Unoco Apparel, Inc.

UNOCO APPAREL, INC. Unoco Apparel, Inc. and International Ladies' Gar- ment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO. Case 15-CA-4655 January 22, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND PENELLO On April 12, 1973, Administrative Law Judge Jerry B. Stone issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel, the Charging Party, and Respondent filed exceptions and supporting briefs, and Respondent filed a reply brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that Respondent, Unoco Apparel, Inc., Selma, Alabama, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. MEMBER PF,NELLO, dissenting in part: Contrary to my colleagues, I believe that the record shows that Respondent has engaged in a deliberate course of surface bargaining with the Union in contravention of Section 8(a)(5).2 Not only did Respondent's negotiator, in effect, lack authority to bargain in good faith, but also Respondent's intransi- I Contrary to our dissenting colleague, we agree with the Administrative Law Judge's analysis of the facts and his conclusion that both parties herein were engaged in "hard bargaining" and were merely jockeying for position as to their main concern, wages and benefits . Our dissenting colleague disagrees with the Administrative Law Judge 's finding that the Union, too, had a fixed bargaining position from which it did not move throughout the negotiations, because he finds the Union expressed a willingness to compromise and because he would not require the Union to lower its demands where the Respondent has failed to produce information to justify its asserted economic position However, neither of these reasons is persuasive The Administrative Law Judge's findings in this regard are amply supported by the record evidence which establishes that the Union essentially refused to agree to or even discuss any of the Respondent's contract proposals Thus, when the Respondent's attorney, Tahaferro, at the fifth bargaining session, requested the Union 's attorney, Goodman, to discuss the Respondent's contract proposals. Goodman ignored the request and proceeded to discuss only the Union's. In doing so, he demonstrated that the Union would not make any concessions for which it could 601 gent position on practically all items, as shown by its refusal to accept any changes whatsoever from the present working conditions, demonstrates that Res- pondent merely went through the motions of bargaining without any sincere intention of reaching an agreement. The question of whether a party has bargained in good faith is one of the most important and difficult of the issues confronting the Board. The National Labor Relations Act was conceived in an effort to promote industrial relations through collective bar- gaining since it was believed that employers and employees (through their bargaining representative if they have selected one) are the best parties to settle differences in the working- place. Indeed, the Board has recently placed a premium on stability through collective bargaining by deferring to private settle- ment of disputes, where possible, without outside, governmental intervention .3 However, while the Act encourages collective bargaining, Congress has man- dated a concomitant duty to the Board to insure that such bargaining is "more than the holding of conferences and the exchange of pleasantries. The law contemplates that both parties will approach negotiations with an open mind and will make a reasonable effort to reach a common ground of agreement."4 In my opinion, the Board must examine not only the quantity of negotiations but also the quality of such discussions in its effort to ascertain whether the parties have complied with the law. Admittedly, this task is often a formidable one, inasmuch as there is a fine line dividing lawful hard bargaining and illegal surface bargaining. In the exception of this duty, it is necessary to examine all the circumstances of negotiations, including the conduct and statements of the parties. Although the Board may not "sit in judgment upon the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements," 5 ". . . at the same time it seems clear that if the Board is not to be blinded by empty talk and by the mere surface motions of collective bargaining, it must take some cognizance reasonably expect to receive a quid pro quo from the Respondent Thus, the Union's failure to indicate any willingness to modify its proposals forced the Respondent to take a position in which it could only reject what it deemed to be the more onerous and outrageous ones, while accepting others with which it felt it could live (indeed, the record evidence establishes that it was the Respondent and not the Union that made the concessions necessary to enable the parties to agree on the various items upon which agreement was reached ). Accordingly, all that the evidence herein establishes is that the Respondent refused to concede on financial matters until the Union became less intransigent on the same and other matters contained in its proposals. In such circumstances, we agree with the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that the Employer was not engaged in unlawful "surface bargaining," and we so find. 2 However, I agree with the majority that Respondent 's refusal to furnish the Union the requested financial records violates Sec 8 (a)(5) of the Act. 3 Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837 i Houde Engineering Co., 1 NLRB 35 (1934) 5 N.L.RB. v. American National Insurance Co, 343 U S. 395, 404 (1952) 208 NLRB No. 88 602 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD of the reasonableness of the positions taken by an employer in the course of bargaining negotiations." 6 Furthermore, the law does not contemplate that an employer must acquiesce to the demands of a union; in fact, it may hold its convictions to a point of impasse. However, employers are dutybound to make serious proposals with a view towards "meeting the union at least part way." 7 Here, the record shows that the first of seven bargaining sessions was held on May 15, 1972.8 At that meeting, the Union, through its representative, Benny Dansavage, orally outlined its proposals, including demands concerning wages, hospitalization benefits, vacations, holidays, and the like, and then presented Respondent with a complete contract proposal in written form. At the second meeting after some preliminary discussion, Respondent, represent- ed by its attorney, Mark Taliaferro, Sr., offered a written, but partial, contract proposal, stating that additional language would be provided the following week. In the ensuing discussion, it became clear that Respondent's proposal basically codified the existing working conditions on, for example, such significant items as holidays, overtime pay, life insurance, and the length of the workweek. In view of Respondent's silence on the subject, Dansavage asked for its wage proposal, but was told that Respondent had "no wages, no increased minimums, no other fringe benefits and no other changes to offer." Dansavage pointed out that the election's lopsided vote should have told Respondent something, and stated that he was hopeful that they could come to an agreement that was fair to both sides. When Dansavage stated that there was to be an increase in the Federal minimum wage, Taliaferro responded that his client did not give him anything to offer, that it was a new business, and that the Company did not have a reasonable picture as of yet. Dansavage then showed him a credit report which disclosed that Unoco was a subsidiary of Universal Overall, and stated that as Universal Overall was not a new company, they certainly should know whether or not the Company was going to make a profit. Taliaferro responded, "I don't know that they are a part of anything." Again Dansavage asked if Respondent had any increase in wages or minimums, but Taliaferro replied that they did not, that they were going to pay the $1.60-per- hour minimum, and that he did not believe in higher 6 N.L.R. B. v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F .2d 131, 134 (1953). 7 Ibid. 8 After the election , Plant Manager Clyde Bamberg set the tone for the negotiations by his statement , published in the local newspaper, that "as far as the plant's future, I do not know." 9 Following the second meeting, Dansavage called Taliaferro to schedule a third session . During this telephone conversation, Dansavage asked if the Union were going to get a contract with the Company, but Taliaferro replied , "Well, they haven 't given me anything to offer . I told them I don't minimums. With respect to the Union's proposed clauses regarding a shop chairlady, assignment to other work, and access to the shop, Taliaferro stated that they might work something out.9 In the third session,10 Dansavage asked if Taliafer- ro had the additional contract language promised at the last meeting, but Taliaferro replied that he did not have any additional language to present at this time and that his secretary had gone on vacation. Dansavage asked if he had any money, fringes, or changes to offer, but was told that "there was no money, no changes, no fringes. The Company's position will not be altered." When Taliaferro said that the Company did not know if it was losing money, Dansavage mentioned that Unoco had been in Selma for 6-7 months and that with its experience it must have some knowledge of whether or not it was going to have a profit. Taliaferro then stated that it would not have any financial offer to give and that it did not know what it could afford. At another point in the discussions, Taliaferro reiterated his position that "there were no changes or money to offer." In response to Dansavage's still further inquiry as to whether the Company had any increases in money or fringes to offer, Taliaferro replied that the employees came to the "wrong well .. . the well is dry." When asked about the next meeting date, Taliaferro said he did not object to meeting, but the Company had no change in its offer. The fourth session, held on August 3, 1972, began with Dansavage again asking if the Company had any money, fringe benefits, or contract changes to offer, but Taliaferro answered that it did not. Again it became evident that most of the Company's proposals merely reflected current working condi- tions and that others, like the management rights clause, actually took away, according to Dansavage, rights employees had without a contract. At the fifth session, Union Attorney Goodman asked if the Company had any money or fringes to offer, but Taliaferro replied that it did not. When asked why, Taliaferro responded "Because we don't have any at this time." Taliaferro refused to tell Goodman whether the Company was part of a larger company, and later said that there would be no wage increases in the near future. At this point, the parties began discussing the Union's proposal 11 and, while tentative agreement was reached on minor items, know how they expect me to get a contract without giving me anything to offer." 10 The record shows that at this session, as well as in subsequent negotiating sessions , the parties discussed Respondent's proposals in detail. Therefore, my colleagues' statement that the Union did not "even discuss any of the Respondent's contract proposals" is totally without foundation. I I The version of the facts presented by my colleagues to the effect that the Union ignored Respondent's request to discuss its proposal and "proceeded" to discuss the Union's is incorrect. Actually, the Union asked UNOCO APPAREL, INC. 603 Tahaferro refused to respond at all to others and, in effect, retracted his earlier statement that they might be able to work out an agreement on certain clauses. On all money items, Taliaferro consistently stated that the Company would not pay any more than the status quo. At the sixth session, when again asked for a company offer on wages, Tahaferro said that the Company was not going to make any changes in anything it was already doing. When the meeting ended and Goodman asked about the next meeting date, Taliaferro responded, "I am meeting at your request. I would not have called the meeting. I have nothing to offer. I have no changes to offer." The seventh and final session, held October 23, 1972, began with Taliaferro answering several ques- tions by Goodman to the effect that the Company had nothing new to offer on wages or holidays and that the Company would continue to work 40 hours. Dansavage then reminded Taliaferro that the addi- tional contract language promised at the second session had not been provided. When asked at this point if the Company had anything to propose, Taliaferro said, "I am meeting at your request. I wouldn't have requested a meeting, I am meeting at your request." When Goodman asked if he had talked to his client about any wage increases, Taliaferro said he had checked with Bamberg, but had not talked with Eckerling (an owner of Respon- dent) recently. On or about November 13, 1972, Dansavage telephoned Taliaferro to attempt to set up another negotiation session. Taliaferro remarked that he understood "the Board is going to issue a complaint. Why don't we just go and try it, try the case," and then went on to say that he had nothing new to offer. Finally, it should be noted that on November 27, 1972, Respondent reneged on its agreement, made prior to the start of the negotiations, to share the expenses of a meeting hall with the Union. In evaluating the entire course of conduct of these negotiations, both those aspects highlighted supra, as well as the details set forth in the Administrative Law Judge's Decision, it seems clear to me that Respon- dent entered upon these discussions with a closed mind not to reach an accord through the give-and- take process of bargaining. From its postelection veiled threat of a plant closure to its declarations that the Company was not going to make any changes in anything that it was already doing, Respondent displayed an effort to engage in "empty talk" and to bargain without any intention whatsoever of reach- ing an agreement. In my opinion, Respondent's fixed, status quo position on major items constitutes an intransigence that goes beyond the line of mere hard bargaining. In addition, Respondent's entire approach to the negotiations demonstrates an utter failure to bargain in good faith. Respondent proffered an incomplete proposal at the second session-one which was silent on such a basic and crucial issue as wages-and never fulfilled both its promise and obligation to submit a complete proposal. Taliaferro indicated that, as to wages, the Company did not believe in higher minimums, thus emphasizing to the Union that further discussions on this key issue would be futile. Statements made by Taliaferro both during and after the second session show that he did not possess authority to engage in meaningful discus- sions or to make any realistic offers to the Union. It has been long held that such a lack of authority, when considered in the context of these fruitless discussions, shows that Respondent did not bargain in good faith.12 Furthermore, Respondent was reluctant to continue any negotiations once its fixed position was made clear and even refused to consider proposals on which agreement had been postponed. Most importantly, Respondent incessantly stressed that its position on the major items would not be altered, conduct which is so blatantly antithetical to good-faith discussions as to thoroughly undermine the entire atmosphere. The tactics displayed in these abortive discussions was also reflected by Respon- dent's abrupt withdrawal from its agreement to share the cost of the meeting hall. Indeed, Respondent's motive in these discussions could best be described by Taliaferro's own admission during the negotia- tions that Respondent might discourage membership in the Union and have another election. The Administrative Law Judge, himself, reached many of the above conclusions, yet he failed to find surface bargaining principally on the ground that the record showed that both parties were jockeying for position in these discussions. The clear implication of this conclusion is that the Union, too, made little movement towards an agreement. I completely disagree with this evaluation of the facts. First of all, in each and every session, the Union sought some ground upon which an agreement could be made and, in so doing, clearly indicated its willingness to compromise in order to reach a fair contract, while Respondent displayed its deliberate strategy not to negotiate with an open mind. Second, Respondent's Tahaferro if he would sign each article as an agreement was reached, and but Tahaferro did not succeed as the parties then continued to discuss the Tahaferro agreed After Goodman opened the Union's proposal, Tahaferro Union's proposal interjected with "let's talk about the Company's proposal " Thus, it was 12 Fitzgerald Mills Corporation, 133 NLRB 877 Respondent who actually attempted to thwart this movement by the Union, 604 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD refusal to disclose its financial status-itself found to violate Section 8(a)(5)-prevented the Union from appraising the validity of Respondent's economic claims or from modifying its economic proposals. Absent the Respondent's supplying sustaining figures in support of its claims, I would not expect or require the Union to revise its proposals downward as the Administrative Law Judge and my colleagues seem to imply it should have done.13 In short, it is Respondent's rigid, predetermined adherence to its status quo position, in light of its other conduct and the 8(a)(5) violation found by the Administrative Law Judge, which I would find to constitute surface bargaining. As it was so aptly put in Reed & Prince, "the employer is obliged to make some reasonable effort in some direction to compose his differences with the union, if [Section] 8(a)(5) is to be read as imposing any substantial obligation at all." 14 Respondent simply did not fulfill that obliga- tion. 13 C-B Buick, Inc, 206 NLRB No 10 1+ Supra at 134-135 DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JERRY B. STONE, Administrative Law Judge: This proceeding, under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, was tried pursuant to due notice on February 13 and 14, 1973, at Birmingham, Alabama. The charge was filed on October 12, 1972. The complaint in this matter was issued on November 20, 1972. The issues concern whether Respondent has engaged in overall bad- faith bargaining with the Union, and whether Respondent has bargained in bad faith by not furnishing certain requested financial records. Thus, the issues are whether Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. All parties were afforded full opportunity to participate in the proceeding. Briefs have been filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent and have been considered. Upon the entire record in the case and from my observation of witnesses, I hereby make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER The facts herein are based upon the pleadings and admissions therein. Respondent, a corporation licensed to do business in the State of Alabama, is engaged in the manufacture of jeans and dungarees at its Selma, Alabama, facility, the only facility involved in this proceeding. During a I-year representative period, Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business operations described above, purchased and received goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 which were shipped directly to it from points outside the State of Alabama. During the same period, Respondent shipped and sold goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside the State of Alabama. As conceded by Respondent and based upon the foregoing, it is concluded and found that the Respondent is, and has been at all times material herein, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED I International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, the Union, is and has been at all times material herein a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES Preliminary Facts The General Counsel's allegations for paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 of the complaint are as set out herein: 6 All production and maintenance employees, includ- ing packers, employed by Respondent at its Selma, Alabama, plant ; excluding office clerical employees, plant clerical employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 7 On April 13, 1972 a majority of the employees of Respondent in the unit described in paragraph 6, above, by secret-ballot election conduct in Case No. 15-RC-4815, under the supervision of the Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region of the National Labor Relations Board, designated and selected the Union as their representative for the purposes of collective bargaining with Respondent and on April 21, 1972, the Regional Director certified the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in said unit. 8 At all times since on or about April 13, 1972, and continuing to date, the Union has been, and is now, the representative for the purposes of collective bargaining of a majority of the employees in the unit described in paragraph 6, above, and, by virtue of Section 9(a) of the Act, has been, and is now, the exclusive representa- tive of all employees in said unit for the purposes of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, I The facts are based upon the pleadings and admissions therein UNOCO APPAREL, INC. wages, hours of employment and other terms and conditions of employment. The facts as pled by the General Counsel in complaint paragraphs 6, 7, and 8, are established by the pleadings, admissions therein, and conclusions to be drawn there- from. I so conclude and find that the facts alleged in the General Counsel's complaint paragraphs 6, 7, and 8, set forth above, are the facts established. The General Counsel alleged in paragraph 9 of his complamt as follows: Commencing on or about May 1, 1972, and at all times thereafter to date, the Union requested, and has continued to request, Respondent to meet and bargain collectively with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment for all employees in the unit described in paragraph 6, above. The Respondent denied the above allegation. The facts, however, reveal no real issue as to the Union's requests for bargaining. It is clear that the Union, by letter to Eckerling (one of Respondent's owners), initiated a bargaining request, that thereafter the Union contacted Mark L. Taliaferro, Sr. (Respondent's attorney) and scheduled various bargaining sessions, and that bargaining sessions occurred on May 15 and 23, June 12, August 3 and 29, September 13, and on October 23, 1972. The facts reveal that around November 13, 1972, the Union was advised that the complaint in the instant case was going to be issued. On November 13, 1972, Dansavage (for the Union) called Mark L. Taliaferro, Sr., and asked for another meeting date. Taliaferro told Dansavage that he understood that the NLRB was going to issue a complamt, that they might as well just go and try the case, that he had nothing new to offer, and that he did not want to attend a union meeting or a monkey show. Dansavage continued to seek a meeting date, and the parties agreed to meet on November 30, 1972. Taliaferro sent the Union the following letter on November 27, 1972. THOMAS, TA.LIAFERRO, FORMAN, BURR & MURRAY Sixteenth Floor Bank For Savings Building Birmingham, Alabama 35203 Telephone 323-7711 Area Code 205 November 27, 1972 Mr. Benny Dansavage 929 Linwood Road Birmingham, Alabama 35222 Re: Unoco Apparel, Inc Dear Mr. Dansavage: You called me without any knowledge of the docket in front of me and I find it is not convenient to meet with you on the 30th of November. I can meet on the 7th of December if this date is satisfactory with you. 605 Sincerely yours, THOMAS, TALIAFERRO, FORMAN, BURR & MURRAY /s/ M. L. Taliaferro M. L. Taliaferro MLT/aw P.S. In view of the union's method of negotiating, we will no longer be willing to share the expense of a meeting hall. Later the parties agreed to meet on December 11, 1972. Thereafter, Dansavage sent Taliaferro the following telegram. call Letters : GQW-2:15 PM Charge To: I.L.G.W.U. TALIAFERRO THOMAS, ESQUIRE 1600 BANK FOR SAVINGS BUILDING BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA 35203 December 8, 1972 DEAR MR. THOMAS: PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT DUE TO A PRESSING MATTER, NOT CONCERNING UNOCO APPAREL, INC., I WILL BE UNABLE TO MEET WITH YOU ON DECEMBER 11, 1972. I WILL CALL YOU AT YOUR OFFICE DURING THE WEEK OF DECEMBER IITH TO ARRANGE FOR ANOTHER MEETING. THANK YOU, BENNIE DANSAVAGE STATE DIRECTOR OF ALABAMA (REPORT DELIVERY) Dansavage did not contact Taliaferro during the week of December 11, 1972, or thereafter, as to another bargaining meeting. Between that date and the date of this decision, the Union's unfair labor practice charges and the NLRB complaint thereon have been pending. Respondent sent to the Union on December 22, 1972, what purports to be an unaudited financial report. On February 12, 1973, the Union sent to Respondent's lawyer, a telegraphic response, concerning such unaudited financial report. Considering all of the foregoing, I conclude and find that the Union on May 1, 1972. requested Respondent to bargain collectively with respect to the appropriate bargaining unit, and has continuously thereafter requested and pursued collective bargaining with the Respondent. The last specific request for a scheduled meeting occurred prior to December 11, 1972. However, in view of the unfair labor practice charges, the pending complaint and trial in this matter, the contentions of the parties at negotiation sessions, and the mutual obligations of the parties to bargain collectively, it is clear that the Union's overall conduct constituted a continuing demand for collective bargaining. I so conclude and find. The facts are not in real dispute and may be summarized as follows: 1. Dansavage (for the Union) and Mark L. Taliaferro, Sr. (for the Respondent), sometime in early May 1972, agreed that the first bargaining session would occur on May 15, 1972. Dansavage and Taliaferro also agreed that the parties would share the expenses of a meeting place for the bargaining sessions. The parties thereafter met on May 606 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 15 (for approximately 1-1/2 hours), on May 23 (for approximately 2 hours), on June 12 (for approximately 1 to 1-1/2 hours), on August 3, 1972 (for approximately 1/2 hour), on August 29, 1972 (for approximately 1-1/2 hours), on September 23, 1972 (for approximately 40 minutes), and on October 23, 1972 (for approximately 30 minutes). The meetings were all held in Selma, Alabama, away from the premises of Respondent. 2. The persons representing the Respondent at all of the bargaining sessions were Taliaferro and Bamberg. The persons representing the Union at the May 15, 23, June 12, and August 3 meetings were Dansavage (International representative), Willie Chisholm (organizer) and a commit- tee of five employees. The same persons and Goodman (union counsel) represented the Union at the bargaining session on August 29, 1972. On September 13 and October 23, 1972, the same persons, plus Goodman and 10 other employees on the employee committee represented the Union. 3. Dansavage and Tahaferro agreed informally before the first bargaining sessions that the parties would share the costs of a meeting place. Thereafter, the Union paid for the meeting place for the sessions on May 15, June 12, August 29, and October 23, 1972. The Respondent paid for the meeting place for the sessions on May 23, August 3, and September 3, 1972. At the August 29, 1972, bargaining session Goodman (counsel for the Union) suggested that the next meeting be held in Atlanta, Georgia. Tahaferro for the Respondent would not agree to this, indicating that the meetings should be held where the Company was located. On November 27, 1972, Tahaferro (Respondent's coun- sel) wrote Dansavage of the Union, related in effect that he had agreed to meet on November 30 without having knowledge of the docket that was in front of him, related that it was not convenient to meet on November 30 but that he could meet with the Union on December 7, 1972, and set forth "In view of the union's method of negotiat- ing, we will no longer be willing to share the expense of a meeting hall." 4. At the first bargaining session on May 15, 1972, Dansavage sketched out generally the Union' s aims as to securing better wages, fringe benefits, and employment conditions for employees. This discussion clearly indicated a desired range of wages increases and may be said to have outlined a perimeter of demand thereto. Dansavage then presented to Respondent a written standard type contract proposal, to be used as a guide in arriving at a contract. This written proposal did not specify the actual wage demands. There was thus some general discussion of contract provisions at this session. At the second bargaining session on May 23, 1972, the Respondent presented to the Union a document. This document purported to be a grouping of contractual proposals which would constitute a substantial part of a contract as proposed but did not purport to be a proposal of a complete contract. Tahaferro indicated to Dansavage (for the Union) that he would furnish additional language for the proposal the next week. At the session on June 12, 1972, Dansavage asked Tahaferro for the additional language for Respondent's contractual proposal which Respondent had promised. Taliaferro told Dansavage that he did not have any additional language to present at this time, that his secretary had gone on vacation. Between May 23, 1972, and February 13, 1973, the time of the trial in this matter, Tahaferro did not furnish the additional contractual language (in writing) that he had promised Dansavage. At the last bargaining session on October 23, 1972, Dansavage again asked Taliaferro for the additional contract language he had promised. Taliaferro told Dansavage that there was no sense in giving additional language, that the Union hadn't done anything with the language already given. Although during the sessions there were some agreements made concerning the Union's and Respondent's proposals, there were no significant propos- als made by Respondent otherwise. 5. The initial bargaining postures of the parties as revealed by their proposals and comments thereto may be summarized as follows: The Union's initial posture was the presentation of a standard type contract as a guide and the seeking of substantial wage and fringe benefits. The standard type contract contained detailed provisions as to employee rights and benefits and union-security and checkoff provisions. The Respondent's initial posture was the presentation to the Union of status quo provisions, same wages and benefits, excepting that the management rights clause eliminated certain rights accorded an exclu- sive bargaining representative as a matter of law, and excepting the fact that the conditions would be embodied in a written contract. There was no significant change in the bargaining postures or positions throughout the seven bargaining sessions and until the date of trial in this matter. During the seven bargaining sessions , the parties discussed the proposals and reached agreement with respect to a number of items. As to other proposals, there was adequate discussion and reasons offered for positions thereto as to some of such proposals. As to some of the proposals, Tahaferro gave a flat no, commented in effect as to some proposals that "it stinks," and as to some essentially refused to discuss the proposals. Some of the Union's representatives also made com- ments to the same effect about some of the company proposals. Tahaferro, throughout the bargaining sessions, took the position that Respondent would not offer increased wage or fringe benefits. Tahaferro repeatedly stated that the Respondent was a new company and that it did not have enough experience to know whether it could or could not afford a wage increase. With respect to this, it is noted that Dansavage, during the bargaining sessions, on May 23, 1972, pointed out that the Union had information to the effect that Respondent was a subsidiary of Universal Coveralls which was not a new company and that they should certainly know whether or not the company was going to make a profit. Tahaferro told Dansavage that he didn't know that they "are a part of anything." On June 12, 1972, the Union requested profit-and-loss information from Respondent. On August 3, 1972, the Union, by telegram, again requested such information. No informa- tion purporting to supply the above information was given the Union until mid-December 1972. As indicated later UNOCO APPAREL, INC. 607 herein, I find that Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by its refusal to timely furnish relevant information concerning its financial records relating to its reasons in support of its wage offers. The Union also requested other information from the Respondent. I have considered all of the evidence thereto and am persuaded that the evidence relating to such requested information (wage rates, etc.) does not reveal bad-faith bargaining. There is a dispute as to whether the Union requested the average earnings of individual employees or the average earnings of all employees Considering the language on the Union's August 3 telegram as to average earning of all employees and the failure to complain to Respondent as to the information ultimately furnished, I am convinced that the totality of the evidence supports Taliaferro's testimony and the Respon- dent's contentions that the request was not made as to average earnings of individuals. 6. Since the major issue of bad-faith bargaining requires a consideration of totality of evidence, I find it proper to briefly refer to certain other facts adduced which came within the ambit of the General Counsel's conten- tions but which I do not find to be sufficient to reveal overall bad-faith bargaining. At one of the later bargaining sessions a dispute arose over whether Bamberg had perjured himself by testifying in an NLRB representation hearing that there were no supervisors, and by submitting a document at the bargain- ing sessions indicating that there were five supervisors. No real issue developed in the bargaining sessions as to whether the individuals were or were not supervisors. At the bargaining sessions Tahaferro and Goodman, the union lawyer, argued about the Union's accusation that Bamberg had perjured himself, about Respondent's being cross-examined during bargaining about this matter, and about court actions that might be involved. I do not find this incident or argument to be indicative of overall bad- faith bargaining since no genuine issue as to the status of the five employees referred to on the document as supervisors continued. During the bargaining sessions, the parties discussed whether Respondent had unilaterally cut some wage rates. The wage rates cuts were rescinded, but the employees involved were not paid back wages for the cuts. Essentially, Tahaferro's position at the bargaining sessions was that the wage rate cuts would be rescinded but no backpay would be paid. The General Counsel had elected prior to the trial not to litigate the question of the wage cuts as an unfair labor practice. Without, at least, a background determina- tion that the wage rate cuts were unlawful, which the General Counsel's election not to proceed thereupon as an unfair labor practice prevents, the evidence is insufficient to reveal that Respondent's conduct at the bargaining sessions as regards such wage cuts is that of bad-faith bargaining. The General Counsel adduced evidence relating to remarks by Plant Manager Bamberg shortly after the NLRB election results in the representation election. Thus Bamberg on April 14, 1972, apparently told a newspaper reporter that the election results were unbelievable, that "as far as the plant's future, I do not know." I am not persuaded that these remarks are persuasive to reveal that the bargaining by Respondent was that of bad-faith bargaining. During the bargaining sessions, apparently when being pushed by the Union's attorney as to the meaning of Respondent's management rights proposals and as to Respondent's discouragement of union membership there- from, Tahaferro remarked that Respondent might try to discourage union membership and want another election Considering the totality of the evidence, Respondent's proposal concerning the recognition of the Union, and the fact that Respondent did not question the Union's status, I am persuaded that these remarks, although ill chosen, do not reveal a bad-faith intent as to bargaining. There is a dispute as to whether, before the June 12, 1972, bargaining session, Tahaferro told Dansavage that he didn't know how Respondent expected him to get a contract since it gave him nothing to offer. I credit Dansavage's testimony as to such remarks. Although Tahaferro denied such remarks in his testimony, the attitude expressed is consistent with the hard-nosed posture he took in the bargaining sessions . I am not persuaded that Tahaferro knowingly misstated the facts. Rather, I am persuaded that his memory of what occurred on such occasion is not as reliable as Dansavage's. I am not persuaded that such remarks reveal that Respondent's overall bargaining was in bad faith. Conclusion Whether or not a Respondent bargains in bad faith and with no intention of entering into a final and binding contract requires a consideration of the totality of all the facts and a valued judgment based thereupon. The facts are not in real dispute. The essential thrust of the facts has been presented. The ultimate conclusionary factual deter- mination that I make is that the overall facts are not sufficient to reveal that Respondent has bargained in an overall manner in bad faith and with no intention to enter into a final and binding agreement. The above conclusion is not completely free from doubt. I have considered all of the fact, including facts which are indicative of bad-faith bargaining. When parties are engaged in hard bargaining, it is clear that they know that final results will not come quickly and easily. Respondent's withdrawal from its agreement to share the expenses of the meeting place on November 27, 1972, is indicative of bad- faith bargaining. The failure to give reasons for its positions as to some of the proposals excepting to say "it stinks" is also indicative of bad-faith bargaining. The failure to timely furnish contract language proposals when promised is also indicative of bad-faith bargaining. However, as I see the facts, the bargaining sessions reveal that neither party has altered substantially its overall posture. The Respondent's written partial proposal offered on May 23, 1972, included proposals covering a substantial number of items included in many contracts. The agree- ments made between the Respondent and the Union are not insubstantial despite the fact that the parties' overall postures remain the same. It is clear that wages constituted a critical issue . It is clear that Respondent's refusal to timely furnish relevant information relating to its reason 608 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD for its wage offers has a substantial bearing upon the question or progress of resolution of the wage issue question. The overall facts, however, reveal that the parties have jockeyed for position as to the main issues. Each party has attempted to make the other party move substantially on the wage issue without substantial move- ment on its own position. Each party has remained substantially fixed on its wage demands. The Respondent's contract proposals, its revealed posi- tion as to wages and benefits, and the agreements made are strongly indicative that Respondent would be willing to sign a contract consistent thereto. As to the indicia of bad- faith bargaining previously referred to, I am not persuaded that such are sufficient to reveal that Respondent has bargained in an overall manner in bad faith and with intent not to agree to or enter into a final and binding agreement. I conclude and find that the facts do not reveal that Respondent has bargained in an overall manner in bad faith and with an intent not to agree to or enter into a final and binding agreement in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. The Refusal To Furnish Information The Respondent gave the Union its contract proposal (a partial proposal) at the May 23, 1972, bargaining session. The subject of Respondent's wage offer was first discussed at this session. What occurred thereto is revealed by the following excerpts from Dansavage's credited testimony. After glancing through the company's proposal, I said, I don't see anything in here that you are proposing that you are not already doing or already paying. I pointed out that I felt there was going to be an increase in the Federal Minimum and that we shouldn't have to sit around and wait until the Federal Minimum was increased, we should go ahead and try to negotiate higher Minimums. Mr. Taliaferro informed me that he did not know that there would be an increase in the Federal Minimums, that his client did not give him anything to offer, and, that it was a new business and that the company hadn't received or hadn't had a reasonable picture as of yet. I then again asked him if he had any increase in money or any increase in contract minimums. Mr. Taliaferro informed me that they did not. The subject of wages was again discussed at the June 12, 1972, bargaining session. What occurred thereto is revealed by the following excerpts from Dansavage's credited testimony. Q. Tell us what was discussed next? A. I then asked him again if he had any money to offer, or any fringes or changes. Mr. Taliaferro told me that the company's position would not be altered. He says, there is no money, no changes, no fringes. The company's position will not be altered. Q. Will you continue with the discussion. A. He went on to say that the company has not been in business long enough, that they didn't know what was happening yet, that the company didn't know if they were losing money but that the owner said they were going to be in the black. Q. Any response to that? A. I told Mr. Taliaferro that the company was here in Selma for about six or seven months and surely with their experience that they should have some knowledge of knowing whether or not they are going to have a profit. Mr. Taliaferro said that they wouldn't have any financial offer to give. They don't know what they can afford. Q. Would you continue. A I then asked Mr. Taliaferro if he had any money to offer or any fringes or any increases. Mr. Taliaferro informed me that the employees came to the wrong well, that the well is dry. One of the employees said, if the well is dry, one of the Committee girls says, if the well is dry how come we are working ourselves to death and all of those pants are being shipped out of the back door. There was no response to that. At that point, I asked Mr. Taliaferro if he would supply the Union with a copy of the Profit and Loss Statement. Q. You recall the response? A. Mr. Taliaferro said he would let me know. Taliaferro's testimony as to the position he took on wages and his asserted reasons is revealed by the following excerpts from his testimony: Q. Did you ever say neither you or the company knew what you could afford to offer? A. No, I did not. I told them that we were not in a position until we had further information as to how the company was doing, and a better way of knowing where we stood to make offers on finances. And as far as affording it, I repeated to them that I knew nothing of the financial condition of the company. I had no reason to inquire, that they paid my fees and that's as far as I needed to inquire. Considering the total consistency of the evidence, the greater preciseness of Dansavage's testimony as to specific events, I find Dansavage's testimony more reliable as to these events and points than Taliaferro's and so credit and find the facts. Taliaferro's testimony, however, consistent with Dansavage's, clearly reveals that Respondent asserted as a reason for its wage offer that Respondent was not in a position to make offers on finances until it had further information as to how the Company was doing and a better way of knowing where it stood. Thereafter, and until December 22, 1972, it is clear that Respondent did not furnish the Union the requested information relative to its asserted reason concerning its wage proposals. On August 2, 1972, the Union by telegram reiterated its request for profit-and-loss information. This telegram was received by Taliaferro on the day of the August 3, 1972, bargaining session. In the bargaining UNOCO APPAREL, INC. 609 session on August 3, 1972, the profit-and-loss information request was discussed as is revealed by the following credited excerpts from Dansavage's testimony. A. Yes. I asked Mr. Tahaferro if he had the information we requested, namely the individual average earnings and the profit and loss statement. He pulled out a telegram and he says, my secretary handed me this telegram as I was leaving for this meeting in Selma and he says, I didn't know you wanted this information. Q. Were you told anything as to the P & L information requested? A. I requested copy of the Profit and Loss Statement and Mr. Taliaferro told me that he didn't know whether he had to furnish us a copy. He didn't know if he would. Then he went on to say, well that he dust wouldn't. Q. You recall what was discussed next? A. I believe I then again asked the company if they had any offers in any money or fringe benefits. Mr. Taliaferro's answer was, no. No changes. The question of wages and the request for profit and loss information was discussed at the August 29, 1972, bargaining session. What occurred with respect thereto is revealed by the following excerpts from the record and Dansavage's credited testimony. MR. KoRETZKY: At the August 29, 1972, negotiation session, Taliaferro and Bamberg represented the company and Dansavage, Chisholm, Attorney David Goodman and the 5-member employee committee represented the Union. The meeting started at about 2 p.m. and lasted about 1-1/2 hours. Goodman began the meeting by asking Taliaferro for the mforrnation he had requested in his August 2 telegram, namely, employee earnings and a profit and loss statement. MR. KORETZKY: At this point, there was discussion relative to the wage or fringe package, but this is not an area of stipulation. The next matter that can be stipulated is that Mr. Goodman asked how long the company had been in business. Taliaferro replied since November 16, 1971. Goodman asked for information on whether the company was making a profit or loss, that he would like to know the financial condition of the company. Taliaferro said this was not available to Goodman. Goodman said he thought he was entitled to this information, and that he may have to file charges if he didn't get it. Taliaferro said he didn't care what Goodman did. and that he would not furnish any financial informa- tion. MR. KoRETZKY: Goodman asked if Unoco wasn't part of a larger company-larger company. Taliaferro replied that it was none of his business. Goodman then asked if any of the owners would be at the next meeting, and would he have any money to offer. Taliaferro said he was negotiating and that there would be no wage increases in the near future. * * * * * Q. (By Mr. Koretzky) Your testimony reflects that at each meeting there were inquiries to the Union relative to the wages and fringe question. Would you tell us at this meeting if you recall at least the initial inquiry relative to wages and fringes. A. Mr. Goodman asked Mr. Taliaferro if they had any money to offer, any fringe benefits. Mr. Taliaferro said, "No, we do not." Mr. Goodman asked him why, and he said, "Because we don't have any at this time." Q. Do you recall whether, at any time later in this meeting, there was any mention of wages and fringes? A. Yes. As a matter of fact, when Mr. Goodman came to wages and in our standard agreement, which is Article VII, page 3, he asked him again about wages, and Mr. Taliaferro said that no, that he had no wages or fringe benefits to offer, that he had nothing more to submit than what he had already submitted. The question of wages and the request for profit-and-loss information was discussed at the bargaining session on September 13, 1972, and is revealed by the following excerpts from the record (stipulation). MR. KoRETzKY: Based upon off the record discus- sion, I believe that the following stipulation is accepta- ble to the parties. At the September 13, 1972, meeting, Taliaferro represented the company, the Union was represented by Mr. Dansavage, Goodman, Chisolm, and an employee committee of 15. The meeting started at about 12:30 p.m., and lasted a total of 40 minutes, including a short caucus. During this meeting, Goodman asked for a profit and loss statement, the earnings before and after the rate cut, the individual average earnings and the figures to check the company's averages. And also requested them to make information available on Blue Cross, both as to benefit and cost. As to the financial information, Tahaferro said he would not provide the financial information. On the other information re- quested, Taliaferro said he didn't have it. That he may get it to the Union. That he would write a letter to them. Goodman said that he felt that they were entitled to this information to be able to negotiate, and that he may have to file charges if he didn't provide this information. Taliaferro said to file any damned charges he wanted to file. Goodman asked how long the company had been in business, and Taliaferro said, "It will be a full year in November." 610 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The question of wages and the request for profit-and-loss information was discussed at the October 23, 1972, bargaining session and is revealed by the following excerpts from the record (stipulations). MR. KORETZKY: Based upon the off the record discussion, I would like to propose the following stipulations as to the seventh and final negotiation session as between the parties. And it was held on October 23, 1972, between 12:30 and 1:00 p.m. Taliaferro represented the company, and Dansavage and Goodman- MR. TALIAFERRO: I have not agreed about, to any final, final is frequently used, but it was not final. MR. KORETZKY: The seventh negotiating session, Mr. Taliaferro represented the employer and Dansa- vage, Goodman, Chisolm, and the employee committee of about 11 employees attended on behalf of the Union. Goodman opened by asking if Tahaferro had anything new to offer, wages and holidays, and Talfaferro said no. Goodman asked if he had anything on wages; Taliaferro said he had nothing to offer. Goodman said, "How about hours?" And Taliaferro said, "No, we will work 40 hours" Goodman asked about the profit and loss statement, and Talfaferro said he would not supply them. The Union filed the unfair labor practice charge in this case on October 12, 1972. Said charge averred in effect that Respondent, since on or about May 8, 1972, had refused to supply the Union with certain material and information pertinent to collective bargaining. The Board's complaint in this matter, alleging, in part, unlawful conduct on Respondent's part by refusing to furnish relevant requested information relating to its wage offer reasons was issued on November 20, 1972. Respondent from June 12, 1972, to December 22, 1972, did not furnish to the Union the requested profit and loss information. On December 22, 1972, Respondent furnished to the Union a statement, purporting to be an unaudited financial statement relating to profit and loss information for the Respondent concerning operations from November 15, 1971, to August 31, 1972. Conclusions Considering all of the foregoing, I conclude and find that Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by not timely furnishing, after proper request, relevant information necessary for the Union to bargain intelligent- ly concerning wages and Respondent's asserted reason for its wage offers. An employer does not have to furnish financial records or profit and loss information to a union, even if requested, if such is not relevant to the bargaining issues. If, however, an employer asserts a reason, such as an 2 Tahaferro's remarks about the "well" being dry reveals that his position was postulated on an assumption that Respondent could not afford a wage increase 3 N.LR B v Truitt Manufacturing Co, 351 U S 149 (1956) 4 1 .find it unnecessary to pass upon whether the information furnished inability to pay or a related type reason, in support of his position on wages, the union is normally entitled to such information as will support or disprove such assertion. A realistic appraisal of what Talfaferro asserted as to his reasons for his wage offers and positions is that Talfaferro asserted that his wage offers and positions were based upon the fact that he might be unable to afford a wage offer other than that offered.2 If such information and facts as were available to Respondent would support this assertion, then the assertion would be true, and the parties could proceed accordingly. If such information and facts as were available to Respondent did not support such assertion, then the assertion would be untrue, and the Union could advocate in bargaining arguments contrary to Talfaferro's assertions that he might not be able to afford a wage increase, could advocate and point out specific and supported arguments to the effect that he could make other offers. To hold otherwise would require the Union to accept a premise tantamount to economic justification of Respon- dent's wage offers, even if not true.3 Respondent, by Taliaferro, on June 12, 1972, and thereafter until December 22, 1972, after unfair labor practice charges and complaint relating to such requested information, took the expressed position that it did not have to furnish the profit and loss information and that it was not going to do so. Under such circumstances, the refusal to furnish relevant information when requested is violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. The ultimate furnishing of profit and loss information on December 22, 1972, even if in compliance with the request otherwise, does not negate the fact that an unfair labor practice has occurred. Further, for adequate reasons, the Union can pursue relevant questions thereto relating to reliability thereof even after receipt of such information.4 IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth, in section III, above, occurring in connection with the Respondent's operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate and substantial relationship to trade, traffic and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstruction commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has refused to bargain collectively with the Union by refusing to furnish relevant information and financial records to support its asserted reason for its wage offers as being because it might not be able to afford a wage increase, it will be recommended that the Respondent, upon request, furnish relevant information and financial records relating to such asserted reason. on December 22. 1972. if timely furnished , adequately responded to the Union's request for information See Metlox Manufacturing Co, 153 NLRB 1388 (1965), enfd 378 F 2d 728, (C A 9, 1967). cert denied 389 U S 1037 (1967) UNOCO APPAREL, INC. Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Unoco Apparel, Inc., the Respondent, is an employ- er engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, is, and has been at all times material herein, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All production and maintenance employees, includ- ing packers, employed by Respondent at its Selma, Alabama, plant; excluding office clerical employees, plant clerical employees, professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. At all times since on or about April 13, 1972, and continuing to date, the Union has been, and is now, the representative for the purpose of collective bargaining of a majority of the employees in the unit described above, and, by virtue of Section 9(a) of the Act, has been, and is now, the exclusive representative of all employees in said unit for the purposes of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment. 5. By refusing to furnish, upon request, relevant information and financial records to justify its asserted reason for offering to agree to only the current wages and fringe benefits, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER -5 Respondent, Unoco Apparel, Inc., its officers , agents, successors, and assigns, shall- I. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit, by failing, upon request, to furnish said Union with such information and other relevant material (to support Respondent's claim that its wage offers are based upon the fact that it might not be able to afford any wage increase) as will enable the Union to discharge its function as the statutory representative of Respondent's employees in the appropriate bargaining unit set out below: The appropriate bargaining unit is: All production and maintenance employees, includ- ing packers, employed by Respondent at its Selma, Alabama, plant, excluding office clerical employees, plant clerical employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective 611 bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. (b) In any like manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaran- teed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which it is found will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, furnish said Union with such informa- tion and other relevant material in support of Respon- dent's claim that its wage offers are based upon the fact that it might not be able to afford any wage increase as will enable the Union to discharge its function as the statutory representative of Respondent's employees. (b) Post at Respondent's plant at Selma, Alabama, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."6 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 15, after being duly signed by Respondent's representatives, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by Respondent for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ- ing all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 15, in writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the allegations of unlawful conduct not specifically found to be violative herein be dismissed. 5 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 10246 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions and Order , and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 6 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the international Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, by failing to furnish said Union with such information and other relevant material as will enable the Union to discharge its function as a statutory representative of our employees in the appropriate unit described below. WE WILL NOT in any like manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. The appropriate bargaining unit is: 612 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD All production and maintenance employees, including packers, employed by Respondent at its Selma, Alabama, plant ; excluding office clerical employees, plant clerical employees , professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. WE WILL, upon request, furnish the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, with relevant information and other relevant material to substantiate our claim that our wage offers are based upon the fact that we might not be able to afford any wage increase. UNoco APPAREL, INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material . Any questions concern- ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Plaza Tower, 1001 Howard Avenue, Suite 2700, New Orleans, Louisiana 70113, Telephone 504-527-6361.