OCAW, Local 1-591

296 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 1-591, AFL-CIO and Snelson, Incorporated. Case 19-CB-2036 January 10, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO On September 10, 1973, Administrative Law Judge James T. Rasbury issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent Union filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER property of the employees of Snelson, Incorporat- ed. WE WILL NOT in any other manner restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaran- teed in Section 7 of the Act. OIL, CHEMICAL AND ATOMIC WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 1-591, AFL-CIO (Labor Organization) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compli- ance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 10th Floor, Republic Building, 1511 Third Avenue, Seattle, Washington 98101, Tele- phone 206-442-4532. Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Reiations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and, as modified below, hereby orders that Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 1-591, AFL-CIO, Anacortes, Washington, its offi- cers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, except that the attached notice is substituted for that of the Administrative Law Judge. APPENDIX NOTICE To MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a trial in which we were given an opportunity to present evidence, examine witnesses, and submit written briefs, we have been found guilty of violating the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. Accordingly, we hereby notify you that: WE WILL NOT restrain or coerce the employees of Snelson, Incorporated, by physical assault upon employees, supervisors, or their property, by preventing the ingress and egress of their employ- ees or equipment to an from the Shell Oil Company refinery at Anacortes, Washington, or by following and threatening the life or personal DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JAMES T. RASBURY, Administrative Law Judge: This case was tried at Anacortes, Washington, on June 28, 1973.1 The charge herein was dated April 20, and was served on Respondent on the same date. Complaint and notice of hearing was issued on May 4. Respondent's answer denied the agency relationship of two of the three individuals alleged to be agents of the Respondent and denied the specific allegations of the complaint alleged to be violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act; however, by way of an affirmative defense, Respondent further pleaded: "Res- pondent has acknowledged that the facts show individuals, both within and without the collective-bargaining unit engaged in individual conduct which could be designated as restraint and coercion within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act." Respondent's answer then sets forth that it has offered to settle this dispute by means of the usual informal settlement agreement, Respondent asking only that a nonadmission clause appear in the settlement agreement. Respondent further pleads: "The Regional Director has refused to settle this case and thereby effectuate the purposes of the Act, and has thereby refused to comply with the official declared policy of the NLRB." Accordingly, the Respondent pleads, the complaint should be dismissed. A similar motion to dismiss was filed by Respondent on May 17 with the Regional Director of Region 19 which I All dates hereinafter will be in the year 1973, unless otherwise indicated. 208 NLRB No. 30 OCAW, LOCAL 1-591 297 motion was referred to the Division of Judges for ruling. On June 8, Administrative Law Judge James R. Webster denied the Respondent's motion, stating: "Although settlements are encouraged, an Administrative Law Judge may not require any of the parties to accept any significant term or provision of a settlement of an unfair labor practice case. A nonadmission clause is deemed to be a significant term or provision." At the hearing in this matter, but prior to the receipt of testimony, Respondent presented its motion for order directing settlement of the case, or in the alternative for dismissal of the complaint (see Resp. Exh. 1). The motion was denied. The primary issues then are (1) whether the Respondent Union is responsible for the actions of its members, which conduct is not denied, and whether or not said conduct did unlawfully restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A); and (2) did the refusal and failure of the Regional Director to settle this case violate the policies and procedures of the National Labor Relations Board and/or the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. Upon the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses and after due consideration of the brief filed by the General Counsel and the Union, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION Snelson, Incorporated, is a Washington corporation with its principal offices located at Sedro Wooley, Washington. At all times material, it has been engaged in the construction industry in Washington and other States. In the course and conduct of its Washington operation, Snelson annually purchased for importation into the State of Washington goods and supplies valued in excess of $50,000. The Shell Oil Company (herein Shell) is a Delaware corporation engaged, inter aka, in refining oil at its Anacortes oil refinery. In the course and conduct of its State of Washington operation, Shell annually purchases for importation into the State of Washington goods and supplies valued in excess of $50,000. The Respondent's answer admits, and I herewith find, that at all times Snelson and Shell are, and have been, employers within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 1-591, AFL-CIO (herein Respondent or Union), is, and at all'times material has been, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background Events The production and maintenance employees of Shell at its Anacortes, Washington, refinery, who are represented by the Respondent, went on strike January 24. Respon- dent's contract differences with Shell were concluded and on June 1 the employees terminated their strike and returned to work. The relevent events of this dispute occurred during the period of Respondent's strike and picketing of the Shell refinery at Anacortes. Snelson, the Charging Party in this dispute, is a general contractor involved, among other duties, in maintenance and new construction work in the petroleum-chemical industry. Snelson, at the time of the relevant events herein, had a blanket purchase order contract for new construc- tion and maintenance work at the Shell refinery to be effective for a 1-year period. Snelson was to have entered the refinery on April 16 with his crew to begin the performance of a 6-or 8-day job consisting of cleaning and repairing a furnace utilized in refinery processing. B. The Critical Events At approximately 7 a.m. on April 16, Wesley Gilfry, an employee relations representative who has been employed by Shell in various capacities for the past 17-1/2 years at Anacortes, proceeded to a separate entrance gate, designat- ed as Gate No. 3, which had been set aside for the exclusive use of the Snelson employees. Gilfry intended to open the gate for the admittance of Snelson's employees as well as two trailers which were to be used for office facilities and change rooms during the time Snelson would be working on the Shell property. Gilfry found that the lock had been jammed and noted that there were two cars placed front end to front end just outside the gate which were obstructing entrance. Gilfry returned to the mainte- nance shop to obtain a bolt cutter to enable him to open the gate. A sizable and very legible sign had been placed at Gate No. 3 indicating "CONTRACTOR'S GATE SNEL- SON, INC. SNELSON ELECTRIC" (see G.C. Exh. 3). The two vehicles which had been parked immediately in front of the gate were removed without serious incident and the entrance to the gate was opened. At approximately 7:30 a.m. Iwo pickup trucks pulling small trailers were observed by Gilfry to be approaching Gate No. 3. At this time there were at least 15 or 20 pickets2 in the area, some of whom were carrying clubs resembling baseball bats or axe handles. They milled around the Snelson vehicles constantly and a rock was thrown which broke a window in one of the trailers. At this time Donald Yates, who is chairman of the Shell group of employees that belong to the Respondent Union and who testified that he- was in direct charge of the strike, was observed to be in the immediate area . Virgil Coragliotti, an international representative of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union assigned to service local unions in the States of Washington and Oregon, testified that he arrived at Gate No. 3 about 7 a.m. and remained until 8:30 a.m. The pickets converged at the gate entrance making entry impossible, while at the same time displaying their clubs and yelling uncomplimentary epi- thets that made it rather plain that it would not be safe to enter. Without too much delay and without any serious confrontation, the drivers of the Snelson vehicles moved on past the gate set aside for their exclusive use. 2 Respondent's counsel objected to characterizing all of the Shell employees or union members who were in the immediate vicinity of Gate No 3 as pickets, but see the discussion of pickets and picketing in Stoltze Land & Lumber Company, 156 NLRB 388 298 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD William Earl Rapp, the field construction manager for the petrochemical work performed by Snelson, was in charge of the early arrivals and he determined that it would be best not to attempt an entry at this particular time. He instructed the drivers to move on past the gates down the highway and he would consult with William Snelson concerning the problems of entering the refinery and the attitude of the Shell strikers. Rapp contacted William Snelson and, after surveying the general situation, another attempt to enter the gate was made at approximately 11:30 a.m. William Snelson led the procession in an unmarked automobile followed by two pickup trucks, each with Snelson signs and each towing a trailer bearing Snelson signs, together with another unmarked vehicle driven by Rapp. They were met at Gate No. 3 by a number of pickets some of whom were carrying strike signs indicating "O.C.A.W. ON STRIKE." Testimony indicated that at this time there were some 35 or 40 pickets in the immediate vicinity of Gate No. 3, most of whom were recognized by Gilfry and Davoho as being Shell employees . A number of these individuals were carrying clubs, others were juggling stones or rocks, and many were shouting threats and blocking the entrance to Gate No. 3. At this time Don Yates approached William Snelson , who had stopped his car approximately 6 feet from the gate because the picketers were blocking his ingress, and informed Snelson: "We would never get through the gate, that we might as well go on back to Sedro Wooley and forget about working there." Yates then departed from Snelson's vehicle after their brief conversation and the real violence began. The front windshield of the car driven by William Snelson was shattered, his rear window was shattered , the trailers and the pickup trucks were both tipped' over and a large piece of metal resembling a crowbar was thrown at the rear window of Snelson's car bouncing off the car and falling at the feet of Davolio, who was standing inside the Gate on Shell property. (See G.C. Exhs. 5, 6, 7, and 8.) Fortunately, the drivers of the pickup trucks were able to get out of their vehicles and into the car driven by Rapp and escaped without serious injury to themselves or the automobile driven by Rapp. Snelson succeeded in getting through the gate, but his car suffered a great deal of damage and he was in considerable fear of his life. All of the Snelson employees took a great deal of verbal abuse. The tipped over trucks and trailers, which never succeeded in entering the gates, were only removed at a later date when the local sheriff was present. C. Misconduct Away From the Refinery Site On April 17, at approximately 3 p.m., Snelson was delayed in his efforts to enter the refinery at Gate No. 3 for approximately 5 minutes by the pickets then on duty, in spite of the fact that the sheriff was parked directly across the road from the gate. As Snelson attempted to leave at approximately 6 p.m. on the same day, he was again delayed some 5 minutes in exiting the plant although the sheriff was still present at the site. After finally exiting the refinery by way of Gate No. 3, Snelson, who was then driving a pickup truck with Snelson identification symbols, turned to the right on Mountain Road and proceeded past the Mount Baker Gate of the refinery. Just before passing the Mount Baker Gate, a green Pontiac LeMans automo- bile pulled out in front of him and moved slowly up the road. At a point some distance from the refinery, the green Pontiac LeMans attempted to stop and block Snelson's efforts to continue on down the road. There were other cars with individuals wearing typical refinery-type hard- hats alongside the road at the point where the Pontiac had stopped. At this puncture Snelson realized what was happening and became concerned about his own safety. He shifted the truck down to the second gear and stepped on the gas, succeeding in pushing the Pontiac on past the other cars and individuals that had been stopped alongside the road. While pushing the car out of the way and continuing on up the road, a yellow and black General Motors type of truck, referred to as a blazer, came alongside Snelson's pickup truck and threw a large rock toward the side window which fortunately missed its mark. Shortly thereafter, the driver of the car which was being pushed by Snelson lost control of it, enabling Snelson to get around the Pontiac and ahead of the yellow and black blazer and successfully elude his pursuers. At a later date, Mr. Snelson identified the individual driving the Pontiac LeMans as a Shell employee whom he had seen at Gate No. 3 during the violence that occurred on April 16. Mr. Snelson testified that he had never seen the black and yellow blazer prior to the incident just related. However, he did see the same black and yellow blazer at the refinery gates after the incident and on the following morning he saw the Pontiac LeMans at the main entrance gate to the Shell refinery. D. Analysis The occurrence of the incidents heretofore related stand in the record undenied, although there are differences as to whether or not all of the people participating in the violence on April 16 and 17 were members of the Respondent Union, as well as whether or not clubs and rocks were being carried b} any of the picketers. In this regard, I fully credit the testimony of William Snelson, Gilfry, and Davolio. It would have been impossible to inflict the damage to Snelson's car shown in General Counsel's Exhibit 7, unless some type of club or large stones were used . The pictorial evidence in the record leaves no doubt that violence did occur on April 16 and substantial damage sustained to Mr . Snelson's personal automobile, as well as the two pickup trucks and trailers. The incident that occurred to Mr. Snelson on April 17 stands in the record undenied. During cross -examination, Snelson testified that he saw individuals run out of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers trailer house parked near the Mount Baker gate and get into the vehicle that pulled out in front of him. This credited testimony by William Snelson is sufficient to directly link this incident to the Respondent. Respondent's defense was in the area of the Respon- dent's lack of responsibility for the misconduct that occurred. Virgil Coraghotti acknowledged that he had been at the refinery on the early morning of April 16 and acknowledged having had some conversation with the boilermakers who were to have worked for Snelson on April 16. He testified that he left at approximately 8:30 OCAW, LOCAL 1-591 299 a.m. and did not return to the Shell refinery that day. Donald Yates testified that he left the area of Gate No. 3 immediately after talking with Snelson about 11 :30 on the morning of April 16, going to the picket shack at the main gate where he attempted to reach Coragliotti by telephone at the local union hall. Yates contended that he was there for some 10 or 15 minutes talking and as he was leaving to go back to Gate No. 3 he was advised that the trailers had been turned over. Bob Melton, who is alleged by General Counsel to have been a picket major with responsibility for the Respondent's Shell employee pickets, had no authority on the picket line according to Donald James Burgess, the financial secretary and chief executive officer of Respon- dent. This testimony is supported by Donald Yates, chairman of the Shell group . Respondent's testimony indicated that Bob Melton was a picket major in charge only of the boycotting activities conducted against Shell and that he had no authority on the picket line. However, General Counsel's Exhibit 2, a three-page mimeographed pamphlet addressed to the membership of Local 1-591, clearly shows that Bob Melton and Cline Herrin were picket majors for the Shell unit. This corresponds to the two picket majors that were indicated in the same pamphlet who would be in charge of the Texaco unit. In view of this written directive to the membership of the Respondent Union and in the absence of some evidence that the general membership was informed that Melton's responsibilities were limited exclusively to the area of boycott activities, I find Melton to be an agent of the Respondent with picket line authority for the Shell unit. The other picket major, Herrin , is identified on General Counsel's Exhibit 6 which depicts the overturned trucks and trailer immediately in front of Gate No . 3. Melton has been identified on General Counsel's Exhibit 5 as one of those individuals who is in the process of overturning one of the trailers. There can be little doubt, and I herewith find, that Virgil Coragliotti , Donald Yates , Robert Melton, and Cline Herrin, and each of them, were agents of the Respondent Union. The international representative, Virgil Coragliotti, acknowledges having been present at Gate No. 3 from 7 a.m. until approximately 8:30 on April 16 at a time when the pickets prevented Snelson's employees and equipment from entering Gate No. 3. This was not only a violation of the Act, but was in violation of an outstanding state court injunction and temporary restraining order limiting the number of pickets to two people at any gate other than the main gate, and restraining Respondent from preventing any person from ingress or egress to and from the refinery. (G.C. Exh. 9.) There is no evidence in the record to indicate that the Respondent at any time took measures to disavow the misconduct that occurred at Gate No. 3 on April 16 or corrective measures to avoid similar miscon- duct in the future . Section 8(b)(1)(A) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7. I find that agents of the Respondent not only allowed the membership of Respon- dent to engage in restraining and coercive conduct directed against William Snelson and Snelson's employees, who had a right to enter the Shell refinery , but agents of Respondent actually participated in the violence and misconduct in the 11:30 a.m. incident of April 16 which restrained and coerced employees in violation of the Act. Clearly, the flagrant misconduct and violence engaged in by the Respondent and its agents both at 7:30 a.m. and again at 11:30 a.m . on April 16 was precisely the kind of outrageous misconduct which Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act was intended to prevent. The Board has also held that a union which calls a strike and authorizes picketing must retain control over the pickets in whatever manner it deems necessary in order to insure that they do not act improperly.3 It is not necessary for an authorized union agent to be present at the time of each violent incident in order to hold a respondent responsible for the misconduct . If a union is unwilling, or unable, to take the necessary steps to control its pickets, it must then bear the responsibility for their misconduct.' Snelson testified that he saw the occupants of the Pontiac LeMans, which precipitated the acts of misconduct and violence on April 17 to his person and automobile, come from the Respondent's picket house located near the Mount Baker gate entrance to the refinery and this testimony stands in the record undemed . Additionally, the yellow and black blazer and the driver of the Pontiac LeMans were linked to the picketing activities on behalf of Respondent against Shell . On the basis of prior Board holdings that if a union is unwilling, or unable, to take the necessary steps to control its pickets , it must then bear the responsibility for their misconduct, I herewith find the misconduct directed toward William Snelson as occurred on April 17 to be violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act and the responsibility of the Respondent Union. There remains for disposition the Respondent's argu- ments that the refusal by the Regional Director to settle this case on terms offered by the Respondent violated not only the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, but also the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act and thus the complaint should have been dismissed, or the Regional Director directed to settle the case . At first blush, Respondent's arguments appear to have some degree of merit and when considered in light of the Board's rather strong language relating to screening out de miminis or isolated violations, as set forth in American Federation of Musicians, Local 76, AFL-CIO, 202 NLRB 620, it causes one to wonder why the Regional Director refused to accept Respondent's settlement offer. Respondent was willing to ac - cept a complete informal settlement , asking only that a non - admissions clause be placed in the settlement agreement, but not the notice to be posted. Respondent argues, and cites Board and court cases , that settlement agreements are not admissions of past liability,5 thus inclusion of a nonadmissions clause in the settlement agreement is not a significant term or provision but is merely an accurate 3 Drivers Local 695, et at (Tony Tellitteri Trucking Service, Inc), 174 Helpers, Local 696 (The Kargard Company), 196 NLRB 645 NLRB 753 5 See N L R B v Bangor Plastics, nc, 156 NLRB 1165. enforcement 4 See General Drivers and Dairy Employees Local Union Local 563 denied 392 F 2d 772 (C A 6, 1968), and Southwest Chevrolet Corporation, (Northern Contractors Supply, Inc), 183 NLRB 1023 , and International 194 NLRB 975 Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers & 300 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD reflection of its legal effect. While this argument has some appeal, neither the Board nor the Administrative Law Judge has the authority to direct a settlement, absent a most obvious abuse of discretion by the General Counsel. Although not totally analagous, a somewhat similar affirmative defense was raised by the respondent in Gimbel Brothers attacking the General Counsel's settlement procedure. There the Trial Exammer7 said at page 886: Under the Act the General Counsel has final autho-ity in respect to the investigation of charges, the issuance of complaints, and the prosecution of those complaints before the Board. (Section 3(d)). The Board, itself, has no power to enter into settlement negotiations of unfair labor practice charges, although it can and does review the terms of a proposed settlement once a complaint has been issued and hearing held. However, neither the Board nor any of its Trial Examiners has any power or right to inquire into the course of settlement negotiations held off the record to decide whether they were fair. This would be a gross violation of law. The General Counsel, appearing as a litigant before the Board, has full freedom to enter into such negotiations. The General Counsel must weigh all relevant factors in deciding whether and on what terms he shall offer to settle a case. Since many charges are filed during a year (5,809 in the fiscal year 1950), he undoubtedly has formulated broad settlement policies of general application and does make distinctions according to different types of violations and the prior history of other litigants in the case. He must determine in the first instance whether a settlement would effectuate the policies of the Act. The General Counsel has the power to make distinctions which the Union has charged he had made, if he in his discretion feels that he should make them. It is no vi elation of law for him to do so. These settlement policies are not "substantive rules adopted as author- ized by law and statements of general policy or interpretations formulated and adopted by the agency for the guidance of the public . .." which are required to be published by the terms of Section 3(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act. The Board has only limited power of review of the actions of the General Counsel in settlement negotia- tions in unfair labor practice cases. It cannot originate settlement negotiations or dictate what terms he shall offer It can only review a settlement agreement once a case has gone to hearing. . . . [Footnotes omitted.] It seems perfectly clear that the Administrative Law Judge does not have the authority to substitute his best judgment for that of the General Counsel insofar as settlement terms are concerned and I so find .8 III. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section II, above, occurring in connection with the operations of Respondent set forth in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof. IV. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices , it shall be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. In view of the nature of the unfair labor practices committed, it shall be recommended that the Respondent cease and desist from restraining or coercing in any manner employees in the exercise of their rights as guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Shell and Snelson are employers within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Internation- al Union, Local 1-591, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Internation- al Union, Local 1-591, AFL-CIO, has violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act through the commission of acts of restraint, coercion, and violence which interfered with the exercise of rights of employees guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDERS Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 1-591, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, and represent- atives, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Restraining or coercing employees of Snelson, Incorporated, by physical assaults upon the property of Snelson, Incorporated, its employees, and supervisors; by throwing rocks toward employees and equipment; by preventing ingress to or egress from the Shell refinery; by 6 Gimbel Brothers, Inc, 100 NLRB 870, recently cited with approval by the Board in Smith Company of California, Inc, 200 NLRB No 106 r August 19, 1972, the title "Trial Examiner" was changed to "Adminis- trative Law Judge " s All the circumstances of this case, including the reckless disregard for property and person displayed by Respondent while under a state court restraining order, would seem to havejustified requiring a formal settlement with court decree 9 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes OCAW, LOCAL 1-591 301 causing great damage to the automobiles, trucks, and trailers driven by Snelson employees; by following from the refinery Snelson supervisors; and by Respondent's course and conduct placing in great danger the life and property of William Snelson and/or Snelson, Incorporated, employees. (b) In any other manner restraining or coercing employ- ees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its offices and meeting hall, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 10 Copies of said notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 19, after being duly signed by its representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reason- able steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Sign, as aforesaid, and mail sufficient copies of the said attached notice to the Regional Director for Region 19, for posting, the Shell Oil Company and Snelson, Incorporated, being willing, at places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Such copies of the notice shall be furnished the Respondent by the said Regional Director. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 19, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 10 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board "