The Dolese Co.

THE DOLESE COMPANY 95 The Dolese Company (Pre-Stress Plant) and Interna- tional Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, Local 627. Case 16-CA-5199 June 4, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND KENNEDY On February 11, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Elbert D. Gadsden issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep- tions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that Respondent, The Dolese Compa- ny (Pre-Stress Plant), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges unfair labor practices not found herein. I We correct the following inadvertent errors which do not affect our conclusions herein: In sec. III, B, first paragraph, last line, "Foreman Carroll H. (Toby) Cole" should read "Structural Inspector John Clark." The paragraph in which In. 10 appears gives an account that combines two telephone conversations by Sandra Stringfellow to Respondent. Mrs. Stringfellow's testimony is that she called Respondent on two successive days, Friday, June 8 and Saturday, June 9. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ELBERT D. GADSDEN, Administrative Law Judge: Upon a charge of unfair labor practices filed on June 25 , 1973, by International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, Local 627, herein called the Union , against The Dolese Company, herein called the Respondent , the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint against Respondent on or about July 25, 1973, alleging that Respondent had engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Sections 8(a)(1) and 2(6) and (7), and Sections 8(a)(3) and 2(6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, herein called the Act. The Respondent filed an answer, which in relevant part denied that it interrogated its employees about their union activity; that it offered its employees wage increases and other conveniences if they did not join the Union; that it prohibited employees from distributing union literature during nonworking times and places; that it encouraged its employees to state their grievances and complaints; and that its discharge of employee Carl Stringfellow was related to any unfair labor practices. A hearing in the above matter was held before me at Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on October 10, 1973. Briefs have been received from counsel for the Respondent and the General Counsel, respectively, and have been carefully considered. Upon the entire record in this case and from my observation of the witnesses, I hereby make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION Respondent, is now, and has been at all times material herein, a corporation duly organized under and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware, and is engaged in manufacturing prestressed and precast concrete prod- ucts at its Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, plant. In the course of conducting its business operations at its Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, plant during the past 12 months, Respondent purchased and received supplies and materials valued in excess of $50,000 which were shipped to its Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, plant from points outside the State of Oklahoma. The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED International Union of Operating Engineers , AFL-CIO, Local 627, herein called the Union, is now and has been at all times material herein a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. M. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Introduction Union Activity It was stipulated by the parties at this proceeding that the supervisory status of Foreman Carroll (Toby) Cole, Plant Production Superintendent George Mercer, Foreman Marvin (Sam) Basden,General Superintendent of Concrete Operations Jack Hammond, and Mike Martin are not in issue. The parties further stipulated that the petition for the union representative election at Respondent's plant was filed March 15, 1973; that it was approved by the Regional Director on April 23, 1973; that the election was held on May 24, 1973, during which time the Union received 36 "yes" and 4 "no" votes; and that the result of said election has not been certified as of the date of this proceeding. 211 NLRB No. 15 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Dischargee Carl (Doug) Stringfellow was hired by Respondent -as-a laborer-in December 1972 at a salary of $3.15 per hour. After working 90 days for Respondent, his salary was raised to $3.25 per hour. Stringfellow worked in the crew of leadman Prentiss Green, which crew was under the supervision of Foremen Carroll (Toby) Cole and Marvin (Sam) Basden, who in turn reported to Plant Superintendent George Mercer. On or about March 12, 1973,1 union representatives were contacted by employees of Respondent to organize plant employees. On June 6 and 7 the plant's normal or official working time was from 7 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., unless work which necessitated completion was not completed at that time. Stringfellow obtained permission from Foreman Cole and leadman Green, on June 6, to leave work at 3:30 p.m. Whether or not Stringfellow also obtained permission to leave work at 3:30 p.m. on June 7 and whether he called in on June 8 to report that he would be absent from work because of illness are matters in dispute between the parties. Nevertheless, Stringfellow left work at 3:30 p.m. on June 6 and 7 and did not report to work on June 8. His departure from the plant at 3:30 p.m., on June 7, was reported to Plant Superintendent Mercer on June 7 by Foreman Cole. In reliance on the report, Superintendent Mercer prepared a discharge statement in accordance with company procedure, indicating that Stringfellow was discharged June 8 for taking off from work early on June 7, without proper permission and because he was absent from work on June 8 without furnishing any reasons therefor. Superintendent Mercer signed the statement. Although his signature alone is usually sufficient, on this occasion, Mr. Mercer said he called in Foreman Cole and leadman Green and had them sign the statement also, since he prepared it upon information furnished by Cole, on June 7, and upon Green's subsequent statement on June 8 that he (Green) only gave Stringfellow permission to leave at 3:30 p.m. on June 6.2 Issues In regard to the alleged discriminatory discharge of Carl (Doug) Stringfellow in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, and the other alleged violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, the principal questions presented for decision are whether Stringfellow actually left the job early without permission on June land failed to report for work on June 8 without explanation, and was therefor discharged for cause, rather than for union activity; and whether Respondent through its managers and agents did in fact engage in unlawful interrogation of its employees, made promises of rewards to them, prohibited them from lawful distribution of union literature, and/or encouraged em- ployees to submit grievances and complaints to discourage said employees' organizational efforts, all, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. B. Interrogation of Employees and Promises of Wage Increases and Other Benefits The alleged discriminatee, Carl Stringfellow, testified I Hereinafter all dates will refer to the year 1973 unless otherwise specified. that on or about March 12, he telephoned Bill Grant, the union representative, and requested some union cards which he (Stringfellow) later picked up, distributed, signed one himself, and procured signed cards from 12 to 15 fellow employees at Respondent's plant. He further stated that he and other employees spearheaded the Union's organizational effort by engaging in promotional talk with fellow employees and also handbillmg at the plant's gate on or about March 15, when he was seen by Plant Superintendent George Mercer and Foreman Carroll H. (Toby) Cole who knew about his union activity. Stringfellow further testified that during the morning break on or about March 19, Foreman Carroll (Toby) Cole approached him and asked him, "who handed the union cards out?"; that being fearful of losing his job, he said he did not know; and that Cole then asked him did he sign a union card and he (Stringfellow) said, "I did." On April 24, while at the end of bed B on the jobsite, Foreman Cole said to him, "We didn't need the Union and that he could be our negotiator, and that the Company was giving us a 25- cent an hour raise anyway"; that on the afternoon of May 3, while at the end of bed B, Cole again said to him that they (the employees) really did not need the Union because he (Cole) could get them the same things they wanted and that he was planning on getting them a 25-cent an hour raise anyway; and that Cole said: "I want you to get out there and talk to the guys about this. Now lets hear a big `No' vote." Cole's alleged statements were made to Stringfellow during the period of the progress of the preelection campaign, but Cole denied he made such statements to Stringfellow. Stringfellow also stated that on the same day (May 23), Supervisor Cole approached himself and employee Marvin Holloman while they were working and his testimony revealed the following: A.-and he told us we didn't need the union again. He said that he would be our negotiator. He told us the hard workers wouldn't have a chance of moving ahead because the union goes strictly by seniority. Stringfellow also testified that on May 20 or 22 a large trailer was brought on the plant's premises near bed B and Foreman Cole said to him, "This trailer is for you guys if you vote the union out . . . if the Union gets voted in, we're going to lock it up." The trailer was to be used for breaks during the winter but Stringfellow has seen it used only for a meeting called by Superintendent Hammond. Subsequently, on or about May 23 at 9:20 a.m., he was asked by leadman Green to report to a meeting held in the trailer; that he attended the meeting and at the direction of Chief Plant Superintendent Jack Hammond, he and five or six other employees signed their names on a tablet acknowledging their presence and Mr. Hammond then asked them if they had any complaints; that this was the first time any such meeting was ever held and the conversations which ensued were as described in the following testimony: Q. Did you or anybody else voice any complaints? 2 The facts set forth above are undisputed in the record. THE DOLESE COMPANY 97 A. I didn't personally but somebody else told him about the parking lot, that we couldn't drive in it, and that we have had to have our cars pulled out by tractors. Q. Did he respond to this complaint? A. Yes, he did. Q. What did he say? A. He said he would do his best to get it fixed. He said he couldn't guarantee anything. Q. Were there any other complaints voiced at this time? A. There were a couple more small complaints. I'm not sure what they were about, and then somebody started to say something about a raise. He said that the union couldn't get us anything that the company didn't want to give because it was the company's money. Q. Did he say anything else? A. Not that I can remember. Q. Was this a regular meeting? A. No, it wasn't. Q. Did they conduct monthly meetings at Dolese? A. Safety meetings every once in awhile, but not regularly. Q. Did they ever conduct any complaint meeting like this before? A. No, they haven't. Q. That's the first one they've conducted? A. Yes, it was. Q. Do you know if they conducted any since that time? A. Not while I was there. Employee Eugene D. Carrera testified that his work crew, too, was summoned to a trailer house meeting on May 21 or 22 by Superintendent Hammond, during which time they were asked to check off their names on a list acknowledging their presence ; that Mr. Hammond then told them that he could not brainwash them (the employees) by the use of a trailer, as the Union's leaflet had said, because he is not a psychiatrist; that Mr. Hammond then said the Union could not do anything that the Company did not agree to do; and that he asked them if they had any complaints and suggestions to improve work conditions. Jack Hammond, general superintendent of concrete operations for Respondent, credibly testified that he conducted a series of meetings in the trailer with six or seven employees at a certain time on one day before the election. He further testified as follows: Q. What was the presentation that you made at the meetings? A. Well I wanted to be sure the employees understood the company's position with regard to the upcoming election, and I wanted to be certain that they knew the proper procedure in actually voting, so I explained that to each group along with listening to any questions they might have or any complaints they would like to make. I did show this hand bill that had been handed out with reference to my brainwashing them so to speak. I told them I was not there to brainwash them and even if I were I didn't have the capacity because I was not a psychiatrist. I related my personal feeling that I would like for them to remain nonunion, and of course the company felt the same way, but it was entirely up to them as an individual as it would be up to me if I were in their shoes. They could vote any way they saw fit and it would not be held against them no matter what the outcome of the election was. Q. And the union won 36 to 4? A. Yes sir. Q. Was there anything said as to the benefits the union could obtain for them? A. Yes sir, I told them for sure that the union could not get one penny for them if the company did not agree to it. Q. Do you recall whether these employees asked questions at these meetings? A. Yes sir. I don't know if I recall this specifically but I believe it might have been Spears who asked something about vacations, and I stated to him what our policy was at the time on vacations and holiday pay, whatever our benefits were at the time. If they had questions about it, I'd clarify it for them. Q. How long have you been with Dolese? A. Just past 23 years. Q. Approximately how many different plants does the company operate? A. Plant to plant, probably 30 to 40 different actual plant facilities. Q. That includes ready-mixed plants, rock quarries, sand plants and other types of operations? A. Yes sir. Q. Is this pre-stress plant the first plant the company has had that has had a union election? A. No sir. Q. Do you have plants presently under union contracts? A. Yes sir. Again referring to the trailer meeting about May 24, Mr. Hammond was asked: Q. Why did you take roll? A. So that I personally would know if there were some people that I didn't get a chance to visit with. Q. Did you ask the employees whether they had any complaints or suggestions? A. I don't recall asking that question, no sir. Q. How did these complaints that were aired come about? A. I imagine they came out in answer to my question, "Now if you fellows have any questions or comments or anything on your mind, I'll be glad to listen to you on anything you've got to say, but I certainly want you to understand that I have no right and will not make any promises because it is not legal." They understood that the clearest of all. Q. Had you ever conducted a meeting of this nature before at this pre-stress plant? A. No sir. Q. Have you conducted a meeting of this nature since that time? 98 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD A. No sir. Leadman Eugene D. Camera also credibly testified that on May 23 around '3 p.m. Superintendent George Mercer came up to him and asked if the men (two or four) in his crew were for the Union and he told him they were; and that Mr. Mercer said something to the effect that he didn't guess there was much they could do about it now. Carrera is still a leadman. He believes he has authority to let a man off early (the normal quitting time) and he has done so in the past. Employee James Ingram testified that he had also attended a trailer house meeting with Mr. Hammond on May 22 and acknowledged his presence by signing a tablet circulated amongst the employees. Mr. Hammond then asked them: A. . . . if we had any gripes. Some of the guys stated the gripes that they had such as the parking lot, and another gripe was that there was no lunch room. + • s a s Q. Did you voice any complaint? A. I told him that we didn't have any sick leave. He said that he didn't have any sick leave, either, so we'd better not get sick. He said- Q. Well, go ahead-I'm sorry. A. He went on to say that the union could not get us anything that the company was not willing to give. Q. Do you remember anything else being said during that meeting? A. No sir. Q. Did the company conduct this type of meeting on a regular basis? Q. Was this the first meeting of its type to occur there? _ A. Yes, it was. Q. Have any meetings occurred since this time? A. No, they haven't. Supervisor Cole testified that he was unaware of any connection between the arrival of the trailer house and the onset of union activity. James Ingram credibly testified that he was employed by Respondent on August 14, 1972; and that although he has engaged in various forms of union activity such as soliciting union cards, signing a union card, and attending union meetings, he nevertheless remains in the employ of Respondent as an operator . However, Ingram further testified that in the afternoon on or about March 17, near the welder's shack, Foreman Cole asked him if he was for the Union and he replied he was 100 percent for the Union.3 Prentiss Green credibly testified that he has been employed by Respondent since September 9, 1972; that he was under the supervision of Foreman Carroll (Toby) 3 I credit the testimony of James Ingram that Foreman Cole asked hun if he was for the Union because it is not only undisputed in the record, but is essentially corroborated by the testimony of Foreman Cole himself. 4 Again I am persuaded not only by the impression I received that Green was testifying truthfully, but by the logical consistency of his testimony with all of the employee witnesses and partially consistent with Foreman Cole's Cole; and that he is and was the leadman of the crew in which Stringfellow worked. The parties to the proceeding willingly stipulated that Green is a leadman, that he is in the same bargaining unit with Stringfellow, and that he is not a supervisor within the meaning of the Act. Green further testified that on or about March 13, Foreman (supervisor) Cole came up to him and asked him if he knew who was passing out the union cards and he told Cole he did not know; that about 7:30 a.m. on March 22, Foreman Cole asked him did he attend the union meeting and he told him that he (Green) did; that Foreman Cole then asked him what was the union meeting about and he said, about different things; that later that morning, Foreman Cole asked him if he had signed a union card and was he for the Union, and he advised him that he had signed a card and that he was for the Union. Leadman Green also stated that on May 10 supervisor Cole came up to him and said: "We don't need a union and if a union is not voted in, you'll be satisfied with a 25-cent raise"; and that on the afternoon May 17, Foreman Cole said to him, "that any young man who has the ability to make it can do so, but if the Union was voted in they would go by seniority."4 Eugene D. Carrera credibly testified that he has been employed by Respondent since July 17, 1972, and has been a leadman since October 1972; that he formally worked under the supervision of Foreman Cole when Stringfellow was employed there, but now he works under the supervision of Foreman Basden; and that he attended the union meeting in March and signed an authorization card. He further testified that on or about March 21, Foreman Cole came up to him and said, "why don't you take your pencil with you to the meeting tonight? I want to know what's going on." There was a union meeting on that night and Carrera said he attended the meeting. On the next morning about 9:30 a.m., Foreman Cole asked him what happened and what he thought about it, and he told Cole he thought it was a pretty good deal. Cole then said, "that's good if that's what you want,15 Caroll H. (Toby) Cole credibly testified that he was employed by Respondent during Stringfellow's tenure with Respondent, until late August or early September, when he voluntarily terminated his employment to become em- ployed by the Thomas Pre-Cast Company; that during his work tenure with Respondent, he was the supervisor of Stringfellow and he admitted that he held general discus- sions with Stringfellow and other employees of Respondent about the Union; that discussions about the Union during March-May were frequent and widespread in the plant; and that about 90 percent of such discussions he had with the employees were initiated by them and about 10 percent were initiated by himself. He stated that he did not recall having any discussion about the Union with Stringfellow and he did not know whether the latter had signed a union card. More specifically, with respect to the general discussions testimony in this regard . I therefore credit Green's version of the discussions held withForeman Cole about union activity. 5 I credit Camera's testimony because it is not disputed and because it is consistent with the testimony of other employee witnesses, and is essentially corroborated by Cole's testimony. THE DOLESE COMPANY 99 about the Union held with employees, Foreman Cole said he expressed his opinion "that certain conditions regardless how- good a.man Was that he could come out here and bust himself wide open for you, you could not push him past this dude over here that was kind of riding along, coasting. You could not push this man with experience that had come right off the field in ahead of him." Cole also said he knew Knight and Ingram and that he had engaged in discussions with them, each of them expressing their own opinion about the Union; that he probably did ask them questions during their discussions but he could not remember the substance of them; that he believes he did ask Ingram was he for the Union and that Ingram said yes he was for the Union; that he did ask Camera, "just under what conditions and what he thought it (the Union) could do better for him that he wasn't already getting, and general things like this ..." and "just whether he thought the majority of people was attending the union meetings"; that it was not personal interest, just knowing how the men felt, just what was all on their minds, just to get the general idea of what was going on. Cole further stated that he did not ask Camera to go to the union meeting but he might have jokingly asked him to take his pencil to the meeting. He did not tell Camera that he wanted to know what was going on but the next day Camera might have mentioned that most of the employees were present at the meeting . He knew that Camera and Ingram were for the Union and he had a good idea that Stringfellow was for the Union. On cross-examination Foreman Cole denied that he asked Green if he signed a union card or who was passing out cards, but said he did ask him who was for the Union. He denied that he told Green they did not need the Union because the Company was going to give them a raise anyway. He denied he ever told Stringfellow he could be the employees' negotiator but admitted he asked Ingram and Camera how many and who were for the Union and that he could have asked them if they were for the Union, he was not sure. Supervisor Cole testified that he remembered some discussions about a 25-cent wage increase but stated that they were in relation to the starting wage rate of a laborer, which is $3.15 per hour during the probationary period and then it is increased to $3.25 an hour. He further stated that Respondent had other classified jobs such as forklift operator, finisher, and welder, the rate of pay for which is $3.50 an hour ; and that it was a 25-cent increase in wages given to an employee who advances from a laborer to one of these classified jobs.e Based upon the foregoing credited testimony, I conclude and find that dischargee Stringfellow was largely responsi- ble for initiating the organizational effort of Respondent's employees; that his leadership participation in the organi- 6 I credit the testimony of Stringfellow regarding Cole's and/or Superintendent Mercer's inquiries about who was distributing union cards, and Cole's questions as to whether or not Stringfellow signed a union card, were he and other employees for the Union, Foreman Cole's statements about a 25-cent wage increase and his opinion about the disadvantages of unionization of the employees, because, not only was I persuaded by the truthful manner in which he testified in this regard, but his testimony is also essentially corroborated by the testimony of his leadman , Green, and fellow employee Camera. Said testimony is also partially corroborated by employee Ingram and by Foreman Cole himself. Moreover, Stnngfellow's zational effort was known by Respondent (Mercer and Cole) who interrogated Stringfellow and other fellow employees about their union interests, activity and affilia- tion; that Foreman Cole is a supervisor within the meaning of the Act; that Foreman Cole advised said employees that he could negotiate for them and that they should not favor the Union. He stated or implied that they (employees) were going to receive a 25-cent-an-hour raise anyway and urged them to vote against the Union; that Foreman Cole asked an employee to attend the union meeting and report to him what transpired at the meeting; that Respondent (Superin- tendent Hammond) called its first and only meeting with employees a few days before the election for the Union, and after explaining the nature of the election, encouraged said employees to express their gripes or complaints; that although Foreman Cole was the most knowledgeable supervisor on the union activities of Stringfellow and some of his fellow employees, and the principal supervisor interrogating the employees and making promises of reward to them and statements against unionization, he is nevertheless an agent of Respondent and, therefore, acted on its behalf; and that all of such conduct on the part of Respondent constitutes interference, restraint, and coer- cive conduct in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. C. Prohibition Against Distribution of Union Literature Dischargee Stringfellow testified that on May 15 while he was distributing handbills at the plant's gate with Bill Grant and Tom Patterson, representatives of the Union, John Clark, from quality control of the Respondent, drove up and asked Bill and Tom to leave the plant's property. They did not leave but asked Mr. Clark to go and talk to Plant Superintendent Mercer. Clark did not ask him (Stringfellow) to leave the property but turned his car around and headed towards the plant's office. Stringfellow further stated that Mr. Clark inspects the concrete beams, tells them when something is wrong with their work, and he has seen him pull men off one job and had them perform another. However, in his testimony Mr. Clark denied that he actually has or ever exercised such supervisory authori- ty. He said he merely inspects the beams and that he may request a leadman or laborer to correct an imperfection. If the employee fails to make the correction he can only report the matter to a supervisor (a foreman or the production superintendent). With reference to the handbill distribution incident at the gate on May 15, Mr. Clark gave the following account: A. I drove up ready to leave the plant a little after 5:00 o'clock and the union people were passing out their handbills. As I was about to leave the gate or testimony is credited because it is also consistent with the general tenor of all of the credible evidence of record relating to interrogation and discussions about the Union, initiated in part by management (Messrs. Cole, Mercer, and Hammond) and other employees of Respondent. I credit Cole's testimony and discredit Stringfellow 's with respect to promises about the use of the trailer because Stringfellow and other witnesses appeared to be unsure and somewhat selective in answering questions on this subject. Moreover, it is not clear from the evidence that the trailer was either held out or was used as a beneficial inducement to influence the employees on the matter of unionization of plant employees. 100 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD getting close to the gate, one of the union people approached my car so I slowed down and stopped. He came over and gave me one of these hand bills and I looked at it just briefly. I didn't really read anything on it. Then this union representative asked me if I'd had a hard day, and I replied, "just like always," or something to that effect. It was just small talk. He was getting kind of friendly with me so I just asked him if he thought that he shouldn't be on the other side of the fence to be passing out these hand bills. At this, he got a little upset and asked me who I was. "Who are you?" he said. I said, "Well I'm working in Engineering." After he asked me who I was he said, "Who says I have to get on the other side of the fence?" I said, "Well I know that George Mercer has said that he doesn't (want) union representatives on Dolese property passing out literature." He said, "Well if George said that, let George come up and tell me himself, and I'm not leaving unless he does ." So I left and went back to get Mr. Mercer. I notified Mr. Mercer of this and he was going to come up with me but at that time we had a problem with our water supply, so I stayed with him and we worked on this water supply until about 6:00 o'clock. At the time I left the union representatives were no longer there . Nobody else was there either. Q. They were inside the Gate distributing the literature? A. Yes, they were at least 50 feet on Dolese property. Q. The fence is on the property line? A. Yes sir, to my knowledge the fence is the property line. Q. And by going outside the fence means to go off of Dolese's property? A. Yes sir. Q. Is there room to go outside the fence without being run over by cars? A. Yes sir. Mr. Clark said Stringfellow did apologize to him the next day for the conduct of the union representative at the gate the night before, but he denied that he said, "You guys will get yours," as Stringfellow stated. Stringfellow said they continued to distribute handbills and then George Mercer drove up, honked his horn, and pointed down the road, which he (Stringfellow) understood to mean, for him to leave the gate, so he left . Witness John Clark said he did not see Superintendent Mercer honk his horn and Superintendent Mercer testified that he did not do so when Stringfellow, Green, and Grant were distribut- ing handbills on May 15, but said he did honk his horn and pointed down the road on another occasion when 7 1 discredit Stringfellow's testimonial account of the handbilhng incident at the gate, and I credit Clark's account because it appeared to be more logically consistent with the events that followed, especially since Stringfellow apologized to Clark on the following morning for the conduct of the union representatives . Since Clark merely suggested that Stringfellow, Grant, and Patterson step on the other side of the gate , he did not appear to be talking as a supervisor but a fellow employee, and although he returned to the plant and reported the incident to Mr. Mercer, the latter did not return and order them off company property. Moreover, since there is conflict between Stringfellow's and Superintendent Mercer's interpretation Stringfellow and Union Representative Grant had the road (gate) blocked.? Based upon the credited testimony of Stringfellow, Inspector Clark, and Superintendent Mercer, I conclude and find that Respondent did not attempt to prohibit nor prohibited its employees from handbilling on company property on May 15. D. Respondent's Discharge of Stringfellow A composite of the credible testimony of Stringfellow, Green, Cole, and Clark established that Respondent is engaged in the manufacture of prefabricated, prestressed, and precast concrete, steel reinforced beams used in bridge construction; that once you begin to pour the concrete you cannot stop work until the process is completed; that although the employees usually completed work around 3:30 p.m. (during the period in question), it was not unusual to work until after 4 p.m., and only occasionally until 6 or 6:30 p.m.8 Stringfellow testified that on June 6 and 7 his family was to move from one house to another and on June 6, he thereupon asked leadman Prentiss Green could he leave early (at the usual quitting time 3:30 p.m.), and that Green said it was all right with him if it were approved by Foreman Cole and he advised Stringfellow to ask Mr. Cole; that he (Stringfellow) went to Foreman Cole and asked him could he leave early (3:30 p.m.) on June 6 and 7 and that Foreman Cole said "OK." Stringfellow further stated that he left work at 3:30 p.m. on June 7; he reminded leadman Green that he had to leave at 3:30, and on his departure at 3:30 p.m., he saw Foreman Cole and waved goodbye to him; and that Cole, who had a spray gun in his hand, waved the same (goodbye). Leadman Green credibly testified that he knew String- fellow was moving his family on or about June 6 and 7 and he said he has the authority to allow a member of his crew to leave work early; that he told Stringfellow it was all right for him to leave at 3:30 p.m. on June 6 if it were approved by Foreman Cole; that there may be times when the foreman will let an employee leave early without his (Green's) knowledge, but that he did not remember Stringfellow asking him to leave early on June 7; that after 3:30 on June 7, either he or Foreman Cole asked the other where was Stringfellow, and Foreman Cole went to the timeclock and noted that Stringfellow had clocked out at 3:30; and that he (Green) and his five man crew continued to work until after 3:30. When Foreman Cole asked him did he give Stringfellow permission to leave early he (Green) said he replied, he did not remember. At the hearing, Green said Stringfellow had a trailer hitch attached to the rear bumper of his car on June 7 but he of what Mercer's horn honking and hand pointing incident meant (get off company property or do not block the gate), I cannot credit Stringfellow's uncorroborated testimony over Superintendent Mercer's. 8 Although there were minor discrepancies in the testimony of the several witnesses with respect to the usual or official end of the workday, I believe such discrepancies were reasonable and were due to technical but honest errors in judgment and memory of each witness in disclosing what information he deemed significant at the time he was interviewed and interrogated, and that any errors in said times were not due to bad faith or dishonesty of any of the witnesses. THE DOLESE COMPANY could not remember whether a trailer was also attached to the same. Leadman Green further credibly testified that on June 8, Foreman Cole came to him and told him Plant Superin- tendent Mercer wanted to see him in his office. He reported to Mr. Mercer's office, sat down, and a paper containing a statement about permission for Stringfellow to leave work at 3:30 on June 7 was placed on the table before him. He advised Mr. Mercer that he gave String- fellow permission to leave early (3:30 p.m.) on June 6 but he could not remember whether he gave Stringfellow permission to leave early (3:30 p.m.) on June 7. Mr. Mercer then asked him to sign the statement, which was prepared before he entered the office, so he signed it because he did not think there would be any further discussion or contest about it Foreman Cole testified that only supervisors and the plant manager have the authority to allow an employee to leave work early; and that a leadman can allow an employee in his crew to leave work early if he finds that it will not obstruct necessary job progress and he will not need the particular employee. Specifically, he stated that on June 6 Stringfellow approached him between 7 and 8:30 a.m. and asked him if he could leave work on the afternoons of June 6 and 7, at 3:30, because he was in the process of moving his family. He said he gave Stringfellow permission to leave at 3:30 p.m. that day (June 6) if his crew were not running behind the work schedule, and that he (Stringfellow) could do so by informing his leadman. However, he said he advised Stringfellow to check with him on the next day (June 7) about leaving at 3:30, because it was too far in advance for him to grant approval. Nevertheless he said if the progress of the work was all right, it, was possible he could leave early; and that Stringfellow did not check with him on June 7 and he [Cole] did not give him permission to leave on June 7. Foreman Cole said he first learned that Stringfellow had left early on June .7 when leadman Green approached him and asked where was Stringfellow and he replied he did not know. Green then asked him did he give Stringfellow permission to leave early and he responded, "I certainly did not." Foreman Cole said he then went and checked the timecards and noted that Stringfellow had checked out at 3:30 p.m. He then asked Green did he (Green) give Stringfellow permission to leave and Green said he did not. Foreman Cole said Green's crew had work to be completed after 3:30 on June 7, and it was either himself or Green who initially reported Stringfellow's departure to Plant Superintendent Mercer. On cross-examination, Foreman Cole admitted that men are pulled from their assigned crews to substitute for vacancies on other crews in cases of emergencies, and that there are interchanges of crew members on occasion. He also admitted that he reported Stringfellow's early departure on June 7 to Mr. Mercer on the same afternoon (June 7), and he wrote up a report to that effect. 9 1 credit Green's testimonial account of the events which lead to Stringfellow's discharge because although he appeared to be testifying truthfully to the extent that he testified, I received the distinct impression that he was afraid of management because he was uneasy answering questions which indicated an answer adverse to his supervisor (Mr. Mercer) who was present in the courtroom ; and because he was careful in not 101 Plant Production Superintendent George Mercer credi- bly testified that on the afternoon of June 7, Foreman Cole told him that a man (Stringfellow) had left the plant without permission and before his job was performed. Thereupon he prepared a discharge form, which is standard procedure for all violations of plant rules, to keep in the files. This prepared statement (Resp. Exh. 2) indicated that Stringfellow was discharged on June 7 for leaving work without proper permission from leadman Green and Foreman Cole; and for failure to report to work on June 8 without calling in to give an explanation for his absence. Mr. Mercer then called Foreman Cole and leadman Green into his office on June 8, and having heard Green state that he did not give Stringfellow permission to leave work at 3:30 on June 7, had Green and Cole to sign the discharge statement, since he obtained from them the information upon which the discharge was based. In explaining why Knight was given only a 3-day suspension for walking off the job at noon without permission, Mr. Mercer said Knight was a dozer, frontend loader operator; that such operators were difficult to find and retain at that time; that Knight was the only operator that could keep the job going and he was compelled to consider the alternative punishment (suspension); that employee Ingram was a forklift operator but not a qualified dozer frontend lift operator as was Knight; and that if he had other operators as Knight, the latter would have been discharged as was Stringfellow. Moreover, Mr. Mercer continued, other employees have been discharged for walking off the job, such as one Robert Silar, a skilled laborer, who left the job without permission for several days and returned. He was unable to recall the specific reasons for which said other employees were discharged. Superintendent Mercer also testified that he did not complete a discharge form on Knight when he was discharged because Knight was not a laborer and he worked under the supervision of Construction Superin- tendent Pete Peters, who merely asked his opinion about appropriate disciplinary action. Therefore, it was Pete Peters' responsibility to complete the suspension form, and if Peters did not complete the form, it was Peters who did not comply with company procedure in not doing so. Sandra Stringfellow, wife of dischargee Stringfellow, credibly testified, corroborating his testimony, that she called the office of Respondent on the morning of June 8, as she had on other occasions, to report that her husband was ill; that she asked to speak with Superintendent George Mercer but was advised that he was not there; that she then talked with Mike Martin, who identified himself, and informed him that her husband (Stringfellow) would not be in on that day (Saturday, June 8) because he was ill; that Martin then said: "Well tell him not to bother because he has been terminated ... for leaving early on `Thursday' (probably meant Friday) and to have him come and pick up his checks." 10 Based upon a composite of the foregoing credible categorically denying that he gave Stringfellow permission to leave early on June 7, but instead, he emphatically stated several times, that he did not remember giving such permission. 10 Although Sandra Stringfellow is the wife of dischargee Stringfellow, I nevertheless credit her testimony because I received the impression that she was testifying truthfully. I also credit her testimony , even though (Continued) 102 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD testimony, I conclude and find that the usual end of Respondent's workday in June was 3:30 p.m.; that if a pour of concrete was not completed by 3:30 p.m., the employees would work until it was completed ; that on the morning of June 6, Stringfellow requested permission from leadman Green and Foreman Cole to leave work at 3:30 p.m. on June 6 and 7; that leadman Green who knew Stringfellow was moving his family on June 6 and 7, gave him permission to leave work at 3:30 p .m. on June 6, provided it was approved by Foreman Cole, but he could not remember whether he also consented to Stringfellow's leaving at 3:30 p.m. on June 7; that on the morning of June 6, Stringfellow requested permission from Foreman Cole to leave work at 3:30 p.m. on June 6 and 7; that Foreman Cole granted Stringfellow permission to leave work at 3:30 p.m. on June 6 and granted him qualified permission (provided he was not needed after 3 :30 p.m.) to leave work at 3:30 p.m. on June 7; that Stringfellow did not actually pour concrete but cleaned the beds before a pour, and the evidence does not unequivocally show that he (String- fellow) was specifically needed after 3:30 on June 7; that Stringfellow left work at 3:30 p.m. on June 6 and 7 and his crew worked until after 3:30 p.m. on June 7; that on the afternoon of June 7, Foreman Cole advised Superintendent Mercer that Stringfellow left work at 3:30 p.m. without permission and before his job was completed; that on June 8, Stringfellow's wife called the plant's office to report that he would not be in on that day because he was in and she was advised that Stringfellow was terminated for leaving work early on the previous day; that on June 8 leadman Green advised Superintendent Mercer that he could not remember whether he gave Stringfellow permission to leave at 3 :30 p.m. on June 7, but he was nevertheless asked by Superintendent Mercer to sign the discharge statement which was prepared in reliance upon the report of Foreman Cole ; and that Green thereupon signed the statement and Stringfellow was officially discharged forthwith, without any questions or opportunity to give an explanation. Based upon the foregoing consolidated findings under B and D supra, I ultimately conclude and find that String- fellow's leadership participation in initiating the organiza- tional efforts of Respondent's employees was known by Respondent; that Respondent's supervisory personnel's (Cole, Mercer, and Hammond, especially Foreman Cole) inquiries and discussions with its employees about their union interests and activities were too diligent and persistent to characterize as inconsequential and, therefore, constituted interference with, restraint upon, and coercion against Respondent's employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7, in violation of Section 8(axl) of the Act. Moreover, when the above violation is considering along with the evidence and findings under D, Respondent dented that it received a call about Stringfellow's absence on the 8, because the evidence does not indicate that Stringfellow left the job on June 7 without intending to return or that he had ever left the job early or failed to call in sick on any previous occasion. Hence I am persuaded that Stringfellow's testimony, corroborated by his wife that she called Respon- dent's office to report his illness , is in all probability correct. I further conclude and find that Respondent's discharge of Stringfellow was discriminatory and violative of Section 8(a)(3)(1) of the Act. Analysis and Conclusions The evidence and findings under B (supra) clearly establish that Respondent, through its supervisory person- nel, had knowledge of Stringfellow 's concerted or union activity and did in fact interrogate Stringfellow and other employees about their union interests , activities and/or affiliations . One of its principal supervisors, Foreman Cole, even advised Stringfellow and other fellow employees that they did not need the Union because he could be their negotiator, and he tried to lead them to believe that either Respondent on its own initiation, or through his efforts, was going to give them a 25-cent per hour raise and he urged said employees to vote against the Union . Although in his testimony Foreman Cole tried to explain that his statements about a 25-cent increase in wages was referrable to other job classifications, which paid 25-cent an hour more than that of Stringfellow's crew, it is highly improbable that all of the employee witnesses misinterpret- ed his statements in the same manner. This is especially so, since some of said employee witnesses were not new employees and in all probability were sufficiently knowl- edgeable about the existence of other job classifications, so as not to have confused them with a wage increase for themselves. Moreover, when the chain of discussions between management and the employees are viewed from every dimension most favorable to Respondent, I do not believe that it can be reasonably concluded that such widespread discussions on the part of Respondent did not exceed the pale of free speech. On the contrary, such frequent and persistent inquiries by supervisory personnel of Respon- dent about employee interest in the Union, about who was distributing union cards, a foreman volunteering to be the employees' negotiator with a promise to obtain them a raise, asking for complaints, and advising the employees that the Union cannot get them anything the Company is not willing to give , all just prior to the union election, clearly constitute interference with, restraint, and/or coercion against the employees in the exercise of their protected rights guaranteed by Section 7, in violation of Section 8(axl) of the Act. The fact that most of these discussions with the employees were carried out by Foreman Cole alone, does not, unfortunately, exonerate Respondent from the violation since Foreman Cole, unequivocally, was a supervisor and agent of Respondent within the meaning of the Act, and as such, his conduct was the conduct of Respondent. With respect to Respondent's contention that String- fellow left work early without permission on June 7, it is well established by the evidence of record that Respondent knew about Stringfellow's union activity, particularly through Foreman Cole, who made diligent inquiries of employees as to who was distributing union cards, and he probably learned that Stringfellow was so engaged. Foreman Cole also admitted he had an idea Stringfellow had signed a union card or was for the Union. It is particularly noted that although Foreman Cole testified THE DOLESE COMPANY 103 that leadman Green told him he (Green) did not give Stringfellow permission to leave work early on June 7, ,although-- it .was. possible he did give permission, Green consistently testified under oath that he did not remember whether or not he gave Stringfellow permission to leave early on June 7. It is further noted that the record is barren of any evidence that Stringfellow's work was unsatisfacto- ry, that he was guilty of excessive absenteeism , was in the habit of leaving the job early, that the report of his leaving early was investigated by Respondent, or that he was given any warning for his first alleged infraction of a company rule (leaving the job early). Moreover, it is especially noted in conjunction with the above-considered factors, that it is not as though Stringfellow did not report for work or that he left work before the usual or normal quitting time (3:30) on June 7, but rather, that he left at the usual quitting time (3:30) before work of questionable necessity and duration (1-1 1/2 hour) was completed, and upon highly disputed circumstances as to whether or not he left without permission from Foreman Cole or leadman Green. Foreman Cole admitted that on June 6 Stringfellow asked him for permission to leave work early on June 6 and 7 and that he gave Stringfellow permission to leave on June 6, and qualified permission to leave early (3:30) on June 7. Hence, since leadman Green did not deny that he gave Stringfellow permission to leave early on June 7, which permission he admitted he could have given but could not remember whether or not he did in fact give such permission, it is clear that the circumstances surrounding Stringfellow's early departure on June 7 are equivocal and that an unequivocal conclusion that he left without permission would not be reasonable or fair. However, even if the evidence showed that Stringfellow did leave early on June 7 without permission, such one time early departure (approximately 15 to 90 minutes, at most), without any evidence that his absence (after 3:30) reasonably affected work progress, would hardly serve as a reasonable and believable basis for which he was discharged, in the absence of other motives. Thus, when Respondent's knowledge of Stringfellow's union activity is taken into consideration along with its previously described conduct in violation of Section 8(aXl) of the Act, it becomes obvious that Stringfellow's discharge was substantially motivated by his union activity and, therefore, was discriminatory and was in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. The fact that Respondent did not discharge Stringfellow until 2 weeks after the election does not make his discharge any less an act of reprisal than if it had discharged him before the election. Nor is the fact that Respondent did not discharge other employees who were engaged in union activity along with Stringfellow of sufficient mitigative significance as to render Stringfellow's discharge nondis- parate or nondiscriminatory. On the contrary, it is clear from the evidence that Foreman Cole had several coercive and restraining conversations with Stringfellow and other employees about the Union, and it was Cole who precipitously reported Stringfellow's early departure on June 7 to Superintendent Mercer, in such a manner as to cause or recommend his discharge. When Superintendent Mercer had an occasion to discipline another employee (Knight) for leaving the job early before 3:30, he merely suspended him for 3 days. Hence, again it is clear that Respondent's conduct in discharging Stringfellow was substantially motivated by Cole's opposing concern about Stringfellow's leadership role in union activity which he tried unsuccessfully to discourage. Although Respondent contends that Stringfellow was also discharged for failure to call in on June 8 and explain his absence, this contention was disputed by Stringfellow and his wife, who testified that the reason for her husband's absence was reported to Respondent on the morning of June 8. It is also noted that this disputed charge is the first and only time the evidence shows that Stringfellow was charged with not reporting for work without an explanation. In fact, it appears to be a pretextual tie-in charge to reinforce the already pretextual charge of leaving the job early, in an effort to justify Stringfellow's discharge. However, I credit the testimony of Stringfellow and his wife, that Respondent was notified on June 8 that Stringfellow was ill and unable to report for work and that it was during that conversation that she was informed that Stringfellow was terminated for leaving work early on June 7. At the same time, I discredit Respondent's charge that Stringfellow did not call its office on June 8, because the person to whom Mrs. Stringfellow testified she spoke did not appear at the proceeding and Respondent's denial of receipt of such a call did not impress me as being credible and appeared self-serving in view of the total evidence of record. Finally, when the evidence is viewed in its entirety, it becomes clear that Respondent's discharge of Stringfellow was made largely upon the report of Foreman Cole, who had manifested a deep and opposing interest in the union activity of Stringfellow and other employees; and that Respondent discharged Stringfellow without any investiga- tion of the report, without any warning to him, and without affording him an opportunity to make an explanation to the unilateral report of the circumstances which supported the charge. Under these circumstances I am persuaded that the evidence does not establish that Respondent's dis- charge of Stringfellow was for cause. The record does not show that any other employee was discharged upon what appears to be such a minor infraction, supported by nebulous and conflicting evidence. Moreover, while the record shows that unionization of Respondent's other plants did not present unfair labor practice problems, as contended by counsel for Respon- dent, such freedom from unfair labor practices in its other plants would not negate unfair labor practices largely initiated and implemented by one or some of Respondent's supervisory personnel in the instant plant. The court, in N.L.R.B. v. Western Bank and Office Supply Company, 283 F.2d 603 (C.A. 10, 1960), cited by counsel for Respondent, held that an employer with no antiunion background, which made no threat, exercised no coercion, and had said nothing derogatory of any union or union member, would not be found guilty of discrimination for discharging an employee for low productivity and unsatis- factory work. However, while the propriety of this decision does not appear to be questioned, it is readily observed that it is not applicable in the instant case, since the 104 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD employer (Respondent) herein engaged in coercive and other conduct violative of Section 8(axl) of the Act, and the employee herein was not shown to have had a record of low productivity and unsatisfactory work. Counsel for the Respondent also contends that supervi- sory personnel of Respondent made an isolated statement and mere expressions of opinion about the Union to employees which did not constitute an unfair labor practice. In support of his contention , counsel cited N.LR.B. v. Acker Industries, Inc., 460 F.2d 649 (C.A. 10, 1%2). However, while an examination of the above-cited case reveals that the court held as counsel contends, it is noted that the facts therein are distinguishable from the facts in the instant case in the following respects: In the case cited, the employer made one statement to two employees, to the effect that "the union could not force us to close our doors." The court held that such statement in the absence of any link between the statement and a proscribed course of conduct did not constitute an unfair labor practice ; and that whether such statement is construed as a threat or mere expression of opinion lies with the Board. In the instant case, Foreman Cole made several inquiries of several employees about their union activity and several statements against the Union ("you do not need the union ...", including offering the employees benefits and volunteering to be their negotiator). Hence, the statements made by the Employer (Cole, in conjunc- tion with the statements made by Mercer and Hammond) were not isolated and were in fact accompanied by a proscribed (repetitious) course of conduct which were of an interfering, restraining, and coercive nature. Nor were the statements of the Employer herein remote in point of time from the election, as was the statement of the employer in J. S. Dillon & Sons Stores Co., Inc. v. N.LR.B., 338 F.2d 395 (C.A. 10, 1964), cited by counsel for Respondent. IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above , have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several states and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. discharged Carl D . Stringfellow in violation of Section 8(aX3) and (1) of the Act, the recommended Order will provide that Respondent offer him reinstatement to his job, and, make him whole for loss of earnings within the meaning and in accord with the Board's decisions in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716, except as specifically modified by the wording of such recommended Order. Because of the character of the unfair labor practices herein found, the recommended Order will provide that Respondent cease and desist from or in any manner interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. N.L.R.B. v. Entwhistle Mfg., Co., 120 F.2d 532, 536 (C.A. 4). Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in this case , I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent, The Dolese Company, is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, Local 627, is, and has been at all times material herein, a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. 3. By discriminating in regard to the tenure of employment of Carl D. Stringfellow, thereby in an effort to discourage membership in the Union, a labor organization, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices con- demned by Section 8(aX3) and (1) of the Act. 4. By interrogating Stringfellow and other employees about their union activities and by offering them a raise, urging them to vote against the Union and volunteering to be their negotiator, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by lawful agreements in accord with Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 5. By calling special employee meetings only when union activity is imminent and encouraging the employees to submit complaints on grievances, the Employer violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact , conclusions of law, and the entire record , and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:11 V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices warranting a remedial Order, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act. It having been found that Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced Carl D. Stringfellow and/or its other employees in the exercise of their Section 7 protected rights, in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act ; and that it II In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. ORDER Respondent, The Dolese Company, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Coercively interrogating its employees at its Oklaho- ma City plant about their and other employees concerted or union desires and activities. (b) Offering to be its employees' negotiator and promis- ing to pay them wage increases, while urging them to vote against the Union or union positions. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. THE DOLESE COMPANY 105 (c) Calling special employee meetings only when union activity is imminent and encouraging its employees thereat to submit complaints or grievances. (d) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against employees in regard to hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment because of their protected, concerted, or union activities. (e) In any other manner interfering with , restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaran- teed in Section 7 of the Act except to the extent that such rights may be affected by lawful agreements in accord with Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer Carl D. Stringfellow immediate and full reinstatement to his former position or, if such position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position without prejudice to his seniority or other rights previously enjoyed, and make him whole for any loss of pay suffered by reason of the discrimination against him with interest at the rate of 6 percent, in the manner described in the section entitled "The Remedy." (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of the recommended Order. (c) Post at Respondent's plant at Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen- dix."12 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 16, after being duly signed by Respondent's representatives, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by Respondent for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspic- uous places, including all places where notices to employ- ees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 16, in writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 12 In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate employees about their and other employees' union membership, activities, and desires. WE WILL NOT offer to be the employees' negotiator, promise to pay them wage increases, and urge them to vote against the Union or the Union's positions. WE WILL NOT call special employee meetings only when union activity is imminent largely for the purpose of encouraging the employees to submit complaints and grievances to discourage union adherence and activity. WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Interna- tional Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, Local 627, or any other labor organization, by discharging employees or otherwise discriminating in any manner in respect to their tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise and enjoyment of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by lawful agreements in accord with Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. WE WILL offer Carl D. Stringfellow immediate and full reinstatement to his former position or if such position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent one, without prejudice to the seniority and other rights and privileges enjoyed by him, and make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of his discharge, with interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum. All our employees are free to become, remain, or refuse to become or remain, members of said Union or any other labor organization, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by lawful agreements in accord with Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Dated By THE DOLESE COMPANY (Employer) (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Federal Office Building, Room 8A-24, 819 Taylor Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, Telephone 817-334-2921.