U.V. Industries, Inc.

534 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Mueller Brass Co., a Subsidiary of U.V. Industries, Inc. and United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC. Case 26-CA-4666 January 21, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND KENNEDY On August 9, 1973, Administrative Law Judge Sidney Sherman issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and General Counsel filed exceptions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions2 of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified below, and hereby orders that Respondent, Mueller Brass Co., a subsidiary of U.V. Industries, Inc., Fulton, Mississippi, its officers , agents, suces- sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, as so modified. 1. Delete the words "or for giving testimony under the Act" from paragraph 1(a) of the recom- mended Order. 2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the Administrative Law Judge. i Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F 2d 362 (C A 3, 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. 2 We do not adopt the Administrative Law Judge s conclusion that Respondent's suspension of Rogers violated Sec 8(a)(4) of the Act. While Rogers gave testimony in the prior unfair labor practice proceeding against Respondent (204 NLRB No. 105), there is insufficient evidence in this case that his testimony in fact supplied a motive for his suspension We shall amend the recommended Order accordingly. Member Jenkins , for reasons expressed by the Administrative Law Judge, would find that Respondent's suspension of Rogers also violated Sec. 8(a)(4) of the Act As to whether Respondent additionally violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by supervisor Cartels remarks to Stockton, the Administrative Law Judge failed to specifically credit Stockton's testimony over the denial of Carter that such conversation occurred. Accordingly, Member Jenkins is unable to determine whether such conversation did in fact occur For this reason Member Jenkins agrees that this allegation of the complaint should be dismissed and not for the reason offered by the Administrative Law Judge, namely, that such remarks, if they did in fact occur, constituted nothing more than a conversational gambit. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Act gives all employ- ees these rights: To engage in self-organization To form, join, or help unions To bargain collectively through a repre- sentative of their own choosing To act together for collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection To refrain from any or all these things. WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with these rights. WE WILL NOT create the impression that we are engaging in surveillance of the union activities of our employees. WE WILL NOT suspend or otherwise discrimi- nate against employees for engaging in union activity on behalf of United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, or any other union. WE WILL compensate James Roy Rogers for any earnings lost by him as a result of his suspension on March 8. 1973. MUELLER BRASS CO., A SUBSIDIARY OF U.V. INDUSTRIES, INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compli- ance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Clifford Davis Federal Building, Room 746, 167 North Main Street, Memphis, Tennessee 38103, Telephone 901-534-3161. DECISION SIDNEY SHERMAN, Administrative Law Judge: The instant charge was served on March 10, 1973,1 the i All dates hereinafter are in 1973, unless otherwise indicated 208 NLRB No. 76 MUELLER BRASS CO. complaint issued on April 20, and the case was heard on June 5 and 6. The issues litigated related to alleged violations of Section 8(a)(1). (3). and (4). After the heanng briefs were filed by Respondent and the General Counsel.2 Upon the entire record,3 the following findings and recommendations are made: 1. JURISDICI'ION Respondent is a corporation, engaged at Fulton, Missis- sippi, in the manufacture of copper tubing. During the 12 months preceding the issuance of the complaint, Respon- dent, in the course and conduct of its business, sold and shipped goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly to out- of-State points outside the State of Mississippi and during the same period it received goods, products, and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from out-of-State points. It is Found that Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED United Steelworkers of America , AFL-C1O-CLC, here- in called the Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE MERITS The pleadings raise the following issues: 1. Whether Respondent created the impression of surveillance of union activity? 2. Whether Respondent interrogated an employee about his union activity. 3. Whether Respondent suspended Rogers because of his union activity and for giving testimony under the Act. A. Sequence of Events The instant plant has about 350 production and maintenance employees who work on 3 separate shifts. The Union has been trying to organize them since 1971. Having lost a representation election in September 1971 (Case 26- RC-4079), the Union started a new campaign in the summer of 1972. Also, about that time it filed a charge with the Board alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) by Respondent. A complaint issued and a hearing thereon was held before Judge Boyls in January 1973. At that hearing, Rogers testified for the General Counsel in support of one of the 8(a)(3) allegations of the complaint. On March 8, Rogers was suspended and was not permitted to return to work until March 13. On March 16, an election was held on a new petition by the Union? On March 28, Judge Boyls issued her decision in the prior complaint case, 2 There were also submitted after the heanng certain stipulations, which have been received in evidence as Court's Exh . 1, 2(a), and (b). See the order of June 25. a For corrections o, the transcript, see the order of July 19 4 The result was inconclusive , the final outcome hinging on the 535 finding certain violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3), which findings were affirmed by the Board on June 28.5 B. Discussion 1. Background evidence of union animus Rogers' prounion sentiments were admittedly known to management. Not only had he testified in the prior complaint case that he was a member of the Union's organizing committee but the instant record shows that he distributed prounion literature in the plant, wore union buttons and signs, and successfully solicited 20 to 30 of his fellow employees to sign union cards. Moreover, in the prior complaint case the Board made the following findings on the issue of Respondent's animus toward the Union, in general, and toward Rogers, in particular. 1. That Respondent's plant manager, Lymburner, was averse to organization of the employees by the Union. 2. That Respondent's industrial relations manager, Gregory, told an employee in September 1972, that Rogers' name was on the desk of every employer in the area as a "union pusher" and that, if he lost his job with Respon- dent, he would be unable to get another in the area. 3. That in September 1972, Gregory told another employee, after displaying some union cards, that Respon- dent knew what was going on and that Union adherents would have difficulty obtaining jobs with other, area employers. 4. That Respondent's suspension and ultimate dis- charge of an employee, Blanton, for soliciting for the Union was unlawful .6 Finally, at the instant hearing, there was uncontradicted testimony, which is credited, that about March 1, general foreman Stamper and foreman Gunter, called a meeting of employees, at which the two supervisors spoke against the Union; that Respondent's president, Kullander, struck the same note in a speech delivered to a group of employees about midnight on March 5; and that at these meetings Rogers spoke up, taking sharp issue with the views expressed by management. 2. The 8(a)(1) issues There was no contradiction of the testimony of employee Stockton, and it is found, that in the fall of 1972, in a conversation with Personnel Manager Gregory, the latter remarked that he had heard that Stockton had been lending his car to other employees for the purpose of attending union meetings. This remark tended to create the impression that Respondent was aware of the identity of those attending such meetings, as well as of the fact that Stockton was providing them with transportation. By thus resolution of challenges by the Union, which were still pending before the Board at the time of the instant hearing s 204 NLRB No. 105. 6 An allegation that another employee was also discriminatorily discharged was dismissed in the prior case. 536 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD creating the impression of surveillance of union activity. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.7 3. The suspension of Rogers As to the events precipitating Rogers' suspension, a synthesis of the testimony of Rogers, Gunter, and Stamper shows the following: Rogers worked as a machine operator on the "midnight shift" from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m., under the immediate supervision of Gunter, who reported to Stamper. On March 4, Rogers had been so employed about 15 months, during which time he had missed 21 days for various reasons, including illness. The night of March 4, his wife called the plant to report him sick. He reported for work at 11 p.m. the next night. Soon thereafter, Rogers attended the meeting addressed by President Kullander, already mentioned, in which he asked the speaker some rather provocative questions displaying a strong prounion bias. After he returned to his work station from the meeting, he was approached by Gunter, who engaged him in a conversation in the course of which Gunter asked him for the name of his doctor.8 Rogers supplied the name of a Dr. Ratliff, and, in response to Gunter's query, said he had last seen the doctor either "today" (according to Gunter) or "on a Monday" (according to Rogers). At 8 the next morning Gunter instructed a plant secretary, Gray, to check with Dr. Ratliff's office on Rogers' alleged visit. That night, having received a report from Gray that Dr. Ratliff had no recollection or record of a visit by Rogers on March 5,9 Gunter relayed that information to Stamper, who directed that a check be made with Rogers to verify the name of the doctor.'O Rogers repeated his identifica- tion of the doctor and the next morning Gunter told Gray to check again with the doctor's office. Later that day Gray submitted a report indicating that Rogers' name did not appear on the list of patients treated in the doctor's office on the 5th. Thereupon, Stamper again directed that Gunter verify from Rogers the name of his doctor. Gunter did so, receiving the same answer from Rogers. Stamper then took the matter up with Williams, a vice president of Respon- dent's parent, and it was decided to suspend Rogers pending investigation of an alleged violation of a plant rule, which provides for disciplinary action for falsifying any "reports or records including personal absences, sickness ...." The next day, March 9, another call was made to Dr. Ratliff's office, and a report of that call 7 Stockton, who worked as a janitor, testified further that in January he had a talk with his supervisor, J Carter, about keeping the premises clean, in the course of which the witness stated that, when the Union came in "a lot of this stuff will have to be changed We will have to keep it clean " At this point. according to Stockton, J Carter asked him how he felt about the Union, eliciting from Stockton the rejoinder that he was for the Union. J Carter denied that there was any such conversation Even if one credits Stockton , it is clear that he first broached the matter of the Union in terms that implied that Stockton believed that the success of the current union campaign was a foregone conclusion. In view of this open avowal of confidence in a union victory, any inquiry by J Carter about Stockton's sympathies could have had no investigative purpose or been thought by Stockton to have been anything more than a conversational gambit Accordingly, no violation is found here. 8 Gunter testified that this conversation occurred between I i p.m and midnight, whereas Rogers' recollection was that it took place after the meeting with Kullander which, according to Rogers, was held at midnight However, Gunter did not specifically dispute that the Kullander meeting showed that, according to an associate of Dr. Ratliff, there was no record of any visit by Rogers between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m. on the 5th, nor any record of his having been there during "the last two months."" It was then decided to continue Rogers' suspension until March 13. At the hearing there was litigated at some length dust what Rogers told Gunter about the date of his visit to Dr. Ratliff. Rogers insisted that he said only that he believed that he had last visited the doctor on "a Monday," whereas Gunter's version was that Rogers said that he had visited the doctor "today," and Stamper confirmed that this was what was reported to him by Gunter. However, no need is perceived for resolving this conflict, since, even if one credits Rogers' version, the record warrants a finding that Gunter understood him to be referring to March 5, as the date of his last visit to Dr. Ratliff, and that Respondent justifiably believed on the basis of Gray's reports that he had not made such a visit on that date, which belief would necessarily have been fortified by the final report of March 9. However, this finding that Respondent was justified in believing that Rogers had not visited Dr. Ratliff on March 5, is not dispositive of the matter. There remains to be considered whether this apparent misstatement by Rogers was the real reason for his suspension or merely a pretext to conceal discriminatory motivation. There was considerable testimony as to how it happened that Rogers was approached by Gunter on March 5, and questioned about his doctor. On this point, Stamper, who was general foreman over the midnight shift, testified that on the night of the 4th, after it was reported to him that Rogers had called in sick, the witness instructed one of his foremen, Gunter, to ask Rogers (upon his return to work) why he was absent; that such instruction was in accord with Stamper's usual procedure; that on the night of the 5th, Gunter reported to him Rogers' reference to a medical visit, whereupon the witness told Gunter to check on the doctor; and that all his supervisors have a standing instruction to ask employees, who have reported sick, whether they were treated by a doctor, and, if the employee indicates that such was the case, it is Respondent's practice to verify that fact. Thus, if one is to credit Stamper, one would have to find that it was standard, operating procedure for his foremen to check on the reasons for an employee's absence and, in the case of alleged illness, (1) to ascertain whether the employee visited a doctor, (2) to obtain the name of such was already over, when he approached Rogers. Accordingly, it is found that such approach was made either shortly before or shortly after midnight, but in any event after the exchange between Rogers and Kullander at the meeting in question 9 Resp Exh 4 This report does not specify that Gray's inquiry on March 6, was limited to the March 5 date However, a followup report by Gray (Resp Exh 5) indicates that it was so limited. 10 According to Gunter, this was the first such instruction from Stamper the latter testified that he had given such an instruction the preceding night, when Gunter allegedly notified him of Rogers' reference to Dr Ratliff However, there is no need to resolve this conflict, as there is no dispute that Stamper did give such an instruction at least twice and that the various attempts at verification of the visit to Dr Ratliff described above were in fact made. i i However, it was stipulated at the hearing that Rogers had in fact last visited Dr Ratliff on February 10 MUELLER BRASS CO. doctor, if any, and (3) to check with such doctor on the alleged visit. One would also have to find, if Stamper be credited, that the investigation of Rogers' absence on March 4 merely followed the foregoing, routine pattern. However, D. Smith and R. Smith, both of whom worked on the midnight shift, testified that on those occasions when they called in sick no inquiry was made about their medical treatment or the name of their doctor, and Stevens, who, like Rogers, worked under Gunter, testified to the same effect. Absent any contradiction thereof, their testimony is credited. Moreover, although the record shows that before March 4, Rogers had missed 21 days from work for various reasons, including alleged illness on his part, Gunter admitted that he had never before March 5 asked Rogers whether he had gone to a doctor; that he had on previous occasions asked Rogers only "why he was sick"; that Rogers had answered that "he was just sick"; and that Gunter had "taken [Rogers'] word for it" And, Gunter acknowledged that, although all 27 employees under his direction have missed work for various reasons. including illness, during the year and a half that he has been a foreman, he had checked on the cause of absence in only 3 cases, other than that of Rogers, and only one of those 3 employees was disciplined as a result of such investiga- tion.12 While Stamper professed to recall the names of three other employees who had been disciplined for false statements about their absences from work, it is clear from the foregoing, particularly Gunter's testimony, that, with regard to the employees under Stamper's supervision, the alleged, routine procedure for investigating absence's due to illness was not followed in the case of Rogers, himself, until March 5, and was only sporadically followed with respect to the other, night shift employees.13 Moreover, Gunter failed to corroborate Stamper's testimony that it was he who initiated the interrogation of Rogers by instructing Gunter-on the night of the 4th to check with Rogers on the reason for his absence. On the contrary, Gunter insisted that it was his own idea to ask Rogers on the 5th about his doctor and his illness i4 and that Gunter had no instructions from Stamper about the matter until the night of the 6th. Even more puzzling was Stamper's testimony as to why he regarded Rogers' apparent invention of a visit to a doctor as a violation of Respondent' s rule on false statements. When it was pointed out to him that Rogers' 12 According to Gunter, such disciplinary action occurred more than 2 years before the instant hearing, but, by his own account, he had been a foreman for only 1-1/2 years. No attempt was made to explain this apparent discrepancy ii Williams, a vice president of Respondent's parent, testified that he handles industrial relations for 12,000 employees in about 120 plants, that all his supervisors are instructed to inquire into an employee 's whereabouts during a period of absence and to verify any information given by him Williams added that within his experience over a period of 25 years "several hundred" employees ha,e been disciplined for misrepresenting the reason for absenteeism However, whatever light it may shed on the practices in other plants or of other supervisors. such testimony is entitled to little weight in determining the practices or motivation of the two supervisors, Stamper and Gunter, who were alone responsible for setting in motion the events leading to Rogers' suspension . Sears, Roebuck & Co , 172 NLRB 2222, In. 1, Jamel, Inc, 129 NLRB 1191, 1201 (fti 26); Federal Tool Corporation, 130 NLRB 210, 220-221, Allegheny Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company v NLRB , 312 F 2d 529 (C.A 3, 1962) 11 Gunter explained that he chose this particular occasion to make an in- 537 scheduled work hours, from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m., did not coincide with normal, professional office hours, Stamper professed his willingness to assume that any visit by Rogers to his doctor would have had to occur at some time after 7 a.m., on the 5th. The General Counsel then attempted to elicit from Stamper.an explanation of why he deemed Rogers' alleged misrepresentation about a visit to a doctor after working hours to violate the plant rule. The following is an excerpt from the examination that followed: Q. ... Did you have any doubt that [Rogers] was sick? t s # s s A. I did not know whether he was sick or not, I really don't know. I assume he was sick. Q. . . . Did you infer from the fact that he didn't go to the doctor, as you discovered later, did that cause you to believe that maybe he wasn't sick at all? Is that what you are trying to say? A. No, sir. Q. You still thought he was sick, but you kept questioning whether he went to a doctor? A. We were questioning about his attendance, the reasons. As already noted, Stamper was the one who, by his own account, initiated the inquiry into the circumstances of Rogers' absence and it is clear that he was the driving force behind the followup investigation and brought the matter of Rogers' apparent false statement to the attention of Williams. Moreover, if Stamper be credited, he participat- ed with Williams in the decision to suspend Rogers on March 8. because of the alleged rule violation.15 Yet, as is evident from the foregoing quoted excerpt, he acknowl- edged that he persisted in investigating the reason for Rogers' absence, even though he did not doubt the genuiness of that reason, and that he did not entertain any such doubt even after it appeared that there had been no visit to Dr. Ratliff on March 5. In view of this, it is not apparent what legitimate purpose Stamper had in making an issue out of Rogers' reference to a visit to his doctor.16 Accordingly, it appears that Respondent's defense is depth investigation of Rogers' alleged illness because he had a pattern of being absent on Mondays (While the record shows such a pattern, it had been established long before March 5, and Gunter failed to explain why he first became skeptical on that date of the reason for Rogers' Monday absences.) 15 Williams testified that he alone made that decision on the basis of Stamper's report. There is no need to resolve this conflict, as it suffices that Stamper was the one who at least made the decision to refer the matter to Williams See cases cited in fn 13. above 16 At the hearing. Respondent's counsel took the position. in effect, that the question of Rogers' illness was irrelevant, since. even if he was sick, any false statement about a visit to a doctor would still violate the plant rule. This implies that the rule was intended to reach any falsehood, regardless of its significance or materiality However, no witness testified that it had been so construed or applied and the only realistic construction of such a rule is not that it was designed to inculcate in the employees devotion to the truth for its own sake but that, insofar as it related to absences, the purpose of the rule was to reduce avoidable absenteeism by penalizing concealment of the true reason therefor. Thus, in the case of alleged illness , the rule is properly (Continued) 538 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD marred by irreconcilable conflicts between Stamper and Gunter as to who made the initial decision to quiz Rogers about his medical treatment and the reason for that decision and by conflict between Stamper and Williams as to the degree of participation by Stamper in the decision to suspend Rogers, as well as by Stamper's admission that throughout his elaborate investigation of the reason for Rogers' absence he did not doubt the genuineness of the one assigned by Rogers. One is thus brought to consider the General Counsel's theory that the sole purpose of Respondent's investigation was to find some colorable basis for an act of reprisal against Rogers for his prominence in the union movement. Support for that theory is found in Respondent's demon- strated animus toward the Union, the implied admission noted above that Respondent had caused area employers to "blacklist" Rogers, as well as other union adherents, his conspicuous activities for the Union, including his testimo- ny in the prior case, and his confrontations with manage- ment spokesmen during the crucial preelection period over the issues of the election. Under all the circumstances, including the absence of any other persuasive explanation of Stamper's role in the suspension of Rogers, the evidence is deemed to prepon- derate in favor of a finding that the true motivation therefor was Rogers' conspicuous involvement in union activity, culminating in a series of public exchanges with management spokesmen at the height of the preelection campaign.17 It follows that, by suspending Rogers for that reason, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Since his giving of testimony under the Act adverse to its interests could not have failed to heighten Respondent's resentment of Rogers' advocacy of the Union's cause, and to that extent contributed to the decision to suspend him, it is found that by such suspension Respondent also violated Section 8(a)(4) of the Act. IV. THE REMEDY It having been found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l), (3), and (4) of the Act, it will be recommended that it be required to cease and desist therefrom and take appropriate, affirmative action, which shall include the reimbursement of Rogers for earnings lost by hint as a viewed as aimed at a misrepresentation as to the existence of such a condition, and not at any gratuitous elaboration on the nature of the illness or the treatment received therefor Indeed , recognition that this was the true purpose of the rule is reflected in Stamper's rejoinder in the above-quoted excerpt that Respondent's investigation was directed at "the reasons" for Rogers' absence, as well as in certain testimony by Williams , the thrust of which was that Respondent's only concern in such an investigation as was conducted here was to verify the reason for absence. (In this connection, it may be noted that, in explaining why he attached significance to Rogers' apparent misstatement about a visit to a doctor, Williams, unlike Stamper, professed to have regarded such misstatement as casting doubt on the genuineness of Rogers' illness. However, even if that be deemed the reason for the part played by Williams in the instant matter, that would not exonerate Respondent. For reasons already cited, it would still be relevant to consider the propriety of Stamper's motive for probing into the matter and bringing it to Williams' attention) 27 In this regard, it is deemed significant that, as found above, Gunter's initial interrogation of Rogers about his doctor occurred only moments after the confrontation between Rogers and Respondent's president, Kullander Due weight has been given to the rather mild penalty imposed on Rogers result of his suspension, with interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. 2. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by creating the impression of surveillance of Union activities. 3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act by suspending James Roy Rogers because of his union activities and because he had given testimony under the Act. 4. Such violations constituted unfair labor practices affecting commerce. Upon the above findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, there is hereby issued the following recom- mended: ORDER 18 Respondent, Mueller Brass Co., Fulton, Mississippi, its officers, agents, successors and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Suspending or otherwise discriminating against employees because of their activities on behalf of United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO-CLC, or for giving testimony under the Act. (b) Creating the impression of surveillance of Union activities of its employees. (c) In any other manner , interfering with , restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self- organization, to form, join, or assist the above-named Union, or any other labor organization , to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other coricerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action , which is deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) In the manner prescribed in "The Remedy" section of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision, make James Roy Rogers whole for any loss of earnings suffered as a result of Respondent's discrimination against him. and the unusual pains taken by Respondent to ascertain whether he had in fact visited Dr Ratliff With regard to the latter point, it must be remembered that there was pending at the time of the instant events an unfair labor practice case against Respondent, involving, inter aba, a charge implying that Respondent had some connection with the blacklisting of Rogers by area employers because of his union activities . That circumstance would tend to deter Respondent from taking any action against Rogers for any reason, good or bad, without at least making sure of the facts on which it was relying As for the mildness of the disciplinary action , Respondent admittedly had an established policy of imposing only a few days' suspension for an initial violation of the rule against false statements, which policy necessarily limited the scope of any discipline that might be imposed on Rogers without inviting a charge of disparate treatment i" In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. MUELLER BRASS CO. 539 (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amounts of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (c) Post at its place of business in Fulton, Mississippi, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 19 Copies of said notice. on forms to be provided by the Regional Director for Region 26, shall, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained by it for a period of at least 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that such notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 26, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 19 In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be hanged to read