Local Union 103, Iron Workers

LOCAL UNION 103 IRON WORKERS 45 Local Union No. 103, International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO ' and Higdon Contracting Company, Inc. Case 25-CP-63-2 January 6, 1975 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO On August 23, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Lowell Goerlich issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief and the Respon- dent filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge only to the extent consistent herewith. The material facts are essentially undisputed. Higdon Construction Company has been an employ- er engaged primarily in the building and construction industry within the meaning of Section 8(f) of the Act, and Local 103 has been a labor organization of which building and construction employees are members within the meaning of Section 8(f). Higdon Construction Company, herein called Higdon Con- struction, and Respondent have had a collective- bargaining relationship since 1968. Their initial contract which expired about December 1972, had been negotiated under Section 8(f) of the Act. In July 1973, Higdon Construction was engaged in the ,performance of a construction contract at Glenmore Distillery. Local 103 refused to furnish employees unless Higdon Construction executed a contract, and together with Carpenters and Operating Engineers shut down the job twice. Whereupon, Higdon Construction on July 31, 1973, signed an acceptance of agreement covering Respondent's ironworkers by which Higdon Construction agreed to abide by an existing agreement between the Tri-State Iron Work- ers Employers Association, Inc., and Local 103, which by its terms expires on March 31, 1976. The contract does not contain a union-security clause or any checkoff provisions. Neither at the time the I Herein called Local 103 or Respondent. 2 Gerald J . Higdon is the sole stockowner of both Higdon Contracting and Higdon Construction and the president of both companies . His son is secretary-treasurer of both companies. The directors are the same. Higdon Construction, which owns all the equipment, leases the equipment to Higdon Contracting. Trucks used by Higdon Contracting on the Grace contract was executed nor thereafter did the Union claim to, or in fact, represent a majority of Higdon Construction's employees. The record indicates that some employees were supplied by the Union on the Glenmore job and wages and contributions to the welfare fund were paid for them according to the contract. Higdon Contracting Company, the Charging Party, herein called Higdon Contracting, was formed in July 1973 to perform nonunion ironwork jobs.2 It successfully bid on jobs of W. R. Grace Co. at Owensboro, Kentucky, and of Barmet at Rockport, Indiana. About January 1, 1974, shortly after construction at the W. R. Grace jobsite began, Local 103 Business Representative William Oglesby and Carpenters Representative Mosely talked to Higdon Contracting's general manager, Philip C. Kelly, and told him that Higdon Construction was in violation of its contract at the Grace jobsite. Thereafter, in February 1974, Oglesby asked Higdon "what was going on" at the Grace jobsite. Higdon replied that the reason the job was being handled under the new company's name was because Higdon had been forced into signing the contract at Glenmore, and Higdon had a lot of nonunion competition. When Ogelsby attempted to "get [him] signed up," Higdon responded that "this would be kind of silly for me to do this because it would defeat the purpose I had started out to do. . . ." Higdon admitted "it's one and the same companies . . . under one hat or another hat, depending on whether [he was] doing Union work or non-union work. . Local 103 caused pickets to be placed at the Grace jobsite on January 29, 1974. Pickets remained at the site, except during periods of inclement weather (about 4 or 5 days) until March 1, 1974. The picket sign carried the following inscription: Higdon Construction Company is in violation of the agreement of the Iron Workers Local Number 103 Higdon Contracting started the Barmet job on or about February 20, 1974. Within the first few days, Local 103 Business Agent Hill asked Kelly if "we" were going to use union people on the job. Kelly told him that Higdon Contracting was doing the job; it did not have a contract with the Ironworkers, and was not going to do the job as a union contractor. Hill said, "I'll get right on it." Thereafter, Local 103 jobsite, discussed infra, bear the name of Higdon Construction. In addition, an invoice dated March 8, 1974, indicates that material worth $96,788, for a building on the Rockport, Indiana, site, discussed infra, was charged to Higdon Construction . Higdon testified that Higdon Construction is the "only one that has any par value at all" and "it's one and the same companies... . 216 NLRB No. 5 46 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD picketed this job on March 4, 5, 18, 19, and 20, 1974, with the same signs described above. Local 103 has not filed a petition seeking an election, nor has Higdon Contracting or Higdon Construction. Nor has Local 103 filed an 8(a)(2) charge. It did file charges alleging violation of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5), which were dismissed April 25, 1974. In R. J. Smith Construction Co., Inc.,3 the Board found that, although Section 8(f) of the Act clearly exempts a company and union from unfair labor practice liability for entering into a contract prior to establishment of the union as a majority representa- tive, Section 8(f) does not protect the union from inquiry into its majority status during the contract term. The Board thus concluded that Section 8(f) only protects from illegality the preliminary contrac- tual steps of a prehire agreement, and that, where a union never thereafter obtains majority status, the company does not violate Section 8(a)(5) and (d) of the Act by refusing to continue the bargaining relationship established and by unilaterally changing terms and conditions of employment set forth in the contract. Since the Board found that the union had admittedly never attained majority status, it dis- missed the refusal-to-bargain complaint. As set out above, it is undisputed that the Union did not represent a majority of either the employees of Higdon Construction or of Higdon Contracting at any relevant time. Nor is it disputed that the parties' July 31, 1973, contract was a prehire agreement lawfully executed under Section 8(f) of the Act prior to the establishment of the Respondent's majority status. The Administrative Law Judge sought to distinguish this case from R. J. Smith, supra, on the ground that there is no persuasive evidence that the Employer actively repudiated the contract. Rather the evidence is that the Employer sought to adhere to the contract for union work, such as the Glenmore contract, and to avoid it as to nonunion work by the creation of a second corporation. The Administrative Law Judge therefore concluded that the picket legend published the truth. He found that the target of Respondent's picketing was not to force or require the Employer to initially accept the Union as the bargaining representative since that had already been accomplished, but instead was to secure compliance with an existing contract, a permissible objective. We disagree. In Ruttmann Construction Company,4 a companion 3 191 NLRB 693 (1971), enforcement denied sub none. Local No. 150, Operating Engineers v. NLRB., 480 F.2d 1186 (C.A.D.C., 1973), remand accepted 208 NLRB 615 (1974). 4 191 NLRB 701, 702 (1971). s More precisely until the provisions of the union-security clause have taken effect at a project (usually 7 days). 6 194 NLRB 52 (1971), enforcement granted in part and denied in part case to R. J. Smith, supra, the Board stated that the "prehire agreement is merely a preliminary step that contemplates further action for the development of a full bargaining relationship: such actions may include the execution of a supplemental agreement for certain projects or covering a certain area and the hiring of employees who are usually referred by the union or unions with whom there is a prehire agreement." Thus, the Board recognized the industri- al realities of the construction industry in finding that 8(f) contracts do not carry, even with union- security provisions, a presumption of majority status until such time as employees for particular projects have been hired.5 In David F. Irvin, et al., d/b/a The Irvin-McKelvy Company,6 the parties conceded, and the Board held, that by virtue of compliance with union-security provisions in an 8(f) contract the union had majority status at those projects still underway. The Board nevertheless dismissed the complaint therein with respect to projects not yet begun at the time the employer terminated the union contract. From the foregoing, we conclude that the contract herein is an 8(f) contract and that no presumption of majority status attaches to it in the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the duty of Higdon Construc- tion and its alter ego, Higdon Contracting,7 to honor the Employer's collective-bargaining agreement with Local 103 is limited by the nature of 8(f) agreements. Under the doctrine set out in the cases cited above, the Employer could have terminated the agreement with Local 103 for projects not yet underway. For the Board to allow the Respondent to picket to enforce an 8(f) agreement if an employer decides to ignore it, as the Employer herein has done with respect to nonunion jobs, which Respondent could not enforce by means of obtaining an 8(a)(5) bargaining order, is to permit it to do by indirection what it could not do directly, and in effect nullify our decisions in R. J. Smith and its progeny that such contracts are voidable by either party if a union never thereafter obtains majority status. In these circumstances, we conclude that the picketing by Respondent to enforce a noneffective 8(f) contract was for initial recognitional purposes and therefore was proscribed by Section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent engaged in certain 475 F.2d 1265 (C.A. 3, 1973). 7 The Administrative Law Judge found that Higdon Contracting was the alter ego of Higdon Construction, and the General Counsel did not except to this finding. Thus, Higdon Contracting was bound by the collective- bargaining contract of Higdon Construction and Respondent. See Peter K,ew,t Sons' Co. and South Prairie Construction Co., 206 NLRB 562 (1973). LOCAL UNION 103 IRON WORKERS unfair labor practices, we shall order that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action set forth below to effectuate the policies of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Higdon Contracting Company, Inc., is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By picketing Higdon Contracting Company, Inc., from January 29, 1974, until March 1, 1974, at its W. R. Grace Company jobsite at Owensboro, Kentucky, with an object of forcing and requiring Higdon Contracting Company, Inc., to bargain with Respondent, without being currently certified as the representative of Higdon Contracting Company, Inc.'s employees and without a petition under Section 9(c) being filed within a reasonable period of time, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the mean- ing of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Local Union No. 103, International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO, Evansville, Indiana, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall: 1. Cease and desist from picketing or causing to be picketed, or threatening to picket or cause to be picketed, Higdon Contracting Company, Inc., where an object thereof is forcing or requiring said employer to recognize or bargain with it as the representative of its employees in violation of Section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the purposes of the Act: (a) Post at its business offices and meeting halls copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 8 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 25, after being duly signed by the Respondent's authorized representa- tive, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by it to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 47 (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 25, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 8 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a trial in which all parties had the opportunity to present their evidence, it has been decided that we violated the law by picketing or causing to be picketed, or threatening to picket or causing to be picketed Higdon Contracting Company, Inc., where an object thereof was to force or require the said Employer to recognize or bargain with us as the representative of its employees in violation of Section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act. We have been ordered to post this notice. We intend to carry out the Order of the Board and abide by the following: WE WILL NOT, under conditions prohibited by Section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act, picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed, Higdon Contracting Company, Inc., where an object thereof is to force or require the said Employer to recognize or bargain with us as the representative of its employees. LOCAL UNION No. 103, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BRIDGE, STRUCTURAL AND ORNAMENTAL IRON WORKERS, AFL-CIO DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE LowELL GOERLICH, Administrative Law Judge: The charge filed by Higdon Contracting Company, Inc., herein referred to as Higdon Contracting, against Local Union No. 103, International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO, the Respondent herein, sometimes referred to as the Union, on March 6, 1974, was served on the Respondent by registered mail on or about March 6, 1974. A complaint and notice of hearing was issued on April 25, 1974. The complaint charged that the Respondent violated Section 8(b)(7)(C) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, herein referred to as the Act, in that the Respondent picketed certain jobsites, with the object of forcing and requiring Higdon Contracting to 48 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD recognize the Respondent as the collective-bargaining representative of its employees and the employees of Higdon Contracting to accept the Respondent as their collective-bargaining representative when at the time of said picketing the Respondent was not certified as the bargaining representative of the employees of Higdon Contracting nor had the Respondent filed a valid petition under Section 9(c) of the Act within a reasonable time from the commencement of such picketing. The Respondent filed a timely answer denying that it had engaged in any of the unfair labor practices alleged. The case was submitted pursuant to the following stipulation: The [parties hereto] hereby agree as follows: 1. All parties hereby waive all rights to the holding of a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. 2. The case shall be submitted to an Administrative Law Judge for decision and issuance of decision, and the following shall constitute the record in this case, copies of which are attached hereto and made a part hereof: a. The complaint, marked Attachment A, which was timely served on all parties. b. The answer, marked Attachment B, which was timely served on all parties. c. The order postponing the hearing, marked Attach- ment C, which was timely served on all the parties. d. The order indefinitely postponing the hearing, marked Attachment D, which was timely served on all parties. e. The transcript (including the exhibits) of a hearing before District Judge Gordon on May 6, 1974, concerning the above case, marked Attachment E. [The parties hereto agree that references in the transcript to "VII" should read "&"] f. The petition for injunction in Civil No. C74-420, marked Attachment F. 3. The parties do not necessarily concede the relevance of all facts above recited, and any party urging irrelevance will do in a brief to the Administra- tive Law Judge. 4. The privilege of filing a brief to the Administra- tive Law Judge is expressly reserved by all parties hereto, said briefs to be due by a date to be set by the Administrative Law Judge. All briefs have been carefully considered. FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS, AND REASONS THEREFOR 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE CHARGING PARTY Higdon Contracting is, and has been at all times material herein, a corporation duly organized under , and existing by virtue of, the laws of the State of Kentucky. At all times material herein, Higdon Contracting has maintained its principal office and place of business at Owensboro, Kentucky, herein called the facility, and various other facilities and jobsites in the States of Kentucky and Indiana, and is, and has been at all times material herein, engaged at said facilities and jobsites as a general contractor in the construction contracting industry. During the past year, a representative period, Higdon Contracting in the course and conduct of its business operations purchased, transferred, and delivered to its Kentucky facilities and jobsites goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 which were transported to said facilities and jobsites directly from States other than the State of Kentucky. During the past year, a representative period, Higdon Contracting in the course and conduct of its business operations performed services valued in excess of $50,000 in States other than Kentucky wherein Higdon Contracting is located. Higdon Contracting is now, and has been at all times material herein, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Respondent is, and has been at all times material herein, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Facts The Union caused pickets to be placed at the W. R. Grace Chemical jobsite in Owensboro, Kentucky, where the Higdon Contracting was performing construction work on January 29, 1974. Pickets remained at the site, except during periods of inclement weather (about 4 or 5 days), until March 1, 1974. The picket sign carried bore the legend: Higdon Construction Company is in violation of the agreement of the Iron Workers Local Number 103 The Union also picketed with a similar sign on March 4, 5, 18, 19, and 20, 1974, at the Barmetjobsite at Rockport, Indiana, where Higdon Contracting was also performing work. On July 7, 1973, the Higdon Construction Company, herein referred to as Higdon Construction, recognized the Union and accepted and approved the current labor agreement between the Tri-State Iron Workers Employees Association, Inc., and the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 103, terminating on March 31 , 1976. The agreement was signed by Gerald J. Higdon for Higdon Construction. At the time this agreement was signed Higdon Construction had executed a construction contract dated May 7, 1973, calling for construction work at the Glenmore Distilleries Company in Owensboro, Kentucky. An article of the contract provided: It is understood and agreed as a material part and as a consideration for this contract that Contractor [Higdon Construction Company, Inc.] as well as any sub-contractor or assignee hereunder , shall use union labor exclusively in the performance of this contract. Higdon maintained that he entered into the labor agreement with the Union "reluctantly, against my will." LOCAL UNION 103 IRON WORKERS 49 He explained that in order to comply with his agreement with Glenmore Distilleries Company he had asked for employees through the Union. The Union refused to furnish employees. Nevertheless, when Higdon determined to continue without union labor, the Carpenters and Operating Engineers "entered into it." Said Higdon: "They came up and shut my job down and there was talk about a walk out of the Distillery. So, their manager came to me and told me that something would have to be done. Well, when the final shut down came, uh, well, I-I just lost my cool and I went and signed their contracts." The contract does not contain a union-security clause or any checkoff provisions. Thereafter in July 1973 Higdon incorporated the Higdon Contracting Company, Inc., the Charging Party herein. Higdon is the sole stockowner of both Higdon Contracting and Higdon Construction and the president of both companies. His son is secretary-treasurer of both compa- nies. The directors are the same. Equipment is being leased from one company to the other.' Trucks used by Higdon Contracting on the Grace Company jobsite bear the name of Higdon Construction. Indeed an invoice dated 3/8/74 reveals that material for a building in the amount of $96,788 intended for the Rockport, Indiana, site was charged to Higdon Construction. In February 1974 when Union Representative William Oglesby asked Higdon "what was going on" at the Grace Company site, Higdon replied that a new company had been set up. He continued, "they had, uh, forced me into signing this agreement at the Glenmore Distillery that I had to do something because, uh, I have a lot of competition that is not non-union . . . ." When Oglesby attempted to "sign up" the new company Higdon respond- ed that "this would be kind of silly for me to do this because it would defeat the purpose I had started out to do ...." Higdon frankly admitted "it's one and the same companies . . . under one hat or another hat, depending on whether [he was] doing Union work or non-union work 112 After Higdon refused to honor the above-mentioned labor agreement the Union placed the pickets as above detailed. Neither at the time the contract was executed nor thereafter did the Union represent a majority of the employer's employees within an appropriate unit. B. Conclusions and Reasons Therefor The contract executed by Higdon Construction and the Union on July 7, 1973, satisfied the lawful requirements for a prehire agreement authorized by Section 8(f) of the Acts Nevertheless, the General Counsel apparently asserts, as his major premise, that the contract, "an g(f) agreement," had no prospective validity requiring the employer to adhere to its terms because at no time after it was executed did the Union represent a majority of the employer's employees in an appropriate unit. Thus, reasons the General Counsel, it follows that, in the absence of a valid contract, the Union's picketing aimed at the employer's violation of a noneffective contract was for initial recognitional purposes proscribed by Section 8(b)(7)(C). The General Counsel's major premise is drawn from the Board's holding in R. J. Smith Construction Co., Inc., 191 NLRB 693 (1971). In this case a majority of the Board held "that a prehire agreement, although validly executed for a fixed term of years, is effective only so long as both parties wish to adhere to it and may be ignored with impunity .. . by either party at any time without thereby offending either Section 8(a)(5) or Section 8(b)(3) of the Act" 4 if the Union has not previously established a majority.5 The facts in that case disclose that the employer, while'he executed 8(f) agreements, did not intend and never did abide by their terms. Moreover, during the period of the agreements, without prior notice or bargaining with the union, the employer raised wages of certain employees covered by the agreement. The facts in the instant case differ. Here the terms of the contract were implemented, Employees were supplied by the union and wages and contributions to the welfare fund were paid according to the contract. There is no persuasive evidence that the Employer actually repudiated the contract. On the other hand, the evidence is that the Employer sought to adhere to the contract for union work (such as the Glenmore Distilleries contract) and to avoid it as to nonunion work by the creation of a second corporation as a subterfuge and a sham. This blow hot, blow cold stance of the Employer,6 which contemplated an i Higdon testified, "Well Higdon Construction Company is the only one that has any par value at all and, uh, therefore it would own the equipment, once it is paid for and, uh, we lease it to the Higdon Contracting Company." 2 When Higdon informed Union Representative Oglesby that Higdon Construction did not have a contract with W R. Grace Company, according to Higdon, Oglesby said that "we were in violation of contract and that we should get a lawyer because we would have to go to court with 'em. 11 The employer was "engaged primarily in the building and construction industry"; the employees covered by the agreement were "engaged (or who, upon their employment, [would] be engaged) in the building and construction industry"; and the union was "a labor organization of which building and construction employees [were] members (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in section 8(a) of [the ] Act as 11 an unfair labor practice .. . 4 This language is taken from the dissent 5 This proposition of law was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 480 F.2d 1186 (1973). The court held that "an employer, who has entered into a validly executed prehire agreement may, after a reasonable period, seek a representation election to challenge an enduring minority union, but until he does and prevails, he should be held to the same standard of conduct in regard to unfair labor practices as an employer who has entered into a collective-bargaining agreement with a union certified to have majority status." On remand, 208 NLRB 615 (1974), the Board applied the court's views. In a footnote it was noted, "Member Fanning agrees with the court's decision. Chairman Miller reserves opinion as to the underlying legal issues ..." While I adhere to the reasoning of the court and the dissent, I deem myself bound by the Board's decision Insurance Agents' International Union, AFL-CIO, 119 NLRB 768. 772-773 (1958) 6 The record indicates that Higdon was the real employer, the alter ego of Higdon Construction and Higdon Contracting, a single integrated business entity. See J Howard Jenks, d/b/a Glendora Plumbing, 165 NLRB 101 (1967); and Industrial Fabricating Inc., 119 NLRB 162 (1957). Higdon admitted that Higdon Contracting and Higdon Construction were "one and the same " In Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers' Union, Local No 1, 209 NLRB 820 (1974), it was stated by the Administrative Law Judge: Where an individual is the sole owner of a corporation , the Board has (Continued) 50 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD adherence to the contract for some purposes, was not of such character as to render the Union's picket line vulnerable to Section 8(bX7)(C).1 Not all picketing which continues for more than 30 days without filing a represent- ation petition runs afoul of Section 8(bX7)(C). Local Union No. 741, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, 137 NLRB 1125 (1962). Only picketing is banned where an object of such picketing is to require an employer to "recognize or bargain" with a labor organization or to require the employees "to select such labor organization as their collective bargaining representative." In the instant case the object of the picketing as indicated by the picket sign was to inform the world that the Employer was in violation of an agreement with the Union. Since there is no persuasive evidence that the Employer, who had recognized the Union , intended to terminate the contract in toto but only sought by subterfuge and chicanery to avoid its application for nonunion works while adhering to the contract for union work, the picket legend published the truth. The target of the Union's picketing was not to force or require the Employer to initially accept the Union as the bargaining representative, since that had already been accomplished, consistently ignored the corporate fiction and has considered one as the alter ego of the other. Diaper Jean Manufacturing Company, 109 NLRB 1045 (1954); Industrial Fabricating Inc, 119 NLRB 162, 169 (1957), enfd. 272 F.2d 184 (C.A. 6, 1959); Ogle Protection Service, Inc and James L Ogle, 149 NLRB 545, 546 ( 1964), fn. 1, modified in other respects 375 F.2d 497 (C.A. 6, 1967). Sec. 8(bX7XC) reads as follows: (7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed, any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees, or forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to accept or select such labor organization as their collective bargaining representative , unless such labor organization is currently certified as the representative of such employees- 7 . . . but to secure compliance with an existing contract, a permissible objective. In Bay Counties District Council of Carpenters, AFL-CIO, et al., 154 NLRB 1598, 1605 ( 1965) the Board said: We have held in previous cases that Section 8(bX7XC) is not to be literally applied so as, for example, to reach picketing by a recognized union to secure compliance with an existing contract, since the section was intended to proscribe picketing having as its target forcing or requiring an employer 's initial acceptance of the union as the bargaining representative of his employees. [Emphasis sup- plied.] (Citing Building and Construction Trades Council of Santa Barbara County, AFL-CIO, et al. (Sullivan Electric Compa- ny), 146 NLRB 1086, 1087 (1964).) Thus, the Union's picketing did not come within the proscription of Section 8(b)(7)(C). Moreover, the conclusion that the picketing was legal activity is strengthened by the proviso to Section 8(b)(7XC) since the legend used was pointed at an employer who failed to apply a union contract. [Recommended Order omitted from publication.] (C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under section 9(c) being filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty days from the commence- ment of such picketing: Provided, That when such a petition has been filed the Board shall forthwith , without regard to the provisions of section 9(c)(1) or the absence of a showing of a substantial interest on the part of the labor organization , direct an election in such unit as the Board finds to be appropriate and shall certify the results thereof: Providedfurther, That nothing in this subparagraph (C) shall be construed to prohibit any picketing or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising the public (including consumers) that an employer does not employ members of, or have a contract with a labor organization, unless an effect of such picketing is to induce any individual employed by any other person in the course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver or transport any goods or not to perform any services 6 Higdon testified, "in order to, uh, get around the contract, as you put it, uh, to be able to bid with my competition, yes."