Pioneer Broadcasting Co.

PIONEER BROADCASTING CO. 1005 Pioneer Broadcasting Company and American Federa- tion of Television and Radio Artists , AFL-CIO. Case 23-CA-4513 April 9, 1973 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO On January 19, 1973, Administrative Law Judge Marion C . Ladwig issued the attached Decision in this proceeding . Thereafter, the Respondent and the General Counsel filed exceptions and supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings , findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein." ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the . National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified below, and hereby orders that Respondent Pioneer Broadcasting Company, Austin, Texas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Administrative Law Judge's recommended Order as so modified. 1.' Delete paragraph 1(a) of the Administrative Law Judge's Order and substitute the following: "(a) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, AFL-CIO, and its Dallas-Fort Worth local by refusing to sign the August 7, 1972, 2-year agreement which it had reached with them, or by failing or refusing to bargain with them concerning issues which have arisen, or which may arise, under the terms of the agreement." 2. Insert the words, "and its Dallas-Fort Worth local" immediately following "AFTRA" in para- graph 2(b) of the Administrative Law Judge's Order. 3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the Administrative Law Judge. . I The General Counsel has excepted to the Administrative Law Judge's finding that the Respondent did not violate Sec. 8 (a)(5) by refusing to bargain with AFTRA's Dallas- Fort Worth local . We find merit to this exception and shall amend the Administrative Law Judge's recommended Order accordingly . Contrary to the Administrative Law Judge, we conclude that AFTRA was not a substitute for the local , but was a third party whose addition was consented to by all concerned and that it thereafter acted on its own behalf and as an agent of the local. Although we agree with the Administrative Law Judge that the record amply supports the finding that the Respondent was not lawfully motivated in its refusal to sign its own proposed agreement, we additionally note that in the circumstances of this proceeding its refusal to sign violated Section 8(a)(5) regardless of motivation . E.g., N. L. R. B. v. M & MOldrmobile, Inc., 377 F.2d 712 (C.A. 2, 1967), enfg. 156 NLRB 903. . APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board having found, after trial, that we violated Federal law by refusing on August 7, 1972, to sign a collective-bargaining agreement we had reached with AFTRA and its Dallas-Fort Worth local: WE WILL forthwith sign the August 7, 1972, agreement we reached with American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, AFL-CIO, and its Dallas-Forth Worth local, and will give retroactive effect to the terms of the agreement from that effective date. WE WILL make whole any losses our employees may have suffered from the delay in signing the agreement, plus 6-percent interest. WE WILL bargain in good faith with AFTRA and its Dallas-Fort Worth local as the exclusive representatives of our employees covered by the agreement. PIONEER BROADCASTING COMPANY (Employer) Dated By . (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material,' Any questions concerning this notice or compli- ance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Dallas-Brazos Building, 1125 Brazos Street, Houston, Texas 77002, Telephone 7137226- 4296. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MARION C. LADWIG, Administrative Law Judge: This case was tried at Austin, Texas, on November 21, 1972.1 All dates are in 1972 unless otherwise stated. 202 NLRB No. 134 1006 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The charge .was filed by AFTRA on September 15, and the complaint was issued on October 5 (and amended at the trial). The primary issue is whether the Company, the Respondent, unlawfully refused to sign ' its own proposed agreement with AFTRA after being notified , 13 days before the end of the certification year, that "AFTRA will accept the proposal as is," thereby violating Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act. Upon the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Company, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION The Company, a Texas corporation , is engaged in commercial radio broadcasting and operates radio station KNOW in Austin, Texas, where it subscribes to syndicated national news agencies and broadcasts news items fur- nished by them, and where it annually receives in excess of $100,000 from the operation, and in excess of $50,000 for broadcast services from customers, each of whom makes sales or performs services valued in excess of $50,000 for other firms located outside the State. The Company admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and that American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, AFL-CIO, herein called AFTRA, and American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (AFL-CIO) Dallas-Fort Worth Local, herein called the Local, are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Acceptance of Company Proposal On August 20, 1971, the Local was certified as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the Com- pany's employees in a unit of all full-time and part-time announcers, all full-time and part-time newsmen, technical director, continuity writer-announcer, announcer-mainte- nance men, and announcer-salesmen, excluding all office clerical employees , guards, watchmen , and supervisors as defined in the Act. Thereafter the Local submitted to the Company a written proposal for an agreement between AFTRA (not the certified Local) and the Company. Section 14, entitled "National Board Approval," of the proposal read: "The Company agrees that this Agreement is subject to approval by the National Board of AFTRA and does not become effective or binding until approved by such National Board and counter-signed by the National Executive Secretary of AFTRA." After a number of bargaining sessions, AFTRA National Representative Harold Kocin (an assistant of the national executive secretary) replaced the Local's representative in the negotiations and, with an employee committee, met with the Company in negotiations on April 13 and 14. It is undisputed (as Kocin credibly testified) that on April 13, the Company rejected the Local's section 14 "National Board Approval" proposal . It is also undisputed (as Kocin credibly testified) that on April 26, the night before the Company canceled the next bargaining meeting scheduled for April 27, Kocin held a meeting with the unit employees, reported what the Company was offering in'the negotia tions, stated that he was endeavoring to get two changes (a 2-year instead of a 3 -year agreement, and either a wage reopener or a wage increase for the second year), and received the employees' approval to accept the Company's proposed contract (as amended in the April 13-14 negotiations), or whatever he could get, whether or not these two changes were negotiated. Kocin next met privately with the Company (Attorney L. G. Clinton and General Manager Harry Smith) in Houston on June 16, when the Company agreed to amend its offer to provide for a 2-year agreement, but did not agree to a wage reopener or wage increase after the first year. On July 3 (following Kocin's cancellation of the bargaining meeting scheduled for June 30), Attorney Clinton wrote to Kocin at the AFTRA national office in New York, without a copy to the Local, enclosing two copies of the Company's third proposal for an agreement and inquiring when it would be convenient to resume negotiations. The proposal, for an agreement between AFTRA and the Company, provided that it would "become effective on the date of execution ." It did not include any provision for approval or ratification by the unit employees , the Local, or the AFTRA national board, and did not specify any signature or countersignature by the national executive secretary. Kocin was out of the office and did not receive Attorney Clinton's letter (with the enclosed proposal) until August 1, when Kocin returned from vacation . On August 4, after first getting the approval of the national executive secretary (and after notifying General Manager Smith by telephone on August 3), Kocin , as "national representa- tive," wrote Clinton a letter on the official stationery of AFTRA's national office, with a copy to the Local. The letter (received on August 7) stated that "AFTRA will accept the proposal as is," and advised , "I am returning the agreement to you with my signature . We need two signed copies for our files here , and I could use about 20 additional copies so that each member of the unit could have an individual copy of the agreement ." Kocin also stated in the letter that Smith had already been advised, and "Please let me know how many signed copies you will need, and [send] them along for signature." Receiving no response from Attorney Clinton, National Representative Kocin tried to reach him by telephone several times. As Kocin credibly testified, "Mr. Clinton's secretary always told me that he was out every'time I called . Although I left word to return the calls , they were never returned." On August 30, Kocin wrote Clinton again (on AFTRA national office stationery, with a copy to the Local): On August 4 1 wrote you, accepting on behalf of an AFTRA the last proposal of the Company for, agreement between AFTRA and KNOW. I had already told Harry Smith that AFTRA had accepted the proposal. Please send me copies of the agreement . I need two PIONEER BROADCASTING CO. 1007 for our files, and about 20 for members of the unit. Please let me know how many copies you will need, and I'll return those. Still Kocin received no response. At, the trial, the Company admitted that on and since August 7, it has refused to sign the contract it offered to AFTRA on July 3. B. Contentions The ' General Counsel contends that the Company's admitted refusal to sign its own contract proposal, after the acceptance by AFTRA, is a clear violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Pointing out that the August 20, 1971, certification was near expiration when the Company received the acceptance letter on August 7, the General Counsel argues , "It is obvious that the real motivation for Respondent's refusal is the fact that it was stalling until the end of the certification year." The General Counsel also argues against various defenses urged by the Company at the trial. The Company denies that it violated the Act, and contends that it was not obligated to sign the agreement for the following reasons: 1. AFTRA not certified union The Company contends that inasmuch as the Local, not AFTRA, was the certified bargaining representative, the Company was not obligated to sign the agreement with AFTRA. However, the substitution of AFTRA for the Local was agreeable to all the parties. The Local proposed a contract between AFTRA and the .Company, and the Company agreed, including in its. July 3 proposal the provision that the agreement was between AFTRA and the Company. As held in N.L.R.B. v. Winchester Electronics, 295 F.2d 288, 291-292 (C.A. 2, 1961), cited by the General Counsel, the lack of certification in such a situation "poses no bar to requiring" the Company "to sign the contract." I reject the contention. 2. No approval by AFTRA National Board The. Company contends that its refusal to sign the agreement was not unlawful because National Representa- tive Kocin had no authority to sign for AFTRA. The evidence is undisputed that, in the April 13 negotiations, Kocin was seeking company acceptance of the section 14 "National Board Approval" provision in the Local's earlier written proposal. Company Attorney Clinton's notes of the meeting show that Kocin stated that "the Union would not enter into any contract with the .. . Company unless it contained a provision that the agree- ment ..: would not become effective or binding unless and until approved by such National Board of AFTRA and was countersigned by the National Executive Secretary of AFTRA." Kocin and Clinton both testified that after Clinton wrote this down, he read it to Kocin, who stated that was correct, "as far as it goes." Clinton's notes further show that Kocin stated this was a constitutional require- ment of the Union, and the "Statement is made only because this is in the Union's constitution." (Art. VIII, "Establishment of Locals," sec. 5, of the AFTRA constitu- tion reads in part: "... nor shall any Local enter into any contract or understanding on behalf of its members .. . without the approval of the National Board." (Emphasis supplied.) Another provision, article XIII, requires mem- bership ratification of "national" contracts. There is no provision in the AFTRA constitution requiring national board approval, signature by the national executive secretary, or membership ratification of an individual agreement, which a national representative may negotiate and accept on behalf of AFTRA with a local station.) When National Representative Kocin was asked on cross-examination whether he changed his position regard- ing section 14 in the Local's proposal, he testified, "Well, yes, of course. When I bought you cocktails on the night of [April] 13th, and when I talked to you in your Houston office on June [16th], I told you I would accept, your contract as presented [without a "National Board Approv- al" provision] if you would make a couple of decent changes in it . . . . I told you and Harry Smith at cocktails in the Sheraton Crest on the night of the 13th that if you would give us a two-year contract with a wage increase at the end of the first year, I would accept the proposal." (Emphasis supplied.) On redirect examination, Kocin testified that he "regularly" signed contracts on behalf of AFTRA without the approval of the national board: "All of the National Representatives sign contracts without approval of the National Board." (On rebuttal, the General Counsel, introduced into evidence some agreements which had been signed by Kocin and other AFTRA national representatives without prior national board approval.) Following this testimony, General Manager Smith and Attorney Clinton, appearing as defense witnesses, gave their recollections of what occurred in the hotel bar on April 13 and in Clinton's office on June 16, and what Kocin had said in negotiations on April 13. Smith testified that Kocin said in the bar, "If we could have a little bit more money we could have a contract," or "words to that effect." Clinton testified, "I don't remember us specifically talking about anything other than the Union' s general request that . . . they needed more money." Concerning the June 16 meeting in Clinton's office, Smith and Clinton had conflicting recollections. Smith positively testified that Kocin made no statements about his authority to sign a contract on behalf of the Union, whereas Clinton testified that Kocin "again' said that he did not have authority to sign the contract on behalf of the Union." Both Smith and Clinton testified that in the April 13 negotiations, Kocin went beyond Clinton's notes when discuss the "National Board Approval" provision in the Local's written proposal. Both testified that Kocin added that he did not have the authority to sign the contract on behalf of the Union. (Another defense witness, a unit employee who indicated on the stand his hostility toward AFTRA, gave a conflicting version of what happened. He did not impress me as being a trustworthy witness.) Although neither Smith nor Clinton recalled Kocin stating "I would accept," in the bar or in Clinton's office, Kocin impressed me as having an accurate recollection of what he said, and I credit his testimony. Concerning Smith's and Clinton's recollection that Kocin stated in negotiations on April 13 that he "did not have authority" to sign a contract, and Clinton's testimony (in conflict with Smith's) that Kocin repeated 1008 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD this on June 16, I find this unpersuasive. Clinton was taking such complete notes of what Kocin said , I find it quite unlikely that Kocin would have made such a significant disclaimer of authority without Clinton having added that to his notes. Also, in view of the contracts in evidence, supporting Kocin's testimony that national representatives do sign contracts without national board approval and that he himself regularly does so, I find it most unlikely that Kocin would have stated in the negotiations that he did not have the authority. Further- more, I find it unlikely that Kocin would have disclaimed the authority on April 13 and, as recalled by Clinton (although positively denied by Smith), "on June 16 he again said that he did not have authority to sign the contract on behalf of the Union," and then proceed to write Clinton on August 4, stating that he was returning the agreement with his signature. I credit Kocin's testimony that at no time did he ever say he did not have the authority to sign. I reject the Company's contention about lack of authority, and find that National Representative Kocin possessed the authority to accept and sign the Company's July,3 proposal on behalf of AFTRA. I also find that Kocin previously, on two occasions, had indicated to the Company that he had such authority by telling its representatives that he would accept its proposed con- tract-thereby dropping his earlier insistence on the "National Board Approval" provision in the Local's written proposal-if certain changes were made in the Company's offer. Thereafter, up until the time of Kocin's acceptance of the Company's amended offer, neither the Company nor AFTRA, I find, made national board approval a precondition for reaching a binding agreement -as demonstrated by the Company' s omission of any such requirement in its July 3 proposal, and by AFTRA's notice of its acceptance over Kocin's signature. 3. No ratification by unit employees The Company contends in its brief that AFTRA conditioned execution of a final and binding agreement upon employee ratification. This contention also lacks merit. National Representative Kocin testified, upon cross- examination: Q. [By Mr. Clinton] Did you ever make any statement to us, Mr. Kocin, that all of the agreements that we were making in the course of these negotiations were, of course, tentative and subject to approval of what the membership wanted? A. That is correct. When taking the stand as a defense witness, Attorney Clinton recalled that "Mr. Kocin made it clear that whatever agreements we reached across the table with him, he would submit to the local membership for their approval, their ratification. .. . Whichever way Kocin made the statement (as suggested in Clinton's question or as testified by Clinton), it is undisputed that Kocin did take the Company's proposed contract, as amended in the April 13 and 14 negotiations, to the unit employees in an employee meeting on April 26, and that the employees did agree to accept the Company's offer, with or without two changes which Kocin stated he was seeking. Therefore, Kocin had already received approval by the unit employees of the Company's July 3 proposal before it was made. Moreover, as in Houchens Market of Elizabethtown, 155 NLRB 729, 730 enfd. 375 F.2d 208 (C.A. 6, 1967), cited by the General Counsel,. "employee ratification had never been agreed on by the Respondent and the Union as either a contract provision or a condition precedent to the execution and application of the contract." I therefore reject the contention. C. Motivation As mentioned above, the General Counsel contends that "It is obvious that the real motivation for Respondent's refusal [to sign the agreement on August 7] is the fact that it was stalling until the end of the certification year [August 20 ]." Although Attorney Clinton (when testifying as a defense witness) recalled that the upcoming expiration of the certification year "didn't have anything to. do with" the Company's refusal to sign the agreement , he at least implied (when making his closing argument as company counsel) that the Company would have disfavored signing the agreement at that time, even if its July 3 proposal had been submitted to the employees, then approved by the national board, and signed by the national executive secretary, "as Mr. Kocin represented to us in negotiations that he would do." Clinton argued: If those matters had been done in that fashion and [the company proposal] then returned to us, Judge, I think there would be no question but what we would have a contract. We would have been forced to sign it. [Emphasis supplied.] I also note that when Attorney Clinton received Kocin's August 4 acceptance letter on August 7, and found that Kocin-through obvious oversight-had failed to affix his signature on the two returned copies of the Company's July 3 proposal, Clinton did not answer Kocin's letter and call his attention to the oversight (or, for that matter, mention anything about national board approval). Instead, Clinton instructed his secretary to stamp the two copies with his law firm's file mark "since we had other copies of this proposal. I wanted there to be no uncertainty as td exactly which copies that we had received [unsigned] from Mr. Kocin." Thereafter, at the trial, when explaining the Company's answer to the complaint, Clinton stated, "We deny that the contract was ever signed by anyone." (Kocin not only had stated in his August 4 letter, "I am returning the agreement to you with my signature ," but he offered in that letter, and also in his August 30 letter, to sign additional copies for the Company' s use. Clinton did not answer either letter, and he did not contact Kocin nor talk to him until the day of the trial.) When testifying at the trial, Attorney Clinton was repeatedly asked why he did not answer Kocin's August 4 letter. He testified that the contract had not been approved by the national board and countersigned by the national executive secretary (neither was required in his July 3 proposal), and that in view of the statements made in negotiations about relying on the AFTRA constitution, "I wanted to see if I could find a copy of the Constitution," PIONEER BROADCASTING CO. 1009 which General Manager Smith was unable to obtain in Texas, and which he had 'been promised in negotiations but never furnished. On cross-examination, he testified: Q. Well, why didn't you write Mr. Kocin and say "Well, look, you didn't sign this. But before I sign it I want to check on this stuffin the Constitution. Send it to me before I sign."? A. Well, Counsel, on at least six occasions . . . we had asked for a copy of the Union's Constitution and been told, that we were going to get it..They assured us on every occasion that they would give it to us. They have completely failed to do so. 0. Why didn't you say "Look, this is why .1 am not signing. I want to see the Constitution first."? A. Well, because I had asked him for copies of the Constitution, as I said... . The General Counsel contends that "Clinton's explanation that he did not respond in writing to Kocin's letter of August 4 because he had not received a copy of the Union's constitution and was seeking by other (unidenti- fied) means to obtain one . . . is excessively feeble." Despite giving these reasons for not answering Kocin's letter, Attorney Clinton recalled, "I know that after I received his letter that on at least four different days, two or three times a day, we tried to reach Mr. Kocin, both through his New York office and through his residence in Washington, D. C." I find that Clinton's recollection must be faulty, not only because of his above-quoted stated reasons for not corresponding with Kocin, but because Kocin admittedly was seeking to contact Clinton by telephone, and, if Clinton's secretary had in fact attempted to telephone Kocin, it is likely that Kocin would have been so informed. (When asked by Company Counsel Clinton on cross-examination, "Did your office ever tell you that we attempted to reach you on a number of occasions [after August. 7] and were unable to get you," Kocin credibly replied, "No. I checked with my office and never got a statement like that. . . . My office secretary and telephone operator has been there longer than I have [over 19 years] and she is pretty good. So, I assumed that you never returned my calls.") Clinton may have confused these uncorroborated' attempts to telephone Kocin with the earlier unsuccessful attempts by Clinton's secretary to telephone Kocin to cancel the scheduled April 27 meeting before Kocin arrived in Austin for the meeting. I do-not doubt that Attorney Clinton desired to obtain a copy of the AFTRA constitution to determine if there was any restriction (which there was not) on National Repre- sentative Kocin's authority to sign a contract on AFTRA's behalf. However, I find that the Company's controlling motivation-for refusing to sign the agreement, while ignoring Kocin's letters and telephone calls, and while failing to disclose' to AFTRA either the Company's decision not to sign or any reasons therefor-was to avoid reaching an agreement before the expiration of the certification in less than 2 weeks, in an obvious effort to eliminate union representation of the unit employees. I find that the Company unlawfully refused to bargain with AFTRA by refusing on and since August 7 to sign the Company's own proposal after its acceptance by AFTRA, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. In view of this finding, I reject the General Counsel's alternative allegation that the Company unlawfully refused to bargain with the Local by refusing to sign the agreement. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. By refusing on and after August 7 to sign the agreement which it proposed to AFTRA on July 3 and which AFTRA accepted in writing on August 4, the Company unlawfully refused to bargain collectively in good faith with AFTRA as the bargaining representative of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit covered by the agreement, thereby engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Company did not unlawfully refuse to bargain with the Local. 3. All full-time and part-time announcers, all full-time and part-time newsmen, technical directors, continuity writer-announcers , announcer-maintenance men, and an- nouncer-salesmen, excluding all office clerical employees, guards, watchmen, and supervisors as defined in the Act, is an appropriate bargaining unit.- REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find it necessary to order the Respondent to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that the Respondent unlawfully refused on and after August 7, 1972, to sign its own proposed agreement after its acceptance by AFTRA,. I find it necessary that the Respondent be ordered forthwith to execute the 2-year agreement as of that date, to give retroactive effect to the terms and conditions of the agreement from the August 7, 1972, effective date, and to make the unit employees whole for any losses, to be determined' at the compliance stage, they may have suffered as a result of the delay in signing the agreement, plus interest at 6 percent per annum as prescribed in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). I also find it necessary, in the event the Company delays execution of the 1972-74 agreement until more than 1 year after the August 7, 1972, effective date, to order the Company thereafter to bargain in good faith, on request, for a new agreement to take effect after the expiration of the 1972-74 agreement, as the General Counsel proposes. I find that otherwise the Company-found above to have been motivated by a desire to eliminate union representation of the unit employees when it refused to sign the agreement -would be able to benefit from its own unlawful conduct, by depriving the employees of coverage under the collective-bargaining agreement for most or all of its term and thereafter taking advantage of any resulting loss of 1010 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD union support to continue its endeavor to eliminate union representation of the employees. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER2 Respondent, Pioneer Broadcasting Company, its offi- cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with American' Federation of Television and Radio Artists, AFL-CIO, by refusing to sign the August 7, 1972, 2-year agreement which it had reached with AFTRA, or by failing or refusing to bargain with AFTRA concerning issues which have arisen, or which may arise under the terms of the agreement. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: . (a) Forthwith execute the August 7, 1972, agreement as of that date, and give retroactive effect to, it from that August 7, 1972, effective date. (b) In the event the 2-year agreement is not executed until after August 7, 1973, bargain in good faith with AFTRA, upon request, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the following appropriate unit, for a new agreement to take effect after the expiration of the 2-year agreement and, if an understanding is reached, embody it in a new signed agreement. All full-time and part-time announcers, all full-time 2 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall , as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. and part-time newsmen, technical directors, continuity writer-announcers, announcer-maintenance men, and announcer-salesmen, excluding all office clerical em- ployees, guards, watchmen, and supervisors as defined in the Act. (c) Make whole all employees and/or former employees for any losses suffered by the delay in signing the August 7, 1972, agreement, in the manner set forth in the "Remedy" section of the Decision of the Administrative Law Judge. (d) Preserve and, upon' request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (e) Post at its radio station in Austin, Texas, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 3 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 23, after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immedi- ately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ- ing all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (f) Notify the Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found. 3 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."