Penn Pipe & Supply Co., Inc.

PENN PIPE & SUPPLY CO., INC. Penn Pipe & Supply Co., Inc. and Building Material & Dump Truck Drivers Local No. 36 , International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware- housemen and Helpers of America. Case 21-CA-11659 December 28, 1973 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND KENNEDY On August 23, 1973, Administrative Law Judge James T. Rasbury issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep- tions and a supporting brief. General Counsel filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. The Administrative Law Judge found that Respon- dent's grant of wage increases and other benefits after receiving knowledge of the Union's majority status violated Section 8(a)(5) as well as 8(a)(1) of the Act and that a bargaining order remedy is appropri- ate under the holding of the Supreme Court in the Gissel case.I During the early morning of March 12, 1973, seven of the eight employees in the appropriate unit attended a union meeting at which they signed not only union authorization cards but also applications for union membership, and paid initiation fees and membership dues. On March 13, the Union's attorney wrote Respondent a letter which advised Respondent that the Union represented a majority of its employees in an appropriate unit and requested bargaining. Meanwhile, on the afternoon of March 12, Respondent's manager, Curtis Wright, learned that the employees had contacted the Union. He assembled the employees at a meeting on the morning of March 14 and promised them increased benefits if the employees discontinued their interest in and support of the Union. Shortly after the meeting, the employees met and decided to abandon the Union. On March 19, a spokesman for the employees called the Union and requested it to forget the whole thing. Apparently, Respondent does not dispute the Administrative Law Judge's finding that after learn- ing of its employees' union activity, its manager 9 assembled them and promised and granted them wage increases and other benefits as a condition to their abandoning interest in the Union. Nor does it apparently dispute the Administrative Law Judge's finding that this conduct violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The thrust of its argument is that the promise and grant of benefits did not violate Section 8(a)(5) because the meeting with the employees was held before Respondent received the Union's letter advising of its majority status and requesting bargaining. The evidence was in dispute as to whether the meeting was held before or after Respondent received the Union's letter. The Admin- istrative Law Judge found the resolution of this factual question unnecessary to a determination of the issues in the case. We agree. On March 12, the Union had unquestionably received the adherence of a majority of employees in the appropriate unit. It is also unquestionable that as a result of Respondent's unfair labor practices, intended to achieve that result, the employees withdrew their support of the Union. Under these circumstances, the only effective remedy for Respon- dent's unfair labor practices is to require Respondent to bargain with the Union, regardless of whether Respondent received the Union's demand for bar- gaining before or after its promise of additional benefits to employees. To refuse to issue such an order would reward Respondent and allow it to profit by its unlawful conduct.2 Accordingly, we find, as did the Administrative Law Judge, that by promising and granting wage increases and other improved employee benefits after having knowledge of the employees' union activity, Respondent violat- ed Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.3 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that Respondent, Penn Pipe & Supply Co., Inc., Escondido, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. I N L R B v. Gissel Packing Co, 395 U S 575 (1969) 2 Merritt Motor Company, 181 NLRB 1099, 1106, General Stencils, Inc, 195 NLRB 1109 3 N L.R B v. Gissel Packing Co, supra, Merritt Motor Company, supra Chairman Miller agrees that a bargaining order is appropriate herein as a part of the remedy in accordance with his separate views as expressed in United Packing Company of Iowa, Inc, 187 NLRB 878, and General Stencils, Inc, supra. He would note that the facts here point up the need to abandon the legal fiction of finding an 8(a)(5) violation in these cases, and to demonstrate that what is really at issue is whether a bargaining order is an appropriate Remedy, not whether there has been a refusal to bargain under our usual criteria. 208 NLRB No. 5 10 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JAMES T. RASBURY, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard at San Diego, California, on June 11, 1973.1 The charge was filed by the Union on March 22, and the complaint was issued on May 1.2 The primary issues are whether the Company (a) unlawfully solicited grievances, promised wage increases, and other employee benefits to the employees in order to induce said employees to refrain from supporting the Union as their collective-bargaining representative; and (b) whether Respondent has refused to bargain in good faith with the Union as the representative of the employees in an appropriate unit in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act. Upon the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Company, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION The Respondent is engaged in Escondido, California, in the wholesale distribution of plumbing supplies. During the past calendar year, in the course and conduct of its business operations, Respondent purchased and received goods, materials, and supplies valued in excess of $50,000 directly from suppliers located outside the State of California. The Respondent admits, and I herewith find, that at all material times it has been an employer engaged in commerce and in a business affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. At the hearing, the Respondent agreed to stipulate, and I herewith find, that the Union is now, and has been at all times material herein, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background With the exception of one issue, which will be noted and discussed hereinafter, the essential facts are not in dispute. By way of background only, the testimony revealed that in the early part of June 1972 Hugh McDonald, Jr., business agent for the Union, was contacted by James Beatty, an employee of the Respondent, and told that the employees of Respondent were interested in being represented by the Union. McDonald met with the employees on June 15, 1972, at a restaurant in Escondido at an early morning hour. On that occasion McDonald obtained union authori- zation cards from all of the employees, but received a telephone call either that afternoon or the following day, advising him to forget the whole thing. No explanation was given to McDonald as to why the employees had changed their minds. Donald Ray Phillips, however, testified that 1 All dates hereinafter are 1973 unless otherwise indicated 2 The complaint was amended by telegram dated June 7 and motion granted at the hearing Curtis Wright, manager of Respondent, had offered the employees a raise and additional holidays if the employees would forget the Union. B. Current Events In the early part of March, McDonald received another phone call from an employee of Respondent again requesting the Union to aid them as their bargaining representative. As a result of this conversation, McDonald met with the employees on March 12 at 5 a.m. at Sandy's Restaurant in Escondido. There were eight employees in what was stipulated to be an appropriate bargaining unit and on the occasion of this meeting, seven of the eight employees attended.3 At this meeting, McDonald not only obtained authorization cards but also applications for membership, including the initiation fee and dues from each of the employees. All of the employees paid McDonald $38 except Chester Patton, who had formerly been a member of a Teamsters local and he redeposited his Teamsters card and paid a sum of $25 to McDonald. The application cards reflecting payment of the monies are in evidence as General Counsel's Exhibits 3(a) through (g). The authenticity of each of the signatures appearing on these exhibits was stipulated by Respondent. On March 19, McDonald received a telephone call from Chris Maier, one of the employees of Respondent in the appropriate bargaining unit who had attended the early morning meeting of March 12, informing McDonald that he had been elected spokesman for the group and he was requesting McDonald to forget about the whole thing. Other than a phone call from an employee by the name of Riggs, who wanted to know what to do with his dues, McDonald has not spoken or had further contact with any of the employees of Respondent. By letter dated March 13, Ronald Domnitz, attorney for the Union, advised Respondent that the Union represented a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit; expressed a willingness to submit conclusive proof of its majority status to a mutual'y acceptable, neutral third party; and demanded a meeting for purposes of collective- bargaining negotiations regarding the wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment (see G.C. Exh. 2). Meanwhile, in the afternoon of March 12, Curtis Wright received information from one of the clericals in the office that the warehousemen were interested in the Union. Mr. Wright testified that upon learning of this, he contacted two of the employees, Chris Maier and James Beatty, and asked each of them if there were some misunderstandings. Upon learning that there were some misunderstandings and that the employees had contacted the Union, Mr. Wright notified all of the employees involved that there would be a meeting on the early morning of Wednesday, March 14. Before attending this meeting, Mr. Wright had copied a number of wage scales and holidays from the union contract that had been given him by James Beatty. (This was a copy of the contract which the Union had negotiated covering the period 1972 through 1975 and is 3 The eighth employee was Clella-Ann Goforth, a woman working as a warehouseman-counterman who has since become an office clerical. PENN PIPE & SUPPLY CO., INC. 11 titled "San Diego Plumbing & Hardware Dealers Inde- pendents' Agreement." McDonald had given each of the employees at the early morning meeting of March 12 a copy of the contract and explained that this was what he would seek to obtain for them. See G.C. Exh. 5.) At the meeting of March 14 Mr. Wright solicited gripes or grievances from the employees, circulated the paper which contained the holidays and wages rates that he had copied from the union contract, and indicated to the employees that these increased holidays and hourly earnings, includ- ing time-and-a-half for hours in excess of 40 per week, would be granted all employees if they discontinued their interest and support for the Union. Employee Louis Nagy testified that his weekly pay was increased from $135 to between $170 and $190 per week. Shortly after the meeting with Mr. Wright, the employees met and decided to abandon the Union. The one point of factual difference between Respondent and General Counsel is the time of the meeting between Mr. Wright and the employees. Did this meeting occur at a time after the receipt of the letter from the Union or before the Union's letter was received? Employees Phillips, Nagy, and Riggs could not be sure whether the meeting occurred on Wednesday or Thursday. However, Phillips testified that to his best recollection, Wright indicated to the employees that he had received a letter from the Union and thus knew of their interest in the Union. Mr. Wright was very positive that the meeting had been held at 7 a.m. on Wednesday, March 14, and that the letter had not been received because the mail is normally delivered around I o'clock and the letter dated March 13 could not possibly have been received before 1 p.m. on March 14, which would have been after his meeting with the employees. Furthermore, he said that he contacted his attorney immediately upon receipt of the letter from the Union and was advised by his attorney not to have any further contact with the employees, insofar as this matter was concerned, until he received further advice from the attorney. He said he followed his attorney's instructions. A resolution of this factual difference is not, in my opinion, necessary for a complete and total resolution of the current dispute. C. Analysis Curtis Wright, an acknowledged supervisor and agent of the Respondent, testified to learning of the interest and activity on the part of Respondent's employees on the afternoon of March 12. Immediately thereafter, he inter- viewed and solicited further information concerning the employees' gripes and grievances from two of the employ- ees directly involved. This conduct was, in turn, followed by a meeting with the employees where a further solicitation of grievances occurred and the employees were promised wage increases and improved holiday benefits in exchange for a discontinuation of their interest in the Union. The promising and the granting of wage increases, 4 International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO [Walls Manufacturing Co.] v N L R.B, 321 F.2d 753 (C A.D C, 1963), cert denied 375 U.S. 923 (1963) 5 E.g., "It is the demand from the Union which creates the duty to bargain. Mount Hope Finishing Company v N L.R B, 211 F.2d 365 (C A 4, 1954) The burden of proof is on the Union to show that the employer's an increased number of holidays, and the soliciting of grievances from the employees in exchange for the employees' discontinuing their interest in the Union, I find to have interfered with, restrained, and/or coerced employ- ees in the exercise of their rights as guaranteed in Section 7 and thus violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I am of the opinion that Mr. Wright was entirely innocent in his conduct and had no idea that he was limited by the law in what he could do and say to his employees. This personal lack of knowledge of the law, however, does not detract from the violation. There can be no doubt that his motive for granting the improved benefits and soliciting the grievances was to induce the employees to abandon their interest and activities within the Union. The Board's well- settled test is whether the employer engaged in conduct which, it may reasonably be said, tends to interfere with the free exercise of employee rights under the Act. In fact, the protection afforded by Section 7 is not limited to the right to join or assist labor organizations, or to refrain from such activities but has been invoked to protected concerted employee activity wholly unrelated to union organization. 4 In N. L R. B. v. Exchange Paris Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964), the Supreme Court said: "The broad purpose of Section 8(a)(1) is to establish 'the right of employees to organize for mutual aid without employer interference.' Republic Aviation Corporation v. N.LR.B., 324 U.S. 793, 798. We have no doubt that it prohibits not only intrusive threats and promises but also conduct immediately favorable to employees which is undertaken with the express purpose of impinging upon their freedom of choice for or against unionization and is reasonably calculated to have that affect" The affect of Wright's course of conduct was undoubtedly just as he had expected it to be; namely, it caused the majority strength which the Union had clearly established prior to the improper conduct by Respondent to be completely dissipated. Respondent's argument in its brief is directed entirely toward the 8(a)(5) allegations contained in the complaint. Respondent cites N.LR.B. v. J. H. Rutter Rex Manufactur- ing Co., Inc., 415 F.2d 1133 (C.A. 6, 1969), wherein the court said, "Whether Respondent's unilateral wage in- crease violated Section 8(a)(5) depends on whether Respondent was obligated to bargain with the Union at the time it was granted." Respondent then argues that it is the demand from the Union which creates the duty to bargain and further asserts that there was no such demand communicated to the Respondent until after its course of conduct and thus there can be no refusal to bargain. While this is an ingenious argument that can be given some credence by circumscribed language taken from a number of cases which Respondent's brief cited,5 nevertheless, it is not the law. In the Rutter Rex case, supra, the court remanded the case to the Board for further findings with respect to the violations of Section 8(a)(5) only because the Supreme Court had rendered its decision in N.LR.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), between the failure to recognize it was not based on good faith doubt that the Union represented a majority of its employees in the appropriate unit Montgomery Ward & Co. Inc. v. N LR.B. 385 F 2d-760 (C A. 8, 1967) If bona fide proof of representation is presented to the employer, the law obligates him to bargain Oregon Teamsters Security Plan Office, 119 NLRB 207 " 12 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD time Rutter Rex was considered by the Board and the time it was considered by the circuit court. The remand asked the Board to make an express finding concerning the effect of the unfair labor practices as the Supreme Court indicated in Gissel, supra, is necessary. The General Counsel has requested a Gissel-type remedy in the instant case and it might be well to recite portions of the Supreme Court's decision in Gissel in an effort to ascertain its application to the facts herein. The traditional approach utilized by the Board for many years has been known as the Joy Silk doctrine. Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 NLRB 1263 (1949), enforced 87 U.S. App. D.C. 360, 185 F.2d 732 (1950). Under that rule, an employer could lawfully refuse to bargain with a union claiming representative status through posses- sion of authorization cards if he had a "good faith doubt" as to the union's majority status; instead of bargaining, he could insist that the union seek an election in order to test out his doubts. The Board, then, could find a lack of good faith doubt and enter a bargaining order in one of two ways. It could find (1) that the employer's independent unfair labor practices were evidence of bad faith, showing that the employer was seeking time to dissipate the union's majority. Or the Board could find (2) that the employer had come forward with no reasons for entertaining any doubt and therefore that he must have rejected the bargaining demand in bad faith. An example of the second category was Snow & Sons, 134 NLRB 709 (1961), enforced 308 F.2d 687 (C.A. 9th Cir. 1962), where the employer reneged on his agreement to bargain after a third party checked the validity of the card signatures and insisted on an election because he doubted that the employees truly desired representation. Continuing, the Court traced the Board's modifications to the Joy Silk doctrine and then said: Thus, an employer can insist that a union go to an election, regardless of his subjective motivation, so long as he is not guilty of misconduct; he need give no affirmative reasons for rejecting a recognition request, and he can demand an election with a simple "no comment" to the union. [Underscoring added.] After considering the cases and the legislative history and concluding that Congress intended that there were accepta- ble methods of ascertaining majority status other than by a Board-conducted election, the Court said: And we have held that the Board has the same authority even where it is clear that the union, which once had possession of cards from a majority of the employees, represents only a minority when the bargaining order is entered. Franks Bros. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 702 (1944). We see no reason now to withdraw this authority from the Board. If the Board could enter only a cease-and-desist order and direct an election or a rerun, it would in effect be rewarding the employer and allowing him to "profit from [his] own wrongful refusal to bargain," Franks Bros., supra, at 704, while at the same time severely curtailing the employees' right freely to determine whether they desire a representative. The employer could continue to delay or disrupt the election processes and put off indefinitely his obligation to bargain; and any election held under these circumstances would not be likely to demonstrate the employees' true, undistorted desires. [Footnotes omitted.] In giving approval to a bargaining order without an election, the Court then concluded: The only effect of our holding here is to approve the Board's use of the bargaining order in less extraordi- nary cases marked by less pervasive practices which nonetheless still have the tendency to undermine majority strength and impede the election processes. The Board's authority to issue such an order on a lesser showing of employer misconduct is appropriate, we should emphasize, where there is also a showing that at one point the union had a majority; in such a case, of course, effectuating ascertainable employee free choice becomes as important a goal as deterring employer misbehavior. In fashioning a remedy in the exercise of its discretion, then, the Board can properly take into consideration the extensiveness of an employer's unfair labor practices in terms of their past effect on election conditions and the likelihood of their recurrence in the future. If the Board finds that the possibility of erasing the effects of past practices and of ensuring a fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional remedies, though present, is slight and that employee sentiment once expressed through cards would, on balance, be better protected by a bargaining order, then such an order should issue. [Footnotes omitted.] In the instant case, there can be no doubt but that the Respondent's illegal course of conduct in soliciting grievances and in granting wage and benefit improvements to the employees caused the Union's majority strength to be dissipated and I have so found. As a consequence, I herewith find that the granting of the wage increase and the other improvements in employee benefits without consultation and negotiations with the Union was in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. To hold otherwise would allow the Respondent to profit by its own illegal conduct. While there may have been some "good faith doubt" at the time Mr. Wright first met with the employees, based on Wright's own testimony as well as the acknowledged date on which the Union's demand was received, the actual payment of the improved wages and improved benefits occurred after Wright had received the Union's letter. I find that the Respondent's course of conduct was not only violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, but the installation of the wage increase and the other improved employee benefits after having knowledge of the Union's majority status was clearly a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Under the doctrine expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Gissel, supra, a bargaining order remedy is appropriate in situations where, in fact, a union's majority can be clearly established by authoriza- tion cards and the nature and extensiveness of the PENN PIPE & SUPPLY CO., INC. employer's unfair labor practices make a subsequent free choice by the employees problematical. In the instant case, the Union's majority was clearly established by the authorization and membership cards, as well as the Union's records. (See G.C. Exh. 3(a) through (g) and 4(a) through (g).) The employees have been guilty of "using" the Union to obtain desired results and having accom- plished their purpose, they may not now desire the Union. Their current attitude, however, was only achieved by the unlawful conduct of Respondent and it is most unlikely that a fair election could be held. D. The Appropriate Bargaining Unit The complaint alleged, and during the course of the hearing the Respondent stipulated, the appropriate bar- gaining unit to be: "All truck drivers, warehousemen, helpers and countermen employed by Respondent at its facility located at 2357 Vineyard, Escondido, California; excluding all other employees, office clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act." On the basis of the stipulation approved by the Respondent, I find the description of the unit set forth immediately above to be an appropriate bargaining unit. III. THE EFFECT OF ' THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The unfair labor practices of the Respondent, as set forth in section II, above, occurring in connection with its operations described in section 1, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof. IV. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that Respondent be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Respondent unlawfully refused to bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in an appropriate bargaining unit, it will be recommended that Respondent be ordered to bargain collectively with the Union, upon request, and, in the event an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is, and at all times material herein was, 6 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 13 an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All truck drivers, warehousemen, helpers and count- ermen employed by Respondent at 2357 Vineyard, Escondido, California; excluding office clerical employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. The Union is, and at all times since March 12, 1973, has been, the exclusive representative of the employees in the aforesaid unit for the purposes of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment. 5. By soliciting grievances and by granting wage increases and other improved benefits with full knowledge that the Union was active and interested in representing the employees, Respondent has interfered with the employ- ees' Section 7 rights as set forth in the Act and has thereby violated Section 8(a)(1). 6. By refusing, upon request, to bargain in good faith with the Union as the representative of its employees in the above-described appropriate bargaining unit and by dealing directly with the employees as set forth in the paragraph immediately above, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: 6 ORDER It is hereby ordered that Penn Pipe & Supply Co., Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Offering to bargain directly with employees in an attempt to bypass the Union, or any other authorized representative of its employees. (b) Promising and granting employees wage increases and other fringe benefits to induce them to forego adherence to the Union, or any other labor organization. (c) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of employees in the appropriate bargaining unit described above. (d) In any like or related manner interfering with the rights of employees guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which I find will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the above- described appropriate unit and embody in a signed agreement any understanding reached. 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 14 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (b) Post at its Escondido, California, place of business copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 7 Copies of said notice to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 21 shall, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of Respondent be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for a period of at least 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 21, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 7 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT promise or grant employees wage increases or other improved fringe benefits to induce them to forego their adherence to Building Material & Dump Truck Drivers Local No. 36, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or any other labor organiza- tion. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with said Union as the exclusive representative of our employees in the appropriate bargaining unit described as follows: All truck drivers, warehousemen, helpers and countermen employed at 2357 Vineyard, Escon- dido, California; excluding all office clerical employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with the rights of our employees as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with said Union as the exclusive representative of our employees in the above-described appropriate bargain- ing unit, and embody in a signed agreement any understanding reached. Dated By PENN PIPE & SUPPLY CO., INC. (Employer) (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concern- ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Eastern Columbia Building, 849 South Broadway, Los Angeles, California 90014, Telephone 213-688-5229.