King Arthur Toyota, Inc.

KING ARTHUR TOYOTA, INC. King Arthur Toyota, Inc. and Automobile Salesmen's Union Local 1095, Retail Clerks International Asso- ciation. Case 20-CA-8501 June 28, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO On December 28, 1973, Administrative Law Judge Irving Rogosin issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief and counsel for the General Counsel filed a brief answering Respondent's excep- tions and otherwise in support of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions 2 of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela- tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge as modified below and hereby orders that Respondent, King Ar- thur Toyota, Inc., Fremont, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Administrative Law Judge's recom- mended Order as herein modified: 1. Delete paragraph 1(b) and reletter paragraphs 1(c) and (d) as 1(b) and (c). 2-Substitute the attached notice for the Adminis- trative Law Judge's notice. i The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F 2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings 2 For the reasons stated by the majority in Steel-Fab, Inc, 212 NLRB No. 25, we do not adopt the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5) of the Act, but rather enter a bargaining order as a remedy for the serious unfair labor practices committed by Respondent We shall modify the Administrative Law Judge's recommended Order and notice accordingly. Member Jenkins, for the reason stated in his dissent in Steel- Fab, would find the violation of Sec. 8(a)(5) and base the bargaining order on that section as well as Sec. 8(a)(1). APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government 159 WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Auto- mobile Salesmen's Union Local 1095, Retail Clerks International Association, or any other labor organization of our employees, by termi- nating or discharging employees or otherwise dis- criminating in regard to their hire or tenure or terms and conditions of employment because of their union affiliation or other protected concert- ed activities, except to the extent authorized by the proviso to Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as amended. WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate any of our employees with regard to their union member- ship or affiliation, threaten them with reprisals for engaging in union activities, or inform them that they will be required to furnish evidence or require them to furnish evidence that they are no longer members of the Union as a condition of employment with us. WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with, re- strain, or coerce our employees in the right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist Automobile Salesmen's Union Lo- cal 1095, Retail Clerks International Association, or any other labor organization, to bargain col- lectively through representatives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities, except to the extent that said right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor orga- nization, as provided in the proviso to Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. WE WILL offer Robert Patton, Joe Liotine, Jr., Walter Clinton, and Horace Overton immediate and full reinstatement to their former positions or, if those positions no longer exist, to substan- tially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges, and make each of them whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against him, in the manner set forth in the section of the Decision entitled "The Remedy." WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with Automobile Salesmen's Union Local 1095, Retail Clerks International Association, as the 212 NLRB No. 42 160 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD exclusive representative of all our employees in the appropriate unit described below, with re- spect to rates of pay, hours of employment, or other terms and conditions of employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody such un- derstanding in a signed agreement. The appropri- ate bargaining unit is: All automobile salesmen employed by us at our Fremont, California, location, excluding all other employees, guards, watchmen and su- pervisors as defined in the Act. All our employee are free to become and remain or refrain from becoming or remaining members of the above-named labor organization or any other labor organization. KING ARTHUR TOYOTA, INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compli- ance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 13018 Federal Building, Box 36047, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California 94102, Telephone 415-556-3197. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE IRVING RoGOSIN, Administrative Law Judge: The com- plaint, issued on September 21, 1973, alleges that Respon- dent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Re- spondent (1) on or about August 5 , 1973, by Sales Manager Edward Salais, interrogated an employee regarding the union activities of its employees , and, on or about August 8, informed an employee that no employee would ever be permitted to work for Respondent unless he could prove that he was not a member of the Union; (2) on or about August 5, 1973, discharged named employees I because of their union membership or activities ; and (3) since August 5, 1973, has refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in an appro- priate unit despite the Union's status as majority representa- i Robert Patton, Joe Liotine, Jr., Walter Clinton, and Horace Overton. tive 2 e Respondent's answer admits the procedural and jurisdic- tional allegations of the complaint but denies the remaining substantive allegations, including the appropriateness of the unit.' Pursuant to due notice, a prehearing conference was held on October 17, 1973, before Administrative Law Judge George Christensen, and a formal hearing, on October 30 and 31 and November 2, 1973, in San Francisco , California. All parties were represented by counsel, were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine wit- nesses, to introduce oral and documentary evidence rele- vant and material to the issues, to argue orally , and to file briefs and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The parties waived oral argument but, pursuant to an exten- tion of time duly granted, filed briefs on November 28, 1973. No proposed findings of fact or conclusions of law have been filed by any of the parties. Upon the entire record in the case, and based on the appearance and demeanor of the witnesses, and the briefs of the parties, which have been carefully considered, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT The complaint alleges, Respondent's answer admits, and it is hereby found that, at all times material herein, King Arthur Toyota, Inc., a California corporation with a place of business at Fremont, California, has been engaged in the retail sale of automobiles . During the year preceding the issuance of the complaint, in the conduct of its business, Respondent received gross revenues in excess of $500,000. During the same period, Respondent purchased and re- ceived goods or supplies valued in excess of $50,000 from suppliers located outside the State of California. The complaint further alleges, Respondent's answer ad- mits, and it is hereby found that, at all times material herein, Respondent has been an employer engaged in commerce and in operations affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Automobile Salesmen's Union Local 1095, Retail Clerks International Association, the Union herein, is, and at all times material herein has been, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act: 2 Designations herein are as follows. The General Counsel, unless other- wise noted or required by the context, his representative at the hearing; King Arthur Toyota, Inc, Respondent, the Company, or the Employer, Automo- bile Salesmen's Union Local 1095, Retail Clerks International Association, the Charging Party , or the Union , the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61. Stat 136, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U S.C Sec. 151, et seq, the Act, the National Labor Relations Board, the Board. The original charge was filed on August 9, 1973, and a copy thereof, sent by registered mail on August 10, was returned unclaimed It was stipulated, however, that a copy of the charge, mailed on August 24, was received by Respondent on August 27. Unless otherwise indicated, all events occurred in 1973 3 Subsequently admitted by stipulation at the hearing KING ARTHUR TOYOTA, INC. 161 III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Sequence of Events Late in July 1973, Respondent's new-and-used car sales- men decided to join the Union. Joe Liotine, Jr., one of the salesmen, communicated with the Union and arranged a meeting of the salesmen with the union representatives. On August 1 a meeting was held at, a coffee shop in Fremont attended by Union Representatives Ferd Silva and Ed Hill, and Robert Patton, Joe Liotine, Jr., Walter Clinton, Horace Overton, and John Parker.4 All the salesmen attending this meeting signed valid authorization cards designating the Union as their exclusive bargaining representative, and paid the initiation fee and first month's dues. Silva informed the salesmen that he would communicate with the Respondent to negotiate a contract. Next day, August 2, Silva prepared a letter notifying Re- spondent that the Union had been designated by the sales- men at its Toyota dealership in Fremont and requesting recognition and a meeting on August 8, 1973, at 9 a.m. for purposes of negotiating a collective-bargaining agreement. The Union offered to submit to a card check in the event Respondent entertained any doubt of the Union's majority status. A covering letter, dated the same day, referred to the enclosed demand and warned Respondent against any vio- lations of the Act. Two sets of identical letters, addressed to Mr. Art Bridges, King Arthur Toyota, Fremont, California, and Mr. Art Bridges, Art Bridges Pontiac, Hayward, Cali- fornia, were mailed on August 3, 1973, postage prepaid, one sent by certified mail, the other by regular mail. All the envelopes bore the Union's return address. The letters sent by certified mail to Respondent's place of business in Fre- mont were returned by the post office to the Union with the notation, "Unclaimed." Although there is a controversy as to the date of receipt of these letters, it is not disputed that Respondent never acknowledged or replied to any of these letters. On Sunday, August 5, about 5 p.m., Respondent termi- nated four of the five salesmen who had designated the Union as their bargaining representative on August 1. Par- ker was the only one among the group who was not termi- nated on that date. Respondent disclaims any knowledge of union activities of its salesmen prior to its decision to termi- nate them, or at any time prior to August 7, when it claims it first learned of the Union's demand for recognition. On Saturday, August 4, Bridges was not at the agency. The salesmen had been expecting the Union's letter de- manding recognition to be delivered that day. Mail deliv- ered to Respondent's agency on Saturday was ordinarily left in the finance office and was not turned over to the office manager until the following Monday. On this occasion, salesmen who went into the finance office in connection with deals they were working on observed an envelope bear- ing the Union's return address lying on top of the stack of mail. Of the salesmen, Overton, Liotine, Patton, and Clin- ton saw the envelope and mentioned it,to Parker. Parker, however, could not recall whether he actually saw the enve- lope himself. According to Overton, he noticed the letter while looking through the mail for car option slips. Sales Manager Salais, who was in and out of the finance office substituting for Richard Dobkins, the finance and insur- ance manager who was on vacation, testified that he did not recall seeing the mail that day, but, according to Overton, he remarked to Salais, "Oh, a letter from the Salesmen's Union. Art [Bridges] must be having trouble in Hayward." S Salais made no response, though, according to Patton, Sa- lais looked at the envelope. The union letter, the salesmen testified, remained with the stack of mail all that day and, according to Clinton, was there when he left that night. It was still there unopened the following morning, Sunday, August 5, he testified, when he want into the finance office. About 11 or 11:30 that morning, Bridges arrived at the agency. Shortly afterward, Bridges went into the finance office. Clinton testified that he had been in the finance office some 15 minutes earlier and that no one else had entered the office in the interim. The salesmen were point- edly watching to see whether Bridges would open the letter. According to them, Bridges opened the letter which had been lying on top of the mail and after apparently reading it left for his private office with the letter in his hand. Clin- ton went into the finance office after Bridges left and dis- covered that the union letter was gone. Liotine then remarked, "He's got the letter." 6 Bridges denied seeing the union letter on Sunday, August 5, insisting that he had no knowledge of union activities or the demand for recognition until Tuesday morning, August 7, when he saw the letter, which had been sent to him by certified mail, at the Pontiac agency in Hayward. Bridges testified that he arrived at the Toyota agency about noon on Sunday and went directly to his private office. About 45 minutes later, he went into the finance office and while there, according to him, took two letters out of his pocket and telephoned his wife to discuss plans for a scheduled trip of Toyota dealers and their wives to Hawaii. Bridges con- ceded that he had received an announcement of the trip the previous Thursday or Friday. On the Sunday in question, he had driven from his home in San Leandro directly to the agency in Fremont. It is, therefore, surprising that he would have waited until he reached his office after just having, left his home to discuss the trip with his wife on the telephone, especially as he had known of the trip for several days. To support Bridges' denial that he saw the union letter on Sunday or at any time before Tuesday, morning, August 7, Respondent offered the testimony of Dennis A. Hall, its service manager. Hall testified that mail received on Satur- day is customarily delivered to the showroom and left on the 5 Bridges also owned and operated an automobile agency known as Art Budges Pontiac in Hayward, which, as a member of an association, had a collective-bargaining agreement with the Union. Overton's reference to the automobile agency in Hayward instead of the one in Fremont could have been prompted by his reluctance to disclose the unionization of the salesmen 4 Stu Holt, another salesman, was on vacation at the time, and John Camy before Respondent was apprised of the, Union's demand for recognition. terminated his employment with Respondent between July 15 and August 1 6 Respondent argues that the General Counsel's failure to call Liotine as Camy was later hired by Art Bridges Winnebago, a corporation of which a witness compels the inference that his testimony would not have supported Arthur Bridges, Respondent's president, and his wife are also principal stock- the General Counsel's case Such an inference is unwarranted in view of the holders mutually, corroborative testimony of the General Counsel's other witnesses. 162 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD desk in the finance and insurance office. The mail is later transferred to the main office, usually by him, Salais, or Dobkins, where it remains until opened by the office man- ager on Monday. On the Saturday in question, about noon, Hall testified, he took the mail from the finance office to his own office in the service department. There he removed some large gray envelopes, containing service bulletins and similar material from the Toyota distributor, and left the rest of the mail on his desk. He did not follow the usual procedure of taking the mail to the main office because, he testified, the rear door to that office was locked from the inside. Although he admittedly had a key to the front door, he testified that he would have been obliged to cross a driveway to reach the building in which the office was locat- ed. Instead, he left the mail on the desk in his office. Because of his preoccupation with his paperwork, the mail remained on his desk the rest of the day. Hall did not work on Sunday. When he went to work on Monday, according to him, the Saturday mail was still on his desk. Again, he became involved in his duties and forgot to deliver the mail to the main office until Tuesday morning, when he finally turned it over to Katherine Beatty, the office manager. According to Hall, the incident was impressed on his mind because Beatty had been upset with him for hold- ing up Saturday's mail, which had contained the firm's bank statements. Hall's testimony regarding his handling of the Saturday mail would, of course, if true, preclude any finding that Bridges could have seen the union letter on Sunday. It is significant, however, that neither Hall nor the office manag- er was able to recall that the union letter was in the Saturday mail when it was delivered to Beatty on Tuesday. Consider- ing the importance of establishing that Bridges did not actu- ally see the letter on Sunday, the lack of recollection on so crucial an issue impels the conclusion that the letter was not there. This lends credence to the circumstantial evidence that Bridges did, in fact, see the union letter on Sunday, and did not replace it with the rest of the mail after reading it. Hall's explanation for his failure to deliver the mail- to the office manager until;Tuesday morning was so strained and unconvincing as to cast grave doubt upon the rest of his testimony. Regardless of what the usual practice may have been relative to the disposition of Saturday mail, Hall's testimony as to this occasion appears to have been elabo- rately contrived to lend credence to Bridges' testimony that he was unaware of the Union's demand for recognition until August 7. While there is no direct evidence that the letter which Bridges was seen reading was, in fact, the Union's demand letter, the circumstantial evidence warrants such a finding. In the first place, all but one of the salesmen working that Saturday testified that they actually saw the envelope ad- dressed to Respondent, and bearing the Union's return ad- dress, lying on top of the mail in the finance office. The letter, mailed on August 3, would normally have been deliv- ered in the usual course of the mails, by Saturday. The letter remained undisturbed the rest of that day and the following day until Budges went into the finance office. Moreover, Overton's remark to Salais, calling attention to the letter on Saturday, was not specifically denied. On Sunday, when Clinton went into the finance office, shortly before Bridges went there, the letter was still lying on the stack of mail. When Clinton went back, after Bodges left the finance of- fice, the union letter was no longer there. It was then that Liotine announced spontaneously, "He's got the letter," an obvious reference to Bridges. Based on the foregoing, and a resolution of the conflicting testimony, especially when considered in light of the events presently described, it is found that Bridges did, in fact, read the union letter de- manding recognition while he was in the finance office on Sunday. Salais arrived at the agency on Sunday at 12:30 or 1 p.m. Almost immediately, he and Bridges left together and went to the Cloverdale Creamery across from the automobile agency. The two men did not return until about 4 p.m. The record is silent as to the reason for their extended absence from the agency but, in view of subsequent developments that afternoon, presently discussed, it is reasonable to infer that the subject of the Union was discussed between the men during this interval. B. Interference, Restraint, and Coercion When Salais returned to the agency about 4 p.m., Parker asked him to appraise a truck which was being traded in. Salais told Parker that he did not consider it necessary since the vehicle had already been appraised, but finally agreed, and he and Parker drove off in the truck. After driving a while, Salais stopped to inspect the truck. It was then, ac- cording to Parker, that Salais asked him, "Are you involved in this union thing? Level with me, John." Parker said, "Well, you know I will. Yes, I am." Salais continued, "Ev- erybody?" Parker replied, "Well, everybody except Stu Holt [who was on vacation]." Salais persisted, "Paul [Horace] Overton?" Parker said, "Yes, Paul-everybody." Salais ex- pressed his indigation by uttering a four-letter word obscen- ity, and the men drove back in silence? It is, therefore, found that, by Sales Manager Salais' inter- rogation of Parker for the purpose of ascertaining the views and sympathies of its salesmen with regard to affiliation with the Union, and by Salais' remarks on that occasion, Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7, thereby engaging in unfair labor practices within the mean- ing of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act s 7 At first, Salais testified that he had no recollection of any such conversa- tion. Later, when pressed to explain whether he meant that he had no recol- lection of the incident or whether the incident did not occur, he denied the remarks attributed to him. Salats' attitude and demeanor on the witness stand was equivocal and unconvincing. Parker was not terminated on August 5, with the other salesmen, but continued in Respondent's employ until Septem- ber 13, 1973, when he left voluntarily. No motive has been suggested for Parker to have fabricated this incident out of whole cloth In fact, Parker testified that, when he acknowledged to Salais that he was involved in the union activity, he added, "I wish to hell I hadn't been involved," which could have accounted for the fact that he was not terminated with the others. It is found that Salais interrogated Parker and made the remarks Parker attribut- ed to him as found above This incident lends further support to the conclu- sion that Bridges had read the Union's demand letter earlier that day and had discussed it with Salats while they were away from the agency Sunday afternoon No explanation was offered as to how Salais could otherwise have gained knowledge of the union activity of the salesmen. 8 Struksnes Construction Co., Inc., 165 NLRB 1062; Fontana Bros., 169 NLRB 368 KING ARTHUR TOYOTA, INC. 163 C. Discrimination in Regard to Hire and Tenure of Em- ployment; Further Interference, Restraint, and Coercion Normal closing time on Sunday was 6 p.m. About 10 minutes before then, on earlier instructions from Bridges, Salais told the salesmen not to leave because there was going to be a meeting at 6 o'clock. At the appointed time, Patton, Parker, and Liotine met with Bridges and Salais in the finance office. Due to the confined quarters, Bridges stood in the doorway, while Salais acted as spokesman for the Company. Salais announced that the reason for the meeting was that the Company had no automobiles and did not know when it would be receiving any more. He an- nounced that it would be necessary to terminate some of the salesmen. Looking at Liotine, Salais told him that he was being terminated as of that day. He then turned to Patton and told him that he, too, was being terminated. After a pause Patton asked Salais whether Clinton, who had not been working that day, was included in the terminations. Salais answered that he was. Salais told the men that, in making the terminations, the Company would be guided by seniority, and Salais said because of Parkers seniority he would not be affected. This would leave the Company with Salesmen Holt and Parker, and Richard Dobkins, the fi- nance and insurance manager, who was being assigned to "the floor" selling cars. Parker asked Bridges why no cars were available and remarked, "What the hell is wrong with the Japs-don't they want the biz now that the dollar is no good?" Bridges rejoined, "You should have asked the Em- peror of Japan. He was just here but he's gone back now." I Parker than ventured, "Is it because of this Union thing?" Bridges left somewhat abruptly, without replying, and walked some 40 feet to another office, assertedly to extin- guish his cigar. Salais told the salesmen to turn in their demonstrator cars and to return next day to have the office manager compute their earnings. That evening Overton learned of his termination from the other salesmen. When Salais telephoned Overton later that night and notified him of his termination, Overton went to the automobile agency and asked Bridges if there was any special reason for his termination. Bridges said, somewhat curtly, "No cars." Overton asked him if he was the only employee being laid off. Bridges replied in the negative and told him that there were some employees "out front" and some "out back," presumably referring to the service de- partment mechanics, who were also being terminated. Over- ton asked permission to retain his demonstrator car for another day, and Bridges agreed. It is conceded that none of the salesmen had been notified in advance of the possibility of a reduction in sales staff. The record establishes, however, that there is no policy in the automobile agency business of giving such notice. About 10:30 or 11 o'clock, next day, August 6, Patton went to Respondent's agency to inquire about his final check. According to Patton, none of the office employees, including Office Manager Beatty, was aware that the termi- nations had taken place. Patton asked Salais whether the checks had been made out, and Salais told him that he did 9 Although Parker did not specifically recall Bridges' response, other sales- men who were present attributed that remark to Bridges not know whether the office had been notified of the termi- nations. Salais then remarked, "If you have any beefs, why in the world didn't you come to me instead of going to the Union?" Patton told him that the salesmen felt they could receive no help from Salais, that they had tried to enlist his aid in the past and had decided that it would be necessary to resort to other methods. About noon Overton had a conversation with Salais in the agency. According to Overton, Salais asked him, "What are you guys up to?" Overton said, "Oh, not much." There- upon Salais remarked, "You know its hard to beat a man at his own game." Overton replied, "Well, that's not for us to decide." Salais continued, "Well, you know it's going to take a long time," presumably referring to the unionization of Respondent's salesmen. Overton rejoined, "Well, there again, it is not for us to say." That afternoon, about 3:30 p.m., Patton spoke to Salais in the finance office, in Chnton's presence. Both men told Salais that they wanted to work, that they knew that there were "plenty of cars" to sell, and that if Salais needed any- one or decided to put anybody back to work they would be available. Salais retorted, "You blew it," an obvious allusion to their decision to choose a bargaining agent. The following day, Tuesday, August 7, Patton returned to the agency to inquire about his check. Again, he spoke to Salais in the finance office. Salais mentioned facetiously that he had received a job inquiry about Patton and that Business Representative Silva wanted to pay him $1,000 a month to work for the Union. Patton laughed the matter off and, in the same vein, asked what kind of recommendation Salais had given him. Salais smiled but made no further comment. The pleasantries over, Patton asked Salais what his chances were of ever coming back to work there. Salais said, "There would be no chance of you ever coming back here unless you could come in here and prove that you had never contacted the Union or had no part of this union." io It is, therefore, found that, by Salais' interrogation of and statements to Patton on the morning of August 6 and by his statements to Overton about noon the same day, and to Patton, in Clinton's presence, later that afternoon, Respon- dent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, thereby engaging in unfair labor practices within the mean- ing of Section 8(a)(1). Respondent's contentions Respondent contends that it terminated the four sales- men solely because of economic necessity due to a shortage of new cars. Moreover, it asserts that the decision to termi- nate these employees was reached on August 3, before it could possibly have gained knowledge of the employees' 10 Asked whether he recalled any discussions concerning union activities with any of the salesmen on the day of their termination or the following day, Salais testified, "No, I don't." He did not otherwise deny any of the state- ments attributed to him by Patton or Overton In view of the uncontroverted and credible testimony of Patton and Overton, and Salais' failure to categon- cally deny the statements attributed to him, it is found that he made the statements as testified to by Patton and Overton This evidence, coupled with Parker's testimony regarding his conversation with Salais the previous Sun- day, reinforces the conclusion regarding Respondent's knowledge of the union activities of its salesmen prior to their discharge 164 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD union activities. The record establishes the following. On July 6, Toyota Motors Distributors, Inc., which served the sales agencies in the San Francisco region, in- cluding Respondent, notified its dealers by circular letter that its original projection for the allocation of 4,000 1974 cars to all its dealers for the months of July through Septem- ber (2,000 each for the months of July and August), would be reduced to 1,650 for the month of July. The notice, however, assured the dealers that, "total availability" of cars for the 3-month period would still be, "in the 4,000 range." On July 31, the distributor followed up with another let- ter, notifying the dealers that due to the rescheduling of a vessel, the distributor had ended the month of July with approximately 1,800 units, "dealer wholesaled," instead of the 1,650 previously estimated. The letter also predicted approximately 1,500 units for the month of August but cau- tioned that due to the scheduled arrival of the bulk of those units on August 16, it would not be possible to ship any of those units until the week of August 20. The letter contin- ued: At this time, we do not have a manifest for September arrival of 1973 models. However, initial shipping ad- vice indicate [sic] there will be units available to sup- port the total availability we discussed with you; and as the final numbers are available, we will advise you. In an updated report on August 31, the distributor wrote its dealers confirming that it had "wholesaled approximate- ly 1,500 units," during August, as projected. With regard to September, the distributor advised that due to uncertainty of shipping schedules, the first shipment of September units would not be shipped from the port until sometime during the week of September 17. On October 2, the distributor advised its dealers that, due to problems relating to California emission control and other, "minor items," initial shipments of 1974 units had fallen behind original estimates. The distributor estimated that it would ship some 250 1974 models and 325 1973 models during the period October 10 to 20 to be allocated among the dealers, and added, "It now appears that these problems are being resolved, and October, November and December production will approach the original production schedule." We are concerned primarily, however, with the situation which prevailed on or about August 5, when the termina- tions were made. On a pro rata basis, and without regard to the fact that, as one of the largest dealers in the region, Respondent would have been entitled to a larger allocation, Respondent's share would have amounted to at least 30 of the total of 1,800 cars available in July, and 27 of the 1,500 in August. On August 3, Christopher R. Harvey, the distributor's district manager, called at Respondent's dealership, and met with Bridges, Salais, and Hall, Respondent's service manager, to discuss customer relations. The meeting contin- ued over lunch, during which the availability of new 1974 cars was discussed. Harvey testified that ordinarily he could determine the number of cars which would become avail- able to each dealer 3 to 4 weeks in advance but that recently this period had been reduced to as few as 3 days. Harvey informed the company representatives that, according to projected delivery dates, Respondent could be assured of approximately 14 new cars in August, 9 in September, and 14 or 15 in October. Harvey stressed that these figures repre- sented estimates based on available information but added that, from previous experience, the estimates were probably on the low side and that they could expect 30 cars in No- vember. Harvey also indicated that the shortage of 1974 models should be overcome by late October or early No- vember, and a normal inventory of 60 days' supply reached in February or March. This would amount, in Respondent's case, to between 120 and 140 cars. Under normal circum- stances, according to Harvey, Respondent could expect de- livery of 60 to" 90 cars per month. As of August 1, Respondent had an inventory of 44 new cars, a 24-day supply. From January through September 1973, Respon- dent had received an average of 46 new cars per month. Despite Harvey's dire projections, Respondent actually received 42 new cars in July, 32 in August, and 31 in Sep- tember. The number received in May was 63, and 44 in June. According to Harvey's analysis of Respondent's re- cords, Respondent's new-car inventory declined from 98 or 100 in January to 27 in September. Harvey also testified that it would have been feasible for Respondent to operate its business employing only two or three salesmen from August to the time of the hearing. In Harvey's opinion, Respondent had consistently employed more salesmen than necessary except during months when its inventory consisted of 120 cars. According to Harvey, some dealers whom he serviced sold 30 to 40 cars a month, employing only two salesmen, and others, comparable to Respondent, operated with only two salesmen and a sales manager. Harvey's testimony, however, proves too much for it is unreasonable to believe that Respondent would have employed as many as seven salesmen when all it re- quired was three salesmen to handle its volume of sales. Respondent contended at the hearing that, in order to operate profitably, it should sell between 65 and 70 new and used cars per month, utilizing from five to seven salesmen. According to Bridges, when cars had been in short supply in the past, the Company had operated with a smaller sales force. Thus, according to him, prior to the maritime strike in 1970 or 1971, Respondent had employed five or six sales- men. During this strike, which resulted in a shortage of cars, Respondent reduced its sales staff to three salesmen. Two of these salesmen, however, had left voluntarily, and one was terminated. Bridges maintained that in the present instance the sales- men were terminated to reduce overhead. This was to be accomplished by eliminating the four salesmen and assign- ing Dobkin, who had been receiving a salary of $1,200 a month, to work as a salesman, on commission only." At the 11 Dobkms was on vacation from July 27 to August 13. Since Respondent did not reach its decision to curtail its sales staff until August 3 at the earliest, it is wholly improbable that Dobkin was told before he left on vacation, according to his testimony, that he would be assigned to the floor selling cars upon his return. Moreover, according to the August payroll, Dobkins was still being carried at a monthly salary of $1,200 Dobkin' overall testimony manifested a determination to substantiate Respondent's position irrespec- tive of the facts and did not inspire credence. KING ARTHUR TOYOTA, INC. 165 same time, according to Bridges, Sales Manager Salais would also be selling cars, thereby eliminating the payment of commission on his sales. It should be noted, however, that the salesmen who were terminated worked solely on commissions, receiving an advance or draw of $300 a month, which they were obliged to repay if their commis- sions did not exceed their draw. Although this would have entailed an outlay by Respondent, it would have resulted in no financial loss to it. In virtually every instance, salesmen's commissions far exceeded their draw, and in the rare in- stance where this did not occur , the salesman was charged with his overdraft. Moreover, despite Respondent's contention that its deci- sion to terminate the salesmen was based on projected esti- mates of the number of new 1974 cars which would be available in the coming months, the record discloses that it had a supply of new 1973 Toyota cars in July and August. In July, Respondent's inventory of cars amounted to 206, consisting of 79 new and 127 used cars. In August, the supply amounted to 179 cars, 76 new and 103 used. On this basis, Respondent could have used as many as 10 or 13 salesmen, since Bridges testified that a salesman could be expected to dispose of between 10 and 17 cars a month. In addition, according to Bridges, Respondent had on hand a 24-day supply of new cars as of August 5. It will be recalled that, despite District Manager Harvey's guarded estimates as to the number of new cars which would be available to Respondent, i.e., 14 in August; 9 in September; and 14 or 15 in October, the distributor, in its letters to the dealers, had projected the equivalent of at least 30 cars in July and 27 in August. As it turned out, these predictions more nearly corresponded with actual deliveries (42 in July; 32 in Au- gust; and 31 in September). Also, as projected by the distri- butor, deliveries became normalized late in October or November. It is significant that Respondent's witnesses Harvey, Hall, and Dobkins acknowledged that shortages of new models had been experienced as far back as October 1969. Figures submitted by Respondent established that in May 1972 it had received only 3 new cars; in June 1972, 30; in July 1972, 15; in September 1972, 33; and in April 1973, 6. Neverthe- less, Respondent employed between five and seven sales- men during these intervals. As for Respondent's contention that it decided to curtail the sales force on August 3, following the meeting with District Manager Harvey, the testimony was that Bridges, Salais, Hall, and Beatty held their regular monthly financial meeting directly after Harvey left. Discussion centered on possible action which might be, undertaken to reduce over- head in the event the anticipation of a shortage of cars materialized. The possibility of reductions in staff, as well as curtailment of other expenses, such as janitorial services and reductions in the sales, service , and office departments, were discussed but no decisions were made. After Hall and Beatty left the meeting , Bridges and Salais, according to their testimony, reviewed the employment re- cords of each of the salesmen and decided to terminate the salesmen on the basis of seniority , retaining Parker and Holt, and assigning Dobkins, the finance and insurance man, to the sales floor.12 The testimony that the decision to 12 Actually, the selection was not based on strict seniority and raises seri- terminate the salesmen was made on August 3 because Sun- day, August 5, was the end of the workweek, and all the salesmen would be at work that day, does not comport with the fact that Respondent operated on a biweekly payroll on the 15th and end of the month. Moreover, Overton never worked Sundays, and Clinton did not work on the af- ternoon and evening of August 5, as Salais was well aware. The preponderance of the credible evidence establishes that the decision to terminate the salesmen was not made until the afternoon of August 5, probably while Bridges and Salais were away from the agency for several hours, and after Respondent learned that the salesmen had authorized the Union to represent them. Although the subject of possi- ble reductions in staff may have been discussed while Hall and Beatty were present at the meeting on August 3, no decision had been reached as of the time they left. Both Bridges and Salais testified that neither of them mentioned the names of any salesmen while Hall and Beatty were present. Yet Hall testified that Salais discussed a reduction in force among the salesmen, naming those who would be affected and stating that the reduction would be accom- plished according to seniority leaving only Parker of the group, and that Bridges agreed with Salais' decision. Furthermore, in a pretrial affidavit furnished a Board agent on September 13, 1973, Bridges stated: That day, August 5, 1973, Salais and I decided to cut down on the number of salesmen. . . . The decision to discharge four salesmen was made on Sunday, August 5, 1973, jointly by Mr. Salais and me. . . . The decision to tell the four salesmen they were discharged was made on August 5, 1973, by Salais and me. In the margin of the affidavit, however, there appears the following interlineation: The decision to do this was made on August the 3id, 1973, at the meeting of Hall, Beatty, Salais and me, after the meeting with Chris Harvey. [Emphasis sup- plied.] The mterlineation is inconsistent with the statement in the body of the affidavit, as well as Bridges' testimony that the decision to terminate the salesmen was not made during the meeting at which Hall and Beatty were present but in the separate meeting between him and Salais after Hall and Beatty had left.13 It is evident that Bridges added the state- ment in the margin as an afterthought after realizing the implications of his statement in the body of his affidavit. In view of the intrinsic inconsistencies in his affidavit and the ous doubt that Bridges and Salais even examined the employment records. Thus, the records reveal that Overton was hired on May 1, 1972, while Parker, who was retained, was hired on June 15, 1972. Bridges' attempt tojustify this selection on the ground that Parker was a far better salesman is not borne out by their comparative sales records. Overton's average monthly commis- sions amounted to $1,665 a month as compared with Parker's $1,560. 13 The pretrial affidavit was taken by a Board agent in the presence of Respondent's labor relations consultant and Salais, after the latter had given his own affidavit. 166 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD inconsistency between his affidavit and his testimony and based on his appearance and demeanor as a witness, it is found that the decision to terminate the salesmen was not made until August 5, after Respondent learned of the union activities of its salesmen. The record as a whole, including the various statistical data furnished by Respondent, suggests that the anticipated shgrtage of cars, as it existed on August 3, the earliest date on which Respondent claims to have considered a reduction in its sales force, was not as critical as it maintained. Bridges was an experienced automobile dealer, with two agencies, the one here, and the Pontiac dealership in Hayward. He had previously owned another Pontiac agency in San Fran- cisco, as well as a used-car business in San Leandro. As early as 1956, he had owned a Rambler automobile agency. With other Toyota dealers, he had received projections of deliveries, indicating that allocations of cars for the period July through September would undoubtedly be fulfilled. As an experienced automobile dealer, it is unlikely that he would have ignored the distributor's projections of alloca- tions of cars, particularly in light of the July 31 letter, advis- ing that 1,800 units, rather than the 1,600 estimated on July 6, had become available for July and that an additional 1,500 units would be available by August 20. Be that as it may, the issue is not whether, in the exercise of sound business judgment, Respondent was justified in concluding that it would be faced with a shortage of new cars necessitating a reduction in sales force, but whether it terminated those salesmen solely for that reason rather than for reasons proscribed by the Act; namely, to discourage membership in a labor organization. The record establishes that, after learning, from the Union's demand for recognition, that the employees had designated the Union as their bargaining representative, Respondent, through Sales Manager Salais, interrogated Parker regarding his membership in the Union and ascer- tained the names of the other salesmen who had joined the Union. Within less than 2 hours, Respondent discharged the four salesmen identified by Parker, thereby effectively de- stroying the Union's majority. That Respondent was dis- criminatorily motivated in discharging these employees is further established by Salais' query of Patton, the day after the discharges, as to why the men had gone to the Union instead of coming to him if they had any "beefs." Salais' remark to Overton the same day, after asking what the men were "up to," that it was hard "to beat a man at his own game," and that it would "take a long time," an obvious reference to the salesmen's attempt to organize, furnishes further support for this conclusion. Salais' further remark to Patton, in Clinton's presence, on the afternoon of the same day, in response to Patton's statement that he would be available for future employment, "You blew it," obviously by joining the Union, reinforces the conclusion that the discharges were unlawfully motivated. Finally, Salais' state- ment to Patton next day, when Patton inquired as to his chances of returning to work for Respondent, that there was no chance unless he could prove that he had never been involved with the Union, removes any doubt of Respondent's illegal motivation. Upon the basis of the foregoing, and upon the -entire record, including the timing of the discharges, it is found that Respondent discharged the four named employees on August 5, 1973, and thereafter failed and refused to rein- state them, in whole or material part, because of their union membership and affiliation, thereby discriminating in re- gard to their hire and tenure of employment to discourage membership in a labor organization and engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.14 D. The Refusal To Bargain 1. The appropriate unit The complaint alleges, and Respondent's answer denies, that the following constitutes an appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. Respondent stipulated at the hear- ing, however, and the record establishes, that the unit de- scribed is appropriate. It is, therefore, found that the following unit is appropri- ate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of said section: All automobile salesmen employed by Respondent at its Fremont, California, location, excluding all other employees, guards, watchmen and supervisors as de- fined in the Act. 2. Majority representation; demand for recognition The evidence discloses that as of August 5, 1973, the unit employees consisted of Salesmen Robert Patton, Joe Liot- ine, Jr., Horace Overton, John Parker, Walter Clinton, and Stu Holt.ls On August 1, five employees, Patton, Liotine, Overton, Parker, and Clinton, signed valid authorization cards designating the Union as their bargaining agent and paid their initiation fees and first month's dues. It is thus clear that the Union represented a majority of Respondent's employees in an appropriate unit on August 1. On August 3, the Union made a demand for recognition by ordinary, as well as certified mail, and requested a meet- ing for the purpose of negotiating a contract. Although the letter sent by certified mail was returned unclaimed, the letter sent by ordinary mail, properly addressed, postage prepaid, is presumed to have been received, in the usual course of the mails on August 4, especially as both the sender and addressee are located in Fremont. As has been found, Bridges actually saw and read the letter about noon on Sunday, August 5, and before the salesmen were termi- nated. It is undisputed that Respondent made no response 14 In the light of the unfair labor practices in which Respondent has been found to have engaged, the fact that as a member of separate trade associa- tions Respondent was a party to a collective-bargaining agreement with the Union and the Machinists Union at the Pontiac agency at Hayward does not establish the absence of unlawful motivation here. 15 It was stipulated at the hearing that Richard Dobkins, finance and insurance manager, and assistant to Sales Manager Salais, was properly excluded from the unit. John Camy, the remaining salesman, either terminat- ed his employment or was discharged sometime between July 15 and August 1, 1973 In any event, his inclusion within the unit would not affect the Union's majority. It was further stipulated that the Union filed an RC peti- tion on August 6, served on the Employer by mail the same day. KING ARTHUR TOYOTA, INC. 167 to the Union's demand at any time thereafter. It is, therefore, found that since August 5, 1973, Respon- dent has refused, and continues to refuse, to bargain with the Union as exclusive representative of its employees in an appropriate unit. IV THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent, set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of Re- spondent, described in section I, above, have a close, inti- mate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair .labor practices within the.meaning of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act, it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action de- signed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It has been found that Respondent terminated or dis- charged Robert Patton, Joe Liotine, Jr., Walter Clinton, and Horace Overton on August 5, 1973, and thereafter failed and refused to reinstate them because they had engaged in protected union activities, to discourage membership in a labor organization, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. It will, therefore, be recommended that Respon- dent cease and desist from such unfair labor practices and offer said employees- immediate and full reinstatement to their former positions or, if those positions no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make each of said employees whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against him from the date of such discrimination to the date of Respondent's offer of reinstatement, less net earnings during such period, with backpay computed on a quarterly basis, plus interest at 6 percent per annum, as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. The record fairly establishes that Respondent has en- gaged in violations of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) for the purpose of defeating the employees' efforts to organize and to de- stroy the Union's majority status. These unfair labor prac- tices are so pervasive and extensive that their "coercive effects cannot be eliminated by the application of tradi- tional remedies, with the result that a fair and reliable elec- tion cannot be had." N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 613-614 (1969). Under these circumstances, the employees' signed union authorizations constitute a more reliable measure of the employees' desire for represen- tation. By refusing the Union's bargaining request and en- gaging in the aforesaid unfair labor practices, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5), and it is found that a bargain- ing order is necessary to protect the designation of the Union by the majority of Respondent's employees and otherwise to remedy the violations committed.16 In view of the pervasive nature of Respondent's unfair labor practices, including the discriminatory discharges of its employees, manifesting an attitude of opposition to the purposes of the Act, it will further be recommended, to protect the rights of employees generally, that Respondent be required to cease and desist from in any manner interfer- ing with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in the Act.I7 Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. King Arthur Toyota, Inc., Respondent herein, is, and at all times material herein has been, an employer engaged in commerce and in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. Automobile Salesmen's Union Local 1095, Retail Clerks International Association, the Union herein, is, and at all times material herein has been, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By terminating or discharging Robert Patton, Joe Liotine, Jr., Walter Clinton, and Horace Overton, on Au- gust 5, 1973, and thereafter failing and refusing to reinstate them because of their protected union activities, thereby discriminating in regard to their hire and tenure of employ- ment, to discourage membership in a labor organization, and interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 4. All automobile salesmen employed by Respondent at its Fremont, California, location, excluding all other em- ployees, guards, watchmen and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute an appropriate unit for the purposes of col- lective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 5. Automobile Salesmen's Union Local 1095, Retail Clerks International Association, the Union herein, was, on August 1, 1973, and at all times material thereafter has been, the exclusive representative of all the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 6. By refusing, since August 5, 1973, and at all times thereafter, to bargain collectively with Automobile Salesmen's Union Local 1095, Retail Clerks International Association, the Union herein, as the exclusive representa- tive of Respondent's employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 7. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its em- ployees, in the manner found herein, in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, Respondent has 16 T V Systems, 7nc, 206 NLRB No 135; Fotomat Corporation, 202 NLRB No. 3. 17 N.L.R B v. Express Publishing Company, 312 U.S. 426 (1941); N.L.R.B. v. Entwistle Manufacturing Company, 120 F.2d 532 (C A. 4, 1941); May Department Stores Company d/b/a Famous-Barr Company v. N.L.R B., 326 U.S. 376 (1945); Bethlehem Steel Company v. N.L.R.B, 120 F.2d 641 (C.A D.C., 1941). 168 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and con- clusions of law, and upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I make the following recom- mended: ORDER 18 King Arthur Toyota, Inc., Respondent herein, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discouraging membership in Automobile Salesmen's Union Local 1095, Retail Clerks International Association, or in any other labor organization of its employees by termi- nating or discharging or refusing to reinstate any of its employees, or in any manner discriminating in regard to the hire or tenure or terms and conditions of employment of any of its employees because of their union affiliation or activities. (b) Refusing to bargain collectively with Automobile Salesmen's Union Local 1095, Retail Clerks International Association, as the exclusive representative of all its em- ployees in the appropriate unit described above. (c) Coercively interrogating any of its employees with regard to their union membership or affiliation, threatening them with reprisals for engaging in union activities, inform- ing them that they would be required to furnish evidence, or requiring them to furnish evidence that they were no longer members of the Union as a condition of employment with Respondent. (d) In any manner interfering with, restraining, or coerc- ing its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organiza- tion, to form labor organizations, to loin or assist Automobile Salesmen's Union Local 1095, Retail Clerks International Association, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other protected concerted activi- ties for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, or to refrain from any and all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by any agreement requinng membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which, it is found, will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer Robert Patton, Joe Liotine, Jr., Walter Clinton, and Horace Overton immediate and full reinstatement to their former positions or, if those positions no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges, and make 18 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes each of them whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against him in the manner set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." (b) Upon request, bargain collectively with Automobile Salesmen's Union Local 1095, Retail Clerks International Association as the exclusive representative of all its employ- ees in the appropriate unit described above. (c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, person- nel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze and determine the amount of backpay due these employees under the terms of this recommended Order. (d) Post at its place of business in Fremont, California, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 19 Copies of this notice, on forms to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 20, shall, after being signed by Respondent's duly authorized representative, be posted im- mediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, in- cluding all places where notices to employees are custom- arily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or cov- ered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 20, in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply therewith. 191n the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board "