Local 6, Longshoremen's Union

666 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Warehouse Union Local 6, International Longshore- men's and Warehousemen's Union and Associated Food Stores, Inc. Case 20-CB-2877 May 20, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND PENELLO On October 30, 1972, Administrative Law Judge Martin S. Bennett issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep- tions to the Administrative Law Judge's Decision,' and General Counsel and Charging Party filed answering briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,2 and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that Respondent, Warehouse Union Local 6, International Longshoremen's and Ware- housemen's Union, San Francisco, California, its i General Counsel has moved to strike Respondent 's exceptions to the Administrative Law Judge's Decision on the grounds that they failed to comply with (1) Sec 102-46(j) of the Board's Rules and Regulations, which provides that exceptions shall be promptly served on all parties, and (2) Sec. 102 46(b) which requires, inter aha, that exceptions set forth specifically the questions of procedure, fact, law, and policy to which exception is taken as well as identify the part of the Decision to which objections are being made. Thereafter, Respondent filed a response to the General Counsel's motion to strike exceptions, and the Charging Party filed a brief in support of the Gcneral Counsel's motion to strike and an alternative answering brief. The General Counsel also filed its brief to the Administrative Law Judge as an answer to Respondent's .exceptions" in the event that we denied the General Counsel's motion to strike We have considered the General Counsel's motion to strike and, although it appears that there has been substantial compliance with the service requirements of Sec. 102.46(1), we agree that Respondent failed to comply with the specificity requirements of Sec. 102.46 (b). We do not condone Respondent's disregard for our Rules and Regulations, and it is with some reluctance that we deny General Counsel 's motion in the instant case. Since, however, it does not appear that either the General Counsel or the Charging Party were substantially prejudiced by Respondent's failure to comply with the above-mentioned Rules and Regulations , and since General Counsel and Charging Party have filed answering briefs and seem fully apprised of the issues sought to be raised by Respondent's "exceptions," we have proceeded to consider the merits of the case on review 2 The Respondent has excepted to all credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge It is the Board 's established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge 's resolutions with respect to officers, agents, and representatives , shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order.3 MEMBER FANNING, concurring: I agree with my colleagues that the Administrative Law Judge should be affirmed in finding Respondent in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (B) of the Act. But the Respondent argues that this case, in accordance with the majority's Collyer policy, should be deferred to arbitration. While I disagree with the majority's deferral to arbitration policy, it seems to me that Respondent is entitled to know why this case is different from others. In Houston Mailers Union No. 36 affiliated with International Mailers Union (Houston Chronicle Publishing Company), 199 NLRB No. 69, the majority insisted that the rights and obligations of the parties under their contract should be presented to an arbitrator for interpretation and decision. In The Washington Post Company, 207 NLRB Nos. 123, 124, and 126, the majority reached the same result. Here, as in those cases, the parties have a contract calling for negotiation and arbitra- tion of all disputes. The incident involving Garcia's work performance, the subsequent union meeting, the discharges, the strike, and the fines levied against employees and supervisors certainly involve ques- tions of contract interpretation. I cannot agree with my colleagues that only one party, presumably the Union, resorted to economic force in this case. Under any definition of that term the Employer's wholesale and arbitrary discharge of its employees because they were meeting to discuss their grievance should, it seems to me, be equally condemned. Certainly, the employees' grievance was credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. 3 In response to our concurring colleague, we believe the Administrative Law Judge properly refused to defer this matter to arbitration . Unlike the Houston Chronicle and Washington Post cases to which he refers, there is not alleged to be any contract provision here dealing with the propriety or impropriety of union fines as applied to supervisors . Furthermore, we find ourselves fully in agreement with the Administrative Law Judge that a party which repudiates the peaceful and orderly route afforded by the grievance and arbitration provisions by resorting instead to economic force in support of its contentions should not be heard to assert that the very procedures it has repudiated offer a viable means for resolving disputes as to the legality or actions taken by it in retaliation against those who did not join in the said resort to economic force As for the Employer's alleged resort to economic force , which our colleague would also condemn , we do not perceive its relevance to the issues before us in this case. If, as he states, the Employer also had "dirty hands," that would be a further basis, in our opinion, for not deferring to arbitration, so that we are mystified by our colleagues chiding us for not applying the principle of the above-named cases to this one. Equally puzzling is our colleague's reference to the Employer's "wholesale and arbitrary discharge of its employees because they were meeting to discuss their grievances." No such charge of improper employer conduct is before us; no such finding was made by the Administrative Law Judge ; and we we no basis in the record to make such a gratuitous finding in the present posture of this case. 210 NLRB No. 105 LOCAL 6, LONGSHOREMEN'S UNION 667 cognizable under their contract and their subsequent strike was defensive in response to the discharges. If, as the Administrative Law Judge charges, the Union has "dirty hands," the Employer's hands should be equally open to inspection. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MARTIN S. BENNETT, Administrative Law Judge: This matter was heard at San Francisco, California , on August 1, 2, 3, and 6, 1973. The complaint, issued May 23 and based upon a charge filed April 9, 1973, by Associated Food Stores, Inc., herein the Employer , alleges that Respondent Union, Warehouse Union Local 6, Interna- tional Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(l)(A) and (B) of the Act. Briefs have been submitted by the General Counsel and Respondent Union. Upon the entire record in the case , and from my observation of the witnesses , I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS Associated Food Stores, Inc., a California corporation, maintains its principal office and place of business at Union City, Califorma, where it is engaged in the wholesale distrib Jion of grocery products. During the past year, it received goods and products valued in excess of $50,000 which were shipped to it directly from points outside the State of California. I find that the operations of the Employer affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Respondent Union, Warehouse Union Local 6, Interna- tional Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Introduction,' the Issues It is undisputed that Respondent Union and the Employer have enjoyed a collective- bargaining relation- ship for some years covering warehouse employees, including working foremen. At the time material herein, the applicable contract covered the period from June 1, 1970, to May 31, 1973, and provided that Respondent Union will not "engage in any strikes, or stoppages of work .." It also granted the Employer the right to discharge employees for failure to perform required work and for engaging in strikes or work stoppages. There also was a grievance procedure for the appeal of disciplinary action which forbade any cessation of work pending a decision. This warehouse operates with two shifts, a day shift and a swing shift which commences work at 3:30 p.m. On Friday, December 8, 1972, most of the rank-and-file members of the swing shift convened in the lunchroom after 3 :30 p.m. and performed no work that day, as well as on December 9, 11, and 12 . They were discharged by the Employer, except for two who returned to work later that afternoon under circumstances described below. The General Counsel alleges that Respondent Union thereafter variously disciplined certain of the supervisory and rank-and-file members of Respondent Union for working and refusing to engage in this work stoppage or strike. This conduct by Respondent Union is alleged to be violative of Section 8(bx1XA) and (B) of the Act. The manager of operations at the warehouse was and is Richard Calton, who possessed full authority in the areas of contract negotiations, grievances, and day-to-day labor relations. Responsible directly to him were Warehouse Foreman John Seals and R . C. Russell, who were classified under the contract as "working Foreman A," and were over the swing and day shifts respectively.' Both Seals on the swing shift and Russell on the day shift, it is undisputed, had been granted the authority to issue work, transfer employees, train new employees, authorize over- time, and to discharge employees . They also have authority to handle and adjust work-related problems or "low-line" grievances on the work floor with shop stewards and they exercised this authority in all of the foregoing areas.2 It is also uncontroverted that Foremen Bob Hamilton, Doyle Satterfield, I. Dudley, and J. Prior, all classified as "Working Foremen A," enjoyed responsibilities in essence identical with those of Seals and Russell . I also find that all had varying numbers of rank-and-file employees under their direct supervision. As for these six supervisors who handle low-line grievances, Calton testified, and I find, that in 1972 he and Respondent Union's business representative, Vigil,3 agreed that it would be desirable to handle grievances at this lower level when feasible, rather than to undertake the grievance procedure provided under section 19 of the contract by formally convening a grievance committee of several representatives from each of the parties. Stated otherwise, this envisaged the handling of low-line grievances by the shop steward and the foreman on the scene and this was done. Administrative Business Agent William Burke of Res- pondent Union, Vigil's predecessor as business agent, attempted to downgrade the role of the working foreman, in effect contending that he was not authorized to act in the area of low-line grievances . Yet, he conceded that there were occasions "when matters could be discussed with some positive results by the stewards with the working foremen" ; he cited paycheck shortages or the assignment of personnel with low seniority to higher rated jobs as examples. i Something has been made by Respondent of the fact that their titles union membership contrary to union regulations, despite their supervisory vary and that they are also known as warehouse supervisors or warehouse status Solely relevant herein is their alleged supervisory status and the foremen Be that as it may, it is undisputed and I find that they were known action directed at them by Respondent Union by all these titles and that their responsibilities were unaffected . 3 Also spelled differently in the transcript. 2 1 see nothing to Respondent Union's claim that they continued their 668 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD I find, on a preponderance of the credible evidence and in accord with the contentions of the General Counsel, that the above-named personnel were supervisors within the meaning of the Act. I further find that at all times material herein, Seals and Russell handled and adjusted work- related problems on the work floor with shop stewards and that the other four supervisors, at the very least, similarly represented Respondent in 1972 in handling and disposing of "low-line grievances." B. The Garcia Incident The trigger incident leading to the instant case stemmed from an attempt by Calton to meet with Richard Garcia, an order selector on the swing shift. For some months prior to December 8, 1972, in the belief of management, Garcia's work performance had been unsatisfactory in two respects, viz, excessive absenteeism and low production.4 Calton had previously discussed this problem with Seals on a number of occasions and, on December 6, directed Seals to observe the performance of Garcia during the next 2 days. Absent improvement, Seals was to instruct Garcia to bring a union business agent with him when he reported for work on December 8. The record indicates, as Administrative Business Agent Burke of Respondent Union admitted, that it is standard procedure when discipline of an employee is under consideration to ask a shop steward to be present and either the steward or the employee may also call in a union business agent, if this is deemed desirable. Calton also instructed Seals to pull Garcia's timecard on December 8, if Garcia's work had not improved in the interim, and place it on his, Calton's, desk as a reminder to Calton to talk with Garcia at the start of the swing shift at 3:30 p.m. on December 8. There is uncontroverted evidence by the Employer, and I find, that this was standard plant procedure when it was desired to talk with an employee prior to the start of the shift, this preventing the employee from commencing his shift and avoiding the meeting. I further find that this did not amount to discharge of the employee, but was solely a device to bring him to management for a talk. As Calton put it, the Employer had invested time and money in Garcia, he believed that Garcia could improve, and he had not considered discharging the man. The testimony of Chief Steward Sterling Darnell, as he later told the employees, that this was tantamount to discharge, is found to be contrary to the fact. The performance of Garcia did not improve on Decem- ber 6 and 7 and, on December 7, Supervisor Dudley, apparently so instructed by Seals, informed Garcia that he was to bring a business agent to the plant on December 8. His timecard was pulled by Seals at the conclusion of the December 7 shift and placed on the desk of Calton. Early on December 8, according to Calton and I so find, he took the initiative in attempting to reach a business agent and have him present for the meeting with Garcia. He learned from the union office that none was available that day; and, it appears that Garcia made a similar fruitless attempt, because he advised Seals, on reporting for work on December 8, that no business agent was then available. C. The Work Stoppage on December 8, 1972; Subsequent Events Garcia duly reported for work on December 8, discov- ered that his timecard was missing, and so informed Swing Shift Steward Stuart.5 It is undisputed that employees are paid for working time lost on such an occasion. Stuart, accompanied by Garcia, asked Seals for the reason and Seals responded that Garcia had been instructed to bring a business agent with him that day.6 Stuart and Garcia then enlisted the support of Chief Steward Darnell. According to the latter, Stuart asked him to assist in a "grievance." Darnell, accompanied by Stuart and Garcia, then ap- proached Seals, asked the same question that Stuart had previously put and received the same answer. According to Darnell, Seals stated that he had told Garcia not to report for work unless accompanied by a business agent. According to Garcia, Seals refused to allow him to work unless a business agent was present. Be that as it may, this is not inconsistent with Respondent's position that Calton intended and had planned to talk with Garcia before he started work that day. It was then just minutes before the 3:30 starting time. Darnell asked to meet with Calton and Seals replied that Calton was not available. It is undisputed that Calton, who planned to meet with Garcia at 3:30 p.m. that day, had been called into a meeting at the plant with one of his superiors at 3 p.m. and was tied up until approximately 3:40 p.m. Darnell contended herein that Seals told him that he could not meet with Calton because Seals was representing management, and that he should meet with Seals. Garcia's testimony is silent as to this, and Stuart did not testify. I do not accept Darnell's testimony in this respect, because it is clear that Calton intended to meet personally with Garcia at this hour, and, indeed, the timecard of the latter at that very moment was on Calton's desk. Also illustrative of the tenor of Darnell's testimony was his claim that this was all a "plot" on the part of the Employer. Darnell became angry at this point and, accompanied by Stuart and Garcia, left Seals. As he passed the arriving swing shift employees, he beckoned them to follow him and most of the shift followed him to the plant lunchroom. This group, it appears, had punched in but had not commenced work at 3:30 p.m., as scheduled. At this point, Day Shift Foreman R. C. Russell, who had observed the incident, joined Seals and, at approximately 3:35 or 3:40 p.m., Seals and Russell went to the plant lunchroom; their testimony is in substantial accord as to what took place thereafter. I find, consistent with their mutually corroborative testimony, that they entered the lunchroom and asked Darnell if this was a work stoppage or strike. Darnell, who conceded herein that he was in charge of the meeting, 4 I deem it unnecessary to treat herein with the merits of this. 6 This is based upon the uncontroverted testimony of Seals. Garcia 5 Also appearing in the record as Stewart. testified only as to a subsequent conversation with others present. LOCAL 6, LONGSHOREMEN'S UNION 669 hesitated before replying and ultimately responded that he was tired of the Employer continually harassing Garcia. Darnell was asked by the two supervisors if the men were returning to work and replied that they would not until a business agent came to the plant.7 Seals and Russell left and immediately advised Calton of the state of affairs. Calton instructed them to bring stewards Darnell and Stuart as well as Garcia to his office and this was done. Darnell did most of the talking and asked why Garcia's card had been pulled. Calton, as he and Russell agree, responded that this was consistent with Calton's practice and was done to insure that he meet and talk with the employee before he started his shift. Darnell asked if Garcia was discharged and Calton replied in the negative, also acknowledging the unavailability of a business agent. As Seals put it, Calton urged everyone to return to work and promised that he would immediately meet thereafter with Stuart and Garcia. I so find. Calton then told the union group that he would give them 15 minutes to advise the assembled employees in the lunchroom that Garcia was not discharged and that he would meet with the grievance committee after the men returned to work; Darnell, it may be noted, placed the time granted as 10 to 15 minutes. It is deemed significant, as Darnell conceded, that he had previously told the assembled employees in the lunchroom that the Employer, by pulling the timecard of Garcia, had prevented him from commencing his shift and that this was the Employer's established technique of discharging an employee. Darnell's testimony as to what he did when he returned to the lunchroom may best be described as roaming all over the lot. He initially testified that he returned to the lunchroom, encountered an increasingly angry mood on the part of the employees, and then reported what had taken place in the office of Calton. Darnell claimed that he was in the room no more than 3 or 4 minutes when Seals and Russell, pursuant to Calton's instruction, appeared on the scene. He then conceded that he had been delayed some 5 minutes before returning to the lunchroom while awaiting a telephone call. He next contended that he did not have adequate time to report fully to the assemblage about his conversation with Calton.8 As stated, Seals and Russell went to the lunchroom to ascertain why the men had not returned to work. They did so after a period of time variously estimated from 8 to 15 minutes. According to the composite testimony of Seals and Russell, they entered the room, were told that the meeting was still in progress, that they represented management, and that they were to leave. Darnell repeated that the men would not return to work until a business agent appeared on the scene ignoring the suggestion of Russell that they work through the grievance procedure of the contract. Upon ascertaining that Garcia had not been discharged, two of those assembled declared that there was no problem and duly returned to work. Seals announced r By way of contradiction, the thrust of the testimony by Burke of the Union was that Respondent had breached the contract by asking that a business agent be present as a precondition to Garcia going to work that day Stated otherwise, the representatives of Respondent complained both of the absence of a business agent and the attempt by the Employer to have one present . I find that there was no breach by the latter. 9 It is readily apparent that an instruction from a steward to return to that the other men would be discharged if they did not return to work. As indicated, all concerned and especially Garcia and Darnell were well aware that no business agent was available that day. Darnell conceded that Seals had a seniority list with him and threatened to read off the names of the men, this being tantamount to their discharge. He claimed herein that he asked for and was refused 5 additional minutes with the men. On his version, I fail to see how this improves the legal position of Respondent Union. The two supervisors duly reported this turn of events to Calton and he instructed them to return to the lunchroom with him. The time was variously placed between 4:30 and 4:45 p.m., and I so find .9 According to Calton, he asked the assembled employees if Darnell had reported that Garcia was not discharged. Several indicated that Darnell had explained this, but maintained that they were not returning to work. About 4:45 p.m., at Calton's instructions, Seals read off the seniority list, this signifying the discharge of those whose names were read, namely all those then in the lunchroom including the two stewards . According to Calton, and I so find, he observed the discharged employees congregate immediately thereafter outside the plant with a placard roughly captioned, "Strike." Seals substantially corroborated Calton, placing the discharge of the men at approximately 5 p.m. that day and testified further that the two stewards and approximately one-half of the men stated that they were not returning to work. It was then that he read the seniority list at Calton's request. The credited testimony of Russell is to the same effect. Darnell testified only that when the three returned, he, Darnell, wanted 5 more minutes; Calton declined and stated that they were discharged. Darnell claimed that this was a lockout and instructed the men to leave , which they did. Darnell testified that he did not direct the men to return to work as he lacked sufficient time . Yet, he contradicted himself on an earlier occasion, on March 10 , 1973, when he testified at a union trial of Seals and another , Ludwig, that he had instructed the men in the lunchroom to return to work because the Employer was willing to sit down and discuss the grievance with them. He next became evasive herein and testified that he was confused . His testimony is not accepted where in conflict with that of the above- named witnesses for the General Counsel. Respondent and the Employer, by agreement, did meet on Monday morning, December 11. The first shift did not report for work that day. The Employer offered to reinstate all but the two stewards, Darnell and Stuart, but no agreement was reached. It appears that many, if not a majority of the rank-and-file employees failed to work on December 9, 11, and 12. All employees did return to work on December 13 after other litigation. As set forth, the instant case involves various types of union discipline of work and then negotiate can be most rapidly accomplished if that is what those affected choose to do. According to Calton , Darnell stated that he would explain to the men that Garcia was not being discharged and that they should return to work. 9 There is some conflict, which I deem unnecessary to resolve , as to when Calton contacted President Curtis McClain of Respondent Union by telephone that afternoon. 670 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD rank-and-file as well as supervisory employees who worked during the strike. D. Analysis and Conclusions Initially, it is to be noted that there is no question herein of supervisors performing unit or struck work . Indeed, Respondent Union flatly conceded that such discipline as was forthcoming stemmed solely from the basic principle that the men had worked and not from the nature of the work performed . And the record discloses that no struck work was performed by supervisors . Stated otherwise, so far as is revealed herein, some supervisors apparently performed their customary percentage of unit work and did not augment this in any manner. By notice dated January 8, 1973, employees Dick Shipman, Ted Benson, Bob Banks, Phyllis Marsden, Dennis Anderson, Bob Brennan, and A. Fernandez, as well as supervisors, I. Dudley, R. C. Russell, Bob Hamilton, Doyle Satterfield, and S. Pryor, were cited to appear before Respondent's grievance committee on charges alleging violation of the declaration of principles and oath of obligation as stated in its constitution. On or about January 20, the above-named personnel were found guilty of working behind Respondent Union's picket line. As noted, the vice of the supervisors was for working and not because of the nature of the work performed ; in any event, they did not perform any unit work beyond that normally performed. In addition, all, except Hamilton, were fined and suspended from member- ship for 6 months. On or about January 23 , Respondent cited Supervisor John Seals and employee William Ludwig to appear before a trial committee . On or about March 28, they were found guilty of violating the oath of office in the constitution of Respondent and were expelled from membership for the same reason.10 It is true that the proviso to Section 8(bx1)(A) assures a labor organization of the right to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership. N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967). But subsequent decisions have restricted this right . Thus, a labor organization violated Section 8(b)(IXA) of the Act when, in the guise of enforcing its own rules , it penalized a member for filing charges against it with the Board. N.L.R.B. v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers of America, AFL-CIO, 391 U.S. 418 (1968). And, in Communication Workers ofAmerica, AFL-CIO, (Roches- ter Telephone Corporation), 194 NLRB 872, the Board found a violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act where a labor organization endeavored to enforce conduct found violative of Section 8(d) and 8(b)(3) of the Act. In Rutherford, President, Local No. 18 International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO (Morgan), 205 NLRB No. 75, the Board found unlawful the fining and expulsion of members who had crossed a picket line where the picketing violated the secondary boycott provisions of the Act. Indeed, in Glazier's Local 1162, Brotherhood of Painters (Tusco Glass Inc.), 177 NLRB 393 and Local 2419, International Union of District 50 (National Grinding Wheel Company), 176 NLRB 628, the Board flatly found a violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) when there was internal union discipline against a member who refused to join a union-sponsored strike where the contract, as in the present case, contained a no-strike clause. I find, in view of the foregoing, that by citing, fining, suspending, and expelling from membership the employees named above, Respondent has engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(b)(IXA) of the Act. As found, Respondent fined Supervisors Russell, Hamil- ton, Satterfield, Dudley, and Pryor and suspended them from membership, save Hamilton, because they worked during the dispute. It also expelled Supervisor Seals from membership for the same reason. As they enjoyed and exercised the authority to represent the Employer as its representatives with regard to grievances and were supervi- sors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act, it follows that the discipline of them was violative of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act. See New York Typographical Union No. 6 (Daily Racing Form), 206 NLRB No. 83. I see no basis for deferring this matter to arbitration under Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837. The only dispute is the statutory one between Respondent Union and these employees and supervisors. Moreover, Respon- dent renunciated the most basic of collective-bargaining principles by repudiating its obligation under the grievance procedure of the contract which is the quid pro quo for the no-strike clause and is present with dirty hands, as it were. Western Electric Inc., 204 NLRB No. 94. See also, Communications Workers, Local No. 1197, (Western Electric Co.), 202 NLRB 229. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Associated Food Stores is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act. 2. Respondent Union, Warehouse Union Local 6, International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Un- ion, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By instituting disciplinary proceedings against em- ployees Dick Shipman, Ken Benson, Bob Banks, Phyllis Marsden, Dennis Anderson, Bob Brennan, and A. Fernan- dez and against Supervisors I. Dudley, R. C. Russell, Bob Hamilton, Doyle Satterfield, and J. Pryor for crossing its picket lines; by fining and suspending from membership for 6 months all of the foregoing except Hamilton; and by expelling employee William Ludwig and Supervisor John Seals for the same reason, Respondent Union has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (B) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. to While there is some evidence of other allegations against the group, he foregoing was at least a major contributing factor LOCAL 6, LONGSHOREMEN'S UNION 671 THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent Union has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(l)(A) and (B) of the Act, it will be recommended that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom, to refrain from any like or related infringement upon the Section 7 rights of its members and to take certain affirmative action designed to remedy the unfair labor practices found above. I shall, therefore, recommend rescission of the fines and expulsions and the withdrawal of all pending intraunion charges against those named above. In the event fines have been collected, it will be recommended that these be refunded plus interest thereon at 6 percent per annum. And, to the extent those suspended or expelled may have been deprived of benefits they would have otherwise enjoyed, it will be recommended that Respondent Union make them whole for the loss of any such benefits. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record herein, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: (e) Notify in writing all members directly concerned in the paragraphs above of what steps it has taken to comply herewith. (f) Post at its offices and meeting halls and at all places where it customarily posts notices to members copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." i2 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 20, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of Respondent Union, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent Union to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other materials. (g) Mail signed copies of said notice to the Regional Director for Region 20 for posting by Associated Food Stores, Inc., the latter willing, at all locations where notices to its employees are customarily posted. (h) Notify the Regional Director for Region 20, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps it has taken to comply herewith. i ORDER" Respondent Union, Warehouse Union Local 6, Interna- tional Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Instituting disciplinary proceedings, and fining, suspending, or expelling from membership any of its members for crossing a picket line and not engaging in a strike violative of a no-stake clause in any collective- bargaining agreement between it and Associated Food Stores, Inc. (b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing its members in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. (c) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing Associated Food Stores, Inc., in the selection and retention of its representatives for the purposes of collective-bargain- ing or the adjustment of grievances. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Withdraw all disciplinary proceedings pending against any member of Respondent for not staking and for crossing the picket line established by it against Associated Food Stores, Inc., in violation of a no-strike clause. (b) Rescind all fines imposed, all suspension notices, and all expulsion orders entered against the employees and supervisors named above. (c) Make whole any of those named above for fines collected pursuant to such action with interest thereon at 6 percent per annum and make them whole as well for any loss of benefits suffered by reason of suspension of membership. (d) Offer to James Ludwig and John Seals immediate and full reinstatement to membership in Respondent Union without prejudice to any rights and privileges to which they would have been entitled from the date of their expulsion and reimburse them for any losses or expenses suffered because of their expulsion as heretofore provided in the section entitled "The Remedy." 11 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 12 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT institute disciplinary proceedings, fine, or suspend or expel from membership any of bur members crossing a picket line and not engaging in a strike violative of a no-strike clause in any collective- bargaining agreement between us and Associated Food Stores, Inc. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce our members in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce Associated Food Stores, Inc., in the selection and retention of its representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances. WE WILL withdraw all disciplinary proceeding pending against any of our members including Dick Shipman, Ted Benson, Bob Banks, Phyllis Marsden, Dennis Anderson, Bob Brennan, A. Fernandez, I. Dudley, R. C. Russell, Bob Hamilton, Doyle Satter- field, S. Pryor, John Seals, and William Ludwig, for not striking and for crossing a picket line established by us against Associated Food Stores, Inc., in violation of a no-strike clause. 672 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD WE WILL rescind all fines imposed, all suspension notices, and any expulsion orders against our members, including those named above, resulting from them not striking and crossing a picket line established by us against Associated Food Stores, Inc., in violation of a no-strike clause. WE WILL make whole any of our members for fines collected pursuant to the foregoing action with interest thereon at 6 per cent per annum as well as for any loss of benefits suffered by any of them by reason of suspension of membership. WE WILL offer James Ludwig and John Seals immediate and full reinstatement to membership without prejudice to any rights and privileges to which they would have been entitled from the date of their expulsion and reimburse them for any losses or expenses suffered by reason of said expulsion. WAREHOUSE UNION LOCAL 6, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S AND WAREHOUSEMEN'S UNION (Union Organization) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 13018 Federal Building, Box 36047, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California 94102, Telephone 415-556-0335.