Local Union No. 369, IBEW

LOCAL UNION NO. 369, IBEW 141 Local Union No. 369, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO and Kelley Electric Co., Inc. and C. T. Love & Associates, Inc. Cases 9-CC-755-1 and 9-CC-755-2 January 13, 1975 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO On May 31, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Eugene F. Frey issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the Charging Parties filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Local Union No. 369, International Brotherhood of Electrical Work- ers, AFL-CIO, Louisville, Kentucky, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. 1 In adopting the Administrative Law Judge's broad remedial order, we place no reliance on the previous informal settlement agreement executed by these parties, which is discussed in the Remedy section of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision. encouraged employees of Love and EGB to engage in strikes or refusals to work for their respective employers and thereby coerced and restrained both employers, with an object of forcing or requiring Love or EGB or other persons to cease doing business with Kelley Electric Co., Inc. (herein called Kelley), another subcontractor on said project with whom Respondent has a labor dispute and/or forcing Kelley to make a collective-bargaining contract with Respondent, in violation of Section 8(b)(4Xi) and (ii) (B) of the Act.' At close of the trial all parties waived oral argument, but filed written briefs which have been carefully considered by me in the preparation of this Decision. Upon the entire record in the case, observation of witnesses on the stand, and consideration of arguments of counsel, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF LOVE, EGB, AND KELLEY, AND STATUS OF RESPONDENT Kelley is an Indiana corporation with its principal offices in New Albany, Indiana, where it operates as an electrical contractor in the building and construction industry. In course of this business Kelley annually performs services valued over $50,000 for customers located outside Indiana. Love is a Kentucky corporation with its principal office in Louisville, Kentucky, where it is in business as a general contractor in the building and construction industry. In this business Love annually performs services valued over $50,000 for customers outside Kentucky. EGB is a Kentucky corporation with its principal offices located in Louisville, Kentucky, where it operates as a mechanical contractor in the building and construction industry. Respondent admits, and I find, that Kelley, Love, and EGB are employers engaged in commerce and in opera- tions affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. At all times material herein Respondent is and has been a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE EUGENE F. FREY, Administrative Law Judge: This case was tried before me on due notice on February 14, 1974, at Louisville, Kentucky, with all parties represented by counsel, after pretrial proceedings in compliance with the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 151, et seq. (herein called the Act). The issue in the case is whether Respondent Union, by picketing certain entrances of a project of C. T. Love & Associates, Inc. (herein called Love) on which EGB of Louisville, Inc. (herein called EGB) was doing work as a subcontractor, induced and 1 The issue arises on a complaint issued January 11, 1974, by General Counsel of the Board through the Board's Acting Regional Director for Region 9, after Board investigation of charges filed December 17, 1973, by 216 NLRB No. 25 Operations at the Love Project Since November 1973, Love has been the general contractor for construction of the Southwestern Regional Government Center (herein called the Center) on Dixie Highway, in Louisville, Kentucky, under contract with the fiscal court of Jefferson County Kentucky, an instrumen- tality of the government of Jefferson County. In October 1973, Love made a contract with Kelley to do the electrical work at the Center, and Kelley actually began work there November 7, 1973, with a crew of two electricians, Joseph A. Kelley, son of Stanley G. Kelley, president of Kelley, and one other employee. The electrical work continued Kelley and Love, and answer of Respondent admitting jurisdiction but denying the commission of any unfair labor practices. 142 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD until at least January 7, 1974. In the same period EGB has been subcontractor for plumbing, heating and air-condi- tioning work at the Center. During all times material herein, Respondent has had no labor dispute with Love or EGB, but has had a labor dispute of longstanding with Kelley. The Layout of the Center Project2 At the start of the Love work, the ground on which the Center was to be built consisted of a roughly rectangular tract of land fronting on Dixie Highway to the west, bounded at the rear and east by a railroad right-of-way with tracks, by an open ditch on the left or north side, and on the right or south side by a shallow drainage ditch and an approximate 16-foot strip of land containing an easement or right-of-way for entry of utility lines to another rectangular county tract containing county build- ings and facilities which adjoined the Center tract on its right. The front portion of the second tract along Dixie Highway is either owned or leased to a private gasoline service station operation; the rear portion, which abuts the railroad right-of-way, is occupied by three white county service or maintenance buildings, with an adjacent stockpile of road materials, a parking area along the railroad and a gasohne pump facility to their left. When Kelley started work on the Center tract in November, vehicular access to that site was through two precut breaks in the curb on Dixie Highway. One (marked on G.C. Exh. 2 with a circle and "Gate No. 1") is at the lower left corner of the Center tract, and the other (marked with a circle and "Gate No. 2") is at the lower right corner of the tract, abutting a permanent county building at that point.3 Access to the second, or southern, county tract, from Dixie Highway is afforded by a similar precut break in the curb at the extreme right-hand lower corner of G.C. Exh. 2 (marked with a circle) connecting with a long, unpaved, dirt lane or cleared space running almost the depth of that tract along its right edge, with a left turn in the lane opposite one of the white maintenance buildings through a sliding wire gateway, which gives access to the parking area behind the three buildings and to the gas pumps to their left. Vehicles reaching the gas pumps can gain access to the Center tract by driving through several breaks in a rough post fence line near the right rear comer of the Center tract and also at various points along the shallow ditch and utility right of way closer to Dixie Highway (all access points are marked by arrows on G.C. Exh. 2 pointing into the Center tract). When Kelley started work at the Center on November 7, Love and EGB had separate office trailers parked just inside the Center tract to the right of the gate no. 1 curb break behind a large official sign announcing the purpose of the Center and facing the Center itself. Shortly after Kelley began work, it placed a smaller office trailer at a point at right angles to the Love trailer. However, there 2 The description of the project is based on testimony of witnesses of General Counsel, and a large aerial photograph of the whole site, with directions and the relationships of buildings and other pertinent features described in relation to each other as though the writer were positioned across the highway from, and well above, a permanent white county building on the highway and at the right front comer of the Center project was no sign on that trailer, or at or near the gate no. I entrance to denote the presence of Kelley at the site. Up to December 5, Kelley employees entered the site and reached the Kelley office through gate no. 1. The Union set up pickets at gates I and 2 on December 3, 1973. They carried signs stating on one side "The electrical work on this project is not being installed under a collective bargaining agreement with Local Union No. 369, and the electricians on this project are not receiving fringe benefits provided by IBEW Local Union 369's agree- ment"; the reverse side stated "We are not requesting employees of neutral employers to refuse to work on this project. We are picketing the KELLEY ELECTRIC CO. only." On December 4, Love put up a printed sign at the sidewalk at the edge of gate 1, reading in block letters: "Kelley Electric Company, Inc., its employees and suppli- ers are prohibited from using this entrance." On December 5, Love put up similar sign at gate 2, and also a larger printed sign on the wire fence adjacent to a sliding gate giving access to the county maintenance buildings at the back of the lane on the second tract giving access to those buildings as noted above (that gate is marked as "Gate No. 3" on G.C. Exh. 2). The sign read: This entrance is reserved exclusively for Kelley Electric Co., Inc., its employees and suppliers. All other persons are prohibited from using this entrance. Kelley Electric Co. Inc., its employees and suppliers, are prohibited from using any other entrance to these premises. C. T. LovE AND ASSOCIATES The above signs with the lettering noted have remained at the respective gates until the date of trial. Since the sign was posted at gate 3, employees of Kelley have used that entrance personally and with a truck to enter and leave the Center tract, going up and down the dirt lane and through the sliding gate, around behind the county maintenance buildings, and past the gas pumps through the partial fence and ditch to enter and leave the building site. Orders to that effect were also given to all suppliers of Kelley, and at least one supplier delivering concrete by truck used the same gate and mode of entrance during December 1973. On December 7, Love sent a telegram to Respondent advising it of the separate gate established December 4 for Kelley, and demanding that Respondent restrict its picketing to that gate, warning that Respondent's failure to do so would subject it.to liability for any damages suffered by the secondary boycott of Respondent and that Love would file charges with the Board. Respondent received it December 10. After the signs were posted, pickets of Respondent continued to parade at gates 1 and 2 daily and also at gate 3, until December 21, 1973. At times the pickets were site itself. The left edge of the photo is roughly north , the right edge roughly south, the top is east and the bottom west. Some facts are also found from smaller ground photographs showing details of the project and surrounding physical features 3 The curb breaks were put in at the entry and exit points of a circular driveway to be built across the front of the Center LOCAL UNION NO. 369, IBEW 143 joined by Assistant Business Agent Robert Baker of Respondent. Contentions of the Parties, and Final Conclusions of Fact and Law Thereon While the record shows that Respondent 'picketed reserve gate 3 as soon as it was established for Kelley employees and suppliers,4 a prima facie case of picketing to enmesh neutral employers is established by the continued picketing of gates I and 2 which Kelley. employees and suppliers were publicly and specifically prohibited from using. All parties recognize that Respondent complied with three of the standards for primary picketing on common situs situations set forth in Sailor's Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 NLRB 547 (19); i.e.: (a) The picketing is strictly limited to times when the situs of the dispute is located on the secondary employer's premises; (b) At the time of the picketing the primary employer is engaged in its normal business at the situs; (d) The picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is with the primary employer. Their disagreement occurs over compliance with standard (c) requiring that "The picketing is limited to places reasonably close to the location of the situs." General Counsel argues that continued picketing of gates 1 and 2 after December 5, when the reserve gate 3 was set up, violates the Act. While mere picketing of those gates was peaceful, without apparent active coercion or threats, as Respondent points out, that characteristic would not prevent a finding that it violated Section 8(b)(4) if all the circumstances of the picketing show that it was designed to enmesh neutral employers and their employees in the labor dispute with Kelley.5 Aside from this principle, however, the record shows that the picketing actually had some effect on suppliers of Love, for uncontradicted testimony of Charles G. Sham, the Love project superintendent, shows that on December 10 an employee of its subcontrac- tor, EGB, left his job and refuse to cross the picket line, and on December 18 a supplier of concrete for Kelley advised Shain that its drivers would not cross the picket line to deliver for Kelley, but would do so only if the material was ordered by Love, so that Shain had to use that subterfuge to get Kelley's material delivered. Respondent presents three main arguments in defense of picketing gates I and 2: (1) It claims that gate 3 was not in fact a "reserve" gate for the exclusive use of Kelley and its suppliers, because the record shows that during the picketing it was continually used by employees and vehicles of Jefferson County, the landowner, to gain access to the county maintenance buildings located on the second county tract. While this is true to some extent, the argument is beside the Stanley G. Kelley, president of Kelley, testified to this effect, as noted by Respondent, contrary to the contention of General Counsel. Salem Building Trades Council (Cascade Employers Association, Inc.), 163 NLRB 33, 36 (1967) 6 In reaching this conclusion , I have assumed that county employees point, for the main issue here is whether the picketing of gates I and 2, reserved for neutral employers, after gate 3 was established, was unlawful. However, even if that were material, use of that gate by county employees to any extent would not destroy the "reserve" nature of that gate norjustify continued picketing of gates I and 2. There is no proof that the neutral employers or their employees ever used gate 3, and it is clear that none of the county employees using or working at the county maintenance buildings were engaged in any way in the construction of the Center on the adjoining tract, hence the county and its employees, insofar as they worked on the second tract on county business, were not a "neutral" employer or "neutral" employees within the purview of Section 8(b)(4) of the Acts Moreover, even if neutral employers and their employees had used gate 3 during the picketing, that would not have excused any violations of the "reserve" gate status of gates I and 2 of the neutral employers. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, etc. Local No. 639 (American Modular Corporation), 203 NLRB 1112 (1973). (2) Respondent argues that during the picketing the alleged "neutral" status of gates I and 2 was violated several times by subcontractors of Kelley and their employees, relying on uncontradicted proof which shows that: On December 18, a driver of a supplier delivering electrical conduit for Kelley pulled into gate 1 notwith- standing the prohibitive sign located there, in an attempt to unload material just inside that gate at a point where Kelley was then laying such conduit for underground power lines in a ditch running from a power pole adjacent to gate 1 to the rear of the foundation of the Center. When his truck mired in the mud inside gate 1, the driver sought help from Shain who told him he was using the wrong gate, and should go through gate 3. It is not clear from the record whether the conduit was already unloaded at the point the truck bogged down, before the driver talked to Shain, or whether it backed out and reentered the site through gate 3. An official or salesman of this supplier had previously been ordered to make the delivery through the gate marked for Kelley's use, and the invoice in the hands of the driver clearly gave this delivery instruction. A ditching contractor, Earl J. Hartlage, who had been digging ditches for Love and other subcontractors on the site, was hired by Kelley to dig the conduit ditch aforesaid and actually did the work on December 18 and 19, using equipment already on the site. In this period, Hartlage and his employees continued to use gates I and 2 as formerly, never having been told by Kelley or Love to use gate 3 when working for Kelley. On December 18, a truck of another supplier delivered a bucket for Hartlage's backhoe, using gate 1 to enter the site. If the picketing had started on December 18, there would be some merit to Respondent's claim that on and after that date gate I at least was used by regularly used gate 3 during the picketing, but the record shows that most of them used the 16-foot easement strip along the south edge of the construction site to reach the county maintenance buildings This fact further weakens Respondent's argument. 144 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the primary contractor and its suppliers, so as to justify continued picketing there.? However, such uses of gate I on and after December 18 do not afford any defense or justification for Respondent's picketing of that reserve gate before December 18 .8 Hence, I can only conclude that the picketing in that period failed to comply with the third requirement for common-situs picketing established by the Board under the principles of Moore Dry Dock, supra, and that the picketing of "reserve" gates 1 and 2 in that period could only have been for the purpose of enmeshing Love, EGB, and other neutral employers in Respondent's dispute with Kelley in order to induce them to cease doing business with Kelley, in violation of Section 8(b)(4Xi) and (ii)(B) of the Act. Analysis of the alleged violations of gate 1 on December 18 and after leads to the same conclusion about the picketing through December 21. The delivery of conduit through gate I on December 18 was clearly in violation of specific instructions previously given by Kelley to his supplier. Love tried to remedy the violation of that gate as soon as Shain learned about it. In those circum- stances I conclude that Kelley and Love had done all that was reasonably necessary to establish and maintain the "reserve" status of gate I, and that this isolated instance of violation of that status on December 18 did not cause it to lose its protected status and give Respondent the right to picket it on and after that date .9 Although the use of gate 1 by employees and a supplier of Hartlage while he was doing work for Kelley on 2 days presents a stronger instance of violation of that gate, where neither Love nor Kelley gave him instructions to use only gate 3, I still consider it an isolated occurrence which does not establish a pattern of destruction of the "reserve" gate status of gate 1 so as to justify Respondent's picketing of that gate; and a fortiori it could not on any theory justify picketing of gate 2, as to which there is a total absence of credible proof that Kelley, its employees or suppliers, ever used it.10 (3) Respondent also argues that throughout the picketing Kelley and its employees used other unmarked means of access to the construction site, when, after entering the second county tract through gate 3, they crossed a boundary ditch and fence at four different points along the easement strip to get into the construction site. The record shows that, after gates 1 and 2 were marked as "reserve" gates for neutral employers, Kelley employees always entered the second tract through gate 3, crossed the rear of that tract, and then up the easement (which was part of the construction site), and crossed the adjoining ditch at any one of four different places (marked with arrows) to get to the Center site proper, but at no point did they make the crossing closer than 180 feet from Dixie Highway. When leaving the project, they would follow the same route in reverse. In using this route, they were at no point closer than 180 feet to Dixie Highway. They never used either gates I or 2. Although there was no construction work on the second tract itself, gate 3 and the route taken across 7 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 441 (Jones and Jones, Inc), 158 NLRB 549, 522 (1966) 8 Nashville Building & Construction Trades Council, et als (H.E. Collins Contracting Company, Inc), 172 NLRB 1138, 1139, 1140 (1%8). s United Brotherhood of Carpenters, etc. Local No 639 (American Modulars Corporation), supra, Teamsters Local 294 (Northeastern Industrial Park, Inc), 196 NLRB 332, 339 (1972); Allied Industrial Workers of America, that tract to get to the project site was all part of the county property, and none of it was public highway, hence I find that the whole route through and beyond gate 3 was in effect a private way on county property, well removed from gates 1 and 2, and granted to Kelley for use during the picketing. The easement strip by usage was still on county property and not a public highway. Hence, Kelley's use of it after entering gate 3 was not in any way a violation or circumvention of the "reserve" status given to gates 1 and 2. I find no merit in this argument of Respondent. Having considered all the pertinent facts and circum- stances in light of the arguments of counsel, I must conclude that on and after December 5, 1973, the entrances to the Center project area were so marked in an unconfusing manner as to provide reasonable notice and assurances to Respondent that, by Respondent's picketing of gate 3 reserved for the use of Kelley, which was the situs of its dispute with Kelley, the message of its picket signs would be sufficiently carried to the employees and suppliers of the primary employer. Hence, Respondent's continued picketing of gates I and 2, which were properly and effectively "reserved" for use of and used substantially only by neutral employers and their employees and suppliers, compels the conclusion that the picketing of those gates was designed to enmesh neutral employers and employees in the primary dispute, and that it therefore had the object of forcing and requiring Love and EGB and other neutral employers to cease doing business with Kelley, and thereby violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. Since the picketing also had the effect of encouraging and inducing individuals employed by suppliers or employ- ees of Love and EGB to refuse to work on the project or deliver materials thereto for their respective employers, with the same proscribed objective, Respondent thereby violated Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act.11 III. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section II, above, occurring in connection with the operations of Love, EGB, and Kelley described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com- merce and the free flow of commerce. IV. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce in violation of Section 8(b)(4Xi) and (iiXB) of the Act, I recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom, and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Local 681 (Smith Engineering Works), 174 NLRB 389, 393, 394 (1969). 10 Nashville Building & Construction Trades Council, et als (H E. Collins Contracting Company, Inc.), 172 NLRB 1138,1140 (1%8). ii I have considered carefully other facts, arguments, and authorities adduced by Respondent, but find them insufficient to overcome the above findings and conclusions. LOCAL UNION NO. 369, IBEW 145 General Counsel and Respondent argue for a broad remedial order on the basis of certain aspects of the long- continued labor dispute between Kelley and Respondent. The record shows that for some years before 1972 Kelley had collective-bargaining contracts with Respondent, but not since 1972. In January 1973, the continued feud was marked by the filing by Kelley of charges with the Board alleging Respondent had violated Section 8(b)(4) of the Act in a manner similar to this case, at another construc- tion site in Louisville, Kentucky. The dispute was settled without issuance of a complaint through an informal settlement agreement approved in February 1973, by the Regional Director for Region 9. I also take judicial notice of the fact that Respondent in mid-1973 was found guilty by the Board of a similar violation of the Act in International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 369 (Clark Trucking and Rigging Company), 206 NLRB 15 (1973), which involved threats of secondary boycott activity at a construction site in Cincinnati, Ohio. In a somewhat similar situation the Board held that a broad order is appropnate whenever a proclivity to violate the Act is established, either by prior Board decisions against the labor organization which is then before it based on similar unlawful conduct in the past, or by the facts in a particular case.12 Such order is also justified even though different neutral employers were involved in the prior instances of unlawful conduct.13 I shall therefore recom- mend a broad order prohibiting similar unlawful seconda- ry action against other employers and their employees. or to perform any services, for their respective employers, and from threatening, coercing, or restraining the above- named employers or any other person as aforesaid where, in either case, an object thereof is to force or require C. T. Love & Associates or any other person to cease doing business with Kelley Electric Co., Inc. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is hereby found necessary to effectuate the policies and purposes of the Act: (a) Post at its business offices and meeting halls in Louisville, Kentucky, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 15 Copies of said notice, on forms to be provided by the Regional Director for Region 9, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to its members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Sign and mail copies of said notice to the Regional Director for Region 9 for posting by C. T. Love & Associates, Inc., if it be willing, in all locations where notices to its employees and employees of its suppliers or subcontractors on its construction sites are customarily posted. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in wnting, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Love, EGB, and Kelley are employers engaged in commerce or in industries affecting commerce, and Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. 2. By inducing and encouraging employees of EGB and of suppliers of Kelley to refuse to perform services or transport matenals for their respective employers and threatening, coercing, and restraining Love, with an object of forcing or requiring Love to cease doing business with Kelley, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act. On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and' conclusions of law, and the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER 14 Respondent Local Union No. 369, International Broth- erhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, and representatives shall: 1. Cease and desist from inducing or encouraging any individuals employed by C. T. Love & Associates, Inc., EGB of Louisville , Inc., or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in strikes or refusals in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, matenals, or commodities, 12 International Union of Operation Engineers, Local No 139 (T J Butters Construction), 198 NLRB # 11951 (1972), where the Board issued a broad order based on a single Board finding of similar unlawful conduct in the past 13 General Drivers and Dairy Employees, Local Union 563 (Fox Valley Construction Materials Suppliers Association, Inc), 179 NLRB 650, 654 (1969), International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501, et a! v NLRB , 341 U S 694, 705, 706 (1951) 14 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 15 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board," shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government We hereby notify our members and all employees that: WE WILL NOT induce or encourage any individuals employed by C. T. Love & Associates, Inc., EGB of Louisville, Inc., or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in strikes or refusals in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities, or to perform any services, 146 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD for their respective employers, and WE WILL NOT Associates, Inc., or any other person, to cease doing threaten, coerce, or restrain the above-named employ- business with Kelley Electric Co., Inc. ers or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce where , in either case, an object thereof is to force or require C. T. Love & LOCAL UNION No. 369, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, AFL-CIO