Uarco Inc.

UARCO INCORPORATED Uarco Incorporated andPrinting Specialties and Paper Products Union, District Council No. 2, Internation- al Printing and Graphics Conununications Union, AFL-CIO. Cases 21-CA-12318 and 21-RC-13442 December 31, 1974 DECISION, ORDER, AND CERTIFICATION OF RESULTS OF ELECTION BY MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO On May 15, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Russell L. Stevens issued the attached Decision in this proceeding, finding that Respondent had not engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommending that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety. In addition, the Administra- tive Law Judge found no merit in the Union's Objection 5 to the election held on December 13, 1973, and recommended that it be overruled. Thereafter, the General Counsel and the Charging Party Petitioner filed exceptions and supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order and certify the results of the election. Respondent held 10 preelection meetings com- mencing I month before and ending 24 to 48 hours prior to the December 13, 1973, Board-conducted election. The meetings, attended by representatives of Respondent and employees, were held in three series in the plant's conference room and cafeteria in order to accommodate employees on all three shifts. Although attendance was voluntary, almost all of the employees were present. Representing Respondent at each of the meetings were William E. Gordon, Riverside plant manager; Thomas E. McLemore, western division manager; James B. Brown, vice president and secretary; and William F. Treacy, counsel ; prior to that time, employees had never met any of Respondent's representatives except Gordon. At the first series of meetings, Gordon introduced I The General Counsel has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1 Respondent's other representatives and then turned the meetings over to Treacy who explained the mechanics of a National Labor Relations Board election, after which Respondent "threw the meet- ings open to questions and discussions." Although many of the witnesses offered conflicting testimony, it appears that Respondent carefully avoided an express "solicitation of complaints and grievances." Nevertheless, when Respondent threw open the discussion, all persons present interpreted that gesture as an offer by Respondent to entertain complaints or gripes. This interpretation seems plausible since employees, with the acquiescence of Respondent, proceeded to raise complaints, the major one being the lack of communication between management and employees and especially the ineffectiveness of the shop committee which had been created in 1970 as a device for such communi- cation. Respondent's representatives listened and responded to the comments about the shop commit- tee, and the discussion of this topic was continued at subsequent meetings. The Administrative Law Judge found, and we agree, in view of the prolonged discussion of the complaints with Respondent's tacit, 'if not actual, encouragement, the number of meet- ings, the absence of a regular practice of holding such meetings, and the admitted desire of Respon- dent to win the support of the employees at the meetings, that Respondent at least impliedly solicited complaints and grievances from the employees. Nevertheless, the Administrative Law Judge also found, and we agree, that the Respondent's preelec- tion conduct was not coercive and that it neither violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act nor interfered with the freedom of choice of the employees in the election. The disposition of this case rests on the resolution of the question whether Respondent, by its conduct, impliedly made promises of benefits to the employ- ees, for there is no doubt that none of Respondent's statements themselves contained any such express promises. As noted by the Administrative Law Judge and by our dissenting colleague, the solicitation of grievances at preelection meetings carries with it an inference that an employer is implicitly promising to correct those inequities it discovers as a result of its inquiries.2 Thus, the Board has found unlawful interference with employee rights by an employer's solicitation of grievances during an organizational campaign although the employer merely stated it would look into or review the problem but did not 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. 2 Reliance Electric Company, Madison Plant Mechanical Drives Division, 191 NLRB 44 (1971); Hadbar, Division of Pur 0 Si!, Inc., 211 NLRB 333 (1974). 216 NLRB No. 2 2 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD commit itself to specific corrective action; the Board reasoned that employees would tend to anticipate improved conditions of employment which might make union representation unnecessary.3 However, it is not the solicitation of grievances itself that is coercive and violative of Section 8(a)(1),4 but the promise to correct grievances or a concurrent interrogation or polling about union sympathies that is unlawful; the solicitation of grievances merely raises an inference that the employer is making such a promise, which inference is rebuttable by the employer. In the instant case, notwithstanding the back- ground against which the preelection employee- management meetings were set,5 the inference of such a promise has been effectively rebutted. As set forth above, the principal complaint raised at the meetings concerned the lack of communication and the ineffectiveness of the existing shop committee for this purpose. Representatives of Respondent merely replied that the efficacy of a shop committee depends on the efforts of the employees and then cited some examples of successful shop committees in other plants. Not only did Respondent's representatives make no promise to put more "teeth" into the shop committee or to attend all meetings of that commit- tee in the future,6 but throughout the meetings the employees were repeatedly told that the Employer could make no promises regarding the grievances raised. Thus, any possible inference of a promise of benefits was specifically negated by the express "no promise" responses to the employees' complaints, in the circumstances of this case. And, unlike the situation in Reliance Electric Company,7 any logical anticipation of improved conditions which the employees otherwise might have had was clearly dispelled by the express, affirmative emphasis on the Employer's inability to make promises.8 Particularly is this so where, as here, the record is devoid of any showing of union animus on the part of Respondent, and there is not one scintilla of evidence that Respondent's preelection activities were conducted in the context of other unfair labor practices.9 Nor is a different result warranted because of the 3 Reliance Electric Company, supra; Rotek, Incorporated 194 NLRB 453 (1971). 4 Apparently our dissenting colleague would find the solicitation of grievances alone is coercive and unlawful , despite any evidence that may show that there was no promise of benefits. We cannot accept such a view. While it is possible that in some situations the surrounding circumstances would warrant finding an illegal promise notwithstanding statements to the contrary such as were made here, this is not such a case. 3 These circumstances are that Respondent was not in the habit of holding such meetings ; but for the organizational campaign by the Union, they would not have been held; and, finally , Respondent's representatives impliedly (but not directly) solicited complaints and grievances from the employees. 6 The Administrative Law Judge so found based on credibility resolutions. Respondent's letter, signed by McLemore, which was distributed to the employees just prior to the election and shortly after the last series of meetings, which stated: I am asking you to believe: 1. That I have learned what your legitimate problems are. 2. That I am concerned about your problems. 3. That we can work out these problems by working together. I will make one promise that I will do my best. This is, at best, ambiguous and does not alter the fact that Respondent did not make promises of corrective action and, in fact, cautioned that it could not do so. McLemore's letter, in asserting an awareness and concern for the problems of the employees, clearly related to the preceding meetings in which management officials emphasized that no promises could be made. McLemore's statement, "I will make one promise that I will do my best," when considered, as it must be, in the context of the position taken at the meetings, does nothing that would support or reinforce employee anticipation of improved conditions of employment which might make union representation unnecessary. Finally, our dissenting colleague would find a grant of benefit because, in response to a specific request by an employee made during one of the preelection meetings, the telephone numbers of two of Respon- dent's executives were posted on employee bulletin boards. But the only "benefit" thereby bestowed upon the employees was the ability to dial these executives directly rather than having to place the calls through the switchboard; this was merely a matter of convenience and did not open an avenue of communication with management which theretofore had been closed. Accordingly, we agree with the Administrative Law Judge that the posting of the numbers represented no more than a minor gesture by management, and even if it had been a new means of reaching management it was too trivial an act to constitute a proscribed granting of benefits which 7 Supra. 9 Peerless of America Incorporated 198 NLRB 982, In. 6, and ALJD II1,C,6 (1972). In that case the Board, with Member Jenkins participating, found no unfair labor practice where an employer , during an organizational campaign, asked several employees about their problems or complaints but told each of them that the company could make no promises , and the other statements by the employer implied no promise of benefits. 9 Contrary to the interpretation of our dissenting colleague, we are not placing any limitations upon or modifying the existing rule that solicitation of grievances implies a promise to correct complaints . Rather, it is he who has misconstrued that rule. For, we have never found more than a presumption or inference of a promise of benefits and it is not and never has been an urebuttable presumption which must be accepted blindly regardless of evidence which leads to a different conclusion. UARCO INCORPORATED 3 would interfere with employee rights in an organiza- tion campaign. For the above reasons, we find no basis for reversing the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that Respondent neither violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act nor interfered with the laboratory conditions necessary for a fair election.10 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. CERTIFICATION OF RESULTS OF ELECTION It is hereby certified that a majority of the valid ballots have not been cast for Printing Specialties and Paper Products Union, District Council No. 2, International Printing and Graphics Communica- tions Union, AFL-CIO, and that said labor organi- zation is not the exclusive representative of all the employees, in the unit herein involved, within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. MEMBER JENKINS, dissenting: My colleagues find that Respondent's solicitation of employee grievances and complaints and its response to the matters raised, all of which occurred during the preelection period, is insufficient to demonstrate that the employees were coerced there- by or that such conduct interfered with the Board election. I disagree and, since issues of this nature must be resolved not merely on the remarks themselves, but also in the context in which they were made, I will set forth briefly what I understand to be the pertinent facts. The evidence shows that, during the critical period prior to the Board election, Respondent held a series of 10 meetings with its employees, the last of which occurred a day or two prior to the election. Attendance at these meetings was voluntary, al- though, in fact, most employees were present. It is 10 Our dissenting colleague suggests that the meetings at which the grievances were aired not only raised an inference of promises to take corrective action , but were in fact themselves a remedy to the complaint of the failure of management to communicate with the employees . We do not agree Respondent's decision to hold the meetings was a natural response to an election campaign before it became aware that lack of communications was an employee grievance . It is difficult indeed to conceive of any course Respondent might have followed, short of altogether abandoning its right to hold voluntary meetings to communicate its views to its employees, which would have been less likely to interfere with the employees' freedom of uncontroverted that similar group employee-manage- ment meetings had not been held in the recent past 11 and that, with the exception of Plant Manager Gordon, the high-level management representatives attending the meetings were strangers to the employ- ees. Further, it is admitted by Respondent that one of the purposes of these meetings was to attempt to persuade employees that a union was not necessary. At the first series of meetings, Respondent's counsel, Treacy, explained the mechanics of a Board election and, thereafter, Respondent threw the meetings open to discussion. Although Respondent was careful not to directly solicit grievances and complaints, the Administrative Law Judge found, and my colleagues and I agree, that the record evidence overwhelmingly establishes that Respon- dent invited and impliedly solicited a response from the employees as to their grievances and complaints. As a consequence, the employees raised matters which were of concern to them at these and subsequent meetings and it became apparent that the employees' primary concern was with the ineffective- ness of their shop committee 12 in communicating with management. Respondent immediately demon- strated the importance it placed on receiving employ- ee complaints by, in the first series of meetings, taking notes as to the matters raised so that they could be discussed at future meetings. In response to employee complaints about the lack of effectiveness of the shop committee, Respondent told employees that the efficacy of the shop committee depended on the efforts of the employees and cited examples of how shop committees functioned successfully at other plants. Although Respondent told the employ- ees that it would not promise to do anything about the shop committee, other remarks and conduct by Respondent made it clear to the employees that their complaints about a lack of communication were not going to go unheeded. Thus, one of the top ranking management officials at these meetings, Western Division Manager McLemore, admitted that he would like to attend the shop committee meetings, but could make no promises. Also during the meetings, Respondent promised to post the private telephone numbers of Plant Manager Gordon and Western Division Manager McLemore in order to facilitate communications between employees and top management and, some 7 to 10 days before the choice in the upcoming election II The last such meeting was several years earlier and in similar circumstances in that it was also conducted just prior to a National Labor Relations Board election. 12 The shop committee was first formed in the spring or early summer of 1970 upon the initiative of the employees and existed primarily as a device for communication between management and the employees . It continued to exist in a reconstituted form during the time in question in this proceeding. 4 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD election, the numbers were posted in the plant. If, at this point, any employees had lingering doubts about Respondent's interest in their complaints, these doubts certainly must have been dispelled by McLemore's letter to employees, distributed 1 day prior to the election in which he stated: I am asking you to believe: 1. That I have learned what your legitimate problems are. 2. That I am concerned about your problems. 3. That we can work out these problems by working together. I will make one promise that I will do my best. We have long held, in circumstances such as these, i.e., where there is no past practice of soliciting employee grievances and the solicitations are in response to the union's organizational activities, that such solicitations carry with them the implied promise that such grievances will be remedied.13 I had thought until now that the rule meant what it said and that, in the circumstances described, the mere solicitation of grievances was by itself coercive and in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act without the necessity of establishing by proof that the employer was promising either expressly or by implication to adjust such grievances. But my colleagues now make it quite clear that it is their intention to engraft a further limitation on the rule's applicability by allowing such a presumption only in circumstances where the solicitation of grievances is carried out in the backdrop of other unfair labor practices. In all other situations, they would appar- ently require specific evidence that the employer expressly led employees to believe that their griev- ances would be adjusted if they abandoned the union. I, of course, disagree with the limitation my colleagues have placed on the use of this presump- tion, but, even under the standard of proof they are requiring, I think there is ample evidence to show that Respondent did not lead its employees to think their grievances would be remedied. In Reliance Electric Company, 191 NLRB 44, statements by the employer that it would "look in" or "review" complaints was found to be sufficient evidence to establish that the employer explicitly promised employees it would strive to adjust employ- ee complaints.14 Certainly, at least as much can be 13 Hadbar, Division of Pur 0 SI4 Inc., 211 NLRB 333 (1974); Swift Produce, Inc., 203 NLRB 360 (1973); Reliance Electric Company, Madison Plant Mechanical Drives Division, 191 NLRB 44 (1971); Associated MilL,, Inc., 19ONLRB 113(1971). 14 It is interesting to note that in Reliance Electric Company, although shown here. Respondent's efforts to convince the employees that it was no longer indifferent to their complaints by giving assurances that the employees would be able henceforth to bring their complaints directly to the attention of top management can only be viewed as a promise by Respondent to review those grievances brought to its attention. Also by posting the private telephone numbers of Plant Manager Gordon and Western Division Manager McLemore, shortly before the election, Respondent emphasized the immediacy it placed on entertaining employee grievances. I would think that such a course of action could not help but lead employees to believe that their complaints would be given immedi- ate and active consideration and that legitimate grievances would be remedied. But if at this point any doubt existed in the minds of employees as to Respondent's intentions, it should have been re- moved by McLemore's letter to employees just before the election, wherein employees were told that Respondent had learned what their legitimate prob- lems were; that it was concerned; and that these problems could be worked out by Respondent and the employees working together. In my judgment, the foregoing and in particular McLemore's letter is convincing proof that Respon- dent explicitly promised to remedy legitimate em- ployee grievances. Such conduct obviously would cause employees to believe that no purpose could be served by choosing union representation. Indeed, the very fact that employees were encouraged to raise their complaints before the election for immediate and active consideration by Respondent could only suggest to employees that Respondent's new found interest in their problems was unlikely to continue if they chose union representation. At no time did Respondent indicate or suggest to employees that its interest in their problems or grievances would continue irrespective of whether or not they chose to be represented by the Union. On the contrary, Respondent's "proposal" on its face did not extend beyond direct dealings with employees or dealings with them through the employee shop committee. While the foregoing represents what I understand to be the applicable principles here, there is yet another facet of the case upon which my colleagues touch not at all. This is that Respondent's solicitation or invitation of grievances amounted, not to a specific or implied promise to remedy grievances, but to an actual remedy of the employee dissatisfaction which created their interest in the union-the failure there was a specific finding that the employer was pronusing to adjust grievances, the rule was stated without limitation or qualification and apparently applied even though no other unfair labor practices were involved. UARCO INCORPORATED 5 of management to communicate with the employees. There can hardly have been a more direct or important device to interfere with the employees' choice. I would find that Respondent coerced employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by its solicitation of employee grievances and its promises to remedy them. I would also find that such conduct interfered with the employees' freedom of choice in the election and direct that a new election be conducted. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE carefully considered, were filed on behalf of the General Counsel, Respondent, and the Union. Upon the entire record,2 and from my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT At all times material herein, Respondent has been and now is, engaged in the manufacture of continuous business forms, with a place of business in Riverside, California. In the normal course and conduct of its business, Respondent annually sells and ships goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly to customers located outside the State of Califor- nia. RUSSELL L. STEVENS, Administrative Law Judge: This matter was heard at Riverside, California, on March 26 and 27, 1974. Printing Specialties and Paper Products Union, District Council No. 2, International Printing and Graphics Communications Union , AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the Union, filed on December 18, 1973, objections to a Board-conducted election held at Uarco Incorporated December 13, 1973 . On December 19, 1973, the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge against Uarco Incorporated, hereinafter referred to as Respondent, alleging facts that included issues raised by the aforesaid objections to election . On February 22, 1974, the Regional Director for Region 21 of the National Labor Relations Board filed a report on objections, and order directing hearing of objection 5 in Case 21-RC-13442; on the same date he filed an order consolidating said case with the unfair labor practice Case 21-CA-12318, for the purpose of hearing, ruling and decision . Complaint' and notice of hearing were issued February 20, 1974, alleging that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, by soliciting grievances from its employees, and by promising increased benefits to its employees if they ceased their support of the Union. Issues The principal issues are: 1. Whether Respondent's actions and words, taken and spoken during a series of preelection meetings with employees, precluded a fair election and constituted solicitation of grievances proscribed by the Act. 2. Whether actions and words, taken and spoken during the meetings mentioned above , including those relating to the employees' shop committee and the posting of management telephone numbers for use by employees, precluded a fair election and constituted promises of increased benefits proscribed by the Act. All parties were given full opportunity to participate, to introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to argue orally. Briefs, which have been 1 As amended at hearing, in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6. Errors in the transcript have been noted and corrected. The exact nature of the committee was not described at hearing, but clearly it acted, in some measure, as a grievance committee. Recognition of II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Printing Specialties and Paper Products Union, District Council No. 2, International Printing and Graphics Communications Union, AFL-CIO, is a labor organiza- tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background An election by secret ballot was conducted at Respon- dent's place of business December 13, 1973, under direction and supervision of the Regional Director of Region 21, in the unit agreed to be appropriate for the-- purpose of collective bargaining. The Union lost the election, and on December 18, 1973, filed objections to the election, alleging that certain acts by Respondent "upset the laboratory conditions necessary for the holding of a fair election, precluding any chance of a fair election being held in the future . . . ." It was also alleged that the acts of Respondent constituted unfair labor practices. Respondent held a series of meetings before the election, attended by representatives of management and employ- ees. There were 10 meetings, held at hours convenient for employees on shift work; 4 meetings were held during the first series about 1 month prior to the election; 3 were held about a week thereafter; and 3 were held from 24 to 48 hours prior to the election. Respondent's actions and words at these meetings were the basis for the Union's objection 5. The record shows without dispute that employee attend- ance at the meetings was voluntary. Some employees did not attend, and some left during the meeting. The exact number is not clear from the record, but most, or nearly all, employees did attend. The shop committee at Uarco Incorporated was formed in the late spring or early summer of 1970, upon the initiative of the employees, primarily as a device for communication between management and employees .3 William Gordon, hereinafter referred to as Gordon, the committee as a grievance body in the absence of a union would have no effect herein; it would not, in and of itself, constitute any violation of the Act. Golden Arrow Dairy, 194 NLRB 474 (1971). 6 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Riverside plant manager for the past 5 years, testified that he met occasionally with the chairman of the shop committee (five or six times in 1973), and with the committee on several occasions (three or four times in 1973). A new shop committee was selected by employees in February 1973, and it met with management thereafter on the third Tuesday of each month. The record shows that the employees did not believe the committee was as effective as it should be, and dissatisfaction was voiced during the series of 10 preelection meetings described above. The committee is directly involved in this contro- versy, the General Counsel alleging that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by promising to "pay more attention to the shop committee in the future" if employees ceased their support of the Union. B. The Controversy The acts of Respondent alleged by the General Counsel to be illegal and unfair were those of soliciting employee grievances, and promising increased benefits if employees ceased their support of the Union, during the aforesaid 10 meetings. (Promise to pay more attention to the shop committee, and to post management telephone numbers.) Respondent denies that its acts and words during said meetings can be interpreted as falling within the proscrip- tion of the Act. It contends that its actions and words were carefully drawn, to avoid any conflict with the provisions of the Act. Respondent does not challenge the testimony that similar group employee -management meetings were not held in the recent past, nor the testimony that, other than Gordon, management personnel attending the meet- ings were strangers to the employees . Further, Respondent acknowledges, through testimony and the record, that one of the purposes of the 10 meetings was to attempt to persuade the employees that a union was not necessary in the plant. Other purposes of the meetings were alleged by Respondent to be general group discussions concerning conditions of employment, and explanation by manage- ment of National Labor Relations Board election proce- dures. C. Solicitation of Complaints General Counsel alleges in the complaint (as amended at hearing): In or about November or December 1973, Respon- dent, through Gordon, at Respondent's facility de- scribed in paragraph 2(a) above, did solicit grievances from its employees. Counsel for Respondent was present at all 10 preelection meetings, and took an active part in directing their course. He was particularly careful in seeing that no representative of management specifically solicited complaints, as such, from employees. Use of the words "complaints" and "grievances" was avoided by management during the meetings. The same studious approach by Respondent to the two words was apparent throughout the hearing herein. Although the testimony of all witnesses is not in complete accord, it appears from the record that Respon- dent was successful in its attempt to avoid the label "solicitation of complaints" during the 10 preelection meetings. It is clear, and it is so found, that Respondent did not expressly solicit complaints or grievances during the 10 meetings. However, it is beyond doubt that complaints and grievances were invited, and impliedly solicited. The proof is overwhelming, and need only be described in summary form. First, it is not disputed that the meetings were, at least partially if not primarily, in the nature of preelection campaign meetings . But for the election, they would not have been held; Respondent acknowledges that similar meetings had not been conducted in the recent past. Second, the meetings consisted, in large part , of discussions about conditions of employment, airing of grievances, employee problems, and specific complaints. Obviously, such extensive and prolonged coverage of grievances and complaints as occurred (the meetings lasted from 1 to 2 hours each) would only originate and continue with management acquiescence . Third, all witnesses, both for the General Counsel and Respondent, are in accord in describing events of the meeting as discussions, gripes, complaints, presentation of problems, bitches, and the like. Respondent stated, through T. E. McLemore (letter of December 12, 1973, G.C. Exh. 2), that it had learned about, was concerned about, and could cooperatively work out the employees' "problems." Regardless of the labels attached to the actions and words of Respondent at the 10 meetings, their meaning was clear : Respondent called preelection meetings "to gain the support of the employees in the election." As McLemore further testified, "The company would like to win the election." Respondent "threw the meetings open to questions and discussions." Obviously, some employees were courting the Union. Respondent wanted to know as much as possible about its position. The best way to learn what was troubling the employees who sought union support, if anything, was to ask them. And, ask them Respondent did-perhaps not in so many words, but no witness expressed any doubt about what Respondent wanted to hear at the meetings. It is found that Respondent solicited complaints from its employees in 10 preelection meetings held in November and December 1973. However, solicitation alone is not a per se violation. It is violative of the Act only if its effect is coercive. If solicitation is for the purpose of ferreting out the causes for employees' seeking union representation, and if, upon learning of those causes, the employer eliminates their effect by promise or act, or implies it will do so, in order to destroy union preference, then the solicitation becomes coercive. Such is the sequence of events in many cases wherein a violation has been found . See, for example, Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc., 171 NLRB 293 (1968); Northwest Engineering Co., 158 NLRB 624 (1966), enfd. 376 F.2d 770 (C.A.D.C., 1967), cert. denied 389 U.S. 932 (1967); Crescent Art Linen Co., 158 NLRB 447 (1966), enfd. 387 F.2d 751 (C.A. 2, 1967). Also, if solicitation of UARCO INCORPORATED complaints or grievances is made during commission of unfair labor practices,4 the fact of solicitation may emerge as coercive. H. L. Meyer Company, 177 NLRB 565 (1969). However, where there has been even explicit, specific, and individual solicitation of grievances, there has been found no violation of the Act, in the absence of commission of unfair labor practices. Engineered Building Products, Inc., 162 NLRB 649 (1967). A specific finding of threat, promises, or coercion may support a finding of violation, but mere suspicion will not support a violation. Banner Biscuit Co. v. N.L.R.B., 356 F. 2d 765 (C.A. 8, 1966). If meetings are conducted for the purpose of having employees air their grievances, but no threats, promises, or other coercive action is found, the Act is not violated. Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp. v. N.LR.B., 404 F.2d 581 (C.A. 8, 1968). The fact that employee attendance at the meetings involved herein was entirely voluntary is not disputed. Employees could, and some of them did, either not attend or leave during the meetings. There was not even a hint of threat during the meetings. No unfair labor practice on the part of Respondent was shown or alleged, other than those alleged in the complaint herein. No promise by Respon- dent was alleged, other than the two alleged in the complaint, which are discussed below. The record is devoid of any showing of union animus. To the contrary, the record establishes the fact that Respon- dent encouraged attendance by its employees at union meetings. Further, it was clear from the demeanor and testimony of witnesses called by both parties that there was not an atmosphere of hostility between Respondent and its employees. Finally, there was no evidence of an antiunion campaign, or antiunion attacks, by Respondent. It is found, therefore, that the allegations of paragraph 5 of the complaint were not proved by the evidence and testimony. D. Promise of Increased Benefits Paragraph 6 of the complaint states: In or about November or December 1973, Respon- dent, through Gordon, at Respondent's facility de- scribed in paragraph 2(a) above, did make promises of increased benefits to employees if they ceased their support of the Union. The complaint is worded in the subjunctive. No evidence or testimony, express or implied, was introduced in support of the allegation as it is worded in the complaint. Respondent readily acknowledges that the 10 meetings at issue herein were called, in part, for the purpose of gaining employee support in the election. However, Respondent denies that it promised benefits conditioned on employee abandonment of union support, and that denial has solid support in the record. The record shows a series of preelection meetings held by Respondent, with attendance entirely voluntary, at which several subjects of interest to employees were taken up. Included were a description of National Labor Relations 7 Board election procedure; discussion of progress relating to working conditions long under consideration by management ; discussion of complaints by employees; and miscellaneous minor subjects. No rancor or ill will was exhibited. No antiunion statements, threats, or promises were made by Respondent; to the contrary, Respondent urged attendance at union meetings in the interest of employee election education, and cut one of its own meetings short, to permit employee attendance at a union meeting. General Counsel contends that the meetings resulted in violation of the Act, as evidenced by: (1) similar meetings had not been held in the recent past; (2) management representatives in attendance, except Gordon, were strang- ers to the employees; (3) Respondent promised to "pay more attention to the shop committee in the future"; and (4) Respondent promised "that the telephone numbers of the plant manager and the western division manager would be posted" for use by employees. Thus, the case as presented at hearing is considerably different from the allegations of the complaint. The former requires much by way of implication; the latter is specific and states on its face a violation. The latter clearly is not supported by the record, and it is so found. However, in order to complete this record consideration is given below to the possibility of violations of the Act other than in the language of the complaint. 1. Promise to pay more attention to the shop committee Several witnesses for each party testified on this subject. Although all were not in accord on all points, there is a clear preponderance of credible evidence that: (1) discus- sion of the shop committee was initiated by one or more employees (G.C. witnesses: Melonson, Hudson, Nelson. Resp. witnesses : Alexander, Nette, Gordon); (2) Respon- dent told employees that efficacy of the shop committee depends on efforts of the employees (G.C. witnesses: Stone, Boggs, Wagenfeld. Resp. witnesses : Alexander, Gallagher, Gordon, McLemore); and (3) Respondent told employees that it would not promise to do anything about the shop committee (G.C. witnesses: Stone, Hernandez, Nelson, Wagenfeld. Resp. witnesses : Mann, Alexander, Nette, Reed, Kuykendall, Gordon, McLemore). There was conflict in the testimony as to whether McLemore promised to put more "teeth" in the shop committee, and whether he promised to attend all future meetings of the committee. Witnesses for both parties testified on these points. McLemore denied having made such promises. He was a credible witness, and his testimony has substantial support in the testimony of other witnesses. These two conflicts are resolved in favor of Respondent. It is found that McLemore did not promise to put more "teeth" in the shop committee, and did not promise to attend all meetings of the shop committee in the future. A similar situation was presented in Peerless of America, Incorporated, 198 NLRB 982 (1972), wherein employees stated their grievances in response to the 4 As was the situation in the cases cited by Petitioner, Swift Produce, Inc., 203 NLRB 360 (1973); Associated Mills, Inc., 190 NLRB 113 (1971). 8 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD company president's inquiries. The president told employ- ees that their grievances could be resolved without a third party, and asked for 6 months to work things out. The president told employees he "could make no promise" of benefits. Held no implied promise of benefits to discourage union activity. As pointed out above , the shop committee primarily is a communications device, with some of the attributes of a grievance committee. A pertinent case involving much the same problem as here, is Bryant Chucking Grinder Company, 160 NLRB 1526 ( 1966). There it was held that the employer did not unlawfully grant a new benefit in the form of an improved grievance procedure to dissuade employees from joining the union , when a supervisor was more solicitous in handling employee complaints than he had been in the past, and the employer sent memoranda to supervisors regarding utilizing and improving the com- plaint procedure . Such conduct was held not to be unlawful, even if motivated by a desire to give employees less reason for wanting the union to handle their grievances. There is no question that employees did not think the shop committee was effective , and that they said so in the meetings. Also, there is no question that the committee was discussed at length during the meetings. Some of the testimony is conflicting and cannot finally be resolved, but it is clear, and it is so found , that Respondent did not respond to the discussion with action, or a promise of action, of any kind. There is no basis for implying a promise to take action upon complaints about the shop committee. 2. Posting of telephone numbers The fact of posting the private business telephone numbers of Gordon and McLemore is not in dispute. Respondent readily acknowledges that the postings were made on employee bulletin boards, as a result of the 10 preelection meetings. The question is whether the action was coercive and in violation of the Act. Respondent contends that existence of a company policy at the national level, of permitting employees to communi- cate directly with management personnel , is a defense to the allegations of the complaint on this issue . Testimony relative to the alleged policy was far from conclusive, but assuming, arguendo, that the record shows such a policy, that fact would not be a defense to the charge . Respondent did not show the applicability of the policy to the Riverside operation. Certainly the employees did not know of it, and Respondent had given no notice that such a policy existed and was applicable. However, reliance upon such a policy is not necessary. The numbers were posted in response to a specific request by an employee, made during the meetings here in issue. No new act is involved. The telephones long since had been installed and were in regular use. Posting of direct dial numbers represented no more than a minor gesture by management, to improve communication between management and its employees. The only "bene- fit" was to make it possible for employees to communicate directly with Gordon and McLemore, rather than going through the switchboard . This action is found to be trivial, and is not viewed as coercive, within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act . Raytheon Company, 160 NLRB 1603, 1609 (1967). Concluding Finding Respondent's conduct throughout the election campaign involved herein, and specifically, during the 10 meetings described above, was singularly circumspect. It is found that no threats, surveillance, antiunion acts, change, or promise or threat of change of work conditions, interroga- tions, or anticipatory refusal to bargain were made by Respondent. It is further found that no act of Respondent involved herein was coercive or affected any ballot. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 1. Respondent, Uarco Incorporated, is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Printing Specialties and Paper Products Union, District Council No. 2, International Printing and Graph- ics Communications Union, AFL-CIO, is a labor organi- zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Respondent did not, through alleged conduct, violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act , as alleged in the complaint, and Respondent did not , in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 4. Respondent did not, through alleged conduct, interfere with the "laboratory conditions" necessary for a fair election. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire records in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommend- ed:6 ORDER It having been found and concluded that Respondent, Uarco Incorporated, has not engaged in unfair labor practices, the complaint herein is dismissed in its entirety. It having been further found and concluded that Respondent, Uarco Incorporated, has not upset the laboratory conditions necessary for the holding of a free and fair election, objection 5 of Case 21 -RC-13442 is found to be without merit. S The Union offered in evidence the affidavit of the witness, Hudson, following the use of one sentence thereof by counsel for Respondent. Ruling was deferred for further argument. The matter was not mentioned thereafter by any party, nor was it argued in briefs of counsel . The offer hereby is rejected. 6 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec . 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes.