Coopers International Union

COOPERS INTERNATIONAL UNION Coopers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, and Local Union No. 42, Coopers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO and Independent Stave Company, Inc. Cases 17-CB-1105 and 17-CB-1137 January 7, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND PENELLO On August 31, 1973, Administrative Law Judge Alvin Lieberman issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge only insofar as they are consistent herewith. The General Counsel excepts to the failure of the Administrative Law Judge to find 8(b)(1)(A) viola- tions by conduct antedating an informal settlement agreement and by the conduct of Respondents' agent, Ernest Higdon, postdating that settlement agreement. He also contends that the Administrative Law Judge erred in ordering that the settlement be reinstated and in not recommending an appropriate remedial order. We agree with only so many of the General Counsel's contentions as are indicated below. On February 13, 1973, while leaving work, Betty Koehler, a nonstriking employee, was approached by Ernest Higdon, president of Respondent Internation- al Union, who was on the picket line. Higdon greeted Koehler with the words "hi scabby." After making an obscene suggestion, Higdon told Koehler that "if this was [my] picket line [I] would bust [you] in the mouth . . . . Bring your [old man ] around and I will bust him in the mouth." The Administrative Law Judge held that these remarks by Higdon did not violate Section 8(b)(1)(A). He found that Higdon did not mean what he said and that, consequently, his remarks constitut- ed mere "picket line rhetoric." We disagree. We believe that the main thrust of the remarks readily suggested physical violence, and that their threaten- ing nature was not negated, as the Administrative 175 Law Judge reasoned, by Higdon's failure to then carry out his threat. Furthermore, these remarks emanated from the president of the International Union while on the picket line and were uttered in the absence of any like statements or provocation by the nonstriking employee. It may well have been incredible to Koehler that she was in a position of safety because Higdon implied that this was not his picket line. In any event, we perceive this "assur- ance" of Higdon as meaningless in view of the fact that the picket line was cosponsored by the Respon- dent International Union, and that he said it while there in his capacity as the highest official of that organization. Although we find an 8(b)(1)(A) violation where the Administrative Law Judge did not, we are in agreement with his comment that in any event this isolated incident did not furnish a sufficient basis to reopen the settlement agreement, particularly since this was the only violation found against the Respondent Unions during a period of at least 5 months of the strike, which extended from the date of approval of the settlement agreement by the Regional Director on December 29, 1972, to the time of the trial in May 1973, when the employees were still on strike. See Medical Manors, Inc., d/b/a Community Convalescent Hospital and Community Convalescent East, 199 NLRB 840, and The Lion Knitting Mills Company, 160 NLRB 801. However, unlike the Administrative Law Judge, we view the violation herein as of sufficiently serious conse- quence, particularly since committed by the presi- dent of the Respondent International Union, to warrant a remedial order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that Respondents Coopers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, and Local Union No. 42, Coopers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, Lebanon, Missouri, their officers, agents, and repre- sentatives, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Restraining and coercing employees of the Independent Stave Company, Inc., in the exercise of their right to refrain from joining or assisting the above-designated labor organizations by threatening them with violence. (b) Restraining or coercing employees in any like or related manner in the exercise of their rights 208 NLRB No. 41 176 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at their respective business offices and meeting halls copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." I Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 17, after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized representatives, shall be posted by Respondents immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by them for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasona- ble steps shall be taken by Respondents to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Sign and mail sufficient copies of said notice to the Regional Director for Region 17 for posting by the Company at all locations where notices to its employees are customarily posted, if said Company is willing. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 17, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondents have taken to comply herewith. COOPERS INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL-CIO (Labor Organization) Dated By (Representative ) (Title) LOCAL UNION No. 42, COOPERS INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL-CIO (Labor Organization) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compli- ance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 616-Two Gateway Center, Fourth at State, Kansas City, Kansas 64101, Telephone 816-374-4518. DECISION 1 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board" APPENDIX No'rICE To MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT restrain or coerce employees of the Independent Stave Company, Inc., in their exercise of their right to refrain from joining or assisting our Union by threatening them with violence. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act. 1 By order issued simultaneously with the complaint, Cases 17-CB-1105 and 17-CB-1137 were consolidated 2 During the trial, par 6(b) of the complaint was withdrawn and pars 6(c) and (e) were dismissed . In his brief the General Counsel urges me to reconsider my dismissal of par 6(e) and I have done so Having reconsidered and having taken into account the General Counsel's STATEMENT OF THE CASE AI.vIN LIEBERMAN, Administrative Law Judge: The trial in this proceeding, with all parties except the charging party represented, was held before me in Lebanon, Missouri, on May 30 and 31, 1973. upon the General Counsel's complaint dated April 17, 1973, issued pursuant to charges filed between October 17 and November 30, 1972, in Case 17-CB-1105 and on February 21, 1973, in Case 17-CB-11371 by Independent Stave Company, inc. (Company), and Respondents' answer.2 In addition to alleging that respondents engaged in unfair labor practices the complaint sets forth that on December 29, 1972, in Case 17-CB-1105, a settlement agreement entered into by Respondents3 was approved by the Regional Director for Region 17 of the National Labor Relations Board (Regional Director) and that this approval was withdrawn on April 10, 1973. In their answer, Respondents not only deny the material allegations of the complaint, but also assert that the approval of the settlement agreement was improperly withdrawn. In general the issues litigated were whether Respondents violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended (Act).4 Particularly, the principal questions for decision are as follows: arguments, I am not persuaded that the evidence offered by the General Counsel sufficiently established the allegations of par 6(e). Accordingly. I adhere to my original ruling. 3 Respondents in Case 17-CB-1105 are identical to those in Case 17-CB-1137 4 Set forth below are the relevant provisions of Sec 8(b)(1) of the Act (Continued) COOPERS INTERNATIONAL UNION 1. Is each respondent liable for unfair labor practices allegedly committed by the other during a strike by both against the Company? 2. Assuming an affirmative answer to the foregoing question did respondents, before entering into the settle- ment agreement in Case l.7-CB-1105, violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by, as the complaint alleges, threatening, and taking various forms of reprisal against, nonstriking employees; and by blocking nonstriking employees from entering the Company's plant? 3. Again assuming an affirmative answer to question 1, above, did Respondents, after entering into the settlement agreement in Case 17-CB-1105, violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by referring to nonstriking employees in a derogatory manner; by provoking an altercation with a nonstriking employee; by making an obscene suggestion to a nonstriking employee; and by threatening to assault a nonstriking employee and her husband? 4. Was the approval of the settlement agreement in Case 17-CB-1105 properly withdrawn? Upon the entire record,5 upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, and having taken into account the arguments made and the able briefs submitted,6 I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT7 1. JURISDICTION The Company, a Missouri corporation, is engaged at Lebanon, Missouri, in the manufacture and sale of barrels. During 1972, a representative period, the Company's interstate purchases and sales exceeded $50,000. Accord- ingly, I find that the Company is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act and that the assertion of jurisdiction over this matter by the National Labor Relations Board (Board) is warranted. Siemons Mailing Service, 122 NLRB 81, 85. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Coopers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO (International) and Local Union No. 42, Coopers International Union of NorthAmerica, AFL-CIO (Local), Respondents in this proceeding, are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. (b) It shall be an unfair practice for a labor organization or its agents- (1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 Insofar as pertinent, Sec 7 provides Sec 7 Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, loin, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities s Issued simultaneously is a separate order correcting obvious inadvert- ent errors in the stenographic transcript of this proceeding Included in this order are corrections sought by the General Counsel in a motion to which no opposition was filed 6 Although all the arguments of the parties and the authorities cited by 111. INTRODUCTION 177 Briefly, this case is concerned with alleged violations of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by Respondents during a strike against the Company. Respondents' claimed unfair labor practices, according to the complaint, occurred during two time periods separated by a settlement agreement entered into by Respondents and approved by the Regional Director. The complaint further asserts that by their subsequent conduct Respondents violated this agreement and that for this reason its earlier approval by the Regional Director was withdrawn. The General Counsel contends that Respondents' postsettlement conduct, as well as that which preceded the settlement agreement, violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act and that the former constituted sufficient basis for the Regional Director's action in withdrawing his approval from the settlement agreement. The General Counsel further contends that, in the circumstances of this case, each Respondent is liable for unfair labor practices committed by the other. Respondents deny the commission of any unfair labor practices, both before and after the settlement agreement. Since they had not engaged in any postsettlement viola- tions of the Act, Respondents' argument continues, the Regional Director's approval of the settlement agreement was improperly withdrawn. Finally, Respondents take the position that the General Counsel has not established that either is responsible for any unfair labor practice which, notwithstanding their denial, may have been committed by the other. IV. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS8 A. History of Collective Bargaining Between the Company and Respondents In 1955 Respondent International was certified by the Board as the collective-bargaining representative of the employees of the Company involved in this proceeding.9 This certificate does not appear to have been revoked or superseded.10 Notwithstanding that the certification was limited to Respondent International, the Company has recognized Respondents jointly as the collective-bargaining represent- ative of the employees in the unit set forth in the certificate. From the time of its certification, Respondent them, whether appearing in their briefs or made orally at the trial, may not be discussed in this Decision, each has been carefully weighed and considered r Respondents' motion made at the conclusion of the trial, upon which I reserved decision, is disposed of in accordance with the findings and conclusions set forth in this Decision 8 The purpose of these findings is to furnish a frame of reference within which to consider the facts relating to Respondents' alleged unfair labor practices and to the conclusions to which they may give rise To the extent that the contentions of the parties relate specifically to the findings made here, they will be treated here, although they, as well as the findings, may again be considered in other contexts 9 See Independent Stave Company, Inc, 148 NLRB 431, 434 is In 1968 Respondent International was certified by the Board for a unit of the Company's employees not included in the first certificate See Independent Stave Company, 175 NLRB 156 178 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD International has bargained with the Company and Respondent Local has participated in the negotiations.11 At no material time has there been a collective agreement in effect between the Company and Respon- dents covering the employees here concerned, the last such contract having expired on June 30, 1972. Since then Respondents and the Company have engaged in negotia- tions for a new contract. B. The Strike On September 18, 1972, during the foregoing negotia- tions between Respondents and the Company, Respon- dents struck the Company. This strike, accompanied by picketing, was still in progress at the time of the trial.12 At intervals since the beginning of the picketing, officers of each Respondent have been at the picket line. While there, they have given instructions to the pickets as to the manner in which the picketing was to be carried on. From time to time since the strike's inception, meetings have been held at which the striking employees were informed by representatives of Respondents of the prog- ress of Respondents' negotiations with the Company. At one such meeting, conducted in mid-October 1972, the financial secretary of Respondent Local and a vice president of Respondent International were in attendance. At about the same time, the same two union officers visited the home 6° an employee who had abandoned the strike for the purpose of persuading him to rejoin it and resume picketing. In addition, in this connection, on February 13, 1973, the president of Respondent Interna- tional, engaged in similar efforts regarding two other employees who had also abandoned the strike. C. The Liability of Each Respondent for Conduct Engaged in by the Other During the Strike Briefly summarizing the findings contained in the previous two sections of this Decision, it appears that Respondent International was certified as the collective- bargaining representative of employees of the Company; that after the certification the Company recognized both Respondents jointly as the bargaining agent of those employees, that as such joint agent both Respondents have bargained with the Company for many years; that since June 30, 1972, the date on which the last contract between Respondents and the Company expired, both Respondents have negotiated with the Company for a new contract; that both Respondents struck the Company during the course of these negotiations, obviously for the purpose of bringing the Company to terms; that, during the strike, both Respondents mfoirmed employees of the progress of their negotiations with the Company; and that both Respon- dents sought to persuade employees who had gone back to work to rejoin the strike. It further appears that officers of each Respondent have given instructions to pickets concerning the manner in which the picketing, which has been in progress since the inception of the strike, should be conducted. In view of the foregoing, I find that the strike and its attendant picketing constituted a joint venture engaged in by both Respondents in support of a common objective; namely, the procurement of an acceptable collective agreement from the Company. Miami Plating Co., 144 NLRB 897, 903. This being so, I conclude, in agreement with the General Counsel, that each Respondent is liable for any unfair labor practices which may have been committed by the other during the course of the strike. Tennessee Wheel and Rubber Company,, 166 NLRB 165, 167. D. The Settlement Agreement As earlier noted, between October 17 and November 30, 1972, the Company filed charges in Case 17-CB-1105 alleging violations of Section 8(b)(1XA) of the Act by Respondents. On December 27, 1972, Respondents entered into an agreement in settlement of those charges whereby they undertook to refrain from conduct proscribed by Section 8(b)(1)(A).13 This agreement was, 2 days later, approved by the Regional Director. On February 21, 1973, the Company, in Case 17-CB-1137, filed a charge alleging that Respondents had engaged in postsettlement violations of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. On April 10, 1973, the Regional Director's approval of the agreement settling the charges in Case 17-CB-1105 was withdrawn. This was followed by the issuance of the instant complaint alleging as unfair labor practices not only Respondents' conduct since the settle- ment agreement, but also their prior conduct. The law concerning the circumstances warranting the setting aside of a settlement agreement and giving consideration to presettlement conduct as evidence of violations of the Act is clear. "It is the Board's established practice not to consider as evidence of unfair labor practices conduct of a Respondent antedating a settlement agreement, unless the Respondent . . . has engaged in independent unfair labor practices since the settlement." 14 Furthermore, where there is only an isolated postsettle- ment unfair labor practice or where there is an absence of substantial unlawful conduct following a settlement agree- ment, the settlement agreement will not be set aside and no findings will be made concerning the presettlement conduct. Medical Manors, Inc. etc., 199 NLRB 1093; Lion Knitting Mills Company, 160 NLRB 801, 804. With these precepts in mind the allegations of the complaint dealing with Respondents' asserted postsettle- ment violations of the Act will be considered. Should it develop that these allegations are not well founded, no consideration will be given to the complaint's averments concerning Respondents' presettlement conduct. 11 See Independent Stave Company, Inc., 148 NLRB 431. 434. 12 As stated earlier, the trial in this proceeding was held on May 30 and 31, 1973. 13 The settlement agreement, in evidence as G. C. Exh. 11, recites that "by entering into this agreement [Respondents do] not admit any violation of the .. Act." 14 Larrance Tank Corporation, 94 NLRB 352, 353. The Board's modification of its Larrance Tank doctrine appearing in Joseph 's Landscap- ing Service, 154 NLRB 1384, enfd . 389 F.2d 721 (C.A. 9. 1968). has no applicability here. COOPERS INTERNATIONAL UNION 179 V. 'IHE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Facts Concerning Respondents' Alleged Postsettlement Violations of the Act'-, The complaint alleges that on February 13, 1973, two incidents took place. each involving a different employee, during the course of which several violations of Section 8(b)(l)(A) of the Act were committed. My findings concerning these events are set forth below. 1. The Betty Koehler incident In December 1972, after discussing the matter with her husband, Betty Koehler abandoned the strike. As she left the Company's plant upon the completion of her work on February 13, 1973, Koehler was approached by Ernest Higdon, president of Respondent International, who was at the picket line in front of the building. Greeting Koehler as "hi scabby," Higdon asked her why she had returned to work. Koehler replied that she had done so because she "needed the money." In response, Higdon, using gutter language, suggested an obscene manner in which Koehler's husband "could make some money." Higdon followed this by telling Koehler "if this was [my] picket line [I] would bust [you] in the mouth. Bring your [husband] around and I will bust him in the mouth." 2. The Emory Savage incident Some minutes later, Emory Savage, who, like Koehler, had returned to work during the strike, came out of the Company's building. Ernest Higdon, the president of Respondent International, who was still at the picket line, intercepted Savage and tried to persuade him to rejoin the strike. Being unsuccessful in this, Higdon told Savage that his working while "other people are out here on the picket line , .. makes [him] a scab." Thereupon, Savage hit Higdon with sufficient force to cause him to fall to the ground. After striking Higdon, Savage, seemingly by way of a boast, announced to Koehler, who, although still in the vicinity, apparently had not witnessed the encounter between Savage and Higdon, that he "just knocked Higdon out into the street." 16 15 It will be remembered that the settlement agreement was entered into on December 27, 1972, and approved by the Regional Director 2 days later 15 My findings concerning the Koehler-Higdon and the Savage-Higdon incidents are based upon, and the quotations appearing in the text are taken from. undenied testimony given by Koehler and Savage. 17 As has earlier been noted, Respondents' strike against the Company started on September 18, 1972, and was still in progress on May 31, 1973 rs In IV.LRRB v Longview Furniture Company, 206 F 2d 274 (C A 4. 1953), the court of appeals did not agree with the Board and remanded Longview I for further consideration "[F]or reasons which," the Board stated, "are not pertinent to the ultimate decision in Ithe] case " the Board decided to accept the remand and not seek Supreme Court review of the decision of the court of appeals. In doing so, however, the Board made it plain that it had not departed from the precepts it laid down in Longview I and that it would "apply the principle laid down by the court in its decision as the rule of law for this case only." Longview Furniture Company, 110 NLRB 1734, 1738 (Longview II). is The "utterances" to which the Board made reference in Longview I included "trash." "scabs," "damn bitch," "scabby son of a bitch." and other B. Contentions and Concluding Findings Concerning Respondents ' Postsettlement Violations of the Act A usual concomitant of a strike is the use of abusive and intemperate language by workers on both sides of the economic dispute. Also usual is name-calling, including references to nonstrikers by strikers as scabs and other more invidious and opprobrious terms. This appears to be especially true where composures have become more frayed than they normally would be as the result of a long drawn-out strike, such as is the situation here.17 Concerning this phenomenon the Board stated in Longview Furniture Company, 100 NLRB 301, 304 (Long- view I ), that the language of striking employees, even if "neither polite nor moderate, must be regarded as an integral and inseparable part of their picket and strike activity, for which the Act affords them protection." 18 To this the Board added: Although the Board does not condone the use of abusive and intemperate language , it is common knowledge that in a strike where vital economic issues are at stake, striking employees resent those who cross the picket line and will express their sentiments in language not altogether suited to the pleasantries of the drawing room or even to courtesies of parlimentary disputation . Thus, we believe that to suggest that employees in the heat of picket-line animosity must trim their expression of disapproval to some point short of the utterances here in question, would be to ignore the industrial realities of speech in a workaday world and to impose a serious stricture upon employees in the exercise of their rights under the Act.19 Following the rationale of Longview I, the Board in Chas. Weinstein Company, Inc., 123 NLRB 590, 591-592, al- though again stating that it did not condone the use of "vile and obscene language by strikers . . . in or about the picket line," refused to find that such conduct violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.20 In view of the foregoing, while, like the Board in similar situations, I do not condone the obscenity addressed to Koehler, a nonstriking employee, by Higdon. the president of Respondent International, I do not find it to have been violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.21 Nor do I find violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) Higdon's use of the word like epithets Longview 1, supra, p 336. 20 In Weinstein the "vile and obscene language" which the Board did not find to have been violative of Sec 8(b)(1)(A) consisted, among others, of the following terms "scabs," "tramps," "bastards." "whore," "sluts," "skunks," and "whoremasters." Weinstein, supra pp. 602-603. 2i On brief the General Counsel argues that Higdon's "gross remarks . constitute[d]. an assault" upon Koehler. This contention is farfetched and finds no support in the cases cited by the General Counsel Thus, in Daily Press, inc, 188 NLRB 475. an employee disfavored by a union was physically assaulted in the plant in which he worked by union adherents. In Gimbel Brothers, Inc, 100 NLRB 870, 877, union agents invaded a retail store and created such chaos that clerks were unable to tend to customers The Board held that this type of "harassment of sales personnel on the selling floors . even though it was unattended by . . actual physical obstruction" was as effective in causing them to stop work as placing "gags over their mouths for pinioning ] their arms" would have been. Accordingly, the Board found that Sec. 8(b)(I)(A) had been violated In Gimbel Brothers, however, the Board specifically pointed out that what the union agents did in the store was "very different from mere moral (Continued) 180 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD "scabby" in greeting Koehler, or his calling Savage, another nonstriking employee, a "scab." Yankee Trader, Inc., etc., 191 NLRB 528; Chas. Weinstein Company, Inc., 123 NLRB 590, 602-603; Perry Norvell Company, 80 NLRB 225, 242; Sunset Line and Twine Company, 79 NLRB 1487, 1505. Next to be considered are the complaint's allegations concerning an "altercation," assertedly provoked by Higdon, the president of Respondent International, which took place during his encounter with Savage, In this regard, the General Counsel argues that the "altercation" restrained and coerced Savage in the exercise of his right, guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, to refrain from supporting Respondents' strike and was, therefore, viola- tive of Section 8(b)(I)(A) I do not agree. Regardless of who, or what, provoked the "altercation," it did not consist of an attack upon Savage by Higdon. It consisted, rather, of an attack upon Higdon by Savage, followed by Savage's boastful announcement that he had "just knocked Higdon out into the street." Taking into account all the evidence concerning this matter, including the fact that in the "altercation" Savage, not Higdon, was the aggressor, I cannot adopt the General Counsel's argument that the "altercation" coerced or restrained Savage in his Section 7 right to abandon Respondents' strike. Accordingly, I conclude that, the "altercation" was not violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. The remaining postsettlement unfair labor practice alleged in the complaint is the threat uttered by Higdon, the president of Respondent International, to "bust [Koehler, a nonstriking employee, and her husband ] in the mouth." Considered in context, it is obvious that Higdon did not mean what he said. Had Higdon really intended to hit Koehler because she had forsaken the strike it seems to me that he would not have threatened to do so, but would have pressure orally exerted upon nonstriking employees by a picket line at a plant entrance" (Emphasis supplied.) If nothing else in Gimbel Brothers differentiates it from the case at bar, the last sentence does 22 1 have given consideration to the result which would have followed had I come to a contrary conclusion concerning the threat made by Higdon, the president of Respondent International Had I found it to have been an unfair labor practice, it would have been the only one committed by done so right then and there. Under similar circumstances, a more serious threat, whose effectuation was likewise not intended, was regarded as mere "picket line rhetoric." N L. R B. v. Hartmann Luggage Company, 453 F.2d 178, 185 (C.A. 6, 1971). 1 conclude, therefore, that Higdon's threat to Koehler did not violate Section 8(b)(I)(A) of the Act. Having found that Respondents engaged in no postset- tlement unfair labor practices, findings concerning the presettlement unfair labor practices alleged in the com- plaint may not be made. Vermeer Manufacturing Company, 187 NLRB 888, 892. Accordingly, I shall recommend that the complaint be dismissed and that the Regional Direc- tor's approval of the settlement agreement, improvidently withdrawn under the circumstances, be reinstated.22 Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Company is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) of the Act. 2. Respondents are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Each Respondent is liable for unfair labor practices which may have been committed by the other during the strike against the Company carried on by Respondents. 4. Respondents did not engage in any unfair labor practices after December 27, 1972, the date they entered into an agreement, approved by the Regional Director on December 29, 1972, settling the unfair labor practices alleged in the charges filed in Case 17-CB-1105. 5. The Regional Director's approval of the settlement agreement described in Conclusion of Law 4, above, was improvidently withdrawn. [Recommended Order omitted from publication.] Respondents since entering into the settlement agreement Being, thus, isolated, it would not have warranted the entry of a remedial order. Twin- Kee Manufacturing Co, inc, 130 NLRB 614, 616 Nor, in view of its isolation and obvious insubstantiality, would it have justified setting aside the settlement agreement Medical Manors, Inc, etc, 199 NLRB 840. Lion Knitting Mills Company. 160 NLRB 801. 804