Borden Chemical

932 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Columbus Coated Fabrics, Division of Borden Chemical, Borden, Inc. and Textile Workers Union of America, Local 487, AFL-CIO. Cases 9-CA-6850-1, -2, -3, -4 April 6, 1973 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND PENELLO On December 8, 1972, Administrative Law Judge Bernard Ness issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed limited exceptions and a supporting brief, and Respondent filed a brief in support of the Adminis- trative Law Judge's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided- to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. ' In absence of exceptions, we adopt, pro forma, the Administrative Law Judge's finding that deferral to arbitration is not warranted in this case. We note that the Administrative Law Judge inadvertently referred to Segraves as Baker in stating that Segraves persisted in denying that Likely had any intention of assaulting Baker. Member Fanning would not, in any event, defer to arbitration in this case. See his dissenting opinions in Collyer Insulated Wire, A Gulf and Western Systems Co., 192 NLRB No. 150, and subsequent decisions. DECISION activities as stewards and, (b) maintained, enforced, and gave effect to an unlawful no-solicitation rule designed to prohibit the access of its employees to the Union. The complaint alleges that the aforesaid conduct violates Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. ' More specifically, the General Counsel contends that during the 10(b) period preceding the filing of the charge, the Respondent maintained and enforced an oral unlawful no-solicitation rule, limited to stewards and not applied to other employees. The rule, as viewed by the General Counsel, prohibited union stewards from talking to other employees during working time, regardless of the subject of the conversation. Stewards were not permitted to leave their departments for any reason without permission of their foremen, whereas other employees were permitted freedom of movement. In Respondent's enforcement of the rule, a number of stewards were warned and threatened and one steward received a written employee performance report for violations of the rule. The General Counsel further alleges that, on one occasion, a steward was refused permission to process a grievance. The thrust of his position is that stewards were singled out and restricted in their movements during working time and the enforcement of'the rule resulted in threats and warnings to stewards. Such conduct, the General Counsel asserts, was designed to destroy the Union's ability to represent its members and to harass and interfere with the stewards in the processing of grievances and in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. Respondent maintains that the grievance provisions of the contract prescribe the procedure to be followed by stewards in the processing of grievances. This was enforced by Respondent. But apart from union business, stewards were treated no differently than other employees. Respon- dent contends that there is a practice or rule that no employee was permitted to leave his own department or enter another department to engage another employee in conversation on either employee's working time without permission of the foremen of both employees. In the enforcement of this practice, Respondent says, stewards were treated no differently than were any other employees. As an alternative defense, Respondent's counsel moved that the Board defer to the grievance-arbitration proce- dures in the existing contract between the parties. This motion is disposed of below. Upon the entire record,2 including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs filed by all the parties, I make the following: STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND THE ISSUES BERNARD NESS, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard at Columbus, Ohio, on August 23-24, 1972, pursuant to charges and amended charges filed on March 1 and March 20, 1972, respectively, by Textile Workers Union of America, Local 487, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, and a consolidated complaint issued April 18, 1972.1 The gravamen of the complaint is that Respondent (a) threatened and warned union stewards because of their The complaint was orally amended at the hearing in minor respects. 2 Corrected by an order dated November 10, 1972. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT AND THE UNION INVOLVED . The Respondent, engaged at its Columbus, Ohio, plant in the business of fabrication of plastic-coated fabrics, annually ships products valued in excess of $50,000 from its plant directly to points outside the State, and is engaged 202 NLRB No. 133 COLUMBUS COATED FABRICS 933 in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The Union is a labor organization within the, meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. If. THE DEFERRAL ISSUE Respondent's counsel contends that the collective-bar- gaining agreement contains a grievance and arbitration procedure culminating in final and binding arbitration and that the conduct alleged as unlawful in the complaint raises issues best resolved through arbitration under the applica- ble provisions of the contract, citing the "no union discrimination clause,"3 the "rule making" clause,4 the broad grievance definition,5 binding arbitration,6 and the exclusivity clause.? Respondent's counsel relies on National Radio Company, Inc., 198 NLRB No. 1. He is prepared to waive the time requirements in the contract for processing of the griev- ances filed as a result of some of the conduct alleged to be unlawful. He concedes the bargaining relationship is not an amicable one but contends it is a working one and the purposes of the Act would be effectuated by deferral. Both the General Counsel and the Union contend that the Board should not defer to arbitration. Among other arguments in support of their contention, they stress that .the bargaining relationship is not amicable, which Respon- dent concedes, and that the collective-bargaining process has broken down. In their view, arbitration would be fruitless. That the bargaining relationship between the parties is not amicable is clear from the record. The parties have maintained a collective-bargaining relationship since 1961 when Respondent purchased the plant. Even before such purchase, the Union had for some years represented the employees. During 1971, the Union had 34 stewards and at the time of the hearing about 26. In 1967, two wildcat strikes occurred, lasting I and 2 weeks, respectively. Also in 1967, a 16-week economic strike occurred. In 1969, two wildcat strikes occurred, the first lasting only a few hours and the other, a period of 11 days. In 1972, a wildcat strike began on March 1 and was terminated on March 6 when the Company obtained a district court injunction. An unfair labor practice charge filed by the Union resulted in an informal settlement agreement, approved by the Regional Director for Region 9 on April 2, 1971.8 In the calendar year 1971, 302 grievances were filed. Of this number, 98 were withdrawn before being resolved in the fourth step, the last step prior to arbitration. Of the 204 3 Art. VII, sec. 3. That the Company agrees that there shall be no discrimination against any employee because he serves on any committee coming under the terms of this agreement. 4 Art. IX, sec. I. That the management of the work and the direction of the working forces, including the right to hire, suspend , discharge for proper cause, and the regular customary functions of management are vested exclusively in the Company, but shall not be used in violation of the terms of this agreement or for the purpose of discrimination against any member of the Union. Sec. 2. That the Company has the right to establish reasonable plant rules. Questions concerning the application of these rules shall be subject to the grievance procedure. 5 Art. VII, sec. 2. A grievance shall be defined as a controversy between the Company and the Union or between the Company and the employees covered by this agreement as to (1) any matter relating to working conditions not specifically covered in this agreement and (2) any matter involving interpretation or violation of any provision of this agreement. grievances processed in the fourth step, 88, or 43 percent, were sustained by the Respondent, in whole or in part. During this same period, six grievances were taken to arbitration-in five the Respondent prevailed, and one resulted in a split decision. In 1972, up to the time of the hearing in August, 297 grievances had already been filed. No statistics were disclosed as to their disposition, but, according to Tom Ness, assistant manager of labor relations, not as many grievances have been withdrawn as in 1971. I have serious doubts that the basic controversy involved here, the treatment of stewards, is bottomed on the meaning or interpretation of contract provisions rather than raising issues concerning an abridgement of Section 7 rights. But, in any event; I find it unnecessary to resolve this question. Suffice to say the bargaining history of the past several years has been a rocky one. It has been marred by strikes, by distrust for each other,9 and by continual bickering. Indeed, it is highly questionable whether the Board or an arbitrator can provide much stability to the bargaining relationship so sorely lacking here. A healthy respect and mutual recognition of each other's legitimate rights and obligations can best be provided by the parties themselves. The Board has not yet deferred to the arbitration machinery where the bargaining history has been as controversial and disruptive as is present in this case. I am therefore persuaded that abstention and deferral to , an arbitrator for resolution is not warranted and Respondent's motion is accordingly denied. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The. grievance procedure in the contract provides for the first-step meeting to be held "when all involved can be properly relieved but no later than the time immediately subsequent to the shift the grievant is working." (Art. VII, sec. 4, step 1) There is no dispute between the parties as to the procedure to be followed. During working time, when a grievant and a steward wish to discuss a possible grievance with the foreman involved in the complaint, permission was required of the respective foreman.'° The General Counsel does not contend that such requirement for permission was in itself unlawful. The determination to be made here however is whether the Respondent unlawfully extended the restriction of movement of the stewards so as to infringe upon their Section 7 rights. The General Counsel says the stewards were not permitted to leave their department during worktime for any reason without the 0 Art. VIII, sec. 2. Powers of Arbitrators-The impartial arbitrator so selected or appointed shall conduct a hearing on grievances submitted to him and shall consider the evidence submitted. Such impartial arbitrator shall not have the power to add to, subtract from or modify any of the terms of this agreement. Sec. 3. The decision of the Impartial arbitrator shall be final and binding on both parties hereto. r Art. VII, sec. 7. That inasmuch as a grievance procedure has been provided for, neither the Company nor the Union will use any other means to settle a dispute or grievance. 8 The settlement agreement was received as an exhibit only to show the lack of amity between the parties and not as proof that the Company had committed unfair labor practices. 9 See, for example, the Union's newsletters to its members. (G.C. Exh. 4.) 10 Stewards processed grievances of employees in other departments, as well as grievances arising in their own departments. 934 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD foreman's permission while other employees did not need such permission. The Respondent's position is that no employee, steward or otherwise, could go to another department on either's working time without permission of the foreman if it interferes with production. Roy Dillow, manager of labor relations, testified that employees could go freely to other departments, but not if the other employee is working. Harry Tibbs, South Mill, superintend- ent, and Quality Control Superintendent Norman Orr both said they were not aware of any rule requiring union stewards to get permission from the foreman to talk to other employees for reasons other than union business during worktime. The only qualification was that they, as well as other employees, were not to converse with employees while they were working. Corwin Smith, an employee of almost 20 years, has held various positions in the Union since 1961. He was a steward in 1971 and again in 1972 until his resignation from that position on March 3. Smith testified that he first became aware of the broad restriction against stewards in August 1971 when he was accused by his foreman, Marple,11 of loafing in another department and was told if he wanted to speak to anyone on union business he first needed Marple's permission. According to Smith, he had never requested permission in the past. In early September, he was again admonished for being absent from his department without permission and was given an employee performance report.12 In late November he was told by his foreman, McDonald,13 that Calvin Green foreman of the embossing department had complained he was in that department without permission and was disrupting the work of the employees in that department.14 In December, he was again warned by McDonald for talking to the employees in the embossing department and disrupting their work. As a result of this latest warning by McDonald, Smith filed a grievance contending harassment and undue interference with his 'duties as steward. The grievance was processed through the fourth step and denied; the Company's position was that the grievant was in the other department without permission as required by the contrac- tual procedure in conducting union business. Smith testified that in the third-step meeting on January 4, 1972, Harry Tibbs, department superintendent, said he had complaints about Smith loafing in other departments and disrupting work. Tibbs accused him of soliciting grievances and "trying to stir up something." Tibbs said he was there to work 8 hours a day- and warned him about getting caught in another department and said Smith was "not to speak to anyone in another department." 15 On January 6, Tibbs handed him the Company's step 4 response to his grievance. According to Smith, Tibbs asked him if he was .keeping his nose clean. Smith responded, "Don't worry about me. I will be here." Tibbs then remarked, "That is what other people thought. Do you remember Aleshire and Thacher?" 16 11 Marple is on a leave of absence for illness and-was not called as a witness. 12 A written warning referred to by the witnesses as an "EPR." An EPR may lead to further disciplinary action, depending on the nature of the offense and the number of EPR's. 13 McDonald succeeded Marple as his foreman. Neither McDonald nor Green were called as witnesses. The General Counsel contends that Tibbs' remarks to Smith on January 4 and January 6 constituted, respective- ly, an unlawful warning that Smith cease his union activities as a steward and an unlawful threat of discharge because of his activities as a steward. (Par. 5(a)(i) and (ii) of the complaint.) It should be noted that the discussion of January 4 was related to the conduct of union business during working time. Smith's grievance itself alluded to interference with his duties as steward. It is.clear that when Tibbs told Smith not to talk to anyone, he was cautioning him to obey the rule-to adhere to the requirement that permission first be obtained from the foreman to conduct union business during working time. Tibbs' reference on January 6 to the two employees who had been discharged for excessive absenteeism is ambiguous and does not constitute an unlawful threat. Viewing the context in which the remark was made, i.e., the reference to unauthorized absences from his department to conduct union business, it is clear that the threat to discharge was for future continued violations of the lawful rule pertaining to the conduct of union business-indeed a rule provided for in the grievance procedure. . On February 15, 1972, Smith had processed a step 1 grievance for an employee, Baker, with Calvin Green, Baker's foreman. Smith then reduced the grievance to writing for submission at the step 2 level and asked his own foreman, Armbrust, for permission to discuss the grievance with Green. At first, Armbrust refused permission, but then said he could hand the grievance to Green but could not talk to him.17 Smith then filed a grievance claiming Armbrust deliberately interfered with his duties as a steward by refusing to permit him to process a grievance. The grievance was denied in the fourth step, the Company pointing out that Smith was allowed to ultimately process the grievance during the same shift. According to Smith, after he resigned as steward in March` 1972, he has talked to employees in other departments without any restraints . Except for the Arm- brust incident described above, Smith conceded he has not .been denied permission to process grievances, although, at times, he had to wait until the end of the shift. He said he understood the oral rule to be that he had to have permission to talk to anyone for any reason. When later asked, whether any mention was made on limitations on what he could talk about, his response was, "No, but several times they implied I was discussing union busi- ness." The General Counsel alleges that Armbrust's refusal to permit Smith to talk to Foreman Green in the second step of the grievance procedure violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act (5(b) of the complaint). Pursuant to the contract provisions, Green had 48 hours in which to respond to the grievance at the second step after it had been- filed with him. It can be argued that it was unnecessary for Smith to discuss the grievances with him, but that only begs the IS Union President Bailey was present during this meeting. Although he was called as a witness by the General Counsel. he was not asked about these remarks by Tibbs. 16 Two employees who had been fired for excessive absenteeism. I discredit Tibbs' denial that he made the remarks attributed to him by Smith. 17 Armbrust was not called as a witness. COLUMBUS COATED FABRICS 935 question. Here we have a situation where the foreman -Armbrust-was actually impeding the orderly process- ing of the grievance without any apparent concern other than to make it difficult for the steward and to frustrate him in his attempts to process the grievance. In any event, the grievance was processed during the same shift. It should be noted this was the only time Smith was refused permission to process a grievance. Robert C. Gillen served as steward from 1969 until his resignation from that position in May 1972. In early August 1971, he was told by his foreman, Sam Koepf, he could not leave his department without permission for union business, for breaks, or for any reason.18 He testified this was the first time he was made aware of any such restriction, and.no such restriction was imposed upon the other employees in his section. On October 1, he had completed his shift and an employee called him over to talk about a job assignment. The other employee's machine was shut down and he was on idle time 19 but not on break. After this short conversation, Orr stopped him and cautioned him about conducting union business and said, "Bob, this is the first and last time for this. I do not want to see any more of this. I am not going to tell you again." Gillen filed a grievance contending Orr's remarks consti- tuted discrimination against him in violation of the nondiscrimination clause in the contract.20 The grievance was denied in the fourth step. The General Counsel alleges that this warning by On was an unlawful threat of disciplinary action because of Gilleo's protected activities as a steward (5(c) of the complaint). Gillen was in fact conducting union business -during working time. The other employee was not on break. This was an impromptu conversation between the two employees about a job assignment, but, nevertheless, On's remarks were directed to following the procedure for the conduct of union business during working time. Under the circumstances, I do not find such warning unlawful. Gilleo conceded that foremen never refused to discuss a grievance with him. He had handled grievances even for employees in other departments. He has been granted permission to go to other departments to handle griev- ances. He has discussed grievances with foremen on working time and also at the end of the shift. Kester Segraves has been a steward since October 1971. He testified that prior to becoming a steward, he could take breaks whenever he chose and could talk to employees without first getting permission from his foreman. When he became steward, he was told by his foreman, Baker,21 that if he wanted to talk to an employee, or an employee wanted to talk to him, permission would first have to be obtained from the respective foremen. Segraves understood this restriction pertained to union business. According to Segraves, other employees could talk freely. On January 21, 1972, Segraves heard that another employee, Likely, had been taken to the office and was in the'process of being discharged for allegedly attempting to cut the foreman. He entered the office and attempted to intervene in the dispute. Orr told Segraves to getout of the office, it was none of his business and Likely did not need a steward.22 It was evident that the employee was accused by his foreman of a serious offense and the atmosphere was charged with tension. Segraves did not leave, contin- ued to remonstrate in support of Likely, and the discussion finally ended with Likely being returned to work. Later that day Segraves approached Baker and told him Likely did not have to talk to him without union representa- tion-that Likely did not "have to be a social ball." Baker said he was trying to establish a better relationship. When Baker persisted in denying that Likely had any intention of cutting Baker, Baker screamed, "You're pushing your luck Segraves." I do not find that Baker's remarks to Segraves about "pushing your luck" constituted an unlawful threat as the General Counsel alleges (5)(d)(iii) of the complaint). Theo subject of the alleged cutting was a particular sensitive one and, with the tension created in the office earlier that day, it can hardly be said that Baker's remark tended to unlawfully interfere with Segraves' stewardship. On February 16, 1972, Segraves received an EPR from his foreman, Baker, for visiting Local President Bailey in another department without permission and disrupting production. Segraves then filed a grievance. According to Segraves' testimony, he had asked his foreman, Baker, for permission to see Bailey on union business. Baker said he would let him know. Some time later during the shift, not having had a response from Baker, he again requested permission of Baker. Calvin Green, Bailey's foreman, was also present and refused to grant permission, stating Bailey would be busy all evening. Later that evening, while on break, Segraves approached Bailey who was standing by a machine in his department, near the smoker. The conversa- tion concerned union business. In the midst of the conversation, Baker appeared and ordered Segraves back to his department, stating that Green had reported Segraves had been talking to Bailey without permission and disrupting production. Bailey denied that he was engaged in productive work, although admittedly he was not on break. Segraves received an EPR the following day. The General Counsel contends that Baker's remarks to Segraves on February 16 and the issuance of the EPR on February 17 constituted unlawful threats and a warning of disciplinary action because of his activity as a steward. (Par. 5(d)(i) and (ii) of the complaint.) Baker's remarks to Segraves and the EPR accused Segraves of being away from his department without permission and disrupting production. It is undisputed Segraves had been refused permission by Green to visit Bailey and, despite this lack of authorization, Segraves did stop and talk to Bailey, who was not on break. Thus, Segraves did violate the union business rule. Although it may be argued that Bailey was not busy at the time and no serious disruption of production was involved, I view Baker's directive to Segraves and the issuance of the EPR as a strict enforcement of the lawful rule and not illegal. 18 Gilleo testified he had not taken any breaks from that time until the 20 Art. VII, sec. 3. day before the hearing. Nor had he requested permission. 21 Baker did not testify. 19 Gilleo explained idle time as a period when the machine is not 22 Corroborated by Likely. Although Orr denied ordering Segraves out running. During this period, the employee is expected to do paper work, of the office, I credit Segraves and Likely. match colors, or other work, unless he goes on break. 936 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The General Counsel contends that Roy Dillow, manag- er of labor relations, threatened William Bailey, union president, on February 4, 1972, with disciplinary action because of his union activities (5(e) of the complaint). In support of this. allegation, Bailey testified that on a number of occasions after he became president, Dillow told him he was spending too much time away from his job. On February 4, during a grievance meeting, Dillow again made reference to his being away from his work a great deal conducting union business and, if the pattern continued, it could affect his job. Bailey also testified that Dillow feared that Bailey would become ill because of his deep involvement in union affairs and not be able to perform his work. Dillow suggested he delegate some of his union functions.23 The General Counsel relies upon the reference to union activities affecting Bailey's job as an unlawful threat. Because of the context in which it was made, I do not view such remark as unlawful. Rather, I picture it as a concern by Dillow over production matters, particularly where Dillow was suggesting that Bailey delegate some of the union business to other representatives instead of attempt- ing to handle too much on his own. We now turn.to the alleged no-solicitation rule which the General Counsel contends limited only the union repre- sentatives in their movements in the plant and which the Respondent. says does not exist. The General Counsel does not contend the requirement for stewards to obtain permission to conduct union business during worktime itself was unlawful. As stated above, his position is that the illegality stems from the extension to bar stewards from leaving their departments during working time for any reason or talking to other employees without the foreman's permission while other employees did not need such permission. He contends such restriction imposed on the stewards was intended and designed to frustrate and harass the stewards in carrying out their protected Section 7 rights in the role of stewards. We have the testimony of Smith that, before August 1971, he did not need permission to leave the department. It was at that time that his foreman first limited his movements. He was admonished several times as related above, but in each instance it was because of being away from his department on union business. Under the circumstances, I am convinced he understood the Compa- ny's concern was related to his absences from his department for union business, rather than for other reasons. With respect to the restrictions put on Gilleo, in August 1971 Foreman Koepf instructed Gilleo he was not to leave the department for any reason without permission. Gilleo was a steward at the time. Although Koepf testified permission was not required to take breaks, this apparently was not made clear to Gilleo.24 Koepf testified this restriction was ^ not limited to stewards but to other employees in his department as well. Gus Indiciano, a rebuttal witness for the General Counsel, testified he worked in the inspection department for 24 years and held the same position as Gilleo. He was not a. steward. Although not very articulate, this much could be gleaned from his testimony-that permission to take breaks is not required, but, otherwise, permission is required from the foreman before leaving the department. As Indiciano stated, otherwise, "how would he know where I am at." Albert Olena, another rebuttal witness who works in the same department, testified that employees are not free to leave the department except for breaks. Olena does not hold any position in the Union. It appears that the manner in which Koepf applied the "freedom-of-movement" rule did not conform with the understanding of the higher echelon of management, Dillow, Tibbs, and Orr, whose testimony was to the effect that employees were free to leave their department and talk to other employees provided. the employees were not working. But, regardless of any difference in application of the rule, the question to be resolved is whether the broad prohibition maintained by Koepf was limited to stewards. Based on the testimony described above, I find that Koepf applied the restrictions to the other employees in his department as well as to stewards. As for Segraves' admonishments for being away from his department without permission, the record shows such warnings were all related to violations of the rule governing the conduct of union business during working time. Analysis and Conclusions. It appears that, prior to August 1971, the Respondent did not enforce too rigidly the rule requiring permission to conduct union business during worktime. Since then, however, Respondent made the stewards toe the line and observe the contractual procedure which required the steward to first obtain permission to conduct union business. That this tightening up may have been attributa- ble to the vexations of the parties may be idle speculation. In some respects, the conduct of the foremen appears to have been petty and designed to frustrate the stewards, e.g., Orr's warning to Gilleo on October 1', 1971, when Gilleo was engaged in a short impromptu conversation with another employee on union business ; Armbrust's initial refusal in February 1972 to permit Gilleo to talk to Green in the second step of a grievance during worktime; and Green's refusal to permit Segraves to talk to Local Union President Bailey on union business, also in February 1972. It is not the function of this Agency to insure that the bargaining relationship between the parties be serene and free from bickering with each other. Here we have a lawful limitation on union representatives in their conduct of union business during working time. The right to present grievances by stewards on behalf of employees or to discuss complaints with employees is expressly protected in Section 7 of the Act. But this right does not carry with it a license that such activities must be permitted during working time. As the Board has said, working time is for 23 Dillow admitted having talked to Bailey about being away from his however, that the area where employees took their breaks for smoking or job too much but was not questioned as to the substance. using the vending machines was on another floor and not in this same 24 Koepf testified that the restriction did not apply to breaks because he department. did not consider this to be leaving the department. It should be noted, COLUMBUS COATED FABRICS 937 work and "in the absence of contractual agreement permitting the investigation'and prosecution of complaints on working time, the rights of employees and union stewards to undertake such activities may be. limited." Russell Packing Co., 133 NLRB 192, 196. The intent of the rule requiring permission for the conduct of union business was designed obviously to provide an orderly processing of grievances. The record does show that the supervisors were very much concerned that union business not be conduct- ed in the plant during working time.without permission and took every opportunity to caution and, in some cases, warn the stewards for such infractions. That the rule was enforced strictly is not questioned. Respondent's action in enforcing the procedures in processing complaints was in conformity with the agreed-upon grievance procedures in the collective-bargaining contract. With respect to further limitations on the freedom of movement of stewards, I am persuaded that the stewards were not restricted more than other employees in leaving their departments. Based on the foregoing, I must. conclude that the evidence does. not. support a finding that Respondent maintained an unlawful no-solicitation rule, limited to union representatives as alleged in the complaint, and, accordingly, recommend this allegation of the complaint be dismissed. With respect to the warnings to the. stewards, alleged to have been violative of Section 8(a)(1), I am persuaded they were related to the-enforcement of a lawful rule governing the conduct of union business on working time, and, under the circumstances, not unlawful. Con- cerning the allegation that Armbrust refused to permit the 25 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall,,as provided in Sec. steward to talk to the foreman concerned, during working time, when viewed against the total picture which disclosed that stewards were given permission to conduct such business, often on working time, I must conclude that this single incident is too insubstantial to warrant a finding of an 8(a)(1) violation. CONCLUSIONS OF, LAW 1. Columbus Coated Fabrics, Division of Borden Chemical, Borden, Inc., is, and at all material times has been, an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Textile Workers Union of America, Local 487, AFL-CIO, is, and at all material times has been , a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The General Counsel has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent has engaged in or is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant toSection 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER25 It is recommended that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations . be adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes.