210 NLRB 63
Scalera Bus Service, Inc.
SCALERA BUS SERVICE, INC.
63
Scalera Bus Service, Inc. and Barbara L. Pallister.
Case 22-CA-5358
April 15, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND JENKINS
On August 23, 1973, Administrative Law Judge
Herbert Silberman issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and Respon-
dent filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and finds merit in certain of the General
Counsel's exceptions. Accordingly, the Board has
decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclu-
sions of the Administrative Law Judge only to the
extent consistent herewith.
We agree with the Administrative Law Judge that
Joan Morella, Angelina Baldasarre, Eleanor Vessels,
Eileen Paulsen, and Barbara Pallister were unlawful-
ly refused reinstatement for 1 or 2 days in February
1973 in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. As to
Paulsen and Pallister, however, we further find,
contrary to the Administrative Law Judge, that on
February 5, 1973, the Respondent unlawfully dis-
charged them and since that date has unlawfully
refused to reinstate them in violation of Section
8(a)(3).
The following facts surrounding the discharges and
the refusals of reinstatement are amply supported by
the record. Thus, as of January 31, 1973, the Union,
Scalera
Bus
Drivers
Association, represented a
majority
of the Respondent's employees in an
appropriate unit. On that same day, a number of the
Respondent's schoolbus drivers, including Morella,
Baldasarre, Vessels, Pallister, and Paulsen, who had
unsucessfully sought a written collective-bargainir_,,
agreement for the Union from the Respondent,
engaged in a concerted work stoppage and failed to
report for
work for their scheduled runs that
afternoon. The stoppage was short lived, and on
February 1 the above-named drivers sought to return
to work, but were refused. The Administrative Law
Judge found, and we agree, that the refusal to
i In part, the General Counsel has excepted to certain credibility
findings
made by the Administrative Law Judge
It is the Board's
established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolu-
tions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the
reinstate them on February 1 did not violate the Act,
inasmuch as the Respondent had secured substitute
drivers for that day. However, when they all applied
again on February 2, and again on February 5,
except for Morella, and were again refused, the
Respondent had not yet secured substitute drivers
for that day.
As to Morella, Baldasarre, and Vessels, we agree
with the Administrative Law Judge that Morelia was.
unlawfully refused reinstatement on February 2 and
that Baldasarre , Vessels, Pallister, and Paulsen were
unlawfully refused reinstatement on February 2 and
5, 1973, in violation of Section 8(aX3). However, we
reject, as without merit, both his finding that Pallister
and Paulsen were not unlawfully discharged on
February 5, as alleged in the complaint, as well as the
basis for that finding; namely, (1) that the Respon-
dent could lawfully require the drivers to interview
Kuchin, the Respondent's representative, as a pre-
condition for their reinstatement, which Pallister and
Paulsen failed to do, and (2) that both the drivers
and the Respondent must have intended their
applications for reinstatement to apply only on the
days on which they were made, without regard to
their future reinstatement rights. In this regard, the
Administrative Law Judge stated:
For the purposes of this case I will accept the
proposition that the Company had the lawful
right to insist that each striking employee make a
personal application for reinstatement to Kuchin.
However, as a condition to the exercise of such
right the Respondent was under a duty to inform
each striker who asked for reinstatement of the
need to speak to Kuchin. Thus, the issues
regarding the alleged discriminations turn upon
whether and when the five alleged discriminatees
were notified of such requirement.15
15
.
Based on the fact that they reapplied on successive work
days and that the Company did not discourage them from doing so,
the striking employees and the Company treated each application for
work and each denial as operative only for the day in question and
not as a determination of their future status. It is unnecessary,
therefore, to decide what the situation would be had any of the
alleged discnminatees, without being told that they were required to
speak directly to Kuchin, not applied for reinstatement a second
time after once being denied reinstatement.
We specifically disavow these statements, as in our
view they are contrary to the principles enunciated by
the United States Supreme Courtin N. L. R. B. v. Fleet-
wood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967), and by the
Board in The Laidlaw Corporation, 171 NLRB 1366.
As to the mandatory requirement of an individual
relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect . Standard
Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951).
We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his
credibility findings.
210 NLRB No. 17
64
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
interview with management as a condition precedent
to reinstatement, in Fleetwood Trailer the Court held
that an employer, in refusing to reinstate strikers, must
show that the action was due to legitimate and sub-
stantial business justification, that the burden of prov-
ing such justification is on the employer, and that the
primary responsibility for striking a proper balance
between the asserted business justifications and the
invasion of employee rights rests with the Board rather
than the courts. No such justification has herein been
shown. As to the employees' rights to reinstatement,
the court further pointed out that, by virtue of Section
2(3) of the Act, an individual whose work ceases due to
a labor dispute remains an employee if he has not
obtained other regular or substantially equivalent
employment. In thus explicitly rejecting the argument
that reinstatement rights must be determined at the
time of initial application, the Court stated (389 U.S.
at 380-381);
This basic right to jobs cannot depend on job
availability as of the moment when applications
are filed. The right to reinstatement does not
depend upon technicalities relating to application.
On the contrary, the status of the strikers as an
employee continues until he has obtained "other
regular
and substantially equivalent employ-
ment." (29 U.S.C. Section 15213).
unlawfully refused to reinstate them since February
2, 1973. Accordingly, we shall order that Respondent
make said employees whole for the loss of earnings
they suffered by reason of Respondent's failure and
refusal to reinstate them on the stated dates . Interest
at the rate of 6 percent per annum shall be added to
such backpay and shall be computed in the manner
set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB
716.
Respondent's unlawful activities described above,
particularly its reprisals against the drivers who
participated in the January 31 strike, infringed upon
employees' right to engage in a concerted activity
which is subject to the protective guarantees of
Section 7 and also is specifically sanctioned by
Section 13 of the Act. Its unfair labor practices found
herein are potentially related to other unfair labor
practices proscribed by the Act, and the danger of
their commission in the future may be anticipated
from Respondent's conduct in the past. The preven-
tive purpose of the Act will be thwarted unless the
recommended Order herein is coextensive with the
threat. Accordingly, in order to make effective the
interdependent guarantees of Section 7 and thus
effectuate the policies of the Act, an order requiring
Respondent to cease and desist from in any manner
infringing upon the rights of employees guaranteed
in the Act is deemed necessary.
We therefore must conclude that Pallister and
Paulsen were unlawfully discharged on February 5,
1973, and have been unlawfully denied reinstatement
since February 2, 1973. Accordingly, we shall order
that they be offered reinstatement with backpay
commencing as of February 2, 1973, as herein set
forth below.2
In view of our finding, we hereby substitute the
following, Remedy, Order, and notice for those
recommended by the Administrative Law Judge:
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in
unfair labor practices, we shall order that it cease
and desist therefrom and that it take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies
of the Act.
We have found that Scalera unlawfully failed and
refused to reinstate Angelina Baldasarre and Eleanor
Vessels on February 2 and 5, 1973; unlawfully failed
and refused to reinstate Joan Morella on February 2,
1973; and unlawfully discharged Eileen Paulsen and
Barbara Pallister, on February 5, 1973, and has
ORDER
Respondent, Scalera Bus Service,
Inc.,
South
Plainfield, New Jersey, its officers , agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall:
1.
Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening to take reprisals against employees
who make unconditional applications for reinstate-
ment at a time when their jobs are not filled by
permanent replacements, or by engaging in other
reprisals against such strikers in order to discourage
membership in Scalera School Bus Drivers' Associa-
tion, or any other labor organization.
(b) Discriminating against employees who engage
in a lawful strike by failing or refusing to reinstate
striking employees who participate in a lawful strike.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2.
Take the following affirmative action which is
deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Offer to employees Barbara Pallister and Eileen
Paulsen reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those
i Absent unusual circumstances , Chairman Miller would accept the
Place, who was actually an official of a related company. Here , however,
reasoning of the Administrative Law Judge that Respondent could lawfully
stokers Pallister and Paulsen had been discnmmatonly denied reinstate-
require the strikers to apply for reinstatement directly to Kuchm ,
ment on a previous day, and, therefore, by February 5, were in the position
Respondent's president and principal operating official, rather than to
of discrimmatees who were entitled to an offer of reinstatement.
SCALERA BUS SERVICE, INC.
65
jobs no longer exists, to substantially equivalent
positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other
rights and privileges, and make them whole for the
loss of earnings, in the manner set forth in The
Remedy section.
(b) Make Joan Morella, Angelina Baldasarre, and
Eleanor Vessels whole for the loss of earnings
suffered by them by reason of Respondent's unlaw-
ful discrimination against them in the manner set
forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The
Remedy."
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to
the Board or its agents, for examination and. copying,
all payroll records, social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all
other records necessary to analyze the amounts of
backpay due under the terms of this recommended
Order.
(d) Post at its place of business in South Plainfield,
New Jersey, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix."3
Copies of said notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 22,
after being duly signed by Respondent's representa-
tive, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respon-
dent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 22, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order,
what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.
3 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
Drivers Association, or any other labor organiza-
tion.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL offer Eileen Paulsen and Barbara
Pallister reinstatement to their former positions
or, if those positions are no longer available, to
substantially equivalent positions, without preju-
dice to their seniority and other rights and
privileges, and make each of them whole for any
loss of earnings they may have suffered by reason
of the discrimination against them, in the manner
set forth in the section of the Decision entitled
"The Remedy."
WE WILL make whole Joan Morella, Angelina
Baldasarre, and Eleanor Vessels for the loss of
earnings they have suffered by reason of the
unlawful refusal to reinstate them to their jobs on
February 2 and 5, 1973, after they had made
unconditional applications for reinstatement.
SCALERA Bus SERVICE,
INC.
(Employer)
Dated
By
(Representative)
(Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced
by anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compli-
ance with its provisions may be directed to the
Board's Office, Federal Building, 16th Floor, 970
Broad Street, Newark, New Jersey 07102, Telephone
201-645-2100.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT threaten to take reprisals against
any employee who participates in a lawful strike.
WE WILL NOT discriminate against any employ-
ee for engaging in a lawful strike by failing or
refusing to reinstate any striker who makes an
unconditional application for reinstatement at a
time when his or her job is not filled by a
permanent replacement, or by engaging in any
other reprisals against any such striker in order to
discourage membership in Scalera School Bus
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HERBERT SILBERMAN, Administrative Law Judge: Upon
a charge filed on March 23, 1973, by Barbara Pallister, an
individual, a complaint was issued on April 27, 1973,
alleging that Scalera Bus Service, Inc., herein called the
Company or Scalera, has engaged in and is engaging in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(axl)
and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
In substance, the complaint alleges that : ( 1) because of
their membership in and activities on behAff
a labor
organization and because of their participation in a 1-day
strike on January 31, 1973, Respondent refused for the
period between February 1 and 6 to reinstate five
employees, Joan
Morella, Angelina,,bakh serre, Eileen
Paulsen, Barbara Pallister, and Eleanor V ssels, who, on
66
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
February 1, 1973, had made unconditional offers to return
to work, and Respondent on February 5, 1973, discharged
Pallister and Paulsen ; and (2) by reason of said refusals to
reinstate and said discharges and other conduct set forth in
the complaint,
Respondent also has interfered with,
restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. Respondent in its
answer to the complaint denied that it has engaged in the
alleged unfair labor practices. A hearing in this proceeding
was held in Newark, New Jersey, on May 21, 22, 23, and 24
and June 25, 1973. Subsequent to the hearing, General
Counsel and Respondent filed briefs with the Administra-
tive Law Judge.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my
observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
The Company, a New Jersey corporation, has its office
and place of business at 601 New Market Avenue, South
Plainfield, New Jersey (the entire premises at the New
Market address is hereinafter referred to as the South
Plainfield terminal or premises), where it is engaged in the
business of providing schoolbus transportation and related
charter bus service. During its fiscal year ended April 30,
1972, which period is representative of Respondent's
operations, the Company's gross revenue was $215,239.
As the Board normally does not exercise jurisdiction
with respect to transportation enterprises that do not have
revenue of at least $250,000 per year' the complaint
alleges, but the answer denies, that jurisdiction exists
because there is a single employer relationship between the
Company and another transportation operation, Suburban
Transit Corp., herein called Suburban, over which the
Board's jurisdiction is clear. Suburban , also a New Jersey
corporation, maintains its principal office and place of
business at 750 South Somerset Street, New Brunswick,
New Jersey, herein called the New Brunswick terminal,
and also maintains terminals at other locations including at
the South Plainfield premises. Suburban is engaged in
providing interstate passenger transportation by motor
coach and related services. During the calendar year 1972,
which period is representative of its operations, Suburban's
gross revenue exceeded $500,000 of which in excess of
$50,000 was derived from transportation services furnished
to passengers traveling between the State of New Jersey
and other States.
Scalera employs between 20 and 25 regular drivers who
operate its schoolbuses.2 The drivers work part time. Most
are
women who are supplementing family incomes
although a few men, who either have full-time employment
elsewhere or are retired, also drive regularly for Scalera. In
addition, other persons, including Suburban drivers, are
employed by Scalera to drive its buses on an irregular, as
needed, basis.
The South Plainfield terminal is used not only by Scalera
but also by Suburban and a third company , Plainfield
Transit Bus Company. There is separate garage space for
the vehicles of each company, but there is only one
maintenance facility on the premises. Scalera, Plainfield,
and Suburban, respectively, employ two, one, and six
mechanics at the South
Plainfield terminal.
All the
mechanics are supervised by Vince Costabile, who is paid
separately by the three companies. Scalera has no clerical
facilities. Its clerical work, including the preparation of
payrolls, is performed by Suburban at the New Brunswick
terminal and Scalera reimburses Suburban for such
services. Scalera maintains its separate policies of insur-
ance and provides for its own bank and business credit.
Until his death in April 1973 the principal owner and
operating official of Suburban was Morris Lipshitz. All the
stock of Suburban is owned by the estate of Morris
Lipshitz and by his widow . Morris Lipshitz had been
president of Suburban . As of the date of the hearing in this
case the position was still vacant . Secretary of Suburban is
Sidney Kuchin and vice president of that company is Lee
Jacobs. Since the death of Morris Lipshitz the executive
authority of Suburban is being exercised by four individu-
als who are Sidney Kuchin, Lee Jacobs, Herman Lipschitz,
and Don Engle.
The stock of Scalera is owned equally by Kuchin,
Jacobs, and the estate of Peter Lebrano . Sidney Kuchin is
president and principal operating official of Scalers. The
only other officer of Scalers is Lee Jacobs, who is
secretary-treasurer. Both Sidney Kuchin and Lee Jacobs
are sons-in-law of the late Morris Lipshitz.
Sidney Kuchin testified that he alone is responsible for
the day-to-day operations of Scalera, but when he is absent
for prolonged periods, as when ill or on vacation, Lee
Jacobs substitutes for him. This testimony does not
correspond with other evidence in the case. Normally
Kuchin is at the South Plainfield terminal only 2 or 3 hours
each day from about 8:30 until 10:30 or 11 :30 a.m. Jacobs
is there so seldom that some of the Scalera drivers never
met him. In the absence of Kuchin, which includes the
early morning hours and the afternoons , the
Scalera
employees look to Harry Place, who is the dispatcher and
safety supervisor for Suburban at the South Plainfield
terminal, as the person in charge of Scalera's operations.3
Thus, Ellen Wosatka, the dispatcher for Scalera, testified
that when Kuchin is not present she discusses operations'
problems with Place. Her most frequent problem arises
when she needs additional drivers. At such times Place
usually arranges for Suburban drivers to drive for Scalera.
Also, maintenance and repair requests for Scalera buses
are frequently routed through Place. Although Harry Place
testified that he had "no connections with Scalera," he
further testified that : ( 1) he dispatches for Scalera "if
trouble
begins
where
someone needs help;" (2) he
interviews applicants for employment with Scalera and
i Charleston Transit Company, 123 NLRB 1296.
3 I do not credit Kuchin's testimony that in his absence Ellen Wosatka is
2 Schoolbuses are smaller than motor coaches that are used in interstate
in charge of the drivers and "handles emergencies as they anse" because,
operations.
Also,
because of their distinctive color and accessories,
among other reasons, it is effectively contradicted by other witnesses,
schoolbuses are not suitable for other uses.
including Place and Wosatka.
SCALERA BUS SERVICE, INC.
67
makes recommendations to Kuchin regarding the qualifi-
cations of the applicants,4 and (3) upon the instructions of
Kuchin he has disciplined Scalera drivers . Further, Place
has represented Scalera at a school board hearing where a
problem regarding a Scalera driver was on the agenda for
discussion, and from time to time has operated a bus for
Scalera.
I find, contrary to Kuchin's testimony, that Harry Place
is involved in the day-to-day operations of Scalera and,
although the extent of his authority is not clear, he
exercises greater managerial authority with respect to the
operations of Scalera and the direction of Scalera person-
nel than anyone other than Kuchin.
Sidney Kuchin testified that he had been general
manager of Suburban until about a year before the hearing
in this case when because of illness he had to curtail his
activities.5 He further testified that he is no longer involved
with employee relations at Suburban and that the person
now in charge is his successor, Ronald Kohn. However,
according to Kuchin, in the performance of his duties,
Kohn answers to Kuchin and Jacobs and Kuchin assumes
responsibility for
whatever Kohn does in regard to
employee relations.
In addition to Kuchin's responsibility for Suburban's
overall
operations, he exercises direct authority over
Suburban's operations at the South Plainfield terminal.6
Thus, Harry Place testified that Kuchin is his immediate
supervisor and he consults with Kuchin about "anything in
general that would come up that should be brought to his
attention, accidents of drivers, safety films that we had for
drivers, vacations . . . . Anything pertaining as far as
transportation in the Suburban Division."
Drivers for Scalera,
with few exceptions,
are
not
qualified
to drive for Suburban. However, Suburban
drivers are qualified to drive schoolbuses, and Kuchin
testified that Suburban drivers are employed to drive for
Scalera "as often as we needed them." When a Suburban
employee drives for Scalera he is paid by Suburban and the
latter company is subsequently reimbursed by Scalera.
Upon the foregoing, I find that Scalera and Suburban
are related enterprises, which cooperate closely in their
operations, that significant managerial control, particularly
in regard to employee relations, is exercised over both
companies by the same individuals and, therefore, they
constitute a single employer within the meaning of Section
2(2) of the Act. Suburban Transit Corp., 203 NLRB No. 69.
Accordingly, I further find that Scalera is engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of
the Act and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act for
the Board to exercise jurisdiction in this case.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Scalera School Bus Drivers' Association (herein called
the Association) is a voluntary organization. Membership
4 Thus, Place testified-
Q.
On the occasions when you made certain recommendations
regarding a driver or their qualifications or what have you, do you
know whether Mr Kuchm himself makes any further investigation
about the drivers?
A.
Yes, he does, he calls the past employers and he will go over the
application sometimes with me. Sometimes there is quite a tussel [sic I
is open only to employees of Scalera. Although its bylaws
were not professionally prepared and do not set forth the
purposes of the Association with precision, it is clear
therefrom that a purpose of the Association is to deal with
Scalera concerning grievances and conditions of work. The
evidence further shows that the Association holds meetings
regularly, collects dues from its members , and from time to
time has dealt with Sidney Kuchin, the principal operating
official of Scalera, concerning grievances and conditions of
work. I find that the Association is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
An issue is raised as to whether, during the relevant times
particularly on January 31, 1973, the Association was the
majority representative of Scalera's drivers. The parties
stipulated that 20 named individuals were in the unit on
the critical date, but there is a dispute as to whether 7 other
persons also should be included.
The Association does not maintain records of the kind
which clearly reflect its membership . Its monthly meetings,
including the January 26, 1973, meeting, were attended by
approximately 13 drivers. The treasurer's records show that
of the 20 persons who the parties agree were in the unit on
January 31, 1973, 8 paid dues in December 1972 and
January 1973 and 6 more paid dues in December but not in
January. The delinquencies for January on the part of the
latter six appear to have been normal tardiness in making
payments rather than any desire on the members' part to
withdraw from the Association . In addition,
Eleanor
Vessels, who was hired in December 1972 and did not pay
dues for that month, paid dues for January 1973. In the
absence of any other membership list, the payment of dues
can be taken to signify the intention on the part of the
Scalera drivers to be members of the Association. Accord-
ingly, I further find that as of January 31, 1973, the
Association represented a membership of 15 persons all of
whom were included in an appropriate unit of Scalera
drivers.
Respondent contends that the following seven persons
also should be included in the unit : McCauley, Caporoso,
Quashnick, Pheasant, Guyette, Caswell, and Hardgrove.
The unit in question is composed of part-time employees.
Under applicable Board principles those who work
regularly for the Company are included in the unit but
those who drive for the Company on irregular, uncertain
occasions
are
excluded.
In agreement with General
Counsel I find that the seven employees should be
excluded from the unit. None of the seven have scheduled
runs. Consequently, there is no certainty or regularity to
their employment with Scalera. Furthermore: (1) Caporoso
drove for Scalera less than 1 hour per week during
November and December 1972 and January 1973; (2)
Quashnick and Pheasant did not work for Scalera after the
week ending December 2, 1972; (3) Guyette did not work
for Scalera after the week ending January 13, 1973, and
between he and I because perhaps he may not agree with what I am
saying and he will say perhaps we ought to check this out further and
he does so.
S Kuchin testified that although he gave up the position of general
manager his income from Suburban has not been reduced because he is
perfornung more accounting functions for Suburban.
6 1 do not credit Kuchm's testimony that Ronald Kohn is in charge of
the day-to-day operations of Suburban at the South Plainfield terminal.
68
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
prior thereto worked about 1 day per week during the
weeks that he drove for Scalera; (4) these four employees
plus McCauley were employees of Suburban and were paid
by Suburban (mostly at their regular Suburban rates)
whenever they drove for Scalera which reflects a sufficient
divergence in the conditions of their employment from
those of the regular Scalera drivers as to separate their
employment interests from those of the Scalera drivers;
and (5) because Caswell is a social security annuitant he is
restricted in his earnings and Scalera does not carry his
name on the same payroll as the other Scalera employees.
Upon the foregoing, I find that during the times relevant
hereto the Association represented 15 employees in a unit
of 20 and therefore was the majority representative of
Scalera's drivers.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Dating back at least as far as the fall of 1971 the
Association has been attempting to negotiate a written
collective-bargaining
agreement with Scalera. Thus, a
memorandum, dated November 22, 1971, was addressed to
Sidney Kuchin from the Association7 stating that the
employees "want a contract drawn up" between Scalera
and the Association and setting forth various terms for
inclusion in such agreement. There were subsequent
discussions with Kuchin about the subject but at all times
Kuchin adamantly refused to consider entering into any
written contract with the Association. On March 21, 1972,
the Association sent a written memorandum to Harry
Place requesting certain improvements in the maintenance
of the schoolbuses. On January 26, 1973, a letter with the
typewritten signatures of John Watson, as president, and
Barbara Pallister, as secretary, containing principally
money demands was directed to Scalera. Finally, on
January 31, 1973, a memorandum was delivered to Kuchin
from the Association which, among other things, demand-
ed "a written contract offering us job security" and the
benefits described in the January 26 letter.
In the morning of January 30, 1973, without prior
appointment, a group of four employees, Barbara Pallister,
Eileen
Paulsen,
Joan
Morella, and Peggy Fitzgerald,
constituting the Association's grievance committee, met
with Sidney Kuchin. Present also was Harry Place. The
purpose of the meeting from the employees' standpoint
was to discuss the Association's demands set forth in its
letter of January 26, 1973. Kuchin refused to consider
entering into a written contract with the Association and
informed the group that because Scalera's income for the
then current school year was fixed by contracts with the
various school boards he was unable to make any
immediate improvements in the driver.' rates of pay. He
suggested that they meet in April to discuss rates for the
next school year. Also during the meeting, Kuchin
mentioned that the Company would have to do something
about a problem it was having with John Watson who
I The memorandum was signed by Nick Morelia, as president; Barbara
Pallister, as secretary; and Peggy Fitzgerald, Esther DIDarto, and Joan
Morelia, as members of the grievance committee
8 Barbara Pallister and Eileen Paulsen, who testified that they overheard
the conversation between Wosatka and Kuchin, gave versions which
differed substantially from the testimony of both Wosatka and Kuchin. I do
.efused to drive outside the limits of South Plainfield
because of possible jeopardy to his full-time job.
The next morning when Watson once again refused to
drive outside South Plainfield he was discharged. About 9
a.m., after Kuchin arrived at the South Plainfield terminal,
Scalera dispatcher, Ellen Wosatka, informed him that
Watson's discharge had upset the drivers. According to
Wosatka, Kuchin was very respectful and "let me rant and
rave because I was mad." Wosatka further testified that
during the discussion Kuchin said, "If the girls don't want
to do what I want them to do, I will park the buses."
Kuchin denied that he made such remark pointing out that
he didn't know of any problem at that time.8 I credit
Kuchin's denial.
Incited by the discharge of Watson, about 10 o'clock that
morning a group of about eight drivers met in Joan
Morella's home which is adjacent to the South Plainfield
terminal. Wosatka joined the meeting after concluding her
discussion with Kuchin. The drivers decided that they
would not return to work unless the Company negotiated a
written agreement with them. Pallister typed their demands
and the memorandum was given to Wosatka for delivery to
Kuchin. The drivers also decided that Mrs. Morella should
telephone the Company and report that the drivers were
sick.
Mrs. Wosatka returned to the terminal and delivered
the drivers' memorandum to Kuchin. Harry Place was
present. Wosatka informed them that the drivers were
upset and she did not think they would return to work that
day. Wosatka testified that after Kuchin read the memo-
randum he said, "[H ]e didn't care if it cost him $500 a day,
he was going to teach these girls a lesson, that they couldn't
do that to him. That was the second time. He wasn't going
to let them get away with it." Kuchin denied that he made
this statement, although he testified, "I was quite dis-
turbed. Five hundred dollars is quite a lot of money, I
wouldn't go up that high. I might have been disturbed
enough to say certain things." As both Place and Wosatka
are supervisors9 whatever remark may have been made on
that occasion cannot be deemed a violation of Section
8(a)(1) because it was not made in the presence of
employees.
About the same time Mrs. Morella telephoned to report
the drivers sick, other drivers also called to make the same
report. According to Wosatka, Kuchin informed both
Place and herself, "If they are out sick, I want a doctor's
certificate from everyone of them before they come back to
work." 10 Place testified that Kuchin instructed him, "That
any of the girls who call in, they were no longer employed
by Scalera Bus until they went into his office and had
spoken with him." The record is not clear as to the number
of employees who failed to drive their scheduled runs in
the afternoon of January 31. Mrs. Wosatka's testimony
indicates that the number was between 8 and' 20, while
Place testified that the number was between 5 and 10.11
The strike was short lived. The next morning, February
not credit their testimony in respect to the conversation between Kuchin
and Wosatka.
9 As dispatchers each has the power responsibly to assign and to direct
the activities of drivers.
IU This condition for reinstatement was never imposed.
'
Pallister testified eight drivers participated in the strike.
SCALERA BUS SERVICE, INC.
69
1, the striking employees reported for work. The complaint
alleges that five of the striking employees (Morelia,
Baldasarre, Paulsen, Pallister, and Vessels) were discrimi-
natorily refused reinstatement to their jobs on February 1,
2, and 5 and that two of the five (Paulsen and Pallister)
were unlawfully discharged on February 5.12 The five
named drivers reported for work both in the morning and
in the afternoon on February 1 and in the mornings on
February 2 and 5. According to Wosatka, on February 1
and 2, Place informed them that there was no work for
them because their runs were covered. Place testified that
on the morning of February 1 he informed Pallister,
Paulsen, Baldasarre, and Morelia when they reported for
work that "[n]o one is going to work. It is Mr. Kuchin's
orders that you must see him first. All of the runs are
covered at the present time." 13 Similarly, Place testified
that on February 2 he told the same four drivers, "You are
no longer employed by Scalera Bus Company until you go
to Mr. Kuchin and talk to him." I do not credit Place.14
When the Scalera employees called in sick in the late
morning on January 31, Place and Kuchin had to make a
hurried search for drivers to cover that afternoon's school
runs. They were successful largely because they were able
to arrange for Suburban drivers to substitute for most of
the strikers. Then, according to Kuchin, on the evening of
January 31, arrangements were made to cover the runs "for
the next morning and afternoon for the full day." He
further testified, "We covered [the February 2 schoolbus
runs ] the night of February the 1st" and on Friday night,
February 2, the arrangements were made to cover the runs
for February 5.
I find that when the five alleged discriminatees reported
for work on February 1 arrangements had already been
made for replacement drivers to substitute for them on that
day. Accordingly, I further find that Respondent did not
discriminate against the strikers by failing to reinstate them
on February 1. However, when the five alleged discrimina-
tees reported for work on February 1, no replacements had
been obtained to substitute for them on February 2 and 5.
Similarly, when they reported for work in the morning of
February 2 their scheduled runs for February 5 had not
been covered.
Respondent's defense is that it unposed a reasonable
requirement upon the striking employees that they apply in
person to Kuchin for reinstatement; that Pallister and
12 According to Wosatka , Kathryn Soper, one of the striking employees,
in the afternoon of February 2 begged Harry Place to permit her to return
to work. Place said that he did not have the authority and suggested that she
speak with Kuchin. Soper telephoned Kuchm and returned to work later the
same day.
13 It is significant that Place did not testify that he told Vessels the same
14 1 find that both Place and Kuchin were unreliable witnesses. Each
consciously sought to mold his testimony to the pattern of Respondent's
defense.
Thus,
in their respective testimony,
they made categorical
assertions which developed to be inconsistent not only with the testimony of
other witnesses but also with their own later testimony . Further, Kuchin in
particular and Place to a lesser degress were evasive and argumentative
during their cross-examination. The opinion I reach is that in giving their
testimony they were dissembling and sought to confuse and obfuscate
rather than to shed tight upon and explain the matters in issue
15
The five strikers involved here undertook to apply for reinstatement
on February 1, 2,and 5. On each occasion when they were denied
employment they were informed that there was no work available for them
Paulsen never made such application ; that Morelia and
Baldasarre were reinstated after they applied to Kuchin
and that Vessels was reinstated after Kuchin learned that
she wished to return to work. For the purposes of this case
I will accept the proposition that the Company had the
lawful right to insist that each striking employee make a
personal application for reinstatement to Kuchin . Howev-
er, as a condition to the exercise of such right the
Respondent was under a duty to inform each striker who
asked for reinstatement of the need to speak to Kuchin.-
Thus, the issues regarding the alleged discriminations turn
upon whether and when the five alleged discriminatees
were notified of such requirement.I5
A.
Eleanor Vessels
Eleanor Vessels was first hired to drive for Scalera on
December 4, 1972. Thereafter she joined the Association.
Although she missed the Association's January 31 meeting
because she arrived late at Mrs. Morella's home, she
supported the strike and remained away from work in the
afternoon of January 31. Vessels testified that she reported
for work in the morning of February 1 and was informed
by Harry Place that there was no work for her. She
reported again in the afternoon of February 1 and in the
morning of February 2 and each time Place repeated that
there was no work for her. Vessels further testified that
about noon on February 5 Place telephoned her at home
and asked her to return to work that afternoon which she
did. According to Vessels, dunng their telephone conversa-
tion, "Harry (Place) said he had talked to Sid Kuchin, and
he told him to call me to find out whether I would want to
work or not. He said that being I was a new driver they felt
like I haven't been too much involved in the strike." Place
denied that he made the latter remark and Kuchin denied
that he mstructed Place to make such comment to Vessels.
Kuchin further testified that because a few drivers had
informed him that Vessels wished to return to work he had
instructed Place to call Vessels . Place testified that Vessels
was the only driver whom he asked to return to work and
he did this upon the instructions of Kuchin.16
I credit Vessels whom I find was a reliable witness. I also
find that Place's statement to Vessels on February 5 that
she would be permitted to return to work because the
Company felt that as a new driver she had not been "too
much involved in the strike" clearly implies a threat of
on that day or that their runs were covered for the day. Based on the fact
that they reapplied on successive workdays and that the Company did not
discourage them from doing so, the striking employees and the Company
treated each application for work and each denial as operative only for the
day in question and not as a determination of their future status. It is
unnecessary, therefore, to decide what the situation would be had any of the
alleged discriminatees, without being told that they were required to speak
directly to Kuchin, not applied for reinstatement a second time after once
being denied reinstatement.
16 The testimony of Kuchin and Place that Vessels was invited to return
to work on February 5 tends to support the testimony of the five alleged
discnminatees that they were not informed on February I and 2 that if they
wished reinstatement they had to apply directly to Kuchin. If such advice
had been given to the alleged discriminatees there would have been no
reason for Place to telephone Vessels and specifically ask her to return to
work Also, no reason appears why Place on February 1 and 2 would tell
four of the alleged discnnunatees that they had to apply in person to
Kuchin for reinstatement and would not similarly advise Vessels.
70
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
reprisals against those of its employees who actively
supported the strike .17 Such threat against employees
engaged in a lawful strike is a restraint upon and
interference with their right to engage in an activity
protected by Section 7 and therefore violates Section
8(axl)
of the Act. As Vessels made unconditional
applications for reinstatement on February 1 and 2 and the
only reason given to her by the Company for not
permitting her to return to work on February 2 and 5 was
the untruthful assertion by Place that her runs were
covered for those days, I find further that Vessels was
discriminatorily denied reinstatement on February 2 and 5
because of her support of the Association and her
participation in the January 31 strike. Such discrimination
tends to discourage membership in the Association and
restrains, coerces, and interferes with employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 and therefore
violates Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of the Act.
B.
Joan Morelia
Joan Morena has been employed by Scalera for about'
94/2 years. She hasbeen treasurer of the Association since it
was organized about 2 years ago. Also, the meetings of the
Association are usually held in her home which is located
near the South Plainfield terminal. She participated in the
January 31 strike and, in accordance with the strike plan,
when she telephoned to report herself sick she also
reported the other drivers sick.
Morelia appeared for work in the morning of February
1. Harry Place informed her that she must have a doctor's
certificate. When Morella protested that she didn't need a
doctor's certificate for I day's absence, Place told her,
"That is Mr. Kuchin's order." 18 Morelia later reported to
the terminal for her afternoon runs on February 1 and also
for her morning run on February 2 and each time Harry
Place informed her that her runs were covered.
Morella again reported for work in the morning of
February 5. This time Place told her that she should see
Mr. Kuchin. She waited for Kuchin and spoke with him
when he arrived at the terminal a few minutes after 9
o'clock. According to Morella, Kuchin told her that her job
was terminated. She protested that other drivers were
permitted to return to work and the Company was
discriminating against her. Kuchin replied, "[Y]ou had the
meetings at your house." Morelia argued, "Just about
everyone that was working now also was at my house."
Kuchin responded that her runs are covered. Morella then
told Kuchin that she had injured her arm on February 2.
There was some discussion about the subject. The meeting
concluded with Kuchin informing Morelia to call Harry
Place when her arm was better. The next day, February 6,
Morella telephoned Place and the latter informed her,
"You have your job back with all your runs." She returned
to work the following Monday after she recovered from her
injury.
Kuchm disputed Morella's version of their meeting.
According to Kuchin, Morella spoke with him on Satur-
day, February 3, not on the next Monday. Morella said she
would like her job back. He inquired, "Are you feeling
okay to go back to work?" She replied that she had injured
herself and was unable to return to work immediately but
wished to know whether she still had a job. He informed
her that she could return to work whenever she was able to
do so.
I do not credit Morella's testimony that during her
conversation with Kuchin the latter advised her that she
was terminated because the Association's meetings were
held at her house. First, even Morella acknowledges that
before the discussion concluded Kuchin informed her in
effect that she could return to work when she recovered
from her injury. It is illogical that in a relatively brief
conversation Kuchin would first inform Morella that she
was terminated and then with nothing of consequence
intervening would tell her that she could return to work.
Second, in her pretrial affidavit, executed on February 13,
1973, Morella did not mention that Kuchin had informed
her that she was terminated. However, for the reasons set
forth above in the discussion relating to Eleanor Vessels, I
find that Scalera has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act by
failing and refusing to reinstate Morella on
February 2.111
C.
Angelina Baldasarre
Angelina Baldasarre has been working for Scalera since
1965. She has been a member of the Association since its
organization. She also participated in the January 31 strike.
She reported for work in the morning and in the
afternoon on February 1 and in the morning on February
2. On each occasion Harry Place informed Baldasarre that
there was no work for her.
On the morning of February 5 Baldasarre was accompa-
nied by Barbara Pallister when she went to the South
Plainfield terminal to report for work . According to
Baldasarre, Pallister first asked if there was any work for
her. Place said there was none . Pallister asked why and
Place responded, "[I ]f you want to know you will have to
see Sid (Kuchin)." Then Baldasarre asked if there was
work for her. Place nodded indicating,
"Yes,"
and
motioned with his hand for her to remain. Pallister left.
Place told Baldasarre that she first must talk with Kuchin.
Later that morning Baldasarre spoke with Kuchin who
informed her that she could return to work with her same
runs and with her same seniority.
According to Kuchin, when Baldasarre on February 5
asked to be reinstated he asked her how she felt. When
Baldasarre replied that she was feeling well he informed
her that she could return to work.
17 As Place telephoned Vessels upon the specific instructions of Kuchin,
he was acting as an agent of the Company and Scalera therefore is charged
with the conduct of Place in his discharge of such agency.
18 Place testified that he told Morelia that Kuchm had left instructions
that a doctor's certificate was required . When Morella protested that such
requirement was unusual he responded "that it was unusual for all the girls
[to book ] off sick within an hour." Morelia ultimately was reinstated
without providing a doctor's certification that she was ill on January 31.
There is no evidence that any other sinking employee was told that she had
to furnish a doctor's certificate before she would be reinstated.
19 As Morelia was unable to work on February 5 and 6 because of her
injury it is unmatenal whether she was offered reinstatement on February 3,
5, or 6.
SCALERA BUS SERVICE, INC.
For the reasons stated above in the discussion relating to
Eleanor Vessels, I find that Scalera has violated Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by its failure and refusal to
reinstate Baldasarre on February 2 and 5, 1973.
D.
Barbara Pallister
Barbara Pallister was hired in November 1970. She was
secretary of the Association. She also joined the strike and
remained away from work in the afternoon of January 31.
The next day, February 1, both in the morning and in the
afternoon, and also in the morning on February 2, she
reported to the South Plainfield terminal for work. In each
instance she was informed by Harry Place that her runs
were covered.
On the morning on Monday, February 5, Pallister was in
the company of Angelina Baldasarre when she reported for
work. According to Pallister, this time when she asked
Harry Place whether there was work for her, he replied,
"You are no longer working for Scalera." She asked,
"Why?" He answered, "You are terminated here." When
she insisted that Place give her a reason for her termination
Place answered that he did not know the reason but if she
wants to learn the reason she should see Kuchin. Kuchin
was not then in the terminal. Pallister did not wait for him
and never has spoken with him about the subject. Place,
contradicting Pallister, testified that all he told her on
February 5 was that she must see Mr. Kuchin. Baldasarre
who was present during the conversation testified that
Pallister asked Place whether there was any work for her
and he replied that there was none. Pallister then asked to
know why and Place said, "If you want to know you will
have to see Sid (Kuchin)."
The record shows a pattern with respect to the reinstate-
ment of the striking employees. Except for Kathryn Soper,
none of the strikers was permitted to return to work on
February 1 or 2. However, on February 5 Place informed
them that they would have to speak with Mr. Kuchin
before they could return to work.20 It appears that all the
strikers who spoke with Kuchin were reinstated. Balda-
sarre's testimony tends to corroborate Place that he told
Pallister that she should speak with Kuchin. Also, no
reason appears why Respondent wished to punish Pallister
more than any other striker. Pallister was no more
aggressive in the promotion of the Association's demands
than other members of the Association's grievance com-
mittee such as Morella and Peggy Fitzgerald. I find,
contrary to the testimony of Pallister, that she was not
terminated on February 5 but rather that she was told as
were the other strikers that she had to apply to Kuchm for
reinstatement. As Pallister has never applied to Kuchin for
reinstatement and as I find that such requirement was not
unlawful, I further find that Respondent's refusal to
reinstate Pallister after February 5, 1973, was not unlawful.
However, for the reasons given above in connection with
the discussion of Eleanor Vessels, I find that Pallister was
unlawfully refused reinstatement on February 2 and 5 and
Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act.
20 In his brief, General Counsel points out that "[0 ]n cross-examination,
Place admitted that in an affidavit given to the Board during the
investigation of the instant case he stated 'On Monday, February 5, 1973, 1
E.
Eileen Paulsen
71
Eileen Paulsen was hired by the Company in September
1971. She was a member of the Association's grievance
committee. She also joined the January 31 strike and
remained away from work in the afternoon of that day.
As in the case of the other strikers she reported for work
in the morning and afternoon of February 1 and also in the
morning of February 2. On each occasion she was told by
Harry Place that there was no work for her. Then,
according to Paulsen, when she reported for work on
February 5, Place informed her, "You are officially
unemployed at Scalera." Respondent's position with
regard to Paulsen is the same as with the other strikers;
namely, that they were informed that they had to apply
directly to Kuchin for reinstatement. The evidence, as I
find it, shows that prior to February 5 the strikers were not
told that they were required to speak with Kuchin but
merely were told that their runs were covered. On
February 5 Harry Place informed the strikers that they
should speak to Kuchin if they wished to return to work
and all the strikers who spoke to Kuchin were reinstated.
No reason appears why the Company would wish to
punish Paulsen more severely for her participation in the
strike than any of the other strikers. Accordingly, I find,
contrary to Paulsen, that she was not terminated on
February 5 but she also was informed that she had to apply
for reinstatement directly to Kuchin, which she did not do.
However, for the same reasons set forth above in the
discussion of Eleanor Vessels, I find that the Company has
violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by its failure to
reinstate Paulsen on February 2 and 5.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Company set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with its operations de-
scribed in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist
therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
I have found that Scalera unlawfully failed and refused
to reinstate Angelina Baldasarre, Eleanor Vessels, Eileen
Paulsen, and Barbara Pallister on February 2 and 5, 1973,
and unlawfully failed and refused to reinstate Joan Morella
on February 2, 1973. Accordingly, I shall recommend that
Respondent make said employees whole for the loss of
earnings they suffered by reason of Respondent's failure
and refusal to reinstate them on the stated dates. Interest at
the rate of 6 percent per annum shall be added to such
did tell all the drivers who called in sick that they wee no longer employed
by Scalers Bus Company. I was told to do this by Mr. Kuchin and further
instructed to have each girl see him.' "
72
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
backpay and shall be computed in the manner set forth in
his Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
Respondent's unlawful activities described above, partic-
ularly its reprisals against the drivers who participated in
the January 31 strike, infringed upon employees' right to
engage in a concerted activity which is subject to the
protective guarantees of Section 7 and also is specifically
sanctioned by Section 13 of the Act. Respondent's conduct
indicates a purpose to defeat the right of its employees to
organize and a refusal to accept the procedure of collective
bargaining and therefore contravenes the basic policies of
the Act. Its unfair labor practices found herein are
potentially related to other unfair labor practices pro-
scribed by the Act, and the danger of their commission in
the future may be anticipated from Respondent's conduct
in the past. The preventive purposes of the Act will be
thwarted unless the recommended Order herein is coexten-
sive with the threat. Accordingly, in order to make effective
the interdependent guarantees of Section 7 and thus
effectuate the policies of the Act, an order requiring
Respondent to cease and desist from in any manner
infringing upon the rights of employees guaranteed in the
Act is deemed necessary.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
upon the entire record in this case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
By discriminatorily failing and refusing to reinstate
Joan Morella, Angelina Baldasarre, Eleanor Vessels, Eileen
Paulsen, and Barbara Pallister for I or 2 days in February
1973 because of their participation in a strike on January
31, 1973, thereby discouraging membership in the Associa-
tion, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act.
2.
By reason of the foregoing conduct and by reason of
Respondent's threat to engage in reprisals against employ-
ees who actively supported a strike, Respondent has
interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act
and thereby has engaged in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3.
The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4.
Respondent has not engaged in any violations of
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act alleged in the complaint
except insofar as such violations were specifically found
above to have taken place.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]