Didde-Glaser, Inc.

DIDDE-GLASER, INC. Didde-Glaser, Inc. and District Lodge No. 70, International Association of Machinists and Aero- space Workers, AFL-CIO. Case 17-CA-7326 November 23, 1977 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS PENELLO AND MURPHY On June 6, 1977, Administrative Law Judge David G. Heilbrun issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, General Counsel filed excep- tions and a supporting brief, and Respondent filed an answering brief in response to the General Counsel's exceptions and in support of the Adminis- trative Law Judge's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions2 of the Administrative Law Judge, only to the extent consistent herewith. The General Counsel has excepted, inter alia, to the Administrative Law Judge's failure to find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by Industrial Relations Manager McClenney's interro- gation of employee Krueger. The General Counsel has also excepted to the Administrative Law Judge's failure to provide a remedy for certain other 8(a)(1) violations which he found. We find merit in these exceptions. The record indicates that on April 8, 1976, while giving employee Krueger a written warning of insubordination, McClenney asked Krueger why a handful of employees, including Krueger, felt they needed an outside organization to help them. The Administrative Law Judge found this statement to be only a "gratuitous allusion to unwelcome association with outsiders." We disagree. We find that coercion is implicit in the questioning because it implies that the Employer does not look with favor upon employees who engage in such activities. This in turn discourages employees from engaging in protected activity guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. Accordingly, we conclude that Respondent, by questioning Krueger in the manner described, violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. I The General Counsel has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dr, Wall Products. 233 NLRB No. 115 We agree with the Administrative Law Judge's findings that Respondent, by its fabrication manager, Neinstadt, violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act by engaging in the following coercive conduct: Just prior to the Board election in July 1976 Neinstadt spoke privately with employee Brown and told him that "after the union was over with, the people who were pushing the Union wouldn't be around." Neinstadt also asked Brown how he intended to vote in the upcoming election and, according to Brown's uncontroverted testimony, requested that Brown talk to his fellow employees and "convince them that the Union was bad for the company and so forth and persuade them to vote no." Also, shortly before the election, Neinstadt asked employee Ernst if he had decided how he was going to vote. Finally, in February 1976, during the early stages in the organizing campaign, Neinstadt repeatedly asked employee O'Brien whether he knew of rumored union activities, whether he knew how many cards had been distributed, and whether he knew exactly who was for the Union. While finding the foregoing unlawful under Section 8(a)(1), the Administrative Law Judge nevertheless concluded that no remedial order is required since these activities were, in his opinion, isolated. We cannot agree. The above instances of interrogation and threats are not so isolated and insignificant as to preclude the need for a remedial order. To the contrary, we regard such conduct as serious violations of the Act and view it as an attempt by Respondent to coerce and restrain its employees from exercising rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. Accordingly, we shall issue our usual order with respect to the violations.3 THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, we shall order that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. The Board, upon the basis of the foregoing facts and the entire record, makes the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Didde-Glaser, Inc., is, and at all times material herein has been, an employer engaged in commerce Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950). enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. 2 We disavow the Administrative Law Judge's subjective charactenza- tion of the witnesses in the second from the last paragraph of his Decision. as totally irrelevant, gratuitous, and inappropnate. 3 Groendske Transport, Inc., 211 NLRB 921,922 (1974). 765 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the mean- ing of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Didde-Glaser, Inc., Emporia, Kansas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Threatening its employees for engaging in union activities or interrogating them about those activities. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its place of business in Emporia, Kansas, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 4 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 17, after being duly signed by Respondent's representa- tive, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 17, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dismissed to the extent that it alleges violations not established by the General Counsel. I In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing at which all sides had the chance to present evidence and arguments, the National Labor Relations Board has found that we have violated the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and has ordered us to post this notice and carry out its terms. The National Labor Relations Act gives you, as an employee, these rights: To engage in self-organization To form, join, help or be helped by unions To bargain collectively through a repre- sentative of your own choice To act together with other employees to bargain collectively or for mutual aid or protection, and If you wish, not do any of these things. WE WILL NOT threaten our employees for engaging in union activities or interrogate them about those activities. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act. All our employees are free to become or remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining, members of any labor organization. DIDDE-GLASER, INC. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE DAVID G. HEILBRUN, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard at Emporia, Kansas, on March 28, 29, and 30, 1977, based on a complaint issued November 26, 1976, alleging that Didde-Glaser, Inc., herein called Respondent, violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by interrogating and threatening employees with respect to activities supportive of District Lodge No. 70, International Associa- tion of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, by demoting and later construc- tively discharging Dean Rhudy and by also discharging Earl Bess, because of the refusal by these named individu- als to participate in, and cooperate with, the commission of unfair labor practices, and by suspending employee John Chris Krueger for 3 days without pay and constructively discharging employee Orval Van Hardesty because of their activities on behalf of the Union. 766 DIDDE-GLASER, INC. Upon the entire record,' my observation of the witnesses, and consideration of briefs filed by General Counsel and Respondent, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT AND RESULTANT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW About July 1975 certain employees of the fabrication department formulated a list of questions respecting operational and personnel matters. 2 These were taken by Leadman Richard Krueger to Fabrication Department General Foreman Earl Bess "for going through the chain of command." Bess promptly gave them to Fabrication Department Manager Dean Rhudy, who in turn took them to Manufacturing Division Manager George Markowitz within the next couple of days. Rhudy testified that Markowitz was too busy at the time to do more than place them in his desk, offering also to "get together later on and to go over these questions." About a month later Rhudy was called into Markowitz' office for the purpose of discussing the questions. In this process Markowitz specifically assigned Rhudy to devise answers for certain questions and contact other managerial personnel on the balance. This was done over the next 30 days and when answers were assembled, Rhudy delivered them to Richard Krueger as a package response.3 Related to this back- ground is the fact that a comparable list of questions had earlier arisen from the assembly department and that before final completion of this asking-answering cycle, Richard Krueger, accompanied by another rank-and-file employee, had a meeting with Company Owner Carl Didde respecting their inquiries. In late January 1976 machine operator (now technical advisor) John Chris Krueger (brother of Richard) contact- ed John Overman, a Wichita-based district representative for the Union.4 Organizing efforts ensued, with Chris Krueger actively involved in passing authorization cards, planning employee meetings, and displaying union insignia on his personal vehicle. Machine operator Orval Van Hardesty also functioned actively in this regard, and served as union observer in a representation election conducted July 28. On April 1, Milie Wade was elevated from executive vice president in training to become chief operating officer. Wade had previously identified poor internal communica- tions as a corporate problem and commissioned a consult- ing firm to recommend solutions. From this, over 100 meetings were held during the February-April period between Wade and small groups of employees, during which he sought to sound out the rank-and-file on their concerns and suggestions. Concurrently, management I Certain inadvertent errors in the transcript are hereby noted and corrected. 2 Respondent corporation is engaged in manufacture of printing equipment at a plant located in Emporia, Kansas. and annually purchases materials valued in excess of S50,000 directly from sources located outside Kansas. I find that Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Sec. 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec. 2(5). 3 Markowitz' contrary testimony that he had commissioned Rhudy and other subordinates to develop an immediate response upon first receiving the list from Rhudy is discredited. I am satisfied that Rhudy more correctly described actual happenings, and that on this point Markowitz was manifesting faulty memory plus the inclination to avoid blame. having learned of the Union's organizing drive shortly after inception, a sequence of near-weekly supervisory meetings was held during which officials orchestrated resistance to the Union's campaign. This resistance, coordinated chiefly by then Industrial Relations Manager Dan McClenney, had two main thrusts. The first was assertedly to avoid commission of any unfair labor practices, and the second was to capitalize on opportunities for supervisors to speak permissibly with employees about the advantages of not selecting the Union as a collective-bargaining representa- tive. 5 Rhudy testified that at a supervisory meeting in July, attended and ostensibly run by Markowitz and newly hired Personnel Division Manager Feegeebee Parish, the assem- bled supervisors were told to "go out in the shop and find out who was for the Union and who was against the Union even to the point to ask how they were going to vote, yes or no, a direct question to the people." Markowitz generally denied ever giving such instructions. Bess testified to attending approximately 30 or more supervisory meetings between February and July at which supervisors were "kept posted" by McClenney and told to "try to find out or to talk down the Union and to talk up the Company and encourage the employees to stay on the Company's side." He further recalled urgings "to engage employees in a conversation and try to address the Company's points, the good points, to talk down the Union and, if we could, feel an employee out as to how he felt about the Union, whether he was for or against it." In this regard McClen- ney's teaching was to "approach employees on a one-to- one basis whenever possible, the reason for that being if I as a supervisor said something that possibly wasn't right that it could be denied at a later date if the employee brought it up." Rhudy and Bess dutifully obeyed, in a manner respectively described as never actually asking an employee "point-blank whether he would vote for or against a union," and never "specifically approach[ing] the subject about the Union" but instead trying to stimulate the subject from the employee in order to "explain the Company's standpoint" and why "we thought the Union would harm them." Related to this is Rhudy's testimony that he instructed his own subordinate supervisors in nondeviation from the do's and don'ts. In context of a fiscal year beginning April I and Wade's newly assumed executive role, Respondent planned major reorganization in a manner generally described in Wade's 4-page memorandum entitled "Improvement Projects" sent May 13 to division managers. This document confirmed the present reassignment of Rhudy to a technical training position, contemplated abolishment of the fabrication department's general foreman position, and, among other 4 All dates and named months hereafter are in 1976, unless indicated otherwise. 5 Five years earlier the Union had conducted an organizing effort which, as here, was unsuccessful. In the process of supervisory meetings much discussion was keyed to a written list of"Do's and Don'ts" and "What You as a Supervisor can/cannot Do." to which all supervisors were expected to adhere. Another tactic was to extraordinarily channel all personnel matters, particularly discipline, through McClenney for an assessment of lawfulness. Additionally, as the election neared, supervisors were importuned to "forecast" the sentiments of employees within their own organizational unit, and "guesstimate" individual votes for purposes of mock tallying. 767 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD things, alluded to the "outside organizing attempt" which Wade felt would be defeated upon informed employees being rallied to the Company's nonunion philosophy. Rhudy's job change stemmed from meeting with Marko- witz on April 22, and being abruptly advised of imminent replacement with the only alternative (other than resigna- tion) that of phasing into direction of a newly created machine operator training section. Rhudy testified that Markowitz explained the change as being based on Respondent's current "fight" with the Union, in regard to which Rhudy's "cooperation" was below expectations. Rhudy tacitly accepted the change and promptly phased out of the fabrication department manager position into one titled "training coordinator." Subsequently, employee action notices recorded this change, and an assigned salary range that would have caused Rhudy a weekly reduction of over $100 in gross wages. Officially the change was effective August 15, although a 13-week salary hold was allowed both as temporary income preservation and to avoid prejudice of any ultimate severance pay calculation. As the 13-week period neared its end Rhudy determined he no longer wanted to perform training work, nor to accept the imminent salary cut. He informed his supervisor, Employment Manager Leslie Neff, of this decision and signed as a voluntary termination on November 10. As matters were unfolding with Rhudy, Bess had been informed by Markowitz in early May of his position being abolished and reassignment (without cut in pay) as machine shop foreman II. In this position he came to be supervised by Byron Neinstadt, newly appointed fabrica- tion department manager and the same individual who until recently had been subordinate to Bess as a foreman of the machine shop's third shift. In September, Neinstadt took Bess to the office of Parish, where he was unex- plainedly informed of termination. Markowitz, who per- sonally had no role in the decision, testified to knowing of "complete discontent" within the manufacturing division because Bess habitually failed to discipline employees in regard to general plant rules and specifically as to the "Start/Stop and Wash Up Time" policy. As these dynamics resulted in cessation of employment by Rhudy and Bess, a separate set of facts surrounds other allegations of the complaint. On April 7, Chris Krueger had informed Bess (his supervisor at the time) that he (Krueger) would likely not have his toolbox at work the following day in protest of job classification policies. This occurred and Krueger was, shortly after so appearing the morning of April 8, brought to McClenney's office by Bess with Markowitz also present. Krueger testified that in a 20- minute conversation he was given a written warning of insubordination midst much comment by McClenney of why such "a handful of employees, including myself . . . felt we needed an outside organization to help us" and which, if such activities were to continue, would result in being called "back up for it, that I would be terminated." McClenney testified that he had expressly prefaced the 1- 1/4-hour discussion by saying there was no connection between "this particular disciplinary situation" and the organizing campaign. He added that any further remarks about the union campaign were "probably" introduced by 6 1 find contrary to Van Hardesty's recollection that the document as Krueger. Predictably, Bess partially corroborates Krueger while Markowitz' testimony supports McClenney. I discre- dit Krueger to the extent that he recalled McClenney threatening him with termination. I am convinced that in this regard Krueger has confused discussion of his outside activities with management's immediate distaste for the reckless caper of that morning. Bess, present for all but several minutes of what he estimated was an hour long meeting, did not recall the utterance. The probabilities do not run toward this having been said and I credit McClenney's express denial. I find as fact only that McClenney gratuitously alluded to unwelcome association with outsiders. In further relation to what allegations are contained in paragraph 5 of the complaint, former employee Fred Brown testified that shortly before the representation election Neinstadt spoke privately with him saying that people who were pushing the Union wouldn't be around when it was over and asked that Brown talk with other employees to urge that they vote no. Former employee Robert Ernst testified that several days before the election Neinstadt spoke with him alone in the shop, asking if he had decided how he was going to vote and whether any deceit injected by company officials as to how authoriza- tion cards were handled would be enough to cause Ernst himself to sign a card. Finally, employee Jimmy O'Brien testified that in February, when Neinstadt was still a shift supervisor, the latter repeatedly asked O'Brien whether he knew of rumored union activities, whether he knew how many cards had been distributed, and whether he knew exactly who was for the Union. In July employee Robert Rumold began displaying symptoms of nervousness while at work. Through Lead- man Charlie Young, Rumold requested discussion with the first-shift foreman, Leroy Phillips. In this, Rumold told of being harassed by Chris Krueger and Van Hardesty with name calling of "brown nose" and "kiss ass." Rumold found this disturbed him both at work and home to the point that he obtained medical treatment. Phillips visited the Rumold home to acquire more details on the matter, solicited Rumold's signed statement on the point, and presented the situation to Parish. On the strength of this, Neinstadt disciplined Krueger with a 3-day suspension while Phillips administered a verbal warning to Van Hardesty. Both these actions occurred September 22. Krueger's was essentially uneventful, however, much more unfolded for Van Hardesty. He reacted angrily to the discipline, demanding to know the informant's identity. Phillips declined to reveal this and upon continuing the discussion in Parish's office, this official did the same. It was soon necessary to summon Lloyd (Bud) Utley, Respondent's acting chief executive for that day. Utley appeared, took over Parish's office in an attempt to calm the persons involved, and excused Phillips in order to converse privately with Van Hardesty. The employee angrily told of seemingly having three choices presented by Phillips. These were to sign the employee action notice (embodying a "verbal warning") 6 as an "admission of guilt," not sign it and be fired, or leave employment with severance pay. Van Hardesty elaborated presented to him at the time did contain the typed phrase "verbal warning." 768 DIDDE-GLASER, INC. with strongly held belief that during all his years with Respondent he "never harassed a soul," and stated that Phillips had threatened him with "terrible job recommen- dations" should he be fired. Utley told him to return that Friday afternoon after discussing matters with his family and reaching a personal decision. 7 On Thursday, Van Hardesty telephoned Utley to verify that severance pay would be granted, and ultimately appeared with his wife on Friday afternoon at which time he signed a resignation and related separation papers. In accordance with earlier assurance by Utley, he was provided at the time an estimate of monthly retirement benefits should he instead remain working until at least his 10-year vesting date of May 1977. What has been seen here is an employer relentlessly determined to prevail against another specter of unioniza- tion. In the process it was willing, as an adjunct to both normal operational throb and fundamental changes in organization, management, and capital investment, to fully gird for the expected balloting climax. Reaction to word of a union drive was swift, thorough, and expensive. Supervi- sors were carefully coached to play an effectively watchful role, an administrator expressly functioned to coordinate the overall defense, clearly allowable persuasions were employed (this refers to Wade's three deliberately spaced speeches to assembled employees prior to the election), and legal advice was never more than a telephone call away. Cannily, Respondent also announced the soothing news that upon the Union's defeat no recriminations would ensue. While such conduct may be argued as only deceptively superficial, it is at least a point of departure for decision. As to the "supervisory discharge" issue of the case, General Counsel's complaint is woefully unsupported in fact and law. In this area the key question is whether employees were coerced by events affecting their supervi- sors and whether this derivatively subjected them to the vice of Section 8(a)(1). This may take several forms and has done so from the time of originating doctrine in such cases as Better Monkey Grip Company, 115 NLRB 1170 (1956), in which the violation was for discharging a supervisor upon his giving needful testimony under the Act. Here the more classic instance of supposed refusal to commit unfair labor practices is the theory, and in this regard General Counsel I am satisfied that his failure to recall this was based on poor observation while distraught, and confidently accept Utley's (and Phillips') express testimony that the phrasing was there. 7 Parish had previously imposed a 2-day suspension because of Van Hardesty's provocatively menacing response to Phillips' discipline. Septem- ber 22 was a Wednesday. I There is no bar to employer tactics designed to stay nonunion, where these are permissibly structured and implemented. Here a main theme was information gathenng, from which further steps could be planned. Standing alone there is no wrongdoing in deliberate tabulation of how votes may fall, even though this is done during intramanagement councils that columnize employee names and have as an outgrowth specific plans to convert voters. A tangential aspect of the case, one involving Markowitz' claimed statement to the effect that "union pushers" would ultimately not be around. I resolve by finding it made only as a statistical prediction of attritional employment patterns after the trauma of a union election defeat, and otherwise completely immaterial to the case since not made to any employee nor constituting a showing of animus that might tie in to other issues. 9 Rhudy's demotion and ultimate separation (constructive only in the sense of otherwise facing reduced income) was based on Respondent's dissatisfaction with his willingness to feed an appetite for strategy input (the relies most significantly on Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 223 NLRB 592 (1976). The defect is that this case bears only slight resemblance to Russell Stover. Initially I find that Rhudy and Bess are both poor sources from whom to learn the essence of what supervisors were taught over the course of many meetings on the subject of resisting the Union. Rhudy was vague and unspecific as to key articulations, while Bess testified only to what must be taken as interpreted impression of words spoken and not actual exhortation. Neither of them had any enthusiasm for the project nor did they appear sensitive to nuances of what was being told. I discredit each in this regard and find that management spokesmen demanded only that supervisors be deftly partisan, and constantly strive to assess voting inclinations among the rank-and-file. Specifically, I find that here both McClenney and Markowitz are the reliable witnesses, and each spoke only in implementation of Respondent's do's and don'ts. 8 Reflecting their own personalities and inclinations neither Rhudy nor Bess ever remotely approached any employee impermissibly and the uncooperativeness voiced against Rhudy must be seen only as that of failing to produce feedback. The Russell Stover case was characterized essentially by the demand of an employer that one supervisor of a small operating unit persistently insinuate himself into daily activities of his subordinates, and so vex him as to eventually inform employees he was actually engaged in surveillance of their union activities. That is not the case here and Respondent's assertion that Western Sample Book and Printing Co., 209 NLRB 384 (1974), controls is well taken. In truth, National Industrial Constructors, Inc., 225 NLRB 672 (1976), in which recommended dismissal of Case 17-CA-6760 was adopted, is much closer on the facts. I therefore find that essentials of a "supervisory dis- charge" case are not present, as the persons were not in fact directed to commit unfair labor practices and thus this could not (as Respondent has argued vigorously from the time of its motion to dismiss made during hearing) have been left undone for that reason. In fact, I summarily find that both discharges were for good cause in a sense that would allow Respondent to prevail on this branch of the case even had the foundational conclusions been contrary.9 Chris Krueger's suspension was not discriminatory as alleged. A general aura of animus is lacking, and Nein- essence of complaint pars. 6 read in connection with 8), with claimed laggardness in responding to employees (embracing recorded reference to three despised "unionization attempts" originating from his department). and with poor planning ability (here concerned mostly with a new paint operation). I suspect that Markowitz may not have been above shunting blame toward Rhudy where not fully deserved, however, this is but a normal indicia of intracorporate maneuvering. Bess' situation is more transparent. General Counsel argues his case as though he were not a supervisor within the meaning of the Act. In this regard length of service is largely immaterial, as is the astonishingly naive characterization of General Counsel's brief that his ascension to general foreman in the year 1968 after hire as a rank-and- file in 1959 was for "exemplary" employment and "high caliber" perfor- mance. In truth Bess was a hail fellow to his subordinates who (with other general foremen) was caught up in Wade's merciless systems and methods type of modern business operation, and ultimately left so starkly anachron- istic that the triumphant Neinstadt simply eased him out. The modified appraisal of Van Hardesty, so greatly relied on by General Counsel for sinister significance, is but a reflection of Neinstadt's harder supervisorial line. Again the realities of managerial employment is shown, and the purposes of congressional exclusion of supervisors from most NLRA purposes clearly seen. 769 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD stadt's discipline of him was restrainedly related to the depth of effect on Rumold. Commonality of rough shop talk may be granted; it is still within an employer's province to deal severely with dispiriting harangue of one employee by another. To urge as General Counsel does that this chief union instigator, still employed 16 months after the time he so first functioned, tolerated through a deliberately insubordinate act, and since promoted with a pay increase, was nonetheless discriminated against is unpersuasive to a point some might label as sheer folly. The Van Hardesty matter is even less meritorious. Here a seasoned union activist and election observer was, with one exception,l unjarred by any aspect of the entire organizing campaign or its immediate aftermath. While obviously no love was lost between Phillips and Van Hardesty, the former still possessed ample justification, as to which I have no basis to impose substitutional judgment, for rendering some discipline against Van Hardesty. As with Krueger, Rumold had specifically testified to certain continual name calling by Van Hardesty, which Respon- dent is entitled to squelch at the source with the objective of maintaining general orderliness to its manufacturing operations. From that it was Van Hardesty all the way, escalating the issuance of verbal warning to a near-frenzied state in which he convinced himself that resignation was the only honorable out. I expressly find that Van Hardesty was completely in error to understand he faced "perma- nent probation," a notion foreign to Respondent's person- nel policies, credibly denied by all other participants and obviously arising only as a figment of Van Hardesty's imagination during this agitated period. The truth of Van Hardesty's fanciful "three choices" is found in Utley's credible description of having emphasized that regardless of whether the employee action notice was acknowledged with signature, the underlying discipline would be "sup- port[ed and sustain[ed]" as having been openly given. It is unnecessary that I comment on the subtle emotional and intrafamily realities of the eventful September 22-24 span in Van Hardesty's life. His heart was in a new career and, from what is known, his wife meekly endorsed the petulant act of quitting. Suffice it to know that the astute Utley vainly attempted to bathe Van Hardesty in reason, and for purposes of this case to preserve for him the very employment General Counsel alleges was constructively taken away. Again as with Krueger there is no hint of any contrary influence relating to the long-concluded union activities of early 1976, and I am left genuinely puzzled why such an assertion was even pressed. Respecting allegations of an independent 8(aXl) viola- tion, I largely find for General Counsel on the factual plane." Based on stated credibility findings, McClenney is 1o Around August 1. Van Hardesty's leadman obliquely conceded, but simultaneously retracted as devoid of expressed intent, a remark tattled to by Rumold that unless Van Hardesty got his "head out of my butt over this union, I was going to get fired." This was not alleged to be a violation and considering its source I find no reason to treat it further. 1i The original charge in this matter, alleging in "catchall" fashion the commission of specified "and other acts" in violation of Sec. 8(aX I), was filed and served October 6. This charge was first amended October 28 and second amended November 22, in the latter case raising for the first time explicit issues relating to Rhudy and Bess. I find that remarks of McClenney believed to have departed from his opening disclaimer of seeking to relate the April 8 meeting to a contemporaneous organizing campaign, and instead slipped into animated remarks seemingly critical of Krueger for associating with the outside organization. So the theoretical ingredients are present to argue that Respondent's agent impermissibly connected up the holding of a disciplinary conference to an employee's legitimate protected activities, and thus injected implicit job coercion into the episode. Considering that this was barest verbalism, and, even if as Bess testified repeated several times, the essence of the discussion was Krueger's deliberate insubordination which could only have the effect of goading superiors into exasperated dismay. I see no reason here, nor as viewed in connection with the uncontradicted Neinstadt utterances, to take remedial action. Neinstadt did not testify and description of his remarks are entitled to face value. Should these inquiries of a person newly promoted to higher supervisory office and hyped with his employer's tightly knit plan of combating unionism warrant the ordinary remedial machinery of the Board? I view them, and McClenney's of April 8, as isolated, inconsequential mouthings of picayune concern with respect to the industrial realities of this 500-person work force and not of a character that warrants further action. Overall, the relationship of these utterances to the long settled organizing campaign and, indeed, basic rights under Section 7 of the Act is so tenuously insignificant as to compel an ultimate conclusion that General Counsel's entire complaint was improvidently drawn. In the last analysis this is a case of distinct personalities, each displaying individual uniqueness of style and purpose even in the narrow range of life that constitutes one's employment. Wade, the suave executive; Markowitz, the entrenched manager; McClenney, the bluff functionary; Parish, the exasperable official hired into the final throes of a major organizing campaign; Neinstadt, the ambitiously loyal employer's man; 12 Rhudy, the gently rigid technician who time may have passed by; Bess, lovable to a fault; Chris Krueger, feisty, but compromised in the end; and Van Hardesty, aspiring cosmetologist hopefully afield where the absence of manufacturing-type pressures will not again tax his rather easily distorted perceptions of truth. Two other individuals deserve comment. Rumold was a most pathetic figure and it would be well only to say that his fragile sensitivities were regrettably exploited by both sides. Finally: Utley, on whom I rely so much for acceptable facts relative to paragraph 10 of the complaint was a witness of the finest impression from standpoints of demeanor, consistency, clearmindedness and perspicacious recall. That is the story; this was the cast. The Board would be wise to leave matters where they lie. uttered April 8 are within the Act's 10(b) period (as for the same reason is the allegation addressing Rhudy's demotion on April 22). since the utterance, if it be an actionable threat, is closely related to matters raised in the original charge. I therefore reject that portion of Respondent's defense which relies on the limitation period of Sec. 10(b). See Benner Glass Co., 209 NLRB 686 (1974); N.L.R.B. v. Gaynor News Company, Inc., 197 F.2d 719 (C.A. 2. 1952), affd. 347 U.S. 17. LZ Characterization of Parish and Neinstadt, neither of whom testified, are deductible from the record as a whole. 770 DIDDE-GLASER, INC. Accordingly, I render as conclusions of law that Respondent has not interrogated and threatened its employees in any manner warranting remedial action by the Board, has not violated Section 8(a)(1) in any manner with respect to Rhudy or Bess, nor has it violated Section 8(a)(3) as alleged. [Recommended Order for dismissal omitted from publi- cation.] 771