Teamsters Local No. 379

TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 379 Teamsters Local No. 379, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America and Gerrity Company, Inc. Cases 1-CP-223, 1-CB-2366, and 1-CC-1203 June 17, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS On March 27, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Thomas A. Ricci issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Charging Party filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Respondent filed cross-exceptions and a brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three -member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions, cross- exceptions, and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings , findings, and conclusions ' of the Adminis- trative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that Respondent, Teamsters Local No. 379, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf- feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Boston, Massachusetts, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. 1 In the absence of exceptions , we adopt, pro forma, the Administrative Law Judge's conclusions that Respondent violated Sec. 8(b)(7XC) and Sec. 8(bx1)(A) of the Act. DECISION THOMAS A. RICCI, Administrative Law Judge: A hearing in this proceeding was held on February 6 and 7, 1974, at Boston, Massachusetts, on complaint of the General Counsel against Teamsters Local No. 379, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, herein called the Respondent, or Local 379. On separate charges all filed on July 19, 1973, by Gerrity Company, Inc., the complaint issued on August 17, 1973. The complaint alleges violations by the Respon- dent of three separate and distinct sections of the statute: Section 8(b)(7)(C), 8(b)(1)(A), and 8(bx4)(i) and (ii)(B). Upon the entire record and from my observation of the witnesses I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE CHARGING COMPANY 629 The Gerrity Company is engaged in the sale and distribution of lumber, building materials, and related products. It operates in a number of States , and its sole location involved in this proceeding is called the Readville yard, in Boston, Massachusetts. In the ordinary course of its business this Company causes large quantities of materials to be purchased and transported in interstate commerce through the various States to its various locations, and substantial quantities of building materials to be transported from its locations into other states. Annually it sells products valued in excess of $500,000 from Massachusetts to other States, and imports into Massachusetts materials valued in excess of $50,000. I find that the Gerrity Company is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. II. THE RESPONDENT LABOR ORGANIZATION I find that Teamsters Local No. 379, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES This proceeding arose from a strike called on July 16, 1973, by Teamsters Local 379 against the Gerrity Compa- ny's Readville, Massachusetts, operation. The strike, always accompanied by picketing, lasted through August 22, when the Union both discontinued picketing and offered to return the employees to their old jobs with the Company. There are three separate charges which trig- gered the complaint, each of them involves a distinctive element of the statute, and each in turn is pressed to the full in the General Counsel's complaint and case in chief. (1) The entire strike, and the picketing, is said to have been illegal because its objective was to wrest from Gerrity exclusive recognition as bargaining agent in favor of Local 379. (2) In the effort to persuade everybody-Gerrity employees and strangers alike-to refuse to cross its picket line, the Union and its agents are charged with having threatened violence, and to have restrained and coerced employees, in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A). (3) Local 379 is charged with having induced employees to strike-Sec- tion 8(b)(4)(i)-and threatened and coerced employers -Section 8(b)(4)(ii)-with an object of causing employers other than Gerrity to cease doing business with Gerrity-in total, Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B). The Respondent advances a number of defenses which will be explained below. A. 8(b)(7)(C) Violation Gerrity's Readville yard covers 23 acres and normally employs from 80 to 90 persons, of whom about 25 do what by some witnesses ambiguously called "yard" work, apparently shipping and receiving lumber and finished products. During the few days preceding Saturday, July 14, 15 or 20-maybe a few more, the record really does not 211 NLRB No. 92 630 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD show-signed cards in favor of Local 379, and on Monday morning, July 16, the Union called a strike. The number of Gerrity employees who struck, and picketed thereafter, is variously described as between 14 and 25 by the several witnesses, both management agents and employees. That the purpose of the picketing was to obtain recognition from the Company could not be clearer on this record. On the very first day of the strike Local 379 wrote a letter to Gerrity: "Please be advised a majority of your employees have designated Local No. 379 as their Union Representa- tive. Please notify me when it will be convenient for you to meet for the purpose of Collective Bargaining." On August 24, when Local 379 decided to stop picketing, it wrote again to the Company, saying its earlier "letter requested recognition" was now "inoperative." The company replied on July 18, refusing recognition and suggesting an election by secret ballot. No election petition with the Board was filed and the picketing continued for over a month. Vincent Miller, business representative of the Respondent, testifying for the defense, admitted it was his purpose not to file a petition and to obtain recognition via the strike route, statute or no statute. He spoke of a meeting he held with the Gerrity employees on Saturday, 2 days before the picketing: "I recall that the issue whether we should strike or go to an election was discussed, and considering what occurred with Local 317 in New York City-or Syracuse, rather, New York, by a majority overwhelming vote the men decided to go on strike rather than waste their time petitioning for an election." I find that by inducing Gerrity's employees to strike, and by picketing Gerrity's yard from July 16 to August 22, 1973, the Respondent violated Section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act. The Respondent makes a number of contentions in defense, some fairly understandable from a reading of the transcript, but some only hinted at obliquely. In fact some of the contentions were so deviously and ambiguously worded, either by counsel for the Respondent or its defense witnesses, that it is not possible to state with certainty the arguments are made at all. Restated: some of the arguments are so blurred that the Respondent remained in a position plausibly to assert later it never really did argue what it seemed to be saying. And perhaps this is because some of the defenses are so clearly without merit. Some months before these events another local of the Teamsters International, its Local 317, was certified after a Board election as bargaining agent for employees of this same company at its Syracuse, New York, plant, perhaps 400 miles from Boston. Collective-bargaining negotiations there had not been completed yet, and it seems Local 317 has been on strike at Syracuse. One contention of Miller, business representative of Local 379, is that inasmuch as Local 317 achieved nothing by establishing its majority status via the election process, what was the use of Local 379 doing the same thing, what good would an election do with an employer of this kind, and therefore the Respon- dent was free to force recognition by the strike route, and never mind how Section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act might be a deterrent against strikes by another union, or even this one, viz-a-viz some other employer. Miller came up with the same basic idea-that somehow the Gerrity Company stands outside the protective pale of the law, in more than one context. He said that on Friday, the day before it was decided to strike, some employee had reported to him that he, the unnamed employee, while soliciting Gerrity employees in the yard to sign union cards, had overheard Crowe, a company manager, say he would fire the people who signed cards. He even said Crowe had fired a man in retaliation for this very activity. There is no probative evidence at all, to say nothing of there being no Labor Board charge or complaint, that this Company violated either Section 8(a)(1) or (3) with respect to its Readville yard employees, or Section 8(a)(5) at Syracuse. Still a third escape sought by the Respondent-this apparently with respect to the entire three-pronged complaint-is that whatever happened at the picket line, no matter what sections of the Act the Union may have violated, it must all be excused because the Company hired privately employed security guards who came from other States on this particular assignment, who were armed, and at times even had dogs with them. Gerrity did hire policemen from the cities of Boston and Denham, as well as privately employed professional guards, to patrol its yard and to escort vehicles both to and from its yard during the strike. I find no merit in any of these defenses, if defenses they are said to be. Each is so patently unpersuasive that no extended discussion is warranted. "To the extent that this defense amounts to a reliance on a `clean hands' doctrine, it is rejected; the fact that an employer may be violating the Act is no justification for proscribed conduct by a union, either in retaliation or in defense." United Mine Workers of America, 160 NLRB 913. "One unfair labor practice does not excuse another." Plumbers Union of Nassau County, Local 457, 131 NLRB 1243. Company counsel also attempted to avoid the thrust of Section 8(bX7)(C) by charging the Company did not have a reasonable doubt about Local 379's majority status. "One of the elements, I take it, that may be involved in the question of representation is whether or not there was good faith, belief, in the majority or lack of majority, and various other items of that nature are pertinent." This is simply not a refusal-to-bargain case, and in any event the statutory proscription against recognitional strike and picketing stands entirely apart from a union's representa- tive strength. Such a strike is unlawful regardless of whether the union represents nobody in the bargaining unit or everybody. B. Section 8(b)(1)(A) The picketing was largely concentrated at one of the two gates of the Readville yard; the second was closed during the strike. The gate in question is an opening about 30-feet wide in the fence. The picketing group was large, concededly often as many as 20 men or more. It is also clear, and conceded, that their purpose was to prevail upon everyone not to cross the line-Gerrity's employees coming to work, Gerrity's trucks coming and going, and vehicles of any other company doing business with Gerrity as well. According to the complaint the pickets, with approval and indeed participation of Local 379 agents, physically blocked the entrances and threatened employees and others with physical violence to achieve their determi- TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 379 631 nation in preventing entrance or exit from the yard, all in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A). There came a time when the pickets in groups of four, six, and even more, moved up the road adjacent to the company property but away from the gate itself; some- times they were a quarter of a mile, some times they were 1 or 1-1/2 miles distant. Always, however, they stationed themselves on the road along which trucks coming to and going from the yard had to pass. They did this pursuant to directions by Miller, the Union's business representative. Miller was present on the picket line every day; he was assisted at all times by two picket captains, William Wagner and Jim Healy. There developed a pattern of physical obstruction of the entrance itself, the large groups of pickets deliberately walking back and forth in front of the gate so as to make it impossible for vehicles attempting to pass to do so without endangering the lives of the pickets. This happened, according to General Counsel witnesses, also up the road away from the gate, the pickets at times moving into the road-it is only 20-feet wide and permits only two vehicles, one in each direction-in order to block the road, with trucks thereby forced to ride in part off the road in their attempts to proceed. That this was done with full approval, if not explicit instructions, of the Union cannot be doubted, for its agents, Miller and Wagner, were always somewhere in the vicinity. In fact, Wagner's own description of the picketing at the entrance supports the testimony of those witnesses who said they were physically blocked at the gate. "We were walking back and forth in a circle, in an orderly line .... Directly across the road." There is also direct evidence of Miller's personal participation in physical attempts to block access to the yard. L. Paul Lumber Company deals in lumber and has long done business with Gerrity; its place of business is 75 miles away from Readville. On July 17, the second day of the picketing, one of Paul's trucks had a tire slashed as it was leaving Gerrity's, and moth flakes put into its gas tank. The next day Leon Paul, the owner of the Paul Company, himself, drove a truck to Readville; as he was leaving the yard a number of pickets gathered around and slowed his truck. One asked why was he getting "involved in this," and he answered he had nothing to do with Gerrity's problems. At this point another picket jumped on his running board and said: "Mr. Paul, you're a pretty big man. But, I want to tell you your brain can't stop a bullet." A week later Paul sent three of his trucks to Readville. As he arrived with a fourth a little later, a mile from the yard, he met the other three returning empty. One of his drivers told him they had been unable to go through the picket line and had to turn back. Paul lined up all four of the trucks and led them back towards the gate. Straddling the road, parked at right angles in front of him, he saw Miller's automobile-all the doors opened, the hood up, and a number of pickets standing around in the road. Deter- mined to pass , he drove with his right wheels off the road, endangering his and the next three trucks. Testifying in defense, Miller claimed he had trouble with the "starter," he always has trouble with the starter in this car, had to replace it five or six times. He moved his car off the road when a policeman told him to do so. But cars do not stall, or fail to start, standing at right angles across a road. I do not credit Miller at all in these circumstances. He manifested virtual contempt for this entire proceeding at the hearing. He volunteered the idea Paul should have used some other entrance to reach Gerrity's yard, and even when the policeman told him to remove his car as an obstruction to traffic, as he himself related: "I said, sir, they could go down to the other place, if they wished, but we'll try to roll it off." Miller was deliberately attempting to prevent Paul's trucks from going across his picket line. And his own plain tactic was just another message to his pickets not to hesitate in resorting to illegal means to implement an overall policy of preventing access to the Respondent's yard. I also credit the testimony of the following witnesses. (1) Crowe, the yard's operations manager, testified that he saw pickets in great numbers crowd the entrance gate so the trucks could not enter, and that pickets deliberately parked their personal cars on the adjacent two-lane road-half on and half off the road-so that vehicles could not move through. (2) Clougherty, a Gerrity employee, said that on August 16, as he walked to work, Wagner, the picket line captain, gave him a ride while he was still half a mile from the gate, and asked him to quit his job in sympathy with the strikers. Clougherty refused, and Wagner then said to him: "I'd best quit Monday, the following Monday. They were getting pretty fed up with picketing, and they were going to start busting heads." (3) Erickson, also a Gerrity employee, testified he was held up at the gate when he returned from a delivery with his truck on July 16, and that a picket there told him ". . . that he hated to see any men get hurt, but they were on strike, men had been known to get a broken arm, leg, even necks, and they would appreciate it if I did not show up for work the following day." (4) Hunt, one of the yard managers, said that on July 18 he heard Wagner say to the driver of a customer's (Barboza Company) truck: "We'll stone you in the truck. . . . You'll never get back to the Cape." (5) Robinson, the Paul Company driver, said that as he approached the Readville yard, still about 2 miles up the road, several pickets stopped him and told him not to cross the picket line because if he did "The shit's going to hit the fan." Among these pickets Robinson identified Jerry and Wagner, the picket captain. (6) David Eck, of Eck's Trucking, Inc., testified that on July 25, while he was parked 2 miles from the gate waiting for a Gerrity security guard to escort him into the yard, three pickets approached him and said: "Get out. We're going to beat your head in if you try to run us over." He ignored them and one started to climb up to his cab, but another pulled the picket off. As Eck proceeded closer to the gate along the road, 15 or 20 pickets started to crowd the road to force him off it. He had to swing to the right and in so doing the rear of his trailer sideswiped a parked private car. As a policeman was taking his name, address, and registration, one of the pickets holding a clipboard said to him: "I see you live at 1477 Beacon Street, Brookline . . . Well, we're compiling a list here . . . we're going to come and get you at your house." In this group of pickets Eck recognized Miller. Wagner recalled inviting Cloughert to quit his job, and asking the Barboza driver to "respect" the picket line, but 632 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD denied voicing any threats to any of them. I do not credit Wagner. His demeanor at the hearing paralleled that of Miller. Both agents kept repeating it was Mr. Paul , or Eck, or employees attempting to go into the yard to work, who threatened the pickets, called them dirty names . Referring to the incident on the road when Eck was forced off the highway by crowding pickets, Wagner quoted Eck as saying "If I come through here again , I am going to run over every fucking one of youse that are there." There was no reason for Eck to speak ill to anyone there ; he had no interest in preventing anybody from doing anything. His sole concern was in going about his normal duties, whereas the Union, through Miller and Wagner, was attempting to make its picket line effective. I find that by the conduct of its pickets, authorized and approved by agents of the Respondent, in blocking the entrances to Gerrity's yard, in blocking the roads leading to the yard, and in threatening to inflict bodily injury upon employees to force them not to cross the Union's picket line, by the conduct of its picket line captain Wagner in threatening to do bodily harm to employee Clougherty, and by the conduct of its business representative Miller in obstructing the roadway leading to the yard to prevent passage by the Paul Company trucks, the Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.' The General Counsel asked for a specific finding that when Paul's truck had a tire slashed while leaving the Gerrity yard on July 17, it was the Respondent's pickets who did the damage, and that therefore this was another violation of the Act chargeable to Local 379. There were pickets clustered about the front of the truck when the tire blew; in fact one of the pickets was injured when it practically exploded. None of the witnesses actually saw who did it; the finding of culpability in the Union would have to be an inference. It would probably not be a bad inference, but giving the facts the evidence is indirect, that findings of mass picketing, physical obstruction and threats of violence have already been made, and that a further finding would not enlarge the cease -and-desist order to be issued, no useful purpose would be served by speculating, as it were, just who it was that slashed that particular tire. C. Section 8(b)(4) The facts underlying this third major component of the complaint are no less clear than those which were determinative of the first two. The object of the picketing was to obtain recognition . The methods used to make the picket line effective were coercive. Whether or not the object of the picketing was primary or secondary is also a question of fact, but it bears no relationship to the first two factual questions. And in the answer to this final query-was the picketing primary or secondary-lies resolution of the third allegation, which is that by the conduct of its agents the Union revealed its object as being to force neutral employers "to cease doing business" with Gerrity. Paul's, Triangle, and, perhaps, but not clearly, Eck's also, were neutral to whatever Local 379's quarrel with Gerrity was. A primary picket line-and this is precisely what the Respondent's picket line at Gerrity's was-has as its purpose convincing Gerrity to cease doing business with everybody, in fact, to put him out of business altogether if he does not yield. Merely because the whole of necessity includes the sum of its parts , it does not follow, on well-established law, that the Union's object can be said to have been secondary at all. There can be no question on this record but that every time the pickets, or the union agents, approached employ- ees of the neutral companies, or the stranger employer representatives themselves, all they ever asked them to do was honor the primary picket line. This fact is so clear it is really unnecessary to belabor the point here. Two miles away Paul's driver, Robinson, is told "not to cross the picket line." When Eck stopped his truck a mile or so up the road because Gerrity was sending a security guard to him, the whole arrangement was to facilitate his entry into the yard across the picket line. When the pickets out at that point then told Eck they would beat his head in, it had to be because he was headed for the picket line at the gate. Crowe, a major witness for the General Counsel, used to go from the gate to meet the incoming trucks of Gerrity's customers and heard the pickets tell the drivers, employees of the neutrals, "we don't want you to go in .. . have regard for us." Asked what did he understand the pickets to mean when they said do not come "in," Crowe said: "They meant, into the Gerrity yard." Of course the picket line wanted secondary employers to cease doing business with Gerrity; every primary picket line has that one objective among others. The best answer to the General Counsel's argument in support of this complaint appears in the General Counsel's brief to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, a defense of the Board's dismissal of a complaint very much like this one , in American Federation of Musicians of the United States and Canada v. N. L. R. B. , 186 NLRB 646: Section 8(bX4) is directed at "secondary boycots," i.e., the involvement of neutral employers in labor disputes not their own. The language of Section 8(b)(4) is broad, but its application has been limited to secondary situations in conformity with the "dual Congressional objectives of preserving the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on offending employers in primary labor disputes and shielding unoffending employers and others from pressures in controversies not their own." N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951). Traditional primary strike activity although having an impact on neutral employers and seemingly within the sweeping terms of Section 8(b)(4) has been held to be not violative of the Act. International Rice Milling Co. v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 665, 672 (1951); Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 89 U.S. App. D.C. 155, I Among the many suggestions apparently advanced by Respondent's Local 317 signs did appear before Gerrity's property, and someone did counsel at the hearing as additional defenses to all of this misconduct, is the identify a Carpenter's local agent at the picketing area on one occasion. possibility agents or pickets of Teamsters Local 317 from Syracuse, New Against the direct and cumulative evidence of activities by Local 379 and its York, may have been responsible for it all, or maybe an AFL carpenter agents, this collateral and totally unsupported broad-side defense is totally local union. Before Local 379 called the strike on July 16, pickets bearing unconvincing. TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 379 633 162, 191 F .2d 642, 649 (C.A. D.C., 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 869. In enacting the 1959 amendments to the Act, Congress significantly added the proviso "that nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing." The legislative history of this provision reveals that the recognition thus given to the lawfulness of primary activity was meant to leave undisturbed the basic distinction between lawful primary activity and unlawful secondary activity which the decisions had drawn in cases arising under the 1947 Act. See National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn v. N.L.R.B., 386 U .S. 612, 632-633 (1967). ... court and board decisions. . . have emphasiz- ed the line of demarcation between primary and secondary conduct. . . . one test of the lawfulness of a union's picketing or other strike activity in the course of its dispute with an employer is the identification of the strike activity with the actual functioning of the primary employer's business at the situs of the labor dispute. The Supreme Court . . . recently affirmed this general principle when it stated that a traditional goal of primary strike activity has been to direct appeals for support to "all those approaching the situs whose mission is selling, delivering or otherwise contributing to the operations which the strike is endeavoring to halt." United Steelworkers of America v. N.L.R.B. [Carrier Corp.], 376 U.S. 492, 499 (1964). And see, Local 761, International Union of Electrical Workers v. N. L. R. B. [General Electric Co.], 366 U .S. 667, 680-686 (1960); National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. N.L.R.B., supra, 386 U .S. at 620-630 (1967)... . The validity of the Board's conclusion is not affected by the fact that the Union's appeals did not take place at the Club itself, the situs of the dispute, but were communicated through union publications to musi- cians at other locations . The decided cases make clear that it is irrelevant where the appeal is made, the important considerations being (a) that the action induced is confined to a refusal to perform services only at the premises of the primary employer , and (b) that the appeal is aimed solely at enhancing the effectiveness of the primary strike conduct. Thus, in Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 175 v. N.L.R.B., Il I U.S. App. D.C. 65, 294 F.2d 261 (1961), this Court held that neither picketing nor non-situs appeals to neutral truck drivers asking them not to make deliveries to the strike premises were unlawful. Accord: Milwaukee Plywood Co. v. N.L.R. B., 285 F.2d 325, 326 (C.A. 7, 1960). The Board also has frequently held that appeals by letter or otherwise made away from the situs of the dispute where they call for action only at the situs, does not convert conduct which has a primary objective into a violation of Section 8(b)(4). See, Oil Workers International Union (Pure Oil), 84 NLRB 315, 319 ( 1949); Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union (Interborough News Co.), 90 NLRB 2135, 2149-2150 (1950). And in Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. N.L.R.B., supra, 89 U.S. App. D.C. at 162, 191 F.2d at 649, aff g, 87 NLRB 720 (1950), the inducement took the form of disciplinary action against union members who disobeyed the union's instructions. Accordingly, I shall recommend dismissal of the com- plaint allegation that the Respondent violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act. IV. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent and its agents have engaged in certain unfair labor practices , the statutory scheme requires that an order be entered requiring them to cease and desist from such practices . The violations of the proscriptions of the statute revealed on this total record are extensive and the Respondent must therefore be enjoined not only to cease and desist from hereafter violating the statute with respect to the Gerrity Company , but also with respect to any other employers within its jurisdiction. V. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of all four of the companies discussed above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States , and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Gerrity Company, Inc., is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Teamsters Local No. 379, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By picketing the premises of the Gerrity Company at its Readville yard, in Boston, Massachusetts, and by calling its employees on strike, on July 16, 1973, and for over a month thereafter, with an object of forcing or requiring that Company to recognize or bargain with it as representative of employees, without being currently certified as the representative of such employees and without filing a petition under Section 9(c) within a reasonable period of time, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act. 4. By blocking the entrances to Gerrity's yard, by blocking the roads leading to the yard , and by threatening to inflict bodily harm upon employees to force them to honor the Respondent's picket line, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor 634 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER2 The Respondent, Teamsters Local No. 379, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, its officers, representatives, and agents, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Picketing the premises of the Gerrity Company, or calling its employees on strike, where an object thereof is forcing or requiring said employer to recognize or bargain with it as representative of the Gerrity employees, in violation of Section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act. (b) Blocking the entrances to the Gerrity yard in the course of strike picketing, blocking the roads leading to that yard, or threatening to inflict bodily injury upon employees or other persons for the purpose of preventing them from crossing the picket line, in violation of Section 8(b)(IXA) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its offices and meeting halls copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 3 Copies of said notice, to be duly furnished by the Regional Director for Region 1, shall, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of the Respondent Union, be posted immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicu- ous places, including all places where notices to its members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Sign and mail sufficient copies of said notice to the Regional Director for Region 1, for posting by Gerrity Company, Inc., that Company being willing, at all places where notices to its employees are customarily posted. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Decision, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS HEREBY FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be, and it hereby is dismissed, to the extent it alleges violations of Section 8(bX4)(i) and (ii)(B). 7 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 3 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board " shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT picket the premises of the Gerrity Company , Inc., at Readville, Massachusetts, or call its employees out on strike , with an object of forcing or requiring that company to recognize or bargain with this union as representative for collective bargaining purposes of any of its employees. WE wiLL NOT restrain or coerce the employees of Gerrity Company, Inc., or of any other employer, in regard to their rights to engage in union activities, or to refrain from engaging in union activities , by blocking the entrances to Gerrity's place of business at Read- ville, Massachusetts, by blocking the roads leading to that location, or by threatening any employees or persons with bodily harm for the purposes of prevent- ing them from crossing any picket line. TEAMSTERS LOCAL 379, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA (Labor Organization) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 7th Floor, Bulfinch Building, 15 New Chardon Street, Boston, Massachusetts, 02114, Telephone No. 617-223-3330.