Local 1104, Communications Workers

114 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Local 1104, Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO (New York Telephone Company) and Wellington G. Rigby Local 1101, Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO and New York Telephone Company. Cases 29-CB-1347-3 and 29-CB-1426 June 6, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO On December 28, 1973, Administrative Law Judge John P. von Rohr issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel and the Respondents filed exceptions and supporting briefs and the Charging Parties filed answering briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that Respondents Locals 1101 and 1104, Communications Workers of America, AFL-C 0, their officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the said recommend- ed Order. i The Administrative Law Judge inadvertently found that Rigby's employment by the Company began in 1968 ; the correct date is 1948. Similarly, the Administrative Law Judge inadvertently found that member- ship had been denied to employees who "refused to cross the picket line," AUD, last par. of sec. E. He clearly intended to find that membership had been denied to employees who crossed the picket line and his Decision is hereby corrected accordingly. We also note that, although the Administra- tive Law Judge refers to his observation of the witnesses, there were no witnesses and no issues involving credibility. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JOHN P. voN ROHR, Administrative Law Judge: Upon charges, duly filed, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, by the Regional Director for Region 29 (Brooklyn, New York) issued complaints, consolidated in this proceeding, against Local 1101 and Local 1104, Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, herein called the Respondents or the Unions, alleging that they had engaged in certain unfair labor 1practices in violation of Sections 8(b)(IXA) and (2) of the Act.' Respondents filed an answer denying the allegations of unlawful conduct alleged in the complaint . Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before me in Brooklyn, New York, on October 24 and 25, 1973. Briefs were received from the General Counsel, the Respondents and the Charging Parties on December 3, 1973, and they have' been carefully considered. Upon the entire record in this case, and from my observation of the witnesses , I I hereby make the following: i FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY New York Telephone Company, also referred to in the complaint as Telco, is a New York corporation maintain- ing its office and principal places of business in the City and State of New York where it is engaged in providing 'telephone communication and related services . During the year preceding the issuance of the complaint, Telco derived gross revenues from its operations in excess of $500,000. During the same period it purchased goods and material valued in excess of $50,000 from points and places located outside the State of New York. The parties concede, and I find, that New York Telephone Company is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. If. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Locals 1101 and 1104, Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background The facts in this case are essentially undisputed.2 The Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is the collective-bargaining representative for employees in a i The complaint in Case 29-CB-1347-3 issued on January 31, 1973, and was based on a charge filed on October 17, 1972. A complaint and an amended complaint in Case 29-CB- 1426, issued on March 27, 1973, and October 12, 1973, respectively. The charge in this case was filed on February 2, 1973. 2 The facts pertinent to the background of this case , as well as other facts relative to the issues herein, are principally set forth in Local 1101 and Local 1104, Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Case 2-CB-5172, et ,at. the transcript and exhibits of which the parties have agreed to stipulate as part of the record in the instant proceeding. Administrative Law Judge Benjamin K. Blackburn issued his decision in this proceeding on September 4, 1973 (JD-537-73). In setting forth the background and other factual matters herein, I have borrowed freely from the facts, which are uncontested, as set forth in Judge Blackburn's Decision as well as from those set forth in the brief submitted by Charging Party New York Telephone Company. Respondent's beef does not include any detailed statement of facts, presumably because they are not in material dispute. 211 NLRB No. 18 LOCAL 1104, COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS number of separate bargaining units in the Bell system, including the New York Telephone Company. The Respondent locals are constituent locals of their CWA parent, Local 1101 having jurisdiction over Suffolk County, New York,and Local 1104 over Nassau County, New York. These are located in the New York City metropolitan area and thus are "downstate," as distin- guished from various "upstate" locals. In 1971, as in the past, CWA and the Bell System bargained nationally on a pattern basis, the Western Electric Company and the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company having been selected as the pattern makers. Negotiations with these parties began in the spring of 1971 and were expected to set the pattern for settlements with the other Bell System Companies. These negotiations resulted in a nationwide telephone strike which began on July 14, 1971, and ended on July 21, 1971. CWA's contract with New York Telephone Company having an expiration date of July 28, 1971, the parties to this agreement began negotiations for a new contract on July 6, 1971. The union bargaining committee consisted of two representatives of Local 1101, the president of Local 1106, and representatives of Locals 1107, 1122, and 1126, and was chaired by Don Sanchez, CWA's director and chairman of its bargaining committee . Following meetings on July 7 and 9, Sanchez canceled a meeting scheduled for July 13 so that the bargaining committee members could return to their home locals in New York State to carry out their duties in connection with the nationwide strike scheduled to begin the next day. Negotiations resumed on July 14 and continued to July 18. On July 14, 2000 employees of the approximately 39,000 unit employees of New York Telephone reported to work. The national negotiations resulted in an agreement on July 18, 1971, subject to ratification by employees on a unit basis. The CWA national executive board thereupon terminated the strike and directed all members to return to work on July 21 pending results of the ratification vote. The New York locals, however, including the Respondent Locals in this proceeding, opposed the settlement agree- ment and remained on strike.3 On August 19,197 1, the New York Telephone Company resumed negotiations with the CWA. On August 26, CWA formally authorized the strike of the New York locals which then was continuing in effect. A new contract between CWA and the New York Telephone Company was finally ratified on February 16, 1972, and the New York strike was terminated on February 18, 1972. During the course of the strike , employees of New York Telephone Company, in varying numbers and at various times, including those hereinafter named, reported for work and crossed picket lines. Some employees resigned from the Union before returning to work while other were never members of the Union. Prior to the latest (1972) contract, the collective-bargain- ing agreements between CWA and Telco contained only a maintenance of dues provision. However, the agreement of February 1972 for the first time contained a so-called 3 Three upstate CWA locals returned to work in compliance with the CWA national board directive. 115 "agency shop" provision. The language of this clause provides as follows: 33.01 Each regular employee shall, as a condition of employment, pay or tender to the Union amounts equal to the periodic dues applicable to members for the period beginning 30 days after hire or 30 days after February 17, 1972, whichever occurs later, until the termination of this collective bargaining agreement, except that an employee may terminate this condition of employment by giving a written individual notice to the Company and the Union of such termination by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, and postmarked between July 8, 1974 and July 17, 1974 both dates inclusive. B. The Allegation That Respondent Local 1101 Unlawfully Sought the Discharge of Employees for Failure to Pay Dues, While Denying Them Union Membership The facts concerning the above allegations are brief and not in dispute. Thus, the parties stipulated that during the month of July 1972, the following employees applied for membership in Respondent Local 1101 pursuant to the agency shop clause in the contract: Mary Semanicki Tyrone Hecker Guiseppe Arrigo Alice Allen C. Clumysun Anthony Perillo Leon Pantin William Haydak Onkar Singh Donald MacMillan J. R. Swart Carl Bryan Clarence Meekins John Schreiner Frank Fyall Nelson Phitts Joseph Fiumano John Munday Wun Yee Poon John Martinez Frederick Brown Lala Jones Remo Bellioli Douglas Goodman Theodore Braithwaite Mary Myhalko Eugene Sullivan W. Jurevyszyn Gordon St. Louis It is further undisputed that each of the above employees signed check-off cards authorizing the Company to deduct union dues from their pay. However, as Respondent concedes, on or about August 18, 1972, the membership applications of each of the above employees were rejected solely because they refused to participate in the strike and had crossed the picket lines established by Local 1101.4 Finally, it is undisputed that upon denial of membership, the above employees refused to tender amounts equivalent to union dues to Local 1101, whereupon this Respondent, on or about December 4, 1972, requested the Company that they, and each of them, be discharged under the agency shop provision of the collective-bargaining agree- ment. Concerning all the foregoing, the complaint in Case 29-CB-1426 substantially alleges that Respondent Local 1101 violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) by demanding 4 Respondent's answer admits the allegation in the complaint that the denial of membership occurred on or about August 18, 1973. 116 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD that the New York Telephone Company, on or about December 4, 1972, discharge the above-named employees for failure to pay dues, under the agency shop provision of the contract, following its rejection of their applications for membership because they crossed Respondent 's picket line during the strike against the Company from July 1971 to February 1972. As a starting point in deciding the issue presented above, I think it well to first cite the applicable provision of the Act. Thus, Section 8(b)(2) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization: to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discrimi- nate against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, which set forth the require- ments of lawful union-security agreements, in relevant counterpart makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer by discrimination in regard to the hire or tenure or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of requiring or retaining membership. Recognizing the obvious difference between a union security agreement, and an agency shop agreement both the General Counsel and the Respondents cite the case of N.L.R.B. v. General Motors Corporation, 373 U. S. 734 (1963), in support of their respective positions concerning the alleged violations herein . However, the Supreme Court's decision in that case, as I read it, in essence goes no further than to hold that an agency shop is a permissible form of union security under the Act. Other than that, and apart from any far-reaching arguments which can be made only by citing certain dicta taken out of context from the whole, I fail to see where the General Motors decision, supra, has any material bearing upon the issue presented in the present case. More to the point, the General Counsel urges that the instant proceeding is analagous to issues presented and decided in Local 4186, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO (McGraw Edison Company), 181 NLRB 992 (1970), and Communications Workers of America, Local 9505, AFL-CIO (The Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company), 193 NLRB 83 (1971). In the McGraw Edison case the union denied an employee the right to attend union meetings and to hold office for a period of 1 year for the reason that he previously had filed a decertification petition with the Board. When the employee thereupon refused to pay dues, the union, under a valid union- security clause in the collective-bargaining agreement, threatened to seek his discharge. Under these facts the Board held that "a labor organization violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by invoking, or threatening to invoke a lawful union-security clause to enforce payment of dues by a member whose membership has been significantly im- paired because he filed a decertification petition." In so finding, the Board first made it clear that it was not dealing with the union's internal right to discipline a member because he filed a decertification petition, but rather that it was the insistence of payment of dues upon penalty of discharge while membership was impaired that constituted the unlawful conduct. The Board further stated: However, Respondent's insistence upon Blaine's con- tinued payment of dues during periods when his rights as a member were significantly reduced constituted a continuing form of coercion tending to operate as a serious restraint upon access to Board processes. The Union's insistence upon Blaine's payment of dues, on pain of discharge, cannot be considered as disassociat- ed from the suspension of membership rights resulting from his decertification activity. We see no justifica- tion, either in the proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A) or in considerations of a labor organization's need for self- preservation, for the steps taken against Blaine. The threat to enforce the union-security clause while continuing the sanctions against Blaine was hardly necessary to preserve the Union's existence as an institution, nor could it be viewed as a noncoercive form of internal discipline which would have no discouraging effect upon a member's decision to invoke the Board's representation procedures. The Pacific Telephone case, supra, involved substantially the same factual situation as McGraw Edison, except that the employees there involved had been disciplined by expulsion from the Union, rather than by impairment of membership privileges, for having filed a decertification petition. In addition to finding an 8(bXl)(A) violation, the Board in Pacific Telephone found that the union violated Section 8(b)(2) of the Act for in fact having demanded the employer to discharge the employees under the union-shop provision of the contract. Returning to McGraw Edison, the Board found it unnecessary to pass upon the essentially related question presented in the instant case and specifically noted as follows: As our decision in this case is based on the coercive steps taken as a result of filing a decertification petition, we need not pass on whether a labor organization violated 8(b)(1)(A) through enforcement of a union security clause against a member whose membership was impaired for reasons unrelated to seeking access to board decertification processes. Passing upon this point, as I now must, and for the moment restricting this view to a union-security situation, I find there are compelling reasons for extending the Board's holding in McGraw Edison and Pacific Telephone to apply to situations where membership is denied or impaired because of employees' exercise of rights guaranteed them under Section 7 of the Act. Thus, it is hardly necessary to LOCAL 1104, COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS cite authority for the proposition that a primary function of the Board has been to protect Section 7 rights. It is equally clear that the refusal of employees to cross a picket line during a strike is one of the rights guaranteed by Section 7. Accordingly, if the Board deems it necessary to protect the right of "providing unimpeded access to its procedures and remedies," as it stated in McGraw Edison, I would find that, in effectuating the policies of the Act, the Board is equally obligated to protect the rights of employees arising under Section 7 of the Act. It follows, therefore, and I would hold, that a labor organization violates Section 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the Act by invoking a lawful union-security clause to enforce payment of dues where employees have been denied umon member- ship for exercising a right (crossing a picket line during a strike) guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. Assuming the validity of the premise as aforesaid, the issue further presented is whether this principle should be extended to an analagous situation, but involving the enforcement of an agency shop rather than union shop provision. For the reasons stated below, I am persuaded that this question should be answered in the affirmative. To begin with, it is hardly open to question that an agency shop arrangement provides a labor organization with a lesser form of union security than does a lawful union-shop arrangement. In fact, and as is apparent from the facts in the General Motors case, supra, the very concept of an agency shop arrangement originated with a labor organization and was intended to be utilized as a device to protect labor organizations against "free rides" in states where otherwise lawful union-security arrangements are prohibited by right-to-work laws. Accepting, then, the undeniable fact of the agency shop being a "less severe form of union security arrangement"5 than the union shop, it surely would be anomalous to hold that, under equivalent circumstances, a labor organization should be invested with greater rights to enforce the collection of dues as a condition of employment under an agency shop agreement. Further, since it is well settled that under a union shop an employee has the option to refrain from becoming a union member, as long as he tenders his dues,6 a similarly anomalous result would be reached if this option no longer would be available to an employee under an agency shop situation. In short, I think it contrary to all common sense and the mandate of the Act to allow the Union here to selectively choose its membership while at the same time retaining the right to insist upon payment of dues as a condition of employment. This, as has been discussed above, it could not do under the more stringent form of a union-shop arrangement. Accordingly, and in view of all the foregoing, I find that by demanding the discharge of the above-named employ- ees for failure to pay sums equivalent to union dues, after General Motors, supra s Thus, in Union Starch & Refining Co, 87 NLRB 779, enfd. 186 F.2d 1008 (C.A. 7), cert. denied`342 U. S. 815, the Board stated: If the union imposes any qualifications and conditions for membership with which he is unwilling to comply , such an employee may not be entitled to membership, but he is entitled to keep hisjob Throughout the amendment to the Act, Congress evinced a strong concern for 117 having denied them union membership because they crossed the picket line, Respondent Local 1101 violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. C. The Case of Wellington G. Rigby (Local 1104) Except for the factual differences discussed below, Rigby's case is not unlike the cases of the employees discussed above. Rigby has been in continuous employ of New York Telephone Company since July 6, 1968. He became a member of Respondent Local 1104 in May 1969 and remained a member until July 7, 1971, at which time he resigned his union membership in accordance with the collective-bargaining agreement then in effect. Rigby did not work during the strike referred to in the preceding section herein, but returned to work after the strike had been settled. Thereafter, in the spring of 1972, Rigby engaged in organizing activities on behalf of the Teamsters Union. On or about July 20, 1972, at which time he had ceased his activities upon behalf of the Teamsters, Rigby applied for membership in Respondent Local 1104. At the same time he executed a dues checkoff card, authorizing the Company to deduct membership dues from his wages. It is undisputed that on September 5, 1972, Respondent Local 1104 rejected Rigby's application for membership solely on the ground that he had engaged in organizational activities on behalf of a rival union, i.e., a Teamster local.? Thereafter, upon Rigby's refusal to tender amounts of money equivalent to union dues under the agency shop provision of the contract, Respondent Local 1104 request- ed the New York Telephone Company to terminate his employment for failure to pay the agency shop fee. Just as the employees who crossed the picket line were engaged in the exercise of a Section 7 right, Rigby's participation in organizational activities on behalf of the Teamsters Union was a right also protected by Section 7 of the Act. Accordingly, and for all the reasons set forth in the preceding Section, I find that Respondent Local 1104, by seeking the discharge of Rigby for failure to pay the agency shop fees, after having denied his membership for engaging in organizing activities on behalf of a rival union, violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. E. The Allegation That Respondent Local 1101 Violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by Denying Membership to Employees Who Crossed Its Picket Line Apart from the allegations pertaining to Respondent's request that employees be terminated for failure to pay the equivalent of union dues, the General Counsel further contends that the denial of membership to the employees previously named herein (exclusive of Rigby) was itself protecting the individual employee in a right to refrain from union activity and to keep his job even in a union shop. Congress carefully limited the sphere of permissible union security and even in that limited sphere accorded the union no power to affect the discharge of nonmembers except to protect itself against "free rides " 7 Respondent's answer states that on September 2, 1972, Rigby "reiterated his earlier request for admission to umon membership." 118 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD unlawful because the basis for such denial was their crossing of Respondent's picket line during the strike.8 Conceding that Respondent's denial of membership to these employees would not violate the Act if the strike was lawfully called, the particular basis for this contention is premised on the further allegation that CWA and Local 1101 engaged in the strike without meeting the notice requirements of Section 8(d) of the Act. Insofar as the latter allegations are concerned, this issue has been raised and litigated in Local 1101 and Local 1104, Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO (New York Telephone Company, et al.) Cases 2-CB-5172, 2-CB-5141, et al., in which Administrative Law Judge Benjamin K. Blackburn issued his decision on September 4, 1973 (JD-537-73). For the reasons stated therein, I agree with and adopt the findings, and accordingly herein find, that Respondent Local 1101 engaged in the strike (which commenced on July 14, 1971, and continued to on or about February 17, 1972) without meeting the requirements of Section 8(d) of the Act.9 It is now well established that, notwithstanding the proviso to Section 8(b)(l)(A) of the Act which confers upon labor organizations the right to prescribe their own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership, a union may nonetheless commit an unfair labor practice if it takes certain disciplinary action against members for the purpose of enforcing union rules which are violative of the Act or of public policy. Thus, in upholding the Board's finding that expulsion from the Union for filing charges with the Board violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) the Supreme Court, in N.L.R.B. v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers of America, AFL-CIO and its Local 22, 391 U.S. 418 (1968), stated "Section 8(b)(l)(A) assures a union freedom of self- regulation where its internal affairs are concerned. But where a union rule penalizes a member for filing an unfair labor practice charge with the Board, other considerations of public policy came into play." In a later case, Scofield [Wisconsin Motor Corp.] v. N.LR.B., 394 U.S. 423 (1969); the Supreme Court elaborated further with the following: Under this dual approach, Section 8(b)(1) leaves a union free to enforce a properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Congress has embedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforced against union members who are free to leave the union and escape the rule. [Emphasis supplied.] Since the Respondent here engaged in a strike without complying with the provisions of Section 8(d) of the Act, thus clearly impairing a policy which Congress has embedded in the labor laws, I find that Respondent's action in denying membership to employees who refused to cross the picket line during the strike in question 8 I find no merit to Respondent's contention that the allegation here at issue is barred by Section 10(b) of the Act. The alleged violation here was Respondent's denial of membership to the employees, which occurred on or about August 18, 1972. This was well within the period covered by the charge herein, which was filed on February 2, 1973. 9 The parties involved having been previously served Administrative Law Judge Blackburn's decision , I see no need to further burden Board constituted restraint and coercion within the meaning of Section 8(b)(l)(A) of the Act.10 IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondents set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of the employer described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondents have engaged in unfair labor practices violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the Act, I shall recommend that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. New York Telephone Company is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. Respondents Local 1101 and 1104, Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO, are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By requesting the discharges of the employees heretofore named in this Decision unless they paid amounts equal to periodic dues, while simultaneously denying them union membership because they crossed Respondents' picket line, Respondent Local 1101 re- strained and coerced these employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act and by attempting to cause New York Telephone Company to discriminate against these employees in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. 4. By requesting the discharge of Wellington G. Rigby unless he paid amounts equal to the periodic dues, while simultaneously denying him union membership because he engaged in organizational activities on behalf of another labor organization, Respondent Local 1104 restrained and coerced Rigby in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act and by attempting to cause New York Telephone Company to discriminate against him in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, is thereby engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. 5. By denying union membership to employees for crossing a picket line established by Respondent, Respon- dent Local 1101 restrained and coerced employees in the costs and duplication processes by hereto attaching a copy of that decision. 10 Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Local 1170 (Rochester Telephone), 194 NLRB 872. For related cases see also Local 12419, District 50, United Mine Workers of America (National Grinding Wheel Company, Inc.), 176 NLRB 628: Glaziers Local Union No. 1162 (Tusco Glass, Inc.), 177 NLRB 393; International Molders' and Allied Workers Union, Local No. 125 (Blackhawk Tanning Co., Inc.), 178 NLRB 208. LOCAL 1104, COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, thereby engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. On the basis of the above findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I issue the following: ORDER" Local 1101, Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, its officers,! agents, [and representatives shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Requesting the discharge of employees pursuant to an agency shop contract unless they pay amounts equivalent to periodic dues while simultaneously denying them union membership for crossing a picket line established by Respondent. (b) Denying membership to employees for crossing a picket line during a strike called by the Respondent without first complying with the provisions of Section 8(d) of the Act. (c) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon tender of periodic dues and initiation fees, offer union membership to the following employees whom Respondent previously denied membership because they crossed the picket line during the strike beginning on July 14, 1972, and e'.tding on February 18, 1972: Mary Semanicki Tyrone Hecker Guiseppe Arrigo Alice Allen C. Clumysun Anthony Perillo Leon Pantin William Haydak Onkar Singh Donald MacMillan J. R. Swart Carl Bryan Clarence Meekins John Schreiner Frank Fyall Nelson Phitts Joseph Fiumano John Munday Wun Yee Poon John Martinez Frederick Brown Lala Jones Remo Bellioli Douglas Goodman Theodore Braithwaite Mary Myhalko Eugene Sullivan W. Jurevyszyn Gordon St. Louis (b) Post at its offices, and meeting halls copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix A."12 Copies of said notices on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 29, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative shall be posted immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced,or covered by any other material. (c) Additional copies of the Appendix A shall be signed 119 by the representative of the Respondent union and forthwith returned to the Regional Director for Region 29. These notices shall be posted, the New York Telephone Company willing, in all places where notices to its employees are customarily posted. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 29, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. Respondent Local 1104, Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents,and representatives shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Requesting the discharge of employees pursuant to an agency shop contract unless they pay amounts equivalent to periodic dues while simultaneously denying them membership because of their activities in support of another union. (b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which it is found will effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Post at its offices and meeting halls copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix B."13 Copies of said notices on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 29, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reason- able steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Additional copies of Appendix B shall be signed by the representative of the Respondent Union and forthwith returned to the Regional Director for Region 29. These notices shall be posted, the New York Telephone Company willing, at all places where notices to its employees are customarily posted. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 29, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 11 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Section 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 12 In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing An Order of the National Labor Relations Board " 13 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 120 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD APPENDIX A NOTICE To MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT request the discharge of employees pursuant to an agency shop contract unless they pay amounts equal to our periodic dues while simultane- ously denying them union membership for crossing a picket line during a strike. WE WILL, upon their tender of union dues and initiation fees, offer membership to the below-named employees whom we have previously denied member- ship for crossing a picket line during our strike against the New York Telephone Company which ended on February 18, 1972, in which we participated without having first afforded the Company a timely opportuni- ty to bargain within the meaning of Section 8(d) of the Act. Mary Semanicki Guiseppe Arrigo C. Clumysun Leon Pantin Onkar Singh J. R. Swart Clarence Meekins Frank Fyall Joseph Fiumano Wun Yee Poon Frederick Brown Remo Bellioli Theodore Braithwaite Eugene Sullivan Gordon St. Louis Tyrone Hecker Alice Allen Anthony Perillo William Haydak Donald MacMillan Carl Bryan John Schreiner Nelson Phitts John Munday John Martinez Lala Jones Douglas Goodman Mary Myhalko W. Jurevyszyn WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. LOCAL 1101, COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO (Labor Organization) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 16 Court Street, 4th Floor, Brooklyn, New York 11241, Telephone 242-596-3535. APPENDIX B NOTICE To MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT request the discharge of employees unless they pay amounts equal to our periodic dues, while simultaneously refusing them union membership because they have engaged in activities upon behalf of another union. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. LOCAL 1104, COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO (Labor Organization) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 16 Court Street-4th Floor, Brooklyn, New York 11241, Telephone 212-596-3535.