202 NLRB 472

Ohio Hoist Manufacturing Co.

Last amended: 1973Year: 1973Length: 5,393 wordsOfficial source
472 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Ohio Hoist Manufacturing Co. and District No. 79 of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO. Cases 8-CA-5753 and 8-CA-5895 March 19, 1973 SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO On March 8, and April 9, 1971, the National Labor Relations Board issued Decisions and Orders in this proceeding, inter alia, directing Ohio Hoist Manufac- turing Co. to make Edmund R. Braham, Jr., Raymond E. Langdon, Frank C. Smith, and Charles L. Ferguson whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of the unfair labor practices found to have been committed against them in violation of the Act.' On November 19, 1972, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit entered a consent judgment enforcing the Board's Orders. On July 26, 1972, the Regional Director for Region 8 issued an Order consolidating cases and a consolidat- ed Backpay Specification and Notice of Hearing. A hearing was held pursuant thereto before Adminis- trative Law Judge David S. Davidson on October 11 and November 15, 1972, to determine the amount of backpay owed to the employees. The Administrative Law Judge issued the attached Supplemental Deci- sion on January 2, 1973, finding that the employees were entitled to backpay in the amounts set forth therein. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Supplemental Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Administrative Law Judge made at the backpay hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed: The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the record and the attached Supplemental Decision in the light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amesided, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Ohio Hoist Manufacturing Co., Lisbon, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall pay to the employees involved in this proceeding the amounts set forth by the Administrative Law Judge in the attached Supplemental Decision, plus interest, less deductions required by state and Federal laws. 1 188 NLRB No . 137; 189 NLRB No. 96. SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE DAVID S. DAVIDSON, Administrative Law Judge: On March 8, 1971, and April 9, 1971, the Board issued Decisions and Orders finding, inter alia, that Respondent had discriminated against Edmund R. Braham, Jr., Raymond E. Langdon, Frank C. Smith, and Charles L. Ferguson in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. The Board ordered that they be reinstated and made whole for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of the discrimination against them.' On November 19, 1971, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit entered a consent judgment enforcing the Board's Orders. Controversy having arisen over the amounts of backpay due under the terms of the Board's Orders, on July 26, 1972, the Regional Director for Region 8 issued an Order Consolidating Cases and Consolidated Backpay Specifica- tion and Notice of Hearing. On August 25, 1972, Respondent filed its answer. A hearing was held before me at Lisbon, Ohio, on October 11, 1972, at which the four claimants appeared as witnesses and were cross-examined by Respondent. Re- spondent thereupon sought and was granted a continuance for the purpose of investigating the efforts of the claimants to obtain interim employment disclosed by their testimony at the hearing. Further continuances were granted until November 15, 1972, when the hearing reconvened. At that time, Respondent indicated that it was still not prepared to go forward and requested a further continuance. The request was denied and the hearing was closed. The General Counsel and Respondent have filed posthearing briefs.2 Upon the entire record in the case, including my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 1. THE ISSUES The principal issue raised by Respondent's answer and brief is whether the four claimants willfully or negligently failed to make adequate efforts to secure interim employ- ment and therefore should be denied any backpay. In the event that the claimants are not disqualified from receiving any backpay, Respondent contends in the alternative that the amounts of gross pay claimed for Ferguson and Langdon should be reduced because of absenteeism, that Langdon should be denied backpay for periods during which he held part-time jobs, and that Ferguson's backpay 1 188 NLRB No. 137; 189 NLRB No. 96. 2 The General Counsel has also filed a motion to correct the transcript. As the corrections all appear warranted, the motion is granted and is received in evidence as ALJ Exh. 1. 202 NLRB No. 68 OHIO HOIST MANUFACTURING CO. 473 should be reduced by an amount he was paid for participating in a manpower training program. There is no issue otherwise as to actual interim earnings received by the claimants,3 or the formula used in computing the gross backpay claimed. H. EDMUND R. BRAHAM, JR. Braham was discharged by Respondent on February 9, 1970. Braham did not apply for unemployment compensa- tion benefits,4 but checked newspaper ads and state employment offices at Salem and East Liverpool, Ohio, in the search for other employment. He contacted several employees in various locations in the general area of his homes and on March 17, 1970, obtained a job at William K. Stamets Co. at Columbiana, Ohio. Braham worked at Stamets until April 8, 1971, when he was laid off in the course of a plant shutdown. On April 10 or 11, Braham applied for unemployment compensation benefits and again sought work through the state employ- ment service, a private employment agency, newspaper ads, and oral reports from acquaintances of job openings. He named approximately 20 employers that he visited and testified that he visited most of them two or three times. His unemployment benefits expired in October, and he thereafter continued to look for work. During the entire period of his unemployment, the Ohio Employment Service did not refer him to any job. On December 17, 1971, Respondent offered Braham reinstatement. Braham accepted the offer, returned to work, and quit after 1 day. Respondent contends that Braham's testimony shows that during both periods of his unemployment Braham showed a lack of genuine interest in finding employment because he visited less than one employer a week, he made only the minimum search required to collect unemploy- ment compensation after his layoff from Stamets, he failed to visit hundreds of employers in the area in which he sought work, and he quit his job with Respondent I day after his reinstatement. It is well settled that in backpay proceedings, the burden is on the General Counsel to establish the gross amount of backpay claimed, while the burden is on the Respondent to establish any dimunition of gross pay because of interim earnings or failure to make a reasonable effort to obtain alternative employments The fact that the General Counsel prodgces the claimants and examines them as to their interim earnings and efforts to obtain employment does not shift the burden of proof as to these matters from the Respondent. Whether or not a claimant has made a reasonable search 3 The specification was amended at the hearing to reflect additional interim earnings for Langdon for the second quarter of 1971. Although Respondent's answer raised an issue as to certain deductions from interim earnings attributed to additional travel expenses incurred by employees during periods of interim employment, the uncontradicted testimony of the claimants supported the deductions and Respondent has not pressed its contention in its brief. I find the deductions warranted. The Richard W. Kaase Company, 162 NLRB 1320, 1326. 4 Braham testified that he believed he was not eligible because he was fired by Respondent. 5 Braham named seven employers, including the one which ultimately hired him, with whom he sought employment during this period. for alternative employment depends in each case on all the circumstances.? Here, immediately after Braham's dis- charge, he visited state employment offices even though he was not seeking unemployment compensation and after 5 weeks found alternative employment. In the interim he also visited six other employers. While unquestionably there were numerous other businesses in Braham's own area and other areas which he visited, there is no evidence to show how many of them employed persons with Braham's skills or that any of them were then hiring. That Braham found other employment and held it for over a year is in itself strong indication that his search was sincerely directed toward that goal. I find that Respondent has failed to establish that Braham's efforts to obtain employment between February 10 and March 17, 1970, were inadequate. During the period after Braham's layoff from Stamets, Braham did apply for unemployment compensation and collected benefits until his eligibility was exhausted. Although the list of employers he visited amounts to less than one a week for the period of his unemployment, he testified that he visited most of them two or three times and that he had also visited other employers whose names he did not record. During the entire period of his unemploy- ment, he was not referred to any employer by the Ohio Employment Service. Respondent has asked that notice be taken of published data showing the number of manufac- turing establishments in Ohio counties to show that there were a large number of employers that Braham failed to visit and to contradict his testimony that there were only 20 to 25 businesses in his traveling area.8 But that evidence fails to show that these establishments utilized employees with Braham's skills or had any job openings during the period of his unemployment. While there may have been more than 20 to 25 manufacturing establishments in commuting distance from Braham 's home, the evidence does not establish that among them there were any likely employers of Braham to whom he reasonably should have been expected to make application. While Braham concededly quit his job with Respondent 1 day after his reinstatement, he testified without contra- diction that he did so because during the I day he worked his foreman stood over him, yelled at him, and made him a nervous wreck. In these circumstances, one cannot infer that Braham's quit shows lack of desire to obtain employment during the preceding 8 months. I find that Respondent has failed to carry the burden of proving that Braham's attempt to obtain employment after his layoff from Stamets was inadequate, and conclude that 6 Mastro Plastics Corporation, 136 NLRB 1342, 1346, enfd. 354 F.2d 170 (C.A. 2), cert. denied 384 U.S. 972. Nelson Manufacturing Company, 148 NLRB 1632, 1639, 7 Cornwell Company, Inc., 171 NLRB 342. 8 The list shows 209 manufacturers in Columbiana County where Respondent is located, 71 manufacturers in Jefferson County, the adjacent county to the south, 345 manufacturers in Mahoning County, where Youngstown is located and where Braham looked for employment, 544 manufacturers in Stark County where Canton is located and where Braham also looked for employment, and 757 manufacturers in Summit County where Akron is located and which is closer to Braham's home than Lordstown, Ohio, where Braham also looked. 474 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Braham is entitled to backpay in the amount set forth in the specification with interest .9 III. RAYMOND E. LANGDON Langdon was also discharged by Respondent on Febru- ary 9, 1970. Upon his discharge he went to the Salem, Ohio, office of the Ohio Employment Service and applied for work at the area machine shops. Shortly thereafter he went to the East Liverpool office of the Ohio Employment Service and applied for unemployment compensation. He also applied directly with two employers, one at East Liverpool and one at Lordstown, Ohio. About a week later, Langdon was offered part-time employment by a neighbor who was manager for the Francis H. Leggett Co. Langdon accepted and started work on February 24, 1970. On that job he worked approximately 30 hours a week as a driver. While working for Leggett, Langdon heard from a union business representative that there were openings at Stamets. Langdon went to Stamets, filed an application, and returned for 3 consecutive weeks until he was hired. He started work for Stamets as a full-time employee on May 25, 1970. Langdon remained at Stamets until January 28, 1971, when he was laid off in connection with the plant shutdown. On February 1, 1971, Langdon applied for unemploy- ment compensation benefits. As a condition of receiving benefits, he was required to visit at least one employer a week in search of a job. Langdon went to more than one place each week, following up newspaper ads and leads given him by friends. On February 16, Langdon went back to Leggett to work fulltime for a month in place of another driver who was off work for that period. On March 16, his job with Leggett ended, and Langdon again signed up for unemployment compensation, and again was required to look for at least one job a week. He went to a number of places, some of which did not take written applications from him because he was not a high school graduate or because they were not hiring. Langdon again went to more than one place a week, following up newspaper ads and leads from friends, and visiting employers for whom he had previously worked. During the entire period of his unemployment, he was not referred to any job by the Ohio Employment Service. On August 2, Langdon started work as manager for Scafide's Market, a job which he obtained on his own. He was still there when Respondent offered Langdon rein- statement on December 17, 1971. Langdon accepted the offer and arranged to leave his job at Scafide and to return to work for Respondent in January 1972. Langdon worked for Respondent until June 9, 1972, when he quit. During the period of his employment, Langdon was absent 12 days in January, 14 days in February, 6 days in March, 8 days in April, 11 days in May, and worked only half a day in June. Langdon testified, without contradiction, that after his return to work conditions on the job were terrible. At the outset, General Manager Horvath stood over him and "cussed" him. Langdon complained to the Board, and 9 Brown and Root, Inc., et a!., 132 NLRB 486, 501, 540-543, enfd. as qualified 311 F.2d 447, 318 F.2d 543, 327 F.2d 958 (C.A. 8); Bonnar- Vawter, thereafter Horvath would not speak to him even to answer his questions. During the spring, Langdon visited a doctor and was treated for ulcers. Also during the spring, Langdon started taking days off to do work on his own as a house painter. Langdon testified that Respondent gave him such a hard time that he did not care if he went back or not. Respondent contends that Langdon did not exercise due diligence in seeking work for reasons similar to those advanced as to Braham and also because his records show no search for work from March 16, 1971, until April 16, 1971, after he left interim employment at Leggett, because he did not go to larger towns such as Alliance, Canton, Akron, Youngstown, or Pittsburgh, all within easy driving distance, and because his absenteeism after reinstatement shows that he had no desire to work when he got the chance to do so. Respondent also contends in the alternative that, because of the minimal nature of his search, Langdon should be denied backpay for the period or periods of part-time employment and that his backpay should in any event be diminished in proportion to his absences after reinstatement. With respect to the period between March 16, 1971, when Langdon testified his employment at Leggett ended and April 16, Langdon's reporting record shows that he reported for unemployment compensation on March 16 and March 22, and then not again until April 14, 1971, after which there are regular weekly entries. After February 11, there is one undated entry for an employer visited and the next entry is dated April 16. At the hearing, the backpay specification was amended to show that Langdon had interim earnings from Leggett in the amount of $315 in the second quarter of 1971, which began April 1. It is apparent that Langdon again returned to Leggett after leaving on March 16 and worked there for 2 or 3 additional weeks. Although these earnings were discovered at the start of the hearing through examination of Langdon's social security records, he was not asked about them or the employment they reflected by Respondent. There is no reason to believe that Langdon's failure on direct examina- tion to testify to this period of employment was more than oversight. In these circumstances, it is unreasonable to conclude that the absence of entries showing that Langdon visited other employers during this period reflects lack of diligent search during a period of unemployment. With respect to Langdon's efforts after April 16, the considerations are similar to those discussed above with respect to Braham. Far from disclosing a general desire not to work, the evidence shows that, in a period of less than 2 years, Langdon on four or five occasions independently found other employment and had considerable interim earnings. Although Langdon did not visit the cities named by Respondent, the evidence shows that he traveled substantial distances seeking employment and did not at all times have a car available to him. While the entries in Langdon's book show the minimum required to collect unemployment compensation, he testified, and I credit him, that he made other unrecorded efforts to obtain employment as indeed his successes show. Furthermore, in Incorporated, 135 NLRB 1270,1274; Dorn's Transportation Co., 181 NLRB 403. OHIO HOIST MANUFACTURING CO. the light of Langdon's record of interim employment and his uncontradicted testimony as to job conditions after his reinstatement and their effect upon him, I reject the contention that his absenteeism after reinstatement shows that Langdon had no desire to work during the backpay period. In these circumstances and in view of the failure of the Ohio Employment Service to refer Langdon to any jobs, I find that Respondent has failed to sustain the burden of establishing that Langdon was not duly diligent in his search for alternative employment. The evidence also does not support Respondent's contention that Langdon should be disqualified for backpay during the period or periods that he worked parttime for Leggett. The record establishes only one such period from February 24, 1970, until May 25, 1970. Contrary to Respondent's contention, during that period through his own efforts Langdon obtained full-time employment at Stamets, and I have rejected the premise of this contention that Langdon in general made minimal efforts to find other employment. Moreover, when Lang- don was asked if he attempted to find a full-time job while working for Leggett, he answered affirmatively and described his successful attempts to obtain work with Stamets. He was not asked whether hi made any other efforts during this period, and there is no evidence that he did not. Finally, I reject the contention that Langdon's backpay should be reduced in proportion to his absences after reinstatement. Langdon's testimony establishes that his attendance after reinstatement does not reflect that he was unavailable for work during the backpay period. More - over, the backpay specification states that the measure of his gross backpay is his average weekly wage earned in 1970. That figure already accounts for his normal absenteeism during the period of his prior employment with Respon- dent.10 Respondent has not established that any further reduction of his gross backpay is warranted. Accordingly, I conclude that Langdon is entitled to backpay in the amount set forth in the specification, as amended at the hearing, with interest. IV. FRANK C. SMITH Smith was also discharged by Respondent on February 9, 1970. Smith did not work again until July 8 when he started to work as a part-time bartender. Smith testified that after his discharge, he went with Langdon to the Salem and East Liverpool Ohio Employment Service offices, checked newspaper ads for leads, and made inquiries with a number of employers in East Liverpool and surrounding areas. Smith identified approximately 15 employers by name that he visited, testified that he visited all the potteries and brickyards in the area, and testified that he visited other employers whose names he did not remember. Smith was not examined as to the dates he visited various employers but testified that he visited a number of them several times during this and a later period of unemployment. 10 Hickman Garment Company, 196 NLRB No. 59. 11 The fact that Smith left Stamets before his scheduled layoff does not affect Smith's backpay as there is no claim for net backpay for the fourth quarter of 1970, and his testimony that he was about to be laid off is 475 One of the employers visited by Smith was Stamets where he heard that there were job possibilities. Smith first went to Stamets in February or March, and went back several times thereafter. In August while he was working as a bartender, he was called to work by Stamets and started work there on August 9, 1970. Smith worked at Stamets until November 18, 1970. At that time, work had started to slow down and layoffs had begun. During the week of November 18, Smith was told he was scheduled to be laid off. As Smith had an opportunity to go to Florida, he left a few days before his scheduled layoff and went to Florida. He stayed there for about a week and looked for work without success."' Smith then returned to his home in East Liverpool. Smith next found work in August 1971, when he was referred by the Ohio Employment Service to Montgomery Ward to work as a replacement for a vacationing truckdriver. Smith registered with the Ohio Employment Service upon his return to East Liverpool, and this was the first job to which it referred him. In the interim, Smith revisited most of the employers with whom he had sought work during his initial period of unemployment. He also went to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where he went to the Pennsylvania Employment Service but was not referred to any jobs. During the first 6 months of 1971, Smith went to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where he stayed for about a month. While there he sought a job through the Pennsylva- nia Employment Service but found nothing. Smith's employment with Montgomery Ward ended in early September. For a short while he looked for work in the East Liverpool area. Then, in late September, Smith went to Florida again, and immediately found permanent full-time employment with Matthews Corporation. Smith was offered reinstatement by Respondent on December 17, 1971, but declined it because he had relocated in Florida where he had a permanent job. Respondent contends that Smith's search for employ- ment was the most fragmented and minimal of all, that his testimony was vague and unspecific, that his failure to register for unemployment compensation shows that he was not interested in seeking other work, and that his testimony shows that most of the time he was unemployed he did nothing about seeking a job. 'While Smith did not register for unemployment compen- sation,12 and therefore lacked the record of visits to employers required to obtain compensation, his testimony is nonetheless uncontradicted that he registered for employment with the state employment services at East Liverpool, Salem, Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia. Although testimony elicited by the General Counsel was general in some respects and unspecific as to dates, on cross- examination by Respondent he was asked to supply little of the missing detail. Despite the claim that Smith displayed no genuine interest in finding a job, he found four jobs during the period in question. He first visited Stamets in February or March 1970, and went back several times until he ultimately was hired. When he went to uncontradicted. 12 Smith testified that he did not complete an application after he explained the circumstances of his discharge by Respondent because he was told he eventually would have to pay back the benefits he received. 476 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Florida the second time, he immediately found and took a job dispelling any notion that the trip was recreational. While there may well have been other places where Smith could have sought employment during his periods of unemployment, there is no indication that any of them utilized employees with Smith's qualifications or had any job openings during the periods in question. I find that Respondent has not sustained the burden of proving that Smith made inadequate efforts to seek interim employment, and conclude that he is entitled to backpay in the amount set forth in the specification, with interest. V. CHARLES L. FERGUSON Ferguson was terminated by Respondent on June 2, 1970. He had worked for Respondent as a general laborer and was not a high school graduate. On the day of his termination, he learned of an opening at Pipe Line Service Company in North Lima, Ohio, and was hired to start work as a general laborer on June 8. Ferguson worked there until August 3, 1970,13 when he was laid off. Ferguson registered with the Ohio Employment Service at East Liverpool immediately thereafter and applied for unemployment compensation. Ferguson looked for em- ployment in the area where he lived and the surrounding area visiting a number of employers without success. During the period of his unemployment, he also contacted Pipe Line Service periodically and was recalled to work by that employer on March 8, 1971. He worked there until August 4, 1971, when he was again laid off. Immediately after his layoff, Ferguson again applied for unemployment compensation and registered with the Ohio Employment Service. Thereafter, he again visited a number of employers in the area but was unable to get work. On December 13, 1971, he entered a manpower training program to train as a welder. On December 17, 1971, the Respondent offered Ferguson reinstatement which he rejected because he was being compensated to attend school and thought he was better off remaining in school. During the periods of his unemployment the Ohio Employment Service referred Ferguson to only one job, for which he was not hired. Respondent contends that Ferguson did not exercise due diligence in seeking employment because his efforts to obtain work were minimal, he visited only one employer a week to meet requirements for collecting unemployment compensation, his testimony shows that he had much available time in which he failed to visit other employers in the area, and he confined his search to smaller towns and failed to visit larger centers of employment. iespondent contends in the alternative that Ferguson's backpay should be reduced by 20 percent to reflect his normal absenteeism during his prior employment with Respondent and that his compensation received from the manpower training 13 Although Ferguson testified that he was laid off on July 3, his interim earnings and testimony otherwise make it clear that he was laid off on August 3 14 Ferguson maintained himself and a family of six with his unemploy- ment compensation and loans from relatives At one point, just prior to his recall to Pipe Line Service, he applied for public assistance 15 Hickman Garment Company, supra 16 See Gullets Gin Company, Inc v N L R B, 340 U S. 361 17 Id at 365, fn 1. program for the week before December 17, 1971, should be deducted from his interim earnings. Ferguson's testimony was not that he visited only one employer a week, but that he only recorded the name of one employer a week to meet unemployment compensation requirements. He testified that he also visited other employers as his resources permitted.14 Ferguson testified that he did go to Youngstown to seek work, and that he applied to Youngstown Steel, where he was rejected because he failed to pass a physical. He also testified that he read ads in the Youngstown and Pittsburgh papers but seldom saw anything for which he was qualified. That Ferguson had a genuine desire to find work is shown by the speed with which he sought and found a job after his discharge. I find that Respondent has failed to establish that Ferguson's efforts to seek interim employment were inadequate. With respect to Ferguson's absenteeism, Respondent's answer does not affirmatively raise this issue, and its contention would appear to be foreclosed for this reason alone. Moreover, the backpay specification states that the measure of Ferguson's backpay is his average weekly earnings during his period of employment with Respon- dent. As that figure already reflects Ferguson's normal absenteeism, no further reduction of his gross backpay is warranted to account for that absenteeism.15 With respect to Ferguson's compensation for the week of December 13, 1971, the record shows that he was paid $76, of which a portion was reimbursement for travel expense. The record also shows that Ferguson was not obligated to repay that amount in the event that he received backpay for that week in this proceeding. The record is otherwise silent as to the terms or conditions of Ferguson's compensation. It would seem that the compensation was intended to provide Ferguson with means of support while he completed the training program, but it is not established what conditions Ferguson had to fulfill or whether Ferguson was required to perform any services for anyone else in order to receive this compensation. As the General Counsel points out, interim earnings are set off against gross pay, but collateral benefits are not, and the burden is on Respondent to establish interim earnings to be set off.'6 The fact that the compensation paid Ferguson is not refundable is not determinative. 17 Rather the question is whether Ferguson's compensation constituted earnings for services rendered.18 It may be assumed that Ferguson was required to attend the training program regularly as a condition of receiving his compen- sation. But unemployment compensation benefits paid to Ferguson were similarly conditioned upon his making a search for work each week. In each case, the condition of payment was primarily for Ferguson's benefit and only 18 N L R B v Brashear Freight Lines, Inc, 127 F.2d 198 (C A 8), Golay & Company, Inc. v. N L R B, 447 F 2d 290 (C A 3) See also American Mfg Co of Texas, 167 NLRB 520 There the Board deducted as interim earnings workmen's compensation payments representing payment for wages lost due to an industrial accident at a time when the claimant had interim employment. That portion of the workmen' s compensation benefit was a payment in lieu of earnings the claimant would have received but for his injury OHIO HOIST MANUFACTURING CO. 477 more generally of benefit to the State in "carry [ing] out a policy of social betterment ." 19 I find on the record before me that Respondent has failed to establish that compensa- tion received by Ferguson for the week of December 13, 1971, constituted interim earnings. Accordingly, I conclude that Ferguson is entitled to backpay in the amount set forth in the specification with interest. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings and conclu- sions, it is ordered that Respondent Ohio Hoist Manufac- turing Co., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall pay to the employees involved in this proceeding, as net backpay, the amounts set forth opposite their names: Edmund R. Braham, Jr. $5,126.23 Raymond E. Langdon $2,732.37 Frank C. Smith $5,621.97 Charles L. Ferguson $5,369.64 Each of the foregoing sums shall accrue interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum, computed in the manner set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. There shall be deducted from each of the foregoing amounts, social security taxes, income tax withholding, and such other deductions as may be required by the laws of the United States or the State of Ohio. 19 Gullets Gin Company, Inc. v. N.LR.B., supra.
202 NLRB 472: Ohio Hoist Manufacturing Co. | Justis AI