Pur O Sil, Inc.

HADBAR, DIVISION OF PUR 0 SIL, INC. 333 Hadbar, Division of Pur 0 Sil, Inc. and Stove, Furnace & Allied Appliance Workers International Union of North America, Local 158, AFL-CIO. Cases 21-CA-1173 5 and 21-CA-11840 June 11, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO On November 13, 1973, Administrative Law Judge Henry S. Salim issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions, a supporting brief, and a reply brief and the General Counsel filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge only to the extent consistent herewith. The Administrative Law Judge found that Respon- dent's layoff of employee Jeanne Buccola was discriminatorily motivated in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. The Respondent excepted to the Administrative Law Judge's finding, contending that the complaint alleged only Respondent's failure to recall Buccola as being violative of the Act. The Respondent further contended that Respondent's failure to recall Buccola was not discriminatorily motivated. We find merit in Respondent's excep- tions. We note, in regard to the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Buccola's layoff was violative of the Act, that during the course of the hearing counsel for the General Counsel specifically disavowed an allegation that Buccola had been laid off for her union activities. Under these circumstances we believe that it would be prejudicial for us to make a finding that Buccola's layoff violated the Act.' We also find merit in Respondent's contention that the record fails to establish that Respondent's failure to recall Buccola was discriminatorily motivated. As found by the Administrative Law Judge, Buccola was laid off on March 9, 1973, allegedly for lack of work. The Administrative Law Judge found based on credited testimony that, within 2 weeks after Buccola's layoff, Respondent hired "contract" labor to perform Buccola's duties. The Respondent's president testified that the switch to contract labor was made because it was less costly, in that Respondent could use contract labor for only the number of hours in a day it was needed, and because it reduced Respondent's unemployment compensa- tion premiums. Furthermore, Buccola had the least seniority in her department and subsequent to her layoff two other employees were transferred out of that department. As evidence of Respondent's knowledge of Bucco- la's union activities, the Administrative Law Judge found that on April 24, 1973, Buccola saw Respon- dent's president, Buchanan, and Respondent's pro- duction manager, Hagan, standing in a window watching her distribute union literature. Respondent, however, introduced into evidence an original copy of a hotel bill which shows conclusively that Buchanan was in Seattle, Washington, on April 24, 1973. The Administrative Law Judge made no comment in his Decision on the existence of this evidence. We find that Respondent's failure to recall Buccola was not discriminatorily motivated. In so finding, we note that Respondent obtained the contract labor approximately 1 month before Respondent's officials supposedly observed her distributing union literature in front of the plant. Aside from this evidence, the record is totally devoid of any evidence that Respondent knew of Buccola's union activities. In light of this lack of knowledge and Respondent's explanation of its economic reasons for retaining contract labor, we cannot find that Respondent's failure to recall Buccola violated the Act. According- ly, this portion of the complaint shall be dismissed. The Respondent filed further exceptions to the Administrative Law Judge's finding that it violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act when it discharged employee Gaspar Gilbert Hildago.2 We find merit in this exception. Hildago was hired on February 16, 1972, and discharged on April 18, 1973, allegedly for unsatis- factory work performance. The Administrative Law Judge found, however, that Hildago was a satisfacto- ry employee and, therefore, the reason given for his discharge was pretextual. We do not believe the record supports the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Hildago was a satisfactory employee. In this respect, we note that Hildago never received a wage increase while employed by Respondent even though other employees had received increases during this period, and Hildago had been promised Asia Garden Restaurant of San Francisco, Inc, 205 NLRB No 141 instead of April 18 The Administrative Law Judge also inadvertently found 2 We note that , at several places in his decision, the Administrative Law that Hildago became aware of the advent of the union organizational Judge inadvertently referred to the date of Hildago's discharge as July 18, campaign in May 1973, rather than March 1973 211 NLRB No. 32 334 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD an increase within 90 days after he was hired. Furthermore, Hildago testified3 that whenever he asked his foreman, Lovato, about a raise, Lovato would reply that Hildago would get a raise when his bad work habits improved. Lovato also told Hildago that he was not producing as much as the other employees. In December 1972, Respondent executed a review of Hildago's work performance. The review stated, in part, "He should work on changing his attitude." This all took place prior to the union's organizational campaign which commenced in Feb- ruary 1973. Hildago himself did not become aware of the campaign until March 1973, approximately 1 month before his discharge. On February 23, 1973, Hildago was given a "correction interview" for attitude, failure to call in personally when he was absent for 2 days, and bad work habits. In this regard, Hildago testified that Lovato told him that if he didn't personally call in the next time he was absent, he would be terminated. Despite Hildago's credited testimony, the Administrative Law Judge concluded that Hildago did not know his job was in jeopardy. We find, contrary to the Administrative Law Judge, that Hildago's testimony makes it abundantly clear that he was aware of the grave situation. Hildago's foreman, Lovato, testified that Hildago was absent on April 10, 11, and 14, 1973, and that Hildago did not personally notify Respondent that he would be absent. Although the Administrative Law Judge did not credit Lovato's testimony, we note that Hildago did not deny that he was absent on those days, but testified that he could not remember whether or not he had been absent. On April 18, Lovato discharged Hildago for continued bad work habits. In light of the above, we do not believe the record supports a finding that Hildago's discharge was discriminatorily motivated. Hildago's work record could hardly be considered satisfactory and there is undisputed evidence that he had been repeatedly warned about his work habits prior to the advent of the Union and before he personally became aware of the Union's campaign. The fact that a discharged employee with a poor work record is also a union adherent is not sufficient to support a finding that he was discharged for his union activities. This is particularly true where the employee has been warned that he is in danger of losing his job prior to his becoming involved in union activities. According- ly, we shall dismiss this portion of the complaint. The General Counsel has excepted to the Adminis- trative Law Judge's failure to find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by soliciting grievances from employees in order to undermine the employees' support of the Union, and directing employees to select an employee representative to deal with Respondent concerning grievances and terms and conditions of employment in order to undermine the employees' support of the Union. We find merit in these exceptions. On April 12, 1973, Foreman Lovato called a meeting of the 14 employees under his supervision. During the course of the meeting, Lovato told the employees that he knew what they were trying to do and that they wanted better working conditions and benefits. He then asked the employees what other improvements they wanted. After hearing the em- ployees' complaints, Lovato requested them to select a representative to confer with him and other management officials. We believe that where an employer, who has not previously had a practice of soliciting employee grievances or complaints, adopts such a course when a union engages in an organizational campaign and asks the employees to select a representative to meet with management, it implies to its employees that it will correct the inequities it discovers as a result of its inquiries, thus making union representation unneces- sary.4 We conclude, therefore, that, by soliciting grievances and directing employees to select a representative to meet with management, Respon- dent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.5 Due to the large number of Spanish-speaking employees employed by the Respondent, we shall order that the notice be posted in both Spanish and English. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge as modified below and hereby orders that the Respon- dent, Hadbar, Division of Pur 0 Sil, Inc., Alhambra, California, its officers, agents, successors, and as- signs, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, as herein modified: 1. Delete paragraphs 1(a), (b), and (c) and insert the following: "(a) Interrogating employees with respect to their union membership or activities, or as to the union membership or activities of other employees. "(b) Soliciting grievances from employees in order to undermine the employees' support of a union. 3 The Administrative Law Judge credited Hildago's testimony. Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act when Lovato interrogated 4 Reliance Electric Company, 191 NLRB 44. Ybarra about the union activities of other employees, we find that the 5 Although we adopt the Administrative Law Judge's finding that record fails to establish that Lovato told Ybarra to report back. HADBAR, DIVISION OF PUR 0 SIL, INC. "(c) Directing employees to select an employee representative to deal with Respondent concerning grievances and terms and conditions of employment in order to undermine the employees' support of the Union." 2. In paragraph 1(d) delete the words "any other manner" and substitute therefor "other like or related acts." 3. Delete paragraphs 2(a) and (b) and reletter remaining paragraphs accordingly. 4. Substitute the attached notice for the Adminis- trative Law Judge's and publish the notice in both Spanish and English. MEMBER JENKINS, dissenting in part: Unlike my colleagues, I would adopt the Adminis- trative Law Judge's findings that Respondent's "layoff" of employee Jeanne Buccola and its subse- quent failure to reinstate her was discriminatorily motivated in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. The credited testimony shows that in late February 1973,6 the Union contacted Buccola and enlisted her aid in organizing the employees at the plant. Buccola agreed to help and, after signing a union authoriza- tion card herself, she contacted her coworkers and reported back to the Union that a considerable number of them were interested in union representa- tion. On March 5, Buccola invited several employees to a meeting at her home where they were addressed by union officials and, on the following day, Buccola and representatives of the Union mailed union literature and authorization cards to all employees. On March 8, after the employees had received the union literature, Buccola's immediate supervisor asked her what she thought of "this union business." Buccola replied that she had received the union literature just like everyone else. On the following day, March 9, Woody LaValley, Respondent's personnel manager, summoned Buccola to his office and told her that they had too many girls on the floor and he was going to have to lay her off as the one with the lowest seniority. LaValley also told her, at this time, that employee Kelly who had been working temporarily in the office would now be returning to Buccola's department. Buccola asked whether she was eligible for rehire and LaValley said that she was, but gave her no indication as to when she might be recalled. Following her layoff, Buccola remained active in contacting and organizing the employees and, on three separte occasions, she distributed union literature and cards at the plant gate. Buccola was never recalled. 335 The explanations offered by Respondent for Buccola's layoff were found by the Administrative Law Judge to be at variance with the facts. The first such explanation was the one given to Buccola at the time of her layoff; namely, that it was necessary to reduce the number of employees in her department and Buccola was being selected because she had the lowest seniority. As the Administrative Law Judge noted, this explanation just will not stand up under close scrutiny. Buccola was immediately replaced and the machine to which she had been assigned was in continuous operation thereafter. Furthermore, the credited evidence shows that since Buccola's layoff, all of the employees in her department have been performing overtime work. The second explanation for the layoff, i.e., that Respondent decided to use less costly contract labor, fares no better. Not only is it inconsistent with the reasons given Buccola at the time of her layoff, it is absolutely contrary to the facts which show that Respondent did not begin the practice of using contract labor until some 2 weeks after her layoff. My colleagues avoid the implications of these findings by pointing to the complaint 's failure to allege that Buccola's layoff was unlawful and the General Counsel's statements at the hearing that the layoff was not being alleged as a violation . Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that from an evidentiary standpoint Buccola's layoff and the alleged unlawful refusal to recall her are closely related and, as a result, the facts surrounding both were fully developed and litigated at the hearing. Respondent was permitted to, and did , present a full defense on the layoff issue. In these circumstances, I fail to perceive how Respondent was in any way prejudiced by the complaint's failure to allege the layoff as a violation or by the General Counsel's clarification of the complaint's allegations and, accordingly, I would accept the Administrative Law Judge's determinations in regard to this issue.? What we are left with then is , in my opinion, a classic example of unlawful discrimination. Buccola, the prime mover in the Union's organizational campaign, is abruptly discharged just 4 days after she arranged the first contact between the employees and officials of the Union and the reasons offered by Respondent to justify the discharge are clearly demonstrated to be pretextual in nature. Nor can there be any doubt concerning Respondent's animus towards the Union in light of the 8(a)(1) violations found by my colleagues, with which I agree. The sole remaining element in the 8 (a)(3) violation, that of employer knowledge, is readily established at times both prior to and after the discharge. Subsequent to 6 All events occurred in 1973, unless otherwise indicated 7 Tamper, Inc, 207 NLRB No 142 336 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the discharge, Buccola passed out union literature at the plant entrance where her activities were observed by officials of Respondent.8 In my opinion, it is likewise established that Respondent had knowledge of Buccola's union activities at the time of her alleged layoff. Like the Administrative Law Judge, I rely principally on the fact that immediately after the employees had received the union literature Buccola had sent them, she was singled out by her supervisor and asked what she thought of "this union business." However, even without this evidence, I think it would be reasonable to infer knowledge in a situation such as this where the employee complement is only some 45 people and the union activist in an open and unmasked fashion personally contacts each employ- ee individually both within and outside the plant. In light of the foregoing, I would find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by discharging Jeanne Buccola and thereafter failing to reinstate her and I would provide the usual broad corrective action necessary to remedy this violation. In all other respects, I join in the determinations reached by my colleagues. s The fact that Buccola may have been mistaken in identifying President Buchanan as one of the officials who observed her solicitations from a window in the plant would seem to me to be immaterial to the issue. There is no question that on at least one occasion, Buccola was observed handing out union literature at the plant entrance by Respondent's officials. APPENDIX employee representative to deal with us concern- ing grievances and terms and conditions of employment in order to undermine the employ- ees' support of a union. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, and will not prevent them from forming, joining, or helping a union and they can act together for collective bargaining or other aid or protection. HADBAR, DIVISION OF PUR 0 SIL, INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compli- ance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Eastern Columbia Building, Room 600, 849 South Broadway, Los Angeles, California 90014, Telephone 213-688-5254. NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a trial at which all sides had the chance to give evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has found that we have violated the law and has ordered us to post this notice and we intend to carry out the order of the Board and abide by the following: WE WILL NOT question our employees about how they feel about their union activities or the union activities of other employees. WE WILL NOT solicit grievances from employees in order to undermine the employees' support of a union. WE WILL NOT direct employees to select an DECISION HENRY S. SAHM, Administrative Law Judge: This proceeding, heard at Los Angeles, California, on July 17- 18, 1973,1 pursuant to various charges filed between April 20 and May 31, presents questions whether Respondent, called the Company, laid off and refused to reinstate an employee and discharged another in violation of Section 8(a)(3) because they engaged in activities on behalf of the Charging Party, herein called the Union, and whether Respondent engaged in other acts of interference, restraint and coercion in violation of employee rights under Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, herein called the Act. Upon the entire record, including observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs filed by the parties on August 20, there are made the following: I All dates refer to 1973 unless otherwise indicated. HADBAR, DIVISION OF PUR 0 SIL, INC. 337 FINDINGS OF FACT2 I. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER AND THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Respondent Company, a corporation engaged at Alhambra, California, in the sale of hoses and related rubber products, annually ships products valued in excess of $50,000 to points outside the state and is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. A. Introduction This case arose in the context of a union organizational campaign commencing in February 1973 at Respondent's plant. The unfair labor practices are alleged to have occurred during the time the Union was soliciting the employees to sign authorization cards. When a sufficient number of Respondent's employees had signed authoriza- tion cards, the Union requested recognition on April 13, and filed a petition for an election, whereupon an election was held on June 29, approximately 4 months after the organizational campaign began. The Union won the election by a decisive margin. The tally of ballots showed there were 48 eligible voters and that 44 votes were cast, of which 30 were for the Union, 9 against the Union, and 5 were challenged. On August 10, the Board issued a certification of representatives. B. Credibility The witnesses for the General Counsel and Respondent are in conflict as to the salient issues in this case. However, after observing the witnesses and analyzing the record and inferences to be drawn therefrom, this conflict in testimony is resolved in favor of the versions told by the General Counsel's witnesses who appeared to be forthright and truthful. Based upon the recital of the facts in this case, hereinafter set out, the demeanor of the witnesses in testifying, the substantial evidence on the record appraised as a whole, and on the straightforward testimony of the General Counsel's witnesses, the testimony of Lovato, Buchanan, and Cooksen, the company officials, is not credited. Their recitals lacked plausibility, their vague and equivocal denials, and self-contradictions, weighs against ascribing credence to their version of what occurred with respect to the salient issues in this proceeding, as hereinafter explicated. 2 The testimony concerning some of the incidents involved in this proceeding, particularly the dates and chronological sequence , are contra- dictory, ambiguous, incomplete, and, in some instances, incoherent as to specific details, due, in part, to some of the witnesses having difficulty with the English language even though they testified with the aid of an interpreter. Others who did not use the services of an interpreter, in some instances, still had difficulty in expressing themselves as is reflected throughout the transcript . Consequently, findings of fact made herein result from an attempt to reconcile the evidence to determine not only when particular events occurred but what occurred . In attempting to supply coherence to those statements which in some instances approach incoher- ence, and acts which are ambiguous because of a paucity of evidence or, in some instances , a failure to elicit sufficient facts from a witness, necessary Moreover, many of Respondent's witnesses' answers were voiced in response to leading and suggestive questions propounded by Respondent's counsel which also militates against the weight to be given their testimony. As the vice in counsel asking his witnesses leading questions is that they suggest the desired answers, which the witnesses will merely adopt, it may seem futile to object once such a question has been asked and the desired answer suggested. Therefore, little probative value has been given to such testimony thus elicited. Another practical consideration which cannot be over- looked in resolving the credibility issues in this case is the fact that three of the General Counsel' s witnesses were still in the employ of the Respondent Company at the time they testified; namely, Velarde, Flores, and Kelly. As such, they depended on their jobs for their livelihood and they understood that after testifying they must continue in the employ of the Respondent. Moreover, the trier of these facts is not unmindful of the predicament of an employee who testifies adversely to his employer's interests, being apprehensive and fearful, with some measure of justifica- tion as to the future possibility of retaliatory action. These practical considerations, coupled with the normal workings of human nature, have led me to place considerable credence upon their testimony as it is believed they were impelled to tell the truth regardless of what consequences might eventuate. An additional cogent reason for crediting the versions of the General Counsel's witnesses is the Respondent's failure to call other witnesses ; namely, LaValley, Hogan, Charles, and Wolman, all of whom played roles of special significance with respect to important issues in this proceeding. The failure of the Respondent to produce these three material witnesses at the trial to corroborate the testimony of Lovato, Buchanan, and Cooksen renders their versions of what occurred dubious, and also warrants drawing an inference that if these absent witnesses had been produced their testimony would not have been favorable to the Respondent .3 Their absence "not only strengthens the probative force" of the witnesses for the General Counsel, "but of itself is clothed with a certain probative force. "4 C. The Alleged Unfair Labor Practices 1. The layoff of Buccola Jeanne Buccola was employed by the Company in its finishing department from October 1971 until she was "laid off" on March 9, 1973. In late February, Angelo Masi, an official of the Union, enlisted her aid in organizing the Union at Respondent's plant. After signing recourse has been made to other witnesses' testimony in the context of their testimony, as well as other facts and circumstances, in an effort to determine what was meant or occurred. However; in all situations this was not possible. In the interests of accuracy, the testimony of those witnesses who testified as to the critical aspects of this proceeding has been quoted in haec verba copiously as their flavor and nuances are frequently incapable of literal translation or interlineal rewording so that even a metaphrase might be considered imprecise. 3 Interstate Circuit v. U. S., 306 U.S. 208, 225, 226. N.LRB. v. Wallack & Schwalm Co., 198 F.2d 477, 483 (C.A. 3); Concord Supplies & Equipment Corp., 110 NLRB 1873, 1879. 4 Paudler v. Paudler, et al., 185 F.2d 901, 903 (C.A. 5), cert. denied 341 U.S. 920. 338 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD a union card, Buccola contacted her coworkers and reported to Masi that a considerable number of them were interested in a union. Shortly thereafter, she invited some of the employees to a meeting at her home on March 5, at which time they were addressed by union officials. Other union meetings were also held at the American Legion Hall on May 14 and June 28. On March 6, Buccola and the union officials mailed to all the employees brochures printed in both English and Spanish, to which were attached union authorization cards. On March 8, after the employees had received the union literature and cards mailed to them, Buccola's immediate superior, Chris Charles, who is in charge of the finishing department, asked her: "What do you think of this union business?" to which Buccola replied, "... I got literature just like everybody else." The following day, March 9, Woody LaValley, personnel manager, summoned her to his office. He told her that "this was one of the parts of his job that he did not like of laying people off, but they were not allowed to have that many girls on the floor, and since I was the last one hired, I must be the one that was laid off and that Juanita Kelly, who had originally worked in the finishing department, and was no[w] temporarily working in the office, was going to come back into the [finishing] department again.5 . . . I asked Mr. LaValley if I was eligible for rehire and he said, 'yes.' I asked him how soon and he said that he did not know." Buccola was never recalled.6 After her layoff, Buccola continued to contact Respon- dent's employees with respect to soliciting them to sign union authorization cards and also by notifying them of union meetings at her home or the American Legion Hall. She also handed the employees union literature and authorization cards on April 24, May 11, and June 27, as they left the Respondent's plant at the end of the working day. On April 24, she handed Ralph Mesa, an employee, literature and a union card outside the plant. She next observed LaValley and Wolman, company officials who were 15 to 20 feet away from her, approach Mesa whereupon Mesa gave them the union material which they proceeded to read. Buccola testified that on the same day, while distributing union literature to the employees, she saw Buchanan, Respondent's president, and Hagan, production manager, standing at a plant window, 5 feet from her, observing her hand union literature to employ- ees.7 Also, on April 24, Angelo Masi, organizer for the Union, while distributing union literature at the plant to employ- ees was asked by LaValley and Wolman, company officials, to allow them to read the material he was distributing. Masi refused. It is well settled that union activities such as Buccola S Kelly had been transferred from the finishing department to the inspection department the last week of December 1972, and then returned to finishing when Buccola left on March 9, where she remained until June 18 when she transferred again to inspection. 6 She had been laid off on two previous occasions: for 2 months in December 1971 and June or July 1972 for I month. 7 Masi, the union official organizer , described the company officials as "opening up" the window drapes of their offices and "looking out the window" at him, Buccola, and Hidalgo, an alleged discriminatee , distribut- ing union literature to the employees as they left the plant. engaged in are a fundamental right accorded by Section 7 and protected by Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Acts Also, reprisal against an employee in the form of a layoff or discharge as a result of an employee exercising his or her protected rights is a violation within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1).9 Accordingly, the sole issue in the present case is one of fact-whether or not substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports, by a preponderance of the testimony, the General Counsel's contention that Respondent's failure to recall Buccola after she had been laid off was discriminato- rily motivated. The Respondent Company counters this argument by alleging that Buccola was laid off because of lack of work and her having the least seniority of all employees in her department. Furthermore, Respondent alleges, a valid business decision had been made to employ "contract labor" which cost less than full-time employees as contract labor is paid on the number of hours actually worked daily, whereas full-time employees are paid on an 8 hour basis regardless of whether there is work to occupy them for the entire working day. These contract labor individuals are claimed by Respon- dent not to be employees of Respondent and hence not to be considered "employees" in the context of determining whether Respondent hired "employees" after Buccola's layoff to perform the job she had formerly performed. The answer to this frivolous proposition was well stated when the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in refuting a fatuous justification held that such an argument 10 "sticks in the bark, is without reality and substance . . . . Drawn to deal substantially with substantial things, the National Labor Relations Act has been from the beginning, it must continue to be, consistently with its avowed purpose and the language employed in the Act, broadly construed and as broadly given effect to cope with and prevent the mischiefs it was designed to meet and do away with. Shadow boxing with words, including dialectical hair splitting, the tithing of mint, anise and cumin, and the division of a mustard seed, to reach a formal, a technical result, has therefore no proper place, and may not be employed, in construing and applying it." Moreover, Buchanan, president of Respondent, did not leave a favorable impression because of his inability to recall how many contract employees were hired, and for what period of time; nor did he know the name of the agency from whom he hired them even though he signed the checks paying the agency for their hire. Such implausible and incredible testimony leads one to conclude that the contract labor argument was a subterfuge. Cogently probative in determining whether Respon- dent's failure to reinstate Buccola was discriminatorily motivated are the following considerations: Buccola's supervisor asking her on March 8 what she thought of the 8 Section 7 of the Act reads: Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa- tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, ... . 9 N.L.R.B. v. Victor Otlans Roofing Co., 445 F.2d 299, 300 (C.A. 9), enforcing 182 NLRB 898. 10 N.L.R.B. v. Metallic Building Co., 204 F.2d 827, 828. HADBAR, DIVISION OF PUR 0 SIL, INC. 339 "union business" after the union literature was received by the employees on either March 6 or 7, and her "layoff" on Mg -9h 9.._ This precipitgt coneate,pation of events, all of which occurred within 4 days, commencing on March 5 when a union meeting was held at Buccola's home, leads one to believe that there was more than a temporal coincidence between -Buccola being the leading employee proponent in the Union's organizing campaign, the mailing of the union literature, her supervisor inquiring after the employees received the. union literature as to her views about the Union, and her "layoff" the following day.11 In addition the remarks of LaValley, the personnel manager, are noteworthy. LaValley summoned Buccola to his office on March-9, and without any advance notice told her of her immediate layoff, However, before telling Buccola of her immediate layoff, LaValley apologized for his action by stating that he disliked doing it but there was nothing he could do about it as "they were not allowed to have that many girls on the floor and since I was the last one hired, I must be the one that was laid off..." Not only is this justification inconsistent with the facts, as hereinafter explained, but also it casts doubt upon its veracity and stamps it as pretextual when it is considered that there was no economic necessity for Buccola's so- called layoff. This is evidenced by the machine she operated not being idle from the day of her layoff until the time of this trial. Immediately upon her leaving, Buccola's job was taken over by other employees and 2 weeks later, as credibly testified to by Flores, a coworker of Buccola, the "contract" employees- thereafter manned the same machines which Buccola had operated and performed the same duties as Buccola. Further militating against Respon- dent's alleged defense for laying off Buccola is the testimony of Buchanan, Respondent president's contradic- tory and inconsistent reasons for her layoff. He testified that he received a "report" from the company comptroller recommending that contract labor be employed as it was less costly than full-time employees. This report was received by him on April 18, approximately 6 weeks after Buccola's layoff and approximately 2 weeks after the contract labor had already been employed and working. He could not, therefore, have relied on the recommenda- tions of the comptroller's "report" (which was not produced at the trial) in deciding to lay off Buccola on March 9. Moreover, the justification advanced for Bucco- la's layoff is at variance with the reason given by LaValley at the time when he notified her that she was being laid off. Such assertions lead one to believe that the Respondent's purported reason of economic necessity was a pretext advanced in an effort to conceal its proscribed motive in laying off Buccola. There is not a scintilla of credible evidence that Respondent was considering the employment of contract 11 See N.L.R.B. v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 333 F.2d 790,796 (C.A. 8, 1964); N.LR.B. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 242 F.2d 497,502 (C.A. 2, 1957) cert. denied, 355 U.S. 829 (1957). 12 Arbie Mineral Feed Co. v. N.LR.B., 436 F.2d 940, 943 (C.A. 9, 1971). 17 Cf. Filtron Co., Inc., 134 NLRB 1691, 1709-11 , enfd. 309 F.2d 184, 185 (C.A. 2, 1%2); Ox-Wall Products Co., 135 NLRB 840, 841, enfd. 310 F.2d 878, 879 (C.A. 2, 1962). , 14 Morristown Knitting Mills, 80 NLRB 731, 732. 15 Alice Velarde testified that the so-called contract employees assumed labor before Buccola's March 9 layoff. Not only did her protected concerted activities motivate the contrivedlayoff decision on March 9, but also her intensive union activity including her distributing union material at the plant after her layoff, of which Respondent was aware. The same factors eventuated in Respondent ultimately deciding not to reinstate Buccola to her former job. It is well settled that a discriminatorily motivated failure to recall a laid-off employee is violative of the Act, even if it is only partially motivated by discriminatory considerations.12 Thus, the layoff and subsequent failure to recall Buccola was unlawful, as the reason for such failure was Buccola's union activities.13 Moreover, it is not necessary for an employee discharged in violation of the Act to request reinstatement in order to be entitled to it.14 Corroborative of this finding that the Act was violated is the fact that immediately after Buccola was laid off other company personnel assumed her duties. Juanita Kelly was transferred from the inspection department to take over Buccola's duties. Beginning approximately 2 weeks after Buccola's layoff and up to the close of this trial, her position was filled by various other contract employees who were hired after her alleged layoff.15 Alice Velarde, who is presently employed by Respondent, credibly testified on rebuttal that since Buccola's March 9 layoff all the employees in the finishing department have worked overtime the last week of the months of March, April, May, and June 1973. It is reasonable to infer and so found that the employees' overtime was occasioned by a plentiful amount of work on hand. This is cogent evidence to refute Respondent's contention that valid economic considera- tions were the basis for Buccola's layoff, as the record clearly reveals there was no lack of work in the finishing department. Moreover, it is uncontroverted that personnel were hired after Buccola's layoff who performed and were performing at the time of the trial the same work as Buccola did. Also, buttressing this conclusion is Respon- dent's union animus as indicated by its illegal discharge of another employee and interference with its employees' Section 7 rights, infra, all of which occurred after the advent of the Union. These actions were motivated, it is found, not for valid reasons, but rather, with the purpose of aborting the union campaign by ridding itself of Buccola who was the prime employee activist in the union organizational campaign at its plant. Moreover, Charles, who was Buccola's immediate superior asked her what she thought about the Union the day after the Union had mailed literature and authoriza- tion cards to all the employees. This is probative of the fact that Respondent had knowledge of her union activities when she was laid off the next day. It is not too unreasonable to assume that Charles not only advised her superiors of her conversation with Buccola but that the duties of Buccola 2 weeks after she left. These contract employees were all hired at 2-week intervals and then replaced at the end of 2 weeks by other newly hired contract employees. Juanita Kelly, who has been employed by Respondent for approximately 7 years, corroborated Velarde's testimony. Immediately upon Buccola leaving , Chris Charles took over Buccola's job for a short time until Kelly was transferred, who continued in Buccola's job until the so-called "contract" employees assumed Buccola's duties 2 weeks later. 340 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD company officials might have requested Charles to ascer- tain Buccola's views about the Union. There is evidence in the record which appears to indicate Buccola's union activities were of such widespread activity and intensity that it can reasonably be inferred they could not have escaped notice by Respondent when it is considered she not only worked in a small plant of about 45 employees, but also she was observed by company officials distribut- ing union literature at the plant after her layoff, which eventuated in her not being reinstated although there was plenty of work. Even though Respondent had direct knowledge of her union activities when company officials observed her distributing literature to employees as they left the plant, the Supreme Court has held direct knowledge not necessary, stating "it was not required to deny relief because there was no direct evidence that the employer knew these men had joined [a union J."16 Moreover by Section 10(e) of the Act, Congress gave to the trier of the facts power to draw inferences from the facts and to appraise conflicting and circumstantial evidence and the weight and credibility of testimony.17 On the other hand, economic considerations which Respondent alleges as the cause for Buccola's layoff may not be asserted to shield the Respondent Employer against the consequences of its discrimination against her, since she would not have been laid off but for her union activities. The circumstances of each case must be weighed to determine what motivations truly dominated Respon- dent in laying off Buccola. In this proceeding, it is found that Respondent was motivated, at least partly, by its antagonism to her efforts to bring the Union into the plant. In view of the whole record including Respondent's opposition to the Union, infra, its knowledge of Buccola's union activities, its patently unconvincing explanation for its layoff of Buccola, as well as its actions subsequent to her layoff in not recalling her, it is found that substantial evidence supports a finding that the real reason Buccola was not reinstated was because of her union activities. Such conduct on the part of Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 2. The discharge of Hidalgo Gilbert Hidalgo was employed from February 16, 1972, to April 18, 1973, at which time he was discharged for alleged unsatisfactory work performance and being absent from work on February 19 and 20. Hidalgo first became aware of the Union's organizational campaign in May when he was mailed union literature and an authorization card. About the same time, Alice Velarde, an employee, telephoned him and asked him if he was interested in having a union at the plant to which he answered in the affirmative. The same day he signed and mailed the authorization card to the Union. He attended four union meetings at which plans were discussed to obtain the signatures of additional employees on authorization cards. Hidalgo solicited 10 employees of whom 5 signed union authorization cards. On April 12, 6 days before Hidalgo's discharge, his supervisor, Lovato, called a meeting of the 14 male employees in the calender room, long press area who were under his supervision. According to Hidalgo's testimony, Lovato told them "There is somebody that is trying to start some trouble here, but we don't know who it is as yet. Then he changed his language to Spanish and he said, 'We know about you guys trying to-that want better conditions and better benefits and like that' and then after he asked what did we want, some of the men there answered what they wanted . . ." Hidalgo continued that they complained about their wages, excessive heat, and foul air in the shop and requested that their working conditions be improved. Mention was also made of the profit-sharing and pension plans which had been discontinued on July 1, 1972, when the previous owner sold the plant to Respondent. Lovato then requested the assembled employees to select a representative to confer with him and Hagan, a company official, regarding their complaints. After Lovato left, the men elected Hidalgo to represent them. Hidalgo's testimo- ny continues that he was selected: "because I am bilingual and since I was passing the cards around and asking the guys to be in the Union with me, I felt that I had a responsibility to them to do that." However, Hidalgo never met with Lovato or Hagan. Instead, these company officials met later the same day with another of the employees, Jose Torres, who is related to Lovato. Although Lovato testified a "few" of the complaints were resolved in his and Hagan's meeting with Torres, he failed to testify what was "resolved," or how it came about that instead of Hidalgo, Tones was authorized to represent the employees. Another employee, Guillermo Contrares, in testifying on cross-examination as to Torres' role in meeting with Lovato and Hagan stated that "Jose Luis Torres went because he wanted to do so. We didn't propose him." In fact, Lovato testified that he did not know whether Torres was selected by the employees to represent them when Torres and he "discussed" the employees' complaints. Tones spoke to his fellow-employees on April 16, and according to Hidalgo he told them that Lovato and Hagan agreed to grant them fans and brooms to keep the shop clean and, scissors, but refused their request for a pay increase. When Tones finished speaking to his coworkers, Lovato then came to where the employees had gathered and told them the same thing as Tones had. When Lovato left, Hidalgo told the employees not to believe anything Lovato had said "because they are just trying to buy us off and use this meeting to keep the Union away from the Company." Contrares', a fellow employee, version of this incident was that Hidalgo told them "not to pay attention to the promises being made, that if the Union got in it was going to be better." Two days later, July 18, Hidalgo was fired. He was summoned about 3:15 p.m. to the office of LaValley, the personnel director, who told him according to Hidalgo that "I was being discharged for bad work habits and that I missed two days without calling in and he handed me my checks and papers saying the date of the discharge on it. I 16 N. L. R. B. v. Link-Bell Co., 311 U.S. 584, 602, Sutton Handle Factory, 19 Link-Belt, supra, at 597. See Radio Officers Union v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 119 NLRB 955 , affd. 255 F.2d 697 (C.A. 8, 1958), cert. denied 358 U.S. 865 17, 40-52. (1958). HADBAR, DIVISION OF PUR 0 SIL, INC. asked him . . . why did it take so long to fire me because I was absent these two days about two months already. It has been two months since I missed these days without calling in." 18 He was given a written notice stating that he was being discharged and handed his check not on the regular payday but in the middle of the pay period.19 John Lovato, a supervisor, who was in charge of the calender room and long press area testified that Hidalgo was an unsatisfactory employee. He testified that this evaluation was based on Hidalgo's inadequate production, his "shooting the breeze with the guys, . . . playing around a lot," his "poor work," and "his work habits and attitude." On February 23, Hidalgo was handed a written form which states he was "given a correction interview" for the following reasons: "Attitude, failure to call in for 2 days [and] bad work habits." After this notice was given to Hidalgo, Lovato testified that he told Hidalgo: "that if he improved within 30 days I would see about getting him an increase [in pay ] and if he did not I would have to see about discharging him." However, Hidalgo was not discharged until 2 months later. On April 17, he was given a written form notifying him that his "attitude and bad work habits" persisted and that Lovato recommended his discharge. On April 18, he was discharged and given a written termination paper which again stated that the reason was his "bad work and attitude." Furthermore, Lovato testified that Hidalgo's absenteeism, particularly 2 days in February when he was absent, also contributed to his decision to discharge him on July 18. Jose Ybarra has been employed by Respondent since October 1970. Ybarra, who is a neighbor of Hidalgo, testified that Hidalgo telephoned him in February that he was ill and requested him to notify Lovato he would be absent from work. When Ybarra delivered Hidalgo's message, Lovato told Ybarra that it was Hidalgo's responsibility to notify him personally. The facts show that it was not until July 18, 6 months after Hidalgo's alleged unauthorized 2 day absence in February, that this was resurrected as a reason for his discharge. However, it is uncontradicted that Ybarra did notify Lovato. Assuming arguendo that Hidalgo's absence was not properly reported, there is still substantial evidence and it is found, as explicated below, that Hidalgo's discharge was motivated because of his concerted protected union activities which violated the Act.20 Harvey Cooksen, whose testimony and demeanor left much to be desired, is a foreman under whose supervision Hidalgo worked for approximately 6 months in 1972. Cooksen described the quality of Hidalgo's work as "unsatisfactory;.... [I] did not like his attitude and the way he performed his work . . . . And his general attitude. He did not care whether it was done or not . . . his work habits were very poor . . . . It seemed to me like he worked when he wanted to and wouldn't work when he did not want to." He concluded his direct examination in response to leading questions by stating he told Lovato in 1972 that he "didn't think the man was worth keeping." On cross-examination, it was elicited after some effort 18 This is an unmistakable reference to Hidalgo having been absent for 2 days in February when Ybarra notified Lovato. See infra. 's Cf. Burk Bros. v. N.L.R.B., 117 F.2d 686, 687 (C.A. 3); Materials 341 that Cooksen made out a "performance review" on December 18, 1972 (Resp. 6). In his judgment of Hidalgo, he rated him as "average" on the "performance review" and in answer to a question whether Hidalgo's perform- ance was "unsatisfactory," he slyly answered: "It was not perfect, no." When asked how Hidalgo demonstrated his "poor attitude" he answered: "When you were talking to him, he was off in another part of the world somewhere, like he was not paying attention." Henry Bond, a foreman, testified that on a "few" occasions Hidalgo worked for him and "He just didn't do enough work, he just disappeared too much on the job." On cross-examination, it was elicited that this occurred ,.not too long after he started working" for Respondent. Further questioning revealed it was in August 1972, about 7 months before his discharge on April 18, 1973. Jose Ybarra testified that on his own initiative he informed Lovato that the Union was distributing authori- zation cards to the employees. See above. Two days later Lovato asked him, according to Ybarra, the identity of these employees who were distributing the union cards "so they could fire the persons." On cross-examination, it was elicited that the reason Ybarra volunteered the information to Lovato that employees were distributing cards was "because I was afraid he was going to fire me because he had stayed for a few days without talking to me." He explained that he felt he would ingratiate himself with Lovato if he were to reveal that the Union was organizing the Company's employees and thereby obviate any possibility of being fired by Lovato who had stopped speaking to him. Ybarra stated that he feared the reason Lovato had ceased speaking to him was Lovato might have learned he had signed a union card. It was this fear that he might be fired, continued Ybarra, that impelled him to go to Lovato in order to curry favor with him and divulge what he knew about union activity in the plant, hoping thereby to placate Lovato and be in his good graces and thus prevent being fired. A week later, Ybarra testified, Lovato came to him at his work station and inquired if he had learned anything more with respect to the Union's organizational campaign. Ybarra replied in the negative. After this conversation, Ybarra testified that he warned Hidalgo, Velarde, and Rita Lamas to be careful of Lovato "because he was looking for somebody to throw out of the Union." The testimony of Lovato is a maze of contradictions, discrepancies, equivocations, generalities, and in some instances outright improbabilities. Then, too, the vague, unspecific, and indefinite complaints testified to by Lovato and Cooksen with respect to the quality of Hidalgo's work, which in the main are too intangible to refute, leaves his discharge unsatisfactorily explained. Their testimony was uncertain and not specific as to the reasons, identity, and details of some of their complaints regarding Hidalgo. For example, they described Hidalgo in such nebulous and general terms as "attitude" and "bad work habits" and "poor work" and "unsatisfactory work." Finally, Lovato Transportation Co., 170 NLRB 997, 998. 20 Berland Paint City v. N.LR. B., 478 F.2d 1405 (C.A. 8, 1973) 342 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD shifted to another reason for deciding to fire Hidalgo, namely, because he played ball. It should be noted that Lovato's and Cooksen's reasons for firing Hidalgo were not related to any specific incidents. Rather, they are broad, generalized subjective characteriza- tions and were, therefore, quite impossible to refute and difficult to impugn through cross-examination. The unspe- cific, inconsistent, contradictory, and unconvincing rea- sons given for his discharge create a suspicion that they were offered to conceal an unlawful motive which in this situation, it is found, was an attempt to forestall union activity and to abort the Union's organizational activities by discharging one of the most active union adherents whose union activities, it is uncontradicted, Respondent was aware of before the date of his discharge. This is evidenced by him being selected by his fellow employees to represent them. His statement to the other employees not to believe that Lovato would rectify their substantive complaints, it is not too unreasonable to assume, was brought to Lovato's attention by Torres who was related to Lovato and who in some strangely unexplained manner supplanted Hidalgo as the employees' representative to deal with Lovato and Hagan. For the reasons hereinafter explained, it is found that the record in this case speaks for itself in that the evidence adduced by Respondent in support of its defense is not of sufficient probative force to overcome the prima facie case made out by the General Counsel. The testimony makes plain that with respect to the layoff of Buccola and the discharge of Hidalgo there is more than a coincidental connection between their union activities and their separations by the Respondent. Indeed, it is found that "the principal events [are] really no coincidence at all, but rather part of a deliberate effort by the [Respondent] to scotch the lawful measure of the employees before they had progressed too far toward fruition."21 The unconvincing character of proffered shifting and multiple reasons given by Respondent for Hidalgo's termination which even included the charge that he threw rubber balls at other employees during working hours is also a significant factor in determining whether or not his discharge was improperly motivated.22 It is found that the reasons stated by Respondent for Hidalgo's discharge are not only false, as evidenced by the testimony set out above, but also reveals that Hidalgo's performance review shows him to have been a satisfactory employee. Inasmuch as Respondent's stated reasons for firing Hidalgo are false, it is reasonable to infer there is another motive. In this case, it is found that the motive for Respondent's discharge is one which Respondent sought to conceal-an unlawful motive, namely, Hidalgo's union activities.23 D. Conclusions It should be borne in mind that Buccola and Hidalgo were the spearhead of the Union's organizational activity in the plant. It was they who signed union cards, solicited other employees to do likewise, attended union meetings (including two at Buccola's home), and distributed union 21 N.L.R.B. v. Jamestown Sterling Corp., 211 F.2d 725, 726 (C.A. 2). 22 Dant & Russell, Ltd., 92 NLRB 307, 320; N.L.R.B. v. Condensor Corp., 128 F.2d 67, 75 (C.A. 3). See Mooresville Mills, 99 NLRB 572, 600. literature outside the plant. It was only after they engaged in all these protected activities that the quality of Hidalgo's work became intolerable to Respondent and it was decided not to recall Buccola to the job she was laid off from, thereby discharging her. Against the feeble evidence of Hidalgo's inefficiency and the alleged economic reasons for the layoff of Buccola, there has been weighed Respondent's knowledge of their union activities and the summary nature of their separa- tions with neither knowing their jobs were in jeopardy. This combination of circumstances is scarcely explainable except upon the hypothesis that Respondent was discrimi- natorily motivated and makes no other explanation reasonable. It is found that these belated reasons were specious afterthoughts advanced by the Respondent for its actions and used as a pretext. The real reason was to eliminate Hidalgo and Buccola from its work force and thus cripple the union organizational effort as well as discourage its employees from continuing the organization- al campaign. Such conduct violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Section 8(a)(1) On the basis of the foregoing, it is concluded that Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees and thereby violated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act by the following conduct found above: (1) Charles, who was Buccola's immediate supervisor, interrogating Buccola on March 8, as to what she thought about the Union. (2) Although Ybarra's fear of discharge because he had signed a union card impelled him to curry favor in an attempt to ingratiate himself with Lovato by divulging to him what he knew about union activity in the plant, nevertheless, Lovato interrogating Ybarra a week later as to whether he had learned anything more about the Union's organizational campaign was a violation of Section 8(a)(1). (3) When Lovato asked Ybarra to report to him on what union activities were going on in the plant, this violated Section 8(a)(1). There was not only a lack of the requisite preponderance of evidence elicited by the General Counsel to prove the other averments in the complaint alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1), but also, in some instances, a failure of proof. Accordingly, it will be recommended that paragraph 9, subheadings (a), (c), (d), (e), (f), and paragraph 10 of the complaint be dismissed. II. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several states and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. 23 Shattuck Denn Mining Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 362 F.2d 466, 470 (C.A. 9, 1966), enfg. 151 NLRB 1329. HADBAR, DIVISION OF PUR 0 SIL, INC. Upon the foregoing findings and conclusions, there are hereby made the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union herein, Stove, Furnace & Allied Appli- ance Workers International Union of North America, Local 158, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3.. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing the employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, as specified above, the Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. By discharging and discriminating with regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Gilbert Hidalgo, Respondent discouraged membership in the aforemen- tioned Union and committed unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 5. By laying off Jeanne Buccola, as set forth above, Respondent discriminated against her in regard to her tenure of employment, and the terms and conditions thereof, to discourage membership in the Union and thereby violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 6. The allegations of Paragraphs 9, (a), (c), (d), (e), (f), and 10 of the complaint are dismissed. THE REMEDY It is recommended that the Respondent cease and desist from violating Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Act, and that it reinstate both Jeanne Buccola and Gilbert Gaspar Hidalgo and that it reimburse them for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of the discrimination against them, by paying to them a sum of money equal to the amount they would have earned from the dates of their discrimination to the date of offer of reinstatement, less their net earnings during the period of such discrimination, with said reimbursement to be computed as provided in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum in the manner prescribed in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, there is issued the following recommended: 24 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. ORDER 24 343 Respondent, Hadbar, Division of Pur 0 Sil, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discriminatorily discharging and/or laying off its employees or otherwise discriminating against any employ- ee because of his or her activity on behalf of, or membership in, Stove, Furnace & Allied Appliance Workers International Union of North America, Local 158, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. (b) Interrogating employees with respect to their union membership or activities. (c) Requesting employees to report to it with respect to its other employees' union activities. (d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer to Gaspar Gilbert Hidalgo and Jeanne Buccola immediate, full, and unconditional reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions without prejudice to their seniority or other rights, privileges, or working conditions and make them whole for any loss of earnings they may have suffered as a result of their discharge and/or layoff, in the manner set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due and rights of employment under the terms of this Decision. (c) Post at its plant in Alhambra, California, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 25 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 21, shall, after being duly signed by Respondent, be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 21, in writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Decision, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 25 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board " shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."