Warrenton Lumber Co.

WARRENTON LUMBER COMPANY Warrenton Lumber Company and International Woodworkers of America Local Union 3-4, AFL-CIO. Case 36-CA-2286 April 3, 1973 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JENKINS , KENNEDY, AND PENELLO On December 20, 1972, Administrative Law Judge Martin S. Bennett issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep- tions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.2 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that Respondent, Warrenton Lumber Company, Warrenton, Oregon, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, except that the attached notice is substituted for the notice attached to the Administrative Law Judge's Decision. I The Administrative Law Judge found that discriminatee Larry Adams grieved to Night-shift Supervisor Ernie Mickle on January 12, 1972, concerning a large deep hole at the back of the mill, and that such conversation took place in the presence of witnesses in the mill lunchroom The record shows that this conversation did take place, but by the stud edger and not in the lunchroom However, the record does indicate that Adams also grieved to Night-shift Supervisor Laird Hyde, shortly after the above conversation with Mickle, concerning the same matter, and that this conversation took place in the presence of witnesses in the mill lunchroom This inadvertent error in no way affects the result in this case 2 The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions were incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C A 3) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings APPENDIX 841 NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL offer Larry Adams immediate and full reinstatement to his former job, or, if this job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority and other rights and privileges , and WE WILL make him whole for any loss of wages suffered as a result of our discrimination against him. WE WILL NOT discourage membership in, or activity in behalf of, International Woodworkers of America, Local Union 3-4, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization of our employees, by discharging employees or by discriminating in any manner in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition thereof. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. All our employees are free to become or remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining, members of the above-named or any other labor organization , except to the extent such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organiza- tion as a condition of employment, as authorized by Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. WARRENTON LUMBER COMPANY (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) We will notify immediately the above-named indi- vidual, if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of the right to full reinstatement, upon application after discharge from the Armed Forces, in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act. This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compli- ance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 310 Six Ten Broadway Building, 610 SW Broadway, Portland, Oregon 97205, Telephone 503-221-3085. 202 NLRB No. 121 842 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MARTIN S. BENNETT, Administrative Law Judge: This matter was heard at Astoria, Oregon, on August 30 and 31 and September 21 and 22, 1972. The complaint, issued June 15 and based upon a charge filed April 17, 1972, by International Woodworkers of America, Local Union 3-4, AFL-CIO, herein the Union, alleges that Respondent, Warrenton Lumber Company, has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Briefs have been submitted by the parties. Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS Warrenton Lumber Company is an Oregon corporation maintaining its principal place of business at Warrenton, Oregon, where it is engaged in the manufacture of lumber and wood products. During the past year, it shipped lumber and wood products valued in excess of $100,000 to purchasers located outside the State of Oregon. I find that the operations of Respondent affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED International Woodworkers of America, Local Union 3-4, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Issue; Introduction The Union was certified as the representative of the employees of Respondent in September 1967. Larry Adams was in the employ of Respondent for 7 1/2 years until his discharge on January 14, 1972, the sole issue herein. He was a job steward on the swing shift and the record demonstrates that he was an active one. The General Counsel contends that Adams was discharged because of an incident 2 days earlier on January 12 when he more or less forcefully presented a grievance to management in his capacity as job steward. Respondent allegedly has a policy of issuing pink slips for misfeasance or nonfeasance of duties, with a third pink slip within 1 year resulting in the mandatory discharge of the employee. Adams received such a third pink slip on January 14, and the surrounding facts are discussed below, as well as those in two prior pink slips. Respondent also presented considerable evidence concerning Adams' entire work record. Respondent's case was initially tailored to Adams receiving the third and fatal pink slip. The General Counsel stresses that Respondent, after his discharge, then placed reliance upon other aspects of his work record which, it may be noted, was not marked by pink slips. Adams was well regarded at the time of his initial employment, and was selected for a temporary transfer of some months to another operation of Respondent. A new stud mill of Respondent was opened in September 1970 and a newer random-length mill in July 1971. Adams was designated as a relief man in the new mill which admittedly had relatively new equipment of a complex and highly sophisticated nature. A relief man normally devotes most of his time to giving a 10-minute break twice a shift to the respective operators in the two mills. During those breaks, he operates the equipment. This assignment involves approximately 16 operators; the other time of the relief man is devoted to certain cleanup operations and to finding tasks that require doing. It takes about 2 1/2 hours in all to run through a set of reliefs. The General Counsel stresses Adams' active record as a shop steward, but, in my judgment, the case ultimately reduces itself to whether Adams was pretextuously dis- charged on January 14 because of a grievance concerning working conditions presented on January 12 in a manner which was neither respectful nor unduly offensive, but rather best described as very direct. The General Counsel points to a grievance filed on March 17, 1971, against Supervisor Dick Rohr, no longer in the employ of the Respondent, who, according to Adams, told him that he would be discharged if he filed another grievance. I do not rely upon this incident involving a former supervisor. Although well prior to the pink slip problem, another incident is offered to demonstrate the hostility of General Manager Ted Bellingham to Adams. Significantly, as will appear, Bellingham was aware of the January 12, 1972, grievance and concerted activity on the part of Adams. A regularly scheduled meeting was held on July 21, 1971, between management and the Union to discuss several new job classifications and the job descriptions were written on a blackboard. The words "ability and efficien- cy" were crossed out by parties unknown and replaced by the word "seniority." Bellingham accused Adams of making the change and this was denied by him; there is evidence that another employee had made the change. According to Adams, Bellingham told him on this occasion that Adams had his neck stuck out and that he, Bellingham, intended to chop it off. Adams is substantially corroborated by witnesses Yardley, Hillard, and Lane, all currently in the employ of Respondent, that Bellingham uttered remarks to this effect. Bellingham vaguely and generally denied the statements attributed to him by Adams. In view of the most substantial corroboration of Adams by the various witnesses designated above, I credit Adams herein. The General Counsel and the Charging Party aptly point out that Respondent's alleged promulgation of the three- pink slip policy leaves something to be desired. It appears that Respondent's supervisors variously met at lunch in a local restaurant in Warrenton and the topic was then discussed. Robert Axelson, purchasing agent and safety director, testified that he attended a meeting at a local tavern in September 1971, when the supervisors discussed the fact that three pink slips would result in discharge. Yet, he, too, conceded, as did others, that a pink slip was to be preceded WARRENTON LUMBER COMPANY 843 by oral warnings, one or more. He further testified that a pink slip would not issue prior to at least one oral warning, although he later stated that, if a breach was serious to morale, the pink slip would not be preceded by an oral warning. Albert Turk, plant superintendent for 4 months and a most verbose witness, categorically deposed without reservation that, at this meeting, General Manager Ted Bellingham spelled out the policy, namely, that a man was first to be warned and, upon a repeat performance, given a pink slip. Turk also put it that he was to be given a pink slip after being warned once or twice, although, if the offense were grievous, he, Turk, would award a pink slip upon the first offense. However, Bellingham was asked if, at this crucial meeting of supervisors, pink slips were discussed and, more specifically, if there was any determination as to the number of pink slips that would cause a discharge. He replied in the negative and added that a pink slip was to reflect a second warning on any problem and that no fair determination could be made as to the number of pink slips which would prove determinative, because the problem would vary in each case. I find therefore, on the posture most favorable to Respondent, that it created a nebulous policy concerning the issuance of the pink slip as a disciplinary warning. More particularly, I find that it did not have an established policy that three pink slips required a discharge. I further find that a pink slip, absent a most grievous offense, was not to be awarded without a prior warning. And, it may be added, as will appear later, three unqualified pink slips did not exist in the case of Adams. It is also to be noted that the pink-slip policy was never officially announced or promulgated to employees, al- though various employees learned of it by word of mouth. Adams, it is undisputed, is the only employee ever discharged because he had received three pink slips. Be that as it may, the record of his three pink slips is as follows: comment that this type of performance, overlooked in training, could no longer be 'tolerated. The fact of the matter is that Adams had inserted too high a slab of timber which knocked out the guide.2 The regular operator on this piece of equipment, Gary Schaupp, returned to the scene immediately after the incident, knocked the top guide back into place and proceeded to resume production without any delay. He categorically testified and I find that there was no downtime, that the guide blocks had not been sawed out, and, further, that the saw was not stretched and rendered inoperative. Hyde queried Schaupp about the incident and Schaupp informed him that it resulted from the insertion of too wide a slab. Schaupp testified, and I find, that he told Hyde, after the issuance of the pink slip, that Adams did not deserve one. He also testified that Adams, in his observa- tion, encountered no other problems on this machine. As is readily apparent, the pink slip was not merited in at least two of the three particulars set forth. And Hyde realized this. Adams duly filed a grievance setting forth the facts as discussed above, admitting knocking out the top guide, but denying that guide blocks were sawed out or that the saw was stretched. Hyde thereafter offered to withdraw the pink slip in its entirety, but Adams declined, stating that it was a union record. Hyde thereafter presented a note to Adams stating that he had deleted two of the three offenses described above from the pink slip of December 16. To sum up, Respondent was willing to rescind the second pink slip in its entirety, this demonstrating its lack of substance. And, on the posture most favorable to the Respondent, the second slip was at best one-third of a pink slip, indeed as acknowledged by Respondent in its subsequent memoran- dum to Adams. And it is questionable whether this alone would warrant a pink slip without a prior warning. C. The January 12 Incident B. The First Two Pink Slips On October 27, 1971, Adams received a pink slip from Robert Axelson, purchasing agent and safety director for Respondent, because he wore low-cut, rather than desig- nated safety, shoes. There is a conflict as to whether he had received a prior warning, but the simple answer is that he did ultimately obtain the shoes and thereafter wore them on the job without incident and there was no job injury. The incident is manifestly a minor one. On December 16, 1971, Swing Shift Supervisor Laird Hyde 1 issued a second pink slip to Adams because of an incident which took place while he was on relief on the line bar resaw. This pink slip was issued as a reprimand for "inefficient work" in that he had erred in three respects, namely, (1) he had knocked out the top guide, (2) he had sawed out the guide blocks, and (3) he had stretched the saw, this rendering the saw inoperative. Hyde added the Hyde and Ernie Mickle were the two swing shift supervisors. The record erroneously identifies the latter as Michel. There is an area behind the mill which the millwright then had to traverse in the dark; at a date beyond the time material herein this was rectified by the installation of lights. A washout occurred some days prior to the discharge of Adams, this leaving a large deep hole, and a 4 inch by 12 inch plank was placed across this by Respondent. Millwright John Thompson complained to Adams that this created a hazard on a dark rainy night. Adams investigated the problem and, on Wednesday, January 12, he grieved to the two night-shift supervisors, Ernie Mickle and Laird Hyde, in the presence of witnesses in the mill lunchroom. According to Adams, and I so find, he told Mickle that the men wanted something done about the hole because, an employee might fall in and incur serious injury. He added that if this were not attended to by Friday, January 14, he, Adams, would notify the appropri- 2 The guides are set at a particular inch height; for example, if a setting is made at 14 inches, a 16-inch slab will knock out the guide. 844 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ate state safety inspector. Mickle replied that he would look into the matter.3 Shortly thereafter, Hyde entered the lunchroom and Adams made the same statement to him, pointing out that Millwright Thompson had barely saved someone from falling into the hole. Alvin Olson, who observed the incident, testified, and I find, that Hyde visibly flushed when Adams so addressed him. Millwright Thompson also testified that Adams on this occasion told Hyde that he had 24 hours to repair the hole. Respondent does not dispute that the incident occurred, challenging only the breadth of the statements by Adams. The hole was duly repaired, although the date is not precisely fixed. Hyde admitted that he took up this complaint with General Manager Ted Bellingham that same evening, contradicting the latter who testified that he did not recall learning of it on the same evening . Mickle was also advised by Hyde that Adams had grieved to Hyde on this occasion. On the very next day, January 13, Mickle and Hyde, the two top supervisors on the shift, commenced an intense surveillance of Adams' activities. They abandoned their regular duties and stationed themselves at various locations throughout the plant so that they could observe Adams at all times for the entire shift. They proceeded to clock him as to the length of time he took on his two daily breaks and lunch period. They followed the same pattern on January 14, although that mission was interrupted for 1 1/2 hours due to a mill breakdown. Bellingham allegedly was unaware of this obviously major undertaking and complete departure from normal duties by his two subordinates. A note made by the two officials, which allegedly reflects excessive break and lunch periods, led to the third pink slip at the end of the shift on January 14. This decision, it is the testimony of the witnesses for Respondent, was made solely by Mickle without the knowledge of Bellingham. Nor did Hyde, Mickle's equal and collaborator on the surveillance, allegedly participate in the decision to discharge Adams, although, curiously Hyde, not Mickle, prepared the slip. Adams was well aware of the surveillance, claiming that he pointed it out to some of his coworkers. He is corroborated here by Silas Jones, still an employee, who was advised by Adams of the 2-day surveillance and Jones observed that Adams was correct. Another employee, Gary Schaupp, also noticed the surveillance and directed it to the attention of Adams, although he also claimed that he detected it duping the previous week. Similarly, employee Paul Underhill testified that Adams brought this to his attention at the time and he, too, observed it. This bears upon the argument of the General Counsel that the clocking notes made at the time are unreliable, urging that it is highly unlikely that Adams would transgress under these circumstances and open himself to discipline. Respondent, in turn, argues that the clocking stems from its dissatisfaction with the way Adams was either unwilling or unable to follow his prescribed relief schedule. One immediately notes that he was not clocked on the time he took at each of his respective 10-minute 3 Respondent adduced testimony, denied by Adams. to the effect that Adams also announced that he would shut down the plant if the hole was not filled. I deem this immaterial. This would amount at best to a threat by relief assignments , but was clocked only as to his nonwork time. D. The Third Pink Slip and Adams' Discharge At the end of the shift on January 14, Adams was given his third pink slip by Mickle. The slip stated that Adams had taken an excessive breaktime on the first half of the swing shift on both January 13 and 14 and that this would not be tolerated. Mickle also told him that he was through and that his timecard was being pulled. Mickle claimed, and Adams denied, that on two occasions between September and December 1971, Mickle had warned Adams about spending too much time in the lunchroom. Mickle somewhat inconsistently also claimed that these two warnings were but a month or 6 weeks apart. The employees of Respondent struck over the discharge of Adams, but, at Adams' request, they returned to work after approximately 3 weeks. According to Mickle, the decision to discharge Adams was his alone without consultation with anyone else. He was aware of the two prior pink slips and realized that the issuance of the third slip required the discharge of Adams. There is some inconsistency between Mickle and Hyde, for, according to the latter, he and Mickle discussed the possibility of issuing this third pink slip and jointly decided to do so. Hyde proceeded to write it up and Mickle delivered it to Adams. Despite this joint effort and despite Mickle's awareness of the fact that this was the third slip, I am unable to accept Hyde's testimony that the two men did not discuss the discharge of Adams. Turning to the underlying data, the memorandum prepared by the two supervisors discloses that Adams took his normal 10-minute break from 5:20 to 5:30 p.m. on January 13. His second break is shown as lasting from 8:22 to 8:44 p.m., i.e., 12 extra minutes. His lunchbreak is shown as from 9:31 to 10:18 p.m., i.e., 17 extra minutes. The memorandum discloses that on January 14 Adams took his first break from 8:30 to 8:45 p.m., namely 5 extra minutes. His lunchbreak is shown from 9:30 to 10:10 p.m., when the two superintendents temporarily left the area, this reflecting at least 10 extra minutes. Adams is then shown in the lunchroom from 12:52 a.m. through 1:00 a.m., this not fully explained. Alvin Olson recalled that he and Adams lunched together on January 13 and 14, consistent with their practice, and that Adams took no more time than Olson on these occasions. Yet, the record is completely silent as to any warnings directed at Olson. E. Analysis and Conclusions Respondent has presented a plethora of evidence concerning Adams' incompetence, neglect of duties, and negative attitude. I deem it unnecessary to treat with this in detail because of the following reasons. (1) None of these derelications or failings on the part of Adams resulted in a pink slip. This pink-slip policy was the initial cornerstone of Respondent's case herein, although the shop steward to strike over a hazardous working condition. manifestly a protected concerted activity under Section 7 of the Act. I see no assistance to Respondent herein. WARRENTON LUMBER COMPANY 845 this was later expanded to include other conduct. Stated otherwise, alleged derelictions not resulting in a pink slip are not deemed entitled to substantial weight. (2) Mickle testified that Adams was an unsatisfactory employee or incompetent for a period of 4 months, commencing in September 1971. Yet, despite Mickle's testimony as to the damage he allegedly inflicted, Respon- dent saw fit to retain Adams in a job where he came into contact with and operated much equipment. If Respondent were to be credited, Mickle sat by and for 4 months witnessed substantial damage to equipment of Respondent, something I do not accept. (3) This is highlighted by the fact that Mickle had considered transferring Adams from the job as relief man, but never sought to implement this because he felt that Adams would not accept it. Mickle conceded that Adams' work other than on the operation of machinery was satisfactory. All this is advanced despite the fact that Adams was on record for some time as seeking a transfer to the day shift, this requiring bidding down to a lesser basic classification. (4) As noted above, the method of operation of the pink- slip system is clouded, i.e., whether oral warnings were first given. Moreover, Adams' second pink slip hardly qualifies as such. Witnesses for Respondent attempted to embellish the line-bar resaw matter, but the simple answer is that Hyde offered to retract the entire slip and ultimately retracted two-thirds of the charge. (5) The timing of the third slip and its language restricted to breaktime warrants the inference that the other matters raised herein by Respondent played no part in the decision.4 (6) Adams, as found, was aware of the marked surveillance by the two supervisors who had apparently abandoned all other duties and it hardly seems logical for Adams, manifestly an astute person, to have conducted himself in the manner attributed to him. Again, Mickle testified that he made the decision to terminate Adams 1 hour before the end of the shift. This perforce gave him ample time to prepare the slip and set forth any other operative factors. Further, the slip was actually prepared by Hyde, according to the latter. (7) Respondent adduced much evidence concerning Adams' inability to follow the schedule which set forth the order in which Adams was to relieve workers. Suffice it to say that it prepared a new schedule as of January 10. A consideration of the facts surrounding this schedule discloses the following. Adams testified that he was shown a copy of the new schedule. He claimed that he was permitted to view it briefly, but was not given a copy thereof. This is disputed by witnesses for Respondent who contended that Adams merely gave it a cursory appraisal, put it down, and then left.5 According to Hyde, Adams was called into the office on January 10, shown a new relief schedule, and asked if he + Indeed, the third pink slip is critical only of Adams' excessive breaktime during the first half of the shift and is silent as to the second half `> Adams impressed me as cocky in nature with a tendency to quibble, although this begs the basic issue herein None of the recommendations made hereinafter are intended to preclude Respondent from disciplining or discharging him for any legitimate shortcomings on his part as an employee could live with it. Adams inspected it for not over 2 minutes, said nothing, put it down, and left. Hyde claimed that, because of Adams' ostensible indifference to the new schedule, management decided to check out the time he spent on breaks and at lunch, although Hyde, as he conceded, had not previously charged Adams with taking any excessive breaktimes. Mickle testified that Adams relieved personnel consistent with the new schedule on January 10. On the second night, he asked Hyde if he was to relieve in the same manner. Hyde instructed him to comply therewith and Adams duly relieved in the prescribed manner until his discharge and, according to Mickle, "It wasn't a problem any more." Thus, it is readily apparent that from January 10 on, on the face of Mickle's testimony and it was he who allegedly decided on the discharge, that Adams complied with the new schedule. This perforce lends strong support to the claim of the General Counsel that it was Adams' presentation of the grievance on January 12, fervent or otherwise, which manifestly was resented by Hyde, that triggered management's supervision of Adams on January 13 and 14 and its decision to discharge him. There is still other evidence in this record, strongly and lengthily litigated, as to the pros and cons of Adams' ability. Be that as it may, I am convinced upon a strong preponderance of the evidence that, but for Adams' advocacy in his role of shop steward of the repair of a dangerous facility, he would not have been discharged on January 14. Stated otherwise, assuming other cause existed to warrant his discipline or discharge, he would not have been discharged but for his protected Section 7 activity on January 12. As I have previously indicated, it is perhaps true that Adams regarded his status as a shop steward as an insurance policy against discipline for surliness toward his superiors, and I believe that his conduct to some extent was so marked. But a more basic issue is involved. Adams, tactfully or otherwise, presented a genuine grievance and did not become so insubordinate as to warrant discipline. On a strong preponderance of the evidence, he was discharged 2 days later on, at best, a pretextual basis. And, as noted, Adams had received a prior warning from Bellingham that his vigorous presentation of grievances could result in his discharge. Furthermore, Adams was the only employee ever discharged for the receipt of three pink slips. Also reflecting upon Respondent's expansion of the three-pink slip reason to other nebulous causes is the testimony of Plant Superintendent Albert Turk that Mickle informed him that he had discharged Adams because he had received three pink slips. Here again, Turk in effect deprecated the pink-slip policy, admitting that when an employee took 8 or 10 minutes longer than allowed on a smoke break, a pink slip would not be issued. In view of all the foregoing considerations, I find that Respondent, by discharging Larry Adams, has engaged in Differently stated, his role as shop steward does not insulate him with a license to act as he chooses or to become insubordinate The fact is that he is an employee of Respondent and under its control. As for the instant issue, in my view, Respondent approached the problem in a different and unlawful manner and chose to censure him for engaging in a protected Section 7 activity 846 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Warrenton Lumber Company is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act 2. International Woodworkers of America , Local Un- ion 3-4, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By discharging Larry Adams for engaging in union and concerted activities , Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 4. By the foregoing, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It has been found that Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discriminatorily discharging Larry Adams. I shall, therefore, recommend that Respon- dent offer him immediate and full reinstatement to his former job or, if thisjob no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges. See The Chase National Bank of the City of New York, San Juan, Puerto Rico Branch, 65 NLRB 827. I shall further recommend that Respondent make him whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered as a result of his discharge by payment of a sum of money equal to that he normally would have earned from said date to the date of Respondent's offer of reinstatement, less net earnings, with backpay and interest thereon to be computed in the manner prescribed by the Board in F. W Woolworth Co, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing Co., 138 NLRB 716. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, 6 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER6 Respondent, Warrenton Lumber Company, Warrenton, Oregon, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discouraging membership in, or activity in behalf of, International Woodworkers of America, Local Union 3-4, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization of its employ- ees, by discriminating in regard to hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition thereof. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, except to the extent such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized by Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer Larry Adams immediate and full reinstatement to his former job or, if this job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole for any loss of pay suffered by reason of the discrimination against him in the manner provided above in the section entitled "The Remedy." (b) Preserve and make available to the National Labor Relations Board and its agents, upon request, for examina- tion and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to determine the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (c) Post at its mills at Warrenton, Oregon, copies of the notice attached hereto and marked "Appendix." 7 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 19 shall, after being duly signed by Respondent, be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 19, in writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Decision, what steps it has taken to comply herewith. 7 In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board "