Beatrice Food Co.

80 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD John Sexton & Co., a Division of Beatrice Food Co. and John W. Knuth. Case 13-CA-11989 March 25, 1975 SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND PENELLO On October 2, 1974, the National Labor Relations Board issued a Decision and Order Remanding Pro- ceeding to the Administrative Law Judge' in "the above-entitled proceeding in which it directed him to decide the case on its merits. On October 25, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Thomas S. Ricci issued the attached Supplemental Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to the Ad- ministrative Law Judge's Supplemental Decision and a supporting brief, General Counsel filed cross-excep- tions and a supporting brief, and Respondent filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Supplemental Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order as modi- fied herein.' - The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging John Knuth because he persisted in filing grievances under Respondent's collective-bargaining agreement with Local 705 of the International Brother- hood of Teamsters. We agree. The General Counsel contends, however, that Knuth was also discharged because, in refusing to drive on November 17 with a suspended driver's license, he was attempting to implement a contract right,' and that his discharge for this reason constituted a separate vio- 1 213 NLRB No. 111. 2 The Administrative Law Judge inadvertently omitted the word "Supp- plemental" from the title of his Decision. 3 The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge It is the Board's established policy not to over- rule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings 4 Respondent's request for oral argument is hereby denied, since the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues and the posi- tions of the parties 5 According to General Counsel, Knuth's refusal to drive constituted an attempt to enforce the right of drivers to refuse to drive where driving would be "in violation of any applicable statute" as provided for in art 14 of the collective-bargaining agreement then in effect. lation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The General Coun- sel'scontention is premised upon a finding being made that Knuth was discharged at least in part for refusing to drive a truck on November 17. The Administrative Law Judge expressly rejected this finding as pretextual. Rather, the Administrative Law Judge found that Knuth was discharged solely because he filed many grievances against Respondent, a finding which the record supports and with which we are in complete agreement. However, even if Knuth had been discharged for refusing to drive, as Respondent claims, we neverthe- less would be compelled to find that, considering Re- spondent's knowledge that Knuth's refusal stemmed from the apparent suspension of his license, his dis- charge would have been in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. For, under article 14 of the existing collec- tive-bargaining agreement, Knuth had an arguable right to refuse to drive with a suspended license and, thus, his assertion of that right constituted a grievance within the framework of the contract that affected the rights of all the unit employees. The Board has consist- ently held that Section 7 of the Act protects employees attempts, such as Knuth's, to implement the terms of bargaining agreements irrespective of whether the as- serted contract claims are ultimately found meritorious and regardless of whether the employees expressly refer to applicable contracts in support of their actions or, indeed, are even aware of the existence of such agreements.' Consequently, were we to find that Re- spondent's asserted reason for Knuth's dismissal was not pretextual, we nonetheless, under the circum- stances here, would find his discharge unlawful. However, wholly apart from the discharge issue, we find that the Respondent did violate Section 8(a)(l) when it told Knuth, albeit falsely, that he was being discharged for refusing to accept a driving assignment on November 17. As we have found above, Knuth, in refusing to drive without a valid license in assertion of a contract right, was protected by the Act. Thus, Re- spondent's conduct of merely telling him that his refusal to drive was the reason for his being fired had the tendency to restrain and coerce Knuth and his fellow employees, who subsequently would learn of his discharge and the stated cause therefor, from thence- forth exercising their rights under the Act to seek im- plementation of contract provisions governing their employment with Respondent. Accordingly, we find an 8(a)(1) violation based on this statement alone and 6 Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 NLRB 1295 (1966), enfd. 388 F.2d 495 (C A. 2, 1967); and C& IAir Conditioning, Inc., McKeon Construction, 193 NLRB 911 (1971), enforcement denied 486 F.2d 977 (C.A. 9. 1973). 7 Although the complaint does not specifically allege that Respondent independently violated the Act by this statement, we find that this matter is encompassed in the broader allegations that Knuth was discharged for trying to enforce the contract and that, thus, the Respondent was fully 217 NLRB No. 12 JOHN SEXTON & CO. we shall order that Respondent cease and desist from engaging in such conduct. AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Renumber paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Administrative Law Judge's Conclusions of Law as paragraphs 2 and 3, respectively, and insert the following paragraph as paragraph 1: 1. By threatening to discharge employees for assert- ing or attempting to assert their rights under a collec- tive-bargaining agreement governing the terms and conditions of their employment, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act." ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re- lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified below, and hereby orders that Respondent, John Sexton & Co., a Division of Beatrice Food Co., Elk Grove Village, Il- linois, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Or- der, as so modified: 1. Insert the following paragraph as paragraph 1(a) of the recommended Order and reletter the subsequent paragraphs accordingly: "'(a) Threatening employees that they will be dis- charged for asserting or attempting to assert their rights under a collective-bargaining agreement govern- ing, the terms or conditions of their employment." 2. Substitute the attached notice for the Administra- tive Law Judge's notice. apprised of its existence as an issue In any event, we find that it was fully litigated by the parties and that, therefore, no denial of due process is involved, APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board having found, after a trial, that we violated the Federal law by dis- charging an employee because he engaged in union activities: WE WILL NOT threaten to discharge our em- ployees for asserting or attempting to assert their rights under a collective-bargaining agreement governing the terms or conditions of their employ- ment. 81 WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate against any employee because he files grievances against us, through his union. WE WILL NOT In any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, except to the extent that those rights may be affected by an agreement re- quiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. WE WILL offer to John Knuth immediate and full reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position without prejudice to his senior- ity and other rights and privileges and make him whole for any loss of earnings he may, have suf- fered as a result of the discrimination against him. JOHN SEXTON & Co, A DIVISION OF BEATRICE FOOD CO DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE THOMAS A.-Ricci, Administrative Law Judge: After a full hearing on the merits of the substantive issue of the complaint in this proceeding, the complaint was dismissed in its entirety on September 11, 1973. The dismissal rested exclusively on the ground that the discharge of John Knuth, alleged to have constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, had been processed through final binding arbitration by the parties pursuant to their collective-bargaining agreement. On Octo- ber 2, 1974, the Board remanded the case for decision based upon the record evidence, oral and documentary, as received in the National Labor Relations Board hearing. Accordingly, again upon the record as a whole and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following findings and conclu- sions. A. The Question in Brief Knuth, a truckdnver, worked for the Respondent from September 1969 through November 1972. During that period he initiated a number of grievances against the Company through Teamster Local 705, his collective-bargaining agent, with which the Respondnet has had written contracts for many years. Knuth won certain major grievances, the Re- spondent paying him substantial sums in consequence, and lost others. He was dismissed summarily 4 days after submit- ting still another grievance. The complaint alleges he was released in retaliation for his repetitive insistence upon exac- tion of contractually guaranteed employment rights through the Union, and that the act of discharge violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3). Denying any illegal motive in its conduct, the Respondent contends,, in affirmative defense, that he was dismissed because on November 17, 1974, he literally refused to drive on a regularly and properly scheduled delivery route. There are questions of credibility presented, and there are conflicting inferences urged by the parties. The following 82 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD facts, however, are established beyond question. On Thurs- day, November 16, while Knuth was on the road with his truck, a state trooper delivered to his home a written docu- ment reading: FINAL NOTICE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE INVESTIGATION SECTION 5301 W. Lexington Ave. Chicago, Ill. 60644 Date November 15, 1972 Name John Knuth Address 4544 S. Knox You are hereby notified to appear at the above address On 11/17 1972 at 1:00 P.M. Officer Dahcin Star No. 142 ES-9-5616 379 5600 Hearing Notice of an Order of Suspension has already been for- warded to you, together with instructions to surrender the items listed below. You have failed to surrender them. Unless they are received at the above address on or before the appearance date shown, it will be necessary for you to bring them personally. [X] DRIVERS LICENSES K530 47941222 [ ] CHAUFFEURS LICENSE [X] LICENSE PLATES [ ] REGISTRATION CARD Failure or refusal to surrender the items listed above is a violation of Section 6-301 or 8-123 of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Law. The following morning, at 6 a.m., Knuth presented himself at the company yard, where the drivers were gathered as usual and where the day's schedule of runs was posted. He spoke to Bob Baldino, the supervisor in charge, and to Joe D'Amato, the Teamster 705 steward on the job, himself also a driver. Knuth's name was on the driver list for that day. In the face of Baldino's insistence that he take the truck out and make the deliveries, he refused. His refusal was reported during the day to James Mank, the dispatcher and Baldino's superior, who arrived in the afternoon, and to Norman Porges, the general manager. During that same day Knuth reported to the office of the Secretary of State in keeping with the order of suspension detailed in the written notice he had received the previous Thursday. He was told- the notice had been issued in error, that his driving license was not suspended, and that he need not surrender either his driver's license or his license plates. Knuth was not scheduled to work on Saturday, November 18. He was scheduled the following week and worked 5 con- secutive days. He was scheduled off Saturday, November 25, and that day received a telegraphic message from the Com- pany, telephoned to him at home, advising that "as of today November 27, John Knuth is fired." No one advised Knuth of this intended action before that moment, and no one, on behalf of the Company, advised any agent of the Union before Knuth arrived at the truck depot the following Monday, November 27_ Another objective and absolute fact of record is that on Thursday, November 30, Knuth returned to the office of the Secretary of State and was given a letter addressed "To Whom It May Concern," certifying that he was in full com- pliance with all legal driving requirements. The officer in charge even added his telephone -number to the document-a ready convenience for anyone who might want to verify the statement. Knuth returned to the Company that evening, but his request for reinstatement was rejected. B. Credibility Knuth's testimony is that when he went to the truck depot on November 17 with the notice saying it was improper for him to drive, he showed it to Supervisor Baldino, saying "I couldn't drive," and when the supervisor said "nothing he could do . . . I had to take the drive," he, Knuth, showed it to Union Steward D'Amato, again saying, "I received a sus- pension . . . I don't think I want to jeopardize my job." Both Baldino and D'Amato told him that he nevertheless had to drive. Baldino is no longer with the Respondent and was not called to testify; D'Amato gave shifting testimony. At one point he said Knuth did not tell him "that he could not legally drive his truck." The steward also recalled, however, that Knuth told him "Something about going to ,the Secretary of State and to have his license plates." D'Amato also said the driver "showed me a piece of paper and I didn't read it all, I know there was a date on it and he had to be there at one o'clock." He then also admitted he put his glasses on in order to read the notice, but was familiar only with "the top of it," he did not bother to read it all. I do not credit this man's testimony against that of Knuth. Knuth's testimony was cor- roborated by that of Baltazar, another driver. The night before, after finding the suspension notice at his home, Knuth called the dispatcher, Marik, to alert him to the fact he would not be able to drive the next day because his license had been suspended. According to Knuth's testimony, Marik told him he was greatly in need of men and would try to utilize Knuth in some other way. Again, Marik's version is different; he testified Knuth said only "that he had some business to take care of at the Secretary of State the next day," and asked for a driving assignment that would take him close to that office. Marik said Knuth did not tell him why he had to report to the Secretary of State. Marik was not present in the morning, when Knuth ar- nved with his suspension notice and talked to Baldino and D'Amato. But this is as convenient a place as any to consider the dispatcher's credibility also. He and Baldino reported everything that same day to Porges, the general manager. Porges testified, and he said all he knew was what the two lower supervisors told him. He said he definitely decided to discharge the man that very day, after being told that Knuth had refused to drive, and after the subordinates had told him "that he [Knuth] had some business at the Secretary of State's office. . . " I am asked to believe that not one of these three JOHN SEXTON & CO. meni Marik, D'Amato, and Porges, professional truckdriv- ers all, knowing that Knuth refused to drive, and that he had to report to the office of the Secretary of State-asked, either of him or of one another, why it was that the driver had to go to that office, that not one of them knew or suspected that the problem involved the driver's driving license. I am asked to believe that Knuth, with the written revocation of license inhis hands, would talk to BaIdino, Marik, and D'Amato about it, would ask for time off-without driving-to do something about it, but would say nothing to any of them about the very substance of the official notification. Apart from the inherent implausibility of the driver hold- ing back on the heart of his reason for refusing the driving assignment that day, there is more in the testimony casting a very serious doubt upon the credibility of the Respondent's witnesses. After straightening out the State's record concern- ing his driving license that Friday, Knuth telephoned the dispatcher in the evening, and advised him, according to his testimony, that he was now in the clear, that he would be back to work regularly on Monday, 'and that he was available for assignment even the'next day, Saturday, if there were work to be done. Marik, as a witness, said he received many calls every evening from drivers, to ask about the next day's schedule, to ask such questions as "What do you have me on," or "What time," and things of that kind. His version of Knuth's call that night is that the man said he had been out on the truck of another driver, Baltazar, during that day, and not another word. Marik insisted Knuth did not tell him why he called, and he did not bother to ask him. In short, Marik attributes an irrational and pointless act to the driver. Marik even said he had learned earlier in the day, from Baltazar, that Knuth had accompanied him earlier. What are the chances Knuth, in trouble with his employer after refusing a direct order to drive in the morning, relieved now of the worry about losing his license, and no doubt happy to go about his normal work, would call the dispatcher-his boss-to tell him nothing? More important, what are the chances Marik would say nothing to him, now that the deci- sion had already been made with finality-according to Porges-to discharge the man? Why did not Marik at least tell him not to report on Monday? On the face of his tes- timony, Marik cannot be believed. There is also a direct conflict in testimony between Knuth and Porges. After obtaining the exculpating note from the Secretary of State's office on Thursday, November 30, Knuth returned to the plant, and, as he testified, showed it to Porges and D'Amato. As Knuth testified: "Mr. Porges read it and he handed it back to me and he said that it didn't mean nothing to him and if I thought it meant something to me I should take it down to my grievance proceeding coming up and as far as he was concerned I was fired." According to Porges: "John [Knuth] related the incidents, he had a piece of white paper in his hand. Conversation was basically that I could not drive that day, I shouldn't have been fired. Joe D'Amato supported him. I can recall Joe saying give him one more chance." Porges added he refused the request and told Knuth to "go through grievance." It is too facile a story to refer so passingly to Knuth's very formal document from the Financial Responsibility Depart- ment of the Secretary of State, as a "piece of paper." When Knuth told the boss of the "incidents" which explained why 83 he "could not drive that day," he must have been emphasiz- ing the erroneous suspension of his driver's license. There could be no other reason for him to have that "piece of paper" in his hands. I do not believe D'Amato's, Marik's, and Porges' stories. I fmd that the company managers knew, from the first day, that Knuth's driver's license had been sus- pended and they refused to recognize that fact as sufficient reason for him, not to drive until the matter was resolved. The company representatives also knew, of course, that it would have been improper if not unlawful for him to drive, to say nothing of the danger that liability insurance might not be effective while he drove under such a disability. And the Respondent also knew, of necessity, of the provision in its contract with Teamsters Local 705 that effectively said Knuth was not to drive that day. i There is a certain persuasiveness in the assertion set out in the Respondent's brief that no employer carrying on a truck- ing business would discharge a man whose license was sus- pended and who refused to drive for that reason. As this record does show the Respondent was aware of such restraint upon Knuth, I also fmd that whatever its true motivation may have been, the one it stated in Knuth's discharge notice, and that it reasserted at the hearing, is not the true reason for his discharge. A reason there had to be, not only in the mind of management for dismissing him, but also in the thinking of the Union, through its steward, D'Amato, in failing to support Knuth's position on the morning of November 17 and in advising him, to drive a truck in violation of both applicable law and the Union's own contract. And it is the theory of complaint that the true reason for the discharge is the fact Knuth filed too many grievances through the Union to suit the Company. Indeed, there is even a hint in the record that he filed too many for the Union's comfort. C. Protected Union Activity 1. Knuth started as a 10-percent driver, at the bottom of the seniority list; for several months he worked only 2 or 3 days a week. Because of his subordinate status, the Respond- ent did not contribute to the Union's health and welfare fund on his behalf. Knuth protested, to the supervisors and to both the Local 705 stewards-D'Amato and Ramacotti. Knuth read the union contract as giving him these fringe benefits, too. The Company paid. 2. In December 1971, Knuth was suspended allegedly for having two accidents in 1 year. He filed a grievance claiming the Company was wrong. The grievance went to arbitration, he won, and was paid about $700 in compensation. 3. In June 1972 Knuth was suspended again because of a $1 shortage in his travel expense account. He filed another grievance, again there was arbitration pursuant to the con- tract, and again the Union prevailed. This time he was re- 1 Art. 14 in the collective-bargaining agreement then in effect contains the following provision- Dangerous Conditions Section 4 Under no circumstances will an Em- ployee be required or assigned to engage in any activity involving dangerous conditions of work or danger to person or property or in violation of any applicable statute or court order, or in violation of a government regulation relating to safety of person or equipment. The term "dangerous condition of work" does not relate to the type of cargo which is hauled or handled 84 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD stored to good standard and paid about $1,500 in loss of wages. 4. About a month later Knuth complained to dispatcher Marik that his pay was between $9 and $12 short; he read the union contract as calling for full pay while a man was waiting assignment in the warehouse, but the Company thought he was only entitled to 15 minutes' pay, unless a supervisor, in writing, authorized more. Knuth then brought the question to the union steward's attention, but, by that time, the 5-day contract period allowed for filing grievances had passed, and the matter died. 5. There was once still another dispute between Knuth and management involving a money shortage. He was suspended in discipline, and lost "a week or two in pay." The record shows no details about this except that he filed a grievance and that it was resolved in favor of the Company. 6. Finally, Knuth wrote out another grievance and handed it to Supervisor Gatles, a supervisor, on the morning of Mon- day, November 20, when he returned to work after being cleared a few days earlier by the Secretary of State. It will be recalled he telephoned the dispatcher on the evening of Fri- day, November 17, to say he was available for assignment for the following day. When Knuth arrived at the depot on Mon- day, the schedule of assignment for the previous Saturday was still posted, and it showed that a driver with less seniority than he had been given a run, but not Knuth. As he read the union contract, Knuth should have been given that run in- stead. When he told Ramacotti, the union steward, about this, Ramacotti said "claim the money." Knuth did that. There is no indication as to what was ever done about that complaint. D. Analysis and Conclusions delayed, but instead "Procedure would have it we contact the union offices, the business agent to apprise him of the situa- tion, whenever we suspect a grievance to be filed." With this Porges then had to explain why no one on behalf of the Company spoke to any agent of the Union anyway. He said three calls were made to Heim , the business agent, but "he did not answer our calls." He also said each day of that week he asked Supervisor Gatles had he been able to get in touch with Heim and always the answer was no. And finally , Porges admitted no one even attempted to give notice to the two union stewards-D'Amato and Ramacotti-who appeared everyday at the plant as regular company drivers. The inference that Knuth was discharged because he filed union grievances, and not because of the November 17 inci- dent, is inescapable on this total record . It is an unfair labor practice to discriminate against an employee because he turns to his collective-bargaining agent to enforce his contract rights against the employer. Illinois Ruan Transport Corpora- tion, 165 NLRB 227 (1967). And the Board has held it is not a defense to the complaint that the employee may have been wrong in the grievance complaint he urged against the Com- pany. Mushroom Transportation Co., Inc., 142 NLRB 1150 (1963), reversed on other grounds 330 F .2d 683 (C.A. 3, 1964). This is certainly not the case of a deliberate and habitual troublemaker filing repetitive grievances totally lacking in merit. Knuth turned out to be right in most of his complaints. But he did file many of them. Indeed, considering Teamsters Steward D'Amato's cooperative attitude with the dispatcher's insistence that Knuth drive on November 17 without a license, it seems clear that the Union , too, was tired of the man's grievances and was happy to see him fired. I find, as alleged in the complaint, that the Respondent discharged Knuth because he filed grievances through his Union, and that it thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. The offense of refusing to drive, if offense it was-what with the contract clearly providing he should not drive with a suspended license-occurred on November' 17. Despite Porges' statement that he decided upon the dismissal that very day, he did nothing about it until a week later and told nobody about his asserted decision. Nothing happened in connection with Knuth's work between November 17 and 25 except the fact he filed still another grievance when he claimed pay for Saturday work which he did not perform. To push his discharge action back from November 25 to the day the alleged misconduct took place, Porges gave inconsistent and unconvincing explanations. During the first day of the hearing he said he makes it a practice always to wait 5 days after deciding to discharge a man before doing so. This was purely a self-serving statement and had no objective evidenti- ary value. He also said at this point of his testimony that the union contract required the 5-day delay: ". . . it is specifi- cally written in there there is a 5-day waiting period." But his contract with Local 705, the one which governed Knuth's employment, contains no such provision. Moreover, he did not communicate in any way with any agent of the Union at all.-Recalled by the Respondent to testify in defense a second time the next day, Porges changed his story. Now he said it was not a contractual requirement that disciplinary action be THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE Respondent's activities as set forth herein, occurring in connection with the operations of the Respondent in its com- mercial activities, have a close, intimate, and substantial rela- tion to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. The Respondent must rein- state John Knuth to his former position or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and it must make him whole for any loss of earnings resulting from the discrimination against him, with interest at 6 per- cent. The Respondent must also cease from in any other manner interfering with the statutory self-organizational rights of its employees. JOHN SEXTON & CO. 85 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW It. By discharging John Knuth for filing grievances through his Union, the respondent has engaged in unfair labor prac- tices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. 2. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record , and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER' The Respondent, John Sexton and Co., a Division of Bea- trice Food Co., Elk Grove Village, Illinois, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: It. Cease and desist from: (a) Discharging or in any other manner discriminating against its employees because they file grievances through their Union. (b) In any other manner interfering with , restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the right to self-organi- zation, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec- tuate the policies of the Act: ,(a) Offer to John Knuth immediate and full reinstatement to his former job, or if that job no longer exists, to a substan- tially equivalent position without prejudice to his seniority and other rights and privileges. (b) Make John Knuth whole for any loss of earnings he may have lost by payment to him of a sum of money equal to the amount he would have normally earned as wages from November 25, 1972, to the date of the Respondent's offer to him of full and complete reinstatement, together with interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum, less his net earnings during the aforesaid period. (c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, person- nel records and reports , and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of the Order. (d) Post at its Elk Grove Village, Illinois, place of business, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."3 Copies of said notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 13, after being duly signed by its representatives, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be.maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by it to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 13, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 2 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its bindings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 3 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."