Helvertia Sugar Coop., Inc.

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Helvetia Sugar Cooperative, Inc. and Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, Local P-1124. Case 15-CA- 6286 February 1, 1978 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND PENELLO On October 11, 1977, Administrative Law Judge Joel A. Harmatz issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief and Respondent filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find- ings,1 and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. The Administrative Law Judge found no merit in Respondent's claim that the issues raised here should be deferred for resolution within the grievance arbitration provision of the collective-bargaining agreement pursuant to the policy expressed in Collyer Insulated Wire, A Gulf and Western Systems Co., 192 NLRB 837 (1971). Member Penello would not defer in this case and Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins would not defer in any event. Roy Robinson, Inc. d/b/a Roy Robinson Chevrolet, 228 NLRB 828 (1977); General American Transportation Corporation, 228 NLRB 808 (1977). In the absence of exceptions, we adopt the Administrative Law Judge's decision to dismiss the allegations that Respondent violated the Act by unilaterally changing employee work schedules; by granting wage increases to shift foremen; and by the prepayment of the October 14 wage increase to certain workers. Furthermore, in the absence of exceptions, we also adopt the Administrative Law Judge's discussion of the effect of the decertification petition on the obligation to bargain. Finally, in the absence of exceptions, we adopt the Administrative Law Judge's determination that any impact of Respondent's prepayment of the October 14 increase to certain seasonal workers was minimal and not worthy of a remedy. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JOEL A. HARMATZ, Administrative Law Judge: This proceeding was heard on February 10 and April 19, 1977, upon a charge filed on November 8, 1976, and a complaint issued on December 29, 1976, alleging that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to 234 NLRB No. 112 bargain with the certified union since September 13, 1976, and by unilaterally, and without negotiating with the Union, implementing a wage increase, and changing work schedules whereby overtime hours of unit employees were reduced. Respondent, in its duly filed answer, denied that any unfair labor practices were committed and affirmative- ly asserted that the subject matter of this proceeding ought be deferred to arbitration pursuant to Collyer Insulated Wire, A Gulf and Western Systems Co., 192 NLRB 837 (1971). After close of the hearing, briefs were filed on behalf of Respondent and the General Counsel. Upon the entire record in this proceeding, and from my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, and with due consideration to the posthearing briefs, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Respondent is a Louisiana corporation with a principal office and place of business in Convent, Louisiana, from which it is engaged in the processing of sugar cane into raw sugar and blackstrap molasses. In the course and conduct of said operations, Respondent, during the 12-month preceding issuance of the complaint, a representative period, sold and shipped products valued in excess of $50,000 to firms in Louisiana, which are engaged in interstate commerce, and which annually sell products in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside the State of Louisiana. The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that Respondent is, and at all times material herein has been, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, Local P-1124 is, and at all times material herein has been, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Issues The question of ultimate concern in this proceeding is whether Respondent violated Section 8(aX5) and (1) of the Act by its suspension of collective bargaining following a challenge to the representative status of a certified repre- sentative through the filing of a decertification petition. The General Counsel does not challenge the apparently controlling principle that the existence of a valid decertifi- cation petition which raises a question concerning repre- sentation furnishes a lawful justification for a suspension of negotiations until such question concerning representation is resolved. See Telautograph Corporation, 199 NLRB 892 (1972), and Essex International, Inc., 222 NLRB 121, 132 (1976). Instead, the General Counsel relies on the equally apposite authority to the effect that an otherwise valid decertification petition furnishes no impediment to the 638 HELVETIA SUGAR COOPERATIVE, INC. obligation to engage in continuous collective bargaining with an incumbent representative in circumstances where the employer has engaged in unfair labor practices tending to dissipate the Union's majority status and to induce the loss of majority evident from the decertification activity itself.' In so claiming, the General Counsel relies entirely on alleged unfair labor practices defined in a single paragraph of the complaint, which sets forth as follows: On or about October 14, 1976, Respondent, by its plant manager, Alberto Martinez at its Convent, Louisiana, plant (i) unilaterally implemented a wage increase affecting the majority of unit employees, and (ii) unilaterally implemented changes in work schedules, thereby reducing the overtime hours of the majority of unit employees. In defense of the allegedly unlawful unilateral action, Respondent raises a number of alternative defenses. First, apart from the merits, Respondent asserts that this pro- ceeding presents a controversy involving issues of contract interpretation as to which the Board should defer to the contract's grievance procedure pursuant to the policy expressed in Collyer Insulated Wire, supra. In the alterna- tive, as to the merits, Respondent contends that the evidence fails to substantiate that it engaged in proscribed unilateral action in that the Union received prior notice of the benefit changes under conditions which satisfied Respondent's duty to bargaining prior to implementation. Respondent further argues that by virtue of the terms of binding agreements between itself and the Union, as well as past practices, the Union's right to negotiation with respect to the subject matter of the complaint was waived through the process of collective bargaining. B. Background Respondent is a cooperative, composed of 18 members. Day-to-day management of the plant is entrusted to Paul Keller, the general manager,2 and Alberto Martinez, the plant manager. However, a board of directors, which meets on the first Wednesday of every month, must approve all significant shifts in personnel policy. Production activity at the facility here in question is highly seasonal and conducted entirely within a 2- to 3- month period called the "grinding season." Normally the grinding season begins in mid-October and runs through late December. During the off season, Respondent employs a regular, year round work force of about 30 employees, who during that period engage in maintenance activity. During the grinding season, the work force doubles, with year round employees, in many instances, changing classification to engage in production activity. The bargaining history reveals that the seasonal employ- ees were initially excluded from the unit represented by the Union, but then added by contract. Thus, in Case 15-RC- 5224, the Regional Director for Region 15, on November I See, e.g., Autoprod Inc., 223 NLRB 773, fn. 2 (1976), Celanrse Corporation of America, 95 NLRB 664, 673 (1951 ). 2 Keller's employment with Respondent terminated after the events in issue here. 21, 1973, certified the Union as exclusive representative of the following employees: All regular employees of the employer at its Convent, Louisiana plant; excluding all grinding season employ- ees, professional employees, office clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. However, just 2 days after the certification, the parties executed a collective-bargaining agreement, which express- ly included grinding season employees. That contract had a term of November 23, 1973, through January 2, 1977. It contained a broad management rights clause, as well as a provision customarily referred to as a zipper clause, and established a grievance procedure, culminating in final and binding arbitration. The issues in this case relate to management adjustments in working conditions which were effective from the outset of the 1976 grinding season. As the collective-bargaining agreement was not scheduled to expire until January 2, 1977, that agreement was to remain in effect during the 1976 grinding season. Thus, despite the fact that said contract included no new wage scale or increases to be effective during the calendar year 1976. The matters in controversy here unfolded with a letter sent Respondent on August 9, 1976,3 by Harding Farlough, the Union's president. That letter stated, as follows: In accordance with our labor agreement dated November 23, 1973, it so states to open contract negotiations 60 days prior to the deadline date of January 2, 1977 on modifications of wages and other benefits. I realize this will be during the grinding season which will be a very busy period for you. Therefore, if you will agree, we can get into negotiations at this time to get this out of the way before grinding starts. Your cooperation will be greatly appreciated. Respondent, through Paul Keller, its general manager, responded on September 13, as follows: I am writing in reply to your letter asking that we start negotiations early on our contract with your union in order to avoid the rush of the grinding season. We appreciate your concern for the Company's position during the grinding season, however, we will be unable to start our negotiations before the time stated by our contract. The reason being that Mr. Martinez and myself are very tied up with preparation of the mill, planting cane, and heat treatment. We are also very concerned with the low sugar price and unavailability of natural gas for this coming season. We feel it would be more beneficial to our employees and less strain on management to begin negotiations at a later date. On October 14, the grinding season opened, admittedly, with several changes in conditions of employment. Thus, in past years during the grinding season employees worked a 3 All dates refer to 1976, unless otherwise indicated. 639 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 12-hour day, 7 days per week. Instead of the two shift arrangement, the 1976 grinding season operated on a three shift basis with employees working 8 hours daily, 7 days a week. Simple arithmetic evidences the loss of earnings imposed upon employees through this arrangement. With respect to wage rates, although the existing contract made no provision for an increase in 1976, several wage adjustments were effected at the outset and during the 1976 grinding season. First, on the first day of the grinding season, each classification rate was increased by 5 percent. Second, Plant Manager Martinez, in recruiting seasonal employees, while on a trip to Puerto Rico, offered several experienced Puerto Rican workers 20 cents above the new rate applicable to yard laborers, with some receiving this additional increment after their ability was demonstrated during the 1976 grinding season, and some receiving all new wage benefits upon their initial employment in advance of the grinding season. Finally, as had been done in years past, certain regular, year round employees were elevated to the position of shift leader, and in recognition of their additional responsibility, were awarded a 20-cent increment, which was approved during the grinding season, but made retroactive to October 14. 4 While grinding was in progress, on October 27, Farlough wrote Respondent, as follows: In accordance with our labor agreement dated November 23, 1973, it so states to open contract negotiations 60 days prior to the deadline date of January 2, 1977 on modifications of wages and other benefits. Enclosed is a copy of contract changes. This is an official notice. Hoping to hear from you soon,. .. As the letter indicates, this bargaining request was accom- panied by specific proposals for modification of the existing agreement. Shortly thereafter, on November 2, the decertification petition was filed in Case 15-RC-352. On November 8, 1976, the charge giving rise to the instant proceeding was filed. C. Concluding Findings 1. The Collyer defense In the circumstances of this case, I find no merit in the claim by Respondent that the issues here be deferred for resolution within the grievance arbitration provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement. In so finding, it is noted that I have no quarrel with the observation in Respondent's brief that insofar as this proceeding contests the unilateral modification in wages and hours of work, said issues fall within the type of controversies which a majority of the Board has deemed appropriate for primary resolution pursuant to contractual remedies. Thus, unquestionably, Respondent's defenses to those allegations are predicated 4 In 1976, four regular employees were elevated to foreman or shift leader status. In 1975, there had been only three. The addition of a third shift in 1976 accounts for the designation of the additional shift leader during the 1976 grinding season. 5 Par. 9 of the complaint alleges that "since on or about September 13, upon more than a colorable claim of contract interpreta- tion, Respondent has expressed as a matter of record its willingness to proceed to arbitration, the parties appear to have sustained a harmonious bargaining relationship and their agreement provides for final and binding arbitration. Nonetheless, more is at stake in this proceeding than a remedy for alleged unilateral changes in work conditions. Thus, on November 17, Keller, Respondent's plant manag- er, wrote Harding Farlough, the Union's president, as follows: On October 27, 1976, you wrote to me concerning contract negotiations, and enclosed with your letter a list of your proposals. Subsequent to receipt of your letter, we received a copy of a petition from the National Labor Relations Board, filed on behalf of our employees to decertify your organization as bargaining representative. We now understand that the Labor Board, is temporarily withholding the processing of the employee petition because of an unfair labor practice charge filed by you against the Company. Frankly, we do not understand your contention that the Company has refused to bargain collectively. However, in light of the question concerning representation raised by the Labor Board petition, we believe we should not reply to your proposals or make proposals of our own. We are precluded by law from bargaining collectively until a real question concerning representation has been final- ly resolved. Teleautograph Corp., 199 NLRB 892 (1972). Thus, an additional issue based upon the abatement of contract negotiations exists. This issue is within the purview of the complaint,5 and, if the General Counsel were to prevail, would give rise to an unfair labor practice of telling impact upon the bargaining rights of the certified representative, and, undoubtedly, one of serious conse- quence to the bargaining relationship. In short, a suspen- sion of bargaining manifested under conditions wherein the employer is not free to assert a good-faith doubt of majority is an unfair labor practice which constitutes no less than a basic repudiation of the bargaining relationship and strikes at the heart of the collective-bargaining process. The Board has refused to defer the regulation of collective bargaining to other forums with respect to alleged unfair labor practices of such dimensions. See Oak Cliff-Golman Baking Company, 207 NLRB 1063, 1063-64 (1973), and Fairfield Nursing Home, 228 NLRB 1208 (1977). Based thereon, I find that the Collyer doctrine does not apply to the instant case. 2. The merits a. The reduction in daily working hours Following certification of the Union, in 1974 and 1975, the hours of work during the grinding season were 12 hours daily, 7 days per week. On October 14, 1976, this two shift arrangement was supplanted by the addition of a third 1976, and at all times thereafter, Respondent has refused to meet with the Union and engage in collective bargaining." Although the actual suspension in negotiations occurred after September 13, 1 construe this allegation as broad enough to include the undisputed and fully litigated facts concerning the subsequent curtailment of bargaining. 640 HELVETIA SUGAR COOPERATIVE, INC. shift, which reduced the work hours to 8 daily, with the 7- day workweek remaining intact. General Manager Keller, in effect, testified, without contradiction, that prior to this innovation general feeling in the plant ran against the 12-hour day, which was felt to be undesirable as contributing to fatigue and general inefficiency among the employees. More specifically, he relates, again without contradiction, that in 1975 this sentiment was expressed at a meeting attended by Union President Farlough. Some analysis is required with respect to testimony relative to whether this change was discussed with the Union prior to its implementation. Plant Manager Marti- nez relates that prior to the 1976 grinding season, he discussed management's intention to alter shifts with Reynold Gaudin, the Union's chief steward at the plant. It is the testimony of Martinez that in the early summer of 1976, he expressed informally to Gaudin the Respondent's preference for reducing the 12-hour workday to 8 hours daily. At that time, Gaudin expressed a willingness to try the new arrangement. Thereafter, according to Martinez during the summer, reference was made to the possible change in conversations with Gaudin. Parenthetically, it is noted that addition of the third shift required operational changes, including the advancement of an additional year- round employee to the position of shift leader. Martinez in this respect testified that Gaudin, who during prior grind- ing seasons was one such shift leader, was consulted by Martinez with respect to the latter's deliberations as to who would be selected to run the additional shift. Later, on September 8, according to the credited uncon- tradicted testimony of Martinez and Keller, Respondent's board of directors met and approved the shift change. Although Martinez and Keller confessed to a lack of clear recollection as to precisely when Gaudin was apprised of the board's action, they indicate generally that this oc- curred within I to 3 weeks after September 8. Both further credibly testified without contradiction, that at no time prior to the filing of unfair labor practice charges on November 8 did the Union request negotiations with respect to the shift change, grieve the Employer's action with respect thereto, or protest this modification in any way, shape, or form. Union President Farlough concedes that at a meeting with Respondent's officials some 2 to 3 weeks before the opening of the 1976 grinding season, Martinez indicated that he expected to go to an 8-hour day during the 1976 grinding season. Farlough expressed no disagreement. Gaudin's testimony is not entirely clear. He testified that on October 13, a meeting was called by Martinez and Keller to notify the Union about changes from a 12-hour to an 8-hour system. Although the General Counsel's brief implies otherwise, Gaudin did not expressly deny that he received notice from Martinez and Keller prior to October 13 concerning the shift change. If it is the General Counsel's view that Gaudin's testimony is to be construed as a denial that he was afforded such notice, and were I to agree with such an interpretation, I would discredit Gaudin to this extent. Gaudin, while the Union's chief steward, was also a regular year-round employee, who, as indicated, during prior grinding seasons was elevated to the status of shift leader or foreman. As such, operations on his particular shift fell within his immediate responsibility. The establishment of a third shift required manpower revisions. Considering Gaudin's status, as a senior employee, with service dating back to 1942, and his role during past grinding seasons, I consider it entirely probable that Martinez did, as he testified, consult with Gaudin as to the problems to be encountered in effecting this change well in advance of the October 14 commencement of the grinding season. It is the true that Martinez and Keller confessed to a hazy recollection of the precise dates of the various events material to the instant proceeding. However, the material aspects of their testimony with respect to discussions involving Gaudin, particularly the testimony of Martinez that in the early summer, probably June, he began discussing the Company's intention of modifying the nature of the shift operations, and consulting Gaudin with respect to problems to be encountered, and his further testimony, that he notified Gaudin of board approval of the shift change in September within I to 2 weeks after September 8 struck me as entirely credible. As for Gaudin's testimony, it struck me as either carefully hedged in a manner calculated to deceive, or unreliable, depending on the interpretation given. Having found that Respondent's deliberations concern- ing the shift change were communicated to Gaudin well in advance of approval by the board of directors, and thereafter at least 2 weeks prior to the scheduled implemen- tation of the change, I find that the facts fail to substantiate a breach of the duty to bargain in good faith in this instance. Gaudin as the chief steward, according to the uncontradicted testimony of Martinez and Keller, had been the primary conduit through which management communicated to the Union matters of relevance to unit employees. Furthermore based upon the testimony exacted from Farlough, the Union was alerted to the Company's intention to go on an 8-hour day at least 2 weeks prior to the opening of the grinding season. In my opinion the Union was afforded prior notification of the contemplated change, under conditions allowing full opportunity to negotiate if that were the Union's intention. Thus, this is not a case where bargaining with respect to a management decision had been frustrated by a fail acconmpli. To the contrary, the Union, through its representatives, previously having affirmed its desirability, after receiving word of management's intention, neither protested nor requested negotiations concerning the contemplated change. There is not the slightest intimation that the Company deemed its contemplated action nonnegotiable or did anything to suggest to the Union that a request for negotiations would prove futile. The suggestion by the General Counsel that Respondent could not lawfully invoke the change absent evidence that it first solicited the Union's views is uncon- vincing. To hold the Union to its informal agreements, based upon tacit assent, is far more in consonance with the statutory process of collective bargaining than other appli- cations of the law which could, in certain instances, invite "sand bagging," or veiled reneging on matters which when broached were the subject of mutual consent. Accordingly, I shall dismiss the 8 (a)(5) allegation insofar as it alleges that 641 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD which resulted in an increase in which Gaudin also participated. Here again, it was granted only after Respon- dent, in the presence of Gaudin, indicated that it would seek future approval from the board of directors." As the premium accorded the shift leaders was consistent with prior practice, of which the Union through Gaudin had knowledge, and as Gaudin as of the October 13 meeting with Martinez was aware of Respondent's intention to seek board approval of such an increase, I find that sufficient advance 12 notice was afforded to the Union that the Company would follow this course in 1976 and that in the face of the Union's failure to protest or request negotia- tions with respect thereto, Respondent was free to imple- ment this benefit without violating Section 8(a)(5) and (I) of the Act. It also appears that with respect to some 11 employees occupying seasonal laborer classifications increases of 20 cents per hour were granted above the 5 percent. The 11 employees, all of Puerto Rican descent, were in classifica- tions calling for a $2.71 rate. It appears that of this group, four received $2.91 upon their initial hire, and the balance were raised to that level after their employment had commenced. Martinez testified that these increases were granted out of recognition of the experience and skill of the employees involved. It is claimed on behalf of Respondent that discretionary increases of this type were authorized by language in the supplemental agreement dated March 23, 1974, which provides as follows: The above wages are minimums for each classification only. The company may pay rates in excess of those above to any employee or classification subject to agreement with steward for temporary work and subject not to lay-off of regular employees. The increases in question here were not shown to have resulted in layoffs, and were not, according to the con- tract's definition of the term "temporary," applicable to such a classification. Furthermore, Keller testified, without contradiction, and credibly that Farlough during a confer- ence in 1975 confirmed that the above-clause afforded Respondent discretion to pay more than the rates called for by the contract. Respondent's position and the expressed view of Union President Farlough in this regard stand unchallenged. Consistent therewith, I find that the quoted clause contains terms sufficiently clear and unmistakable to embody a contractual waiver on the part of the Union of the obligation of the Employer to bargain before granting the individual increases in question here. Accordingly, the 8(a)(5) and (1) allegation in this respect has not been substantiated. Finally, while it is unclear whether the General Counsel claims a violation with respect to prepayment of the October 14 increase to certain seasonal workers, this issue also warrants disposition. In this connection, Keller testi- 1i Although of no significance to the ultimate result, it is noted that, while the record does not firm up the issue, serious questions exist as to whether the four shift leaders had authority effectively to recommend discipline and as to whether this increase involved a class of unit employees whose benefits were not subject to statutory bargaining. 1i It will be recalled that the board of directors did not approve the differential until November. 13 This group does not include an individual named Lucille Du Pepe. fied that, in order to avoid an immediate payroll adjust- ment to reflect the increase as to seasonal employees hired shortly before October 14, these employees were paid the new rates from the date of their hire. Independent examination of Respondent's payroll records which are in evidence as Joint Exhibit 3 indicates that 25 grinding season employees were hired prior to October 14 at rates of pay reflecting the 5-percent increase. Of this group 23 worked only 8 hours, or less, prior to October 14. The other two worked 48 hours.'3 These employees did not work in any payroll period prior to that ending October 11. Early enjoyment of the grinding season increment for 23 of the 25 employees affected amounted to a gross gain, ranging from $1.04 to the individuals at the lowest rate of pay and $2.64 to the individuals enjoying the highest rate of pay.14 This discrepancy in the timing of the increase first appeared through my own examination of Keller. Al- though the General Counsel's brief makes reference to the prepayment, it is not entirely clear that he asserts an independent violation of Section 8(a)(5) with respect thereto. In any event, from what evidence there is in the record, it appears that the impact of the Employer's action in this respect was minimal, and that in the total circum- stances, including the the bookeping adjustments which would be immediately necessary had Respondent followed some other course, I find that, at best, any violation was technical and one neither warranting a remedial order, nor contributing measurably to the decertification activity. Based upon the foregoing I find that Respondent engaged in no conduct reflective of departure from the principles of good-faith collective bargaining which would warrant a statutory remedy prior to its suspension of the bargaining relationship on November 17, 1976. As for this latter action, I find that based on the filing of the decertification petition, Respondent was justified in cur- tailing negotiations with the Union until such time as the question concerning representation were resolved. Accord- ingly, it shall be recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed in its entirety. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce and activities affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Respondent has not engaged in any unfair labor practices alleged or litigated in this proceeding. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in this proceeding, and From examination of her payroll sheet, together with It. Exh. 2. and other aspects of the record, it does not appear that Du Pepe was a member of the contract unit. 14 According to my calculations, Pedro Garcia, who worked 48 hours during the payroll week ending October II11, realized additional savings of S14.20 as a result of the early payment of the grinding season increment. Ismael Torres, Jr., who also worked 48 hours during the payroll week ending October I I grossed S6.76 as a result of the advance payment of the increase. 644 HELVETIA SUGAR COOPERATIVE, INC. pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: 15 '5 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. ORDER It is hereby ordered that the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 645