Brahaney Drilling Co.

624 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Brahaney Drilling Company and Local 826, Interna- tional Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO. Case 16-CA-5188 March 13, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND PENELLO On November 14, 1973, Administrative Law Judge Joel A. Harmatz issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed a brief in support of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that Respondent, Brahaney Drilling Company, Odessa, Texas, its officers, agents, succes- sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. I Although not affecting the ultimate conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge, we find merit in Respondent's claim that in his Decision he incorrectly referred to Allstate Construction , Inc, as a drilling contractor. The record supports the Respondent 's contention that Allstate is a dirt contractor Likewise, we agree with Respondent that four of the negotiating sessions which Harman held with the Union on behalf of other contractors during the hiatus period here in question were held with Howell, the Union's business manager, rather than with Fortenberry , as found. These apparently inadvertent errors, however, do not affect any material findings of the Administrative Law Judge. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JOEL A. HARMATZ, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard in Odessa, Texas, on September 27, 1973, upon a charge filed on June 11 , 1973, an amended charge filed on June 25, 1973, a complaint issued on July 24, 1973, and an I Pursuant to motion to correct transcript filed by the General Counsel, and consistent with my recollection , and the sense of the matters set forth in the transcript, I hereby grant said motion , and the transcript is hereby amended 2 Siemons Mailing Service, 122 NLRB 81 ; Brahaney Drilling Company, 176 NLRB 289 amendment thereto filed on September 12, 1973, alleging that Respondent, Brahaney Drilling Company, violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, by, on June 4, 1973, withdrawing recognition from and thereafter refusing to meet with the Union, the certified collective-bargaining representative of unit employees, and, by, on June 4, 1973, without prior consultation or negotiation with said Union, unilaterally granting wage increases to said employees. Thereafter briefs were filed by the Respondent and the General Counsel. Upon the entire record,' including my observation of the witnesses while testifying, and careful consideration of the posthearing briefs, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Respondent, a Texas corporation with its principal office and place of business in Midland, Texas, is engaged in the business of drilling oil and gas wells in the Permian Basin area in Texas and New Mexico. During the calendar year preceding the issuance of this complaint, a representative period, Respondent performed services valued in excess of $50,000, of which amount services valued in excess of $50,000 were performed in States other than the State of Texas. I find that Respondent, at all times material , is and has been an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.2 iI. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The complaint alleges, the answer admits , and I find that Local 826, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, is and has been, at all times material , a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 111. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Issues This is a companion case to Leatherwood Drilling Company, Case 16-CA-5189 (209 NLRB No. 92), issued simultaneously herewith. The issues presented here are substantially identical to those in Leatherwood and anse from a similar fact pattern. Thus, it is undisputed that Brahaney, on June 4, 1973, withdrew recognition and refused to bargain further with the Union as certified bargaining representative of its employees . The General Counsel contends that by said action, and through a contemporaneous unilateral wage increase ,3 Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5). The Respondent claims that these actions were legitimate since supported by a good-faith doubt that the Union represented a majority. In response to the Respondent's affirmative defense, the General Counsel argues that the facts relied on by Respondent fail 3 Respondent admits the allegations relative to the unilateral wage increase. Therefore whether or not such action was violative of Sec 8(a)(5) and (I) turns in its entirety upon the validity or invalidity of the withdrawal of recognition Accordingly, since the unilateral action presents a purely derivative issue, the basis for my ultimate conclusion regarding it will entail no further discussion 209 NLRB No. 93 BRAHANEY DRILLING CO. to substantiate a reasonably based doubt of majority, and, in any event, that Respondent's entire course of conduct reveals that the doubt of majority was not asserted in good faith. B. Concluding Findings 1. Background It is conceded that on September 11, 1968, the Union was certified as exclusive bargaining representative of all derrickmen, motormen and floorhands, otherwise referred to as roughnecks, employed by Respondent in the drilling operations in the area known as the Permian Basin, but excluding all tool pushers, drillers, office employees, technical employees, professional employees, guards, and all supervisors as defined in the Act. That certification resulted from an election conducted in accordance with the eligibility formula first announced in Hondo Drilling Company, 164 NLRB 416. That formula evolved as a result of the high degree of turnover characteristic of the unique pattern of employment among the 50-60 oil well drilling concerns operating in the Permian Basin of Texas and New Mexico. Various contractors situated similarly to Respondent questioned the validity of the so-called Hondo rule and many contested certifications based thereon to the Board and then the courts. Respondent, following the certification and union requests for bargaining, elected also to challenge the certification on this basis, and therefore refused to bargain. On June 2, 1969, the Board issued its Decision and Order,4 upholding the validity of the certification, rejecting Respondent's contentions relative to the Hondo formula, and directing Respondent to bargain with the Union. Respondent refused to comply with this order, electing instead to contest the validity of the certification in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. On October 6, 1970, that court enforced the Board's order.5 By letter dated March 30, 1971, the Union requested a meeting for purposes of collective bargaining. On May 11, 1971, the Union again wrote Respondent, enclosing a copy of the Union's proposed contract. Pursuant to agreement of the parties, the first negotiating session was held on June 22, 1971. Further bargaining sessions were held on January 20, March 14, April 14, July 21, and October 13, 1972. However, no final agreement was reached. Following the meeting in October 1972, the Union, by letter dated April 19, 1973, requested a resumption of negotiations. On June 4, 1973, Respondent, through Brooks Harman, its attorney, answered indicating that Respondent "declines to negoti- ate further for the reason it has a good faith doubt Local 826 represents a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit." At that time, Respondent, without notifying or consulting with the Union, announced a general wage increase to be accorded unit employees. 4 Brahaney Drilling Co. 176 NLRB 289 5 N L R B. v Brahaney Drilling Company, 432 F 2d 1271 (1970). 6 Laystrom Manufacturing Co, 151 NLRB 1482, Frito-Lay. Inc., 151 625 C. Analysis 1. The asserted good-faith doubt Under well-established principles, Respondent's with- drawal of recognition and contemporaneous unilateral action were violations of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, unless the evidence adduced by Respondent establishes that said action was predicated upon objective considera- tions furnishing a reasonably based belief that the Union no longer represented a majority.6 Testimony establishes that the grounds for the doubt of majority were devised by Brooks Harman, Respondent's attorney, and Phil Graves, Respondent's safety engineer and its labor relations representative. Graves testified that he questioned the Union's majority status because of (1) the high turnover rate experienced by the Company at various intervals since the election in 1968, (2) the fact that on visits to drill sites in recent months he did not hear much discussion of the Union among the employees, and (3) the fact that the Union did not communicate with the Company between the last bargaining session on October 12, 1972, and April 19, 1973, a period of 6 months. a. The Union's delay in requesting a resumption of negotiations It is my opinion, that the Union's failure, following the October 1972 meeting , to request a resumption of negotia- tions until some 6 months thereafter , failed to constitute acceptable evidence of a loss of majority. The testimony of Graves makes it clear that the Union's inaction during this period was adopted as a basis for withdrawing recognition on suggestion of Harman. As in the Leatherwood case, I am satisfied that Harman, could not reasonably have held the view that the mere lack of communication from the Union suggested an intent on its part to abandon the Respon- dent's employees. Subject to variations as to dates, personalities, and other facts, my findings and reasoning in this regard are identical to my treatment of the same issue in the Leatherwood case. The following is taken from my decision in Leatherwood and with indicated deletions and appropriate additions appeanng in brackets constitute my findings and conclu- sions on the record in the instant case as to the Union's delay: It is a well-known fact that the effort to organize the employees among the various drilling contractors in the Permian Basin involved a long drawn out, time- consuming effort, involving extensive litigation . Organ- ization, where successful , was attained on a single- employer basis. Upon acceptance as the majority representative, the Union, following unsuccessful at- tempts to establish a multiemployer unit , has sought to negotiate contracts on a single-employer basis . Brooks Harman who impressed me as a man highly familiar with the history of organization by this Union in the Permian Basin, and the difficulties faced by the Union NLRB 28; cf Celanese Corporation of America, 95 NLRB 664, United Electric Company, 199 NLRB 603. 626 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD in that connection, represented several contractors during such negotiations, in addition to [Brahaney]. In his brief to me, he concedes knowledge of the difficulties encountered by the Union in their efforts to organize employees, and to secure and administer contracts covering employees in this area. The Union simply had too little manpower to deal immediately with complexities presented by the diverse policies and attitudes of the companies with whom bargaining would take place, operational variations among these companies, and geographical dispersal of the various employers. From the foregoing, and other facts, I find that Harman, and [Graves], as well, had direct knowledge as to the unlikelihood that the Union would schedule negotiating sessions, without hiatus, until final agree- ment had been reached. [Harman and Graves attended all bargaining sessions involving Respondent and its spokesmen.] That such delays were known [by them] to be inevitable is evident from Respondent's bargaining history. For, while the . . . [Court's decree confirming the Board's bargaining order issued on October 6, 1970, the Union made no request to bargain pursuant thereto until March 26, 1971. Furthermore, after the first bargaining session on June 22, 1971, the Union did not request a further meeting until December 7, 1971, a time lag which not only approximated the period of union inaction under consideration here, but which involved a wasting of the Union's protection from the certification.] This delay was with assent of the Union, and placed Harman and [Graves] on notice that from the Union's point of view, delays would be a part of the negotiation process. It also appears that Harman had a basis for suspecting in the period October 1972 through April 1973 based on his past experience with the Leatherwood negotiations, that the lack of communication from the Union during that period was consistent with the Union's previously mani- fested disinterest in negotiating while an employer's rigs were down. It will be recalled from the Leatherwood case, that the Union agreed to defer negotiations therein in January 1971 for a considerable period of time because Leatherwood's rigs were down. This fact is significant because in the instant negotiations Graves, in Harman's presence, at the meeting of October 13, 1972, told Fortenberry that, with the exception of one rig all the Company's rigs were down, and that when that rig stopped operating, the Company had no further contracts.? It is undisputed on this record that thereafter neither Graves nor Harman informed Fortenberry, when its rigs reverted to normal operating levels. Considering Harman's under- standing of the Union's position with respect to downed rigs as was evident to him from the Leatherwood negotiations, I cannot find that the representations as to Brahaney's operating condition as of October 13, 1972, r Based upon the credited uncontradicted testimony of Fortenberry. It is noted that G.C. Exhs. 6 and 7(a) show that on October 13, 1972, five of the Company's six rigs were not in operation 8 In addition to his attending meetings conducted with Fortenberry as to would have been overlooked by Harman in his assessment of the reasons for the Union's subsequent inaction. [There are additional factors that persuade me that] ... Respondent could [not] reasonably believe that subsequent delays reflected an intention on the part of the Union to abandon the Respondent's employees. This is particularly so, when one considers the fact that in the period [October 1972] through April 1973, Harman was actively engaged in negotiations with the Union on behalf of other drilling contractors, including Allstate Construction, Inc., Chaparral Drilling Co., Hondo Drilling Co., McVay Drilling Co., [and] A. W. Thompson, Inc.... On some [18] occasions between [October 19721 and April 1973, Harman and Forten- berry, in addition to their other responsibilities, met in connection with these negotiations.8 From the evidence relative to these negotiations it is apparent that, as to most of the contractors, there were significant time gaps between bargaining sessions. There is no sugges- tion that in Fortenberry's communications with Har- man during this period, he in any sense created the impression that the Union lacked an interest in attaining a contract with Respondent. On the other hand, Harman knew that Fortenberry was responsible for representation of the Union in further dealings with Respondent, and that during this period, Fortenberry was burdened by other matters. Aside from Respondent's knowledge that delays would be a characteristic of the negotiations, the unreasonableness of its interpretation of the Union's inaction is enforced by the absence of any sensible explanation as to why Respondent would assume that the Union would single out [Brahaney] for abandon- ment, contemporaneous with its efforts to secure bargaining agreements with [Brahaney's] competitors. The Union had long been involved in organization among the crews in the Pernuan Basin. Securing contracts with all contractors in the Basin was obviously its ultimate objective. It defies commonsense to assume that this was not understood by Respondent. Furthermore, Respondent cites no facts, apart from the delay in securing negotiations, which would suggest that the Union's attitude towards it would differ from that of the other organized contractors. Respondent knew, or should have known, that the Union's interest in obtaining agreements covering Respondent's opera- tions was no less than its objectives with 'respect to Respondent's organized competitors. In this regard, it should be noted that the turnover facts asserted by Respondent as evidencing a doubt of majority are in all material respects representative of the experience of all drill companies in this area. They would not so drastically differ with the experience of contractors with whom the Union was actively negotiating during 1972 through 1973, as to warrant a belief by Respon- dent that the Union, being impressed by the turnover these contractors, Harman represented other contractors, as to whom negotiations during that period remained in an open state . These included Rod Ric Corporation and Tn-Service Dulling Co BRAHANEY DRILLING CO. history among Respondent's employees, elected to go away. For the above reasons, I find that Respondent did not, and could not, have held a reasonable belief that the absence of communication from the Union between [October] 1972 and April 1973, either indicat- ed an intention on the part of the Union to abandon the unit, or to otherwise contributed to any belief that the Union had lost its majority. [Footnotes omitted.] b. Employee lack of interest As a factor supporting his doubt of majority, Graves testified that, in his visits to drill sites, he heard no discussions among the crew hands concerning the Union. Graves also testified that he had no knowledge that any employee at any time expressed dissatisfaction with the Union. Therefore it is the sense of Graves' testimony that, as a management representative, his failure to hear employees avowing their union allegiance suggested to him that the employees did not support the Union. Such reasoning is hardly persuasive. It fails to substantiate a reasonably based doubt of majority. In these circum- stances, Respondent's arguments in this regard are rejected as neither constituting nor contributing to a reasonably based doubt of majority. c. Turnover Remaining for consideration are the Respondent's contentions based upon turnover. Summarized the facts offered in support of this claim show: (1) of the 23 names on the 1968 election eligibility list, only 1 individual remains on Respondent's payroll and he occupies a nonunit position; (2) in the 5 years that have passed since the election, the Company employed a total of 1,591 roughnecks, only 30 to 40 of whom left and then returned to the Company's employ, and (3) in the first 5 months of 1973, the Company had employed 160 roughnecks to fill 24 to 36 jobs. Respondent's contentions in this regard are identical to those postulated in the companion Leatherwood Drilling case. The numerical and statistical data on which it relies, though involving varient figures, is not so dramatically different from those presented in Leatherwood as to warrant different conclusions as to their legal significance. Therefore, in rejecting the turnover facts as a justification for the withdrawal of recognition herein, I do so for the reasons, equally applicable here, heretofore expressed in the Leatherwood case, and set forth as follows: ... Respondent, in his brief, concedes that Board precedent does not accept turnover alone as the type of objective consideration that would legitimately support a withdrawal of recognition. Under existing Board authority, in turnover situations, "new employees will be presumed to support a union in the same ratio as those whom they have replaced." 17 Nonetheless, Respondent argues that the turnover situation in the Permian Basin is unique and principles followed in other industnes should not be applied to the drilling contractors involved there. A variety of arguments are advanced to support the view that turnover should be 627 honored in this industry as a good-faith defense. Most, however, relate to the high velocity of turnover. In my opinion this fails to persuade that the presumption that replacements will support a union to the same extent as their predecessors is a fallacy in this industry. If it is fair to assume that replacements will support a union where the level of turnover is 50 percent, this assumption is no less valid where the turnover amounts to 900 percent. The fact that nine employees might in a given time period fill a single job previously held by a union supporter, does not warrant an assumption that the ninth replacement will support the union to any lesser degree than the first.18 But, in any event, to recognize an exception, based on turnover, to the good-faith doubt rule would depart materially from the policy considerations underlying the Hondo formula. It should be apparent to any reader of Hondo and other cases involving the drilling contractors in the Permian Basin, that the Board, appreciating the turnover conditions, that existed there, committed itself to the desirability of fashioning means to assure that, employees of various contractors operating in this two- state area, despite the transient nature of their employ- ment, could assert their Section 7 statutory rights "to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organiza- tions, [and] to bargain collectively through representa- tives of their own choosing...." I have heretofore stated that it is fair to assume that the turnover experi- enced by Respondent is generally representative of that experienced by its competitors in the Permian Basin. Hence, to accept the turnover facts adduced here as substantiating a good-faith doubt of majority would provide all contractors in the Basin a like defense. Stable collective bargaining could hardly proceed to a mean- ingful state under such conditions, for, the drill contrac- tors, on expiration of each collective-bargaining agree- ment could thereby require the Union to reestablish its majority as a precondition for negotiation of a successor agreement. See, e.g., Emerson Manufacturing Company, Inc., 200 NLRB No. 33, JD. Although ultimately the Board might sustain Re- spondent's contention, or even repudiate Hondo, as matters now stand, it is my opinion that to regard turnover as a justification for the refusal to bargain, would reduce the elections conducted by the Board in the Permian Basin to a futile exercise and render the status of certification of representatives resulting therefrom to little more than a focal point for game 17 Laystrom Manufacturing Co., supra, 1484 and cases cited at fn. 7: Printers Service, Inc, 175 NLRB 809, 812: 18 In addition to the degree of turnover, I am not persuaded by Respondent's arguments based on observations that many of its crewmembers must have been employed by nonunion contractors, and that union representatives would have difficulty in maintaining regular contacts with employees. These factors are simply too remote to throw any light on the organizational preferences of crewmembers hired from time to time by Respondent. These arguments were not asserted as the basis of Respondent's doubt when recognition was withdrawn, and hence, though arguably relevant to the question of whether the Board should alter its view with respect to turnover in this industry, they are otherwise in the nature of afterthought and hence cannot be considered as the basis for Respondent's doubt of majority. See N.LR B v. Gulfmont Hotel Co., 362 F.2D 588, 592. 628 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD playing. In sum, I envision the exception to Board policy sought by Respondent, as, in practical conse- quence, eventually undermining both the policy consid- erations which resulted in the Hondo formula and the exercise of self-organizational rights by employees engaged in the drilling industry in the Permian Basin. Accordingly, I find, pursuant to established Board principle,19 that turnover did not furnish a good-faith doubt that the Union continued to represent a majority of Respondent's employees, and I find that Respon- dent, by withdrawing recognition from the Union on [June 4, 1973], violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 19' it is true that in Southern Wipers, Inc., 192 NLRB 816, the Board accepted "heavy turnover" as one of several factors supporting a good-faith doubt of majority. That case does not reverse prior precedent to the effect that turnover alone will not justify a withdrawal of recognition , and, though not cited by Respondent, I note my view that said decision is inapposite See also Viking Lithographers, Inc, 184 NLRB 139. It follows therefore, and I further find, that the unilateral wage increase announced contemporaneous with the with- drawal of recognition also violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act .9 Upon the basis of the entire record, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Brahaney Drilling Company is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Local 826, International Union of Operating Engi- neers, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All derrickmen, motormen and floorhands, other- wise referred to as roughnecks, employed by Respondent in the drilling of oil wells in the area known as the Permian Basin, but excluding all tool pushers, drillers, office employees , technical employees, professional employees, guards and all supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. At all times since September 11, 1968, the Union has been and is now the exclusive bargaining representative of 9 The Respondent's failure to substantiate its affirmative defense makes it unnecessary to consider the General Counsel 's alternative theory to the effect that Respondent's entire course of conduct, since the 1968 election, established that the doubt of majority was not asserted by Respondent in good faith The curiosity I expressed in fn 8 of the Leatherwood case as to the propriety of a procedural system which allows the General Counsel, without prior notice, to litigate, under the endless umbrella of "back- ground," matters dating back some 5 years also applies here In any event, were I to reach the merits I would reject the General Counsel' s position as not substantiated by the record I would find lacking in merit each of the contentions made by the General Counsel in his brief as to this issue Thus, Respondent's refusal to recognize and provide the Union with requested information, prior to the Fifth Circuit's action on October 6, 1970, cannot fairly be regarded as bearing adversely upon Respondent's state of mind, since all actions in advance of that date were consistent with its not unreasonably maintained legal position Similarly, I see nothing untoward in the fact that Respondent did not submit until May 26, 1971, information requested by the Union on March 26, 1971 This delay was credibly explained as resulting from a breakdown in communication following a change in the identity of Respondent's counsel, the information was provided well in advance of the first bargaining session, and the delay was not shown to have in any way prejudiced the progress of negotiations. the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. By withdrawing recognition on June 4, 1973, thereafter refusing to meet with the Union, and unilaterally granting a wage increase , Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) aid (1) of the Act. 6. By the foregoing conduct, Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, and has thereby engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(axl) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Considering the pattern of employment experienced by Respondent in the conduct of its operations, special provision is necessary to assure adequate publication of the provisions of the Order herein. Therefore, as in Leather- wood Drilling Company, 16-CA-5189 [209 NLRB No. 92], I shall recommend that in addition to requiring that copies of the notice be posted at the offices and yards of the Respondent in Midland, Texas, it will be further provided that copies be posted at crew headquarters on site at all rig operations, and that copies be provided the Union for posting, if the Union is willing, at meeting places in the Permian Basin. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby recommend the following: ORDER 10 Brahaney Drilling Company, its officers, agents, succes- sors, and assigns, shall: Additionally, it is my opinion that Respondent was not under a duty to initiate bargaining requests during periods when the Union was silent, and hence its failure to do so was not indicative of bad faith . See NLR.B v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., Inc, 306 U.S. 292. Finally, I disagree with the General Counsel that dilatory behavior can be attributed to Respondent on the basis of the latter's failure to provide a counterproposal, in contract form, until the second negotiating session. In sum, as far as I can discern from the record , Respondent's conduct, at and away from the bargaining table , prior to June 4, 1973, was perfectly consistent with the 8(d) obligation to bargain in good faith Accordingly, were it necessary to reach this issue, I would find that the background evidence bearing on Respondent's state of mind did not preclude assertion of a doubt of majority Cf. Coca Cola Bottling Works, Inc, 186 NLRB 1050,1053; United Electric Company, 199 NLRB 603; Printers Service, Inc., 175 NLRB 809, 811 io In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. BRAHANEY DRILLING CO. 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Local 826, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in Lie following appropriate bargaining unit: All derrickmen, motormen and floorhands, otherwise referred to as roughnecks , employed by Respondent in the drilling operations in the area known as the Permian Basin, but excluding all tool pushers , drillers, office employees, technical employees, professional employees, guards and all supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) Withdrawing recognition from and refusing to meet with the Union as exclusive collective-bargaining repre- sentative of employees in the appropriate unit. (c) Granting wage increases or otherwise changing wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employ- ment, without first notifying and bargaining with the Union. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Local 826, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment and embody in a signed agreement any understanding reached. (b) Post at its offices and yards in Midland, Texas, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."ii Copies of said notice, on forms to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 16, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of the Respondent, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ- ing all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Similar copies shall be posted at the crew headquarters at all operating drilling sites. Copies shall also be provided the Union for posting (the Union willing) at union halls or meeting places in the Permian Basin. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. ii In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Naticnal Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 629 (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 16, in writing, within 20 days from receipt of this recommended Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Local 826, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive collective - bargaining representative of all our following employees: All derrickmen, motormen and floorhands, other- wise referred to as roughnecks, excluding tool pushers, drillers, office employees, technical employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition and refuse to . meet with the Union as exclusive collective-bargaining representative of employees in said unit. WE WILL NOT change wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment without first notifying and bargaining with the Union. WE WILL bargain collectively with the Union upon request as the exclusive collective-bargaining represent- ative of the employees in the appropriate unit and if an understanding is reached we will sign a contract with the Union. BRAHANEY DRILLING COMPANY (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Federal Office Building, Room 8-A-24, 819 Taylor Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, Telephone 817-334-2921.