Trustees of Boston University

330 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Trustees of Boston University and Building and Service Employees' International Union, Local 254, AFL-CIO. Case 1-CA-9296 April 29, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND KENNEDY On January 29, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Paul Bisgyer issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed a brief in support of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that Respondent, Trustees of Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. whether the Respondent since on or about August 17, 1973, has failed to perform its statutory bargaining obligation by refusing to furnish to Building and Service Employees' International Union, Local 254, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, the exclusive representative of the Respondent's maintenance and servicing employees, cer- tain requested information alleged to be relevant and necessary to the processing of a grievance under the parties' current collective-bargaining agreement and there- by violated Section 8(aXl) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.2 At the close of the hearing, the parties waived oral argument but thereafter the General Counsel and the Respondent submitted briefs in support of their respective positions. Upon the entire record,3 and from my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and with due consideration being given to the arguments advanced by the parties, I make the following: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 1. JURISDICTION The Respondent operates a private nonprofit education- al institution in Boston, Massachusetts, where it also has its principal office. From these operations, it annually derives gross revenues, for use with no restrictions, in excess of $1 million. In the regular course and conduct of the institution, the Respondent annually purchases goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 which are transported to its Boston location directly from sources outside the Commonwealth. It is conceded, and I find, that the Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Admittedly, the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE PAUL BISGYER, Administrative Law Judge: This proceed- ing, with all parties represented, was heard on November 19, 1973, in Boston, Massachusetts, on the complaint of the General Counsel issued on October 11, 1973,1 and the answer of Trustees of Boston University, herein called the Respondent or the University. In issue is the question i The complaint is based on a charge filed by Building and Service Employees' International Union, Local 254, AFL-CIO, on Aug. 24, 1973, a copy of which was duly served on the Respondent by registered mail on Aug. 27, 1973. 2 Section 8(a)( I) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." Insofar as pertinent, Section 7 provides that "[e ]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ...." Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees" designated by a majority of them in an appropriate unit. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Evidence For the past 20 years, the Union has been the collective- bargaining representative of the Respondent's mainte- nance and servicing employees.4 Included in the bargain- ing unit, among others, were seven painters assigned to the paint shop which was one of several subdepartments of the physical plant supervised by Director John J. Hoban and 3 No opposition having been filed to the General Counsel's motion to correct the record, a copy of which was duly served on the parties, the motion is granted and the transcript of testimony is accordingly corrected in the respects indicated in Appendix A of this Decision [omitted from publication J. 4 The bargaining unit, as described in the complaint and conceded to be appropriate, consists of: All full-time and regular part-time employees employed by Respondent in the maintenance and servicing of Boston University in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, exclusive of student employees, employees directly assigned to academic departments , office clerical employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in Section 2(11) of the Act. 210 NLRB No. 48 TRUSTEES OF BOSTON UNIVERSITY Assistant Director Nathan H. Poor. As discussed below, it was the elimination of the paint shop and the permanent layoff of six employee-painters which gave rise to the filing of a grievance and the Union's demands for assertedly relevant and necessary information to enable it to handle and process the grievance intelligently. The pertinent facts are undisputed and may be summarized, as follows: On August 13, 1973,5 six of the seven employee-painters6 received separate letters signed by Assistant Director Poor, stating: Due to a budget reduction, the Boston University Physical Plant is eliminating the Paint Shop work force. Therefore, this date will mark your notice of layoff, which will be effective on August 31, 1973. If you desire to be placed on a re -employment list and apply for other University positions, please contact the Personnel Services Department ... . It appears that, in eliminating the paint shop and laying off the painters, the Respondent acted in reliance upon article VI, the management rights section of its current collective- bargaining contract with the Union ,7 which provides: The parties agree that the operation of Boston University, including the supervision of the employees and of their work, is the right of the University. Accordingly, the establishment of reasonable rules to assure orderly and effective work , the determination of what, when and where duties will be performed, the right to lay off employees due to lack of work, the determination of employees' competency, the hiring, transfer, promotion, demotion, layoff, discipline or discharge of employees for just cause, and working schedules, are rights of the University alone, subject to other provisions of this Agreement. The University shall S All dates refer to 1973 unless otherwise indicated. 6 One painter was retained in the Respondent's employ but his retention has no bearing on the issue before me. I This contract was executed on January 31, 1973 , for a term expiring on October 31 , 1974, and yearly thereafter in the absence of 60-day written notice of termination. 6 Art. VII provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 1. The representatives of both the University and the Union shall be responsible for making prompt and earnest efforts to adjust grievances or misunderstandings between employees and the University. 3. Grievances other than those handled directly by the individual affected shall be handled as follows: Step 1: The grievance shall be taken up by the Union's Steward with the Foreman within seven (7) days of the alleged infraction. If no satisfactory settlement is reached within two (2) days thereafter, then: Step 2: The grievance shall be reduced to writing and submitted to the other side . The written statement of the grievance shall specify the provision or provisions of the Agreement claimed to be violated. The grievance shall be taken up at a conference between representatives of the Union and the authorized representative of the University. Such conference shall be held within five (5) days after it has been requested. 331 not exercise these rights arbitrarily, capriciously or in bad faith. [Emphasis supplied.] Upon the painters' receipt of their layoff notices, Shop Steward Demers telephoned the Union and informed Assistant Business Agent James C. Moore of the Respon- dent's action. The next day (August 14), the Respondent sent the Union copies of the layoff letters quoted above. Acting in accordance with the four-step grievance- arbitration procedure prescribed by the parties' contracts the shop steward promptly protested the layoff to the painters' foreman who summarily rejected their complaint. A written grievance dated August 14 was thereupon drafted by the Union and signed by the laid-off painters, alleging that the elimination of the paint shop and their layoff violated articles I (purpose of agreement), II (recognition), V (seniority), VI (management rights), and XX (antidiscrimination) of the contract .9 At a union-management meeting held in Poor's office on August 17, as the second step in the grievance procedure, Moore presented the written grievance to Poor. In the ensuing discussion, Poor explained that Director Hoban had made the decision to discontinue the paint shop and to lay off the six painters on account of a reduction in the physical plant budget ; that the paint shop was selected for elimination because it performed the "least essential" services; and that the Respondent's action was sanctioned by the above-quoted management rights clause in the bargaining contract. When the shop steward asserted that he had observed an increase in painting work being performed by subcontractors at that time ,10 Poor denied that the moneys expended for this year's subcontracted painting jobs exceeded such expenditures during the past 2 or 3 years. Admittedly, the Respondent has for years employed contractors to perform painting work at the University, in addition to that regularly done by its own painters, without objection from the Union. It also appears Step 3: In the event the grievance is not settled, the authorized representatives of the Union shall meet with the Personnel Director. Step 4: If no settlement is arrived at within five (5) days following such conference, then either party may submit the grievance to arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitration Association. The decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding except that he shall have no authority to add to, subtract from, change or disregard any of the terms or provisions of this Agreement .... The word "grievance" shall not be interpreted to include questions of general wage rates throughout the bargaining unit. These questions are reserved to the University and the Union. 9 Specifically, the grievance stated that "Our rights under arts. 1, 11, V, VI, and XX have been violated in that Boston University has notified us that they are going to eliminate the Building and Grounds Paint Shop, while the services of painters are still going to be required to maintain the University." Art. V relates to the Respondent's retention of a seventh painter, concerning which no information was requested and therefore is not involved in this case. 10 Moore similarly testified that between August 17 and 23 he, too, had observed a great number of outside painters working at the University and that after August 31 , the effective date of the layoff, he also saw a contractor's painter finishing jobs which lard-off painters had previously started. Moore further testified that he believed that the painting subcontracts were entered into about June and July and that he had no knowledge whether any were executed after the effective date of the layoff. 332 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD that this contracting practice never resulted in the past in the layoff of any of the University's own painters." In the course of these discussions, Moore sought from the Respondent substantiation of the reason advanced for the layoff and information concerning subcontracted painting work. Accordingly, he requested of Poor copies of the physical plant budget for the current and the 2 previous years and copies of the painting subcontracts executed during the same years.12 Moore testified that he needed this material to verify and evaluate the asserted budget cut and the extent of subcontracted painting work by compar- ing the current physical plant budget and subcontracts with those of the past 2 years in order to ascertain whether the elimination of the paint shop and the layoff were justifiable or whether the Respondent had acted arbitrarily and in bad faith.13 Poor, however, declined to provide the requested data solely on the ground that the Union was not entitled to it. The meeting ended with Poor's denial of the grievance. Not having received satisfaction of the grievance on this level, the Union proceeded to the third step of the grievance procedure. On August 23, Moore, accompanied by the shop steward and a painter, both of whom had also attended the prior meeting, met with Personnel Director Ritchie, his assistant, Jack Schnieder, Physical Plant Director Hoban, and Poor. In response to Ritchie's inquiries, Moore undertook to clarify in what respects he believed the contract was violated by the Respondent as set forth in the written grievance . He explained that article I (purpose of agreement) was violated in that good relations between the parties could not be promoted by eliminating the paint shop while retaining outside painters to perform painting work. Article II (recognition) was breached because employees represented by the Union were laid off and thereby were removed from the unit. Article VI (management rights) was violated because the Respondent acted arbitrarily and in bad faith in discontin- uing the paint shop while "quite a bit of painting" was being carried on by contracting firms. Finally, article XX (antidiscrimination) was breached in that the painters were selected from among all the employees to be terminated. In response to Moore's contention that article VI was violated, Ritchie insisted that the elimination of the paint shop with the consequent layoff was due to a cut in the physical plant budget. Hoban confirmed Ritchie, adding that the paint shop was discontinued because it was the "least essential" service. On this occasion, Moore reiterated the Union's request for copies of the physical plant budget and the painting contracts for the current and 2 previous years.14 Ritchie, however, adhered to the University's position that the Union was not entitled to such informa- tion. At this point, the shop steward asked Hoban whether he had any painting contracts which were costing the 11 Of course, the question whether the subcontracting was actually a factor in the elimination of the paint shop relates to the meets of the controversy between the parties , which is now pending before an arbitrator, and manifestly is not an issue before me. is Moore also requested copies of the budget for the same years for the entire University covering departments other than those comprising the physical plant. The complaint , however, does not allege the Respondent's refusal to furnish such information to violate the Act and, hence , is not an issue in this proceeding. is As indicated above, art. VI of the contract entitled "Management- University $80 a day per man. Hoban answered in the negative. Ritchie then denied the grievance on the ground of management rights and the meeting closed. It is noted that at neither the August 17 nor August 23 meeting did the Respondent claim that the requested information was nonexistent or too burdensome to produce. The Respondent's refusal to furnish the requested information prompted the Union to file the next day (August 24) the unfair labor practice charge in this case, alleging that this information was relevant and necessary for the Union's intelligent and effective representation of the employees in question regarding their layoff. In addition, pursuant to the contractual grievance procedure, the Union submitted its grievance to arbitration, manifest- ly the appropriate forum for the resolution of the parties' dispute on the merits. It appears that at the subsequently held arbitration hearing the question of the Union's right to the material involved in the present unfair labor practices case was not raised but that, after evidence was taken pertaining to the merits of the dispute, the arbitrator decided to keep the proceeding "open pending further advice from the Parties" regarding the disposition of the unfair labor practice case .15 It is unclear whether or not the arbitrator committed himself to receive as evidence any documents or information the Board might order the Respondent to furnish to the Union. In justification of the discontinuance of the paint shop and the termination of the six employee-painters and in defense of the Respondent's withholding of the requested material, Director Hoban testified that it was he who made the decision to eliminate the paint shop and to terminate the employee-painters; 16 that this decision was based on his opinion that it was not efficient to paint the Universi- ty's buildings during the academic year but that this work should be performed during the vacation period from May through August; and that for this reason it was unnecessar- y to maintain a regular painting crew. It is undisputed that the foregoing reason was not conveyed to the Union or the laid-off painters. Hoban further testified that for the past 2 fiscal years the amount of subcontracted painting work remained substantially the same ; that most of those contracts for the current year were let in June and a few in July and August; and that, although those contracts called for completion dates prior to August 31, contractors remained on the job after that date for the sole purpose of finishing up work which they should have completed before. B. Concluding Findings The General Counsel contends that the information sought by the Union is relevant and reasonably necessary for the proper performance of its statutory function to Rights," expressly provides that 'qt the University shall not exercise these rights arbitrarily, capriciously or in bad faith." 14 On this occasion, too, Moore unsuccessfully sought copies of the University's budget pertaining to departments other than the physical plant. is According to Assistant Business Agent Moore, his initial request to the arbitrator to postpone the arbitration hearing pending the outcome of the instant Board case was denied. is As of the time of hearing herein, the terminated painters were not replaced. TRUSTEES OF BOSTON UNIVERSITY 333 administer the bargaining agreement and intelligently to evaluate and process the layoff grievance thereunder and that therefore the Respondent's refusal to comply with the Union's requests constitutes a breach of the Respondent's bargaining obligation violative of Section 8(aX5) and (1) of the Act. The Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Union is not entitled to the requested information because such material "bears no relevance to the issues in dispute, is privileged and, if made public, could result in substantial damage to the University." To demonstrate the irrelevancy of the requested data, the Respondent urges that it exercised in good faith its managerial rights under article VI of the parties' agreement to eliminate the paint shop and lay off its employee-painters and that no work normally performed by these painters was contracted out. However, no evidence was adduced showing the confiden- tial nature of the requested information or the damage the Respondent would likely suffer as a consequence of disclosure. It is now settled law that the duty to bargain in good faith imposed upon an employer by Section 8(aX5) of the Act includes the obligation to provide the employees' representative with information relevant and reasonably necessary to the intelligent performance of its function as bargaining agent.17 Since "the duty to bargain," as the Supreme Court has observed, "unquestionably extends beyond the period of contract negotiations and applies to labor-management relations during the term of an agree- ment," 18 the employer's obligation to furnish information extends with equal force to material needed by the Union for the effective administration of an existing contract and the processing of grievances thereunder even through arbitration.19 Certainly, the production of relevant infor- mation with respect to a grievance serves the additional worthwhile purpose of enabling the bargaining representa- tive to evaluate prudently the merits of the asserted claim with the view of deciding whether to pursue the grievance through arbitration or to drop it 20 And where binding arbitration is pursued under the parties' contract, the foregoing "discovery-type standard decide[s] nothing about the merits" of the controversy, which still remains as a matter for the arbitrator's ultimate resolution unaffected by "the Board's threshold determination concerning the potential relevance of the requested information." 21 Applying these principles to the present case, I find, contrary to the Respondent's contention, that the Union is entitled to copies of the physical plant budget for the current and 2 prior years and copies of the painting subcontracts entered into during these years and that the Respondent's asserted good-faith reliance on its contractu- al right unilaterally to discontinue the paint shop and to lay off its painters does not relieve it of the statutory duty to produce this material. The requested information, I find, has potential relevance to the employee-painters' grievance 17 NL.R B v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-436 (1967); The Prudential Insurance Company of America v. N.LR.B., 412 F.2d 77, 81 (C.A. 2), cert denied 396 U.S. 928 (1969); The Timken Roller Bearing Company Y. N LR B, 325 F 2d 746, 750 (C.A. 6, 1963), cert, denied 376 U.S. 971(1964). 18 N L R. B v Acme, supra 436. 19 Fn 17, supra 20 It is not, nor can it be validly, contended that the Board is without jurisdiction to decide the relevancy of the requested material. As the and must be supplied to the Union as their bargaining agent. As indicated above, the Respondent bases its right to discontinue the paint shop and lay off the painting crew on the management rights clause in the contract . Significantly, this asserted right is not without qualification . Article VI expressly provides that the "University shall not exercise these rights arbitrarily, capriciously or in bad faith." Moreover, in their notice of layoff, the employee-painters were advised by the Respondent that its action was due to a budget reduction. This reason was reiterated by the Respondent in the subsequent union-management discus- sions in the second and third steps of the contractual grievance procedure. By thus attributing the elimination of the paint shop and the layoff to cutbacks in the physical plant budget, the Union's requests for the copies of the physical plant budget for the current and past 2 years had a definite bearing on the validity of the employees' grievance and the question whether the Respondent acted "arbitrarily, capriciously or in bad faith." 22 Manifestly, these documents would enable the Union to compare and evaluate the physical plant budgets for these years to ascertain whether there was, in fact, a budget cut warranting the elimination of the paint shop and the layoff. Furthermore, as the Respondent also denied at a grievance meeting that the moneys expended during the current year for painting subcontracts did not significantly exceed the amount normally allowed for such purposes in prior years, the potential relevance of the budgetary information is readily apparent as well. Whether or not the evidence thus developed would be sufficient to persuade the arbitrator to sustain the grievance is beside the point. Under settled law recited above, it is the potential relevance of the requested information to the grievance that governs the Union's right to disclosure. With respect to the Union's requests for copies of the painting subcontracts for the current and 2 previous years, I similarly find that such information has potential relevance to the grievance in question and should therefore be produced. Conceivably, an unusual increase in painting subcontracts could adversely affect the amount of work available to employee-painters and their job security. This being the case, a disclosure of the requested material would give the Union the opportunity to appraise the situation and determine whether the Respondent had actually increased subcontracting work at the expense of the laid- off employee-painters or whether the subcontracting practice had remained relatively stable during the past few years, as the Respondent claims. This information, in turn, would have some relevance to the question whether the Respondent acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and in bad faith when it eliminated the paint shop and laid off the employee-painters and thereby violated the contractual limitation on its managerial prerogatives. Supreme Court observed in N.LRB. v. Acme, supra, 436, the Board is not required to "await an arbitrator's determination of the relevancy of the requested information before it can enforce the union's statutory rights under Section 8(aX5)." See also Timken Rolla Bearing, sirpra 751-754; The Fafnir Bearing Company v. N.LR. B., 362 F.2d 716, 721-722 (C.A. 2, 1966). 21 N.LRB. v. Acme, supra 437-438. 22 Cf. Puerto Rico Telephone Company v. N.LR.B., 359 F.2d 983, 986-987 (CA. 1, 1966). 334 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD It is thus clear that disclosure of the foregoing informa- tion, in all probability, "would be of use to the union in carrying out its statutory duties and responsibilities." 23 Doubtlessly, as the exclusive representative of the Respon- dent's employees, the Union has a real interest and, indeed, the duty to see that its constituents are treated fairly by their Employer and that their contractual rights are respected and vindicated. Without the requested informa- tion, the Union is hampered in effectively and intelligently performing this duty and making an informedjudgment of the merits of the employee-painters' grievance whether to pursue it further or drop it. The law no longer requires the bargaining representative "to play a game of blind man's bluff" 24 in its effort to protect the employees' interests. Had the Union here been furnished with the information when first requested , it might well have been persuaded to forego processing the grievance to arbitration. Lastly, I find nothing in the record or the special circumstances of the University, as an employer, which warrants depriving the Union of its right to disclosure because of the asserted confidential nature of the requested documents or the possible damage the University might suffer as a result of disclosure. In sum, I find that, by refusing to supply the requested material to the Union during the second and third steps of the grievance procedure and the pendency of the arbitra- tion proceeding, the Respondent breached its bargaining obligation in violation of Section 8(aX5) and (1) of the Act. In so ruling, I, of course, do not determine the merits of the employee-painters' grievance or the propriety of the Respondent's elimination of the paint shop and the termination of the six painters. Matters of this nature are clearly the province of the arbitrator whom the parties have designated to resolve their dispute in accordance with the terms of their contract. IV. THE REMEDY Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, as amended, it is recommended that the Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from engaging in the unfair labor practices found and in any like or related conduct and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. As I have found that the Respondent has unlawfully failed to perform its bargaining obligation by denying the Union, as the exclusive representative of the Respondent's employees in an appropriate unit, copies of the physical plant budget for the current and 2 prior years and copies of the painting subcontracts let during these periods, which the Union has repeatedly requested, I recommend that the Respondent be ordered promptly to furnish such informa- tion to the Union. The posting of an appropriate notice is also recommended. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case , I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All full-time and regular part-time employees em- ployed by the Respondent in the maintenance and servicing of Boston University in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, exclusive of student employees , employees directly assigned to academic departments , office clerical employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in Section 2(11) of the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. At all times material herein, the Union has been the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. By refusing to furnish the Union with copies of the physical plant budget for the current and 2 prior years and copies of the painting subcontracts let during the same years, for use in connection with the prosecution of the grievance of the Respondent's laid-off employee-painters, the Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(aX5) and (1) of the Act. 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, as amended, I hereby issue the following recommend- ed: ORDER 25 The Respondent, Trustees of Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to perform its statutory bargaining obliga- tion owing to Building and Service Employees' Interna- tional Union, Local 254, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of the Respondent's employees in the unit described below, by refusing to furnish the Union with information relevant and necessary for the proper prosecu- tion of the grievance filed by its six employee-painters: All full-time and regular part-time employees employed by the Respondent in the maintenance and servicing of Boston University in the Commonwealth of Massachu- setts, exclusive of student employees, employees direct- ly assigned to academic departments , office clerical employees, professional employees, guards and super- visors as defined in Section 2(11) of the Act. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their 23 N LR.B. v. Acme, supra, 437. conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 24 The Fafnir Bearing Company v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 716, 721 (C.A. 2, 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become 1966). its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be 25 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the deemed waived for all purposes. Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, TRUSTEES OF BOSTON UNIVERSITY 335 bargaining rights through the above-named Union, which are guaranteed to them in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Furnish the above-named Union with copies of the physical plant budget for the current and 2 previous years and copies of the painting subcontracts entered into with outside contractors during the same years, for use in connection with the prosecution of the grievance filed by the Respondent's laid-off employee-painters which is now pending before an arbitrator. (b) Post at its physical plant office in Boston, Massachu- setts, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix B."26 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 1, after being duly signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 26 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX B appropriate unit described below, by refusing to furnish the Union with information relevant and necessary for the proper prosecution of the grievance filed by our laid-off employee-painters: All full-time and regular part-time employees employed by the Respondent in the maintenance and servicing of Boston University in the Com- monwealth of Massachusetts, exclusive of student employees, employees directly assigned to aca- demic departments, office clerical employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in Section 2(11) of the Act. WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their bargaining rights through the above-named Union, which are guaranteed to them in Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL furnish the above-named Union with copies of the physical plant budget for the current and 2 previous years and copies of the painting subcon- tracts entered into with outside contractors during the same years, for use in connection with the prosecution of the grievance filed by our laid-off employee-painters which is now pending before an arbitrator. Dated By NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT refuse to perform our statutory bargaining obligation owing to Building and Service Employees' International Union, Local 254, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of our employees in the TRUSTEES OF BOSTON UNIVERSrrY (Employer) (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Seventh Floor, Bulfinch Building, 15 New Chardon Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02114, Telephone 617-223-3300.