Kuhlman Corp.

776 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Kuhlman Corporation and International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, and its Local 799. Case 15-CA-4943 May 21, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND KENNEDY On January 8, 1974, Administrative Law Judge George J. Bott issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, exceptions and supporting briefs were filed by the Respondent and the General Counsel. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein.' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified below, and hereby orders that Respondent, Kuhlman Corporation, Crystal Springs, Mississippi, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, as so modified. 1. Add the following as paragraphs 1(b) and (c), respectively: "(b) Telling employees that they or other employ- ees will be discharged for having engaged in union or other protected concerted activities." "(c) In any other manner interfering with, restrain- ing, or coercing their employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organi- zations, to join or assist the above-named Union or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all of such activities." 2. Substitute the attached notice for the Adminis- trative Law Judge's notice. I During the Board-conducted election at Respondent's plant on July 12, 1973, employee Luke Funchess served as an observer for the Union. The Administrative Law Judge found that , upon seeing Funchess performing his observer duties , Supervisor Todd Parrett-clearly referring to Funchess -told employee Dragovich that "that black son of a bitch is going to go after the election." In the same conversation, Parrett also declared that Respondent would win that election by a specified number of votes. The complaint herein alleged, inter alga, that Parrett's remarks were violative of Sec 8(a)(1) of the Act, but the Administrative Law Judge failed to either sustain or dismiss that allegation. We find that Parrett's statement to Dragovich carried the clear implication that certain union activities could or would lead to the discharge of other employees Accordingly, we conclude that Respondent, through its supervisor, engaged in conduct which interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Sec. 7 of the Act and constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Sec 8(axl) of the Act. See Odai Printing Company, Inc., 188 NLRB 63.66, enfd. 456 F 2d 1335 (C.A. 2). APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT discourage membership in International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, and its Local 799, or any other labor organization, by discharg- ing or refusing to reinstate employees or in any manner discriminating in regard to their hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment. WE WILL offer Luke Funchess and Eddie Blackwell immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if they are not available, to substantially equivalent positions, without preju- dice to seniority or other rights and privileges, and make them whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of the discrimination against them. WE WILL NOT tell our employees that they or any other employees will be discharged for engaging in union or other protected concerted activities. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist the above- named or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities. KUHLMAN CORPORATION (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) 210 NLRB No. 116 KUHLMAN CORPORATION This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compr ance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Plaza Tower, Suite 2700, 1001 Howard Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana 70113, Telephone 504-527-6361. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE GEORGE J. BoTT, Administrative Law Judge: Upon a charge of unfair labor practices filed on August 6, 1973, by International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, and its Local 799, herein called the Union, against Kuhlman Corporation, herein called Respondent or Company, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint on October 3, 1973, alleging that Respondent had violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, herein called the Act, by discharging two employees because of their membership and activities on behalf of the Union. Respondent filed an answer, and a hearing was held before me at Crystal Springs, Mississippi, on October 30 and 31, 1973, at which all parties were represented. Subsequent to the hearing, General Counsel and Respondent filed briefs which have been considered. Upon the entire record in the case and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION OF THE BOARD Respondent, a Michigan corporation with its principal office and place of business in Birmingham, Michigan, manufactures electrical power transformers at its Crystal Springs, Mississippi, facility, the only facility involved in this proceeding. During the 12-month period preceding the issuance of the complaint, Respondent manufactured, sold, and shipped products valued in excess of $50,000 from its Crystal Springs, Mississippi, facility, directly to points outside the State of Mississippi. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. I During the day, employees enter information on the cards about the jobs they work on Some employees leave their cards in the rack and use III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES 777 A. The Discharge of Luke Funchess and Eddie Blackwell on August 2, 1973 1. Basic findings The Company has an admittedly long-established rule against punching other employees' timecards. Funchess and Blackwell were terminated on August 2, 1973, because Funchess punched two timecards on August 1 and gave one to Blackwell, according to Respondent , but General Counsel claims that neither employee engaged in miscon- duct and that Respondent was motivated by antiunion considerations in discharging them . Respondent also contends that even if the employees were innocent of the offense of punching another's card , the discharges were not a violation of the Act because Respondent , in good faith, believed that they had violated Respondent's rule in that regard. Funchess and Blackwell worked in the assembly depart- ment under Supervisor Hallman. Funchess had been employed for approximately 6 years when he was terminat- ed and Blackwell had worked for about 9 months. Both employees had good work records and neither had received any warnings prior to discharge. Funchess and Blackwell were members of the Union's organizing committee which existed prior to a Board election which the Union won on July 12, 1973. Funchess was more noticeably active in union affairs than Blackwell, for he obtained many more employee signatures to union cards prior to the election and he also acted as a union observer during the election , a job which required him to visit each department with a company observer and announce that employees could cast their ballots at that time. Funchess was also elected to the Union's negotiating committee less than a week before his discharge. Both employees are black, and Blackwell testified, without contradiction, that Funchess was the principal union activist among the blacks. Respondent maintains a number of timecard racks and clocks, but involved in this case is the so-called "big assembly timeclock" where employees from Funchess' and Blackwell's department normally punch in and out. The timecards which the employees use do not contain their names or any other identification before the employee utilizes them each day. They are blank, and the practice is for each employee to take one from the rack , insert it into the timeclock to record the time, then enter his department number and the last four digits of his social security number on the card, and, on punching out at the end of the day, leave his card in the box at the clock.' All clocks operate on a 24-hour basis, beginning at 7 a.m. as 0:00, and each hour is divided into hundredths rather than minutes. It is important to note that the first recording in the morning is 0 :00 and the second is 0:02 , and that 1.2 minutes elapse before the clock changes from 0:00 to 0:02. Funchess testified credibly that on the morning of August 1, 1973, he took a timecard out of the rack and punched it on the wrong side. He laid this card down and scratch paper on which to make notes about the jobs for later transference to the timecards. 778 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD punched another correctly, and, after entering his depart- ment number and clock number on the card, he returned it to the rack and picked up the other card and put it in his shirt pocket.2 He then entered the nearby men's room where he cleaned his safety glasses and left. As Funchess walked out of the restroom door, he saw Blackwell walking away from the timeclock toward their department. Blackwell testified credibly that, after he punched in on August 1, he observed Funchess coming out of the men's room. He spoke to him and they walked together to their department. Carl Terrell, an employee, testified that on the day before Funchess and Blackwell were fired, a day he remembered was Wednesday, a payday, he punched in at 0:02, right behind Blackwell. He said that as he ap- proached the timeclock Blackwell was at the clock, 15 feet or so ahead of him, making motions in front of the clock like one who was punching a timecard would make. After he himself punched his card, Terrell said, he saw Funchess come out of the men's room and join Blackwell, and they walked to their department together. Neither Funchess nor Blackwell saw Terrell near the timeclock, and Terrell said he did not see employee- timekeeper Neal in the area. Neal's card, as will appear in more detail later, for he is Respondent's main support for its contention that Funchess punched a timecard for Blackwell, is time-stamped 0:00, the same as Funchess' and Blackwell's. I consider the circumstances that Terrell did not see Neal and that Blackwell and Funchess did not see Terrell as interesting but not particularly significant .3 Terrell is still employed by Respondent and at one time he refused to give a Board investigator a sworn statement because he did not want to get "involved," he said. I observed him carefully and I believe he was telling the truth. I find that he saw Blackwell punch his own timecard on August 1. Production Control Manager Hickman testified that timekeeper Neal4 reported to him that he had observed from a review of timecards that, during the 2-week period prior to August 1, Funchess and Blackwell had punched in at the same time. Neal also advised him during the same period that on one occasion he saw Blackwell approaching the timeclock and signaling to Funchess, who was standing at the clock, to punch a card for him. Hickman said that Neal also brought to his attention timecards that he had found around the timeclock which had been punched, but which contained no identifying department or employee numbers. On the basis of these reports from Neal, Hickman said he felt that "we had reason to believ;, tnat some person was punching more than one card," and so he instructed Neal "to observe the cards." H' testified that, on August 1, Neal told him that he had seen Funchess punch two timecards that morning. He asked Neal if he had seen Blackwell "anywhere," but Neal had not. Hickman then instructed Neal to have the timecards checked when he picked them up the next morning to "see if *_ unchess and Blackwell were punching in at the same time." Hickman said he reported the situation to Personnel Manager Havens that day. On August 2, Neal brought Hickman the timecards for the previous day, and Hickman noted that Funchess and Blackwell had punched in at 0:00. Hickman told Neal to show the cards to Havens, and later on he, too, spoke with Havens. He testified that they concluded "with the evidence we had there it looked like Luke had punched Blackwell's card . . . ." On that basis, he said, they decided to terminate Funchess and Blackwell but to let Division Manager Smelko make the final decision. Neal testified that Havens and Hickman told him a few weeks prior to August 1 that "they had heard" that timecards, which had been punched but without identifica- tion, had been seen lying near the timeclocks, and they instructed him to report what he observed. Neal said he did discover punched but unidentifiable timecards thereafter on two occasions, "at two different time clocks," and reported his findings to his superiors. He also said that on occasion he noticed that Funchess' and Blackwell's timecards indicated that they had punched in at the same time. According to Neal, Hickman also told him that Blackwell had been seen coming in late mornings , but his timecard would be punched at the proper time, and he added that he, too, had seen Blackwell come in late one morning but have a proper time stamped on his card when it was inspected. He said this happened 5 or 6 days before August 1, but he did not report it to Hickman until "later." In his testimony, Neal also described the incident where Blackwell is claimed to have signaled Funchess to punch a timecard for him. Neal said that Blackwell had "his finger up in the air" while Funchess "was leaning to get a card but he never did go to get it." Neal agreed that he could not "say for sure" what Blackwell meant by his gesturing, and he stated that no extra card was punched. Neal testified that on August 1 he punched in right after Funchess. He said he saw Funchess punch two cards, place them in his pocket, and enter the nearby men's room, but he did not see him leave. He did not see Blackwell or Terrell in the area, and although he named certain employees who were standing around waiting to go to work, he did not mention employee Jones. Neal told Hickman what he had seen Funchess do, and it was agreed that the timecards would be checked on the following morning. On August 2, Neal brought Funchess' and Blackwell's cards to Hickman and Havens. Personnel Manager Havens testified that prior to August 1, 1973, he had reports that some timecards had been found at various clocks already punched but without identification. He also said that he had heard about "people punching more than their own card," but he added that he had no recollection of the time or the person who gave him this information. Havens said he was told by Hickman on August 1 that it "was suspected" that Funchess had punched two cards and that Blackwell had used one of them. On August 2, Neal 2 Funchess is one of the employees who leaves his card in the rack after 3 Neal did not see Blackwell or Terrell either, but he had gone to work punching in and uses scrap paper to record job and specification numbers on his timecards as soon as Funchess entered the men's room. during the day for later entry on the timecards I credit his testimony that he 4 Neal is employed in production under Supervisor Hallman, but he also has used spoiled timecards for this purpose in the past and that this is why is assigned to gather and record the information on the timecards in his he kept the improperly punched timecard on August 1 department, a task which takes about an hour each day. KUHLMAN CORPORATION 779 brought him the timecards which showed that Neal, Blackwell, and Funchess were all recorded as punching in at 0:00. Neal also reported that he had seen Funchess punch two cards on August 1 and enter the men's room, according to Havens, who then asked Neal if anyone else had seen the incident. Advised by Neal that employee Jones had, Havens said he checked with Jones who confirmed it.5 Havens said he then informed Division Manager Smelko what had happened and asked his advice. Smelko, he said, told him "to take action in accordance with the company rules." After talking with Smelko, Hansen instructed Supervisor Hallman to bring Funchess and Blackwell to his office. Havens testified that when Funchess and Blackwell reached his office he addressed Funchess, stating that he had been accused of punching two timecards, which he showed Funchess, and of giving one to Blackwell. He said he then asked Funchess if he had anything he wanted to say, but Funchess said nothing. He then turned to Blackwell, who stated that he had punched in at a different timeclock. Havens said that Blackwell denied asking Funchess to punch a card for him, but that he did not respond to other questions. On the basis of the evidence and the interview, Havens said he had no alternative but to dismiss both employees. Supervisor Hallman was present when Funchess and Blackwell were terminated. He testified that Havens accused the men of violating the rule and gave them an opportunity "to express their feelings." Funchess did not respond, but Blackwell made some remark, which he did not understand, about not punching in at the "big assembly clock." This was all Hallman remembered about the meeting. As he and the employees left Havens' office, Blackwell said something about being "framed ," Hallman recalled, but he said he did not reply, but only commented that he was sorry that "this happened." Although he supervised the complainants, Hallman said he knew nothing about "this problem punching," and he had not been informed by anyone in management that Funchess and Blackwell were suspected of punching in for each other until Havens told hun to bring them to his office on August 2. Funchess' account of the meeting in Havens' office differs mainly in regard to the sequence of remarks, the tone of the meeting, and his evaluation of it. He agreed that he did not defend himself when Havens accused him of punching two cards. He explained that he assumed that Havens was talking about the previous day when he actually had punched two cards, and he said he asked for no explanation because he felt that Respondent had already decided to fire him and that it would do him no good to argue. He testified that Havens opened the meeting by stating that he and Blackwell were being let go because he had been seen punching two cards and giving one to Blackwell. He asked Havens if he should turn in company materials and Havens said he should. He recalled Blackwell asking Havens when the incident was supposed to have occurred and getting no reply. When Blackwell made the same inquiry again, Funchess said he told Blackwell to "forget it" and "let's go," because Havens' mind was made up. As they left the room, with Hallman accompanying them, Hallman commented that he had had nothing to do with what had happened. He had no recollection of Blackwell indicating at the meeting that he had punched in at another clock on August 1. I have previously indicated that I found Funchess to be a reliable witness, and although he may not have remem- bered exactly what was said by everyone at the time of his termination, anymore than Havens or Hallman could have, I believe his account is basically sound , and I credit his explanation for his silence when accused on the basis of his good-faith and rational belief that Respondent had irrevocably decided to fire him before he entered Havens' office and that no explanation would save his job. Funchess was fully aware of Respondent's rule against punching timecards for other employees , and he testified credibly that he never has punched a card for another employee or has had it done for him. He also said he had no understanding with Blackwell to punch a card for him if he was late for work. Blackwell testified that, after Havens accused Funchess of punching two timecards and giving one to him, he asked Havens when this incident occurred, but Havens did not answer him. It was at that point, he said, that Funchess said to him, "let's go," adding that nothing they could say would make a difference. He also recalled Supervisor Hallman stating that he had nothing to do with the situation. Asked why he did not deny Havens' charge when he made it, Blackwell indicated that he was, in effect, denying the accusation by asking when it had occurred. He explained further that he thought that he and Funchess were being terminated because of their union activities, since there was no other valid reason he could think of, and he also believed because of Havens' demeanor that nothing he said would alter Havens' decision. As in Funchess' case, I credit the substance of Black- well's testimony, and I find that he had reason to believe that he and Funchess were confronted with a fait accompli and for that reason made little effort to defend himself. I also credit his testimony that Havens ignored his inquiries and that Hallman made it clear that he had not been involved in anyway in the terminations. Blackwell also knew about the rule on punching timecards. He credibly denied that he and Funchess had ever punched each other's timecards. He also credibly denied that, about a week or so before August 1, he made a hand gesture to Funchess indicating he wanted him to punch a timecard for him, as Neal had testified.6 As indicated earlier, Funchess acted as an observer for the Union during the Board election on July 12, and he and a company observer visited each department in the plant advising employees that it was time for them to vote. Employee Dragovich testified that during the election Perrett, foreman of the maintenance department , spoke to 5 Jones was not called as a witness. He signed a statement for Havens on permitted this document into evidence, not for the truth of the statements in August 2, 1973, which was prepared by the Company's personnel relations it, but as information in Respondent's possession before it terminated the director from the corporation's Birmingham, Michigan, office, stating that complainants. he saw Funchess punch two cards and "put them down." Blackwell then 6 Funchess also denied that such a thing had occurred. "came over and picked up one of the cards," according to the statement. I 780 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD him and commented that the Company was going to win the election by a certain number of votes . According to Dragovich, at that time Funchess and the company observer, who were releasing employees to vote, ap- proached the area, and Perrett turned to Dragovich and stated, "that black son of a bitch is going to go after the election." Perrett testified that he could have spoken with Drago- vich on election day, but he denied all the remarks attributed to him by him . He said he thought the Company would win the election and that he probably voiced his opinion to employees . He has known Dragovich for a "good many years," and he occasionally "kids" with him. Dragovich has been employed by Respondent for 5 years. Logic and probability strongly indicates that Dragovich was not fabricating a conversation with a supervisor, and I was also favorably impressed by the low-keyed and apparently sincere way in which he testified . I credit his testimony in full. 2. Analysis, additional findings, and conclusions There is no question, as Respondent contends, that an employer can discharge "for good cause, or bad cause, or no cause at all," 7 or that General Counsel has the burden of proving that the discharges were illegally motivated. It is also clear that the mere existence of conduct which is violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act does not automatical- ly make a discharge an unlawful ones Contrary to Respondent's position, however, I find that General Counsel has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the discharges of Funchess and Blackwell were motivated by illegal considerations. More specifically, I find that Respondent had no legitimate basis for discharging these employees nor did it in good faith believe that it did. These factors and other considerations to be discussed lead me to conclude that the employees' union activities and nothing else caused Respondent to discharge them. Funchess was known to be active in the Union.9 He was the most active of the black employees and he stood out among the other employees by acting as a union observer during the election, going from department to department, telling all employees and their supervisors that it was time for the employees to cast their ballots. His appearance in the plant caused Supervisor Perrett to predict that he would no longer be employed after the election, which Perrett expected the Company to win. The timing of the discharges is of some significance. Respondent began to observe Funchess' and Blackwell's timecard-punching habits shortly after the Union won the election, according to Neal, and Funchess was fired less than a week after he was elected to the Union's negotiating committee. 7 N.L.R. B. v. T.A. McGahey, Sr, et al., dibla Columbus Marble Works, 233 F 2d 406 (C.A. 5, 1956) 8 N.L.R.B v. Fox Manufacturing Company, 238 F.2d 211 (C.A. 5, 1956). 9 Havens incredibly testified that he knew of no prounion employee in the plant before the election. It is beyond dispute, of course, that he knew about Funchess' role in the election, and I believe he must have known, or suspected at least, that Blackwell, as a friend of Funchess, if for no other reason, was prounion. In any case, regardless of what he knew about Blackwell's union activities , having decided to fire Funchess , who in my Funchess and Blackwell did not commit any offense against company policy, as I have found above. They corroborated each other in that regard, and I have also credited the testimony of employee Terrell, who saw Blackwell punch in on the morning of August 1, just before he did. Even if Respondent honestly suspected or believed that the dischargees were guilty of misconduct, which I cannot find, its handling of the matter indicates that it was more interested in quickly ridding itself of the employees than it was in finding out exactly what had happened and how to cure the situation. Funchess had been employed for almost 6 years and had a good record, and there were apparently no complaints about Blackwell's work or conduct during his tenure. Nevertheless, although Respondent only "sus- pected," according to Hickman's testimony, that the employees had violated the rule, no one warned or counseled the employees about their conduct and no one thought to ask Hallman, their supervisor, for his opinion or consult him in anyway about a problem which Respondent said it considered serious. This is particularly significant when it is recalled that Neal testified that he did not see Blackwell at the timeclock on August 1 and had no knowledge about when he reported for work. Hallman would know if Blackwell was late or on time, and he could confirm or negate Respondent's theory that Funchess was punching Blackwell's card when he was late. It seems almost redundant to state that, if Blackwell were on time on August 1, there was no reason for Funchess to cover for him. Respondent's precipitance is evidenced by the meeting in which the employees were terminated. It is clear, not only from Funchess' and Blackwell's testimony but from Havens' testimony as well, that the decision to fire the two had been made before the meeting. Havens testified that he reported the facts about timecard punching to Division Manager Smelko before he met with the employees and was given authority to fire them,i° and I have also credited the testimony of the employees that it was apparent that Havens' mind was made up when the meeting started. Another factor indicating that Respondent's motive was other than what it claimed it to be is that the testimony of its witnesses in regard to how they came to suspect Funchess and Blackwell and what they did about it is illogical and contradictory. First of all, since there is no evidence that either Funchess or Blackwell ever had a tardiness problem, there was no reason to believe that they needed to arrange a method of concealing their times of arrival. Neither had ever been warned about their attendance.ii According to Hickman, the only evidence he had which could cause him to believe that Funchess and Blackwell might be involved in a timecard problem was the view was Respondent's main target, Blackwell, as an alleged participant, had to be discharged too Unquestionably, in such circumstances, Blackwell's discharge was illegal if Funchess' was. 10 His words were, "he told me to take action in accord with company rules." Since Smelko did not testify, we must assume that "take action" is a euphemism 11 Here again, Hallman would have been helpful , but Respondent's officials used him only to witness the complainants "termination." KUHLMAN CORPORATION 781 fact that their cards had been punched in at the same time on two or three occasions during a 2- or 3-week period.12 No other cards were checked, and it will be recalled that 1.2 minutes elapses before the timeclock moves from 0:00 to 0:02. There is nothing significant in such circumstances in two employees having the same time stamped on their cards, and I do not believe that Hickman thought so.13 Neal's testimony differs significantly from Hickman's, and I have no confidence in it. He testified that Hickman told him that Blackwell had been seen coming in late in the mornings but with his timecard punched at the proper time. It is significant that Hickman did not mention this important evidence supporting Respondent's "suspicion" in his testimony, and since the matter was not developed the record is silent on the source of Hickman's information on this point.14 Neal then testified that he, too, had seen Blackwell arrive late but have an on-time time -stamp on his timecard. Although this was supposed to have occurred after he had been instructed by Hickman to watch for this sort of thing, he said he did not report it to Hickman until after August 1. Here again, there is nothing in Hickman's testimony about this incident. If Neal's testimony is true, Respondent had sufficient basis on which to discharge Blackwell prior to August 1, but Neal, contrary to his instructions, did not report it. I do not credit Neal's testimony about what he knew, observed, reported, or was told to report to management prior to August 1, and neither do I credit Hickman's about the basis of his "suspicion" of Funchess and Blackwell or his reason for instructing Neal to keep the two under observation. Personnel Manager Havens' testimony about the source and nature of the information supporting management's belief that Funchess and Blackwell were possibly involved in misconduct in connection with timecards is vague and unimpressive, and the evidence on which he said he relied in recommending their discharge is contradictory. He said that he "had reports" prior to August 1 about timecards found at timeclocks punched at 0:00 as well as reports "from employees" that "some of the people" were "punching more than their own cards," but he could not recall who gave him the information or when he got it, and he did not suggest that Funchess and Blackwell were mentioned in connection with these reports. Although his testimony is not precise on this point, apparently he learned no more until August 1, when he said Hickman told him that "it was suspected that Funchess and Blackwell" were involved in improper timecard punching. He had their timecards checked and he talked with Neal and employee Jones. It appears from the record that the information Jones gave him is not consistent with Neal's report. Neal testified that on August 1 Funchess punched two timecards and placed them both in his shirt pocket. He did not see Blackwell in the area. Jones' statement, which was prepared and handwritten by Roth, states that he saw Funchess punch two timecards "at starting time and put 12 Neal's vague and uncertain testimony, denied by the dischargees, that he once saw Blackwell make a gesture to Funchess, which he felt was a signal to punch a card for him, should not even create a "suspicion" of wrongdoing in a mind that was not looking for it 13 He also stated that punched but unidentified cards had been found around the clocks There is absolutely no reason to attribute this condition to the dischargees rather than to someone else, whatever significance it has them down. Ed Blackwell came over and picked up one of the cards." Neal's, Funchess', and Blackwell's cards all show a 0:00 starting time, but it was never explained how Jones could have seen Blackwell take the timecard (the overt act in the conspiracy) and Neal could not . Jones did not testify, and I do not believe his evidence would support Respondent's case. Respondent could have discharged Funchess and Black- well "for good cause, for bad cause, or no cause at all," 15 but the absence of any cause for discharge is evidence bearing on the weight of the evidence advanced by Respondent to offset an inference of discriminatory motivation from other evidence. General Counsel's eviden- ce warranted an inference that the discharges were discriminatorily motivated. My analysis of the reasons given by Respondent for the discharges, the context in which they were effected, and my evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses has led me to believe that Respondent had no legitimate business justification for firing the employees and did not honestly believe that it did. I find nothing else in Respondent's case to offset the inference that the discharges were illegally motivated. I find that Respondent discharged Funchess and Blackwell in violation of Section 8(aX3) and (1) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE It is found that the activities of the Respondent set forth above, in section III, occurring in connection with its operations described in section I, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade , traffic, and com- merce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(axl) and (3) of the Act, it will be recommended that the Board issue the recom- mended Order set forth below requiring Respondent to cease and desist from said unfair labor practices and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Respondent violated the Act by discharging Luke Funchess and Eddie Blackwell, I will recommend that Respondent offer them immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs are not available, to substantially equivalent positions , without prejudice to their seniority or other rights or privileges, and make them whole for any loss of earnings they may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against them, by payment to them of a sum of money equal to what each of them would normally have earned as wages from the date of discharge to the date of the Respondent 's offer of from a management point of view . The cards, if they were found, were at more than one clock. I consider this asserted reason for checking on Funchess and Blackwell to be an afterthought and a makeweight. 14 It could not have been Hallman, the employees' supervisor, for he never heard about the matter until the day the employees were discharged. 15 N L R. B. v. T.A . McGahey, Sr., et al., d/b/a Columbus Marble Works, supra 782 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD reinstatement, less net earnings during such period, with backpay and interest thereon to be computed in the manner prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. 3. By discharging Luke Funchess and Eddie Blackwell because Funchess or both of them had engaged in union activities, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record , and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I issue the following recommended: ORDER 16 Respondent, Kuhlman Corporation, Crystal Springs, Mississippi, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from discharging employees, refusing to reinstate them or otherwise discriminating 16 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. against them because they engage in union or other protected concerted activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer Luke Funchess and Eddie Blackwell immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs , or if those jobs are not available, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make them whole for any loss of earnings, in the manner set forth in "The Remedy" section of this Decision. (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents all payroll records , social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to compute the backpay and reinstatement rights due under the terms of this Order. (c) Post at its Crystal Springs, Mississippi, plant, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 17 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 15, after being duly signed by Respondent, shall be posted immediately upon receipt thereof, in conspicu- ous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 15, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 17 In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board " shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."