Swift Textiles, Inc.

36 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Swift Textiles, Inc. and Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO . Cases 10-CA-10110, 10- CA-10136-2, 10-CA-10200, 10-CA-10207, 10- CA-10293, 10-CA-10328, 10-CA-10336, and 10- CA- 10408 October 11, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND PENELLO On April 15, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Mil- ton Janus issued the attached Decision in these pro- ceedings. Thereafter, Respondent and Charging Par- ty filed exceptions and Respondent filed supporting and answering briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in these proceedings to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs, and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge with certain modifications. 1. Member Penello agrees with the Administrative Law Judge that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by Supervisor Golden's remarks to employee Sanders "that the Union couldn't do any more for him than the Company would let it." In addition to the reasons stated by the Administrative Law Judge in support of this finding, Member Penello believes it relevant that this statement occurred in the context of unlawful interrogation of Sanders and was made in immediate reply to Sanders' response to that interrogation. In Member Penello's opinion the conversation should be considered in its totality and cannot be fragment- ed, with each statement viewed as if it occurred in a vacuum.' (As indicated in his concurring and dissent- ing opinion, Member Fanning agrees with Member Penello's affirmance of the Administrative Law Judge.) 2. Member Penello also agrees with the Adminis- trative Law Judge for the reasons relied on by him, that Personnel Manager Miller's asking employee Young, after the election, whether she would be 1 Chairman Miller does not agree with this finding . In his view . Golden's remark , made during an exchange of views with Sanders as to what the Union could or could not accomplish for the employees, was a permissible expression of views, intended merely to convey that union demands are not automatically granted , but instead are subject to bargaining . The Chairman would , however, affirm the finding of the Administrative Law Judge that Golden's questioning Sanders whether he was for the Union. which precipi- tated their conversation , constituted unlawful interrogation. going to work at Fieldcrest now since she has wanted a union so badly, violated Section 8(a)(1). Miller's question must be viewed in the context of Young's later unlawful discharge.' (As indicated in his con- curring and dissenting opinion, Member Fanning agrees with Member Penello's affirmance of the Ad- ministrative Law Judge.) 3. Contrary to the Administrative Law Judge, we would not premise any 8(a)(1) finding on Supervisor Snell's remarks to employee Margeria Lane 2 weeks before the election to the effect that "if [the Union] get in here the niggers will run it," and inferring that the Union would have a black president as at Field- crest. Such remarks, which might be alleged to have improperly injected an inflammatory racial issue into an election campaign, the propriety of which would be scrutinized carefully by the Board if so alleged as an objection in a postelection representation pro- ceeding, nevertheless do not constitute a threat of employer action, and thus are insufficient to estab- lish a violation of Section 8(a)(1). Glazers Wholesale Drug Company, Inc., 209 NLRB 1152 (1974). 4. We also, in disagreement with the Administra- tive Law Judge, would not find comments by Person- nel Manager Miller to the effect that the mill "would have to close because of the Union's excessive de- mand" to be violative of Section 8(a)(1). These re- marks were made in the context of, and in response to, union promises to obtain a minimum wage of at least $3.75 per hour. According to Miller's credited testimony, he told employees, "if . . . the Union were able to force Swift to pay this type of wage, the price of its cost would have to go up to sustain that type of increase," which would "impair the plant's competitive position and cause the mill to close." These remarks, in our view, were susceptible of rec- ognition by the employees as economic arguments rather than threats of plant closure in reprisal for the employees' union activities. Consequently, we con- clude that such remarks were privileged as free speech under N. L. R. B. v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969); see also Chairman Miller's dissent in Marathon LeTourneau Company, Gulf Ma- rine Division of Marathon Manufacturing Company, 208 NLRB 213 (1974). 5. The Administrative Law Judge found that Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by its dis- charge of union activist Johnny Belinda Hall on a Monday, following a lawful suspension of that em- ployee on the previous Friday, for repeated work 2 Chairman Miller would not find this to be a violation in the absence of accompanying threatening remarks, as occurred in the cases of Lane and Hall when Miller suggested they go to work at Fieldcrest. The personnel manager's comment to Young. in the Chairman's opinion, amounted to innocuous badinage. 214 NLRB No. 10 SWIFT TEXTILES, INC. derelictions.' We disagree with the finding that Hall's discharge was unlawful. Hall testified that, when Supervisor Luther Morris suspended her, he directed her to the personnel office to find out whether she would be discharged for her work derelictions. Thereupon Hall told Personnel Manager Miller that she wanted to know immedi- ately whether she was fired or whether she should return to work the following Monday. Hall said that she hoped that she would not be discharged but thought she was being picked on "because of certain activities." Miller replied that with her "good train- ing" she could get a job with Fieldcrest. Miller added that a committee would have to study her case and she would be advised of its decision on Monday. On Monday, Hall returned and Miller informed her that after studying her case "they had to terminate her." At this time Miller also commented that if the Union won the election the mill would have to close down because it could not afford to pay the Union's wage demands and he reiterated his suggestion that Hall could go to work at Fieldcrest. The Administrative Law Judge held that Supervi- sor Morris' decision to suspend Hall, properly based on the deteriorating quality of her work, was over- ruled by Miller and converted into a discharge be- cause of her union sympathies, as evidenced by his "gratuitous" and "extraneous" comments about what would have happened to the Company had the Union won the election and telling Hall that she could go to work at Fieldcrest. We find the evidence to be to the contrary. Personnel Manager Miller testified that when su- pervisors suspend they do so pending discharge of an employee. Others become involved in the ultimate decision, including the next level of supervision, at times the superintendent and the personnel manager, and at times the industrial relations manager. The employee is informed by the personnel manager of management's decision. Thus, Terry Bailey, second- shift supervisor of warp preparation, testified that he had suspended employees Ward and Russow for ab- senteeism, and that the decision to terminate them was made by George Storey, the department manag- er, upon consultation with Personnel Manager Mill- er. Ralph Golden, department manager of the beam and packing dye house, discharged employee San- ders on April 11, but sent him to Miller for his final walking papers. The Administrative Law Judge held, and we agree for the reasons he gave, that Sanders' discharge did not violate Section 8(a)(3). And Em- ployee Garnett was sent home for lateness on Satur- day, June 9, by Supervisor LaQuintera. Garnett was There are no exceptions to the finding that Hall's suspension was, not discriminatorily motivated in violation of the Act. 37 discharged on the following Monday for successive repetitions of this dereliction. Miller notified Garnett of his discharge with Supervisor Luther Morris present.4 As to Hall, Luther Morris testified that he made the decision to suspend, but that a committee, in- cluding his supervisor and the personnel manager, made the ultimate decision to terminate. The proce- dure followed in Hall's case was not manifestly anomalous, in comparison with the discharges of Ward, Russow, Sanders, and Garnett, nor did it sug- gest, as the Administrative Law Judge has found, that the personnel manager superseded the judgment of line supervision in the ultimate decision to dis- charge. Furthermore, the decision to discharge did not overrule the suspension: it merely resolved the uncertainty of that status which had been brought about by the employee's work derelictions and not her union activities. In our judgment, in a situation where, as: here, the employee was lawfully suspended, pending consider- ation of whether the offense for which such suspen- sion was meted out. was serious enough to warrant his or her final separation, supervening evidence of a clear and convincing nature must be adduced show- ing that the employer's ultimate decision to terminate the employee's employment was discriminatorily mo- tivated rather than grounded on the legitimate rea- sons that initiated ;the original disciplinary action taken by the employer. We find that the evidence here relied on by the Administrative Law Judge is insufficient, in view of the circumstances showing that the precipitating sus- pension was warranted, to give rise to an inference strong enough to overcome the validity of the Respondent's assertion that Hall's discharge, like her suspension, was for cause. Unlike the Administrative Law Judge, we do not regard Miller's postdischarge remarks to Hall, that if the Union had won the elec- tion Respondent would have closed down because it could not afford the Union's demandstand that she could go to Fieldcrest (a union shop) for a job, as evidencing improper motivation in her discharge in view of the context in which=such comments were made. Miller testified without contradiction that Hall became emotionally upset and began crying-at the discharge interview, and that he attempted to console her by saying that she could seek work at Fieldcrest; Phenix (a sister company of Respondent), Borden Mills, and any number of other companies in the industry in the area where inspectors of her experi ence could be used. In this posture, we are unwilling to assign any ulterior or sinister motive to Miller's °There are no exceptions to the findings that Garnert's discharge was lawful. 38 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ambiguous reference to her looking for work at Fieldcrest, among other places. Likewise, we are not persuaded that Miller's state- ment concerning the likelihood of the plant closing had the Union succeeded in its organizational cam- paign is sufficient to establish that the lawful suspen- sion was converted into an illegal discharge. The Ad- ministrative Law Judge evidently found that Miller's statement had but one meaning to it in the context in which it was uttered: that the Company was taking such final action in reprisal for her known union ac- tivities . We do not find as he did that the remark of Miller must perforce be limited to that interpretation alone. We find instead that the statement is ambigu- ous and therefore susceptible of several varying inter- pretations, only one of which would lead to an illegal result. While the timing of the statement is suspicious in view of the fact that the Union had lost the elec- tion and Hall had just been told she was discharged, we are not convinced that it related directly to her union activities or mirrored the reason for her dis- charge. In our view, Miller's statement, which he had been making to various employees throughout the union campaign, can be construed as a passing remark gra- tuitously proffered in an awkward. and unpleasant moment for both Hall and him. -They recently had gone through a hotly contested organizational cam- paign in which they found each other, on. opposite sides. Hall had earlier asked Miller in the suspension interview whether that action had been related to'her prounion sympathies. The issue. of the past union, campaign was clearly, therefore, understood by them to be lying underneath the surface of their meeting, and, thus, his remark could be interpreted as evi- dencing nothing other than the mere recognition of that fact; that is, it was meant by him to represent brief acknowledgment of their differing viewpoints on the effect of unionization and his stubborn insis- tence or belief that such an occurrence could have been disastrous for the 'wellbeing of the continued existence of the, Respondent at that location and those it employed; -including, Hall, had she not, been discharged for work derelictions,,, and perhaps him- self. Other, interpretations, of Miller's remark suggest themselves: he wanted to remind her-of,.the fruitless- ness of her efforts in, behalf of,the Union; he -wanted to have-the last word on the.s.ubject; or he was at- tempting to, make conversation, during a trying mo- ment by stating the first thing that came to his mind concerning a. subject -of. continuing common interest to both of them. Accordingly, since both remarks of -Miller are am- biguous in meaning and susceptible to conflicting in- ferences under the circumstances existing at the time of the discharge interview, we will not, as the Admin- istrative Law Judge did, infer improper motivation from either one. Consequently, in the absence of any evidence showing that Hall was treated disparately in comparison to other employees who similarly had been properly suspended and then discharged, as de- scribed above, we shall dismiss the 8(a)(3) and (1) complaint allegations as to employee Hall. 6. The Administrative Law Judge found that Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (l) by Supervi- sor Luther Morris' discharge of union organizing committee member and election observer Luller Wyatt on August 15, 1973, almost 4 months after the election,' to discourage union activity in any second election. We disagree with the finding that Wyatt's discharge was unlawful. Production Manager. Boswell testified that there was considerable dissension in Wyatt's department between the pro- and antiunion factions of employ- ees, which caused an inspection backlog requiring costly - overtime to eliminate . Each faction com- plained of harassment by the other, including note- taking and excessive. proselytizing. Boswell, at a meeting of all .the employees on or about August 6, 1973, informed them that such harassment would no longer be; tolerated. Boswell-repeated this warning to Waytt, a: prounion employee, and to several' antiun- ion employees about whom complaints had been re-' ceived: In.spite of his warning to Wyatt, she contin- ued harassing other employees. - Quality Control Manager Conner; who'had ulti- mate supervision over Wyatt's department, testified that he concurred in Morris' decision to terminate Wyatt because of her foreman's (Van Landigham) and Morris' reports to him that Wyatt was continu- ing to openly take notes, was hiding in restrooms to spy on antiunion employees, and was threatening an- tiunion employees that she was. going to take over the plant after the Union won and would run them off the job, and because Conner himself observed that Wyatt was interrupting the work of other employees by talking.-to them. Luther Morris testified; without contradiction,_ that he, Conner, and' Van-. Landig- ham b had observed-Wyatt continuing her- note-tak-ing on. several occasions and that. he .and Conner jointly decided -to terminate Wyatt because these.ob- servations had shown that Wyatt was violating Boswell's instructions. There is: no evidence that other employees, either prounion -or antiunion, had The election.was conducted on'April 20, 1973. and resulted in a majority vote against the Union. Thereafter, upon objections filed by the Union, the Regional Director set aside , the election: such was the status of the case at the time the postelection events, alleged'herein to Be unfair labor practices.' occurred . Thereafter, upon Respondent's exceptions. the Board sent the matter back for hearing : that case is still pending in the Region. 6 Van Landigham was not. called as a witness. SWIFT TEXTILES, INC. violated Boswell's instructions. Wyatt's own testimo- ny confirms that she violated Bowell's warning by openly engaging in note-taking, argumentative con- versation, and similar activity of the type which was shown by uncontradicted testimony to have substan- tially interfered with production. In this connection, the record establishes that after Wyatt's removal pro- duction increased. Under the foregoing circumstances, and in the ab- sence of any evidence that Wyatt was disparately treated, we cannot say that the General Counsel has proved by a clear preponderance of the evidence that Wyatt's discharge was motivated by Respondent's union animus rather than its lawful concern about her violation of instructions designed to prevent pro- duction losses. Accordingly, we shall dismiss the 8(a)(3) and (1) allegations as to Wyatt. 7. The Administrative Law Judge found that Re- spondent refused to hire Johnny Williams during the period of March 29 to September 9 because of the known union activities of his father, employee M. L. Williams. We disagree. The complaint alleged that, Johnny Williams was refused employment in violation of Section 8(a)(3) on or about June 10, but the Administrative Law Judge, finding that the matter of his seeking employ- ment was fully litigated beginning with his applica- tion for work in March, found that the violation at- tached as of March 29 and continued until Williams failed on September 9 to accept a job offer suitable to his status as a full-time high school student. The pertinent facts are set forth below. Johnny Williams was a full-time high school stu- dent and had worked for the Company until early 1973, when he quit because his hours had been re- duced. Personnel Manager Miller testified that for employees under 18 work permits were required un- der Georgia law. He further testified without contra- diction that it was Respondent's policy not to work high school students more than 32 hours per week, and in most cases much less than that during the school year. During the summer recess, however, stu- dents could work, a full 40 hours. On March 29, Johnny Williams reapplied for work with Respondent. Miller told him he had nothing open for him then, and asked to have his father see him. A few days later M. L. Williams met with Mill- er who asked if he should hire Johnny. M. L. said yes, he would probably'stay this time. Miller asked if Johnny would be as loyal as M. L., a sarcastic refer- ence to M. L.'s known union sympathies. Miller re- cited his "economic lesson" about not being competi- tive with a union in the plant and told' M. L. to bring Johnny around in May, that he would see how M. L. acted. Johnny Williams did not apply for work again 39 until June 22. In the meantime, on or about June 10, Respondent advertised in the newspaper for experienced and in- experienced help, without specifically listing any classifications for the latter. Miller testified that Re- spondent hired some 15 students for the summer. Whether they were recruited through the June 10 ad does not appear in the record, nor can we tell exactly when they were hired. In any event, Johnny Williams testified that he applied for work on June 22 as the result of a radio ad, presumably the June 10 one. Both he and another student, Gary White, were told by Miller that there was no work for them at that time. In September after school had started, Johnny applied for work a third time and was hired week- ends as a cleaner, which was the type of work he had done when earlier employed by Respondent. On Sep- tember 9, he failed to report to work as scheduled. Based on the above fact, the Administrative Law Judge concluded that Respondent refused to consid- er Johnny Williams for employment during the peri- od in question because of his father's continued adherence to the Union. We do not find that conclu- sion supported by a preponderance of the record evi- dence. With respect to'his finding that the discrimi= nation in hire commenced with Respondent's refus- ing Williams work on March 29, there is no evidence that Respondent had any available work for him on that day or around that time. Indeed, the Adminis- trative Law Judge seems to concede that much as fact,' but nevertheless finds a violation on the ground that Respondent would consider Williams' applica- tion only in terms of how "loyal" his father would be, to', it vis-a-vis the Union. 'Apart from our dis- agreement with him that the evidence as a whole es- tablishes that to be the motive behind Respondent's rejection of Johnny Williams' first two reemploy- ment applications, we do not see'how the Adminis- trative Law Judge, through that finding; can create a job in March for the'alleged discriminatee when none existed. Obviously, Miller's implied suggestion that the "loyalty" of M. L. was the price of future employment for Johnny d'o'es not prove that Respon- dent had an opening in "March which was denied for union reasons. However impure Respondent's moti- vations may have been, its failure to hire Williams in March cannot be a discriminatory act since,Respon- dent was under no obligation to hire him if no work or job was in fact then available. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that Miller had requested to see M. L. Williams after Johnny had reapplied-for work on March 29, solely to ascertain whether, if the Com- pany later offered him employment, he could be re- lied upon to stick the job out since he had already once quit. If M.L.'s union activities were the gov- 40 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD erning factor in Miller's refusal to hire Johnny on that date, it does not make sense that Miller even would have inquired of the father about his son's seriousness in seeking work. Indeed, only when M. L. replied affirmatively, did Miller broach the subject of M. L.'s adherence to the Union. In these circumstances, particularly the fact that no job was available, we find that the Respondent did not un- lawfully refuse employment to Johnny Williams on March 29. Nor do we find that Respondent discriminatorily refused to rehire Williams on June 22 when he next applied for a job.' Apparently by that time 15 stu- dents had already been hired for the summer, and there is no evidence that work was available on June 22 when Respondent turned down Williams' applica- tion, along with that of Gary White, for that reason. No allegation is made that the refusal to employ White was discriminatorily motivated. In our view, Miller's antiunion remarks to M. L. Williams, which were made approximately 3 months before, provide insufficient basis for concluding that Williams' rejec- tion was for a reason different than that for White's nonhire. Besides, we note that Miller had suggested to M. L. Williams to have Johnny reapply for a job in May when consideration for summer employment in June most likely would have been favorable. Whether M. L. conveyed that message to Johnny or whether his son simply did not follow through after receiving it, we do not know. We do, however, know that Johnny made no application for a job in May or early June when there most likely would have been a job opening. Finally, there is the fact that Respon- dent eventually did offer Johnny Williams a job which he forfeited by his subsequent failure to ap- pear for work. There is nothing in the record that indicates that M. L. Williams' prounion feelings had changed between March and September. That being the case, we cannot perceive any reason for Respondent's change in attitude towards the accept- ability of employment for Johnny Williams as of the later month than the earlier one and those in between unless, as it asserted throughout, its failures to hire Williams in March and June were simply because it 7 As noted, the complaint alleged that the initial unlawful refusal to hire Williams took place on June 10. Since Williams did not seek work on that day, we find no basis for finding that any violation occurred as of then. We find that there was no obligation on the part of the Respondent to call him to see if he wanted a job at that time, even though it then was seeking summer help . Miller had told M. L. Williams to have his son apply for work again in May and Johnny had failed to do so. In such circumstances. Re- spondent would have been justified in thinking that Williams no longer was seeking employment with it. In any event , we find that the burden was on Johnny Williams to renew his application for employment and not on the Respondent to seek him out. That Johnny Williams similarly viewed the situation of his getting work again with Respondent is evidenced by his applications of June 22 and later in September. had no work for him when he then applied for jobs. Accordingly, we shall reverse the remainder of the 8(a)(3) findings of the Administrative Law Judge concerning Johnny Williams; therefore, we shall dis- miss the 8(a)(3) allegations of the complaint relating to him. AMENDED CONCLUSION OF LAW We adopt the Administrative Law Judge's Conclu- sions of Law as modified except the references to Johnny Belinda Hall. Luller Wyatt. and Johnny Wil- liams in paragraph 3 thereof, and to appeal to racial prejudices and to threats of plant closure , in para- graph 4. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Swift Textiles, Inc., Columbus. Georgia, its officers, agents, successors. and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discouraging membership in Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor or- ganization of its employees, by discriminatorily dis- charging employees, forcing the termination of em- ployees, or, in any other manner, discriminating against any, employee in regard to hire, tenure, or any other terms or.conditions of employment. (b) Coercively interrogating its employees con- cerning their union membership, sympathy, or activi- ties; intimating that union meetings are kept under surveillance; deliberately driving dangerously close to union representatives or employees engaged in dis- tributing literature at plant gates; forbidding the wearing of union insignia in the plant; threatening the loss of jobs and layoffs for engaging in union activities; telling union supporters that they should go to work at a unionized plant; ordering plant guards to list employees who speak to union repre- sentatives; or ordering employees to stop soliciting for the Union more than once during nonwork time. (c) In any other manner interfering with, restrain- ing, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form labor organiza- tions, to join or assist the above-named labor organi- zation, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively with representatives of their own choos- ing, or to engage in other concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or mutual and or protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, or to refrain from any or all such activities. SWIFT TEXTILES, INC. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer Bobbie Young and Margeria Lane inm- mediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent jobs, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make them whole for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of the discrimination practiced against them, as set forth in the section entitled "the Remedy" in the Administra- tive Law Judge's Decision. (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due and the rights to reinstatement under the terms of this Order. (c) Post at its plant and office in Columbus, Geor- gia, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen- dix." 8 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 10, after being duly signed by an authorized representative, of the Re- spondent, shall be posted by it immediately. upon re- ceipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecu- tive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respon- dent to insure that said notices are not altered, de- faced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10. in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply here- with. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the allegations of the complaint regarding any violations not found herein be, and they hereby are, dismissed. MEMBER FANNING, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in the majority's decision to the extent it affirms the Administrative Law Judge's Decision. I n my opinion, the Administrative Law Judge has care- fully and correctly analyzed the evidence in the re- cord and reached the correct conclusions in all re- spects. I therefore dissent from so much of the majority's decision reversing his findings of viola- tions of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. 8 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government 41 WE WILL offer Bobbie Young and Margeria Lane immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent jobs, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges. and WE WILL pay them for the earnings they lost because we wrongfully discharged them, with 6- percent interest. WE WILL No'r discourage membership in Tex- tile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by discharging employees, forcing the termination of employ- ees, or, in any other manner, discriminating against any employee in regard to hire, tenure, or any other terms or conditions of employment. WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our em- ployees concerning their union membership. sympathies, or activities. WE WILL NOT intimate that union meetings are kept under surveillance. WE WILL NOT `deliberately drive dangerously close to union representatives or employees who are engaged in distributing union literature at the plant gates. WE WILL NOT forbid the wearing of union in- signia in the plant. WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with loss of jobs or layoffs for engaging in union activi- ties. WE WILL NOT tell union supporters that they should go to work at a unionized plant. WE WILL NOT order plant guards to list em- ployees who speak to union representatives. WE WILL NOT order employees to stop solicit- ing for the Union more than once during non- work time. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to join or assist Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other- labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, to engage in other concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities. . SWIFT TEXTILES, INC. 42 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD DECISION MILTON JANUS, Administrative Law Judge: The General Counsel issued his complaint in Case 10-CA-10110 on June 11, 1973, and on June 28, 1973, issued a complaint in Cases 10-CA-10136-2, 10-CA-10200, and 10-CA-10207, and an order consolidating all four cases.' A hearing was held before me in Columbus, Georgia, on July 17 and 18, 1973, at which all parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity to be heard. At the hearing, I granted motions of the General Counsel (1) to withdraw Case 10-CA- 10136-2, which alleged that Walter Johnson had been dis- criminatorily discharged, and (2) to amend the complaint by adding other allegations of violations of Section 8(a)(1). Thereafter, on September 19, 1973, the General Counsel issued his complaint in Cases 10-CA-10293, 10-CA- 10328, and l0-CA-10336, and an order consolidating these three cases. The next day, he filed with me a motion to reopen the record and the hearing in the previous set of cases, and to consolidate them with this set, alleging that further violations had been committed by Respondent af- ter the hearing had been scheduled in the first set of cases, and that Respondent's conduct was directly related to is- sues already litigated in the July hearing. On October 9, 1973, I granted the General Counsel' s motion , over the objections of the Respondent which it had timely filed with me. A few days before the scheduled date for the reopened hearing, the General Counsel issued a third complaint, that in Case 10-CA-10408.3 At the start of the reopened hear- ing, which was held on October 24 and 25, 1973, Respon- dent did not object to consolidating that case with the mat- ters covered by the complaint issued on September 19, and waived its right to receive 10 days' notice for the filing of its answer. The various complaints allege that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by specified acts of interrogation, interfer- ence, threats, etc., and that it violated Section 8(a)(3) by discharging eight employees and by refusing to hire two applicants. Respondent's answers have denied all substan- tive allegations of the complaints. After each of the two hearings, the General Counsel filed a brief with me which I have duly considered. Upon the entire record in these cases, including my ob- servation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Respondent.is a Georgia corporation with its principal office and place of business at Columbus, Georgia, where 1 The charges on which these cases are based were filed on the following dates in 1973 : 10-CA-10110, April 23; 10-CA-10136-2, May 21 and June I; 10-CA-10200, May 24; and lO-CA-10207, June 4. 2 The charges on which these cases are based were filed on the following dates in 1973 : l0-CA-10293, July 23 and September 7; 10-CA-10328, Au- gust 15 : and lO-CA-10336, August 20. 3 The charge in 10-CA-10408 was filed October I, 1973. it is engaged in the manufacture and sale of textile prod- ucts. During the past calendar year, it sold and shipped finished products valued in excess of $50,000 directly to customers located outside the State of Georgia. Respon- dent admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Il. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Charging Union, Textile Workers Union of Ameri- ca, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 111. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background The Company manufactures denim through a complete range of operations from carding, spinning, and dyeing natural and synthetic fibers to weaving and finishing the cloth. It employs almost 1,300 workers, of whom 60 to 70 are engaged in direct supervision of production operations. The Union began its campaign to organize the Company's employees in October 1972. It filed a petition for a representation election in February 1973 and, on April 20, the Board conducted the election. It was set aside by the Regional Director on objections filed by the Union. Thereafter, the Company filed exceptions to the report on objections with the Board. As of the date of the second hearing, there had been no disposition of the exceptions to the report. Most of the alleged violations of Section 8(a)(1) are con- centrated in the 4- or 5-week period preceding or immedi- ately following the April 20 election, but some relate to incidents in January, while one is as late as October 23, the day before the reopened hearing. Of the 10 employees who were either discharged or rejected for. employment, alleged- ly for engaging in activities on behalf of, or for sympathiz- ing with the Union, the earliest discharge took place on April 11, and the latest on September 12. B. The 8(a)(1) Allegations The complaints, as amended at the hearings, name a number of supervisors as having committed various types of 8(a)(l) violations during the Union's organizing cam- paign before the election on April 20, as well as thereafter. The General Counsel's first brief does not discuss the testi- mony relating to some of these alleged violations, but I presume that he does not intend to waive whatever viola- tions may have been proved at the hearings, and I shall therefore mention, even if sometimes very briefly, all the allegations listed in the complaints for which there is some support in the record. SWIFT TEXTILES, INC. 1. Ralph Golden is manager of the beam and packing dye house, having supervision over all three shifts in that department. Tommy Lee Sanders, one of the alleged discriminatees, was a dye machine operator until his discharge on April 11. In mid-January, according to Sanders, Golden told him that Sizemore, a leadman in the department (not alleged to be a supervisor), had said that Sanders was for the Union. Sanders admitted that he was, and Golden then asked him what he thought the Union could do for him. Sanders re- plied that he had never been in a Union, and would like to get in one, to which Golden answered that the Union couldn't do any more for him than the Company would let it. . Golden denied having any conversation with Sanders about the Union in January or thereafter, other than at a group meeting in April, to be discussed later. He admitted that Sizemore had reported to him that Sanders had said he was for the Union and wasn't scared to tell anyone about it, and that Golden had then told Sizemore that there was nothing they could do about it, and he was going to ignore it. If Golden's story is to be believed, his only reaction to Sizemore's report about Sanders' interest in the Union was to tell Sizemore that there was nothing to be done about it. But in view of the interest of other company supervisors in what other employees felt about the Union, I find it diffi- cult to believe that Golden was as unconcerned about San- ders as his testimony would indicate. I credit Sanders, and find that Golden asked him in mid-January what he thought the Union could do for him, and then told him in effect that he need not expect that the Union would im- prove his situation. I find that the inquiry and subsequent downgrading of the Union's efforts. would tend to restrain Sanders in his adherence toward the Union, and are in violation of Section 8(a)(1). Sylvester Lynn was also a dye man in Golden's depart- ment. He testified that early in April, Golden said he had heard that Lynn had been going to the union meetings on Sundays, and asked him what he had learned. Lynn replied that it was the same old thing. Lynn said he made no secret of his union activities, and that conversation about it had been carried out openly in the dye house for several months. • I . Golden was not asked about this conversation; and has therefore not denied that it occurred as Lynn testified. A supervisor's statement to an employee that it is known he has been attending union meetings is an interference with the employee's right to keep such information to himself if he so chooses, and it is also an intimation that the Compa- ny is able to keep such meetings under surveillance. I find that Golden's remarks to Lynn were a violation of Section 8(a)(1). Paragraph 15 of the first consolidated complaint alleges that Golden assaulted Union Representative Hamilton with an automobile the day before the election in the pres- ence of employees near the plant gate. The testimony of Hamilton, who was in charge of the Union's campaign, and that of employees Flakes and Cook, is that they were passing out leaflets about 6 a.m. that morning, and that Hamilton had stepped off the curb to hand some out when 43 Golden drove into the area, bearing down on Hamilton. The others shouted to warn him to get out of the way, and he had to jump quickly back onto the curb, first bracing his hand on the car's front fender, to avoid being hit. Golden said he had come to a complete stop at the inter- section where the distribution was taking place to let the solicitors get back to the curb, and that Hamilton took his time, shuffling along. Golden said he released his clutch to go ahead, and that as he went by, Hamilton placed his hand on the fender and stepped out of the way. I find that Hamilton did not see Golden's car as it approached him, but that Golden saw him as he turned into the area and deliberately drove by to "brush him off." I come to this conclusion because Golden could have avoided even get- ting close to Hamilton, simply by driving around him. By driving up on him so closely, Golden must have intended to give Hamilton a scare because of his open distribution of the leaflets. I find this to be a violation. 2. Margeria Lane, an inspector, testified at the first hearing, before her own termination, that Luther Morris, manager of the inspecting and packing department, told her to remove a union pamphlet which she was carrying in her smock pocket. This was 3 or 4 weeks before the elec- tion. Luther Morris did not deny that he had done so, but defended his action on the ground that employees were wearing signs, and placards pinned to their clothes, both for and against the Union, and that he had asked them all to remove the signs because he considered them in bad taste. Forbidding the wearing of buttons, insignia, and signs dur- ing a union campaign is clearly a violation of the Act, and I so find.4 3. Millard Snell was the manager of the quality stan- dards department. Margeria Lane testified that Snell spoke to her about the Union 2 weeks before the election. He asked her why she wanted it, and she told him it was because people were being treated unfairly and that everyone, black or white, should be treated equally. Snell said that if the Union got in, the "niggers" would run it. He left but returned in a few minutes to say that he wanted to apologize for something, and asked her what it was he had said. She told him he knew what he had said. Again he left and again returned, and repeated his remark about what would happen if the Union got in, this time in the presence of Lullar Wyatt. Wyatt corroborated Lane's testimony as to what Snell had said. Lane and Wyatt are both white. Snell's testimony about this incident is a denial that he had made the remark attributed to him by Lane. He said that he and Lane had been talking about the Union's chances in the election, and that she had said she thought it would be won because all the black employees as well as some of the whites would vote for it. He asked her if she was saying that the blacks were for it, and she responded by asking him what was wrong'with that. He said nothing was wrong with it if she wanted the same setup they had at Fieldcrest.5 Lane asked if he was referring to the fact that the Union at Fieldcrest had a black president. Snell said he didn't know that, and had meant that the Fieldcrest em- Franklin Stores Corporation, et al.. 199 NLRB 53 (1972). 5 Fieldcrest is a textile mill in the same town. 44 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ployees hadn't received any benefits despite their union representation. Snell's own testimony indicates that black support for the Union was a topic of their conversation, and in that context, he had referred to the union at Fieldcrest. I find that Snell was alluding to the fact that the union at Field- crest had a black president and to the possibility, as he put it, that the blacks would also run the Union if it got in at Swift. Snell's appeal to racial prejudice, although totally rejected by Lane, was an implied threat that the whites would somehow be subjected by blacks if the Union won. I find his remarks to be a violation of Section 8(a)(l ).6 The Union had tape recorded messages by certain plant employees which it played back when an advertised tele- phone number was called. Lullar Wyatt had recorded one of these short messages. About 2 weeks before the election, Wyatt was talking to a number of women during a break period when Snell came up and asked if he could join their conversation. Wyatt invited him in and asked him what he would like to know. According to Wyatt, he then told her that he had listened to her taped message and that she had ruined herself, jeopardizing her job by her union activities. Johnnie Hall corroborated Wyatt's testimony as to what Snell had said. Snell admitted that he had listened to Wyatt's recorded message and had mentioned it to her, saying that she sounded scared, as if she were being made to do it, and that he thought she was jeopardizing her cause. The "cause" he said he was referring to was an inference of his, based on another employee's remark to him that Wyatt had said she had a score to settle with the Company, and that she intended to see it through. Snell's explanation is a lame one. It does not explain what connection Wyatt's re- corded message had to do with her "cause" as Snell said he understood it. It is more likely that Snell's reference to "jeopardy" refers to Wyatt's job because of her public es- pousal of the Union's cause. I credit the testimony of Wyatt and Hall as to what Snell said, and find it to be a violation of Section 8(a)(I), as a threat of job loss because of her union activities. Melvin Holcombe testified that Snell approached him about March 6, and said he sure felt sorry for a lot of people if the Union did not succeed in getting in. About 2 weeks later, Snell came up to him and said that the Compa- ny would run the plant the way it wanted to, and there weren't enough unionized mills to be strong-enough to do any good. Snell then said that if he were Luther Morris he would fire all the people out there for talking union. Snell then reached into Holcombe's pocket, pulled out a union leaflet, and said that proved that Holcombe was for the Union. Holcombe retrieved the leaflet and put it back into his pocket. Snell testified that he had not said to Holcombe that he felt sorry for people if the Union didn't get in. He said he had told Holcombe once, when Holcombe picked up a union leaflet, that he hoped the Union did not get in be- cause a lot of people depended on their jobs at the plant, and if the Union got in everybody would have to pay dues 6 General Steel Products. Inc., and Crown Flex of North Carolina. Inc. 157 NLRB 636, 639-640 ( 1966). even if they didn't want to, and if the Union called a strike, the employees would not get paid and would be hurting. It was in that context, Snell said, that he told Holcombe that he was concerned about it and felt sorry for those people. Holcombe than told Snell that he hadn't said he was for the Union, at which Snell pointed out to him that if it was his literature there, it looked to him as if Holcombe was for the Union. He denied saying to Holcombe that if he were Luther Morris, he would fire all the people in his depart- ment who had been talking for the Union. Snell's explanation for his statement to Holcombe that he was concerned about plant employees who might have to go on strike, and that he was sorry for them, strikes me as implausible. He had told Holcombe that he knew he was a union sympathizer because of the leaflet he was carrying, and it seems to me much more probable that he told Hol- combe that he knew he was a union sympathizer because of the leaflet he was carrying, and it seems to me much more probable that he told Holcombe, as the latter testi- fied, that he felt sorry for all union adherents if the Union failed to get into the plant. The clear implication of that remark is that they might then suffer unpleasant conse- quences. In view of Snell's unconvincing explanation of this remark, and his remarks to Wyatt, I also find that Snell told Holcombe that if he were Luther Morris he would fire the people in his department who had been talking for the Union. Both remarks are threats that union supporters would be discriminated against, and are violations of Section 8(a)(I). 4. Ronald Morris, manager of the technical department, had Lullar Wyatt brought to his office on March 20, ac- cording to Wyatt, to tell her that she was harassing the people in his department. She told him she was not harass- ing them, she was talking union. Morris repeated that if she continued to harass people, she would have to suffer the consequences, and that she should not solicit employees to sign a union card more than once, not only in her depart- ment but anywhere in the plant. Wyatt had some union literature pinned to her blouse, and Morris told her to re- move it while she was in his office. Wyatt asked him'if he was sure he wanted her to remove it, and when he repeated that he was, she unpinned it and laid it on his desk. Ronald Morris' version of this incident also places it about March 20, but in Luther Morris' office. The occasion for calling Wyatt in was that on one of his tours- through the department an employee, Currie Johnson, had com- plained to him that Wyatt had tried to-engage her in con- versation about the Union before the beginning of the shift and that Johnson continued to ask her to leave, but that Wyatt persisted until it was time to start work. Morris said that he had told Wyatt he recognized her right to work for the Union during her personal time but that her rights end- ed where other people's rights began, and that she was not to harass anyone who had made it known that they wanted no part of the Union, to leave when she was told to, and that her activities were lowering the morale of the depart- ment. - Motris also testified that Wyatt had some union leaflets or placards pinned to the front and back of her blouse. He said the one on the back was quite large, and he asked her to remove it. Wyatt then removed all the material from her SWIFT TEXTILES, INC. blouse and laid it on his desk. I have already held that a supervisor's ordering an em- ployee to remove union insignia from his clothing is a vio- lation of Section 8(a)(I), and I do so here in connection with Morris asking Wyatt to remove a union placard from her blouse. I also hold that Morris' order to Wyatt to dis- continue soliciting employees on nonwork time who had already shown their unwillingness to listen to prounion talk, was illegal. Discussion and argument during an orga- nizing campaign are necessary for informing and influenc- ing fellow employees towards one's own views. To limit an employee to a single inquiry of a fellow employee on so important a matter as union representation is an unreason- able impediment to the full and frank discussion necessary in airing their differences. Undoubtedly, there may come a time when continued argument directed at an unyielding and unwilling opponent is not only futile, but begins to border on harassment engaged in as a tactic for its own sake. I do not think that time had come here. There is no contention that Wyatt engaged in invective or demeaned those she spoke to about the Union. She was persistent and perhaps annoying, but I believe it would tend to restrain employees in their Section 7 rights to solicit during non- work time if such a rule as Morris was prescribing was permitted to stand. 5. LaQuintera is a supervisor in the inspecting and pack- ing department. He was driving employee Simon Bruce from work sometime in February when he asked Bruce if he was for the Union. Bruce said he was, and LaQuintera then asked him what the Union could do for him. LaQuint- era admitted that Bruce's testimony about their conversa- tion was correct. Inquiries by a supervisor of an. employee as to whether he favors the union, and what he thinks the union can accomplish for him, have been found by the Board to be coercive interrogation. because they infringe on an employee's right to keep his opinions on such matters pri- vate.7 6. Estelle Smith testified that early in March she had complained to Boyette, a supervisor, that she was given no help on her shift, unlike what was done on other shifts. Smith said she had told Boyette that she had an idea why she wasn't given any help in her job. Parks, another super- visor, overheard this and asked her if she was for the Union. Smith said she told Parks she wouldn't say because she had no witness there, and Parks then asked her what she thought about the Union. Boyette and Parks both denied Smith's testimony that Parks had asked her about her feelings towards the Union, although they recalled that she had complained about the lack of help on her shift. On the whole, I am inclined to credit Parks and Boyette. Although there is an implication in Smith's testimony that her not getting help was tied in with the Union, the connection is tenuous. I consider it unlikely that Parks, who was not her supervisor, would be prompted to ask her if she was for the Union, based only on a statement that she had an idea why she was not get- ting any help. I shall recommend dismissal of this allega- 7 H. L. Meyer Company. Inc.. 177 NLRB 565. 566 ( 1969). and. Tyson & Van, Inc., 176 NLRB 141 (1969). 45 tion of the complaint. 7. Jearl Weeks was manager of the inspecting, packing, and burling department, during part of this period. Shortly before he left Swift's employment early in Feb- ruary, he had a conversation with Margeria Lane. She testi- fied that Weeks had stopped her angrily, and said to her that she had been telling employees that he was proud of her because she was for the Union. Lane told him that someone had got it twisted around, that she was for the Union and wasn't trying to hide it. Weeks answered that he had a good mind to fire her, but would make it hot enough for her that she would quit. Lane said she told him he would have to make it pretty hot, at which Weeks started to leave mumbling something about seeing what would happen. She told him that that sounded like him. Weeks' version of this conversation was that he had told her he did not appreciate her telling other employees that he respected her for standing up for the Union, or that he hoped the Union would get in. She denied making such statements about him, and then asked if he wanted to fire her. He said he didn't, but would if he had to. That was the extent of their conversation, and he denied that he had told her he would make it so hot for her that she would have to quit. Lane was one of a few witnesses at the hearings whose demeanor impressed me as being forthright and honest. I credit her story as against that of Weeks, and find that the latter. threatened her with discharge because of her open support of the Union. Johnnie Hall testified that Weeks asked her once what she thought about the Union, that he did not feel the Union could do the people any good, and the only ones who were for it were ignorant. Weeks was not-asked about this conversation, and it is therefore undenied. I find that Weeks'.inquiry of Hall as to what she thought about the Union is coercive interrogation, violative of Section 8(a)(1). 8. The complaint alleges that George Storey, a supervi- sor, engaged in surveillance of employees' union activities on or about April 16,.at the front gate of the plant, watch- ing employees handing out campaign material to fellow employees. Two employees, Lucille Word and Bertha Russow, pre- sented the evidence relied on by the General Counsel to support this allegation. Word testified that the distribution of union stickers, hats, buttons, etc.,. took place a few days before the election, that she had taken some of it, and that she saw Storey and his secretary standing at the gate. She said she saw Storey looking out of the gate, and that his secretary was writing •something down. They were standing there when she walked inside the gate, past the guard shack, and into the area beyond, known as the big alley: She said she observed them just long enough to walk about 30 feet into the big alley. . Russow also accepted a union hat and button at the gate the day of the distribution. She also said she saw Storey and his secretary as she passed them on her way into the plant, and saw the secretary writing something. Storey is department manager of warp preparation and also supervises the handling of material in the" big alley, from the front gate to the warehouse. He testified that his wife works at the plant on the second shift, as did Word 46 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and Russow, and that after he brought her to work. that day, his secretary met him at the front gate and asked him to approve a form providing for final pay to an employee. He read and signed the form, and then returned to his department. He said it was not unusual for him to be at the front gate at shift changing time, to make sure that the materials handling people under his supervision did not stand around the gate waiting for the whistle to blow. I find the testimony of Ward and Russow insufficient to establish that Storey was at the ; front gate to engage in surveillance. They both passed him as they walked into the plant area, and could not have observed him for more than a few seconds, nor did either of them see what his secretary was writing. I shall recommend dismissal of this allegation of the complaint. 9. Jim Davis was the superintendent of the finishing de- partment. Ernest Ogborn, an employee in the finishing department, had signed a union card and had attended union meetings. About a month before the election, Davis came up to him at his job and said, "Somebody's going to get their damn ass run off about this union doings." Ogborn, apparently meaning to deny that he was involved, asked Davis where he had heard those lies, to which Davis responded, "Well, you know." This is Ogborn's testimony. Davis' version of the same conversation and what pre- ceded it is that the third shift supervisor in inspection and burling, for which Davis was then responsible, had report- ed to him that Ogborn was coming into his department before his shift began and soliciting union cards from peo- ple who were then at work. Davis said he-.then told Ogborn that if he caught anyone soliciting in his department for the Baptist Church, the Salvation Army, or the Union, he would run their ass off. Ogborn asked him' what he was talking about, and Davis said that if he didnlt kriow,_ to forget about it. I credit Ogborn and find that Davis thereby threatened him with discharge or other disciplinary action if Ogborn presisted in his union activities. However, even under, Da- vis' version of their conversation, I would find that his ban of all solicitation in his department even during nonwork- ing time for the solicitor and the solicited is too broad, and constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(l). . Edgar James, a janitor, testified that he was looking at the bulletin board about 2 weeks before the election,. when Davis came • up and asked him what it said. James an- swered that he hadn't read it yet. Davis then noticed that James was wearing some union insignia, and asked him why. James said he told Davis the pin, was for the Union. Davis then said there was going to be a cutback. later on and he would see to it that James was on it: According to Davis, the incident at the bulletin board, which he agreed was about 2 weeks before. the -election; involved nothing more than his asking James ifihe had read the notice on the board, and that James said nothing. Da- vis testified,. however, that!about'2 weeks after the election; he had taxed James about.being missing from the depart-, ment for almost 2 hours, and that James .had been arrogant about it. Davis said he then told him that if he didn't want. to run his job, .he might be'the one that was cut back in an: impending layoff...l I credit James, and find that Davis threatened him with a possible layoff because he was wearing union insignia. This is clearly a violation of Section 8(a)(l). Henry Cook, a union adherent who later served as an observer for the Union at the election, testified that he wore a sign taped to his back to the effect that happiness meant having money after all your bills were paid. About 2 weeks before the. election, Davis told him to remove the sign, and began talking about the Union, that it was noth- ing but a bunch of communists. Cook replied that his fa- ther had been a union man on the railroad, and Davis asked him why he didn't get a job there. Cook said he told Davis that he had fought for his country in order to have the right to work anywhere he wanted to. Davis said he was right. Davis recalled the incident about the sign but placed it some months earlier. He admitted he told Cook to remove it, and that Cook had done so out of his presence. Neither Cook nor.Davis could recall whether the sign which Cook was wearing bore any union identification. Even crediting Cook. that Davis linked his order to re- move the sign with comments about the Union, I find no violation here-Davis' remark, identifying the Union with communists seems to me to be legitimate free speech, with no coercive implications. Since I cannot find that Cook's sign on the meaning of happiness was in any way identifia- ble with the Union, I do not find that Davis' ordering Cook to remove. it was a violation.. 10. A. number of witnesses testified for the General Counsel. about conversations they had with Bill Miller, the Company's personnel manager; which are alleged. to be vi- olations of Section 8(a)(1). The conversations of two of these employees, M. L. -Williams and Charles Flakes, with Miller relate to whether the Company would hire relatives of theirs,. Since the Company later refused to hire Williams' son and Flakes' brother, these actions became a•subject of inquiry at the second hearing when it was alleged that' they were due to the Company's union animus, and were in violation of Section 8(a)(3)! In order to discuss all aspects of.the Company's refusal to hire relatives of these two em- ployees at one time, I will defer until 'later a narration of Miller's talks with Williams and Flakes. A.few days before: the 'election, employee Simon Bruce was in the personnel office on business, when Miller asked him to come into his office. Bruce testified that Miller then said something about his belonging to the' Union. Bruce admitted he had signed a union card, to which Miller re- sponded that he would not have thought Bruce would do something like that, considering the length of time he had been with the Company. The first working day after tlie.election, Miller came up to Margeria Lane at her work, and asked her why 'she wasn't over at Fieldcrest since they had a-union there. She said-she knew it; but she liked it at Swift and she wanted a' union-there. Miller, asked her how she could show her face around there, while she insisted that she had done nothing wrong. He said that she, and LullarWyatt had tried to destroy the Company and kept repeating:that he couldn't understand how she could show her face around there. She answered, that she had guts and backbone, and maybe that SWIFT TEXTILES, INC. was what he couldn't understand. The preceding is Lane's version of her conversation with Miller. Johnnie Hall, one of the alleged discriminatees, was sus- pended by Luther Morris on May 18. He sent her to Miller, who asked her what the trouble was. She told him she thought she was being picked on because of certain activi- ties, and he told her she did not have to worry about a job because with her work experience she could be employed at Fieldcrest. She asked him if her suspension meant that she was being discharged, and he told her to come back the following Monday when he would tell her. When she re- turned on Monday, Miller then terminated her. He brought up the Union, saying that if it had been successful, the mill would have had to close down because it could not afford to pay what the Union was asking. Miller also spoke to Bobbie Young after the election, asking her how she liked the results of the election and whether she would be going to Fieldcrest now, since she had wanted a union so badly. Young told him she would stick around at Swift and wait for the Union to get in there. Grady Bates, a plant guard at Swift, but employed by an independent guard service, testified that he was instructed by Miller and Williams, both personnel officials of the Company, to observe and list the names of employees who talked to union representatives while they were handbilling employees at the plant gate. He was also asked to identify an employee talking to a union representative from a pho- tograph which Miller had taken. Neither Miller nor Wil- liams denied Bates' testimony. Miller denied telling anyone that the mill would close if the Union got in, but admitted that he had talked to em- ployees about the mill closing under other circumstances. He said he had done so to counter union propaganda and promises that if it got in, it would insist on a minimum wage at the plant of $3.75 per hour. Miller said he pointed out to employees that such a rate would force up the price of its cloth, impair the plant's competitive position and cause the mill to close. This was, of course, before the elec- tion when employees are most sensitive to an explicit con- nection drawn by their employer between their. votes and their jobs. To take the Union's campaign promises as to what it hoped to attain if it were certified, as if that were what the Company would have to accede to in bargaining negotiations, is to mislead the employees. To assert that the mill would have to close down because of the Union's ex- cessive demands is a threat of. reprisal for selecting the Union, rather than a legitimate expression of the Company's views on the economic effect of_possible union demands. I find it to be a violation of Section 8(a)(l).8 Miller testified that the conversation in his office with Simon Bruce was to give him an "economic lesson" about the mill being forced to close if it could not compete, due to its being forced to pay what the Union was promising it would ask for. I have already found these remarks of Miller's to be in violation of Section 8(a)(l). Bruce also said that Miller had asked him about belonging to the Union, and that he had admitted signing a union card. Although Bruce did not specifically say so, it appears that his admission about union membership was in response to 9 Marathon LeTourneau Company Gulf Marine Division of Marathon Man- ufacturing Company, 208 NLRB 213 (1974). 47 an inquiry of Miller's. I have already held that such inqui- ries by supervisors about an employee 's union membership or sympathies are unlawful interference with Section 7 rights, and I do so here too. As to the testimony of General Counsel 's witnesses that Miller had told them, after the election , to apply to Field- crest for jobs, Miller said that he had told the prounion employees, after the election, that they had injured the Company's relationship with its employees , and that he had also thanked employees who had been outspoken for the Company . I credit Lane , Hall, and Young, and find that Miller had expressed to them his feeling that they would be happier at a union plant such as Fieldcrest, in view of their prounion sympathies . Certainly, as to Lane and Young, who were still employed by the Company, such an expression would tend to intimidate them against any further display of union sympathies , since Miller had made it plain to them that he would like to see them leave the Company's employ. The threat is implicit that if they did not leave voluntarily , they might be forced to leave later. I find that to be a threat of reprisal for continued union activity on their part. Miller instructed Bates, a plant guard , to observe and list the names of employees who talked to union representa- tives at the plant gate . Although Bates was not a company employee he was subject to the Company's direction and control, and the Company's order to him to report on which employees accepted union handbills was an order to engage in surveillance . I find this to be unlawful interfer- ence with the employees' Section 7 rights.9' 11. Employee Kathryn Wright testified that her supervi- sor, Baker, came to her spinning machine about 3 weeks before the election , and asked her what she thought of the Union , and how she intended to Dote. Tyrone Garnett testified that Supervisor LaQuintera had asked him , late in March , if he was for the Union. Carey Hall testified that her supervisor, Terry Bailey, asked her, about 2 weeks before the election, what she thought about the Union , and then said it wouldn't do them any good. None of the three supervisors involved were witnesses at the second hearing, where the above testimony was ad- duced . The stories of the General Counsel's witnesses were therefore undenied. I find that the supervisors' inquiries as to what the employees thought about the Union, or if they were for it, unlawfully interfered with the employees' right not to reveal their feelings or sympathies for the Union, and were in violation of Section 8(a)(l). 12. Employee Rosie Holmes had been served with a subpena by the General Counsel to appear at the second hearing, on October 24. The day before the scheduled hear- ing, she told Luther Morris that she had been subpenaed and she was nervous about it. He asked her if she knew what she would be asked about, and she said she thought it would be about Lullar Wyatt, who had been discharged a short time before. Morris told her he had to see the subpe- na, and she said she would show it to him at the end of her shift. She did so at 3 p.m. Morris then told her that she did not have to go unless she wanted to, and that she could go v Buddy L Corporation . 196 NLRB 603. 606 ( Faust) (1972). 48 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD down and talk to his lawyer. She refused to see the lawyer. He then asked her if Lullar Wyatt had been slowing down production, and she told him that she had not. Morris t1Sen told her to tell the truth at the hearing. He was not asked to testify about this incident. Although Morris was in error in telling Holmes that she did not have to obey the subpena unless she wanted to, his statement contained no threat, open or implied, that she might be penalized if she chose to go. As a matter of fact, when she indicated that she thought she had to go, he told her to do so and tell the truth.1° I find nothing improper in his telling her that he had to see the subpena, since he would have to approve her absence from work the next day, or in asking her if she wanted to see his lawyer. The latter query I consider to be in connection with the lawyer's investigation of the case. I recommend dismissal of this allegation of the complaint. C. The 8(a)(3) Allegations Eight employees are said to have been discharged, the earliest on April 11, and the latest on September 12, be- cause of their union activities; while two persons, it is al- leged, were refused employment on or about June 10, be- cause of the union sympathies of relatives of theirs who were employed by the Company. According to Personnel Manager Miller, employee turn- over at the plant averages about 30-35 per month, of which about 5 would be discharges for cause, and the remainder quits. Some of the eight discharged employees were known ad- herents of the Union, openly soliciting and speaking for it at the plant during nonworking time, while the union activ- ities of others consisted mainly of wearing union insignia during the period just before the election when the Union encouraged such open displays inside the plant. It is diffi- cult to gauge how determined top management and lower level supervisors were about actively thwarting the Union's campaign, but there is no doubt, from the instances of 8(a)(l) violations detailed above, that the Company dis- played a generalized union animus, clearly preferring that the Union not gain bargaining status. Whether it would go so far as to seize on reasons; which it might have over- looked in the case of other employees, to discharge these eight because of their known or suspected sympathy for the Union, is the difficult question to be resolved. 1. Tommy Lee Sanders. He was one of five dye machine operators on the first shift. He had been employed since January 1969, and was discharged on April 11, 1973. He made no secret of his prounion sentiments, and had been appointed to the in-plant organizing committee. tU I find Winn-Dixie Stores. Inc., and Winn-Dixie Greenville, toe.. 128 NLRB 574, 577-579 (1960), on which the General Counsel relies, to he inapposite. In that case, the respondent undertook to tell a number of em- ployees who were under subpena that they did not have to go to the Board hearing, and that if they went, they would be "on their own." The Board found this to be a veiled threat, intended to intimidate them against attend- ing the hearing. Here, on the contrary. once Holmes made it clear that she intended to obey the subpena, Morris dropped the matter and urged her to tell the truth. On April 2, Ralph Golden, manager of a department that included the dye house, called a meeting of the first shift dye machine operators in his office. Also there was Roger Herndon, superintendent of dyeing and Golden's superior. Herndon had a copy of the Fieldcrest union con- tract, and a copy of something identified as a statement of company policy toward its employees. He asked if the dye- men had any questions about the two documents. After a period of silence, Sanders spoke up and asked why the employees at Swift didn't have a contract like at Fieldcrest. Herndon chose to answer his question as if it dealt with why the company statement of policy was not distributed to the employees, saying that it would cost the Company too much to make copies for everyone, but that it was available to any employee to read in the office. Sanders continued, asking, "Ain't we the Union?" Herndon said they didn't have a union, and Sanders responded that he knew that, but they were in the process of getting one. This seems to be all Sanders said although the meeting lasted about an hour, being taken up apparently with a speech by Herndon as to why the Company opposed the Union. This is based on Sanders' testimony, corroborated by Lynn, an- other dyeman who was at the meeting. Herndon did not testify, and Golden was not asked, about the details of this meeting. Herndon's remarks or talk are not alleged as a violation of Section 8(a)(l), and I make no findings on that point. However, I am satisfied that Sanders' questions and remarks served further to identify him in the eyes of Gold- en and Herndon as an outspoken union supporter. Golden testified that Sanders was discharged on April I I because he had operated his machine improperly on three occasions in the last month or so, causing the yarn to be dyed a wrong shade, thereby requiring that it be done over at additional expense.ll The first of these errors occurred on March 6, and resulted in an oral warning given him by' Golden, that he had operated his machine with an unseat- ed beam, causing the material to be dyed a wrong shade.12 Sanders testified that he could not recall this incident. The oral warning was theh written up by Golden, and was placed in Sander's file. This written memorandum was not shown to Sanders, nor did it call for his signature. - He was given a second warning on April 2. This was in writing, was shown to him, and called for his signature. Sanders refused to sign it. A week or so later, Sanders was given another warning in writing, which he also refused to sign. He was then discharged, within a day or so. It is the General Counsel's contention that these three warnings, between March 2 and April 10, occurred during the Union's stepped-up organizing campaign preceding the election on April 20. and that they were pretexts to justify Sanders' discharge for his union activities. As to the two warnings in April, it is the General Counsel's position that they were in effect, based on trumped-up charges and that the improper operation of Sanders' machine was the fault of others. ii Sanders had also been given a written warning for improper operation of his machine in March 1972, but Golden said that it was not a factor in deciding to discharge him the following April. 1' Beams are large spools on which the yarn is wound. Each dyeing ma- chine has from two to eight beams, which must he properly seated in the vat. An unseated beam will cause the material to he dyed improperly. SWIFT TEXTILES, INC. 49 On April 2, when the first shift dye house employees were meeting with Herndon and Golden, as previously de- scribed, all the machines were under the control of Allen Sizemore, a leadman. The meeting had lasted a little more than an hour, from 11 a.m. to shortly after noon. When Sanders returned to his job after the April 2 meeting, he said he noticed that his machine had heated up too soon, which would cause the shade to come out lighter than pre- scribed. He did not report the matter to his supervisors. The next morning, Sizemore called him into the office and gave him a warning slip for not following standard proce- dures, thus necessitating a redye. Sanders refused to sign the slip, saying that it wasn't his fault, since Sizemore had been operating his machine during the hour or so that the meeting had lasted. Sanders said he asked to see Golden, but that Golden never came. to see him that day. Sizemore did not testify. Golden's version, on -which Re- spondent relies, is that Sanders' machine had been operat- ed in accordance with standard procedures while Sizemore was in attendance, and up until about 1:15 p.m., a full hour after Sanders took over.r3 -What went wrong then, accord- ing to Golden, was that Sanders failed to check the reduc- tion of his vat dye before starting a wash operation, and- that if he had done it in.the proper order, he. would have ascertained that the reduction process had not been-com- pleted, and he would then have called it to the attention of Sizemore or Golden to take the .necessary corrective action. By going directly into the wash operation, the yarn came out off-shade and dirty, and had to be redyed. The warning record for April 2 is consistent with Golden's testimony that it was Sanders' failure to monitor the reduction pro- cess properly which caused the error. Golden; however, also admitted that Sizemore had waited 40 minutes after raising the tempterature to 160 degrees before taking •a sample check, instead of the prescribed'30 minutes, but he insisted that the error could not have been the cause for the improper shade on Sanders' machine that day. It is clear that something .went wrong in Sanders' ma- chine on April 2. It is also obvious that I d•o not have the technical knowledge to-determine what it was or who was responsible for it. The only explanation Sanders offered was that when he returned from the meeting about noon, he noticed that his machine had heated up too soon, and that this could cause .the dye to come up a lighter shade than prescribed. What I find significant in Sanders' version is that when he discovered Sizemore's possible error,-he did not call it to.any supervisor's attention for immediate cor- rective action; but instead continued to work to the end of his shift, for over 3 hours, without doing or saying any- thing. If Sanders is correct in blaming Sizemore's error for the dyeing defect, and knowing what would result from it, I find it a serious dereliction on his part that he did nothing about it. Sanders' failure to report Sizemore's error leads me to conclude that in fact it was harmless, that there was nothing wrong with the process at noon when he returned, and that it was, as Golden testified and as the. warning slip relates, his failure to follow the prescribed reduction and wash process which brought about the dyeing mistake. A week later, on April 10, beams were loaded into San- ders' machine. Sanders admitted that it was his responsibil- ity to see that they were all properly seated before begin- ning operation. He also said that if the beams are not seat- ed, the lid of the machine cannot be properly closed. The effect of Sanders' testimony was that since his machine had run that day, the beams must have been correctly seated. The next morning, before his shift began, Golden called him into his office and accused him, according to Sanders, of not doing his job without saying anything about the beams not being seated right. Golden sent him home, tell- ing him that he would learn the next day if he was to be discharged. He returned the next day to the personnel of- fice where Miller discharged him because of Golden's re- port that he had messed up a set of beams and wasn't running his machine right. Sanders denied ever seeing a warning slip signed by Golden, dated April 10, which said that he had not properly checked the beams and had also failed to sign certain beam tickets.14 Sanders' explanation was that the beams in his machine were seated on April 10, because the lid could be properly closed'.. However, his testimony on this point was chal- lenged by two other 'dye machine operators who were called -by the General Counsel. Lynn testified that the lid can be closed even if, beams are unseated,' but that when the machine is started up; the operator should be able to tell that something is wrong either because it makes a noise or because the gauges will indicate that the machine is op- erating improperly. Sometimes, he said, the gauges will not show immediately when the machine is started up that something is wrong, but if it is checked later, tlie'possibility of-an unseated' beam will be revealed: The operator is then required to cut off the machine and 'check. Taylor,'"the other dye machine operator', testified to the sane effect as Lynn. that the lid can be,closed with"an unseated beam, but that the error will show up about 30 minutes after the operation. has started through examination-of the pressure gauge, and that the error must be reported immediately I credit the testimony- of Lynn and -Taylor that a dye machine-in which there is an unseated beam can be started up-and will run, but that an operator should soon become aware through checking his gauges that something-is wrong. Since Sanders permitted his machine to run quite a time without ever learningrit was not operating properly; it follows that he failed to check his machine, and that-it was his inaction which caused the machine' to continue dyeing the wrong shade.15. . I am also satisfied from Taylor's testimony than an im- proper dyeing is usually beyond the operator's control, being caused by what chemicals are Out into the machine by other employees. Thus,' from the point of view of the Company, ti)-have an operator commit three serious errors Golden testified that he tried to,show the warning slip to Sanders. who refused to look ai it ensign it. '5 Dixon. the second shift operator of Sanders' machine. testified tht he was told by Golden. when he came on duty on April 10. that the machine 13 According to Golden's testimony. based on the 24-hour chart for San was nut working properly' Golden told him to let it cool down in order to ders' machine that day-all Sizemore did to it while the operators'were at the draw a sample., Dixon did so. but while he was taking the sample to the meeting was to turn one gauge to raise the temperature from 100 to 160 office. the machine was opened. Dixon did not therefore see if a beam had degrees. been unseated , although Golden told him it had. - 50 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD in little more than a month was unusual. That is also borne out by the fact that no dye machine operator other than Sanders had been discharged in the past 15 years. In the light of the foregoing, I am satisfied that Sanders was not the victim of trumped up charges but had, in fact, failed to operate his machine properly, and that the three warnings he received in March and April were justified. As a conse- quence, I cannot- accept the General Counsel's contention that Sanders was blameless, and that he had been dis- charged for his union activities. In coming to this conclu- sion, I have taken into account the likelihood that Sanders' conduct and questions at the April 2 meeting of the first shift operators with Golden and Herndon caused manage- ment to regard him with disfavor and suspicion, but even so I am not satisfied that the General Counsel has estab- lished that the Company discharged Sanders for reasons other than the serious errors for which it considered San- ders responsible. I shall recommend dismissal of the com- plaint as to Sanders' discharge. 2. Johnnie Belinda Hall. She was an inspector on the first shift, and had worked at the plant from October 1969 until her discharge on May 21, 1973. Her shift supervisor was Monette Van Landigham. Above her was Luther Morris, manager of the inspecting and packing department, and Ronald Morris, manager of. the technical department. Hall had signed a union card, had worn a union button to work before the election, and had been interrogated by a num- ber of supervisors as to her feelings about the Union. Woven cloth is unrolled and moved on conveyor belts for inspection . The inspectors examine it, assigning points for defects.from I to 4. Cloth which shows less than 40 points per square yard is classified as first quality. To.en- sure uniform standards in grading by the 30 inspectors, and to check on their adherence to permissible tolerances, random samples of cloth which has been inspected and graded are taken to the quality -standards department for further checking, and for evaluation of the grading done by each individual inspector. A numerical grade is assigned each week to each inspector, based _,on how closely her grading for the last ten rolls audited, conforms to that of the quality standards check. Respondent's Exhibit 5 is a list of all the-inspectors and their, weekly grades for a period of about 3-1/2 months ending in, May, 1973. It shows that Hall's grading ranged from 60 to 80 for, most of the period, that it then fell to 50 and then to 30 in her last 2 weeks of employment. Of the 30 inspectors in the department, only one other than Hall had ever received a grade as low as 30, and then for only L week early in the period, after which her grade rose to the average of all inspectors. When the quality standards department does its rein- spection, and the difference between their grade and that of the inspector is more than. the permissible range, the inspector is shown the roll in order to explain to her where she went wrong in her.grading. Van Landigham showed Hall two such rolls on April 27, and during this reinspec- tion Hall admitted she whistled softly•during the explana- tion. Van Landigham considered this to be disrespectful and took her to Luther Morris' office later that day. Ron- ald Morris was there at the time, and L. Morris came in later. When Van Landigham complained about Hall's con- duct generally, R. Morris gave her .a written warning, which Hall refused to sign. Hall said that Luther Morris told her that her work was slipping, that she had been har- assing people in the department and that it had to stop.16 Hall's response to the charge that her work was slipping was to slow down on the amount of cloth she inspected in order to improve the quality of her grading, so that where she had been inspecting 5600 yards a day,.she now reduced it to 3000. Despite this purported effort to improve on her grading work, Hall was again called to the quality standards de- partment to regrade another roll, and was again sent to see L. Morris.17 He wrote out a warning slip accusing her of poor grading, which Hall refused to sign. On May 15, Van Landigham again charged her with poor grading, but this time, Morris agreed with Hall that her grading on that par- ticular roll was within acceptable tolerances. Three days later, on Friday, May 18, Van Landigham again called Hall on her grading, and this time L. Morris told her that he was suspending her. He sent her to the personnel office where she spoke with Miller. She told him she felt she was being picked on because of- certain activi- ties. Miller. told her to. come back on Monday to learn whether she would.be suspended or discharged. He also told her that with her work experience she could get a job at Fieldcrest.18 When she returned on Monday, Miller told her that the committee had studied her case and had decid- ed to terminate,her. He also told her that if the Union had won the election, the mill would have had to close down because it could not afford to pay the Union's wage de- mands. [ find that the,quality and quantity of Hall's work had fallen off sharply in her last 3 weeks; and that Luther Mor- ris' decision on May 18 to suspend her was based on the deterioration of'her work.-Miller, however, went-further, in effect overruling Morris, in deciding to discharge her. Was Miller's decision to terminate Hall based solely on the same legitimate considerations that had- motivated Morris to stispend' her? I believe that.Miller's conversation with Hall on the 18th indicates that he took into account anoth- er factor-Hall's known and open adherence to the Union. There is no other reason why Miller should gratuitously inject into an interview on disciplinary matters extraneous comments about the election, held 4 weeks earlier; and what it would have cost the Company. Further, in the light of Miller's continued-exhortations to union supporters to go to Fieldcrest, his remark to Hall that she too could go there is an indication that her union sympathies were -on his mind, and that it was in fact the determinative element in his decision to discharge rather than. suspend her. I therefore find Hall's discharge on May 21 to be in. violation of Section 8(a)(3). .. 3. Lucille Word and Bertha Russow. Both women worked r' "There were strong prounion and antiunion factions in the inspection department . with each side accusing the other of harassing tactics. 7 On May 4; Van Landigham had also given her a verbal warning which was then written up. 18 This is Hall's testimony . Miller tesitifed that Hall had begun to cry in his office because she was worried about finding another .job and , to reas- sure her. fie had told her that with 'her skills and education she should have. no trouble getting another inspection job at a.number of mills he named. including Fieldcrest. SWIFT TEXTILES, INC. 51 in warper preparation on the second shift, under Terry Bai- ley, and both were discharged on May 29 allegedly for having had three unexcused absences within a 6 month period. I find from the testimony of Bailey and his supervi- sor, Storey, and from that of Personnel Manager Miller that there was such a rule in effect. I also find, as Word and Russow admitted, that they knew that an employee who intended not to report on any particular day was re- quired to call in before his shift began for permission. Al- though both denied knowing about the rule on unexcused absences, I find that each had been told about it by Bailey, and that each had been warned on previous occasions. I have no reason to believe that the Company's atten- dance records for Word and Russow are not wholly accu- rate. They were introduced as Respondent's Exhibits 8 through 11, and they show for each of them three unex- cused absences in the first 5 months of 1973, the last for Word on May 27, and for Russow, May 28. The rule may have been harshly applied, if the testimony of Word and Russow is to be believed, that they had ade- quate reaons for all their absences or had called in advance to obtain permission to be away. The Company, however, refused to accept their explanations, and as long as it did so for reasons other than their union adherence, I cannot substitute my opinions on harshness or inequities for those of the Company. The activities of Word and Russow on behalf of the Union were minimal. Word testified that she had signed a union card in February, had passed out three cards to other employees at an unspecified place and time, and had worn a union button and hat for a.few days pre- ceding the election. Her supervisor, Bailey, had talked to her about the Union a number of times, and his supervisor,. Storey, had spoken to her once but none of their remarks was alleged to be in violation of Section 8(a)(I). Russow had also signed a union card and had worn a button and hat for a few days before the election. Bailey had also told her once that the Union would not do them any good. Bailey and Storey must have known they were prounion, but many other employees were also known to be for the Union, particularly during the electioneering in the few weeks before April 20, when the wearing of union insignia was common. I am satisfied that the Company did not treat Word and Russow differently than it did any other employee who had had three unexcused absences.in a 6 month period, and since I am not persuaded that their union activities contri- buted to the Company's decision to discharge them, I shall recommend dismissal of the !Section 8(a)(3) allegations as to them. 4. Tyrone Garnett. He"had worked at the plant from Au- gust 1970 to June 1.1, 1973, after first being suspended the previous Saturday. His immediate supervisor in the inspec- tion and packing department was LaQuintera, whose supe- rior was.L. Morris. Garnett had signed a union" card in April, and had worn union insignia at the plant for a week or two before the election. A month earlier, LaQuintera had asked him if he was,for the Union. I have previously found the inquiry to be a violation of Section 8(a)(1). LaQuintera sent Garnett home on Saturday, June 9, af- ter he had reported late for work. Garnett admitted he was about 15 minutes late for his 3 p.m. shift because his car had broken down on the road. LaQuintera did not testify at the second hearing when Garnett's discharge was litigat- ed. Luther Morris, however, said that he had left the plant after 5 p.m. that day, had seen Garnett approaching the mill, and that Garnett had not been into work before then. He was discharged the following Monday by Miller, in the presence of L. Morris because he had received a number of warnings, going back to June 1971. The two most recent ones before his discharge were on April 16, 1973, for being absent the previous. Saturday without proper notice, and on May 1, 1973, for leaving the department early a few days before. Garnett and L. Morris differed on how tardy Garnett was on June 9, and Garnett said he had tried to call in the Saturday he failed to report for work, but I am satisfied that the Company's warnings in April and May, and his discharge in June, were because the Company found his excuses unsatisfactory. Garnett's activities on behalf of the Union were not ex- ceptional. Many other employees had done as much or more, and although LaQuintera had also asked him in March if he was for the Union, none of this proves that the Company selected Garnett for discharge either in reprisal for his own union activities or as a warning to other em- ployees, I therefore find that Garnett's discharge was not in violation of Section 8(a)(3). 5. Bobbie Young, Luller Wyatt, and Margeria Lane. Al- though the case of each of these three women has its own unique set of facts, they also exhibit some elements in com- mon. They were all in the inspection department (as had been Johnnie Hall) a department where pro- and antiunion feelings were exceptionally strong and vociferously ex- pressed. All three were recognized as ardent union support- ers, and in the view of the General Counsel, they were subjected to pressure by managemeiit designed to force them to quit. Needless to say, the Company's view is quite to the contrary-that it endured the faults of Young and Wyatt for a 'long while, that it finally was forced to dis- charge Wyatt for her rampant disregard of its attempts to restore harmony and efficiency in the inspection depart- ment and that Young and Lane voluntarily chose to quit. Young was terminated on August 2, after she refused to accept a transfer from her job as a billing clerk on the first shift to a job as an inspector on the second shift. Wyatt was discharged on August 15, after she continued doing what the Company had warned her to stop; and Lane quit on September 12, when the- Company refused to transfer her back to the inspecting machine she had previously worked on. Young had started to work for the Company as an in- spector in June'1971. Two months later she broke her arm, but returned to her job in a few weeks. Part of an inspector's job is to doff, that is, to remove the roll of cloth from the machine after it has been graded. The rolls are released from the machine when the 'operator actuates •a lever, but some physical exertion is required to pry the roll loose on occasion, and to position it before it can be re- moved. The job is apparently not too physically demand- ing for the operator under normal circumstances, and ser- vicemen are also available for any heavy work. When Young returned to her inspecting job; she required assis- tance while her arm was healing. 52 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD A few months later, Young was transferred to a better paying job, typing out billing slips which showed such in- formation as the width and weight of the cloth, the style. pattern, etc. Accuracy is important in preparing these bill- ing slips, since they are used in invoicing customers. On the average, a clerk such as Young would type about 340 slips per day. Young stayed continuously on that job for almost 2 years, until she was terminated after refusing to accept a transfer to another job on another shift. Young had signed a union card, wore its insignia at the plant, and had passed out leaflets. She was considered to be a strong union adherent, since personnel manager Mill- er selected her, as one of those whom he twitted about the Union's election loss in April, when he asked her if she would be going to Fieldcrest since she had wanted a Union so badly. Also, shortly before the election Young had typed out a little couplet on some index cards during her break period in response to a bit of antiunion propaganda which the Company had attached to employee paychecks. Luther Morris then called her into his office and accused her of doing it on company time. She denied that she had, and he then warned her against using company property in her poetic efforts. According to Young, there had been no complaints about her work when she was supervised by Weeks, who had left in Feburary 1973. Luther Morris then took over supervision of the billing clerks, and it was not until after the election that Young said she began to get complaints and warnings about her work. A few days after the elec- tion, Morris gave her a verbal warning'about mistakes in billing going back to January, and on May 2, May 21, June 18, and July 12, she was given written warnings about ex- cessive errors on her billing slips. Young admitted she had made some errors, but denied that they were as frequent as the Company asserted, and she also claimed that other billing clerks made errors for which they were not formally warned. I see no need to try to untangle the charges and countercharges as to whether Young had made two, four, or eight errors on some partic- ular day. The ultimate question is whether Young's work radically worsened after the election, or whether the Com- pany chose to hammer her on her admitted errors to wear her down and force her to quit, or to discharge her when it decided that it had laid a sufficient foundation, in reprisal for her union activities. On August 1, she was called to Luther Morris' office, where he showed her five mistakes on her billing slips, told her he had warned her previously that she would either have to improve or get out, and that now she would either have to accept a transfer to the second shift as an inspec- tor, or be terminated . She asked for a day to think it over. The next day she came in to work, and at 11 a.m. her husband met her. Together, and with Luller Wyatt as a witness, they went to the office where they met with Wil liams, a personnel official. Young told Williams that she had just had a third operation on her arm, and that the physical strain on the inspector's job which Morris had offered her would affect her recovery. She asked if there was a job in quality standards, where she would not have to doff the machines, or touch the rolls. Williams said- that sounded all right, and he would check to see if there, was a job opening there. Mr. Young asked Williams if the reason his wife was being harassed and called into the office so frequently was because of her union activities, and that she had had no problems until it became known that she was for the Union. Predictably, Williams said all employees were treated alike. In the meantime, Morris had been called in, and Mr. Young again complained about the pres- sure his wife was subjected to, and said that she could not take an inspector's job because her production would be affected by'her injured arm. Young' s mistakes in billing were brought up, with Young pointing out that the other clerks also made mistakes. Morris said they were all new on the job, while Wyatt insisted they had all been there at least as long as Young had. The Youngs again asked about a job in quality standards. Morris said he would check but that there were not many openings there. The meeting then ended. At the end of the day, she was called to Morris' office. He told her he had checked about a job in quality stan- dards but there was, none available, and that she did not have sufficient seniority. among inspectors to qualify if an opening should develop. He told her he was terminating her. Morris testified that he knew Young had been active in the Union before the April election, and that his problems with her did not begin until late April. He said he had checked about the possibility of another job for her on the first shift, but that none was available. He also said that Young knew there were servicemen present in the inspect- ing area to help the women in doffing, so that her.arms should not be affected. He.also.,pointed out that after her original injury, Young had gone back to work as an inspec- tor before she was, transferred to billing. Lullar Wyatt had been employed as an inspector since 1959. She was a competent, efficient producer about whose work the Company had had no complaint. She had been on the Union's in-plant organizing committee, and had served as an observer at the April 20 election. Wyatt had been very active in, the, inspection department in talking, arguing, and soliciting for the Union before and after the election. I have previously noted,. in the portion of this Decision on the 8(a)(I) allegations, that R. Morris had or- dered her'late in March to stop talking to other employees about the Union, even on nonwork time, once they made it clear that they were not interested. I held there that such a ban on Waytt's solicitation efforts was an unreasonable impediment on, the Union's campaign, although I suggest- ed that there might come a time when continued argument directed at employees who were openly opposed to the Union might border on harassment. Despite the Union's loss of the election, talk about it apparently went on in the inspection department. Wyatt kept on about it, while an antiunion faction, consisting of Clemmons, Temple, Johnson, and others, continued to re- spond in kind. Tactics other'than argument were also used to keep the pot boiling. Wyatt made a show of keeping her opponents under observation, following them to the bath- room, or writing down in a little book what times they came in or when they left their machines . Some of the antiunion people served her in. the same manner, by keep- ing her under observation on trips to the 'bathroom' and SWIFT TEXTILES, INC. elsewhere. Wyatt admitted much of this, claiming only that her activities on behalf of the Union were confined to non- work time. There is, in fact, no claim by the Company that Wyatt solicited for the Union during worktime. George Boswell, the Company's production manager was assigned general supervision in February 1973, over the quality assurance department, of which the inspection department, under Luther Morris, was a part. He learned that there was dissension and loss of production in inspec- tion, and that there were customer complaints over grad- ing. In'July, Ronald Morris who had been the immediate supervisor of quality assurance was transferred elsewhere and, until a successor could be appointed, Boswell as- sumed direct control over it. About this time, several in- spectors complained to him that they were being harassed, and one employee even sought out the president of the Company to tell him about the bickering and low morale in the inspection department. Early in August, Alton Conner assumed direct charge of quality assurance and with it, the problems of the inspection department. About this time, Boswell spoke to the employees in the department on each shift. He told them that the Company intended to do the best it could for the employees as to' wages and working conditions and, that in return, it ex- pected a day's work for a day's pay, as well as harmony. He said it had been brought to his attention that there were problems in the department over what people considered harassment, and that it had to be corrected. He mentioned the note-taking and other acts of personal harassment, said that it would not be further tolerated, and there would be no further warnings. Later that day, he spoke individually to Wyatt and to three of the antiunion group, Clemmons, Temples, and Melton. He said he asked Wyatt if she un- derstood thoroughly what he had just said, and that she answered that he ought to be more specific. He told her that he had reports that she was taking notes on other em- ployees and harassing them. He said Wyatt then asked him if he meant that she could not talk to people about the Union during breaks. He answered that she could talk to anyone during breaks if they wanted to talk to her, but that if they did not, she was not to continue, and that he would consider it harassment. He concluded by asking her if she understood that management intended to run its job. Boswell said he then told Clemmons, Temples, and Mel- ton the same thing. About a week later, Clemmons came to tell him that Wyatt was continuing to take notes on her and she thought it was not right. Boswell turned the com- plaint over to Conner to investigate, and told him that if it was borne out, it was inevitable what their course of action should be. Conner then spoke to Clemmons and Temples individually. Each told him that she had stopped taking notes after Boswell's speech, but that Wyatt was continu- ing to take notes and to time them. Melton told Conner that she had seen Wyatt following people to the bathroom, and had once discovered her standing on the commode in a toilet stall. Conner then discussed the matter with L. Morris, and then recommended to Boswell that Wyatt be discharged. He did not confront Wyatt with what he had heard from Melton and the others. Wyatt's version of these events was that she and Marge- ria Lane had gone to L. Morris on July 30, to complain 53 that Jean Temples had accused her of taking notes. Morris asked her if she had, and Wyatt admitted she did, but not during worktime while Temples and Clemmons were tak- ing notes on worktime. Morris asked her if she had not started the note taking business. She asked him why he said that, and he answered "because you are taking us to trial, we are not taking you." Morris also told Wyatt and Lane, according to Wyatt, that other employees had been com- plaining about the prounion people, but it did not amount to anything, and he saw no need to talk to them about it. As for Boswell's speech, Wyatt said that Boswell had talked about the trouble in the plant and how bad it was in inspection, and then said that they had gotten rid of a lot of employees who had been causing the trouble, but there were more and they would get rid of them too, and that anybody who did anything to slow down production effi- ciency in the department would be fired. After the speech, Wyatt said, she was sent to the office, where Boswell and L. Morris were waiting for her. Boswell said that he under- stood she did not like management, and had been 20 min- utes late getting back to herjob one day, and if it happened against she would probably be fired. Wyatt said she told Boswell that she had gotten permission from Van Landig- ham to go to the personnel office with Bobbie Young that day. Boswell then said he understood she was the worst one in the department for harassing people. She told him she talked about the Union and took notes but only on her breaks, and asked him if he considered that to be harass- ment. He said if she talked union more than once to these people, he considered it to be harassing them, that she could talk union or Baptist Church or anything, as long as she left the people alone. Morris also testified that Clemmons and Temples con- tinued to complain that Wyatt was timing them and taking notes even after Boswell's speech. He said he observed that Wyatt was at least showing signs of timing other employees when they left the area. He said she also gathered her friends around her during breaks, like a coach giving his team a pep talk, and that other employees considered it an additional irritation. On August 15, Wyatt was called into Morris' office where Conner and supervisor LaQuintera were also gath- ered. Morris told her he was terminating her for harassing people and taking notes on them. Wyatt asked why they were concerned about her activities during breaks when other employees were allowed to move around during worktime and talk to fellow employees. Morris referred to Boswell's speech and Conner said he did not want to hear anymore.. She was handed her final check and was then escorted out the plant. Morris testified that there was a gain in productivity in the department almost immediately after Wyatt's discharge. Margeria Lane. Her latest period of employment with the Company was from August 1970, to September 12, 1973, when she worked as an inspector on the first shift. It was common knowledge among employees and supervisors that she was an active union adherent. Lane had suffered from sciatica and bursitis, and had taken leaves of absence from her job in the past because of her condition. On Au- gust 2, the day Bobbie Young was terminated, Lane was under stress because of that and because of pressures on 54 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the job to increase production. She strained her shoulder muscles that day, and stayed away from work for about 6 weeks during which she received therapy. The company doctor approved her return to work on September 5, on a trial basis, and she went back the next day. She had been working on machine No. 2 for about a year and a half, and was assigned to go back to it the day she returned. She continued to work on her old machine for the next few days, until Van Landigham, a supervisor in inspection, told her she was to swap machines with an- other inspector, Dent, who had been operating machine No. 9. Dent had complained that her low production was due to the machine, and Van Landigham told Lane that they were trying an experiment.19 Lane assumed it would be just for the day. That night, she had severe muscle spasms, which she attributed to the difficulties with No. 9. She called Luther Morris at home, and complained about the transfer. According to Morris, he told her that the transfer was only experimental, while she told him she thought she had discovered what made No. 9 so difficult to run. When Lane returned to work the next morning, she went back to No. 2, her old machine, but Dent told her that Van Landigham wanted her to continue on No. 9. Lane went over to Van Landigham, told her about her muscle spasms, and that she didn't think she could run it. Morris was standing nearby, and Van Landigham went over to tell him about Lane's request to go back to No. 2, but Morris indi- cated he wanted her to run No. 9 for the time being. Lane did so and about 30 minutes later, Van Landigham asked her if Morris had spoken to her yet. Lane said he hadn't, and Van Landigham then said she hoped Lane did not think she had anything to do with it. A little while later, after Morris did not come out to see her, Lane went into his office and asked him why she could not go back to her old job. According to Lane, Morris said she was one of his best inspectors, and he wanted her to run the job he had assigned her. She told him he knew she had been out with strained muscles, and she wanted a chance to show she could run her job. Morris then said he guessed there was nothing else he could do, and again she asked him to put her back on No. 2, instead of assigning her permanently to No. 9, as Van Landigham said was to be done. Morris did not assure her that the new assignment was temporary or for how long it was to be, and finally, Lane told him that if she could not go back to her job, obviously referring to No. 2, she would have to quit, that she had suffered enough. She left the office to get her things, and then left the plant. Morris testified that when Lane returned the day after she had worked on No. 9, Lane asked him if she had to go back there, and he had told her she should for that day. The next he knew, about 45 minutes later, Lane came into 19 The machines were all the same make, but some employees considered No. 9 to be a difficult machine to run because the cloth would not unroll properly, so the operator had to pull on it. Its release mechanism was also erratic, so that the operator would at times have to pry the roll loose from the machine. At least one operator of No. 9 had asked to be transferred in the past few years, while another, Higgins, testified that she had operated it for 7 months, and that it had so aggravated a back condition that she had had to take a leave of absence. On the other hand, Morris said that other operators of No. 9 ran it without complaint or injury. his office and told him she was quitting. He said he ex- plained to her that the transfer was not meant to hurt her in any way, and she replied that her shoulders were hurt- ing, "and anyway if it wasn't this, it would be something else, so I will just quit." Two days later, Lane went to see Personnel Manager Miller.. She said Miller asked her what the trouble was, and she told him there was no need to explain, that they had been wanting to get rid of her anyway. Miller said she knew they had hired her knowing she had had surgery on her back. She told him she knew she had injured her back while operating No. 2, but that it was because she was in a hurry and had gotten careless, but she felt she could now work it. Miller told her they couldn't run a risk of her getting rehurt.20 Miller did not attempt to explain whether her assignment to No. 9 was to be temporary or perma- nent. Lane then left and has not been asked to return. Conclusions as to Young, Wyatt, and Lane There are differences in the testimony of witnesses for the General Counsel and the Respondent, but there are no basic contradictions between them. It is established that Young had committed errors in billing, and refused a transfer to another job; that Wyatt continued to annoy the antiunion people in the inspection department, even after Boswell had spoken to all of them about settling down and ending the bickering; and that Lane chose to quit after I day's operation of a machine she found difficult to operate. The difficult question to be resolved is whether the Company's officials were basically motivated by an inten- tion to rid itself of stalwart union adherents after the elec- tion. Such an intention, if it existed, would not and need not be publicized. A plan to weaken the Union in any future campaign, if the April 20 election were set aside, would be furthered if it could rid itself of those who did not hide their sympathy for the Union. The objective would be attained even if reasons for the discharges could be accu- mulated, since the mass of employees are unable to judge the merits of such reasons or the good faith of the Compa- ny. They see what happens to employees who are openly for the Union, and the lesson is learned. I am satisfied that the Company was so motivated and was willing to use whatever came to hand to conceal its discriminatory treat- ment of selected employees. Young, Wyatt, and Lane all worked in the inspection department under Luther Morris, where union supporters were vocal and active, even after the election. Young and Lane had been told by personnel manager Miller, shortly after the election, that they ought to go to Fieldcrest since they were dissatisfied at Swift. Lane had also been threat- ened by Weeks, her supervisor at the time, that he would make it hot enough for her that she would have to quit. I think this is some indication that the Company was not willing to forget their work for the Union, and would be ready to use whatever incidents might come up to make it unpleasant for them, so as to hasten their leaving. I credit 20 Miller's statement as reported by Lane is ambiguous. He may have been claiming that Lane could not be reassigned to No. 2, because she had suffered an injury operating it. or that it was quite safe for her to operate No. 9, since the Company was assured that there was no risk involved. SWIFT TEXTILES, INC. Young that other employees in billing also made mistakes for which they were not given written warnings, and 1 find it significant that it was very soon after the election that her mistakes took on such importance. As for Lane, it seems to me that Morris tried to maneu- ver her into quitting. I believe that the machine she was transferred to a few days after her return was one that presented problems to its operators ; which would be mag- nified for Lane with her history of back problems. I find that Lane reasonably believed, from what Van Landigham told her, that her assignment to No . 9 was to be permanent, and that Morris' refusal to allay her distress when she com- plained about the assignment was a deliberate tactic in his expectation that she could be forced out. Wyatt's case is, in some ways , the most difficult of the three. She was outspoken about her intention to continue talking about the Union during her free time , even at the cost of annoying other employees . I credit Waytt's testimo- ny that Boswell had told her individually , after his speech to the inspection employees, that he understood she did not like management, that he had accused her of being 20 min- utes late in getting back to her job one day, and that if it happened again she would be fired. Since Wyatt had re- ceived permission from Van Landigham to accompany Young to the office the day Boswell was referring to, I find that Boswell was unwilling to conduct an impartial investi- gation into Wyatt's activities . Morris also chose to take the word of the antiunion employees as to Wyatt 's note taking after Boswell's speech , rather than to get Wyatt's account of the matter. I believe that Morris, Conner , and Boswell were too ready to believe that it was Wyatt alone who was responsible for the dissension in the inspection depart- ment; and that they were willing to disregard annoyances perpetrated by the antiunion faction , but unwilling to over- look Wyatt's similar action. I find therefore that the Company discharged Wyatt, and constructively discharged Young and Lane because of their prounion sympathies and activities , in violation of Section 8(a)(3). 6. J. C. Flakes and Johnny Williams were denied em- ployment at Swift, allegedly because relatives of theirs, em- ployed by the Company, were active union supporters. J. C. Flakes is the brother of Charles Flakes, a Swift employee. J.C. filed an application for employment with the Company on April 11 , 1973. Personnel Manager Miller told J .C. to have Charles come to see him. J.C . had listed as his previous employer, Southern Phoenix Mills," and had stated that he. had left because of "finance problems." When Charles went to see Miller, Miller asked him if he thought J.C. would be a good worker. Charles said he thought he would . Miller said he was thinking of hiring J.C., but wanted him to come back after the election (scheduled to be run in a week or so). Miller then asked Charles how he felt about the Union and whether he thought it would get in. Charles said he hoped it would. 21 Southern Phoenix and Swift are subsidiaries of the same holding com- pany , but are operated separately and independently . Southern Phoenix, in Phoenix City , Alabama , is across the Chattahoochie River from Columbus. Georgia , where Swift is located . Both plants draw personnel from the same labor area. 55 The preceding is Charles Flakes' testimony . Miller testified that he did not recall any conversation with Charles about the Union, but did recall telling him that it would be after the election before the plant would really start hiring again. J.C. applied again the week after the election , but Miller told him he couldn' t use him. J.C. applied for the third time on or about June 10, according to the complaint , or in mid July, according to J.C, 's testimony . This time, Miller told him that he would not be hired because he had been fired by Southern Phoenix in March . Miller testified that South- ern Phoenix and Swift follow a policy of not considering for employment anyone who has been discharged by the other within the past 6 months. J.C. admitted that he had been discharged by Southern Phoenix , and had been told that it was for not doing his job properly. I have no reason to believe that Miller testified falsely in claiming that Swift and its sister plant adhere to a practice of not considering for employment anyone discharged by the other within the past 6 months , and I therefore credit his testimony on the point . By the time of J.C.'s application in June or July, Miller had checked with Southern Phoenix, and had learned that he had been discharged in March for leaving his job in the middle of a shift. I am satisfied that the Company would not have hired J.C. under these cir- cumstances, even if Miller's inquiry of Charles Flakes be- fore the election as to how he felt about the Union was intended as a warning to him that his brother 's chances of employment depended on Charles ' feelings about the Union . I shall therefore recommend dismissal of the allega- tions of the complaint as to J.C. Flakes. Johnny Williams is the son of employee M. L. Williams. Johnny was a full-time high school student, and had worked for the Company until early 1973 , when he quit because his hours had been reduced. He applied for work again on March 29, 1973. Miller told him he had nothing open for him then , but asked to have his father see him. M.L. went to see Miller in the next few days, and accord- ing to M,L., Miller asked him if he thought he should hire his son back. Williams said he should, that Johnny would probably stay on the job this time . Miller then asked Wil- liams if he reckoned Johnny would be as loyal to the Com- pany as he was.22 Williams said he didn't know , he hadn't talked to his son about it. Miller then said he was surprised when he heard that Williams was working for the Union, and asked what the Company had done to him to make him act that way. Williams then complained about the pro- duction standards on his job. Miller then said that if the Union got in, they would have to close the mill down be- cause it would no longer be competitive.23 Finally , Miller told him to bring Johnny around in May, that he would see how M . L. acted. When Miller testified, he was asked by Respondent's counsel if he remembered M.L.'s testimony the day before, Miller said he did, but was not then asked about, nor did he deny, the remarks attributed to him by M.L. in their 22 M. L. Williams had been active in the Union's campaign. 23 I have previously found that Miller had made similar statements to other employees, and have held that they constituted violations of Sec. 8(a)(I). M.L . Williams was also one of the employees who was asked by Miller just after the election if he was ready to go to Fieldcrest. 56 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD conversation. I credit M.L. Williams' testimony on the matter. On June 22, Johnny applied to Miller again, because he had heard on the radio that the Company needed help.24 Miller told him, however, that he had nothing for him. This was during the summer school vacation when Johnny would have been available for either full- or part-time work. In September, after the school term started, Johnny applied for the third time, and now Miller offered him a part-time job weekends as a cleaner. This was the kind of work he had done the year before, while attending school. Johnny said he turned it down because it was for only I day a week. However, Miller testified that Johnny told him he would take the job, and accepted a parking sticker, but never showed up for work thereafter. Johnny admits ac- cepting the parking sticker. I credit Miller and find that Johnny Williams accepted the job offered him in Septem- ber, but failed to show up for work. I also find, however, that Miller refused to consider Johnny's application of March 29, because of his father's known union activities. It may be that there was, in fact, no suitable work available for him at that time, but it is also clear Miller had decided to consider Johnny's application only in terms of how "loyal" his father would be. To Mill- er, M.L.'s continued adherence to the Union just before the election, evidenced by his wearing union insignia at the plant, was sufficient reason for not offering Johnny any available job. I therefore find that the Company refused to consider Johnny Williams for employment from March 29, until September 9, 1973, when it offered him a job, suitable to his status as a full-time high school student. I note that the complaint alleges that Johnny Williams was refused employment in violation of Section 8(a)(3) on or about June 10, 1973, but since the matter of the March applica- tion was fully litigated, including Miller's remarks which conditioned any consideration of it on the father's "loyal- ty," I find that the Company violated Section 8(a)(3) on March 29, 1973, with respect to Johnny Williams. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 24 There is also in evidence as G.C. Exh. 5, an advertisement placed by Swift in a Columbus newspaper on June 10, 1973, seeking both experienced and inexperienced help for its plant. 3. By discriminatorily terminating Johnnie Belinda Hall, Bobbie Young, Lullar Wyatt, and Margeria Lane, and by discriminatorily refusing to employ Johnny Williams, thereby discouraging membership in the Union, the Re- spondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (I) of the Act. 4. By coercively interrogating its employees concerning their union membership, sympathies, or activities; intimat- ing that union meetings were kept under surveillance; de- liberately driving dangerously close to union representa- tives or employees engaged in distributing literature at plant gates; forbidding the wearing of union insignia in the plant; appealing to racial prejudices in order to weaken support for the Union; threatening loss of jobs or layoffs for engaging in union activities; threatening to close the plant down if the Union got in; telling union supporters that they should go to work at a unionized plant; ordering plant guards to list employees who spoke to union repre- sentatives; and by ordering employees to stop soliciting for the Union during nonwork time, Respondent had inter- fered with, coerced, and restrained its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. The foregoing unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has committed certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action de- signed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having discharged Johnnie Belinda Hall and Lullar Wyatt, and having forced the termination of Bobbie Young and Margeria Lane, for discriminatory reasons, I find it necessary to order the Respondent to offer them reinstatement, with backpay computed on a quarterly basis from the date of their termination to the date of the offer of reinstatement, as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Compa- ny, 90 NLRB 289, plus interest at 6 percent per annum. I shall also order that Respondent make whole Johnny Wil- liams for the loss of wages he incurred because of its dis- criminatory refusal to hire him on March 29, until the date on which he rejected its offer to employ him. Backpay shall be computed in the manner prescribed above. Finally, I shall order it to post appropriate notices. [Recommended Order omitted from publication.]