Queen City Equipment Corp.

284 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Queen City Equipment Corporation and International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 500D, AFL-CIO. Case 11-CA-5378 June 10, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND PENELLO On February 19, 1974, Administrative Law Judge James V. Constantine issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep- tions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings," and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified below. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified below, and hereby orders that Respondent, Queen City Equipment Corporation, Charlotte, North Carolina, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, as herein modified: 1. Delete paragraph 1(d) of the Administrative Law Judge's recommended Order and reletter the succeeding paragraph accordingly. 2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the Administrative Law Judge. ' We find unnecessary, and do not rely upon, the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Service Manager Fields' telling employee Hampton following the Union's winning the election in May 1973 that the employees would not receive a wage increase for 5 years was violative of Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act. Such conduct was not alleged in the complaint, and was raised at the trial for the first time more than 6 months after the statement was allegedly made. Accordingly, the finding is deleted from the Administrative Law Judge's Conclusions of Law 3(c). APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government We hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT discourage membership in International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 500D, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by discharging employees or other- wise discriminating in any manner in respect to their tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment. WE WILL NOT ask employees to report to us what goes on at meetings of the above-named Union. WE WILL NOT threaten to discharge employees who are members, or in favor of, said Union. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. WE WILL offer Wilbur Eugene Hampton immediate and full reinstatement to his former job or, if such job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent one, without prejudice to the seniority and other rights and privileges enjoyed by him, and make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of his discharge, with interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum. All our employees are free to become, remain, or refuse to become or remain, members of said Local 500D of the Operating Engineers, or any other labor organization. QUEEN CITY EQUIPMENT CORPORATION (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compli- ance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 1624 Wachovia Building, 301 North Main Street, Winston-Salem, North Carolina 27101, Telephone 919-723-2300. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JAMES V. CONSTANTINE, Administrative Law Judge: This is an unfair labor practice case litigated pursuant to Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, herein called the Act. 29 U.S.C. 160(B). It was commenced by a complaint issued on August 29, 1973, by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board, through the Acting Regional Director for Region 11 (Winston-Salem, North Carolina), naming 211 NLRB No. 35 QUEEN CITY EQUIPMENT CORP. Queen City Equipment Corporation as the Respondent. That complaint is base4,9n a charge filed on June 28, 1973, by 'International Uilioii of Operating Engineers, Local 500D, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union. In substance the complaint avers that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3), and that such conduct affects commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7), of the Act. Respondent has answered, admitting some of the allegations of the complaint but denying that it committed any unfair labor practices. Pursuant to due notice this case came on to be heard, and was tried before me, at Charlotte, North Carolina, on December 20, 1973. All parties except the Charging Union were represented at and participated in the trial, and had full opportunity to introduce evidence, examine and cross- examine witnesses, file briefs, and offer oral argument. A brief has been received from the General Counsel. The case presents the issues of whether Respondent: (a) Interrogated employees concerning their union activity and that of other employees. (b) Threatened employees that it was going to "get rid of" all the union supporters. (c) Directed employees to spy on union meetings and union activities of other employees and to report these activities to supervisors.- (d) Promised employees better jobs if they would get the Union out of the Company. (e) Discharged employee Wilbur (Wilbert in the com- plaint) Eugene Hampton because he engaged in union or other concerted activity. Upon the entire record in this case, and from my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses , I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. AS TO JURISDICTION Respondent, a North Carolina corporation, is engaged at its Charlotte, North Carolina, facility in selling, servicing, and renting industrial construction equipment . During the 12-month period preceding issuance of the complaint herein, a representative period, Respondent sold and shipped from its said Charlotte facility equipment and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points and places located outside the State of North Carolina. During the same period, Respondent caused to be shipped to its said Charlotte facility equipment and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points and places outside the State of North Carolina. I find that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and that it will effectuate the purposes of the Act to assert jurisdiction over Respondent in this proceeding. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Union is, and at all times material herein has been, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. General Counsel's Case 1. The discharge of Wilbur Eugene Hampton 285 Hampton was hired by Respondent in June 1972. In January 1973, he signed a union card. In March 1973, Junior Fields, Respondent's service manager, requested Hampton to attend union meetings and report to him what transpired there. Hampton complied with such plea and informed Fields of the happenings at said meetings. Later in March, Fields informed Hampton that he was going to give Hampton a raise in pay. That weekend Fields told Hampton that he, Fields, "did not think the Union would work down there;" he did not like the Union; he was "going to get rid of those union mother f-ers;" and asked Hampton to help him keep "these mother f-ers out of here." Fields repeated this threat to Hampton "plenty of times in March and April." In May 1973, the Union won an election to represent employees at the plant. Not long thereafter Fields informed Hampton that the "union people," i.e., the employees, would not receive a wage increase for 5 years, and that Respondent would "drag it out as long as possible in court." Then, in late May, Foreman Sarge Foster, a supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act, after being told by Hampton that the latter had voted for the Union, asked Hampton why he had so voted. In late May, Hampton told Foster that Hampton had signed a union card. On June 15, 1973, Service Manager Fields discharged Hampton, assigning as the reason therefor that Fields "did not think that Hampton was happy there." On cross-examination, Hampton testified that when he was discharged he was told by Fields and Foster that his, Hampton's,work was "slacking off," but that this was not mentioned as a reason for his being fired. Milford D. McDonald, an employee of Respondent, testified that in early April 1973, Respondent's supervisor over the mechanics, Junior Fields, about 4 to 6 weeks before the election expressed to him the opinion that Wilbur Hampton was one of the best and most enthusiastic mechanics Fields had, and that Hampton would "take the manual [put out by the tractor manufacturer] home and look into it" whenever he had problems to solve. About 3 weeks before Hampton was fired on June 15, 1973, Fields told McDonald, the latter describing himself as "the Union representative," that Hampton's attitude "was getting kind of bad towards his job . . . for the reason that on one occasion they told him to put the clutch in backwards." 2. Alleged violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act About July 30, 1973, Supervisor Junior Fields asked employee Milford D. McDonald if employee Phil Salliti was the ringleader of the Union and if Salliti had anything to do with bringing the Union in. McDonald replied that he, and not Salliti, was such ringleader . Other alleged violations of this section of the Act are recited in connection with the testimony of Hampton set forth above. 286 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD B. Respondent's Defense Respondent's president and general manager, Howard C. Miller, testified in substance as follows. Hampton was hired by Respondent as a mechanic trainee to work under Service Manager Bob Melton and Shop Foreman Dave Bention. In the beginning, Melton submitted favorable reports on Hampton's performance . When Melton re- signed he was replaced by Junior Fields . At first Fields gave an account of Hampton's performance to Miller to the effect that Hampton "looked like he might be a pretty good mechanic if he stuck to it and kept his mind to it." Beginning "sometime in April" Field's appraisal of Hampton changed. Thus Fields reported to Miller that Hampton "had a very bad attitude, kept losing parts, parts that were not readily available , and detained the repairing of machines, that his work had gotten very sloppy ... and that he would argue with other employees." When Hampton was discharged Miller was informed that the reasons therefor were "his attitude was bad; his work was sloppy ; he would come to work looking like he had been out all night; wasn't ready to go to work; he was argumentative with many of the other employees and just bad conduct in general." Although Miller was aware of a union organizing drive prior to Hampton's discharge, Miller at no time had knowledge of how Hampton felt about the Union . In fact employee James T . Foster, who later became shop foreman, told Miller that Hampton "definitely was not interested in the Union, that he [Hampton ] had talked to him [Foster ] outside and said that he [Hampton ] was not interested in the Union in any form , shape, or manner and hoped he [Foster] didn't vote for the Union." Another witness for Respondent was James T. Foster. An adequate summary of his testimony follows . On May 7, 1973, he was made shop foreman , and in this capacity admittedly is a supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. Prior to this he served as a welder- mechanic for Respondent. Before Foster was promoted to foreman, Hampton once told him that he hoped that Foster did not vote for . the Union, asserting that he, Hampton, "could not see where we needed it" and that he wasn't interested in it. Foster conveyed this information to Respondent's president, Miller. A day or two after he became such foreman, Foster spoke to Hampton about the latter's work habits because, although Foster knew that Hampton "could do better," he observed that Hampton's "attitude was kind of changing a little bit . . . and I couldn't understand why he wasn't doing better work." According to Foster, Hampton "always had problems, constant problems . . . and we tried to work out the differences and tried to help him in any way that I could and still would probably." After the foregoing talk, Hampton told Foster that he "would try harder" and, according to Foster, Hampton "did for two or three days , and his attitude changed; and then all at once, it seemed like he would get in a slump again." Between 3 and 5 weeks later, Foster again spoke to Hampton about the latter's bad performance and attitude. This was around May 15, 1973. During this conversation, Foster stressed that Hampton's "work habits were getting very, very poor and needed to improve . . . and his attitude was bad." This caused Hampton to assure Foster that he would try to do better. Then Foster warned Hampton that if the latter did not improve "we would have to do something because we could not continue on this line of thought." Hampton replied, "Well, if I don't improve within the next week or ten days, I will just resign." Notwithstanding Hampton's promise to better discharge his duties, his attitude and performance during the next 30 days did not change in Foster's opinion. Accordingly, Foster reported this to Service Manager Junior Fields. Then, on June 15, 1973, Fields, in the presence of Foster, told Hampton that he, Fields, did not think that Hampton was happy on the job, that Hampton's work "had gotten sloppy," that Hampton was losing parts , and that "we got to do something about it if [Hampton] couldn't improve himself." When Hampton asked Fields "for specifics," Fields mentioned Hampton's so bungling the William Septic Tank 450 job that Hampton took about 2 weeks on it when it required no more than 3 or 4 days . According to Foster, this ineptitude, which he characterized as "sloppy work" on Hampton's part, not only "cost the company about thirteen or fourteen hundred dollars, or therea- bouts," but it required Foster to "spend an inordinate amount of time supervising" Hampton. At the close of the foregoing occasion, Hampton asked Fields, "Have you got my check?" Thereupon Fields replied in the affirmative and at the same time handed a check to Hampton. At this point, Hampton requested a statement of why he was dismissed , and then he left. Although as above recited Hampton told Foster at first that Hampton was not for the Union, Hampton did apprise Foster about May 15 , 1973, that Hampton was for the Union and that he voted for it. At this time Foster was shop foreman. Foster soon acquainted President Miller and also Service Manager Fields of this fact. Another witness for Respondent , Lawrence Fields, also known as Junior Fields, gave testimony which may be encapsulated as follows . He has been Respondent's service manager since February 27 , 1973. According to Fields, the "attitude and performance" of Hampton prior to May 1973, "some days ... would be real good and other days it would be bad . . . it was really hard to observe his working habits and his attitude . . . from week to week ; you had to do it on a day-to-day basis because it was changeable." However, by the latter part of March or April Hampton's work and attitude "became consistently poor." Among Hampton's faults which Fields described was an inability to "keep up with his parts ; he had many parts missing .. . they would get misplaced and we couldn't find them after he had received them." In addition, "people in the shop" complained to Fields that Hampton's "attitude is real bad" and that his performance was unsatisfactory. Fields made the decision to discharge Hampton after Foreman Foster complained that Hampton "is requiring too much supervision and I have got other people in the shop . . . that I have got to consider . . . I just can't continue with him . . . it don't look like there is going to be any improvement . in his working habits." But just before such firing was imposed, Fields first talked to Hampton about mid-June 1973. In this conversation, Fields remarked that "you are just not happy." But QUEEN CITY EQUIPMENT CORP. 287 Hampton's being for or -against the Union did not play a part in the decision to fire him. When Hampton wanted to know "what's wrong," Fields replied that Hampton "is requiring too much supervision, and it is taking too long to do some jobs, and you are losing too many parts," and mentioned some specific instances substantiating this conclusion. Fields took Hampton's attitude into considera- tion in deciding to dismiss him. Thereupon Hampton asked Fields, "Have you got my check?" Upon receiving an affirmative answer, Hampton said, "Let me have it." So Fields handed him the check, and Hampton then left. Fields denies that he (a) told Hampton that he, Fields, was "going to get rid of all those union mother f-ers," (b) asked Hampton to help him get rid of such union employees, and (c) asked Hampton to attend union meetings and report to him what transpired there. Nevertheless Hampton voluntarily and without prodding by Fields "on several occasions" reported to Fields on union activities. Fields further denied that he at any time (a) promised employees better jobs if they would get the Union out of the Company, or (b) promised them anything if they would get the Union out. But he admitted he spoke to employees "about the benefits and so forth . . . and told them, some of them I couldn't see where the Union was going to benefit them because the Company already had a good program and they had many other things in mind, you know, planned; and I didn't go into detail about all of that." I find that this last statement is protected by Section 8(c) of the Act and, consequently does not contravene said Act. Fields gave the following version of the July 30, 1973, meeting in President Miller's office about which General Counsel's witness Milford D. McDonald had previously testified. McDonald asked to come to said meeting to represent employee Ivy Coleman, and Fields granted this request because McDonald "was involved with the Union at that time." In fact McDonald described himself as a union representative in the shop. Fields believes that on this occasion he did not ask McDonald about Salliti's connection with the Union; but Fields did testify that he put such a question to McDonald sometime before said meeting. But Fields insisted that in talking about Salliti "we were very casual; it was open and we talked freely, Mac and I do; we had a fairly good relationship." When asked on cross-examination why he asked McDo- nald if Salliti was the "ringleader" of the Union, Fields replied, "I was just curious to know; nobody volunteered to tell you anything, they always do it and then tell you; and I was just inquisitive; it really didn't matter but I just thought that I would like to know." Also on cross-examination, Fields stated that Hampton, prior to being discharged, had told the shop foreman that Hampton was a member of the Union, and "the shop foreman had related this message to" Fields. On another occasion Hampton told Fields that the Union was "in." Finally, on cross-examination Fields conceded that at no time prior to June 15, 1973, at which time he discharged Hampton, did he ever discuss with Hampton the latter's shortcomings as an employee although the shop foreman "had counseled [Hampton] twice." Respondent's final witness was Joseph M. Meldrich, its comptroller. An adequate abridgment of his testimony ensues. He explained that Fields would ask him for checks of employees with whom Fields intended to discuss inadequate work performances; and that if, after talking to them, Fields was convinced they should be retained, said checks would be marked void. See Respondent's Exhibits la and lb for examples of such void checks. But when Fields felt that an employee for whom a check had been made out would not improve, Fields gave such employee a paycheck at the conclusion of the meeting with such employee. This was the case with employee Hampton. It also explains why Fields had a paycheck ready for Hampton when Fields spoke to him on the day Hampton was terminated, according to both Fields and Meldrich. C. Concluding Findings and Discussion In arriving at the findings made in this subsection C, I have observed and been guided by the following basic principles of law. (a) The burden of proof rests upon the General Counsel to establish the allegations of the complaint, so that the Respondent at no stage of the trial is required to disprove any of said allegations. (b) The noncrediting of some of Respondent's evidence, or the failure of Respondent to establish one or more of its defenses, does not constitute affirmative evidence which will contribute to establishing the General Counsel's case. Such "negative evidence," as some courts refer to it, cannot supply the proof essential to sustain the allegations of the complaint. (c) The findings below are based on testimony which I have credited in those instances where dispute has arisen as to the facts. 1. As to the discharge of Wilbur Eugene Hampton Upon evaluating the entire record in this case I am satisfied, and find, that Hampton was discharged for his union activity and that the grounds given for his discharge, i.e., that Hampton had become sloppy, was losing parts, and was not happy on the job, are a pretext to mask the actual reason. This ultimate finding is derived from the entire record and the ensuing subsidiary findings which I hereby find as facts. a. Respondent entertained union animus. Patently this alone cannot warrant a finding that Respondent violated the Act, as Section 8(c) thereof guarantees to an employer the right to express to his employees that he is opposed to unions. N.L.R.B. v. Consolidated Diesel Electric Co., 469 F.2d 1016 (C.A. 4, 1972); N.LRB. v. Threads, Inc., 308 F.2d 1, 8 (C.A. 4, 1962). And it is settled that engaging in union activity will not immunize an employee against being discharged for a valid cause. P. G. Berland Paint, 199 NLRB No. 45. Yet an employer's dislike of unions communicated to his employees is an element which may be considered, along with other pertinent evidence, in ascertaining the actual reason underlying an employee's discharge. Maphis Chapman Corp. v. N.LR.B., 368 F.2d 298, 304 (C.A. 4, 1966), where the court held that "animosity and hostility" towards unions have "signifi- cance" in Section 8(a)(3) cases. b. 'Hampton was active on behalf of the Union and 288 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Respondent had knowledge thereof. Obviously the dis- charge of a strong union advocate constitutes a highly effective means of frustrating a union organizational effort. Upon this aspect of the case I am aware that employers rarely disclose discriminatory motives in terminating union protagonists; but "such purpose may be shown by circumstantial evidence ." Corrie Corporation v. N. L.R.B., 375 F.2d 149, 152 (C.A. 4, 1967). "Nowadays it is usually a case of more subtlety ...." N.L.R.B. v. Neuhoff Bros., 375 F.2d 372, 374 (C.A. 5, 1967). Thus I believe, and find, such subtlety was resorted to when Hampton was discharged for supposedly not being happy on his job. c. I find that no impartial investigation concerning Hampton's so-called unworthiness was made by Fields before discharging Hampton. It is true that the shop foreman, according to Fields, twice spoke to or "counseled" Fields about Hampton, but Fields did not communicate this to Hampton until just before terminating Hampton. Failing to conduct an impartial inquiry into an employee's alleged unfitness to hold a job amounts to evidence of a discriminatory intent. N.L.R.B. v. Robertshaw Controls Company, Lux Time Division, 483 F.2d 762, 765-766 (C.A. 4, 1973) N.L.R.B. v. Murray-Ohio Mfg. Co., 358 F.2d 948, 950 (C.A. 6, 1966); Norfolk Tallow Co., 154 NLRB 1052, 1059. In this connection I also find that at no time prior to his discharge was Hampton alerted to the possibility of losing his job if his alleged unsatisfactory performance continued. Evidence not consonant with this finding is not credited. Failure to warn under these circumstances warrants the inference-and I draw it-that an antiunion motive played a substantial part in the decision to discharge Hampton. Although Respondent contends that no intent to discharge Hampton is displayed by having his paycheck made out before discharging him, and offered evidence that this procedure had been followed in the case of two other employees, I find that this is not conclusive. Rather I find that Respondent seized upon Hampton's unsatisfacto- ry work as a pretext to discharge him for union activity, and that the cases of the other two employees exemplified by its Exhibits la and lb do not destroy or undermine the foundation for finding such pretext. d. Assuming that valid grounds existed justifying Hampton's being dismissed, it does not follow that he was lawfully discharged. This flows from the rule that merely because lawful reasons to discharge an employee have occurred they provide no defense to a charge that such termination was motivated in part by the employee's union activity when such charge is supported by the record. A corollary of the foregoing rule is that in order to find Hampton's discharge to have been discriminatorily im- pelled it is not necessary to find that his union activity be the only element responsible for his being terminated. It is enough to establish that his discharge contravened the Act to find that his union activity was a substantial or motivating ground for such discharge notwithstanding that a valid ground may have arisen for invoking disciplinary measures. N.L.R.B. v. Lexington Chair Co., 361 F.2d 283, 295 (C.A. 4, 1966); N.L.R.B. v. Symons Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d 835, 837 (C.A. 7, 1964). And I expressly find that Hampton's union activity played a substantial or motivat- ing, but not necessarily the only, part leading to his discharge. Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Murray-Ohio Manufacturing Company, 358 F.2d 948, 950. And I so find even though Hampton's work performance may actually have deterio- rated. See N.L.R.B. v. Murray-Ohio Mfg. Co., 326 F.2d 509, 516 (C.A. 6, 1964). 1 have not overlooked, but find inapplicable on the facts found herein, the principle that I may not question the severity of the penalty imposed upon Hampton for improper work performance, for an employ- er's judgment in selecting and applying disciplinary measures is an "unfettered right" which may not be reviewed, revised, or modified in this proceeding. N.L.R.B. v. United Parcel Service, 317 F.2d 912, 914 (C.A. 1, 1963); N.L.R.B. v. Ace Comb Company, 342 F.2d 841, 847 (C.A. 8, 1965). 2. As to alleged violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act In March 1973, Respondent's service manager, Junior Fields, solicited employee Hampton to report to Fields what went on at union meetings. I do not credit the denial of Fields on this issue. And I find that such request is forbidden by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. On another occasion in March, Fields promised Hampton a raise in pay. But I find that merely making such a promise, without more, does not contravene the Act. On still other occasions Fields communicated to Hampton a dislike of unions, stating that he thought a union would not work in the plant, asked Hampton to help him get rid of "these union people," and said that he, Fields, was going to get rid of "those union . . . people." This is a threat of reprisal contravening Section 8(a)(l) of the Act, and I so find. The testimony of Fields inconsistent with said finding is not credited. Following the Union's winning the election in May 1973, Fields told Hampton that the employees would not receive a wage increase for 5 years and that Fields would "drag it out as long as possible in court." I do not credit that part of the testimony of Fields gainsaying said utterance. I find that this statement of Fields has the attributes of a reprisal which runs afoul of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. At another time admittedly Fields asked employee McDonald about employee Salliti's connection with the Union and if Salliti was its ringleader. This inquiry is not coercive and, therefore, I find it does not collide with the Act. In a conversation in late May 1973, Hampton told Supervisor Foster that Hampton had voted for the Union. This caused Foster to ask why Hampton had so voted. Since Hampton brought up the subject, I find nothing coercive in Foster's joining in it and propounding such inquiry. Accordingly, I find that Foster's question is not unlawful and therefore does not violate the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE Those activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, found to constitute unfair labor practices, occurring in connection with its operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and QUEEN CITY EQUIPMENT CORP. 289 tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing. commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY As Respondent has been found to have engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it take specific action, as set forth below, designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. In view of the finding that Respondent unlawfully discharged Wilbur Hampton, it will be recommended that it be ordered to offer him immediate and full reinstatement to his former position, or, if such is not available, one which is substantially equivalent thereto, without prejudice to his seniority and other rights and privileges. It will be further recommended that Hampton be made whole for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of his discharge. In making Hampton whole Respondent shall pay to him a sum of money equal to that which he would have earned as wages from the date he was terminated to the day he is reinstated or a proper offer of reinstatement is made, as the case may be, less his net earnings during such period. Such backpay, if any, is to be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner established by F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, with interest thereon at 6 percent calculated according to the formula set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. It will also be recommended that Respondent preserve and make available to the Board or its agents , upon reasonable request, all pertinent records and data necessary to aid in analyzing and determining whatever backpay, if any, may be due. Finally, it will be recommended that Respondent post appropriate notices. The discriminatory discharge of Hampton goes "to the very heart of the Act." N.L.R.B. v. Entwistle Manufacturing Company, 120 F.2d 532, 536 (C.A. 4, 1941). Accord: N. L. R. B. v. United Mineral & Chemical Corp., 391 F.2d 829, 837-838 (C.A. 2, 1968). Consequently, the Board's Order should be sufficiently comprehensive to prevent further infraction of the Act in any manner. I shall so recommend. Cf. R & R Screen Engraving, Inc., 151 NLRB 1579, 1587. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 2. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2), and is engaged in commerce as defined in Section 2(6) and (7), of the Act. 3. By engaging in the following conduct Respondent committed unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act: (a) asking employee Hampton to report to Fields what went on at union meetings; (b) threatening to get rid of employees who are members, or in favor, of I In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. the Union; and (c) threatening to deny pay raises to employees because they voted the Union into the plant. 4. By discrimination in regard to the tenure of employment of Wilbur Hampton, thereby discouraging membership in the Union, a labor organization, Respon- dent has engaged in an unfair labor practice condemned by Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 5. The foregoing unfair labor practices affect com- merce within the purview of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 6. Respondent has not committed any other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommend- ed: ORDER' Respondent, Queen City Equipment Corporation, Char- lotte, North Carolina, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discouraging membership in the Union or any other labor organization by discharging employees or otherwise discriminating in any manner in respect to their tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment. (b) Asking employees to report to it what went on at union meetings. (c) Threatening to discharge employees who are mem- bers, or in favor, of the Union. (d) Threatening to deny pay raises to employees because they voted the Union into its plant. (e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer Wilbur Eugene Hampton immediate and full reinstatement to his former job, or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent one, without prejudice to the seniority and other rights and privileges previously enjoyed by him, and make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of Respondent's discrimi- nation against him, with interest at the rate of 6 percent as provided in the section above entitled "The Remedy." (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records and reports, and all other records necessary to ascertain the amount, if any, of backpay due under the terms of this recommended Order (c) Post at its premises at Charlotte, North Carolina, copies of the notice marked "Appendix." 2 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 11, after being signed by a duly authorized representative of Respondent, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive 2 In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 290 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 11, in where notices to employees are customarily displayed. writing, within 20 days from receipt of this Decision, what Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure steps have been taken to comply herewith. that said notices are not altered , defaced, or covered by IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed any other material . insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not found herein.