Raven Industries, Inc.

RAVEN INDUSTRIES, INC. Raven Industries, Inc. and Local 605, Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO. Case 18- CA-3841 February 28, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS On September 28, 1973, Administrative Law Judge Stanley N. Ohlbaum issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep- tions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record- and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, with the modification below.2 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Raven Industries , Inc., Huron, South Dakota, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order as so modified: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Withdrawing recognition from or failing and refusing to bargain in good faith with Local 605, Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, while that Union is lawfully entitled to recognition as the bargaining representative of the following appro- priate bargaining unit of Respondent's employees: All production and maintenance employees em- ployed by Raven Industries, Inc., at its Huron, South Dakota, operation ; excluding office cleri- cals, experimental engineers, engineers, salesmen, ' The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge . It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C A. 3). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. 2 The Administrative Law Judge in his recommended Remedy provided that the Respondent should be required to execute and sign the collective- bargaining contract agreed to on January 30, 1973, effective as of the date it is actually executed by Respondent. In our opinion such a requirement would extend the agreed -upon term of the collective-bargatnmg contract and would amount to a change of a substantive contractual provision While the Board clearly has the power under the Act to require the parties 335 executive managers, supervising managers, guards and supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and all other employ- ees. (b) Refusing upon request of the aforesaid Union to sign the collective-bargaining agreement as re- quested by the Union at the parties' meeting on January 30, 1973. (c) Assisting or encouraging employees to circulate, file, or process a petition or other document seeking to decertify the aforesaid Union and to undermine its status as the duly authorized collective-bargaining representative of Respondent's employees in the aforedescribed unit. (d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organiza- tions, to join or assist the above-named or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and to refrain from any or all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, forthwith execute and sign the collective-bargaining contract agreed to on January 30, 1973, and give retroactive effect to the terms and conditions of the contract from January 30, 1973, with interest at 6 percent per annum for the loss of any benefits which would have accrued to the employees under the contract Respondent refused to sign. (b) If no such request is made, then, upon request, bargain collectively with Local 605, Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the appropriate unit and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed contract. (c) Post at its place of business at Huron, South Dakota, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."3 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 18, after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized to negotiate, the Act does not envision that the Board require a company or a union to agree to a substantive provision not embodied in the collective- bargaining agreement. See H. K Porter Company, Inc v. N.L R B, 397 U S. 99 (1970). Accordingly, we have modified the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge by substituting an Order which accords with our normal remedies in cases of this type. See Yellow Front Stores, 205 NLRB No 64. 3 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 209 NLRB No. 66 336 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicu- ous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 18, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After trial before an Administrative Law Judge of the National Labor Relations Board, at which all sides had the opportunity to be heard, it has been decided that we, Raven Industries, Inc., violated the National Labor Relations Act. We have therefore been ordered to post this notice and to carry out its terms. The National Labor Relations Act guarantees to employees the right to join and to help unions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice, to act collectively with other employees in bargaining with employers, and to be free from interference, restraint, coercion, or threat because of the exercise of any of those rights or any other rights under the Act. The Act also guarantees employees the right to refrain from exercising those rights, if they so choose. It is up to the employees themselves, without interference from their employer or anybody else. Accordingly, we assure you that from now on: WE WILL NOT violate any of your rights listed above. WE WILL, so long as Local 605, Allied Industri- al Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is your duly authorized bargaining representative, continue to recognize that Union , and meet and bargain with it in good faith concerning your wages and other terms and conditions of employment and embody in a signed agreement any understanding reached. WE WILL, upon request, execute and sign the collective-bargaining contract agreed to on Janu- ary 30, 1973, and give retroactive effect to the terms and conditions of the contract from January 30, 1973, with interest at 6 percent per annum for the loss of any benefits which would have accrued to the employees under the contract Respondent refused to sign. WE WILL NOT assist or encourage our employ- ees to circulate, file, or process,any petition or other paper to decertify your Union or to undermine it as your bargaining representative. The bargaining unit is: All production and maintenance employees employed by Raven Industries, Inc., at its Huron, South Dakota, operation; excluding office clericals, experimental engineers, engi- neers, salesmen, executive managers, super- vising managers, guards and supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and all other employees. RAVEN INDUSTRIES, INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compli- ance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 316 Federal Building, 110 South 4th Street, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401, Telephone 612-725-2611. DECISION Preliminary Statement STANLEY N. OHLBAUM, Administrative Law Judge: This proceeding 1 under the National Labor Relations Act as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (Act), was tried before me in Huron, South Dakota, on August 9 and 10, 1973, with all parties participating throughout by counsel, who were afforded full opportunity to present evidence and conten- tions, as well as to file briefs received on September 24, 1973, after extension of time granted on application of counsel. Record and briefs have been carefully considered. The basic issues are whether Respondent Raven Indus- tries, Inc. (Employer), violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by withdrawing recognition from and failing and refusing to bargain with the Charging Party Union as the duly designated collective-bargaining representative of an appropriate bargaining unit of Respondent's employees; I Upon complaint of the National Labor Relations Board's Acting Regional Director for Region 18, issued July 16 growing out of charge filed April 17, 1973, by the above Charging Party RAVEN INDUSTRIES, INC. by failing and refusing to execute a duly bargained collective agreement accepted by the Union; and by assisting and encouraging its unit employees to have the Union decertified as bargaining representative. Upon the entire record and my observation of the testimonial demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following: Findings and Conclusions I. JURISDICTION At all material times, Respondent Raven Industries, Inc., has been and is a South Dakota corporation with principal offices and place of business in Sioux Falls and a manufacturing plant in Huron, South Dakota, engaged primarily in manufacture and sale of parachutes, military balloons, electronic components, sportswear, and plastics. In the course and conduct of that business during the representative year immediately preceding issuance of the complaint, Respondent's sales exceeded $10 million, of which goods valued in excess of $5 million were sold and shipped by Respondent directly in interstate commerce from its facilities within South Dakota to customers outside of South Dakota; and, during the same period, Respondent purchased goods and materials valued in excess of $4 million of which it received in South Dakota, directly from points outside of South Dakota, goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000. I find that at all material times Respondent has been and is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act; and that the Charging Party has been and is a labor organization as defined in Section 2(5) thereof. II. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Facts as Found 1. Refusal to bargain at plant location, refusal to execute negotiated agreement, and withdrawal of Union recognition Following a Board-conducted secret ballot election held on September 29, 1971 (Case 18-RC-8743), the Charging Party Union was certified by the Board's Regional Director on February 2, 1972, as the duly authorized collective-bargaining representative of a bargaining unit of the production and maintenance employees employed at Respondent's Huron, South Dakota, plant. When the Union thereupon requested Respondent to meet and bargain, Respondent refused to do so in Huron (the location of the plant containing the bargaining unit), but only at its main facility in Sioux Falls, about 120 miles distant. After the Union thereupon filed a charge with the Board based upon Respondent's refusal to bargain with its Huron employees other than at Sioux Falls (Case 18-CA-3533), Respondent agreed to bargain in good faith 2 Trial transcript. p. 340: Q Mr. Stavig, with regard to the matter of sick leave and sick pay, isn't it a fact that the company policy as set forth on Pages 4 and 5 of General Counsel's Exhibit 3 ... has at all tunes been in effect and 337 at Huron and to sign any agreement reached, to that end executing a settlement agreement approved by the Board's Regional Director on June 16, 1972 (about 4-1/2 months after the Board's certification date), and subsequently posted a notice to employees to that effect dated June 27, 1972 (about 5 months following the Union's certification). Thereafter, commencing on June 27, 1972, approximate- ly 10 bargaining sessions were held until January 30, 1973. On the latter date, when the Union presented what it considered to be an agreed draft for signature, it developed that there appeared to be an incomplete meeting of the minds thereon. As a result, further discussions were had, until the Union on April I1 informed Respondent that it (the Union) would execute the agreement on Respondent's version and terms. Thereupon Respondent refused to execute the agreement on the ground that the Union's "year of certification" had expired and it no longer represented the employees. Meanwhile, on February 9, 1973, with some assistance, if not encouragement, from Respondent, a decertification petition had been filed by a unit employee (Case 18-RD-555) and later withdrawn. Respondent's defense centers around its contentions that it fulfilled its legal obligations to the Union by bargaining in good faith with it during the "certification year" and while the Union represented the employees; that *ere was never any "meeting of the minds" as a result of the bargaining; and that when the Union agreed to all of Respondent's terms, on April 11, 1973 (G.C. Exh. 11), it was too late since the Union no longer represented the employees. Respondent also denies that it in any way assisted or encouraged any decertification petition against the Union. There was abundant testimony at the hearing concerning the parties' negotiations between June 27, 1972, and January 30, 1973. For purposes of the issues here presented, it is unnecessary to review those negotiations in detail. Among other subjects discussed at the negotiations was the matter of "sick pay" (i.e., paid brief illness) and of "sick leave" (i.e., unpaid sick leave thereafter). It is to be noted, in this connection, that Respondent's "Employee Information Booklet" (G.C. Exh. 3), containing its personnel policies and rules, distributed to its employees, and concededly in effect at all times here material and still in effect nowt contains explicit provisions on these two subjects (G.C. Exh. 3, pp. 4-5), tying paid sick leave to job longevity. Crediting General Counsel's numerous witness- es, I find that the negotiators had in fact agreed on and prior to November 21, 1972, that the matter of "sick pay" and "sick leave" (as above described) would `remain as it is"-as in fact it concededly has.3 The subject was, however, omitted from a subsequent contract draft received by the Union and employee negotiators from Respondent on December 26, 1972; since this omission was caned forward in a subsequent draft received from Respondent, the Union and employee negotiators pointed it out to Respondent's negotiators at the January 30, 1973, session, remained in effect at Raven Industries? A. [By Respondent witness David Stavig, Respondent's vice- president and manager of its Sportswear Division I Correct Supra, fn. 2. 338 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD intended as a final session for execution of the contract. But since the principal Employer negotiator, its attorney, was not present at that (January 30, 1973) meeting because of illness, the remaining Employer negotiators took the position that they would have to consult with the Employer's attorney with regard to that omission; Thus- -and I find-at the conclusion of the parties' January 30, 1973, meeting, the only subject allegedly remaining "open" was the aforedescribed omission regarding "sick pay" and "sick leave," which, I further find the parties had prior thereto agreed would remain unchanged-as in fact it has4-as described in Respondent's "Employee Informa- tion Booklet" (G.C. Exh. 3, pp.4-5). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the parties have not met since January 30 (although they have had discussions), Respondent taking the position since then that the parties were-in "disagreement over the sick pay"-a position I find to be spurious and without merit. As already indicated, when the Union thereafter offered to execute the agree- ment in the form presented by Respondent, Respondent took the position that it was too late since the Union no longer represented the employees. On this aspect of the case, I find that Respondent's failure and refusal to execute an agreement with the Union at all times on and since January 30, 1973, including April 11-12, 1973, has been in bad faith, as well as in violation of its settlement agreement executed on June 16, 1972 (G.C. Exh. 2B and "Notice to Employees" thereto annexed).5 2. Assistance and encouragement to employees to decertify the Union Passing to the allegations concerning Respondent's • sponsorship of, and assistance and encouragement to, the petition to decertify the Union, on and since February 1, 1973, I find the facts to be as follows. Carol Pribyl, a long-term employee of Respondent, is a member of the bargaining unit here involved. According to her testimony, on or about February 2, 1973 (i.e., precisely one year from the date of the Union's certification by the Board), she approached and informed Respondent's Personnel Manager Conradi that she and other employees wished to "get the union out" or have another election .6 Still according to Pribyl, she thereafter received from Respondent's Huron Plant Manager McDonald a decerti- fication petition (G.C. Exh. 8) all filled in and typed out, together with a letter from one Pruitt, a Sioux Falls 4 See In 2, supra. S I reject Respondent's contention at the trial, in the testimony of its witness David Stavig-whose credibility, because of repeated hedging and observed demeanor, impressed me adversely-that if G.C Exhs. 4B and 4C ("Piece Work Policy," 4C dealing with computation of rates-the Employer's own document) were simply appended to G.C Exh. 4A (the basic collective agreement) "chaos" would result because they are mutually inconsistent. By no means is this so. It is undisputed that the Union had agreed to continue the existing wage structure without change In light of this fact and confronted with the explicit provision to that effect in the basic collective agreement (G C. Exh 4A, p. It, art. XIV, sec. 1), Stavig blusteringly pretended not to be able to understand it It is furthermore apparent that (1) no wage changes are called for by G.C Exh . 4B or 4C, and that G.C Exh 4C is Respondent's own existing wage structure for piece rates Thus, there is no reason why G.C Exhs. 4B and 4C cannot be appended to the basic collective agreement (G C Exh. 4A), as is commonly encountered in collective agreements, since as General Counsel witnesses testified and I attorney whom she had and has never met, seen or spoken or written to, and who had been retained by Respondent's Personnel Manager Conradi; and at the same time Respondent's Plant Manager McDonald also handed her a typed statement, dated February 5, 1973, repudiating the Union and requesting an election, for the collection of signatures from other employees.? Pnbyl concedes that at no time did she supply to Attorney Pruitt any of the information contained on either of these forms-or, indeed, any information of any kind, since she never met or communicated with Pruitt. It is further to be noted that Pnbyl also executed and, together with the foregoing papers prepared for her as described, forwarded to the Board's Regional Director, a formal "Notice of Designa- tion of Representative of Agent for Service of Docu- ments," with the "representative" designated being Res- pondent's Personnel Manager Conradi (G.C. Exh. 9). According to Pribyl's testimony at the hearing, Conradi's name was on the document when she received and signed it, and she regarded Conradi as her representative in this matter. Various employees testified that they saw the Pribyl petition to oust the Union being passed along up and down the worklines during worktime at Respondent's Huron plant on or about February 6 or 7 and at an accessory temporary operation ("fairgrounds," a part of the unit here), while no supervisor was present for seemingly extraordinary lengths of time.8 Out of 106 employees, 61 names were collected. Under these circumstances, I find that by assisting and consulting in the preparation, procurement and processing of the decertification papers, arranging for procurement of counsel as described, and serving as designated official representative of employee(s) seeking the decertification, Respondent did indeed assist and encourage its employees to have the Union decertified, immediately upon the first anniversary of its certification, against a history of having wrongfully refused to bargain in good faith with the Union for the first five months of that certification year, and while at the same time (circa early February, 1973) professing and pretending to be finalizing negotiations with the Union. B. Discussion Following a secret election under the National Labor Relations Act, the Charging Party Union was certified by find, agreement had been reached with regard to all matters and the Union expressed willingness to accept these proposals 6 There is evidence that Pribyl had been opposed to the Union even before this r According to Pribyl, she later received a bill from Attorney Pruitt for his services, which Pnbyl claims she herself paid 8 The evidence establishes that when several prounion employees reported this to Manager McDonald he had it stopped Respondent's publication "Raven Review," June 1972, distributed to all of its employees, states (G.C Exh. 6, last page) under the caption "Questions About The Union". - Q : What can we do to work against the union? A . You are free to express yourself in anyway you wish and tell your personal experiences. The only rules you must observe are to be sure and hold such discussions during non-work time. Working time is for working. Also, we will not allow anyone to threaten anyone. RAVEN INDUSTRIES, INC. the National Labor Relations Board on February 2, 1972, as the duly elected exclusive collective-bargaming repre- sentive of the production and maintenance employees in Respondent's Huron, South Dakota, factory. Instead of thereupon bargaining in good faith with the Union and the employees' bargaining committee at Huron, Respondent wrongfully refused to bargain with them unless they came to its Sioux Falls location, a round trip of around 250 miles from Huron. Respondent maintained this wrongful posi- tion until formal proceedings under the Act were instituted against it by the Union, resulting in Respondent's agreement to bargain in good faith at Huron, as it should have done in the first place. But meanwhile some 5 months had already, elapsed. When all issues appeared to have been resolved in the ensuing negotiations and the parties -after delays occasioned in part by illness of Respon- dent's principal negotiator-and the parties met on January 30, 1973, ostensibly to execute the final written agreement, Respondent's negotiators took the position that the matter of handling "sick pay" and "sick leave" was still up in the air-which, as here found, it was not-and that it would have to be checked out with Respondent's principal negotiator, who was ill. (The "issue" of "sick pay" and "sick leave," claimed by Respondent's negotiators to be still "up in the air," involved merely the continuation without change of Respondent's existing system, which still exists now.) In the meantime, while still purportedly considering and discussing this "issue" with the Union, Respondent was assisting and encouraging its employees to attempt to have the Union decertified as their bargaining representative. Finally in April, 1973, when the Union stated it would agree to Respondent's position in all particulars and called on Respondent to execute its own agreement on its own terms, Respondent refused on the ground that the "certification year" had expired and that the Union no longer represented the employees. The basic purpose of the Act is, of course, to assure industrial stability, among other things, through encourag- ing collective bargaining. Although the official certification as exclusive collective-bargaining representative which the Board issues to a union which wins a Board-conducted secret election technically is for 1 year (Ray Brooks v. N.L.R.B., 348 U.S. 96, 101-103), it is well understood that that year will be extended if the employer's misconduct eliminates or shortens the union's opportunity to bargain for the full intended year. Mar-Jac Poultry Company, Inc., 136 NLRB 785; Lamar Hotel, 137 NLRB 1271 and 140 NLRB 226, 229, enfd. 328 F.2d 600 (C.A. 5, 1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 817 (1964); Mid-City Foundry Co., 167 NLRB 795; Interstate Brick Company, 167 NLRB 831. This is such a case. Respondent's unjustified refusal to bargain with the Union at Huron for about 5 months following its certification should not be rewarded by cutting down the Union's "certification year" to the remaining 7 months. Nor should any benefit accrue to Respondent for its failure to honor its settlement agreement, wherein it agreed in 339 June 1972 to bargain in good faith with the Union, by refusing for a year from that June 1972 date (Mar-Jac, supra), including on and since January 30, 1973, to execute a bargained collective agreement, even when (in April 1973) the Union agreed to accept it on Respondent's own terms. As found herein, by January 30, 1973, the parties had in fact agreed on all terms of their collective agreement; even according to Respondent's computations this was still within the original "certification year" and Respondent should therefore have executed the agreement. Moreover, when the Union in April 1973 accepted the agreement fully on Respondent's own "terms," this also was well within the extension of the "certification year" as required by the above-cited cases, after subtraction of the initial 5 months (February-June 1972) of Respondent's wrongful refusal to bargain at Huron. The situation is attenuated by Respondent's assistance and encouragement to its employees, within the certification period as extended, to have the Union decertified. In the light of these facts, under any theory Respondent's refusal to recognize or to bargain with the Union during the extension of the certification period, was unlawful, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, and I so find and decide. See, in addition to the cases cited above: Yellow Front Stores d/b/a Sel-Low Discount, 205 NLRB No. 64; Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 199 NLRB; N. L. R. B. v. S. H. Kress & Co., 194 F.2d 444, 446 (C.A.6). Upon the foregoing findings and the entire record, I state the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Jurisdiction is properly asserted in this proceeding. 2. By its conduct set forth and found in "III," supra, Respondent has engaged and is continuing to engage in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended. 3. Said unfair labor practices and each of them have affected, affect, and unless permanently restrained and enjoined will continue to affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. REMEDY Having been found to have violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, Respondent should be ordered to cease and desist from engaging in or continuing such or like violations; and, since the Union has accepted Respon- dent's terms and called upon Respondent to execute the collective agreement accordingly, Respondent should be required to execute such agreement (N.LR.B. v. S. H. Kress & Co., supra), in the form in which the Union requested Respondent's signature on January 30, 1973, 340 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD effective as of the date of Respondent' s actual execution thereof.9 And Respondent should be required to post the usual notice to employees accordingly. 9 It was on January 30, as shown and found, that Respondent should have executed the collective agreement. The Union's April I I expression of willingness in effect to enter into any agreement desired by the Employer was no more than a last desperate gambit or test by the Union of the Employers bona fides -a test which the Employer failed by out-of-hand refusing to execute even such an agreement As heretofore noted, the Employer has in no way at any time changed its existing policies regarding sick pay and sick leave--indeed, they remain today as they have always been. It would be inequitable to hold the Union to the position of desperation which it was willing to take on April 11 but which the Employer refused It is also of interest to note that, after the Employer had early in the negotiations declared that it "like[d] things just the way they are," the final agreement had not even achieved any pay raise whatsoever, with the Union [Recommended Order omitted from publication.] apparently willing to "gain" little more than the bare recognition to which it was entitled by the Board's certification preceding Respondent's 5-month subsequent refusal to bargain at the plant location Under these circum- stances, to require in the recommended Order that this particular agreement be made effective retroactively to January 30 (as, e.g., in Yellow Front Stores d/b/a Sel-Low Discount, supra, would render relief herein nugatory and defeat the purposes of the Act, since the term of any retroactively effective contract could well have expired by the time Respondent complies with any finally enforced Order herein. It is for this reason that the recommended Order will provide that the collective agreement shall be effective as of the date it is actually executed by Respondent, without prejudice to any wage increase or other benefits granted in the interim . Cf Mar Jac, supra, Lamar Hotel, supra; West Coast Liquidators, Inc, 205 NLRB No. 88.