Army Aviation Center Federal Credit Union

ARMY AVIATION CENTER 435 Army Aviation Center Federal Credit Union and Michel P. McComlskie. Case 15-CA-5212 February 3, 1975 DECISION AND ORDER BY ACTING CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS KENNEDY AND PENELLO On October 31, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Arnold Ordman issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions and a brief in support of the Decision, and Respondent filed a motion rehearing and also exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein.' Respondent advanced, inter alia, the following contentions in support of its exceptions and motion for rehearing: 1. The Decision of the Administrative Law Judge, who was formerly the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, was "highly preju- dical" because it "reflects his prior position . . . in representing claimants over a large number of years." He gave "absolutely no weight or credibility" to the testimony of Respondent's witnesses and he "end- lessly injected himself into the trial as the advocate of the charging party," Michel P. McComiskie. 2. The Administrative Law Judge improperly refused to allow Respondent counsel the use of McComiskie's pretrial statements in connection with his cross-examination of that witness. 3. The Administrative Law Judge has not consid- ered the affidavit of employee Dayna Meuli which was dated October 11, 1974. 4. The Administrative Law Judge failed to rule on Respondent's motion to dismiss the complaint. For reasons given below, we find no merit in the foregoing contentions and we therefore deny Re- spondent's motion for a rehearing: i We agree with the General Counsel's proposed amendment of the remedial Order and notice to include "any loss of earnings or other employee benefits." We shall therefore modify the Administrative Law Judge's recommended Order and notice accordingly. 2 As the Supreme Court stated in N LR B v Pittsburgh S. S Company, 337 U.S 656, 659 (1969), ". . . [T]otal rejection of an opposed view cannot of itself impugn the integrity or competence of a trier of fact." 3 See Sec. 102.35 of the Board's Rules and Regulations , Series 8, as 216 NLRB No. 75 1. Upon an analysis of the entire record, we find no support for Respondent's allegations of prejudice on the part of the Administrative Law Judge. There is no basis for finding that bias and partiality existed merely because the Administrative Law Judge participated in the examination of witnesses and resolved important factual conflicts in favor of the General Counsel's witnesses.2 Indeed, it is the duty of the Administrative Law Judge to inquire into the facts and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.3 It is also the Board's established policy not to overrule the Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponder- ance of all relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect.4 We find no basis for reversing his findings. 2. As indicated above, Respondent also contends that it was prejudiced by the Administrative Law Judge's ruling refusing to require the General Counsel to produce any pretrial statements of his witness, McComiskie, pursuant to Section 102.118 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, Series 8, as amended. Respondent counsel first requested such statements after completing his cross-examination of McComiskie. Upon the Administrative Law Judge's denial of this request, Respondent counsel stated that he had no further questions but reserved "the right to recall" McComiskie. The General Counsel then rested his case-in-chief. Although Respondent coun- sel did not ask for her recall, he did at a later point in the hearing-subsequent to the appearance of six other witnesses called by Respondent and while another witness was on the stand-renew his request for McComiskie's statement which the Administra- tive Law Judge again denied. Thereafter, McComiskie was recalled by the General Counsel as a rebuttal witness. She testified again on direct and cross-examination. However, during her second appearance on the witness stand in this case, Respondent made no request for pro- duction of pretrial statements. It is well established that the proper time to request production of pretrial statements by witnesses for the General Counsel is at the close of direct examination so that the statements may be used for cross- examination.5 We therefore find that the Administra- tive Law Judge's ruling was correct. 3. The record shows that employee Meuli ap- peared as Respondent's witness at the hearing held amended; American Life and Accident Insurance Company of Kentucky, 123 NLRB 529, 530 (1959); "M" System, Inc, et al., 129 NLRB 527 (1960), Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 186 NLRB 1035 (1970) 4 Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C A. 3, 1951). 5 Walsh-Lumpkin Wholesale Drug Company, 129 NLRB 294 (1960); Ra- Rich Manufacturing Company, 121 NLRB 700, 701 (1958). 436 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD on August 27, 1974, and that briefs were timely filed with the Administrative Law Judge by both the General Counsel and Respondent on September 27. Thereafter, Respondent on October 21 untimely filed with the Administrative Law Judge a supplemental brief enclosing an affidavit of Meuli which chal- lenged as "untrue" a statement contained in the General Counsel's brief. The General Counsel moved to strike from the record Respondent's supplemental brief for the following reasons : The supplemental brief was untimely filed and no request was made for an extension of time to file said brief. Respondent had a full opportunity to examine Meuli at the hearing and did not contend that it was in any way precluded at the hearing from adducing the proposed evidence. Although the Administrative Law Judge by inad- vertence did not rule on the foregoing, we agree with the General Counsel that the affidavit cannot be accepted as part of the record and that the Adminis- trative Law Judge did not err in not considering said affidavit. 4. At the close of the hearing, Respondent renewed its motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Respondent's business is too small to affect interstate commerce and that McComiskie resigned and hence was not discharged in violation of the Act. The Administrative Law Judge reserved ruling on the motion "subject to [his] reading of the completed record" and then stated that his decision would "constitute [his] ruling on the motion." Although the Administrative Law Judge did not in his Decision specifically rule on the motion as such, it is clear from his assertion of jurisdiction and finding of violations of the Act that his Decision is tantamount to a denial of Respondent's motion to dismiss the complaint. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge as modified below and hereby orders that Respondent, Army Aviation Center Federal Credit Union, Fort Rucker, Alabama, its officers, agents , successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, as modified herein: 1. Substitute the following paragraph for para- graph 2(a) of the Administrative Law Judge's recommended Order: "(a) Offer Michel P. McComiskie immediate reinstatement to her former job or, if that job no i Respondent filed two prehearing motions. The first motion, a generalized request for the production of all data in the possession of the longer exists, to a substantially equivalent job, without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges, and make her whole for any loss of earnings or other employee benefits in the manner set forth in the portion of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision entitled `Remedy'." 2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the Administrative Law Judge. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT question you about your efforts to organize or obtain improved working condi- tions. WE WILL NOT threaten you because of such efforts. WE WILL NOT discharge or take other action against you because you have engaged in such efforts. WE WILL NOT interfere in any other manner with your lawful right to engage in organizational activities or in collective bargaining, or to refrain from such activities. WE WILL offer Michel P. McComiskie her old job or, if that job no longer exists, a substantially equivalent job. WE WILL also pay her for any loss of earnings or other employee benefits resulting from her discharge. ARMY AVIATION CENTER FEDERAL CREDIT UNION DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ARNOLD ORDMAN, Administrative Law Judge: Pursuant to an unfair labor practice charge filed by Michel P. McComiskie on April 5, 1974, complaint issued on May 28, 1974, alleging that Respondent, Army Aviation Center Federal Credit Union, by interrogating and threatening its employees concerning their protected concerted and/or union activities violated Section 8(aXl) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and further violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by discharging Michel P. McComiskie because of her participation in protected concerted activities. Respondent denies the commission of unfair labor practices. Hearing was conducted in Fort Rucker, Alabama, on August 27, 1974.1 At the conclusion of the hearing at which evidence was presented by General Counsel and by Board relating to the case, was denied under authorities , cited in General Counsel's opposition to the motion. Both the motion and the opposition are ARMY AVIATION CENTER Respondent, the parties waived oral argument and there- after submitted written briefs which were received on September 30, 1974, and have been duly considered. Upon the entire record and upon my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 1. JURISDICTION The complaint alleged that Respondent is a federally chartered credit union with its principal office in Fort Rucker, Alabama, where it is engaged in the savings and loan business; that Respondent during the preceding year, a representative period, made loans to its members in excess of $5 million in total amount, and derived payments therefrom in excess of $50,000 directly from members located outside the State of Alabama; that during the same period Respondent made investments valued in excess of $250,000 through financial lending institutions located outside the State of Alabama; and that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. In its answer to the complaint Respondent admitted that it is a federally chartered credit union located in Fort Rucker, Alabama, and is engaged in the savings and loan business. As to the financial data, however, Respondent pleaded that it neither admitted nor denied the relevant allegations. In its motion to dismiss (fn. 1 supra), Respondent challenged the accuracy of these allegations and asked for dismissal of the complaint, inter alia, on the ground that it is not engaged in interstate commerce and that its business is so small as not to affect interstate commerce. In preliminary discussions following the open- ing of the hearing, Respondent admitted the accuracy of the jurisdictional data alleged in the complaint but reserved its challenge to the Board's assertion of jurisdic- tion. In its brief, submitted following the close of the hearing, Respondent makes no reference to this issue. Based on the financial data alleged in the complaint and admitted at the hearing I find, on well-settled authority, that Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and that assertion of jurisdiction in the instant case is warranted. East Division, Federal Credit Union, 193 NLRB 682 (1971); Lansing Automakers Federal Credit Union, 150 NLRB 1122 (1965); Brand Airways Federal Credit Union, 189 NLRB 282 (1971). II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background Michel P. McComiskie began work for Respondent on August 23, 1973, after an initial preemployment interview with Tom Carter, Respondent' s manager. From that date until her admitted discharge on March 27, 1974, McComi- skie worked in Respondent's Collection Department under contained in the record herein. That ruling was reaffirmed at the hearing. The second motion, also part of the record herein , prayed for dismissal of the proceeding for certain jurisdictional and substantive reasons. That motion was denied at the outset of the hearing on the ground that it raised issues which could and should be appropriately resolved by the presentation 437 the immediate supervision of Ray Blair, Respondent's loan officer. Both Carter and Blair are admittedly supervisors. McComiskie was one of nine employees in Respondent's employ. In addition to her regular duties in the Collection Department, she also filled in on occasion as assistant teller and as general office receptionist. The first several months of McComiskie's employment were uneventful. In an employee evaluation form filled out by Tom Carter on September 10, 1973, her work perfor- mance was rated in average or better than average categories in the numerous aspects of work performance set forth in the evaluation form.2 Carter did note on the form that bluntness was a weak point in McComiskie's performance. This shortcoming was mentioned again in January 1974 when Carter discussed with McComiskie several complaints he said he had received about her poor attitude in dealing with employees and credit union members. According to McComiskie, Carter was unable to define the complaints with particularity and finally told her he thought the complaints arose because she "had a Northern accent and spoke very fast." Carter reassured her, however, that her work was excellent .3 Ray Blair for his part testified that when McComiskie began her employment with Respondent she was "real good." However, he further testified, her performance later became inadequate in several respects. Set forth hereunder are McComiskie's activities with respect to her fellow employees and resultant conferences with Tom Carter and with Respondent's Personnel Committee. B. The Employee Petition; Meetings With Blair and Carter From the beginning of her employment with Respond- ent, McComiskie engaged in numerous discussions with her fellow employees. A principal subject matter of these discussions concerned complaints about working condi- tions including such matters as employees being shifted from job to job, the lack of a pay raise policy, and the futility of bringing individual complaints to Manager Tom Carter. These discussions culminated at a party conducted in the home of employee Christine Roberts on March 5, 1974, attended by McComiskie and a few other employees. McComiskie suggested that their problems might be resolved if all the employees subscribed to a petition requesting that Tom Carter consider suggestions from employees as to pay raise policy. The suggestion was adopted. That night McComiskie drafted a petition reciting in substance that Carter consider their suggestions as to a pay raise policy and that he reply to the petition within 2 weeks. McComiskie typed up the petition the following morning, March 6, and all the employees affixed their of evidence. 2 Carter directed that McComiskie rate herself on courtesy. She did so 3 Carter was not questioned, and did not testify, concerning this conversation. I credit McComiskie's uncontradicted account of this conversation 438 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD signatures.4 Upon obtaining all the signatures McComiskie, accom- panied by fellow employee Dayna Meuli, went to Ray Blair's office and asked him to sign the petition. Blair, after reading the petition and agreeing that all the employees had signed, responded, "Are you kidding? I don't want to be associated with this petition or with you." McComiskie then took the petition and left the office. Meuli remained. McComiskie whose work station was directly outside the office heard Blair tell Meuli that she would get into a lot of trouble if she signed the petition. Christine Roberts, who was also in the immediate area, testified that Blair told Meuli the petition was the wrong thing to do and that the thing to do was to talk to Carter. As McComiskie and Roberts both testified, Meuli then came out of Blair's office and scratched her signature off the petition. Thereupon McComiskie tore up the petition because of the prior agreement among the employees that it would not be presented unless all the employees signed.5 Blair admitted that he told Carter about the petition. On March 8, 2 days later, Carter summoned McComiskie into his office and accused her of stirring up trouble among the employees. McComiskie denied stirring up trouble. In the ensuing conversation McComiskie recounted the dissatis- factions of the employees. Carter responded that the employees were not dissatisfied and could bring their complaints to him. When McComiskie persisted that the employees were dissatisfied with working conditions, Carter told her that there would be no changes and that he did not care what she or the other employees thought. The conversation concluded with Carter's admonition to McComiskie that "if you don't stop stirring up trouble and try to organize the employees, you know what's going to happen to you." Carter testified as to his relationships and conversations with McComiskie. His testimony, however, was not altogether consistent. Initially, he disclaimed knowledge of the circulation of any petition and denied that he had ever discussed union organization or collective bargaining with McComiskie. He further testified that he had never interfered with her right to discuss matters with her fellow employees. However, shortly thereafter he qualified this statement by acknowledging that he had advised McComi- skie early in March that "if she had a problem, she should bring it and talk to me about it. That I didn't appreciate her going out among the other employees and discussing it." On cross-examination, moreover, Carter recalled that he had discussed the petition with McComiskie but that he could not remember what was said. When confronted with an earlier affidavit he had executed, Carter acknowledged that the discussion had to do with salary and wage scale and that he had asked her about circulating the petition. Carter also, in his testimony, reiterated his basic position that employees should bring their complaints about employment conditions to him and not discuss such complaints with fellow employees. 4 The findings in this and the preceding paragraph are based on the credited testimony of McComiskie corroborated in substantial part by other employee witnesses 5 t credit the testimony of McComiskie and Roberts as to these events. Under all the circumstances including the circumstance that McComiskie's testimony was straightforward and squares with other facts of record whereas Carter's testimony was vacillating, inconsistent, and reluctant, I credit the testimony of McComiskie. C. Meetings With the Personnel Committee Disturbed by Carter's hostile reaction to her presentation of employee grievances McComiskie decided to present the matter to Respondent's board of directors. To support her position she enlisted the aid of her husband and the husband of a fellow employee to draft an employee questionnaire as to their feelings about their jobs, their desires for improvements, and related matters. Only two of the employees were willing to fill out the questionnaire. Nevertheless, McComiskie persisted in her efforts to see the board of directors. At the suggestion of its chairman, Bernie Sheppard, the matter was referred to Respondent's personnel committee consisting of Bernie Sheppard, Adrian Cunningham, and Dr. Mark Hoffman. Cunning- ham and Hoffman were also on the board of directors and held, respectively, the offices of first vice president and treasurer in Respondent's enterprise. Beginning March 13, 1974, the personnel committee held a series of meetings to deal with the matters raised by McComiskie. Minutes of those meetings, recorded by Lucy Watson, secretary to Sheppard, while not wholly verbatim or complete, were nonetheless, by common agreement, substantially accurate as to what transpired. The testimony of those present at the meeting confirms the accuracy of the minutes which were introduced into evidence. In sum, it was established and I find that at a meeting on March 14, 1974, McComiskie told the committee of the employees' concern about a wage-salary policy, the obtaining of signatures to the petition which she had drafted and her subsequent interviews with Blair and Carter. Sheppard then asked McComiskie whether she was trying to organize a labor organization and she replied in the negative. A discussion then ensued about the nature of the employee complaints and McComiskie's efforts in that regard. The committee also inquired as to the degree of employee support she had in her efforts. A further meeting with McComiskie occurred on March 25. At this meeting McComiskie said she was not appearing as a representative of the employees but rather in a personal capacity complaining of harassment by Carter because he directed her not to discuss anything with anyone but him. McComiskie explained further that she felt her "rights as a civilian employee were being violated [b ]ecause [she] undertook with the other employees of the Credit Union to form a collective bargaining unit." Further talk ensued about organizing in the course of which Sheppard again asked McComiskie what she thought about organizing as a labor union. McComiskie replied again that she thought the employees should not affiliate with a labor organization. Blair confirmed that the petition was presented to him, that he refused to sign, and that he recommended that, instead, Carter be approached personally ARMY AVIATION CENTER The personnel committee did not confine itself to meetings with McComiskie. On March 13, 1974, it met with employee Dayna Meuli and on March 26 with employee Nancy Meredith and with employee Bobbie Talley. In each instance questions were directed to the named employees about the morale of the working force, about working conditions and about McComiskie. Inform- ation was also sought by the committee as to whether McComiskie was trying to organize a union. D. The March 18 Interview Between Carter and McComiskie Carter was aware of the personnel committee meetings. While they were going on Carter summoned McComiskie to his office. The occasion was on March 18. According to McComiskie, Carter opened the conversation with the remark, "What am I going to do with you?" In an obvious reference to their last interview, Carter said, "I was so mad at you the last time I almost fired you." After a further discussion about pay raise plans and other employee benefits, Carter asked McComiskie whether she was "(f)inished causing trouble." Carter then added, "Well, I hope you're finished. If nothing else happens, I'm not going to fire you." His parting comment to McComiskie was not to try to organize the employees, not to discuss with the employees either her problems or complaints or theirs, and to bring any complaints she might have to him.6 E. The Discharge of McComiskie on March 27 McComiskie was undeterred by Carter's remarks. Imme- diately following the March 18 interview with Carter, McComiskie asked for another meeting with the personnel committee. On the morning of March 27, 1974, according to McComiskie, she was again called into Carter's office. Carter handed her a paycheck and said, "I feel it's in the best interest of the credit union that you no longer work here." When McComiskie asked whether the personnel committee knew about this , Carter answered that it did. Carter told McComiskie that her discharge was effective forthwith. McComiskie had her final meeting with the personnel committee the following morning, March 28. She was told that the hiring and firing of employees was up to the manager and that she had no recourse to anyone else in Respondent's organization. Carter testified that the reason for McComiskie's termination was her "poor attitude" to members, to himself, and to other employees and that there was no other reason for the termination . Carter cited in this regard a number of derelictions on McComiskie's part. These asserted derelictions will be discussed in the succeeding section of this Decision. 6 1 credit the testimony of McComiskie as to the March 18 conversation. For reasons already stated (subsec. B, supra) I find Carter's disclaimer in this regard unpersuasive. F. Analysis and Conclusions 439 1. The protected nature of McComiskie's activities Section 7 of the Act guarantees employees the right, inter alia, to self-organization and to engage in other concerted activities for mutual aid and protection. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, the only statutory provision alleged in this complaint to have been violated, proscribes employer interference with the exercise of that right. Terms and conditions of employment are indisputably a matter for which the statutory umbrella of concerted activities for mutual aid and protection was designed. On this record there can be no doubt that the employees were concerned about a number of the terms and conditions of their employment, most particularly the lack of an explicit wage policy for the employees. To this end, as shown, considerable discussion took place among the employees and, finally, a petition was drafted to Manager Tom Carter by Michel McComiskie. As shown by undisputed evidence this petition was signed by all the employees. A more explicit and obvious example of concerted activity for mutual aid and protection in the statutory sense could scarcely be demonstrated. Floyd Epperson, et at, .202 NLRB 23, 27 (1973); Ronald Moran Cadillac, 202 NLRB 1017 (1973). Blair and Carter, as their own testimony reveals, were plainly aware of the concerted nature and objectives of this activity as were the members of the personnel committee, a fact revealed by the questions they addressed to McComi- skie and other employees who appeared before them. To be sure, the enthusiasm of some of McComiskie's fellow employees quickly palled when Blair and Carter manifest- ed their displeasure with the petition the employees had signed. The statements made before the committee by the employees reflected their discomfort. However, this under- standable change of position does not negate the protected and concerted motivation which gave rise to the petition in the first instance. Nor is this conclusion weakened by the fact that McComiskie protested in her second appearance before the personnel committee that she was not appearing as a representative of the employees but in a personal capacity complaining of harassment by Carter. As McCo- miskie, unsophisticated in the parlance of labor law, explained at that very meeting her personal complaint was that her rights were being violated because "she undertook with the other employees of the Credit Union to form a collective bargaining unit." The questions posed by the committee members revealed that they, too, were under no illusion. Their concern was with the "morale" of the employees generally and with the critical issue whether a labor organization was being sought. I find and conclude that McComiskie and her fellow employees were engaged in protected concerted activity and that Respondent was fully apprised of what that activity was. DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2. Threats and interrogation in violation of Section 8(axl) On the basis of the evidence in the record, previously summarized herein, and consistent with the allegations of paragraph 6 of the complaint, I find and conclude that Ray Blair, an admitted supervisor, threatened employee Dayna Meuli with unspecified reprisals because she engaged in protected concerted activities. I predicate this finding and conclusion on the testimony of McComiskie and Christine Roberts to the effect that Blair told Meuli she would get into a lot of trouble if she signed the petition and that the petition was the wrong thing to do. As already noted, Meuli complied with Blair's ultimatum with understand- able alacrity by scratching her name off the petition. I find and conclude, further, on the basis of record evidence and consistent with the allegations of paragraph 7(a) of the complaint that Respondent's manager, Tom Carter, on March 8, 1974, interrogated Michel McComi- skie about her activities and employee complaints, and threatened her that if she didn't stop stirring up trouble and trying to organize the employees she knew what would happen to her. I further find and conclude, as alleged in paragraph 7(b) of the complaint, that on March 18 Carter told McComiskie that she had been causing trouble, that she was to cease trying to organize the employees or to discuss problems and complaints with them and that if nothing else happened, he would not fire her. The threat implicit in this last remark was not even veiled. Finally, I find and conclude, consistent with the allegations of paragraph 10 of the complaint, that the members of Respondent's personnel committee interrogat- ed employees concerning their protected activities. Re- spondent in its answer to the complaint denied that the members of the personnel committee, Bernie Sheppard, Adrian Cunningham, and Mark Hoffman, were on Respondent's board of directors or were supervisors. However, each testified that he was on the personnel committee and that he was on the board of directors. Each also testified that he was a major officer in Respondent's hierarchy. In these circumstances Respondent was plainly answerable for the conduct here under scrutiny taken in the discharge of their official functions. On the basis of the evidence already summarized, I conclude and find that the committee interrogated employees Michel McComiskie, Dayna Meuli, Nancy Meredith, and Bobbie Talley as to whether efforts were being made to organize a union, as to the extent of employee sympathy and activity in regard to changes in working conditions and as to the scope and impact of McComiskie's efforts in those respects. I conclude and find, in sum, that the interrogation and threats here found to have been engaged in by Respond- ent's officers and agents constituted unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(axl) of the Act. 3. The discharge of Michel McComiskie As narrated previously, Carter's statement to McComi- skie on March 8 that if she didn't stop stirring up trouble and trying to organize the employees she knew what would r A violation of Sec. 8(aX3) of the Act is not alleged in this regard. Hence, it is unnecessary to deal with those arguments and authorities happen to her, and his further statement on March 18, in a similar context, that if nothing else happened he would not fire her came to fruition on March 27, 1974. McComiskie did not cease her efforts and on March 27 Carter admittedly terminated her employment. Absent a counter- vailing showing, this evidence alone would support a finding that the discharge of McComiskie was an unlawful interference with her right under Section 7 of the Act to engage in protected concerted activities and was a violation of Section 8(axl).7 Respondent denies, however, that the discharge of McComiskie was an unfair labor practice. Instead, Re- spondent argues the discharge was attributable to a number of asserted derelictions on her part manifesting her poor attitude; namely, her bluntness, her excessive use of the office telephone for personal calls, her improper handling of customers and of an applicant for employ- ment, and her abuse of office routine with respect to disclosing the minutes of a board of directors meeting. The defenses do not withstand scrutiny. As against the numerous shortcomings now proffered to justify the termination of McComiskie, Carter testified on cross- examination that the reason for the termination was her poor attitude and that there was no other reason for the termination. In addition, Carter conceded that, attitude aside, McComiskie's conduct as compared to other employees was good. Nor was Carter's testimony wholly consistent even with regard to McComiskie's poor attitude. At one point in his testimony Carter stated that McComi- skie's attitude steadily declined from September 1973 until the day he terminated her employment. A few minutes later, Carter alluded to the fact that he had made an entry of bluntness in McComiskie's evaluation in September as a major weakness and that this shortcoming got neither better nor worse thereafter. Moreover, as already noted, Carter told McComiskie in January 1974 that complaints, which he could not specifically identify, about her bluntness were probably attributable to her northern accent and rapid speech, and that her work was excellent. Absent is any explanation as to why McComiskie's attitude, the sole reason assigned for the discharge, suddenly became intolerable on March 27, 1974. The substantiation of the other derelictions attributed to McComiskie is equally lacking in persuasiveness. In respect to excessive use of the telephone for personal calls, McComiskie, whose testimony was candid in all respects even where it could operate to her detriment, stated that she could not recall any occasion where this asserted abuse was called to her attention. Moreover, she credibly denied having used the telephone excessively for personal calls, and further testified that in her occasional stints of duty as office receptionist she had frequently transferred personal calls not only to Blair and Carter but also to other employees. In an attempt to buttress the claim that McComiskie's poor attitude had an adverse impact upon Respondent's business, Respondent's witnesses cited the fact that they had received numerous complaints from outsiders in that regard. However, there was a complete inability to identify advanced in Respondent's brief in support of its position that an 8(aX3) violation has not been established. ARMY AVIATION CENTER 441 the complaints with any specificity. Evidence was adduced that a Colonel Frederick had withdrawn a large account and that this was attributable to McComiskie's handling of Colonel Frederick. Cross-examination revealed, however, that the account in question was a loan account, usually delinquent in payments, and that the reason for paying up the loan was unknown . So far as appears, Colonel Frederick made no complaints to Respondent and it was admitted that the attribution of fault to McComiskie in that regard was sheer speculation. Two other incidents were adduced to demonstrate McComiskie's unacceptable work performance. The first incident had to do with McComiskie's suggestion to an applicant for employment that she seek employment elsewhere. The applicant had a degree in computer sciences and a bachelor's degree in business. So far as appears, there was no position available at the time in Respondent's operation calling for a person with the qualifications the applicant had. The second incident had to do with a situation occurring in February 1973 when McComiskie was preparing a copy of minutes of a meeting of Respondent's board of directors to give to a member of Respondent who wanted the information. Notwithstanding that the members of the Respondent were its owners, Carter stated, albeit somewhat equivocally, that minutes of board meetings were secret even to Respondent's members. Mark Hoffman, a member of the board of directors, testified to the contrary, that minutes of board meetings were not secret information as to members. This incident, too, which occurred in February is not a tenable explana- tion for the termination of an employee who was told more than a month later that if she stopped stirring up trouble and trying to organize the employees she would not be fired. In sum, I am persuaded that the real reason for the discharge of McComiskie was her persistent activity in behalf of herself and her fellow employees and her refusal to cease that activity despite threats of discharge. The several reasons assigned for the discharge , some of them adduced for the first time at the instant hearing, are demonstrably pretextual in character and belated efforts to justify unlawful action. I am satisfied, and find and conclude, that a preponder- ance of the evidence substantiates the allegation of paragraph 9 of the complaint that Respondent discharged McComiskie because of her participation in protected concerted activities and her refusal to cease that activity. Such a discharge is violative of Section 8(axl) of the Act. Floyd Epperson, et at, supra. IN. REMEDY To effectuate the policies of the Act and to enforce its mandate, I will direct Respondent to cease and desist from the several unfair labor practices herein found. Because of the scope of those unfair labor practices ranging from 6 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. interrogation and threats to actual discharge , a propensity and proclivity to violate employees' statutory rights generally are demonstrated and a broad order forbidding Respondent from trenching in any manner upon such statutory rights is warranted. Appropriate affirmative action will also be directed. I shall order that, in order to restore the status quo ante, Respondent offer reinstatement to Michel P . McComiskie in the manner customarily prescribed by the Board and with no prejudice to any rights, benefits or privileges she formerly enjoyed. I shall further direct that she be made whole for lost earnings, computed on a quarterly basis with interest at 6 percent as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950) and in Isis Plumbing & Heating Company, 138 NLRB 716 (1962). The usual provisions regarding record keeping, reporting requirements and notice-posting will also be included. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I shall recommend the following Order. ORDER8 Respondent Army Aviation Center Federal Credit Union, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1.. Cease and desist from: (a) Coercively interrogating employees concerning their participation in concerted activities protected under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. (b) Threatening employees with reprisals for engaging in such activities. (c) Discharging, or otherwise adversely affecting the terms and conditions of employment of, employees for engaging in such activities. (d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, as amended. 2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended: (a) Offer Michel P. McComiskie immediate reinstate- ment to tier former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent job, without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges and make her whole for lost earnings in the manner set forth in the portion of this Decision entitled "Remedy." (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to compute the amount of lost earnings due Michel P. McComiskie under the terms of this recommend- ed Order. (c) Post at its place of business in Fort Rucker, Alabama, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 9 Copies of said notice on forms provided by the Regional Director 9 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 442 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD for Region 15, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of Respondent, shall be posted by Respond- ent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including places where notices to employees are customari- ly posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 15, in writing, within 20 days of the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply herewith.