the afternoon of July 20 between Chivrell and Jacobs concerning the layoff, Chivrell conceded that he could transfer all of the members of the Moody crew to other jobs on the project except Honeycutt and Ingraham, whom he could not keep because they were troublemakers and loud mouths. The record establishes that there were jobs available at that time which could have been filled by the Moody crew. Thus, on July 20, the very day that Chivrell decided to lay off the Moody crew allegedly for lack of work, he ordered a new complete gin pole crew from the Union to report at the Skykomish shop the following day. Gin pole crews did assembly without a crane. This crew included seven positions which could have been filled by members of the Moody crew. The record also establishes that Respondent had decided to create this new gin pole crew substantially before July 20 and that members of the Moody crew had been asked by their foreman if they were interested in working on such crew and had replied affirmatively, yet Chivrell contended that he had no work available and did not consider transferring the Moody crew to such gin pole crew. In addition, according to Chivrell and Hinerman, they had decided a week or more before July 20 to lay off the Moody crew because of lack of need, which was totally inconsistent with Chivrell ordering a new group of men on July 20 from the union hall for the gin pole crew. In addition, the prior day Chivrell had ordered one assembly man as a replacement in a crew at the Merritt shop, who did not report until the following Friday, July 23. The record further establishes that Respondent made calls to the Union for assembly hands every week after July 21 and that, between July 26 and the end of August, Respondent had a total of 16 new openings which the members of the Moody crew were qualified to fill. Thus the record establishes, and I find, that there was work available for the Moody crew and that there were journeyman linemen available for appointment as foreman of that crew. Moreover, Chivrell, during his conversation with Jacobs on July 20, in substance admitted that Chivrell's only reason for laying off the Moody crew was to get rid of Honeycutt and Ingraham. Although Chivrell contended that he alone made the decision to terminate the crew, it was undisputed that Sargent had previously instructed him to discharge Honeycutt and Ingraham and after their layoff took immediate steps to make certain that Ingraham and Honeycutt would never again be referred to Respondent for employment. C. Concluding Findings 1. The discriminatory layoff The complaint alleged that on July 21 Respondent laid off the eight members of the Moody crew, including the Charging Parties, to discriminatorily retaliate against them because of their participation in the concerted work stoppage on July 15 and 16 and/or because of the Charging Parties' participation in a concerted work stoppage in 1968. The General Counsel, of course, relies heavily upon the Board's well-established doctrine of condonation. There is no dispute that the concerted work stoppage engaged in by Respondent's employees on July 15 and 16 constituted an unprotected concerted activity, i.e., a strike in violation of the contract. At that time, Respondent could have discharged such employees for engaging in such unprotected concerted activities. Howev- er, the record establishes beyond dispute that Respondent condoned their activities by unconditionally agreeing to the return to work of all of the employees, admitting that it did so without any reservations despite knowledge of their participation in such unprotected activities and the prior participation of Ingraham and Honeycutt in the work stoppage in 1968. Chivrell, as he stated, was willing to forgive and forget as long as he could get the men back to work and get on with the project. Respondent's notice of July 19 to all of the employees involved in the work stoppage after their return to work constitutes further corroboration of Respondent's condonation thereof, since Respondent specifically stated that should reoccurrence of such action take place in the future all employees who participated in the prior work stoppage would be subject to immediate discharge. The above findings clearly establish condonation by Respondent, and it could not thereafter discharge or otherwise discriminate against such employees for having engaged in such condoned activities without violating the Act. Under such circumstances, the doctrine of condonation has been the law for many years. The Board has described it as follows: ... however, contrary to the Trial Examiner, we find that even if Sherrod's participation in the threat to quit was unprotected, the Respondent's subsequent conduct constituted condonation of the unprotected aspect of Sherrod's otherwise protected activity. A court of appeals has recently stated that the Board's doctrine of condonation "prohibits an employ- er from misleadingly agreeing to return its employees to work and then taking disciplinary action for something TYEE CONSTRUCTION CO. 315 apparently forgiven." [Packers Hide Association, Inc. v. N.L.R B., 360 F.2d 59 (C.A. 8).]2 We are not here concerned with a situation where the employer reserves the right to discipline the instigators of, as distinguished from the participants in, wildcat work stoppages.3 The record contains no evidence that Respon- dent reserved such right but, in fact, establishes the contrary. Moreover, there is no substantial evidence in the record that Ingraham and Honeycutt were in fact the instigators of the strike. Thus the record establishes, and I find, that Respondent in fact unconditionally and without reservation condoned the participation of its employees, including Ingraham and Honeycutt, in their prior unpro- tected concerted activities. Respondent thereby waived whatever rights it had with respect to such employees' conduct. It is well settled that subsequent discrimination for engaging in such condoned activities constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.4 Respondent's only argument with respect to the Board's established doctrine of condonation as approved by the courts is that it is legally defective. Such contention should, of course, be made elsewhere. A preponderance of the reliable, probative, and substan- tial evidence, hereinabove discussed, and in the entire record convinces me, and I find, that Respondent's alleged reasons for discharging or laying off the Moody crew were pretextual, and that Respondent's real reason for laying off that crew was to accomplish the discharge of Honeycutt and Ingraham because of their participation, which Respondent had condoned, in the prior concerted work stoppages, thereby interfering with, restraining, and coerc- ing said employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. It is, of course, well settled that discharging a group of employees, innocent bystanders so to speak, in order to accomplish or camouflage the discharge of certain employ- ees therein in violation of the Act, also constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 2. The discriminatory refusal to hire The complaint alleged that on and after July 21 Respondent failed and refused to permit the Union to refer Ingraham and Honeycutt for employment with Respon- dent through the Union's exclusive hiring hall because of their participation in the July 15 and 16 work stoppage and/or in a prior work stoppage during 1968, an independ- ent violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, regardless of the reason for their layoff on July 21. The facts are undisputed. Pursuant to the contractual provision that the employer had the right to reject any applicant for employment "for any reason allowed under law," on July 21 Respondent notified the Union that Respondent would no longer accept referrals of Ingraham and Honeycutt for employ- ment because they had induced employees to engage in work stoppages in violation of the contract. As found above, this conduct had been unconditionally condoned by 2 American River Constructors, 163 NLRB 551. See also, A & S Asphalt Corporation, 196 NLRB No 38 (1972) and Jones & McKnight, Inc. v NLRB,445F2d97(CA 7, 1971) 3 Complete Auto Transit, Inc, 134 NLRB 652 and Alabama Marble Company, 83 NLRB 1047 4 Fn 2, supra 5 A & S Asphalt Corporation, 196 NLRB No. 38, and American River Constructors, 163 NLRB 551 Respondent. Even if the July 21 layoff were not discrimi- natory or in violation of the Act, it is well settled that a refusal to hire employees for engaging in previously condoned unprotected concerted activities is as much a violation of Section 8(a)(1) as a discharge.5 I conclude and find that Respondent, by refusing to rehire Ingraham and Honeycutt after their layoff on July 21, because of their previously condoned unprotected concerted activities, interfered with, restrained, and coerced said employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 3. Deferral to arbitration Respondent contends that the Board, under the princi- ples enunciated in Collyer,6 should dismiss the complaint and defer to arbitration because the contract contains grievance and appellate procedures, including employee grievances concerning alleged discriminatory or arbitrary treatment. Assuming arguendo that the contract does contain a provision for arbitrationj it seems clear and I find that this is not the type of proceeding in which the Board should or would defer to arbitration inasmuch as it does not involve any issues of contract interpretation. Collyer involved the unilateral granting of wage increases allegedly in violation of the contract and allegedly constituting a refusal to bargain. Its import is that the Board will defer to arbitration in unfair labor practice cases involving the interpretation of the contract, where the expertise of a skilled arbitrator may be assumed to be equal to or greater than that of the Board. The issue herein As one primarily involving condonation and subsequent discrimi- nation, clearly an area not within the confines of the contract and one beyond the scope of the normal expertise of an arbitrator, who might be totally unfamiliar with the applicable legal doctrine. The Board has specifically noted that it has not yet resolved whether and in what circumstances the principles relied upon in Collyer may be applicable to alleged violations of Section 8(a)(3),8 patently comparable to the type of discrimination with which we are here concerned. I am satisfied and find that this proceeding, involving alleged violations of employees' statutory, as distinguished from contractual, rights, and the application of the legal doctrine of condonation, is not an appropriate type of case to be deferred to arbitration. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce, and the Union is a labor organization, within the meaning of the Act. 2. By laying off the members of the Moody crew, in order to effectuate the discharge of Ingraham and Honeycutt, because of their previously condoned unpro- tected concerted activity, Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the 6 Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB No 150 7 Grievance appeals are made to a Labor-Management Committee consisting of three representatives each of the Union and the contractor, with a final appeal to the Council on Industrial Relations for the Electrical Construction Industry of the United States and Canada, consisting of six members of the National Electrical Contractors Association and six members of the International Union, whose decisions must be unanimous 8 Tulsa- Whisenhunt Funeral Homes, Inc, 195 NLRB No 20 316 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 3. By refusing to reemploy Ingraham and Honeycutt because of their previously condoned unprotected concert- ed activities, Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found the Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action of the type which is conventionally ordered in such cases as provided in the Order recommended below, which I find necessary to remedy and remove the effects of the unfair labor practices and to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Respondent reemployed Milos, Appleton, Weann, Harper, Chase, and Pronovost in their former or substantially equivalent positions, they will not be included in the customary reinstatement order. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: 9 ORDER Tyee Construction Co., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Laying off, discharging, or otherwise discriminating against employees because they engaged in previously condoned unprotected concerted activities, or laying off, discharging, or otherwise discriminating against employ- ees, in order to effectuate the discharge of other employees because they engaged in previously condoned, unprotect- ed, concerted activities. (b) Refusing to hire former employees because they engaged in previously condoned, unprotected, concerted activities. (c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer Harold J. Honeycutt and James F. Ingraham immediate and full reinstatement to their formerjobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their semority or other rights and privileges. (b) Make James F. Ingraham, Harold J. Honeycutt, Frank J. Milos, Earl Appleton, Larry C. Wearin, William L. Harper, Leroy Chase, and Asa Pronovost each whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by payment to each of a sum of money equal to that which he would normally have earned from, in the case of Ingraham and Honeycutt, July 21, 1971, the date of their layoff, to the date of the above-required offer of reinstatement by Respondent, and in the case of Milos, Appleton, Wearin, Harper, Chase, and Pronovost, from July 21, 1971, the date of their layoff, to the respective dates of their reemployment by Respondent, less the net earnings of each during said periods (Crosset Lumber Company, 8 NLRB 440), said backpay to be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner established by the Board in F W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, together with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum (Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716). (c) Immediately notify Ingraham and Honeycutt, if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of their right to full reinstatement, upon application after discharge from the Armed Forces, in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act. (d) Preserve and upon request make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copying all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, per- sonnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to determine the amount of backpay due under this Order. (e) Notify, in writing, Local No. 77, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, Ingraham and Honeycutt that Respondent revokes its letters of July 21, 1971, to said Union rejecting the future referrals of Ingraham and Honeycutt, and that Respondent has no objection to the future referral of Ingraham and Honeycutt by said Union to Respondent for employment. (f) Post at its business offices, its project offices and headquarters, and all places where notices to employees are customarily posted copies of the attached notice marked Appendix.l° Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 19, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are-not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (g) Notify the Regional Director for Region 19, in writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Decision what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. i i 9 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 10 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 11 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for Region 19, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith " TYEE CONSTRUCTION CO. 317 APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT lay off, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against our employees because they engaged in unprotected concerted activities , including work stoppages, when such unprotected activities have been condoned by us. WE WILL NOT lay off, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against our employees , in order to effectu- ate the layoff or discharge of other employees because they engaged in unprotected concerted activities, including work stoppages, when such unprotected activities have been condoned by us. WE WILL NOT refuse to hire former employees because they engaged in unprotected concerted activi- ties, including work stoppages, when such unprotected activities have been condoned by us. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of any of the rights guaranteed them by the National Labor Relations Act. WE WILL offer James F. Ingraham and Harold J. Honeycutt immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make each, plus Frank J. Milos, Earl Appleton, Larry C. Weann, William L. Harper, Leroy Chase, and Asa Pronovost, whole for any loss of pay which he may have suffered as a result of our discrimination against him. WE WILL notify, in writing, Local No. 77, Interna- tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, Ingraham and Honeycutt that we revoke our letters of July 21, 1971, to said Union rejecting the future referrals of Ingraham and Honeycutt, and that we have no objection to the future referral of Honeycutt and ' Ingraham by the Union to us for employment. Dated By TYEE CONSTRUCTION CO. (Employer) (Representative) (Title) We will notify immediately Harold J. Honeycutt and James F. Ingraham, if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement, upon application after discharge from the Armed Forces, in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act. This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concern- ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 10th Floor, Republic Building, 1511 Third Avenue, Seattle, Washington 98101, Telephone 206-442-5692.