Ridgely Manufacturing Co.

RIDGELY MANUFACTURING CO. 193 Ridgely Manufacturing Company and Roger Alfred Durban. Case 26-CA-4657 November 12, 1973 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS On June 28, 1973, Administrative Law Judge Jennie M. Sarrica issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep- tions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt her recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that Ridgely Manufacturing Compa- ny, Ridgely, Tennessee, its officers, agents, succes- sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. presenting allegations that Ridgely Manufacturing Compa- ny, hereinafter referred to as the Respondent, committed unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act; and Respondent's answer denying that it committed any violations of the Act. Representatives of all parties were present and participated in the hearing. At the close of the hearing the General Counsel presented his arguments orally. Based on the entire record, including my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 1. JURISDICTION Respondent, with offices and places of business located in Ridgely, Tennessee, and Hickman, Kentucky, is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of wearing apparel. During the past year, a representative period, Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business operations, purchased and received at its Ridgely, Tennes- see, location, products valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points located outside the State of Tennessee. During the same period, Respondent sold and shipped from its Ridgely, Tennessee, location, products valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points located outside the State of Tennessee . Respondent is now, and has been at all times material herein, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, hereinafter called the Union, is now, and has been at all times material herein, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. I The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing her findings. In her decision the Administrative Law Judge failed to set forth the following conditions under which Respondent offered Durban reinstate- ment in the March 6 letter: 1. Cease creating any disturbance in plant in future. 2. That [Respondent ] receive a verification of [his ] references [from him ] within a reasonable period of time. In view of these conditions, we agree with the Administrative Law Judge that Respondent's first offer, as well as the second one, did not constitute a valid offer of reinstatement which would require Durban's acceptance. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JENNIE M. SARRICA, Administrative Law Judge: Upon due notice this proceeding under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. 151, et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act, was tried before me at Dyersburg, Tennessee, on May 16, 1973,1 pursuant to a charge filed on March 5; a complaint issued April 3, I Unless otherwise indicated, all dates are in 1973. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Issue The only issue is whether Respondent discharged the Charging Party for any of the stated causes or because of his concerted or union activity, as alleged, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. B. The Relevant Evidence Roger Alfred Durban worked as a helper in the cutting room of Respondent's Ridgely, Tennessee, plant from January 17, to February 6, when he was discharged by Nettie Roseman, the corporate secretary and plant superintendent . The reason given Durban at the time of discharge was "We don't need you." After the charge herein was filed Respondent wrote Durban a letter giving the following as the reasons for his discharge: 1. You created a disturbance in the front office. 2. You were careless in handling equipment by hurting yourself. 3. You disobeyed plant rules by going into the plant after checking out. 207 NLRB No. 32 194 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 4. In writing for a verification of your references, we still have not received any answers to our letters of request. The evidence establishes that Durban's discharge grew out of events which immediately preceded this action, and the General Counsel specifically disclaimed reliance upon any prior knowledge of Durban's union activity. However, to aid comprehension of the events which on their face appear somewhat incongruous, and to assist in rulings on credibility and motive, certain background evidence is considered relevant. It appears that the Union has been engaged in a lengthy but persistent effort to organize and represent Respon- dent's employees since 1968, and that Respondent has resisted this effort, admittedly to the extent of advising each new employee when hired that the Union was attempting to organize the employees and that Respondent "did not feel that there was any need for a union in the Plant "2 Personal background supplied by Durban reveals that, in interests and conduct, he probably fits the personality pattern of those generally labeled "activists."3 Almost immediately after he was employed Durban began observing working conditions in the plant and, before he even learned that the Union was actively seeking to represent Respondent's employees, he concluded that they needed a union to represent them and engaged fellow employees in conversations to this effect. Upon learning of the Union's organizing campaign Durban contacted the union organizer, obtained an appointment, and signed a union card. At this conference he offered his assistance in the organizing campaign but the union organizer, being suspicious that Durban may have been sent by the Respondent, carefully avoided giving him any specific information or assigning him any organizing work. Indeed, she did not even give him blank authorization cards to distribute. (Ironically, Respondent revealed at the hearing herein its similar suspicion that Durban had been "plant- ed" by the Union as an employee of Respondent.) Nevertheless, Durban began attempts to obtain union support among fellow employees, and since he had been there such a short time -and knew so few employees, he contacted them by memorizing as many names as he could while pausing at the timecard rack, then looking for their names in the telephone directory and calling or visiting them in their homes. He found this too slow and inefficient and, true to his pattern of conduct, decided to expedite matters by bold action. Thus, at the end of his work shift on February 6, he entered the plant office and told the secretary he wished to speak with Mrs. Roseman. Upon the secretary's inquiry as to the purpose, Durban advised that he wished to obtain a list of the employees with their addresses for union organizing purposes. He proceeded to express his views concerning the desirability of union representation, at which point his supervisor, Chapman, entered the office, came directly to Durban and inquired as to what was going on. Durban restated his purpose expressing his belief that the Union would not only be good for the employees but would also benefit the supervisor. Chapman's first response was to stare at Durban. Then he stated, "you'll never see that here." Repeating this phrase, Chapman broke into laughter. Roseman was in her private office, the door of which was about 4 feet from the secretary's desk where the group stood. Hearing the voices from the outer office, Roseman emerged inquiring what was going on. Durban proceeded to state his request and the reason for it to her. There are various versions of the content of her reply,4 but the effect was to deny Durban the information requested and he was asked to leave. Roseman returned to her office accompa- nied by Respondent's president who was present during these events, and Durban turned to Chapman stating he was not satisfied that he had adequately presented his request and wished to speak to Roseman further. Chapman told him he would have to wait "out there" gesturing toward the waiting room beyond which lay the plant. Before leaving, Durban paused at the desk of the secretary and asked her for paper and a pencil which he stated he wanted for the purpose of copying employee names off the timecards. The secretary gave no response and, when he perceived she was not going to comply, Durban went to the water fountain in the plant thence to the timecard rack where he was standing, pondering whether to wait for Roseman and trying to memorize some more names, when Roseman emerged from the offices a few minutes later. Durban testified he saw her appear in the doorway and look about the plant. When she spotted him near the 2 1 find it unnecessary to determine whether Respondent so confined its hiring comments or whether these were expanded to specific and/or veiled threats of discharge or retaliation if the new employee signed a union card, as there is no allegation of a violation encompassing such conduct in the complaint in this proceeding. 3 Thus, without completing his college studies he launched into social action. For about 18 months immediately prior to his employment at Ridgely Durban was employed by the Office of Economic Opportunity, working with Vista Volunteers in Hickman, Kentucky, organizing low income self-help groups and providing social work assistance to families in need in what is known as the "bottom area" of Hickman. Since his discharge Durban has engaged in various similar efforts on a volunteer basis. These activities have included assisting in a co-op grocery venture and helping in organizing a "walk" for underprivileged boys. Various events demonstrate that Durban was not one to ponder any matter for long but was quick to reach a conclusion and adopt some mode of action. An example of record is his volley of letters to the Respondent concerning his insurance coverage and his - discharge, and to the Labor Department concerning occupational safety at Respondent's plant, as well as his gestures to Respondent for a settlement of this case based on his admitted misconstruction of some statement of the General Counsel. Durban relates that when he decided to take a leave of absence from his studies after 2 years in college his father refused to support him further and, thereafter, refused to finance his education until such time as Durban proved he was willing to settle down to steady work and to his studies. To this end Durban obtained employment with Respondent, and within 2 weeks after his employment approached his supervisor, Bill Chapman, for a letter to his father praising his work performance, then proceeded to write such a letter for Chapman's signature. He was accommodated in this. 4 Durban testified Roseman said : "Oh, I don't know anything about that , you will have to see Mr. (name he does not remember)." She then asked him to leave and returned to her office. Roseman testified she replied that she did not permit such lists to be given out, and then asked Durban to leave It is noted that in one version Roseman testified that she told Durban to "leave the office." There is no indication that Roseman knew Durban had clocked out at this time. Respondent's representative at the hearing, who is also the Respondent's president and a stockholder, as well as president of Rolane Sportswear which holds the major portion of Ridgely stock, and who was in the office when this occurred, placed himself on the witness stand to relate what he, had observed on this occasion. He testified only that Roseman said to Durban "You will please leave this office and leave here at once." RIDGELY MANUFACTURING CO. 195 timecards she came directly to him saying "What are you doing here? I thought I told you to leave." Durban started to explain that Chapman had told him to wait outside if he wanted to speak further with her but he was unable to complete this statement as Roseman interrupted demand- ing that he leave and not come back. Durban asked "Am I fired" and Roseman replied, "Yes, you are. Durban pleaded "I really need my job" but Roseman said "Well, that's too bad, we don't need you around here," and added that if he did not leave the sheriff would be contacted. Durban left the plant. Roseman testified that she came into the plant because Durban was creating another disturbance and was refusing to leave the plant at the direction of plant supervisors. She stated that the sole basis for her decision to discharge Durban was the disturbance and the profanity. Durban denied that he used any profanity or raised his voice. He also denied that he had any conversation in the plant at that time with any supervisor or that anyone told him to leave before Roseman came out and so directed him. Although both testified that there were 10 or 15 persons present, including a number of supervisors, when the discharge occurred none of those individuals were present- ed as corroborative witnesses. However, the several versions of that incident given by Roseman are inconsis- tent in many details.5 For this reason, as well as on the basis of demeanor, I am constrained to credit the simple version presented by Durban, and to accept Roseman's account only to the extent that it is consistent therewith. I find that Durban did not use profanity or create the disturbance by the timeclock alleged and that he was not discharged for these stated reasons. Having concluded that Durban did not cause a disturb- ance by raising his voice or using profanity it is necessary to determine whether his discharge was for any of the other alleged causes set forth in Respondent's letter. The first one listed is for creating a disturbance in the front office. 5 With respect to the asserted disturbance, Roseman testified that she was called into the plant when Durban "had caused another confusion there." As to what, specifically, Durban was doing she related variously that he was back in the plant milling around; that he was standing and writing down information; that he was near the timeclock-further back near the timecards; and that when she came'out he was "yelling" because "they" asked bun to leave and he was insisting that he was going to stay and complete what he was doing. In other parts of her testimony Roseman indicated that after she asked him to leave Durban went into a "rage," "yelling," "went on raving," "screaming at the top of his voice" and "using a lot of profanity." Roseman testified that she came into the plant because someone told her Durban was there causing a disturbance. Later she identified plant Foreman Floyd Dockery as the individual who came and gave this report, but at another point she indicated that Dockery and Robert Crittenden were two of the supervisors who were there with Durban in front of the timeclock when she went into the plant. Finally, Roseman admitted she did not see Durban writing anything; that this was what had been reported to her by Dockery or someone. She could not then recall whether she was told Durban was writing something, was going to write something, or wanted to write something, and she could not recall whether Dockery told her this before she entered the plant or after she discharged Durban. In still another version Roseman testified that when she came down to where Durban was standing'm front of the timeclock and said "Didn't I tell you to leave?" Durban replied that he was going to get what he wanted if he had to stay there all night; she told him that if he did not leave she would call the sheriff. Durban asked "Am I fired?" and she replied, "I don't need you around here" and walked away. This is in sharp contrast to other versions given by 'her when asserting that Durban administered profanity on this occasion. Thus, Roseman testified that when she asked Durban to leave, he said he could do what he wanted and started In addition to her assertion that Durban created a "tremendous disturbance" and "there was a lot of excitement in there," which caused her to come out of her private office, Roseman testified that when she asked Durban what he wanted and he inquired for the list of employees, "his tone of voice was very brash and loud, and he was excited . . . very nervous ... practically scream- ing." 6 In view of the close proximity of the group to Roseman's office door and Durban's testimony that all present in the outer office could hear the conversation, I find that it was also heard in the inner office even though it was carried on in normal tone of voice, and it would not be normal if such a conversation did not create some excitement. However, when Durban left the office at her request, Roseman states he was not then fired for his conduct. Moreover, at the hearing Roseman specifically stated that Durban's conduct by the timecards was the sole basis for her decision to discharge him. Although what took place in the office may not be unrelated to the motive for his discharge, I find that Durban was not discharged for any front office disturbance, as such. The second reason listed was that Durban was careless in handling equipment by hurting himself. This undoubtedly relates to an injury received on the job near the end of January which required both medical and dental services and prescription medication. The evidence establishes that Durban was not handling the equipment which fell and injured him; that this event was promptly reported; and that, although Roseman at the time accused Durban of "fooling around," her accusation was without any informa- tion as to what had happened. Later Durban's supervisor inquired of Durban as to how the injury occurred and the matter was not, thereafter, mentioned. Although as a result of events following this injury, Durban reached certain unfavorable conclusions concerning Respondent's employ- ee insurance coverage for on-the-job injuries and this became the subject for some of his correspondence with using profanity, whereupon she told him "We don't need you anymore .. . don't come back. " Further, with respect to the profanity, Roseman testified that Durban "used a four letter word to someone." Later she indicated that he used this language to her, he said "You can all go to Hell with your job" and she said "if that's the case, you can leave, and please don't come back. We don't need you here." Later she identified the, profanity as the statements: "You can all go to Hell" and "You can all go . . . yourselves. ' It is also noted that in one version Roseman testified that she threatened to call the sheriff if Durban did not leave and in another she testified that the "boys," i.e supervisors, stated they would call the sheriff if he did not leave. Other interpretations may be placed on some of Roseman's testimony, but as a whole it is so confused, not only as to what took place but also as to what she actually observed and what was reported to her and by whom, that it is not reliable. In these circumstances I am forced to deem significant the fact that Respondent did not present as witnesses either or both of the two supervisors it has identified as having been present on the crucial occasion. 6 Here again inconsistencies in the details of the event are apparent in Roseman's testimony. For example, in one version she testified that someone called her out of her office, while at another point she testified that the noise in the outer office caused her to emerge from her private office to investigate the cause. Weiss similarly characterized Durban's vocal tone as "shouting at thetop of his lungs" and insisted that it was Durban's voice, not that of Chapman whom he had known for some 15 years, that they heard in the inner office and which caused them to emerge from their conference. However, in listing the individuals present during this incident, he alone listed as present Foreman Dockery but failed to mention Chapman. On the other hand Durban admitted that he was nervous and that his voice cracked when speaking with Roseman, but he had been particularly careful in speaking to Roseman not to offend her. ' 196 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Respondent, none of such action occurred before his discharge. There is no basis for holding that Durban's injury or his conduct in connection therewith had any causal connection with his discharge. The third stated basis for discharge was the asserted breach of plant rules by going into the plant after checking out. Durban had punched his timecard for the end of his workday before he entered the office intent upon seeing Roseman. Respondent has no written plant rules whatso- ever. There are certain oral rules which are stated to new employees by the secretary at Roseman's standing instruc- tions when they hired. These include a statement of the working hours, the reporting time, the lunch period, the requirement that employees call in when they are unable to report to work, and rules governing tardiness, etc. Roseman testified there is also a rule against loitering which she explained as a rule that once an employee leaves work and leaves the premises he is not to come back into the building. At one point in her testimony Roseman indicated that it was just understood that you do not come back once you leave. Durban denied that this last stated rule was mentioned to him when he was hired or that he had even heard of it. Two former employees, each of whom had been employed by Respondent on from three to four occasions, similarly testified that they had never been told of such a rule, had never heard of it, and had themselves, or knew of others who had, on specific occasions, entered the plant when they were not employed or were not scheduled to work. I find that the existence of such a rule has not been established by a preponderance of evidence. Further, as Durban did not leave the premises after clocking out technically he did not breach any rule stated by Roseman. Moreover, there is no evidence Roseman knew whether Durban had clocked out when she fired him. I find this alleged reason pretextual. Finally, in the list of causes for discharge, Respondent advised that, in writing for verification of Durban's reference, it had not received answers to its letters of inquiry. However, according to the testimony of President Weiss, Durban's references on his application had not been checked by the Respondent prior to his discharge. Weiss personally ordered them checked on March 6, the very day Respondent wrote the letter to Durban giving the four reasons for his discharge and offering to return him to his job subject to certain conditions. Although Weiss later testified that he understood the company had written previous letters on some of the references but had not received a reply, he also testified "we assume they check references. I asked for the references on this man. They said they had received none." As to the importance of references Weiss stated that they do not necessarily terminate employees because references do not come in; this depends upon how much they need the employee. Weiss then admitted that they did "an extra ordinary" check on Durban because "he was giving me a lot of trouble" and because "there was something wrong with him mentally" and Weiss merely "wanted to know whether 7 This was the only evidence presented by Respondent with respect to Durban's references except for that involving a separate September 1972 letter concerning a, truckdnving position which Durban had written to Mr. Roseman. Durban testified that Chapman told him shortly after he was employed in January that the reason he had not been huedto drive trucks this man lied . . . the reference was unimportant ...: ' The references on both the September 1972 and the January 1973 applications did "check out." 7 On the basis of the evidence I find that Durban's references, more precisely, the lack of verification of his references, had nothing to do with the reason for his discharge. Having determined that Durban was not discharged for profanity and creating a disturbance or for any of the other reasons listed in the post discharge letter to him, there remains the question of the Respondent's real reason for discharging Durban. The purpose of Durban's actions were clearly stated in the office, not only to those in the outer office but also directly to Roseman when she appeared on the scene. Yet Durban was not discharged for asking her for the list of employees. Thus, his attempt to obtain the list by direct request was not treated as a basis for discharge. In my judgment something happened between the time Roseman turned and entered her private office after requesting Durban to leave and the time she confronted him at the timecard rack, which supplies the real reason for his discharge. In this respect, I view as significant the fact that Durban had, before leaving the office, asked the secretary for a pencil and paper so that he might copy names off the timecards at the timeclock, and the fact that in her testimony Roseman clearly and repeatedly related Durban's actions by the timecard rack as "writing down something or going to write down something." Significantly, also, she later changed this testimony by indicating that this was what someone had reported to her. In addition, the credited testimony indicates that Dockery did not come to get her for any reason; the supervisors who were near Durban,had no knowledge of what had just occurred inside the office or of Durban's mission near the timecards, and as other employ- ees were still leaving there was no basis for them to question him. Rather, I find that Roseman appeared alone in the office doorway because of something she had learned inside the office-namely information from her secretary of Durban's request for equipment to copy names from the timecards and that it was this information that caused her to suspect Durban was there writing down names and to testify at first that that was what he was doing. Durban was not, in fact, in the act of copying the names. However, aside from efficiency considerations, there is little difference between copying employees names from timecards and memorizing employee names from the same source, which was what Durban was doing. I find that his stated purpose and that intent to obtain the names of fellow employees from this source was the real and only reason Durban was discharged. Therefore, it was no deterrent to his discharge that Durban was not, in fact, in the act of copying the names. Although the purpose of this activity was for use by the Union in organizing and was clearly concerted activity, the question remains whether it was also protected activity. The applicable rule of thumb seems to be that employees are entitled to use for self-organizational purposes informa- was because he gave a reference which bad not checked out. Weiss indicated that a previous letter had been written to the company named by Durban but no reply had been received. However, the face of the letter bears an undated pencil notation "Called-they never heard of him nor his father " RIDGELY MANUFACTURING CO. 197 tion and knowledge which comes to their attention in the normal course of work activity and association but are not entitled to their Employer's private or confidential re- cords .8 Thus, Respondent could rightly deny Durban the list of its employees and their addresses and he would not be protected in obtaining such list from Respondent's records surreptitiously. He was, however, protected in his actions of requesting such list from the top official in charge of the plant. Thus, protection for such activity depends on the question of whether timecards located by the timeclock fall into the category of private or confidential records of the Employer or constitute information available to all employees in the course of their normal work relationship. I place them in the latter category as a source through which any employee may learn the names of his fellow employees as rightfully as through personal in-plant contact. Accordingly, I conclude that when he was memorizing the names of fellow employees from the timecards for the purpose of contacting them concerning union representation he was engaged in protected activity. Durban's discharge, because of his stated intent to obtain the names from this source for the stated purpose, was, therefore, violative of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Upon the basis of the entire record, I make the following: IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2) and (6) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By discharging Roger Alfred Durban for engaging in union activity Respondent has discriminated against him with respect to terms and conditions of employment and has interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent engaged in and is engaging in certain unfair labor practices it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Respondent unlawfully discharged Roger Alfred Durban on February 8 See Murray-Ohio Mfg. Co.. 148 NLRB 1541, enfd 358 F2d 948 (C.A. 6, 1966), Steele Apparel Company, 172 NLRB 903, 912-913, enfd. in pertinent part 437 F.2d 933 (C.A. 8, 1971); Anserphone of Miclugan, Inc, 184 NLRB 305, compare, e.g., Hoover Co., 12 NLRB 106; Clearwater Finishing Co., 100 NLRB 1473; Vitronic, Inc., 183 NLRB No. 103; and Farlow Rubber Supply, Inc., 193 NLRB 570 9 As indicated supra, Respondent's March 6 letter to Durban offered employment with certain conditions, and Durban replied stating his desire to return but requesting certain pertinent clarification of the conditions and offer. Without replying to Durban's two letters specifically inquiring with respect to his entitlement to backpay and certain other employment benefits, Respondent, on March 12, wrote Durban advising that the only condition it was attaching to his return to work was "that you will adhere to the plant rules and regulations," and further advising that "If you do not return to work within 24 hours from receipt of this letter, we shall assume that you are no longer interested in being employed by this company " As one of the pretextual reasons asserted for Durban's discharge was the 6, 1973, I shall recommend that Respondent offer him immediate and full reinstatement9 to his former position or, if such position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position without prejudice to any seniority or other rights and privileges he previously enjoyed, and make him whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of its discrimination against him, by payment to him of money equal to that which he normally would have earned, absent the unlawful discharge, with backpay and interest comput- ed under the established standards of the Board, in accordance with the formula set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER to The Respondent, Ridgely Manufacturing Company, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from discharging employees or otherwise discriminating against them with regard to the tenure of their employment or any other term or condition of employment for engaging in concerted union activity for their mutual aid or protection, or in any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer Roger Alfred Durban Immediate and full reinstatement to his former position or, if such position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole for any loss of earnings, in the manner set forth in "The Remedy." (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records, and all other records necessary for determination of the amount of backpay due and the rights of reinstatement under the terms of this Order. (c) Post at its place of business in Ridgely, Tennessee, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 11 Copies of such notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 26, after being signed by an authorized breach of a "so called" plant rule which I have found did not exist, the condition attached to this offer clearly sets up special requirements which disqualify it as a valid offer of reinstatement which would require Durban's acceptance or loss of backpay thereafter. See Laminating Services, Inc., 167 NLRB 234, 236; Webb Mfg. Inc., 174 NLRB 37; 39-41; Padre Dodge, 189 NLRB 378. 10 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 11 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 198 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD representative of Respondent, shall be posted by Respon- dent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 26, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a trial in which all parties had the opportunity to present their evidence, it has been decided that we violated the law and we have been ordered to post this notice. We intend to carry out the Order of the Board and abide by the following: WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise punish employ- ees because they have engaged in concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection. WE wn.L offer Roger Alfred Durban immediate and full reinstatement with backpay. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights. All employees are free to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. Our employees are also free to refrain from any or all such activities. Dated By RIDGELY MANUFACTURING COMPANY (Employer) (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concern- ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's . Office, Clifford Davis Federal Building, Room 746, 167 North Main Street, Memphis, Tennessee 38103, Telephone 901-534-3161.