Global Marine Development of California, Inc.

192 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Global Marine Development of California, Inc. and District 1, Pacific Coast District , MEBA, AFL- CIO. Case 31-CA-4019 October 22, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER By CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND PENELLO On June 13, 1974, Administrative Law Judge James S. Jenson issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and General Counsel and Charging Party filed briefs in opposition to Respondent's exceptions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Global Marine Devel- opment of California, Inc., Los Angeles, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. ' The Respondent has alleged that the Administrative Law Judge demon- strated a bias against Respondent and its position in the instant case. We have carefully considered the record and the attached Decision and find no basis for these charges of bias alleged by Respondent. 2 The Respondent's request for oral argument is hereby denied as the record and exceptions in our view adequately present the issues and posi- tions of the parties. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JAMES S. JENSON, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard before me in Los Angeles, California, on Janu- ary 14, 15, 16, and February 19, 1974. The complaint, which issued on November 29, 1973, was amended on De- cember 10, 1973, and at the trial and was based on a charge and first amended charge filed on October 9 and Novem- ber 28, 1973, respectively. The complaint alleges violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) and seeks a remedy requiring Respondent to recognize and bargain with the Union. Spe- cifically, the complaint as amended alleges that a unit com- prised of first, second, and third assistant marine engineers and oilers employed on Respondent's vessel, the Hughes Glomar Explorer, is appropriate; that since August 10, 1973, the MEBA has represented a majority of the employ- ees in said unit; that on various dates from early August to September 25, 1973, Respondent engaged in various acts and conduct in violation of Section 8(a)(I); and on Sep- tember 25 and October I, 1973, terminated 10 first, second, and third assistant marine engineers because of their mem- bership in the MEBA in order to undermine and destroy the Union's majority status and in order to evade any obli- gation to bargain with the MEBA, all in violation of Sec- tion 8(a)(3) of the Act. By its answer and amended answer, Respondent admit- ted the procedural and jurisdictional allegations of the complaint but denied the remaining substantive allega- tions, pleading affirmatively that the alleged discriminatees were at all times supervisors within the meaning of the Act. In an amended answer filed at the trial, Respondent denied the appropriateness of the unit on the ground it included licensed engineering officers who are supervisory person- nel, with oilers who are nonsupervisory personnel; that there is no community of interest between the licensed en- gineering officers and oilers; and that the licensed engi- neering officers, in addition to being supervisors, are tech- nical and/or professional employees and the oilers are not. All parties were given full opportunity to appear, to in- troduce evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally, and to file briefs. Briefs were filed by the Respondent, the Charging Party, and the General Coun- sel.' Upon the entire record in the case,2 and from my obser- vation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION Respondent, a California corporation, is engaged in the operation of the deep sea mining and exploration vessel, Hughes Glomar Explorer. In the course and conduct of its deep sea mining and exploration business operations, Re- spondent annually purchases and receives goods and serv- ices valued in excess of $50,000 directly from outside the State of California. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 1 After the time for filing briefs expired, Respondent submitted a letter supplementing its brief by calling attention to a circuit court decision, a copy of which was attached thereto. In the absence of objection by either the General Counsel or Charging Party, I have considered the case cited therein, which, in any event, does not affect my findings and conclusions reached hereinafter. 2 In view of my findings and conclusions hereafter, Respondent's motion to dismiss the complaint is denied. 214 NLRB No. 40 GLOBAL MARINE DEVELOPMENT OF CALIF., INC. . 193 II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED District I, Pacific Coast District, MEBA, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background During the early part of 1973,3 the Hughes Glomar Ex- plorer was under construction at the Sun Shipyard in Ches- ter, Pennsylvania. In late July, the ship left on the first of two legs of a shakedown cruise, the first leg ending in Ber- muda on or about August 9, and the second leg ending in Long Beach, California, on October I. It appears from the testimony that the Hughes Glomar Explorer is a unique type vessel in that it was designed to mine or remove man- ganese nodules from the ocean floor, and carries a crew somewhat larger than the ordinary merchant vessel. A gen- eral superintendent appears to be in overall charge of the ship which is divided into the following departments: min- ing, deck, engine, and stewards. The mining department is comprised of approximately 40 employees. Its supervisory hierarchy consists of the superintendent of operations, an assistant superintendent of operations, and an undisclosed number of foremen. The steward's department has approx- imately nine employees and is directly supervised by the chief steward. The deck department has approximately 20 employees and is under the supervision of the captain and chief mate. The employer also classifies and considers the bos'n and the second and third mates as supervisors. Each crew in the engine department is comprised of approxi- mately 10 individuals, consisting of a chief engineer, and first, second, and third assistant engineer and oiler catego- ries." The General Counsel and the MEBA contend the first, second, and third assistant marine engineers who served on both legs of the vessel during its shakedown cruise, all of whom signed authorization cards, are employ- ees, while the Respondent contends they are supervisors. The General Counsel further contends that a unit includ- ing the first, second, and third assistant marine engineers and oilers is appropriate. The MEBA, while requesting rec- ognition in a unit of first, second, and third assistant ma- rine engineers, contends both a unit limited to those indi- viduals, and a unit which also includes the oilers is appro- priate. As noted above, Respondent contends that the three categories of assistant marine engineers are supervi- sors and that those individuals and the oilers lack a com- munity of interest. Respondent further contends the au- thorization cards are invalid because of supervisory solici- tation and instigation. Thus, the issues are: (1) Whether the 10 assistant marine engineers employed on the Hughes Glomar Explorer are supervisors within the meaning of the Act; All dates are in 1973 unless otherwise stated. The parties stipulated that the general superintendent, superintendent of operations, assistant superintendent of operations, foremen, chief steward, captain, chief mate, and chief engineer are supervisors within the meaning of the Act. The numbers of individuals in each of the departments is based on the unrefuted and credited testimony of First Assistant Engineer John Smith. (2) Whether the authorization cards signed by the assis- tant engineers are void because of alleged supervisory so- licitation and instigation; and (3) Whether a unit limited to the assistant engineers or one also including the oilers is appropriate. Insofar as the engine department is concerned, Respon- dent employed two crews which were designated as A and B crews. The A crew was on the ship from at least the time it left the Sun Shipyard until it reached Bermuda on Au- gust 9, at which time it was replaced by the B crew which brought the vessel around South America, arriving in Long Beach on October 1. It was contemplated that the two crews would alternate thereafter, i.e., while the A crew was at sea, the B crew would be at home, and vice versa. In addition to Chief Engineer Anthony, the A crew con- sisted of First Assistant Engineer McDonald, Second As- sistant Engineer Kell, Third Assistant Engineers Aikens, Frederickson, and Ahbel, and oilers Ouellette, Kaun, and McKiney. The B crew was composed of Chief Engineer Stackhouse, First Assistant Engineer Smith, Second Assis- tant Engineer Brookshire, Third Assistant Engineers Ah- bel, Welty, Adamis, and Peel, and oilers Pope, Madden, and Richards.' B. Disputed Supervisory Status With the exception of the chief engineers,6 the engine department personnel-first, second, and third assistant engineers and oilers-were assigned to four overlapping shifts, each man working a continuous 12-hour tour of duty which was divided into a 6-hour watch shift and a 6-hour maintenance shift. Two licensed assistant engineers were on watch at all times, the watch engineer being locat- ed in the control room in accordance with Coast Guard regulations, and the maintenance engineer who ordinarily worked in the engineroom doing maintenance and associ- ated work. Each engineer stood successive control room and maintenance watches. The engineer standing watch in the control room was designated the "watch" engineer, and the one on maintenance duty, the "maintenance" engineer. An oiler was also assigned to each of the watches so that two oilers were on duty at all times.? The composite testimony of the assistant engineers, all 5 The following terms were used interchangeably throughout the trial: first, second, and third engineers: first, second, and third marine engineers; and first, second, and third assistant engineers. The dates of hire for the assistant engineers on duty on the Hughes Glomar Explorer were: A crew- Frederickson-December 4, 1972; Kell-November 7, 1972: McDonald- June 18 ; Aikens-July 17: Ahbel-July 28. B crew-Welty-March I; Smith-April 9; Brookshire-May 22; Ahbel (served on both A and B crews, see above): Peel-August 9; Adamis-August 10. With the exception of Ahbel who served on both crews , all assistant engineers on the A crew were terminated on September 25, and those on the B crew were terminated on October I. "A crew" Chief Engineer Anthony was terminated on Sep- tember 25 and " B crew" Chief Engineer Stackhouse was terminated on October I. 6 The parties stipulated that Chief Engineers Anthony and Stackhouse were supervisors within the meaning of the Act. 7 As there were only three oilers on both the A and B crews, third assis- tant engineers performed the duties of the fourth oiler on both crews, Ahbel (and for a short time Aikens) on the A crew, and Adamis and Peel on the B crew. These four third assistant engineers graduated from the California Continued 194 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 10 of whom testified, establishes that all of the work per- formed by the "watch" engineer and the oiler on the corre- sponding watch is routine. The watch engineer stands his 6 hours of watch in the control booth in accordance with Coast Guard requirements, where, according to First As- sistant Engineer Smith, he monitored the "different alarms which show any change of condition in the machinery. Regulating voltages and kilowatt loads on the generators. We-also had a diesel engine exhaust temperature indicator which we monitored from that point, and checked the tem- peratures and pressures that the oiler brought up on the oiler's log sheets and made certain entries into the engine- room official log book, concerning certain temperatures .. . and the pressures . . . we also entered certain electri- cal readings in the log book." The oiler on the correspond- ing watch makes hourly rounds of all machinery in the engineering spaces, taking readings every second hour which he records in the oiler log sheets, some of which are recorded by the watch engineer in the engine room log book. While he has no duties to perform there, the oiler spends from I to 2 hours of his shift passing time in the control room talking to the watch engineer. The watch en- gineer also relays specific instructions from the chief engi- neer to the maintenance engineer regarding what is to be done on the maintenance watch." 8 Each of the watch engineers was assigned an area of responsibility by the chief engineer, the first assistant engi- neers on each crew, McDonald and Smith, being responsi- ble, along with Third Assistant Engineers Frederickson and Welty on the A and B crews respectively, for the main engines and associated equipment. Second Engineers Kell on the A crew and Brookshire on the B crew were responsi- ble for the fuel oil, bilge, and ballast systems and associat- ed machinery. Third Assistant Engineer Ahbel on the A crew, and presumably Aikens on the B crew, had prime responsibility for the evaporators and high-pressure air compressors. The maintenance work with respect to those areas of responsibility was performed by those individuals on their maintenance shifts, the maintenance shift in each individual's case following immediately his shift as watch engineer. The oiler on the maintenance shift, or the third assistant engineer doing oiler work, worked along with the maintenance engineer. In addition to doing routine main- tenance work in their specific areas of responsibility, the maintenance engineers and oilers performed the unfinished necessary maintenance work of the previous maintenance shift, and other manual routine work such as fixing leaks, scraping and painting deck plates, painting handrails, trac- Maritime Academy in July, having received Bachelor of Science degrees in marine engineering after a 3-year course of study. 8 Upon instructions from Chief Engineer Anthony, First Assistant Engi- neer McDonald made up a list of jobs that needed to be done in the engine- room by the crew. Any assistant engineer or oiler could add to the list, which Anthony reviewed on a daily basis, adding to or deleting jobs, and assigning priorities to jobs. On the B leg of the trip, Chief Engineer Stack- house met with First Assistant Engineer Smith every morning and told him what items he wanted done that day. Smith recorded the jobs in a "little workbook:" As Smith was relieved on the maintenance watch by Ahbel. "he (Smith) would outline a rough program of things to do during my 6 hours." Every evening Stackhouse went to the engineroom and told Second Assis- tant Engineer Brookshire what jobs he wanted done, and on numerous occasions told the oiler directly what he should do. ing and color-coding valves, sweeping and keeping the en- gine and control rooms clean, changing oil in the compres- sors, cleaning up oil spills, pumping bilges, and cleaning purifiers. One of the oilers on the A crew, Ouellette, was also a welder. He spent all of his time on welding jobs which were assigned to him directly by the chief engineer. Upon his own request, he was sometimes assisted by one of the assistant engineers. One of the third assistant engineers, Aikens, took over Ouellette's oiler duties. Each of the 10 assistant engineers testified that he had never exercised, nor had he been advised that he had the authority to recommend or exercise, any of the following authorities: to reprimand, discipline, discharge, grant time off, grant shore leave, prepare evaluations, attend staff meetings, hire, interview for employment, grant pay raises, or authorize overtime.9 Respondent contends, however, that the assistant engi- neers not only possessed supervisory powers, but exercised them on a day-to-day basis. As indicative, Respondent contends that when First Assistant Engineer Smith was-on maintenance watch, the oilers reported to him for their as- signment. It is clear, however, that when Smith was on maintenance watch, he and an oiler worked together, and that Smith was told what work was to be done by the chief engineer. In fact, the record is void of evidence demonstra- ting the authority;on the part of the assistant engineers to make independent assignments. Nonroutine.work resulted when there was a failure of some piece of equipment which required that corrective action be taken. While it was with- in the aura of the watch engineer's responsibility to see that corrective action was taken, the work routinely fell on the maintenance engineer, and oiler. Even in emergency situa- tions it appears it was the responsibility of the maintenance engineer and oiler to effect repairs,'and if the emergency was such that it required a change in the speed of the ves- sel, the watch engineer immediately notified the bridge and the chief engineer came to the engineroom spaces and de- termined the repairs required. Further, Smith testified that the watch engineer lacked authority to pull the mainte-, nance engineer and oiler off a job and assign them to an- other job. Respondent contends Smith exercised supervisory au- thority during the training period of Adamis and Peel by assigning them watch-standing duties. The evidence shows that Third Assistant Engineers Adamis and Peel boarded the ship in Bermuda and, after a brief period of standing watch with an oiler in order to become familiar with the vessel, were assigned to stand watches as oilers with Third Assistant Engineer Ahbel who stood both the watch engi- neer and maintenance watches. Friction arose among the three due to the fact they were about the same age and had all graduated in the same class at the California Maritime Academy. When Peel complained to Smith about the situa- tion, Smith stated there was nothing he could do. Approxi- mately a week later Peel again complained and Smith again told him there was nothing he could do. WhewPeel then advised Smith that the situation was intolerable and "I am just not going to make it down to the watch any- 9 Respondent called no witnesses to rebut the testimony of the General Counsel's witnesses. GLOBAL MARINE DEVELOPMENT OF CALIF., INC. 195 more," Smith stated he would see what he could do about it and contacted Chief Engineer Stackhouse with the rec- ommendation that Adamis and Peel be switched from Ahbel's watch to Smith's watch, and that Pope serve as oiler with Ahbel. Chief Engineer Stackhouse approved the switch and thereafter Adamis and Peel were on watch duty with Smith who had them alternate between the control room and oiler's watches. When Smith felt that the two were qualified to stand the control room watch alone, Smith went into the engineroom and helped out the engi- neer and the oiler on maintenance watch. Moreover, the chief engineer had instructed Smith to come to him for any changes in personnel or machinery. Respondent also alleges Smith assigned the oilers to their various watches. Smith testified as follows: Well, like I say, Mr. Brookshire selected Madden as his oiler and Bob Ahbel, Adamis and Peel they more or less selected each other. I believe that Tim Welty, he had worked with Don Richard before and so they more or less selected each other and I wrote all this up in this order. That left Herb Pope and I asked him if he would like to stand watch with me, and he said sure, I will stand watch any time, any place-that type of thing-very willing. So I wrote it up in that manner. I took it to the chief engineer who I located in the engineroom at that time. He rejected it and changed it-had me change it-and I submitted it to him once again the way he wanted it and he approved it and I posted it in the engineroom. Respondent contends "Smith personally and effectively recommended the discharge of an engineer named Secon- dine." Smith testified that before the vessel left the ship- yard, he recommended to Chief Engineer Anthony that Secondine be terminated because of his absences and that "the chief engineer-Mr. Anthony-he threw up his hands in the air and said I can't hire or fire anybody." While it appears Secondine was in fact terminated approximately a week later, the reason for the termination was not shown, nor that Smith's recommendation had anything to do with Respondent's contentions regarding the alleged supervi- it. sory authority of First Assistant Engineer McDonald are similar to those it raised with respect to First Assistant Engineer Smith and are equally without merit. With respect to Respondent's contention that the assis- tant engineers had the power to effectively recommend dis- ciplinary action against oilers or other subordinates, the undisputed evidence shows that if a Coast Guard regula- tion was violated, the most an assistant engineer could do was to either report the infraction to the chief engineer, who in turn would report it to the ship's master, or "log" the incident in the engineroom log. While it was not shown that this had ever happened on the Hughes Glomar Ex- plorer, in any event it does not appear the assistant engi- neer would make any recommendation with respect to any disciplinary action to be taken: Disciplinary action, if any, would be determined by the Coast Guard. With respect to the authority of the watch engineer over other personnel working in the engineroom, Second Assis tant Engineer Kell testified, without contradiction, that he was informed by either Mining Superintendent Blurton or Rogers that he had no authority over a shipboard electri- cian named Snyder. He further testified that while the watch engineers should be in control in case a controversy arose between an electrician and a watch engineer, such was not the case on the Hughes Glomar Explorer. The evidence further revealed that while members of the min- ing crew occasionally performed duties in the engineroom, they neither reported to, nor received any direction from, the watch engineer. Moreover, as noted above, the watch engineer was without authority to pull the maintenance en- gineer and oiler off one job and assign them to another. A further incident showing the lack of authority resting in the assistant engineers on the vessel involved Second Assistant Engineer Kell. One day while making rounds, he discovered mining department personnel pumping oil over the side of the vessel, an offense which could have resulted in substantial fines and license suspensions for him and the chief engineer. He testified, "Well, I tried to make them stop; tried to get them to stop. and they told me, well, in kind of crude language, to get away from there, get out of there .. .." The mining department personnel continued pumping oil over the side. On another occasion, Third As- sistant Engineer Frederickson asked one of the electricians to take a reading on a certain circuit. The electrician re- fused on the ground he worked for the chief engineer. Frederickson reported the incident to the chief engineer who confirmed the fact the electrician worked under him. Further evidence showing the lack of authority on the part of the assistant engineers involved Third Assistant Engi- neer Ahbel and oiler Pope. Ahbel asked Pope to do some welding, to which Pope replied, "They ain't paying me to be a welder." Ahbel did the welding himself and Pope "stood around just as a fire watch."yAsked whether he could have disciplined Pope, Ahbel replied, "No. There is nothing I could have done." The issue of working overtime arose on one occasion. Following, is First Assistant Engi- neer Smith's testimony on the subject: A. Early in the voyage there was a lot of work just getting organized in the ship and we needed some manhours to get some of these items done and I checked with the chief engineer to see what the proce- dure was for having people work over their, 12 hour day. He wasn't entirely sure about the procedure but he felt that there would be overtime and he would check and find out, but in the meantime I was to go ahead and get the work done and get these jobs. completed if possible-and he would continue checking and he in- structed me to ask these people to inform them that he wasn't sure, they would get this overtime or collect it but we would make an entry in the log book._ , He had some form that he thought the company had that he would fill out and would indicate hours that people worked. That is the basis upon which we proceeded. These people actually volunteered and turned to when I asked them. Q. When you asked them did any of them turn you 196 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD down and say no, I am not going to work overtime? A. No. Q. If they would have did you have the authority to force them to work overtime? A. No. Q. Did you ever get overtime pay? A. No. Q. Did they ever get overtime pay? A. To the best of my knowledge they did not. While assistant marine engineers may be endowed with considerable responsibility in the operation of some ves- sels, which of necessity is accompanied by authority over unlicensed personnel which would render them supervi- sors, that situation does not appear to be the case on the Hughes Glomar Explorer. First Assistant Engineer Mc- Donald explained the differences in the duties of the first assistant engineer as follows: "Well, the first assistant on normal merchant ships . . . he generally takes care of all repair work. He never stands a watch and he is on call 24 hours a day more or less like the chief. In emergency, he is right there at all times. On this vessel, I was never called out anytime off watch. I had no telephone in my room so they could call me. Now on other ships they generally have a telephone for the first assistant." 10 Third Assistant Engi- neer Adamis testified that it was his understanding upon graduating from the California Maritime Academy, that the first assistant engineer worked a 40-hour, 5-day week, was in charge of the main engineroom, overtime, the wip- ers, and did not stand a watch. Adamis served aboard the vessel S S Kopaa until a few days before the opening of the hearing. He testified while the first assistant engineer on that vessel "was a day worker," he was on 24-hour call, did not stand a watch, was in charge of the engineroom and the wipers and handled overtime for all engine department employees. There were no wipers employed on the Hughes Glomar Explorer. Adamis testified that wiper's work, which "consists of scraping, painting, cleaning the engine- room, cleaning up oil, sweeping, emptying the garbage cans, cleaning bilges-whatever the first assistant told you to do. It was mostly the lowest class work in the engine- room-the cleanup work" was performed by, among others, First Assistant Engineer Smith. Contrary to the first assistant engineer on the S S Kopaa, Smith spent from 50 to 60 percent of his time doing wipers work. The duties of the first assistant engineer on the S S Sea Train Georgia- which Ahbel served on immediately preceding the trial of this matter-were the same as those testified to by Adamis on the S S Kopaa. Respondent contends the powers'and authority confer- red by law on the first, second, and third assistant engi- neers by reason of their being licensed by the United States Coast Guard, is sufficient to classify them as supervisors under Section 2(11) of the Act. The Board, however, has taken a contrary view. In Graham Transportation Company, 124 NLRB 960 (1959), the Board stated at 962: We also find no merit in BME's final contention 10 The chief engineer is the only one in the engine department on the Hughes Glomar Explorer with a private room and telephone. that some of the engineers involved herein are supervi- sors because they are licensed by the United States Coast Guard. In determining the supervisory status of marine engineers, whether or not they are licensed, we have always utilized the same tests which are applica- ble in other industries. Thus, where it has been clearly established that marine engineers have the authority expressed in Section 2(11), we have found them to be supervisors, but where they possess no such authority, we have found them to be nonsupervisors. To be sure, the Board has customarily treated licensed marine en- gineers as supervisors, but in those cases, it was clear from the size of the ship and crew that there were other engineroom personnel for the engineers to su- pervise. The fact that a marine engineer possesses a Coast Guard license does not alone support a finding of supervisory status.'' With respect to Respondent's contention that the watch engineer has sole and full responsibility for the entire en- gine department, the record indeed establishes his respon- sibility for the machinery. However, "responsibility for the maintenance of physical property does not, of itself, estab- lish the existence of supervisory authority." 12 The facts set forth above disclose that such direction the watch engineer gives to personnel, being the oiler on his watch and the engineer and oiler on maintenance, are clearly of a routine nature and do not require the use of independent judg- ment. The oiler on duty with the watch engineer makes routine rounds of the engine spaces which precludes the exercise of independent judgment. The relationship of the watch engineer to the maintenance engineer and the oiler is much the same. While the watch engineer is responsible for the "operation" of the physical property, the maintenance engineer is responsible for its "maintenance and repair." The maintenance engineer and oiler perform routine main- tenance and repairs and in emergencies, nonroutine re- pairs. The maintenance engineer, a skilled mechanic, works in conjunction with the maintenance oiler and no doubt directs the oiler in the repair of the machinery. However, the relationship of the maintenance engineer to the mainte- nance oiler in regards to these functions is more akin to a skilled mechanic-helper relationship than that of a supervi- sor-employee one, and does not involve responsible direc- tion. In sum, I conclude and find that the assistant engineers employed on the Hughes Glomar Explorer lack any of the indicia of the authorities specified in Section 2(11) of the Act, and are not, therefore, supervisors within the meaning of the Act. Great Lakes Towing Company, supra; Material Service Division, General Dynamics Corp., supra; Graham Transportation Company, supra; see also A. L. Mechling Barge Lines, 192 NLRB 1118 (197 1).13 ° Accord, Great Lakes Towing Company, 168 NLRB 695 (1967); Material Service Division, General Dynamics Corp., 144 NLRB 908 (1963). 12 Graham Transportation Company, supra at 962. 13 Respondent contends the facts here are remarkably similar to those in Midwest Towing Co., Inc., 151 NLRB 658 (1965). While the jobs performed by the engineers and oilers in that case were indeed similar to the jobs performed by the assistant engineers and oilers on the Hughes Glomar Ex- plorer, the authority possessed by the engineers in the two cases is in no wise similar. Contrary to the facts in the instant case , in Midwest, the engi- neers assigned the oilers nonroutine duties, responsibly directed them in the GLOBAL MARINE DEVELOPMENT OF CALIF., INC. 197 C. Validity of Authorization Cards Having found that the first, second, and third assistant engineers are not supervisors within the meaning of the Act, I find no merit in Respondent's contention that the authorization cards are invalid because of any influence exerted by any of the first, second, or third assistant engi- neers on each other. There remains for consideration, how- ever, the issue of whether the participation of Chief Engi- neers Anthony and Stackhouse in obtaining the cards was such that the cards are void. The 10 alleged discriminatees, all of whom testified, comprised all of the first, second, and third assistant engineers employed on the Hughes Glomar Explorer from August 1 to October 1. Neither Chief Engi- neer Anthony nor Chief Engineer Stackhouse testified. Each of the 10 assistant engineers signed an authorization card reading: I hereby authorize The National MEBA to represent me in any and all negotiations relative to collective bargaining with my present or any future employer. This authorization shall continue in full force and effect until I have revoked same by written revocation delivered to the secretary-treasurer of said union. There is no evidence to indicate any of the authorizations were revoked. It appears from the record that First Assistant Engineer Smith, a member of the MEBA for 25 years, was the most active individual in organizing the engine department. He testified to having attended three meetings about the Union at the Brass Rail, a cocktail lounge near the Phila= delphia Airport, in the latter part of April and early May. His authorization card, along with those of Kell and Fred- erickson, is dated May 9. Welty, whose card is undated, testified that he signed his card at the same time Kell and Frederickson signed. While Smith testified that Chief Engi- neer Anthony also signed a card, attended union meetings, and helped organize "to some extent," it appears from the record that the extent of Anthony's involvement was limit- ed to his signing a card and attendance at meetings. Chief Engineer Stackhouse's activities appear to have been simi- larly limited. Kell testified that while Anthony attended the May 9 Brass Rail meeting, he didn't pass out authorization cards, nor let it be known he favored the Union; that it was not until a later date, after Kell had signed, that he learned Anthony was in favor of the Union. Frederickson testified that on May 9, Union Representative Kerestesy met with Smith, Kell, Welty, Frederickson, and Chief Engineers An- thony and Stackhouse at the Brass Rail, that "it was a question and answer period with Mr. Kerestesy" answering questions about the Union, that Kerestesy stated what the performance of their duties, authorized extra payment for overtime and penalty time, disciplined oilers for misconduct, and effectively recommend- ed action as to hire, retention, transfer, or dismissal. In Globe Steamship Company, el at, 85 NLRB 475 (1949), also cited by Respondent, the assis- tant engineers possessed the authority to effectively recommend the hire, discharge, disciplining, and promotion of the unlicensed engine department personnel, and the settlement of their grievances. Union had to offer; that he, Frederickson, asked Kerestesy for an authorization card which he signed; that he thought everyone asked for a card, but that he didn't know who had signed. Welty's testimony substantially parallels that of Frederickson. He asked Kerestesy for an authorization card which he signed along with the five others in atten- dance; and he didn't recall Chief Engineers Anthony or Stackhouse saying anything about the Union. Sometime in early June a meeting was held in the apartment which Kell and Frederickson shared. Union Representative Kerestesy, Kell, Frederickson, Brookshire, and Chief Engineers An- thony and Stackhouse were in attendance. Brookshire testi- fied that Kerestesy "explained about the Union and their retirement and some of the pay scales," and was asked if he would like to sign an authorization card, which he did. He testified further that while Kell was the only other person that talked to him about an authorization card prior to the meeting, he concluded that everyone at the meeting was in favor of the Union. McDonald, a member of the MEBA since 1942, testified that he signed an authorization card approximately 2 weeks after he boarded the Hughes Glo- mar Explorer on June 18. Kell had asked McDonald and David Lucky, an assistant engineer who left the ship prior to its sailing for Bermuda, if they wanted to meet with Kerestesy. Neither Anthony nor Stackhouse was present when McDonald signed. Later, Anthony asked him ques- tions about the Union. McDonald also discussed the bene- fits of the Union with other assistant engineers who had already signed authorization cards. Aikens, Adamis, Ah- -bel, and Peel signed authorization cards on August 10. Ai- kens obtained his card from Kell and signed it in the en- gine control booth. He testified that he never attended any union meetings and that he never discussed the Union with the chief engineer. Ahbel, who had discussed the Union previously with both McDonald and Kell, obtained his card from Smith in the latter's stateroom while the vessel was in Bermuda. Ahbel knew that the chief engineers had already signed cards and were in favor of the Union. Ahbel also discussed the Union with Adamis and Peel, and told them if they were interested that they should contact Smith. Adamis contacted Smith in his stateroom, asked for a card, and signed it.-Peel testified that he also contacted Smith who handed him an authorization card and asked him to read it over and whether he wanted to sign it, assur- ing him, "Well, if you don't want to, you don't have to." After first declining, Peel returned in about an hour and signed it. Peel testified that Chief Engineer Stackhouse didn't talk to him about the Union. Although all of the assistant engineers who signed cards appeared as witnesses and were subject to cross-examina- tion by Respondent, there is not the slightest suggestion in the testimony of any of them that their designation of the Union was influenced by anything Chief Engineers Antho- ny or Stackhouse said or did. The evidence most favorable to Respondent's position is the testimony of Smith, who testified on cross-examination that Anthony signed an au- thorization card, attended union meetings, and helped or- ganize the crew "to some extent." The record, however, does not reveal any extent of participation in organizing efforts other than signing cards and attendance at union meetings when Smith, Kell, Frederickson, Welty, and 198 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Brookshire signed cards. The testimony of Kell, Freder- ickson, Welty, and Brookshire is completely void of any indication of influence exerted by either of the chief engi- neers. Nor does the record show that either Anthony or Stackhouse approached any employee for the purpose of soliciting an authorization card. Therefore, the evidence convinces me that Anthony and Stackhouse were "follow- ers" rather than "leaders" in the organizational campaign and that their influence on the others, if any, was minimal. Enforcing the Board's decision in 190 NLRB 174 (1971), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in N.L.R.B. v. WKRG- TV, Inc., 470 F.2d 1302 (1973), stated at 1315: It is actual pressure and coercion we are seeking to avoid by our rule disallowing cards tainted by supervi- sory influence. A mechanical rule that requires a find- ing of supervisory solicitation in situations such as we have here, where there is no hint of intimidation, is too broad. Before the Board invalidates a card because of pro- union supervisory solicitation, there must be some showing that the signing employee was subject to a reasonable apprehension that his failure to sign could have adverse consequences. Certainly a direct solicita- tion by a known supervisor could give rise to the nec- essary inference of reasonable apprehension. E. g., N.L.R.B. v. Hecks, Inc., supra, 386 F.2d at 321. Simi- larly, active campaigning for the union by the supervi- sor even without actual solicitation, could in many cir- cumstances necessitate a finding of improper solicita- tion. See Turner's Express, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., supra; [fn. omitted] N.L.R.B. v. Heck's, Inc., supra, 386 F.2d at 322. s There must be a more substantial exhibition of pres- sure than a passing remark or a statement of prounion conviction. So long as nothing in the words, deeds, or atmosphere of the alleged "solicitation" contain the seeds of potential reprisal, punishment,- or intimida- tion, the involvement of the supervisors does not rise to the levels of supervisory "solicitation" that we con- demned in American Cable I, supra. Here the supervi- sors attended a few union meetings and at various times made rather tame statements regarding their ap- proval of the union. There is not a sufficient showing to throw out any of the cards, and the Board was cor- rect in refusing to allow the minimal- supervisory parti- cipation in this organization drive to frustrate the union's otherwise valid majority. On the basis of the foregoing facts and authorities, I conclude and find that none of the authorization cards are invalid, and that on August 10, Respondent had valid de- signations as the collective-bargaining representative of all 10 assistant marine engineers. D. Appropriate Unit Paragraph 8 of the complaint alleges that all first marine engineers, second marine engineers, third marine engi- neers, and oilers employed by the Respondent on the Hughes Glomar Explorer, excluding office clerical employ- ees, professional employees, guards, and supervisors as de- fined in the Act, and further excluding all other employees of the Respondent employed on the ship, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining with- in the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. Paragraph 9 alleges that since on or about August 10, the Union has been the majority representative of the employees in said unit. The record shows that by letter dated June 27, counsel for the MEBA advised Respondent that it represented "the vast majority of the marine engineers employed on your vessel" and requested bargaining. The parties stipulated that on the following day the counsel for Respondent, in a telephone conversation with counsel for the MEBA, de- clined to grant recognition. On October 1, the MEBA filed a petition with the Region 31 of the Board requesting an election in a unit limited to the marine engineers employed aboard the Hughes Glomar Explorer. The petition was not processed and, on October 9, the charge initiating this pro- ceeding was filed. Respondent contends it would not be proper to include the engineers who are supervisors, with oilers, who are not supervisors; that there is no community of interest between the oilers and assistant engineers; and the assistant engi- neers, in addition to being supervisors, are technical and/ or professional employees and the oilers are not: I, have previously found the assistant engineers are not supervi- sors. I further find that they are not professional employees as that term is defined in Section 2(12) of the Act. It is clear from the record that the work performed by the assis- tant engineers, working either as watch engineers, mainte- nance engineers, or oilers, is not "predominantly intellectu- al and varied in character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical or physical work; (ii) involving the constant exercise of discretion and judgment in its perfor- mance; (iii) of such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in rela- tion to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning custom- arily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellec- tual instruction and study in an institution of higher learn- ing . . . as distinguished from a general academic educa- tion or from an apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine mental, manual, or physical pro- cesses.. .." nor was it shown that the chief engineers are professional persons so that working under their supervi- sion would qualify the assistant engineers to become pro- fessional employees. Moreover, the Board does not auto- matically exclude technical employees from a unit of non- technical employees. Instead, the Board looks to see if there is a community of interest among the groups of em- ployees, considering, among others, the following factors: "Desires of the parties, history of bargaining, similarity of skills and job functions, common supervision, contact and/ or interchange with other employees, similarity of working conditions, type of industry, organization of plant, whether the technical employees work in separately situated and controlled areas, and whether any union seeks to represent GLOBAL MARINE DEVELOPMENT OF CALIF., INC. 199 technical employees separately." The Sheffield Corporation, 134 NLRB 1101, 1103-1104 (1961). Thus, even if the assis- tant engineers are technical employees, which I find they are not, the overriding consideration and unit placement is the community of interest, or lack thereof, between the assistant engineers and the oilers. A consideration of all relevant factors convinces me, and I find, that the assistant engineers and oilers share a community of interest and comprise an appropriate collective-bargaining unit. The as- sistant engineers and oilers comprise all of the nonsupervi- sory employees in the engine department, they work side by side, each assisting the other, and are subject to the same supervision. Ahbel's initial training aboard ship, prior to assuming watch engineer status on the B crew, was as an oiler on the A crew. Aikens likewise performed oiler work prior to becoming a watch engineer on the A crew. Adamis and Peel alternated on oiler and watch engineer duties on the B crew. Thus, it is seen that the oilers and assistant engineers possess many of the same job skills and there is a constant interchange of job functions among some of the oilers and assistant engineers. Except for the period the watch engineer is on duty in the control room, the working conditions of the oilers and assistant engineers are similar, since they work together in the engineroom and related spaces. The record further establishes that all employees share the same dining room. While there was no showing that the assistant engineers and oilers enjoy the same em- ployee benefits, the dissimilarity of benefits, if any, is pecu- liarly within the knowledge of Respondent who has chosen not to show them. Although the MEBA did not request recognition in a unit including the oilers, it is willing to represent them along with the assistant engineers. Further, there is no history of collective bargaining for the employ- ees on the Hughes Glomar Explorer. On the basis of the foregoing, I conclude and find that the assistant engineers and oilers have a community of in- terest and that together they comprise an appropriate col- lective-bargaining unit. The unit, at times material to this proceeding, consisted of four assistant marine engineers and three oilers on the A crew, and six assistant engineers and three oilers on the B crew, for a total of ten assistant engineers and six oilers. The MEBA, with valid authoriza- tion cards from each of the 10 assistant engineers, is and has been since on or about August 10, the exclusive repre- sentative of all first, second, and third assistant marine en- gineers and oilers as alleged in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the complaint.- E. Union Animus 14 agents Dean and Williams, promised employees improved benefits in the nature of pension, stock option, and dental plans if they refrained from supporting the MEBA, and threatened that if the assistant marine engineers supported and selected the MEBA as their collective-bargaining rep- resentative, Respondent would not bargain collectively with the MEBA: 15 (2) On or about August 7, Respondent, through its agents Crooke and Evans, promised employees improved benefits in the nature of pension and stock option plans if they refrained from supporting the Union, interrogated employees as to their reasons for supporting the Union, and threatened that if the assistant marine engineers sup- ported and selected the MEBA as their collective-bargain- ing representative, Respondent would not bargain collec- tively with the MEBA; 6 (3) On or about August 9, Respondent, through its agent Williams, told an employee that he should not sign any- thing for the MEBA; 7 (4) On or about September 25, Respondent, through Dean, promised employees improved benefits, including pension and stock option plans if they refrained from sup- porting the MEBA, told employees they did not want em- ployees to affiliate with the MEBA, and threatened em- ployees that if they continued in Respondent's employ they must support Respondent's antiunion policy by not joining MEBA;1 (5) On or about October 1, Respondent, through Dean and Evans, told employees they were being terminated for their failure to support the Respondent's antiunion poli- cy;19 (6) In the first week in August, Respondent, through Ev- ans and Crooke, interrogated employees as to their reasons for supporting the MEBA, threatened them with discharge if they continued to support the MEBA, and promised them improved benefits if they refrained from supporting the MEBA;20 (7) On or about September 25, Respondent discharged Aikens, McDonald, Kell, and Frederickson, and on or about October 1, discharged Welty, Ahbel, Peel, Smith, Adamis, and Brookshire, because said employees joined or assisted MEBA;21 By the acts and conduct set forth in subparagraphs (1) through (6) above, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act; and by the acts and conduct set forth in subparagfaph-(7) above, Respondent discriminated against its employees in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. It is clear, and I find, that Respondent engaged in the conduct set forth above in order to undermine and destroy While the Respondent's answer denied the 8(a)(1) and (3) allegations of the complaint, it offered no evidence to refute the testimony of the General Counsel's witnesses. Accordingly, I find that the preponderance of the evidence establishes that: (1) On or about August 6, Respondent,' through its 14 Respondent admits that the following individuals occupied the posi- tions set opposite their names and are supervisors and its agents: Curtis Crooke-president; John Evans-vice president of operations; James Dean-operations manager ; Tom Williams-personnel director. 15 Based upon the credited testimony of Smith, Brookshire, Welty. and Aikens. Respondent's Attorney Smith, present throughout the hearing, did not deny the August 6 allegations although the testimony shows that he was present when the threats and promises were made. 16 Based upon the credited testimony of McDonald, Ahbel, and Aikens. 17 Based upon the credited testimony or Peel. la Based upon the credited testimony of Frederickson, Aikens, and Mc- Donald. 19 Based upon the credited testimony of Smith, Peel, Ahbel, Welty. Adamis, and Brookshire. 20 Based upon the credited testimony of Kell and Frederickson. 21 Based upon the credited testimony of all 10 assistant marine engineers. 200 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the majority status of the MEBA in order to evade any obligation to bargain with that labor organization. Because of the extensive and flagrant nature of the Respondent's unfair labor practices as found above, whereby it dissipated the MEBA's majority and removed any hope of a fair election pursuant to the MEBA's peti- tion, I find it unnecessary to rule on whether or not there was a technical 8(a)(5) violation as the MEBA contends since, in either event, a bargaining order is appropriate. The Supreme Court has approved the issuance of a bar- gaining order even in the absence of an 8(a)(5) violation, where, as here, the unfair labor practices are "outrageous" and "pervasive" and of "such a nature that their coercive effects cannot be eliminated by the application of tradi- tional remedies, with the result that a fair and reliable elec- tion cannot be had." N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 613-614 (1968); Lincoln Supply Co., Inc., 198 NLRB 932 (1972). But for its unlawful conduct, the Re- spondent would have been obliged to recognize and bar- gain with the MEBA. I find, therefore, that, even in the absence of an 8(a)(5) violation, a bargaining order is re- quired to fully restore the status quo ante and to remedy the 8(a)(l) violations committed by the Respondent. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent as set forth in section 111, above, occurring in connection with the operations of Re- spondent described in section 1, above, have a close, inti- mate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY It having been found that Respondent discriminatorily discharged Leonard Aikens, Robert McDonald, Henry Frederickson, and Gary Kell on September 25, and Tim Welty, Robert Ahbel, Kirk Peel, John Smith , Daniel Adamis, and Archie Brookshire on October 1, I shall rec- ommend that Respondent offer them immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to seniority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed by each, dismissing, if nec- essary, any employee hired since the date of termination of each, having less seniority. It is further recommended that Respondent make the above discriminatees whole for any loss of pay each may have suffered by reason of the dis- crimination against them. Said loss of pay shall be based on the earnings.each would normally have earned from the date of discharge until he is offered reinstatement less the net earnings of each during such period. Said backpay shall be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner estab- lished by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1962). The interest on backpay shall be com- puted in the manner set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). Having found that Respondent's extensive and flagrant unfair labor practices have dissipated the MEBA's majori- ty and removed any hope of a fair election pursuant to the MEBA's petition, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom, and bargain collectively with the MEBA as the exclusive representative of all employees in the unit set forth above, and, if an agreement is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. It is also recommended that Respondent be ordered to make available to the Board, upon request, all payroll and other records to facilitate checking the amount of earnings due. In view of the nature and extent of the unfair labor prac- tices found to have been engaged in by the Respondent, which indicate its determination to interfere aggressively with its employees' rights of self-organization and its inter- ference with the principle of collective bargaining, I shall recommend a broad cease-and-desist order herein. Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent, Global Marine Development of California, Inc., is an employer engaged in commerce with- in the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. District 1, Pacific Coast District, MEBA, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By discriminatorily discharging Leonard Aikens, Robert McDonald, Henry Frederickson, and Gary Kell on September 25, and Tim Welty, Robert Ahbel, Kirk Peel, John Smith, Daniel Adamis, and Archie Brookshire on Oc- tober 1, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices af- fecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. - 4. By promising employees improved benefits if they abandoned or refrained from supporting the MEBA, Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. 5. By interrogating employees regarding their reasons for supporting the MEBA, by threatening employees with discharge if they continued to support the MEBA, and by threatening that it would not bargain collectively with the MEBA if the employees selected the MEBA as the collec- tive-bargaining representative, Respondent violated Sec- tion 8(a)(I) of the Act. 6. By telling employees they should not affiliate with or sign anything for the MEBA, and that they must support Respondent's antiunion policy by not joining the MEBA, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 7. By telling employees that they were being terminated for their failure to support Respondent's antiunion policy, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(I) of the Act. 8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 9. On August 10, 1973, the MEBA was the exclusive representative for collective-bargaining purposes of Respondent's employees in the unit described as follows: All first marine engineers, second marine engineers, third marine engineers, and oilers employed by the Respondent on the Hughes Glomar Explorer, exclud- GLOBAL MARINE DEVELOPMENT OF CALIF., INC. 201 ing office clerical employees, professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined by the Act, and further excluding all other employees of the Respon- dent employed on the ship. The aforesaid unit was, and is, a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act; and any subsequent loss of such status is the result of the Respondent's unfair labor practic- es heretofore found above. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER 12 Respondent, Global Marine Development of California, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against any employee for supporting District 1, Pacific Coast District, MEBA, AFL-CIO, or any other union. (b) Promising employees improved benefits if they abandoned or refrained from supporting the Union. (c) Interrogating employees regarding their reasons for supporting the Union , threatening employees with dis- charge if they continued to support the Union , and threat- ening that it would not bargain collectively with the Union if the employees selected the Union as their collective-bar- gaining representative. (d) Telling employees they should not affiliate with or sign anything for the Union, and that they must support the Respondent's antiunion policy by not joining the Union. (e) Telling employees that they were being terminated for their failure to support Respondent's antiunion policy. (f) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef- fectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain in good faith with District 1, Pacific Coast District , MEBA, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the following appropri- ate unit and embody in a signed agreement any under- standing reached: All first marine engineers , second marine engineers, third marine engineers, and oilers employed by the employer on the Hughes Glomar Explorer, excluding office clerical employees , professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined by the Act, and further excluding all other employees of the Respon- dent employed on said ship; (b) Offer Leonard Aikens, Robert McDonald, Henry Frederickson , Gary Kell, Tim Welty, Robert Ahbel, Kirk Peel, John Smith , Daniel Adamis, and Archie Brookshire immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if their jobs no longer exist , to substantially equivalent posi- tions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make said employees whole as set forth in the remedy section herein, for any loss of earnings suf- fered as a result of the discrimination against them. (c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all pay- roll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records, and other reports, and all other records necessary to analyze and determine the amounts of back- pay due these employees under the terms of this recom- mended order. (d) Post at its offices in Los Angeles, California, and aboard the Hughes Glomar Explorer, and all other places where notices to marine engineers are customarily posted, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 2J Cop- ies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 31, after being duly signed by Respondent's representatives, shall be posted by Respon- dent immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, where notices to marine engineers are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 31, in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 22 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 .46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Section 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 23 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government "The hearing held in Los Angeles, California, on January 14, 15, 16, and February 19, 1974, in which we participated and had a chance to give evidence, resulted in a decision that we had committed certain unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and this notice is posted pur- suant to that decision. The National Labor Relations Act, as amended, gives all employees the following rights: To organize themselves To form, join, or support unions To bargain as a group through a representative they choose To act together for collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection To refrain from any or all such activities. 202 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD WE WILL bargain upon request with District 1, Pacif- ic Coast District, MEBA, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all first marine engineers , second ma- rine engineers, third marine engineers , and oilers em- ployed on the Hughes Glomar Explorer , and put in writing and sign any bargaining agreement reached. WE WILL offer immediate and full reinstatement to Leonard Aikens , Robert McDonald , Henry Freder- ickson, Gary Kell, Tim Welty, Robert Ahbel, Kirk Peel, John Smith , Daniel Adamis , and Archie Brook- shire and make them whole for any loss of earnings or other benefits suffered because of the discrimination against them. WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate against our employees for supporting District 1, Pacif- ic Coast District, MEBA, AFL-CIO, or any other union. WE WILL NOT promise our employees improved bene- fits if they abandon or refrain from supporting the Union. WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees regarding their reasons for supporting the Union, threaten our employees with discharge if they continue to support the Union, or threaten our employees that we will not bargain collectively with the Union if they select the Union as their collective-bargaining representative. WE WILL NOT tell our employees that they should not affiliate with or sign anything for the Union, and that they must support an antiunion policy by not joining the Union. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of any right guaranteed them by the Act. GLOBAL MARINE DEVEL- OPMENT OF CALIFORNIA, INC.