Grant City

622 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD W. T. Grant Company, d/b/a Grant City and Vera Grace Davis. Case 8-CA-7841 May 13, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND KENNEDY On February 5, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Lowell Goerlich issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed excep- tions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions2 of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, W. T. Grant Company, d/b/a Grant City, Salem, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. i The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge . It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C A 3) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings 2 We hereby correct the following inadvertent error in the Administra- tive Law Judge's Decision in the second paragraph of Sec . III A, change 1974" to " 1973 " 24, 1973, because the Respondent believed she had joined, assisted, favored, or became a member of a union and/or because she had engaged in other concerted activity for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and thereby the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, herein referred to as the Act. The Respondent filed a timely answer denying that it had engaged in or was engaging in any of the unfair labor practices alleged. The case came on for trial at Salem, Ohio, on December 3, 1973. Each party was afforded a full opportunity to be heard, to call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally on the record, to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions, and to file briefs. All briefs have been carefully considered. FINDINGS OF FACT,' CONCLUSIONS, AND REASONS THEREFOR I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Respondent is now, and has been at all times material herein, a corporation duly organized under and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware, with its principal offices located in New York City. Respondent is engaged in the retail sale of general merchandise and the operation of department stores throughout the United States, and operates a retail store located at 2352 E. State Street, Salem, Ohio, the only retail store of Respondent involved in this proceeding. Annually, Respondent, in the course and conduct of its retail operations , receives gross revenues in excess of $500,000 and annually receives at its Salem, Ohio, store, directly from points located outside the State of Ohio, goods valued in excess of $50,000. Respondent is now, and has been at all times material herein, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Retail Clerks International Association, Local No. 698, AFL-CIO, hereafter referred to as the Union , is now, and has been at all times material herein, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE LOWELL GOERLICH, Administrative Law Judge: The charge filed by Vera Grace Davis, an individual, on August 20, 1973, was served by registered mail on W. T. Grant Company, d/b/a Grant City, the Respondent herein, on August 22, 1973. A complaint and notice of hearing was issued on October 30, 1973. The complaint charged that the Respondent discharged Vera Grace Davis on February i The facts found herein are based on the record as a whole and the observations of the witnesses 2 The credibility resolutions herein have been derived from a review of the entire testimonial record and exhibits, with due regard for the logic of probability, the demeanor of the witnesses, and the teachings of N L.R B v Walton Manufacturing Company & Loganville Pants Co, 369 U.S. 404, 408 III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES 2 A. Pertinent Facts Grant City, W. T. Grant's store 1149, opened in Salem, Ohio, on October 2, 1972. The Union commenced organizing the store in September 1972 prior to the store's opening and continued its organizational activities until February 1973. Union representatives campaigned by visiting the store about twice a week and conversing with (1962) As to those witnesses testifying in contradiction to the findings herein, their testimony has been discredited, either as having been in conflict with the testimony of credible witnesses or because it is in and of itself incredulous and unworthy of belief. All testimony has been reviewed and weighed in the light of the entire record. 210 NLRB No. 102 W. T. GRANT COMPANY 623 the employees. Union representatives also solicited em- ployees at their homes. Among the employees solicited was the alleged discriminatee, Vera Grace Davis, who signed a union authorization card on November 15, 1972. Davis had commenced work for the Respondent on September 18, 1972. Of the Respondent's employees, Davis engaged in the most union soliciting. She also attended a union meeting in January 1974, and by telephone invited other employees to attend union meetings. At various times union representa- tives conversed with her in the store. On one particular occasion in December 1972, Betty Jackson, personnel manager, while Union Organizer Helen Bittinger was paying for a purchase at Davis' register, approached the register and listened to the conversation of Davis and Bittinger. On another occasion, Davis' father-in- law, who was wearing union buttons on his hat, visited with her in the store. Store Manager John E. Jonosik watched them "the whole time." A store rule required that all employees check their purses at the office during working hours and carry no money on their persons. On one occasion in January 1973, Davis checked her purse which at the time contained union authorization cards. When she retrieved the purse, the union cards were missing. Store Manager Jonosik said that he learned of the union organizational campaign some time in November or early December 1973. Thereafter he discussed the Union at separate meetings with section managers 3 and employees.4 Jonosik told section managers that the "Union had been trying to get into the store" and that the managers were to "watch" the union representatives when they came into the store and "find out who they talked to." The union representatives were identified by Personnel Manager Betty Jackson. Thereafter, union representatives were "watched" by the section managers and reports were made to Jonosik.5 One time Jonosik asked Union Organizer Helen Bittinger to leave the store premises. Section managers were also told by Jonosik to inquire of the employees what their feelings were toward the Union .6 Contacts were made with the employees and reports were given to Jonosik.7 Specifically Jonosik instructed Section Manager Virginia Hull to "stay with Vera Davis." Around February 16, 1973, Jonosik observed some "women talking to her." Jonosik asked Hull about the incident, at which time Hull told him that she had found out that Davis had signed a union card. Jonosik informed the section managers that the store's 3 The General Counsel contends that the section managers are supervisors within the meaning of the Act in the determination of the issues in the case, it is deemed immaterial whether the section managers were supervisors within the meaning of the Act and no decision is made thereon 4 Jonosik testified, "I told them that I recognized the fact that they have the right to organize, but I wanted to make sure that they also had the right not to organize This was the most important point that I tried to make at those meetings " Jonosik also encouraged employees to ask questions 5 Section Manager Louise Grande testified credibly that the section managers "were to go up to the Union person and treat them like a customer and tell our employees to go about doing something else" 6 Section Manager Grande testified credibly, "We were to go to them [the employees] and ask them how they felt about the Union one way or the other, whether they wanted to join or whether they would rather have a Union or not." 7 Jonosik testified, "I asked the section managers to he sure that the "biggest problem" was "the Union people because he called them troublemakers." 8 Jonosik said that "there were ways to get rid of girls that had Union cards or belonged to the Union." 9 At the employee meetings, Jonosik informed the employ- ees that there should be no employee soliciting on store time, that, if employees wanted to pay into the Union, "he could take $5 off" them; 10 that he couldn't see why the employees needed a union; that the Union was stupid; that he didn't want the Union in the store and he could not see that the Union would improve anything . At one meeting, he said that he could identify the employees who had signed union cards. About 2 or 3 weeks before she was discharged and after an employee meeting at which the Union was discussed, Davis met, at her request, with Jonosik in order to ask him why she was being watched. Davis informed Jonosik that she had signed a card and that she "wondered if this was the problem as to why everybody was watching" her. Jonosik replied that he was "pretty sure" Davis had signed a card because a couple of girls had told him that she had called them in reference to a union meeting. During the conversation, Jonosik asked Davis what she thought a union could do for her. She answered, ". . . better job relationships, better job qualifications and you are not shoved all over the place, plus he couldn't meet you at the door and say, `You are fired.' " it The Respondent maintained a rule that required employ- ees who purchased store merchandise during working hours to check the purchases in the office (purses were checked at the same location). The first and third copy of the receipt for an employee's purchase were stapled to the register tape and put in the register. The second copy was stapled on the bag. If an employee purchased an item as she was leaving work she could check it through the register on the way out of the store without checking it at the office. The rule also provided that all packages would be checked at the exit door.12 No packages were to be placed under the counter or locked in lockers. Davis had knowledge of these procedures. Many of the employees had violated the rule by placing merchandise which they particularly wanted under the counter. Jonosik looked upon such procedure with disfa- vor. After lunch on February 24, 1973, Davis was temporarily assigned to the candy department. Here one box of candy remained of certain reduced sale items. Desiring to take advantage of the reduced price, Davis placed the box, Union organizers were not to monopolize time. 8 Jonosik was asked whether he had stated that he knew who the troublemakers were He answered, "No I had a lot of people guessing. But I didn't know " 9 Hull and Grande as well as Davis are credited witnesses. 10 Jonosik testified , "I tried to make the point that they [the employees] didn't have to pay for it. that it was already provided for them." 11 Jonosik admitted a conversation with Davis. Jonosik testified that Davis said that "she hoped that [he] didn't think she was a troublemaker." He also "discussed the position that she was in" and said that he "really had no problems with her work " i2 Employees were allowed to get their purses during luncheon or dinner breaks and at breaktimes These were the only times when employees were permitted to purchase items and check them in the office during working hours 644 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD together with another box of candy, in a bag, wrote her name on it, and placed it under the counter. Later some employee remarked that "if you have anything under the counter, get it out." (Employees had been previously informed not to follow this practice.) Davis removed the sack and placed it beside her register in the stationery department where she had returned. After one incident of a customer knocking the contents from the sack and another incident of a person attempting to purchase the boxes of candy, Davis stapled the sack closed, affixing a blank register tape to the sack. The sack lay by the register for several hours in plain view. At quitting time, Davis said to the cashiers, whom she was then helping bag, that she was checking out and would see them "in a couple of minutes." She picked up the sack and proceeded toward the lounge. Before reaching the lounge, she deposited the sack at the office window counter and asked for her purse. She proceeded to the lounge. Returning with her coat and boots, she picked up her purse and the sack and with a $10 bill and her car keys in her hands proceeded toward the front of the store to pay for the candy at the cash register. Jonosik appeared; he said, "Vera, can I see the slip on that?" She answered, "I don't have it. I am on my way to pay for it now." She added, "I [don't] have anything to hide other than the fact that I . . . put it in the sack earlier than I should... " Jonosik replied, "As of today you no longer have a job." Davis asked, "Why?" Jonosik replied, "Just say you didn't follow store procedures." Davis replied, "You mean putting it in a bag? You will then have to fire other employees." Jonosik responded, "we're just talking about you." 13 Sometime in May, prior to the filing of the charge in this case, Jonosik discharged employee Deborah Phillis for a similar offense. It had been reported to Jonosik that Phillis had been observed taking merchandise to the lounge. Jonosik was shown the merchandise and thereafter "watched it all day." When he saw Phillis leave, Jonosik went into the lounge and found the merchandise missing. He then accosted Phillis at the front door. After examina- tion of the merchandise, Jonosik dismissed Phillis. Jonosik testified that the specific part of the package procedures which Davis violated was the "package check procedure and taking of the merchandise into the employ- ees' lounge. . . . The fact that she bypassed the normal package check procedures." Again he testified, "The fact in question was that she was in the employee lounge with a package and she wasn't supposed to be there. It was sealed and it had a total tape on it. There was no reason that this total should be attached to that package." 14 Jonosik 13 Jonosik's version of the incident was as follows- He saw someone proceeding to the lounge with a package in her hand. As Davis returned, he saw the package she was carrying with a register tape not normally used for employees' purchases stapled to it. He immediately inquired of the office girl whether Davis had given her any packages Upon receiving a negative reply (Davis had not checked the package but had laid it on the office window counter.) he then stopped Davis in the fashion department and asked to see the purchase. Jonosik looked in the bag, whereupon Davis asked him what he was accusing her of She also said she had made arrangements with the girl at the front checkout Jonosik testified, "So I looked in the bag and saw there was candy inside I went up and asked the girl if Mrs. Davis would see her shortly before she left. She indicated 'no.' .. I told her that because she had violated package procedures she no continued, "The thing that concerned me and upset me was the fact that I saw the wrong tape on there." Jonosik testified further that employee packages are checked by a checkout supervisor or an assistant as the employee leaves the store. Such person takes a portion of the receipt which is attached to the bag and matches it "with the register for the purpose of her figuring the amount and purchases." 15 According to Jonosik, this is a security measure which "protects the employee from being accused and us so we may have that information." At the time Davis was accosted by Jonosik, Davis, according to Jonosik, would have had to have passed "through the registers in order to go out the Out door," the direction she was heading. At the time, Davis was about 10 feet from the register and about 25 feet from the door. B. Conclusions and Reasons Therefor While the Respondent admits that "the Company had knowledge that the Union attempted to organize the store shortly after it opened in October 1972 and even held store meetings concerning this organizing attempt in December 1972 and January 1973," it contends that the Respondent "had no knowledge of Davis' Union activity at the time of his [sic] discharge." The Respondent hangs this conclusion on the claim that Davis lied when she testified that she had revealed her union connections to Jonosik and that Section Manager Hull lied when she testified that she had told Jonosik that Davis had signed a union card. Having weighed the demeanor of Davis, Hull, Jonosik,16 and other witnesses, having given due consideration to the affidavits of Davis and Hull, and in the light of the record as a whole, it is found that Jonosik had knowledge of Davis' union affection. These additional factors support this finding: (1) In the light of the Respondent's surveillance of union representatives in its store and of its employees, it is highly unlikely that Jonosik would not have learned of Davis' union partisanship, especially since Davis engaged in more union solicitation than any other employee; (2) union authorization cards were missing from Davis' purse after it had been checked at the Respondent's office; (3) Davis was "watched" by Jonosik when she talked to her father- in-law whose hat was adorned with union buttons; (4) Jonosik instructed Section Manager Hull to "stay with Vera Davis"; and (5) Jonosik told the employees at a meeting that he could identify the employees who had signed union cards. In respect to Davis' discharge, the Respondent asserts that it was "for violating the package check procedure and taking of the merchandise into the employees' lounge." longer had ajob with me." It is of significance that neither the office girl nor the girl who indicated "no" was called by the Respondent for testimony. i4 Jonosik defined a total tape, "These register tapes are used to help us balance out the registers." It was different from a slip attached to a customer's bag "in that the [customer's] tape would have been an exact duplicate of the merchandise that was in the bag." is Jonosik testified, "And the copy that they take from the bag is mashed [sic i in the bag the following morning to make sure that the packages are definitely being checked out properly " 16 The fact that Jonosik experienced two union organizational cam- paigns while an employee of the Respondent and during these campaigns was not the subject of unfair labor practice charges has been considered in judging the credibility of Jonosik W. T. GRANT COMPANY tip The General Counsel claims pretext. The charge that Davis took merchandise into the employees' lounge is not supported by the credible evidence in this case. The credible facts are that Davis laid the package on the office window counter and then proceeded to the lounge to obtain her coat and boots. Moreover, neither in the testimony of Davis nor in the testimony of Jonosik 17 does it appear that Jonosik informed Davis that she was being discharged specifically for taking a package into the lounge. Indeed, Jonosik testified that the "thing that concerned me and upset me was the fact that I saw the wrong tape on there." Obviously Jonosik was not con- cerned at the time about Davis' alleged taking of the package into the lounge because in reality he did not see such alleged occurrence. Apparently his concern in this respect matured as an afterthought in order to augment the weak reason which he seized upon for Davis' discharge. It was a weak reason indeed because no other employee had been discharged for violating package procedures, al- though there had been known infractions, and because, based on Jonosik's knowledge of the incident, 18 there is a serious question as to whether the rule had been violated by Davis. In discharging Davis, Jonosik relied upon certain written rules, items 4, 10, and 12. Item 4 provides: Make all personal purchases according to the store rules, check your package in the office as instructed. These must all be approved and checked out at the exit door at closing time. Item 10 provides: All employee packages are to be turned into the office for safe-keeping until employee leaves the store. Item 12 provides: All employees' packages must be checked through the office. All packages will be checked at exit door before employees leave. No packages can be locked in lockers or under counter. It is clear that the rule does not ban purchases as the employees leave the store for the day or require that such purchases be checked through the office Indeed, the practice was that employees were allowed to purchase merchandise on their departure from the store Moreover, the rule does not mention whether such purchases must be placed in unstapled sacks or sans a total register slip attached thereto. Moreover, had Jonosik suspected theft, he was presumptuous, for Davis was heading toward the cash register with a $10 bill in her hand.19 He depraved Davis of the opportunity to prove her innocence by halting her before she had reached the cash registers. His haste in apprehending her is suggestive of his ulterior motive, of which, when measured against the discharge of employee Phillis, there can be little doubt. When Jonosik was informed that Phillis had placed packages in the lounge, he watched the packages and Phillis until her quitting time, but did not approach and discharge her until she was 17 Jonosik testified, "I had told her because she had violated package procedures she no longer had ajob with me " 18 Jonosik's knowledge was limited to Davis' carrying a package toward the front of the store stapled with a total cash register tape attached to it. On the tape, Jonosik said there appeared $24,000 or $25,000. Jonostk as a knowledgeable person must have known that this figure and the tape did not reveal that at that time the merchandise had been purchased. Jonostk proceeding out of the front door of the store beyond the cash register where payment was required. Had Jonosik behaved toward Phillis as he did toward Davis he would have fired Phillis before she reached the cash registers. Indeed, had he been inclined to enforce the alleged rule against taking packages into the lounge, he would have fired Phillis when he discovered the packages in the lounge. His treatment of Phillis vis-a-vis Davis is the more significant because at the time Jonosik did not know that Davis would lodge unfair labor practice charges against the Respondent. Jonosik's failure to await the chance for substantiating evidence against Davis, as he did for Phillis, discloses the pretextuous nature of Davis' discharge. Moreover, if the treatment of Phillis was normal employer practice, then the treatment of Davis was a variance. Other factors support this same conclusion. Jonosik, by his institution of surveillance of employees and his statements to employees and the section managers, reveals union bias which the discharge of Davis, a known union partisan, would have gratified. "When a . . . manager holding . . . antiunion bias . . . is involved directly in the decision whether to discharge an employee, the Board is entitled to conclude that this was a case of the threat made good." N.L.R.B. v. Neuhoff Bros. Packers, Inc., 375 F.2d 372, 376 (C.A. 5, 1967). As noted above, one of the reasons claimed for Davis' discharge was false. "[P]roof . . . that the reason given [for a termination] was false warrants the inference that some other reason was being concealed. . . . If the employer is independently shown to have an antiunion animus which the discharge would gratify, it may be a fair inference that this was the true reason." N.LR.B. v. Joseph Ante!!, Inc., 358 F.2d 880, 883 (C.A. 1, 1966). Indeed, the addition of a reason not revealed to the employee at the time of discharge smacks of pretext. Credible evidence further indicates that Jonosik acted to remove Davis from the payroll for discriminatory reasons because not only did he threaten to get rid of the union troublemakers, but he directed that Davis be watched and reported on. Moreover, at the time of her discharge, Jonosik gave no heed to any explanation for her alleged misconduct. Cf. United States Rubber Company v. N.L.R.B., 384 F.2d 660,662,663 (C.A. 5, 1967). "[T ]he `real motive' of the employer in an alleged 8(aX3) violation is decisive...." N.LR.B. v. Brown et a!., d/b/a Brown Food Stores, et aL, 380 U.S. 278, 287 (1965). See also Local 357, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf- feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America [Los Angeles- Seattle Motor Express] v. N.LR.B., 365 U.S. 667, 675 (1961). Therefore, on the basis of the record as a whole, it is concluded and found that the "real motive" for the Respondent's discharge of Davis was to discourage membership in a labor organization and to interfere with the right of employees "to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations." must also have known that Davis could not have passed the package through the exit with this type of tape attached to it if the checkout supervisor was performing her job and that it would have been sheer folly for Davis to have made the attempt. 19 While Jonostk testified that he did not see the $10 bill, he said, 'I don't know what she had to her hand." 626 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD "Illegal motive has been held supported by a combina- tion of factors, such as `coincidence in union activity and discharge' . . . `general bias or hostility toward the union' ... variance from the employer's `normal employment routine' . . . and an implausible explanation by the employer for its action. . . ." McGraw-Edison Company v. N.LR.B., 419 F.2d 67, 75 (C.A. 8, 1969). All these factors are present in the instant case. It is well established that the existence of even a proper reason for discharge is no defense if the discharge was actually made as here for an improper purpose. The John Klann Moving and Trucking Co., 411 F.2d 261, 263 (C.A. 6, 1969). Accordingly, it is found that by the discharge of Vera Grace Davis on February 24, 1973, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. 2. The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and it will effectuate the purposes of the Act for jurisdiction to be exercised herein. 3. By unlawfully discharging Vera Grace Davis on February 24, 1973, the Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE RECOMMENDED REMEDY It having been found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, it is recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It having been found that the Respondent unlawfully discharged Vera Grace Davis and thereby violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, it is recommended that the Respondent remedy such unlawful conduct. It is recom- mended in accordance with Board policy20 that the Respondent offer Vera Grace Davis immediate and full reinstatement to her former position or, if such position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges and make her whole for any loss of earnings she may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against her by payment to her of a sum of money equal to the amount she would have earned from the date of her discriminatory discharge to the date of an offer of reinstatement , less net earnings during said period, to be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner established by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and including interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum in the manner set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. Accordingly, upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record in this proceeding, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, it is recommended that the Board issue the following: ORDER 21 Respondent W. T. Grant Company, d/b/a Grant City, Salem, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from Discouraging membership in Retail Clerks International Association, Local No. 698, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by unlawfully discriminatorily discharging any of its employees or discriminating in any other manner with respect to their hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of em?] employment in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. lake the following affirmative action which will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer Vera Grace Davis immediate and full reinstate- ment to her former position or, if such position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges, and make her whole for any loss of pay that she may have suffered by reason of the Respondent's discrimination against her in accordance with the recommendations set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Recommended Remedy." (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this recommended Order. (c) Post at its Salem, Ohio, store copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 22 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 8, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 8, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 20 See The Rushton Company, 158 NLRB 1730, 1740. 21 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall , as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 22 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a trial in which all parties were permitted to introduce testimony and other evidence , it has been decided that we violated the National Labor Relations Act, W. T. GRANT COMPANY as amended, by discharging Vera Grace Davis in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. WE WILL offer Vera Grace Davis her job or, if her job no longer exists, a substantially equivalent job. WE WILL restore her seniority and pay her the backpay she lost because we discharged her. WE WILL NOT unlawfully discharge any of our employees for the same reason we discharged employee Vera Grace Davis. W. T. GRANT COMPANY, D/B/A GRANT CITY (Employer) Dated By 627 (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Suite 1695, Anthony J. Celebrezze Federal Building, 1240 East Ninth Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44199, Telephone 216-522-3715.